68th Anniversary of the Nuremberg Raid

[DC10RealMan]

Ladies and Gentlemen.

Tomorrow (Friday) will be the 68th anniversary of the disastrous raid on Nuremberg in which RAF Bomber Command lost 108 aircraft. Each aircraft had seven young men on board who were the flower of the youth of Britain and her Commonwealth.

I shall lay some flowers at the memorial garden site at RAF Snaith in Yorkshire, the home of 51 Squadron who lost six aircraft that night out of fifteen sent on the raid and on the card with the flowers will be the words Thank you for my future from an "After the War" kid.

I am reminded of the words of US General George S Patton who said "Do not mourn these men, but just thank God that such men lived" and tomorrow evening I shall raise a glass in their memory.

Tony Fallows
Cheshire

[Daysleeper]

Relative of mine was killed along with his crew on that raid. After all their training it was only their second mission. They are buried in Hannover.

Oddly I spent a fair chunk of my carear flying to and from Nuremburg (at night) and having spent many days there it is a city I have great affection for.

[OwnNav]

Some years ago I had the privilege of being invited by my friend, P/O 'Dick' Starkey, to a 106 Sqn reunion at the Petwood Hotel in Woodhall Spa.

Dick was piloting 'Q' Queenie on the Nuremberg raid and was shot down, Dick survived, five of the crew perished, it was his 22nd and last op.

On the way to the Petwood we stopped by the old RAF Metheringam airfield that Dick had taken off from and as we stood looking down the remains of the runway, I could only wonder at the courage of those young men facing death night after night.

Brave Men

[101history]

101 Sqn, as the part of the 'EW countermeasures' aspect of the raid, launched 26 ABC Lancaster aircraft from Ludford Magna, each with an 8 man crew.

7 aircraft failed to return.

[Wensleydale]

2012 is a year of significant anniversaries:

next month sees the 70th anniversary of the Augsburg Raid;

just had the 30th anniverary of Black Buck;

end of the year sees 50 years since the Cuban Missile Crisis;

perhaps the most significant - 100 years of British military aviation with the RFC formed 100 years ago.

[Dee Conflicting]

Are these events being run by Aviation Heritage Lincolnshire? I believe there are 2 ex-RAF guys working on that project . Looks like they are doing a good job.

[DC10RealMan]

I am sure that the founders of the Aviation Heritage Centre at East Kirkby are aware of the significance of tomorrow nights anniversary as their elder brother who was a Flight Engineer with a Royal Canadian Air Force squadron was killed in the raid.

[Wensleydale]

Aviation Heritage Lincolnshire (AHL) are indeed aware and have a program of events organised - look them up on their web-site (Google is your friend).

(Note - this organisation is not the Aviation Heritage Centre at East Kirkby. AHL coordinates activities of 12 aviation heritage sites around the Lincoln area (including East Kirkby) and promotes these sites to the tourist industry. They are doing a splendid job - one hopes that their lottery finding will be renewed next year).

[waco]

........the night when Jerry got a " A hundred before lunch....".

How those guys went out night after night I will never know.

I remain forever in there debt..........

[teeteringhead]

perhaps the most significant - 100 years of British military aviation with the RFC formed 100 years ago. The RFC is no longer with us - the Central Flying School (also 100 this year) most certainly is!

[Wensleydale]

The RFC is no longer with us - the Central Flying School (also 100 this year) most certainly is!


Not surprising since CFS was part of the RFC........ Point was the anniversary of 100 years of British military aviation. :ugh:

[walter kennedy]

The raid should never have taken place in those clear conditions – Harris demonstrated a callous disregard for the airmen and well deserved being called “butcher Harris”.
It is even worse if you consider the strategy dictated to him by Churchill, this snippet in Wikipaedia about the “dehousing” advised by Lindemann, Churchill's mate:
“Following the Air Ministry (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Ministry) Area bombing directive (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Area_bombing_directive) on 12 February 1942, Lindemann presented in a paper on "Dehousing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dehousing)" to Churchill on 30 March 1942, which calculated the effects of area bombardment (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Area_bombardment) by a massive bomber force of German cities to break the spirit of the people.[15] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_Lindemann,_1st_Viscount_Cherwell#cite_note-14)
His proposal that "bombing must be directed to working class houses. Middle class houses have to much space round them, so are bound to waste bombs" changed accepted conventions of limiting civilian casualties in wartime. "It should be emphasized that the destruction of houses, public utilities, transport and lives, the creation of a refugee problem on an unprecedented scale, and the breakdown of morale both at home and at the battle fronts by fear of extended and intensified bombing, are accepted and intended aims of our bombing policy. They are not by-products of attempts to hit factories."”


I wonder how many, if any, of those brave young RAF men knew of the main aim of their mission? I sincerely doubt that Englishmen of the time would have participated if they had known the truth – at least I hope that they would not have. A wicked waste for both peoples.

[November4]

From Middlebrook and Everitt's book, The Bomber Command War Diaries - 1939 - 1945


30/31 March 1944

Nuremberg

This would normally have been the moon stand-down period for the Main Force, but a raid to the distant target of Nuremberg was planned on the basis of an early forecast that there would be a protective high cloud on the outward route, when the moon would be up, but the target area would be clear for ground-marked bombing. A Met Flight Mosquito carried out a reconnaissance and reported that the protective cloud was unlikely to be present and that there would be cloud over the target, but the raid was not cancelled.

795 aircraft were despatched – 572 Lancasters, 214 Halifaxes and 9 Mosquitoes. The German controller ignored all the diversions and assembled his fighters at 2 radio beacons which happened to be astride the route to Nuremberg. The first fighters appeared just before the bombers reached the Belgian border and a fierce battle in the moonlight lasted for the next hour. 82 bombers were lost on the outward route and near the target. The action was much reduced on the return flight, when most of the German fighters had to land, but 95 bombers were lost in all – 64 Lancasters and 31 Halifaxes, 11.9 per cent of the force despatched. It was the biggest Bomber Command loss of the war.

Most of the returning crews reported that they had bombed Nuremberg but subsequent research showed that approximately 120 aircraft had bombed Schweinfurt, 50 miles north-west of Nuremberg. This mistake was a result of badly forecast winds causing navigational difficulties. 2 Pathfinder aircraft dropped markers at Schweinfurt. Much of the bombing in the Schweinfurt area fell outside the town and only 2 people were killed in that area.

The main raid at Nuremberg was a failure. The city was covered by thick cloud and a fierce cross wind which developed on the final approach to the target caused many Pathfinder aircraft to mark too far to the east. A 10-mile long creep back also developed into the countryside to the north of Nuremberg. Both Pathfinders and Main Force aircraft were under heavy fighter attack throughout the raid. Little damage was caused in Nuremberg; 69 people were killed in the cty and surrounding villages.

[November4]

Amongst those killed that night was Fg Off Cyril Joe Barton (http://www.cwgc.org/search-for-war-dead/casualty/2434910/BARTON,%20CYRIL%20JOE)

The following details are given in the London Gazette of June 23rd 1944 : On the night of March 30th 1944 Flying Officer Barton was captain and pilot of a Halifax Aircraft attacking Nuremburg which was severely damaged by the enemy en route, one engine, the machine gun and the inter- communication system being put out of action. The navigator, air bomber and wireless operator, mis-interpreting a signal left the aircraft by parachute. Although in great peril in a damaged plane and without navigational aid, Flying Officer Barton completed his mission, releasing the bombs on the target himself. Then, despite leakages from the two petrol tanks, for 4 and half hours he flew the crippled plane over heavily defended territory against strong head winds and succeeded in crossing the English coast only 90 miles north of his base, his petrol almost exhausted. Before a suitable landing place could be found the port engine stopped. On the one remaining engine Flying Officer Barton made a valiant attempt to land clear of the houses over which he was flying, but crashed. He lost his life, but the other three members of his crew survived. In gallantly completing his last mission in the face of almost impossible odds this officer displayed unsurpassed courage and devotion to duty.

[Chugalug2]

WK:
The raid should never have taken place in those clear conditions – Harris demonstrated a callous disregard for the airmen and well deserved being called “butcher Harris”.
He may have acquired that nickname, and it did indeed relate to his aircrew rather than those they bombed, but he was respected and admired by them generally, and they resent more than anything the way he was ostracised by not being enobled, alone among his peers, after victory was finally achieved.
Walter, may I respectfully suggest that if you wish to start an argument along the lines of "Was the Allied Bomber Offensive of WWII morally justified?", or some such, that you start a thread of your own. This one is for those who wish to post their respectful thanks for the sacrifice of those who gave their lives in this raid, and for the rest of the 55,573 who did likewise. It would appear that you do not feel the urge to do so. So be it.

[Daysleeper]

Middlebrook's book on Nuremberg is a tour de force and I commend it to any of the assembly here as an excellent work.

My great uncle's aircraft departed in 1 hr 57 minutes from now, overloaded and inexperienced.

[phil9560]

Oh shut up Walter.

[pr00ne]

phil9560,

Oh shut up phil9560.


Walters post makes perfect sense to anyone trying to work out WHY there has never been a campaign medal for Bomber Command and why there was a sense of unease about the whole thing from 1944 onwards.

Harris wasn't enobled because he lacked one thing, the ability to do as he was told by his superiors in the Air Ministry, the Directorate of Bomber operations and the Chief of the Air Staff.

[Wensleydale]

Harris wasn't enobled because he lacked one thing, the ability to do as he was told by his superiors in the Air Ministry, the Directorate of Bomber operations and the Chief of the Air Staff.


And there was me thinking that he had been offered an honour but had refused it because of the lack of recognition for the other members of his Command.....

[Chugalug2]

Proone:
Harris wasn't enobled because he lacked one thing, the ability to do as he was told by his superiors in the Air Ministry, the Directorate of Bomber operations and the Chief of the Air Staff.
Er no, he wasn't ennobled because the Attlee Government thought that it would send the wrong message to our new allies, the Germans, and to our new potential enemies, the Russians. As to his superiors in the Air Ministry, they were as treacherous as Churchill in disowning the man and his Command that had carried out their orders. He carried out their directives to the best of his, and more importantly his aircrews', practical ability.
Sir Stafford Cripps and others may have had their qualms about the effects of large scale Strategic Bombing raids against German cities on the inhabitants but Harris was more concerned with taking the war to Germany, the only British Commander able to do that to any appreciable extent. Of course you can despair at the destruction to historic cities, rage at the loss of life, civilian and military, on both sides. I do too. It's called war, and once you have entered into it you must conduct it to the fullest extent possible until victory is yours, lest it slips from your grasp. It is only because that victory was won following Kursk and D-Day, both arguably only possible because of the "Battle of Germany" that preceded them, that we can indulge in this endless argument. I would prefer though that it had not been started with such heartless abandoning of those who had fought in Bomber Command, not least of all by other senior Air Officers, as you rightly point out. I suppose though, given the treatment of Dowding and Park earlier by them, that we should not really be so surprised.
Having said all that can we please have this argued out elsewhere? This is a thread honouring duty and sacrifice, not the rerunning of WWII.

[Wensleydale]

Bomber Command's crews were denied a separate campaign medal (despite being eligible for theAir Crew Europe Star (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Crew_Europe_Star) and France and Germany Star (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/France_and_Germany_Star)) and, in protest at this establishment snub to his men, Harris refused a peerage, the sole commander-in-chief not made a peer (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peerage) in 1946


Just to put the story straight.... The quote is from Wiki but is in fact correct.

Sorry Chug.... you can't ask not to continue this topic in the same post as giving incorrect information.

W.:=

[phil9560]

Apologies Walter and PrOOne.
PrOOne you are correct.Walter's post does read more clearly without the benefit of 2 bottles of red :O

[Chugalug2]

Wensleydale:
Sorry Chug.... you can't ask not to continue this topic in the same post as giving incorrect information.
Whereas Wikki is correct? The offer of a baronetcy to Harris by Attlee is not, AFAIK, anything more than an allegation, or is there something more substantial than Wikki's or, with all due respect, your word for it? Similarly Harris's alleged refusal, on the grounds that such a title would be meaningless in Africa where he intended to retire, is purely anecdotal. I still believe that the Realpolitik of the time was that our enemies were now our allies and our allies likely to be our enemies. Ennobling the man who had lain waste to Germany needlessly (here I play Devil's Advocate) was hardly going to encourage the Germans to embrace democracy and man the ramparts by our side. Likewise the Soviets would see that as an own goal and exploit it, especially in their own zone of East Germany. I very much doubt if such an offer was ever made, or if it were it was done so in such a manner as to ensure refusal.
The truth is, subject to your rebuttal, that we will never know, and in truth the baubles handed out or otherwise to VSO's in 1946 are of little consequence compared to the big lie that the British (as compared to the US) Bombing Campaign 1939-45 was a failure and did not significantly contribute to Allied Victory. Of course there were mistakes, reverses and, ironically of all, raids that went too well for people's comfort. Of course the prevalent view among the enthusiasts, including Harris, that conventional bombing alone could win a war was proved wrong. But the bombing offensive, both by night and by day, contributed greatly to eventual victory, and in my view was an essential ingredient of it.

[Engines]

Chug,

I'd like to offer an alternative view that might help.

Very few people ever assert that Bomber Command's campaign in WW2, which was marked by quite extraordinary heroism, was 'a failure' or that it 'did not significantly contribute to Alled victory'. If that view is aired, it's an extreme one, and certainly does not have the legs to be a 'big lie'.

The more uncomfortable truth, and the reasons, in my view, that Harris didn't get an honour, are three fold. First, he failed to achieve his stated and promised aim to win the war by the sole means of breaking the German civilian population's will to fight on. Secondly, when it became clear that he was not going to succeed (opinions vary, but around late 43 represents a common view), and his superiors told him to change tactics, he refused point blank. Thirdly, and the source of most of the controversy, is the fact that by mid 1944 the RAF's tactics of area bombing German cities with the aim of killing and demoralising the civilian industrial workforce were becoming profoundly uncomfortable for senior politicians and many military commanders to live with.

You could quite rightly accuse them of moral cowardice, you certainly couldn't ever accuse Harris of wavering in his aims and methods. But by late 1944, Harris's failure to recognise that he was not going to meet his promises, and switch Bomber Command to precision targets led to what some distinguished commentators have called a 'bombing competition' with the USAAF which rained thousands of tons of high explosive on already shattered German cities. The Air Staff wanted it stopped, but Harris refused.

In this context, it's hardly surprising that he was roughly treated by Churchill and the Air Staff he had treated so roughly for most of the war.

I'd like to repeat, though, that none of these arguments undermine the reputation of the aircrew of Bomber Command. They fought an amazingly tough campaign with the best equipment they could get at the time, suffering losses second only to German U-Boat crews. WW2 was a total war, and every part of the British war effort played it's part. Churchill understood that, probably better than anyone else.

I'd suggest that trying now, at this distance, to try to judge the Bomber Command offensive as 'decisive', crucial', 'essential' or whatever other adjective can be found, probably detracts from the rightful remembrance of brave mens' efforts. And the RAF needs to grow a slightly thicker skin when people nowadays offer their views of a 'total war' which contained many thousands of examples of organised cruelty. On all sides.

Best Regards as ever

Engines

[Chugalug2]

Engines thank you for your clear and concise resume of what might be called the perceived view of the Bomber Offensive and of Harris's role in it. It has of course the great advantage to everyone else involved, including Churchill and Portal, of letting them off the hook of any criticism of the offensive and pinning it all on Harris. You say that:
The Air Staff wanted it stopped, but Harris refused.
Let us just think about that. There was one sure way for them to get their way, whatever that might be, and that was to have him replaced. Churchill had no compunction in taking such arbitrary decisions, and broke the reputations of various Generals at a stroke. Yet Harris was allowed to go on seemingly defying Allied Directives and direct orders. Well, that is the conventional wisdom, but I don't buy it. He was very clear about the night bombing campaign. It was of necessity a blunt instrument. Precision targets were the province of the likes of 617 Sqn, and most of theirs were daylight ones anyway. Main Force was a blunt instrument, whose losses meant that its crews had little or no time to finesse their skills before they too fell victim to the grim statistics. Whole cities could be missed (including the subject of this thread) and others or dummy ones bombed in error. He was too good a commander to belittle his crews abilities, but he was realistic enough to know that they did best what he had them go on doing, busting cities. That alone greatly disrupted production and transportation. If the Air Staff were not impressed that suave War Criminal Speer certainly was, for he knew the enormous resources that had to be committed to the Defence of the Reich and thus withheld from the Eastern Front.
You are right of course, there were great misgivings about the offensive, from rival Commands, other Services, and not least from his own Chaplain in Chief. But who would have done different and why was nobody appointed to do so in his place?
This is a story of betrayal. He did not defy his orders, on the contrary he carried them out as best he could. But those who issued those orders created this myth of a rogue commander conducting his own murderous campaign in defiance of his superiors, in order to evade the moral censure that only blossomed with the security and safety of peace. That is a comment on them, from Churchill downwards, rather than on him. It is sad that so many of them were, and are still, of his own Service.

[timex]

Perhaps in direct attrition the Bombing campaign could be called a failure, however the very fact that it continued must mean it had some significance or impact?

The assets that the Axis diverted to deal with Bomber Command must have been significant (withdrawal of Fighter wings and numerous batteries of Air Defence Artillery from Russia which allowed the Russians to commence Offensive Ops). ISTR that an often quoted reason for the continuation of the Bomber offensive was to placate Russia as they were insisting on a Second front which we were hopelessly ill prepared for?

[Chugalug2]

You make a very good point, timex. Not only were Luftwaffe units withheld from the Eastern Front, but from the potential Western one as well. The D-Day troops had much to worry about but could at least be reassured that if they heard or saw an aircraft it would be one of ours. It was a damn close run thing anyway, so factoring in the missing Luftwaffe could have meant the difference between success and failure. Air superiority in the West had been bloodily one beforehand in the skies over Germany by day and night. A difficult concept for a sailor or a Tommy to grasp, meat and drink for any airman though, or so you would think. As to the Eastern Front, Kursk was the vital battle, where quantity had a quality all of its own, as the good Generalissimo said. Much is made of the increase in Nazi war production under round the clock bombing, but the point is that it didn't increase nearly enough, despite dispersal, despite civilian mobilisation, despite the brutal use of slave labour. Another vital effect of the bombing campaign. It is the final outcome that matters, and that was the invasion of the Reich from the East and the West. Both depended on Harris's lags. It was a war winning campaign.

[Clockwork Mouse]

Well put Chugs.

[Engines]

Chug,

I'm very sorry that I might have inadvertently misled you in setting out my views on Harris's 'non ennoblement' without laying out the context. My apologies. Perhaps I can set out my views, at a little length.

For the record. I did not and do not accuse Harris or anyone else of conducting a 'murderous campaign'. I also very much agree that the combined Alled bomber offensives caused huge material losses to the German war economy.

But the records show, at least in my view, that Harris was a wholly determined and convinced proponent of using area bombing of civilian populations to achieve swift and total victory. His views and approach chimed perfectly with three significant developments in late 1941.

The first was the RAF's realisation, prompted by a civil servant's report (the 'Butt' report), that it was unable to prosecute a precision attack against selected German industrial targets. The only targets they could reliably hit were whole cities. Nor could its aircraft defend themselves against enemy fighters by day. These were, to say the least, uncomfortable surprises for the RAF Air Staff (and other nations air forces), as they negated the strategy of 'air power' that had been developed after WW1.

The second was an assessment by the then Chief Scientist (Cherwell) that 'de-housing' the German civilian population (a euphemism to beat most) would cause serious loss of morale and damage to the German war effort. This gave a rationale for the area bombing campaign.

Third, and most importantly, Churchill wanted to hit the Germans as hard as he could in any way he could. In 1941, Bomber Command was the only way that Britain could 'give it them back' after the Blitz. In my view, the man ultimately responsible for the area bombing campaign was Churchill - and given the moral dimension, it had to be.

Britain had to fight. All it could hit back with, without being beaten by the German Army on the ground, was Bomber Command. And what they could do was hit large German cities at night. In 1941 and 1942, that was more than enough.

Harris was the man for the hour - and I'll put it on record that I see him as one of Britain's finest warfighting service commanders. He gave Bomber Command a mission they could do, the rationale for it, and the drive to 'see it through', and he deserves huge credit for that, along with his commanders and aircrew. He was ruthless, focussed and dedicated.

The problems with the area bombing offensive arose (in my view) in mid to late 1943, when the Nuremberg raid showed that hitting cities deep in Germany would involve loss rates higher than even Bomber Command could bear. At the same time, the USAAF was getting into its stride and starting a huge air battle that would cause more damage to the Luftwaffe than any other Allied measure. The planning for the D-Day invasion was also starting. The war was changing.

It's here that Harris's total focus on winning the war by area bombing alone worked against him, and led to the controversy that had rumbled ever since. The records show that he stoutly resisted anything that diverted forces from laying waste to the cities, (including Overlord) and by early to mid 1944 he was seriously out of step with the overall strategy for the war. It's on the record that Portal wanted him to divert effort to precision raids on industrial targets, and Harris threatened to resign if he were made to do that. Portal gave way, but Churchill didn't sack him. Why not?

My view - the Bomber Command effort had been a totemic morale booster for the weary British public, as well as a major contribution to damaging Germany. Sacking Harris in mid 44 would have been a political bombshell, and Churchill made the political judgement that if the Air Staff weren't going to, he did not need to set it off. I think that was the right decision, but it allowed Harris to carry on bombing the cities when he should have moved to industrial targets. By that time, Bomber Command was quite capable of more accurate bombing, and Speer's own diaries record that a lack of Alled focus on key plants allowed him to carry on producing munitions into late 44. (One reason that Bomber Command was a 'blunt instrument' in 1941 and 1942 had been the RAF's lack of effort in developing precision navigation techniques, such as the German 'X-Gerat and 'Knickbein' systems - not just 'necessity').

Harris was not, in my view, 'betrayed'. The way that Churchill (and others) moved away from area bombing in 1944 and onwards was unseemly to say the least, but was high politics. Harris wasn't the first warfighting commander in history to fall foul of politics, and won't be the last. Had he 'bent with the wind' in 44 and obeyed Portal, lives would have been saved and Bomber Command's reputation made less controversial. But he couldn't bend - it wasn't in his nature.

Just once more - these views don't, for one second, mean that I don't accord the highest respect to Bomber Command's crews.

Best Regards as ever,

Engines.

[Chugalug2]

Engines, no need to apologise, indeed quite the contrary given the erudite post which I must now attempt to respond to. It seems that our view of Harris and BC is identical until your identified scene shift in 1943. As regards Nuremberg, as others have already stated here, it was a tragedy for BC, but hardly typical so I would not regard it as a marker in the sense that you seem to.
You say that in 1944:
By that time, Bomber Command was quite capable of more accurate bombing
That, I'm afraid is where I must respectfully differ with you. Granted we had more aids by then, particularly for the Path Finders, but they could be and were compromised by the enemy. Other than greater numbers and better aircraft, Main Force had not changed to the degree that it could successfully switch targets from cities without even more innocent German cows going to the fairy dairy land. It was a case of "If it ain't bust don't fix it" in my view. It would have taken a seismic shift to daylight escorted bombing a la the USAAC to really improve bombing accuracy, and even then the cows were still vulnerable, just less so.
I suppose I must declare an interest here. I have no family connections to the RAF, let alone BC. Indeed my Dad was an RA LAA TA Bdr on Bofors who shot planes down for a living, or would have done if he had not become an early guest of the Mikado. I was however on Hastings, which any wartime aircrew, particularly Navs, would have felt quite at home in. We soldiered on with the old girls because we were promised "jam tomorrow" in the form of the AW681, which of course never happened. I remember the Sig informing the Captain as we approached the Hawaiian ADIZ that we were to report Tacan Gate Delta.
"Tell him we don't carry TACAN, Sig"
"He says to call established on the VOR 185 Radial"
"Negative VOR, Sig"
By this time Captain and Navigator were in conference.
"He wants to know what aid you will use, then"
"Tell him the Radio Range, Sig, and we'll call him established inbound on it."
And so it was as we went back and forth from Christmas Island. At the end of the detachment the captain was asked to sign a disclaimer, to the effect that he had now, or in the future, no further requirement for the Diamond Head Radio Range which had no notified users for years, until we came by, and was scheduled for demolition.
I only tell this rambling tale to try to bring home the very limited navigational capability of that aircraft in the 60s let alone the 40s. The Nav had a compass, ASI, API, OAT, Radio Compass, Drift Sight, Sun Gun and Gee. With those they did wonders and circumnavigated the globe. We could put SEAC packs into a jungle clearing smaller than a football pitch, but only by day, of course.
Harris performed the art of the possible. Others had clever ideas that indeed would have hit the German War Machine harder, if they had worked. Harris knew they wouldn't. "Tell them we'll stick to bombing cities, Sig."

[Engines]

Chug,

Thanks for your informative reply. I'm very happy if we differ - it's a free forum and all the better for it. And I have the utmost respect for anyone who flew long range transport in those days with minimal nav aids.

But the issue you highlight is the central one - did Bomber Command go for the cities because it was all they could effectively hit, or because they believed that killing the industrial workforce (and to be clear, they were told to aim for the population centres instead of industrial areas) was faster way to end the war? The first answer is an honest one, and true. But the second one is the one Harris believed in, to his very core. And therein lies the question that remains so sensitive.

In 1943, the USAAF and Bomber Command had been unable to agree on a fully joint offensive (Pointblank). The USAAF claimed that they could conduct a precision bombing offensive against industrial targets - in reality, their accuracy wasn't much better than Bomber Command's. But they aimed at industrial targets, not housing. Harris would not bend, and threw his forces against the largest German population centres furthest east - especially Berlin - and came up short. He could have aimed at industrial centres, but chose not to. he would still have killed civilians - just not on purpose.

By late 43, it was clear to Churchill and Eisenhower that the Aliies would have to invade Europe and defeat the Wermacht on the ground to win the war. Harris (and Spaatz) are on record as opposing Overlord and claiming that 'one more push' would cause Germany to collapse. Harris, because he claimed that morale was about to collapse (it wasn't) and Spaatz because he claimed he had destroyed the german economy's ability to fight on (he hadn't).

Here's my point - both the Allied bomber commanders were, unfortunately, unable to see that their rhetoric (victory through air power alone) was not matched by reality (victory with air power making a huge contribution). That made the job of the Supreme Commander much harder in late 44 and early 45.

Not a thing in this thread takes away from one second the honour and tributes due to Bomber Command aircrew, and all aircrew who fought so gallantly.

Chug, I'm going to halt here, not because I don't want to exchange any more views, but because I think I've set out my stall. You have yours and I respect it absolutely.

Very best regards

Engines.

[Chugalug2]

Indeed, Engines, I agree that it's time to draw stumps. Let others make of our two stalls what they will. I utterly endorse your tribute to Bomber Command's Aircrew. The courage to face that maelstrom night after night is humbling, and one can only marvel at it. That is the theme of this thread, and the right note to end on, agreed.
Regards,
Chug

[Fareastdriver]

Which ever way you look at it; we were not there at the time.

[Pontius Navigator]

May I enter the debate with trepidation. Like Chug I have also navigated the Hastings. I have also navigated the Lancaster, but the question really is about target sets.

And industrial target has many layers. There is the means of power and the dams raid was an example of a strike against that target. Then there is the product, the means of production, and equally important the work force.

Area bombing could destroy the product, it could disrupt the factories and as importanly, disrupt or kill the work force.

A raid that was I believe successful in most of these targets was Peenemunde. Had the Peenemunde target been in a city then the city would have been bombed.

[Engines]

Pontius,

Breaking my own rule,butt to respond.

Peenemunde was a special raid, as set out on the official RAF history site. It was, quoting the site, 'the only occasion in the second half of the war where the whole of Bomber Command attempted a precision raid by moonlight'. It was Pathfinder led, and employed a number of special tactics. Losses were 6.7%.

Area bombing was a totally different tactic, and the one employed in the vast majority of Bomber Command operations after 1941. You are right that an industrial target has many layers, the key is which layer area bombing centred on. There was official obfuscation at the time, and some downright untruths, but the records show clearly that the aiming points were the residential areas of the cities, not the industrial areas. The incendiary loads dropped were optimised to set densely packed housing alight, and were less effective against factories.

The primary objective was, to use Cherwell's phrase, to 'de-house' the industrial workforce. What it really meant was to kill so many of them that the survivors would not work. Destruction of factories was a by-product, and in any case was largely assigned to the USAAF after 1943.

Hope this helps

Best regards as ever,

Engines

[Fareastdriver]

The primary objective was, to use Cherwell's phrase, to 'de-house' the industrial workforce. What it really meant was to kill so many of them that the survivors would not work. Destruction of factories was a by-product, and in any case was largely assigned to the USAAF after 1943.

In Japan after 1943 the USAAF did both. One raid on Tokyo killed more than Hiroshima and Kyoto was struck off the target map as not worth revisiting.

[Pontius Navigator]

Engines, you had no need of rebuttal Had the Peenemunde target been in a city then the city would have been bombed. Peenemunde was only a discrete target because it was not in a city.

[MightyGem]

Point was the anniversary of 100 years of British military aviation.
Not quite. The Royal Engineers started British military aviation with the establishment of the School of Ballooning at Chatham, in 1888. This expanded to the Air Battalion in 1911.

[Wensleydale]

One cannot fully understand the strategy of Bomber Command without looking at some "experimental" raids that went on in early 1942 following the introduction of the Lancaster. These raids include the precision daylight attack on the MAN factory in Augsburg when 7 out of 12 Lancasters were lost. This famous raid was folowed 3 weeks later by a precision low level night attack on the Heinkel factory in Warnemunde where 16 Lancasters (out of a force of 214 aircraft which also attacked Rostok) were directed to attack the factory from very low level between Z+ 50 mins and Z+ 60 mins - only 2 of 44 Sqn's Lancasters survived from this raid - four failed to return. Of the surviving aircraft, one attacked from a height of 70 ft! (the other was coned by searchlights and the pilot climbed when he was blinded by the light - he went round again and bombed from 2,500 ft which he considered much safer despite the intense flak). The Waddington aircraft each carried an extra navigator to act as a bomb aimer (in the early days, the Navigator left his seat to lay under the nose gunner to drop the bombs) so that the low level attack could take place without the navigator playing musical chairs (S/L Nettleton's surviving Lancaster from Augsburg used the same extra crew member).

No 44 Sqn from Waddington had lost 9 Lancasters from 12 sent out over a short period to attack precision targets which could only be done (at that time) at low level. There is little wonder at the lack of enthusiasm for precision attacks at Command after these experiments.

[Whenurhappy]

Harris doesn't even mention the Nuremburg raid in his critique 'Bomber Offensive'. However, after the raid on Augsburg (qv), Willy Messerschmitt moved his Research Bureau to the site of the NATO School in Oberammergau (near his home town of Murnau), where up to 5000 staff from all over Europe beavered away on radical transonic designs - none of which went into production because of the massive dislocation due to the progressive collapse of the transport infrastructure and the necessity to disperse production.

Irrespective of what modern day commentators think of Arthur Harris, in 'Bomber Offensive' he makes some very compelling arguments on the development of the weapons, aircraft and crews necessary to conduct an all-out offensive. There are modern 'Lessons Identified' in what he wrote 65 years ago.

[Exnomad]

With the Nav aids available early in Bomber commands campaign hitting the right town was probably about as good as they could do. Navigation by Astro and dead reckoning with unreliable Met information was likely to be inaccurate.The idea they could choose which sort of house to hit is ludicrous.

[Halton Brat]

Last weekend, I visited Wurzburg in Germany, which was (and is again) a Baroque jewel, with some 67 magnificent churches within its' boundaries, and was of minimal target value. This was bombed by 5 Group Lancasters on the night of 16 March 1945, and was possibly one of the last major 'city' raids.

There is an information centre close to the old Main bridge, which graphically recalls the raid & subsequent c.2000'c firestorm which consumed some 5,000 civilians & c.90% of the city; the last of the rubble was cleared away in 1964. Wiki has quite a good article on the raid.

The bravery & sacrifice of our Bomber Command crews is without question or stain; we who view these tumultuous events through the safe & comfortable telescope of time have no right to pass judgement on these brave young men, who were fighting for their lives, and, ultimately, ours.

We may, however, question the policies of the day; Harris should have been stopped at the end of 1944. This was a complete failure of the Command chain, right up to & including Churchill. Whilst his earlier BC leadership was exemplary, he eventually was fighting his own private war.

HB

[Engines]

Ex and others,

I'd like to be clear - what Bomber Command did in 42 and 43 was, in my view, a justified part of 'total war'. If all they could do was hit a city, then hitting cities was what they had to do.

The issue is that the RAF (Harris) went back to a truly Trenchardian view of air warfare and became convinced that area bombing would win the war by breaking civilian morale. (Whether this move was driven by quantitative and objective analysis, blind faith or a realisation that they could not survive by day, but could not find a small target at night, is a matter for the historians).

Churchill had a better grasp - he just wanted to hit the Germans as hard as he could with whatever he had while waiting for the US to build up their war fighting economy.

By late 43/early 44, the divergence in war aims led to the problems we've discussed in this thread. Harris wanted to keep pounding the living areas of the cities to rubble, convinced that he would win the war without the need for ground combat. The Alled High command wanted to focus on German industrial targets to directly weaken their war effort prepare the ground for invasion.

The raids on cities late in the war are, to use Max Hastings' phrase, 'resistant to being placed in context'. Wurzburg is an example of those raids.

But to be clear - I certainly don't think BC crews were expected to be able to choose 'which sort of house' they hit. We have no right to judge them for their actions from this range. I also think that BC crews were astonishingly brave and deserve huge respect for the war they fought.

But the reason the BC offensive of WW2 still generates discussion is that it talks to the 'air power' theories of today. If we (the West) come to believe that we can prosecute our national aims and defend our national interests by dropping high explosive on foreign lands with minimal risk to life, instead of putting troops in harm's way, I (for one) fear that we're more likely to do so.

I fought a (small) war 30 years ago. Our young people have fought a few more (bigger) ones since then. I'd like them to be less going forward.

Best Regards as ever

Engines

[Pontius Navigator]

A slight deviation, there is an obit in today's DT of the lead navigator on Mosquito low-level precision daylight attacks.

The Mozzie was so effective and its loss rates much lower than the main force. Why didn't we use even more of the wooden wonders?

[Halton Brat]

QuickiWiki:

Mosquito B MkXVI:
Bomb load 4,000lb/Vmax 361kn @ 28,000'/Range 1300nm.

Lancaster MkI:
Bomb load 14,000lb/Vmax 250kn (174kn cruise)/Range 2,200nm.

HB

[Pontius Navigator]

HB, the only thing relevant there is the range. A 4000lb bomb on target is more effective than 14000lbs in the target area.

The 14000lb bomb load, including incendiaries etc, would be far more effective in executing Lindeman's advice. Destruction of factories, and necessarily only one or two per raid would not have had quite the same effect in diverting war effort to defend the Reich.

Also, I guess, night bombing has a quality all of its own with terror of the dark adding to the effect. You can just imagine their looking at moon phase and cloud cover and fearing the worst.

[Halton Brat]

Agreed, PN. The Mossie was indeed an amazing aircraft - the first MRCA, I feel.

There is a guy in NZ who is scratch-building new Mosquito airframes (thankfully, with modern adhesives). Can't wait to see a Mossie in the air again!

HB

[MAINJAFAD]

Yep, Certain marks of Mossie could carry a 4000lb bomb, but with the exception of GEE, bugger all else in the way of navigation equipment other than that used for DR (until late 1944, the only Navaid that would work deep in Germany was H2S, Oboe and GEE and GEE-H were limited in range to the Ruhr). Plus the old cookie wasn't a weapon that could be aimed with any accuracy and all of the deep penetration raids into Germany by Mossies were done at high level. The main role of the Mossie was to scoot off and bomb some other part of Germany that wasn't being attacked by the main force, just to draw off the German Night Fighters. The main force heavies on the other hand dropped the Cookie and what ever else they were carrying (normally 4lb Incendiaries) in one go, so that the Cookie blew the roofs of the buildings so that the 4lb bombs could start the fires. Yes the Low level Mossie attacks were very successful, but none of them were against targets deep in Germany.

[Pontius Navigator]

From today's obit:

31 Jan 43 Reynolds and Sismore led a small force of Mosquitos on the RAF's first daylight bombing attack on Berlin. (1100 miles round trip and as far into Germany as you really needed to go) . Crossing the Elbe at low level they climbed to 25,000 feet and arrived at exactly 11am when Goering and Gobbels were about to start a speech. The raid could be heard on the German radio that was to broadcast the speech live.

It did not say but one would guess they were VMC for the bomb run.

The 4000lb cookie was indeed a blast bomb and could be delivered from as low as 50 feet as attested by German Intelligence reports. Equally they could make precision attacks using smaller bombs. What they could not do was get the same weight of bombs on the target area as the main force, even allowing for many of the main force bombs not being in the target area.

For high speed low level ingress their nav kit was no different from the Canberra a decade and two later.

[LowObservable]

(thankfully, with modern adhesives)

What, you don't like your aircraft held together with cheese?

[Pontius Navigator]

Cheese? Or am I missing something?

Bones, yes.

MOM used to have a tin of Croid in his tool box. Used to bring it out from time to time, boil it up in a can of water. I don't think he ever used it all it lasted so long.

[ACW418]

PN

Wasn't it Casein Glue they used which is made from milk? Its good stuff but I doubt it was much good in the tropics.

ACW

[Pontius Navigator]

ACW, I see from the net that you are correct and that they switched to formaldehyde in the tropics.

You are right that the wet didn't do them a lot of good. The Hornet was also wooden construction but metal clad.

Mind you the tropics didn't do a lot of things much good. A Victor was grounded and sealed with bodge tape before they decided after a few months to fix it and recover it. When they opened one hatch the organ loft was full of fungii.

[ericferret]

Many years ago there was a short piece in Straight and Level (Flight International) which I wish I had kept which made a bombing effectiveness comparison between the modern Tornado force and the RAF bombing strength in WW2.

The conclusion was that for the WW2 RAF to be as effective they would have needed a bomber force far larger than was ever fielded during the war.

Maybe a large force of precision Mosquitos would have been a better option.
Training the crews to the standard would probably have been the problem.


While on the subject of "Flight" my other favourite piece again not kept was an advert which read

"Wanted for Enterprise type starship. White paint capable of withstanding warp factor 9"
Often wondered what that was about!!!

[Pontius Navigator]

Training the crews to the standard would probably have been the problem.

Fair question and fine balance. However the number or aircrew per aircraft would have been far fewer 2:7. The number of replacement crews would have been far fewer given a hoped for reduced attrition.

It would be a massive piece of counter-factual history to reconstruct the whole air war campaign on the premise that Mosquitoes replaced the Halifax and Lancaster and that target sets were smaller but hit harder.

As I said earlier, the workforce is a major part of an industrial target set, a part of the set that would not have been hit as hard with precision bombing. Precision targets can be better and more economically defended with point defence than could the large area targets.