'Falklands' Most Daring Raid'

[Ramshornvortex]

Just a heads-up that Channel 4 will be broadcasting an hour long dramatised documentary based on the first Black Buck bombing mission carried out 30 years ago next month. The programme airs at 2000 on Sunday 18 March. The programme was made by Darlow Smithson Productions and features, among others, Martin Withers, David Thomas (as technical adviser) and our very own XM655 at Wellesbourne (playing her rather more famous sister XM607!).

Here is an excerpt from the press release:

"Falklands’ Most Daring Raid brings alive a fast-paced, funny story of true grit and classic British derring-do to create a thrilling and uncharacteristically upbeat account from the Falklands War.
This gripping film tells the humorous yet heroic account of how a crumbling, Cold-War era Vulcan flew the then longest range bombing mission in history and how a WW2 vintage bomb changed the outcome of the Falklands War.
Astonishingly, this story of one of the RAF’s greatest modern feats has been downplayed into near obscurity by history.
On 30th April 1982, the RAF launched a secret mission; to bomb Port Stanley’s runway, putting it out of action for invading Argentine fighter jets. The safety of the British Naval Task Force, steaming towards the islands, depended on its success.
But the RAF could only get a single Vulcan bomber 8,000 miles south to the Falklands and back again and even that was going to take a 16 hour continuous flight from Ascension Island and an aerial refuelling fleet of thirteen Handley Page Victor tankers.
At the heart of the RAF’s plan was the iconic but ageing Avro Vulcan bomber. But as Britain’s original Cold War nuclear deterrent, the ‘Tin Triangles’ were in the process of being scrapped. Now, just months from being decommissioned, three of the surviving nuclear bombers - one to fly the mission and two as reserve - had to be kitted out for war and retro-fitted to carry 21 x 1,000lb WW2 iron bombs. Crucial spare parts had to be scavenged from museums around the world and whilst others were found in scrap yards – one vital piece was discovered being used as an ashtray in the Officer’s Mess.
In just three weeks, the Vulcan crews had to learn air-to-air refuelling, something the Vulcan hadn’t done for 20 years – and described by one pilot as like ‘trying to stick wet spaghetti up a cat’s backside’ –and conventional bombing, which they hadn’t done for ten. The RAF scoured the country to find just enough WW2 bombs and refuelling calculations were done the night before on a £5.00 pocket calculator.
With a plan stretched to the limit and the RAF’s hopes riding ultimately on just one Vulcan, the mission was flown on a knife-edge; fraught with mechanical failures, unreliable navigation, electrical storms and empty fuel tanks. Of the Vulcan’s 21 WW2 bombs, only one found the target. But that was enough to change the outcome of the war…
Based on Rowland White’s best-selling book, Vulcan 607, the documentary uses strong first-hand testimonies from the original Vulcan and Victor crews and stylised drama filmed in and around a surviving Vulcan Bomber.
It is the Dambusters for the 1980s generation."

I'm sure that a one hour film on commercial television (in other words just over 40 minutes of programme) won't do justice to the wonderful efforts of everyone involved in Black Buck, but let's be thankful that Darlow Smithson and Channel 4 have at least given it a go....

I'm looking forward to it.

[Courtney Mil]

I was always taught that a Ram's Horn Vortex was a bad thing. Seems the RAF lied to me again. :ok: Thanks for the heads up. Having counted it all out and counted it all back again (apart from a diversion to visit Ronie Biggs), I shall certainly be viewing.

[A340Yumyum]

It was doubtless a feat of incredible planning, human determination and resilience but.....didn't the runway at Stanley still remain fully operational?
I recall pictures of a sideways swipe of the airfield resulting in a lone crater to one side of the runway.
The Pucaras and C130s which were using Stanley remained fully operational, albeit using the right hand side of the runway.
Basically, a brilliant effort but.....er....they missed.

[stumpey]

Stands back, pop corn at the ready. :E

[althenick]

I'm not trying to take anything away from an impresive effort to get a strategic bomber in heatre but I think that the insrtion of special forces by a strped down seaking that the flew on to Chile and was destroyed by the aircrew would also be a good documentary....






...Are we allowed to talk about that yet?

[airpolice]

It is the Dambusters for the 1980s generation."


So, is there a Black Labrador in this version,and if so, what's it called?

[Obi Wan Russell]

The dog will be called WELLARD, obviously!:ok:

[Courtney Mil]

I think we've covered all this before, but... They not have closed the runway, but it demonstrated our ability to reach them in the Falklands, whcich made them think we could hit mainland Argentina. That made them divert forces away from the Falklands to defend the fatherland, hence decreasing their offensive war effort.

WELLARD's not a Lab's name, really. I think we need to think of something better.

[Solid Rust Twotter]

Honkie...?

Fair's fair, I suppose.

[Fareastdriver]

...Are we allowed to talk about that yet?

Not really. They destroyed a perfect serviceable helicopter thinking they were in Argentina.

[unclenelli]

A340YumYum - File:Stanley runway craters.jpg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Stanley_runway_craters.jpg)
(Ignore the penned circle, the crater is 1/2 way along and near-enough on centreline. A 2nd bombing run can also be seen to the LHS)

C4/DS filmed at Waddington last year (you might even seem me in the background). I put them in touch with a Victor Nav who took part. I'll even be in FI for this years anniversary.

[glojo]

(Ignore the penned circle, the crater is 1/2 way along and near-enough on centreline. A 2nd bombing run can also be seen to the LHS)C'mon admit it, that is the crater left after the attack by the Harriers.;)

Respect to ALL military types that fought in that conflict :ok:


This image is titled Blackbuck and Sea Harrier bomb damage

http://i1258.photobucket.com/albums/ii527/glojoh/BlackBuck1andSeaHarrierBombDamage.jpg

[BEagle]

In case you can't see it in that image, this is the crater made by a Wetjet, complete with warning marker:

http://i14.photobucket.com/albums/a341/nw969/wetjet.jpg

[orca]

Hello everyone.

Pre-amble: I was nothing more than a fascinated school boy at the time but my admiration for the FRS 1, GR3 and Vulcan aircrew has always been stratospheric. So much so that you can probably trace my career back to watching the jets depart Yeovilton to go south.

I buy the plausibility of the Argentines moving assets to defend the homeland as a result of Blackbuck. But I also know that the Argentine radar unit (VYCA-2 from memory) saw the first inbound raid, and they could all count bombs, and see that it was single stick stuff, so they would have known that all we could muster at that range was a single bomber. They would also know what accuracy it was capable of - and could have made an informed decision on whether or not it would be used in downtown BA. I personally don't think that this would significantly alter strategic thinking.

I have a genuine question.

Do we have any proof that the Argentines planned to use Stanley for fighters throughout the conflict but changed the plan as a result of Blackbuck? Do we have any proof that aircraft types were taken from OCA/ strike/ ASuW and made to do DCA of the mainland instead? Did the Argentines really believe the UK would go nuclear over the FI? I have oft heard the arguments but they've always been British interpretations of what happened - and you never lose a single type debrief!

Does anyone have any Argentine input? Documented squadron moves, ATO changes (I know - ATO existence doubtful...but you get the point), briefing boards etc etc?

Please enlighten me, I would be very interested.

[KG86]

Thread Title - 'Falklands' Most Daring Raid'

At the risk of being contentious here, I would say that the SAS raid on Pebble Island was much more 'daring!'

[Beancountercymru]

The pilot did so as he (Richard Hutchings) wrote a book about it - "Special Forces Pilot"

[Kengineer-130]

If it bears any resemblance to the excellent Vulcan 607 book, it will be a good watch :ok:

[Archimedes]

Hello everyone.

Pre-amble: I was nothing more than a fascinated school boy at the time but my admiration for the FRS 1, GR3 and Vulcan aircrew has always been stratospheric. So much so that you can probably trace my career back to watching the jets depart Yeovilton to go south.

I buy the plausibility of the Argentines moving assets to defend the homeland as a result of Blackbuck. But I also know that the Argentine radar unit (VYCA-2 from memory) saw the first inbound raid, and they could all count bombs, and see that it was single stick stuff, so they would have known that all we could muster at that range was a single bomber. They would also know what accuracy it was capable of - and could have made an informed decision on whether or not it would be used in downtown BA. I personally don't think that this would significantly alter strategic thinking.

As I've noted elsewhere on PPrune, Admirals Leach, Lewin and Fieldhouse, subsequently supported by Admiral Woodward were keen on the idea of Blakcbuck because it would keep the Argentines guessing. This is a matter of public record (the seminar at the Staff College in 2002 at which Admiral Leach revealed that he was a bit more enthusiastic about the raid than MRAF Beetham, a point supported by the latter, who was also present). It didn't mater whether the Argentines thought we might come with one Vulcan or a bomber stream, the point was the possible effect of bombs landing on the mainland.

Do we have any proof that the Argentines planned to use Stanley for fighters throughout the conflict but changed the plan as a result of Blackbuck?

There is some evidence that they offloaded PSP to extend the runway from their first lift of stores to the islands, and post-Blackbuck never bothered to put it back onto a ship.

Do we have any proof that aircraft types were taken from OCA/ strike/ ASuW and made to do DCA of the mainland instead?

Yes - the source being the Argentines themselves. The Mirages of 8 Grupo had additional DCA taskings added; this reduced their ability to fly sweeps over the islands even further - as well as lack of persistence, lack of numbers became an issue.

Did the Argentines really believe the UK would go nuclear over the FI?

No. There was no desire that they should think that we would - the issue (as above) was getting them to worry that Mrs T might be mad enough to have Vulcan rock up over the mainland dispensing HE, with major consequences for opinion towards the junta.

Does anyone have any Argentine input? Documented squadron moves, ATO changes (I know - ATO existence doubtful...but you get the point), briefing boards etc etc?

Please enlighten me, I would be very interested.

There is some input from Argentine veterans into a couple of sources, notably Martin Middlebrook's book on the Argentine experience of the war which tends to support the view that BB1 contributed to a reduction in Mirage III OCA sorties until late May 82 (by which point the Argentines had concluded that we weren't going to raid the mainland).

[Canadian Break]

BLACKDOG?:ok:

[Courtney Mil]

This is a good thread with some great input. But I don't thank anyone that is sitting in an armchair 30 years later questioning what was done or asking for evidence of its effectiveness. We all did the best we could with what we had and it worked. I wasn't all the way down down south during the war, I was in Ascension; I'm not claiming to be a real war vet here. But it's not for any of us to question the actions of those that were really in the thick of it.

Sorry to sound like I'm coming on strong, but I feel pretty strongly about this one.

Ready to accept backlash.

[cosmiccomet]

I am gonna agree about the bravery of the Avro Vulcan flying all the way to Malvinas and back.

I am also agree about Argentine Military Commanders after the first Black Buck were very aware of the British capability of bombing any target at the continent.

But those rides did not make too much damage, the bomb crater was fix after one or two days.

In fact, the Vulcan, SHR and GR3 couldn't hit the runway strip after May 1st.

The Argentine Air Force C-130H and Argentine Navy L-188 Electra and Fokker F-28 kept supplying the Argentinian forces until the very end of the war.
The last C-130H supply mission was on the 13th.

For your information, the Avro Vulcan was targeted in its first ride by the Roland and the Oerlikon Contraves 35 mm radars, but the rules of engagement at that moment were ask to the Command post for shooting clearence before pressing the trigger. When they got the clearence the Avro Vulcan already dropped the bombs and it was out of range for firing or lunching.
That rule changed right after that bombing.

[orca]

Archimedes,

I don't understand your first point. I don't care who asked for or supported Blackbuck. I know what the UK view was. I have been reading about what Woodward et al wanted for 30 years. The point (as you put it) that we could bomb their soil is a British point. They may well have looked at the raids and dismissed the threat as minimal, they might have been scared witless. The point is I don't know what they thought and I am trying to find out!

My question was 'What was the Argentine view?' (which in fairness you go on to mention) without it you cannot begin to understand the raids' effect. I am very interested by what you say about the Mirage DCA and OCA, exactly what I was after - thank you. I understand it was actually a UK statement about not attacking the mainland which helped the FAA allot its fighters.

The Argentine C2 is interesting though. I read a USAF paper about it. Were the 8 Grupo Mirage allotted to FAS (southern air force - the formation tasked with striking the FI, newly formed as I understand) and then denied to it? Or were they allotted to FAS but apportioned to DCA vice OCA? The importance of course being whether or not they were anything to do with hostilities prior to Blackbuck. The FAA had to maintain its posture towards Chile of course, so not all assets were allotted to FAS.

You assume that it was Black Buck which led to the Argentines not extending the runway at Stanley. Based on what? The fact is they didn’t. I want to know why not, not hear a guess as to why not.

All very interesting.

Courtney,

I know what the guys did. We have all known for decades - helped along by the excellent Vulcan 607 book. They flew an amazingly long way, with an amazingly complex texaco plan, in some pretty unpleasant weather and did so pretty much from a standing start at the drop of a hat. Their skill, dedication and heroism is beyond doubt. But I for one have only ever been fed sweeping statements about the effect of the raids. I have never discovered sortie rates for OCA that drop dramatically post Blackbuck for example.

I have sometimes infuriated people with this - but one of my pathological hatreds is people who simply trot out perceived wisdom or regurgitate other people's opinions as fact. I only listen to people if they have accrued knowledge, subjected it to their own conscious thought and arrived at an opinion of their own. I would be an incredible hypocrite if I didn't do the same myself.

If you interpret my search for facts as criticism of the crews you are a long way off the mark. But I do understand the 'I was there, you weren't' school of thought at the tactical level at least.

[Treble one]

Superfuse, for the name of the dog, surely?

[Navaleye]

The Vulcan's bomb was not on the centre line of the runway, it just clipped the edge. Militarily it was was a pointless waste of resources and it stopped precisely nothing. The Argentinians had no plan to use that airfield as a military base because as it was unsuitable and could be shelled by British ships at night when their aircraft could not fly. They still used the airfield right up to the last night night for transport flights, so any claim that it made any difference to the local situation is complete crud. I seem to remember "one bomb Beetham" and even that missed. Great effort by all involved though. I'm not sure 30 years on it was worth it.

[orca]

Concur to a degree, but there may well be truth in the (oft peddled - rarely backed up) line that it diverted OCA assets to a DCA role on the main land.

This would be easy to quantify if we knew which units were reassigned to protect the main land vice sweep the Falkland Islands, where they were reassigned from, how much they flew and what they protected.

There may be other reasons for OCA being limited over the Falklands (other than distance and no AAR for Mirage and Dagger) but I'd like to know what they were - not just surmise what they might have been.

For example: It is plausible that the Argentinians didn't lengthen the runway at Stanley because they had no tractors and diggers, because they didn't use sea lift, because of the SSN threat - nothing to do with Blackbuck...but that would just be a uninformed guess. It might be that Blackbuck was the reason. But without talking to the Argentine airfield manager it's hard to find out.

[Navaleye]

If I may suggest an answer. They could not use Stanley airfield as a military airfield because they would have had to accept 500 50lb 4.5" dustbins landing on it every night. They knew that and would not take the risk. They were not daft. You would not put the best of your air force in un-protected positions exposed to enemy shelling. That's why they never tried it and they knew it.

[orca]

They couldn't have used it for fast air anyway, as far as I understand, due to the runway being so short. So they had the choice of either extending it, using it only for Pucara, C-130, Macchi and Turbomentor ops or not at all.

The pertinent fact is that they hadn't extended it prior to May 1, which they could have done had they really wanted to. From this I draw the conclusion that they didn't plan to use Stanley as a base for fast air. You may be right as to the reason why not.

I have read an interesting USMC analysis which points out that the deployment of the 'COIN aircraft' was questionable due to the high threat environment, but apparently their CAS skills were quite good, so possibly worth the risk.

[Archimedes]

My first point, Orca, was to place the raid into some sort of wider context. Experience shows that if you don't do that, this sort of thread rapidly turns into a 'Bah! Bloody crabs! The RN had all the answers and the light blue were simply recerting to type' discussion, so making clear that it was a joint decision needs to be got in there early, othewise you get references to 'one bomb Beetham' which, with respect to NE, are unfair since Beetham is on record as telling the war cabinet that the limitations of the Vulcan's kit meant that he'd want at least 25 sorties to guarantee to them that the runway would be shut - because of the difficulty of getting enough bombs onto the runway. Also, I wanted to make clear that the view from the UK was that it didn't matter whether the Argentines realised that it might be only one bomber - one bomber was enough as far as their Lordships and 'Airships' were concerned.

We do not, as yet, have direct documentary evidence that the Argentine junta thought of permanent forward basing for their aircraft; nor has the supposition put to me by an Argentine officer of 1982 vintage that he thought the point was that Stanley might be used as a FOL for rearming and refuelling, plus for emergency landing (although the one Dagger which tried that was blown out of the sky in a blue on blue [or should that be 'Orange on Orange?]) with aircraft returning to the mainland at the end of the day been fully confirmed by written material.

We know the unit which had its DCA task increased at the expense of their OCA tasking - 8 Grupo. The unit's pilots say so in Middlebrook's book! Yes, their ability to conduct OCA was constrained by other factors, but the evidence is there, even if it is not from the Argentine archives. It may be that the chaps Middlebrook interviewed were entirely wrong, but that's all we have to go on so far, and there does not appear to have been a countervailing view provided to date. I would have to check, but I am fairly sure that any intimation that there would not be a raid on the mainland came some time later in the war. Again, as far as the Mirage pilots were concerned, they ended up placing greater emphasis on DCA post 1 May 1982.

[sdelarminat]

I've to say that I'm Argentinian and if you dont mind I'd like to offer some input on the subject.
I had a meeting with engineers recently who were based at FAA Rio Grande Base during the war, supporting the Daggers, and they told me that they performed some touch and gos with the Mirages to seize the possibility of using Stanley as an emergency runway for them. They never planned to operate from Stanley for the resons already posted.

As for the Vulcan mission, yes, it was there, did that but every argentinian book about the war emphatizes more in the labor of the Harriers in their bombing duties and the job of the battleships constantly aiming the runway. I honestly don't know what the junta was thinking on the matter, but to my knowledge there were 3 MIII in BA to protect the city even before the war started per se.
We're actually more intrigued by the SAS chopper mission to Rio Grande which ended in Chile and written off. There're lots of stories about that night but nothing concrete. Better not talk about it I guess.

Of course nothing can be 100% spot on, but I wanted to give my view on the matter.

[orca]

Archimedes,

Mate, we are arguing different points. You again address points that are well made but not anything to do with what the Argentines thought about the raids and therefore their effect. I understand your thinking but consider the British planners' opinion irrelevant.

I have read another source which deals with Grupo 8, although it refers to it as a brigade. It mentions that the Mirage III they used had less internal fuel than other aircraft so was used for medium to high ingress initially. It goes on to recount the early engagements where Grupo 8 lost a Mirage to a Sea Harrier and a damaged one to friendly AAA. They started out with 17 and lost 2 apparently - no where near the attrition suffered by other types. Do you concur or am I muddling brigades and grupos?

Which base did they fly from? I can find Mirage III at two locations.

So we have two plausible reasons for Grupo 8s re-task. The first being that the Argentinians genuinely wanted it to defend against Vulcan attack, the other that early encounters with DCA (flown by RN and RAF pilots), distance to the islands and (possibly) tank jettison making it un-employable as anything else.

Either, both or neither may be correct. Thanks for your input.

I have just read the post above, hence the edit. The presence of Mirage III in BA prior to Blackbuck is very interesting. One could either draw the conclusion that the FAA were mindful of the threat from the start or alternatively that the FAA didn't change anything due to the raids.

This is fascinating, thank you.

[Courtney Mil]

Orca,

Re your post #22, you are completely right. I may not have made myself completely clear, for which I applolgise. I didn't mean to use the "I was there, you weren't" argument. I meant to make it clear that I was in Ascension, but no associated with the raid. I simply saw a LOT of aircraft getting airborne, and recovering as singletons later. In some cases, much later.

And you are right, I do need to research more.

:\

[orca]

Courtney,

I am very envious. My favourite part in Vulcan 607 (I am deployed so cannot remember the names and pages exactly) is when it dawns on the head shed that all available gas has to go south as soon as possible. Which you must have seen.

The sinking 'I thought there was a tanker around here somewhere' feeling is a familiar one....as is the rush when one hoves into view...but to be trogging north over the Atlantic knowing that the texaco plan hasn't quite worked out and not knowing if your comms are getting through must have been awful.

I can't remember the name of the Victor captain I am thinking of but what a leadership situation to be in!

[glojo]

What I take issue with is the title of the thread, it is just plain wrong for so many reasons and this is where I put my head right into the lion’s mouth… Did it have a significant influence, did it have any influence?

As a lay person looking at the planning behind this operation, it looks mind blowingly complex although to someone that does this day in, day out it might not be that bigger task??

Seventeen tankers to support one bomber appears to be a first in the history of the RAF and much respect for those involved but what we have to take into consideration is the enormous amount of fuel required, plus the huge requirements for admin, support, parking and no doubt a hundred and one other issues.

http://i1258.photobucket.com/albums/ii527/glojoh/Fuel.jpg

Because of a shortage of parking space at Wideawake it was necessary to limit aircraft numbers based there. This dictated that aircraft not required for the immediate ORBAT had to leave the island for Gibralter, Dakar, or even on occasions the UK. Tasking priorities had to be established by the CinC two or three days in advance to allow time to reposition aircraft to fly the required sortie. Admiral Fieldhouse had to decide if he wanted long range Naval surveillance , Vulcan operations or Hercules drops to ships.

In other words it was eventually down to Admiral Woodhouse to decide between spare parts, extra equipment, Nimrod surveillance OR BLACK BUCK.

Fuel storage at Wideawake had been designed to allow for little more than a weekly C-141 or two to service the US Tracking Station

I include this quote to highlight the amazing efforts required to keep all aircraft replenished with fuel, fuel that was NOT readily available and not something we could supply. Our country owes a huge debt to our allies who, without hesitation gave us whatever we wanted although at times fuel became a huge problem and each BLACKBUCK mission used in excess of 244,000 Imperial gallons of fuel (1,955,000IB) Five BLACKBUCK plus two Shrike missions equates to an awful lot of that scarce commodity. Was it the best use of that fuel which at times was so low we were looking at just 24 hours of operational use before the tanker ran dry?

I have already mentioned the existence of the 10000ft runway and the aircraft parking apron sufficient for twenty four large fixed wing aircraft. However the geography of the airfield and its facilities had a significant impact on the mounting of air operations. In particular the access to the runway, the nature of the surrounding areas, the supply of aviation fuel

He then goes on to describe in great detail the harm that was done to aircraft by the very abrasive volcanic ash plus other debris that was being blasted into not just parked aircraft but also aircraft that were taxying behind other aircraft. Space at Wideawake was at a premium and no way could they afford to have aircraft parked up sitting on that parking apron for long periods of time.

Bearing in mind the Vulcan’s very dated systems and its iron bombs, weapon employment experts will tell you that in order to render a runway like the one at Port Stanley ‘unusable’ would have required some twenty five to thirty sorties so despite what critics may think, that single bomb was a pretty fair result. I spent the evening of the first BLACK BUCK operation with Admiral Fieldhouse, incidentally I can assure you that he was entirely in favour of the operation. Unfortunately our ability to replay the Vulcan card was limited by three crucial factors; the availability of flight refuelling tankers, the relative priority that had to be juggled between demands of Vulcan, Nimrod and Hercules operations; and the physical limitations imposed by fuel stocks and parking space at Wideawake Airfield ……………………………………….We therefore had to balance the need for seven tankers to support long range Nimrod reconnaissance against a Hercules spares run to the fleet which required rather less, and the 100% tanking effort demanded by a bombing sortie

Two points from that quote… Firstly I am positive that the Admiral was all in favour of BLACKBUCK as during the hours of darkness we were sneaking our warships as close in to Stanley as possible for a variety of missions. Any diversion would be greatly appreciated.

If it were a choice between much needed spares, or additional mission necessary equipment then I am guessing BLACK BUCK would be kicked in the ‘buck’ and NO senior Royal navy officer is EVER going to criticise operations carried out by our comrades in arms especially when we all needed to work as a well oiled team. Those islands would have been lost if we professionals had behaved in anything less than the way we did during that conflict... We showed the World just what we were capable of.

My thoughts on this so called ‘Most Daring Raid’ is that the planning, and mounting of this operation is worthy of commendation. Not so much for the aircrews (they were doing a job they were paid for) my pat on the back goes to the back room staff that might not have used the back of a cigarette packet, but none the less they never had today’s modern computers that would work out the complex issues that were involved. Okay, I accept they did use a pocket calculator purchased from Swaffenham Market for £4.95p


If we are talking about long range missions then straight away we should be looking at that trusty old steed the Hercules and what that aircraft managed to achieve under similar ‘war-time’ conditions. That aircraft was responsible for the carrying of spares, equipment, replacement or much needed personnel and the speeds that aircraft could manage meant a VERY long day at the office. Now correct me if I am wrong but during this period the only aircraft capable of refuelling this slow old bus was the much faster flying Victor! The only way the Hercules could match speeds was going downhill with a following wind!! Perhaps the following wind was not needed, but to achieve a fast enough speed to match the slowest possible speed of the Victor then yes both aircraft could NOT fly straight and level. Unlike the short Vulcan trip of maybe ‘just’ 16 hours, the Hercules crew were in that aircraft for a backside numbing TWENTY EIGHT HOURS!! Longest trip I believe was actually 28hrs and 3 minutes. Is that more ‘daring’ or more spectacular than the raids by the Vulcan? The Vulcan at least had a degree of speed on its side, the Hercules just had size!! No I object in so many ways to that title of most daring… My own nomination would be the ‘White Out’ rescue by the Wessex crew of HMS Antrim but I am positive there are other operations that were just as impressive.

Number 1 Squadron of the RAF really impressed members of the Parachute Regiment when the Harriers gave a whole new meaning to the word CLOSE air support. If those aircraft were not trimming the camouflage webbing off the helmets of those soldiers then they were not ‘close’ enough. :ok:;)

Even if the Argentine military decided to withdraw a few aircraft to protect the mainland then so what? During the conflict Sea Harriers destroyed (or partly destroyed) 28 enemy aircraft with no air combat losses. I do not want to make light of thatg statistic and it might have been taht if those few aircraft had stayed it MIGHT have made a difference but my personal thoughts are that the Sea Harriers were commanding the air and MUCH respect to all those pilots who we know wore both light and dark blue uniforms.

Are we pretending that our enemy did not have merchant ships off Ascension or that they were not aware of when aircraft were leaving that island and flying south? Are we forgetting how they also had there own Intelligence Gathering Boeng that was continually monitoring the SLOCS? My thoughts are that they may well have been counting them out and counting them back in! Theyh had ample time to take whatever precuations they deemed necessary to meet any possible threat to their mainland although I would NOT have recommended they sneak out any of their warships to deal with the possible threat of the incoming aircraft.

Seven missions in total and one iron bomb hitting the runway!! This long post is just asking the question was BLACK BUCK really necessary to help win that conflict or was it a demonstration of what could be done? In my opinion it most certainly could not be contemplated without the possibility of air cover and contrary to what is sometimes suggested the occupying force had detected the first in bound Vulcan but thankfully there was no enemy fighters in the vicinity that could pop along to exchange names and addresses .

All information quotes etc are in the public domain.

[sitigeltfel]

The most daring raid? This must be close, if not at the top, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency........

The SAS Raid on Pebble Island | Defense Media Network (http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/the-sas-raid-on-pebble-island/)

[Navaleye]

This a very interesting thread and I have a question to pose. Rather than fly 21 bombs 4000 miles, could the same or better results have been achieved by Harriers flying in daylight west to east at 20,000 ft along the length of the runway? I believe that HEMC bombs wete used in Blackbuck which is what the carriers carried and several Harrier vets have stated that it was possible, so why was it not done?

[Courtney Mil]

Good post, Glojo. That is one of my favourite diagrams when trying to explain to people how a tanker plan works. You clearly know a lot more about the raid than I, so I'm very interested to read what you say. I think the only point we may differ on (on which we may differ, sorry;)) is what they thought they were going to acheive by doing it. Similarly, to Navaleye. I still thaink that the hope was to demonstrate a frightening capability and divert forces back home. I had read somewhere that this was what happened; I just don't know how much difference it made.

Orca, it was a sight to behold. I knew a lot of the tanker guys quite well and they kept me up to speed on the appauling state of the Victors there. They had exploding HDUs, engines that wouldn't produce full power, avionics red lines that sounded positively dangerous , gens that didn't work, dozens of leaks, etc. But they kept flying them. Hats off to them. Oh, and Harry-the-Ace and his amazing C-130 guys - some of the best visual turning and burning I ever did.


Courtney

[orca]

Navaleye,

My personal opinion is that the fuel used by the Vulcans couldn't possibly have been used to support Harrier or Sea Harrier missions because it was in totally the wrong place. Someone correct me if I am wrong but no carrier missions were ever cancelled due to lack of avgas or of 1000lb weapons, were they? Was avgas was held at Ascension for Vulcan that should have been shipped south?

I think we all accept that the FRS 1 and GR3 crews were rushed off their feet down south, so to have attempted to 'black' Stanley would have required them to be apportioned away from their other roles.

Having read RAF Harrier Ground Attack Falklands (possible one for the grammar thread) I was very surprised to hear that the GR3 QWIs didn't know what a high angle dive site picture was, but the upshot would mean that runway cratering was unlikely by GR3. (Corporate LGB knowledge was understandably non-existent it would appear as well from the use of the GR3 laser for guidance). Cratering was also unlikely by FRS 1 using Navhars which would at best have given a 0.1nm accuracy at pickle, or loft which would give about a 30 degree impact.

That being said, there is more to the effect of reducing the enemies supply capacity than disabling an airhead. In turn there's more to disabling an airhead than targeting the runway - and any munition falling may well have contributed to the overall aim.

For me the key point is that the Argentinians appear to have never seriously considered using the field for fast air, but kept it open as a logistics hub throughout the war with what sounds like incredible efficiency.

If we had cratered Stanley - could they repair it and could a C-130 have used Goose Green or Pebble Island? Were we primed to sink any sea lift they attempted?

(No doubt someone will remember what we fuelled the early Pegasus with and what it was then called, if it wasn't avgas I do apologise - but you get the point)

[Navaleye]

I thought the Navy (then) used AVTUR. It was less smokey apparently, although I may be completely wrong.

[Courtney Mil]

No, 'normal' jet fuel is AVTUR (JP4 or Jet A-1). AVGAS is petrol and not for jet engines (except in the Shackleton Mk3 and those Vipers only lasted about 25 hours). AVCAT (JP5) is a less flammable form of parafin (more or less) carried on ships in place of AVTUR. Works almost as well, but slightly more smoke and slightly less thrust. You can still run a Zippo on it, though. There is also AVTAG, which is like AVTUR, but stores better. :ok:

[Pontius Navigator]

Someone correct me if I am wrong but no carrier missions were ever cancelled due to lack of avgas or of 1000lb weapons, were they? Was avgas was held at Ascension for Vulcan that should have been shipped south?

Avtur not Avgas, but I don't think Navaleye was suggesting better use of Avtur which of course could have been used by C130 or Nimrod but not direct use by the carriers.

Navaleye's question about using Harrier rather than Vulcan is well asked and the Harriers could most likely have had more bombs on target for far less effort. That being the case we return to the question of why use the Vulcan.

Archimedes has stated (IIRC) that it was a demonstration of capability rather than an overriding requirement.

The other supposition of how the Arg saw and responded is of course the question. We had a similar question regarding deployment of the Vulcan during Confrontation. It is very much a parallel history question.

[Navaleye]

Thank you PN. The issue was always one of demonstrating "reach". The fact that we had a navy that could travel 8k miles and the RAF that could do the same which was a much harder achievement IMHO would have seriously upset their command. Creating uncertainty goes a long way to winning a war.

[orca]

PN,

I agree that it was a statement of intent - I am not so keen to call it capability.

I believe it was a great effort and anything that could have been thrown at the enemy should have been.

That being said I don't think it demonstrated an ability to strike the mainland in strength.

So for me the jury remains out on the effect. Were the Argentinians so scared of our ability to get a single bomber that far that they significantly changed the game plan?

[Milo Minderbinder]

Why weren't the Vulcans for the later Black Buck Shrike raids fitted with the bomb bay fuel tanks from 27 Squadron's MRR Vulcans?
They must have been available as they were later used in the tanker conversion.
If a couple of airframes had been fitted with them, presumably things would have been rather easier

[Navaleye]

The Grupo 8 Mirages if my memory still serves me were based at Trelew in Northern Argentina they were subsequently moved to Rio Gallegos. The main problem was their Matra 530 missile which was not effective against small fast moving targets (think Phoenix) the other problem was that they had a very simple monopulse radar which when overland in a look down position could deliver nothing. Once they came down to play they were toast to the AIM-9L.

[orca]

I can find documentation saying the Grupo 8 Mirage III EA were based in two locations, Comodoro Rivadavia and Rio Gallegos, both to the south of BA by quite a way. That's not to discount the earlier post saying three were based in BA itself - or your memory Navaleye. I think Rivadavia was actually their C2 node for the FAS so to defend it would make sense.

As far as I can work out there were 17 Mirage III EA originally but 2 were twin seaters. Of the 15 war goers 2 were splashed on day one. (One by Sea Jet the other damaged and then splashed by friendly AAA) So as of May 1 the FAA would be down to 13 total, does anyone have an idea as to their availability rate?

The other tactical consideration is that of OCA sweep when attacking ships. Ships have a MEZ around them, OCA has to sweep around or over the MEZ if it has no SEAD. Medium level sweep into a Sea Dart MEZ would be an incredibly silly idea (as demonstrated later by Learjet). Prior to the landings it made sense to try to attrit Sea Harriers outside the RN MEZ. This wasn't possible for the FAA chaps over San Carlos as their strikers had to penetrate the MEZ to deliver the weapons. Low level sweep through San Carlos would have been incredibly high risk.

The only platform it might have been worth sweeping for would be the Super-E, but that would have given away the element of surprise.

It seems to me that some Mirage III EA were fragged for DCA duties, I wonder if any Argentinian readers could expand on whether this was due to there being no point sweeping for the strikers, Blackbuck, attrition or fuel load?

[Pontius Navigator]

I agree that it was a statement of intent - I am not so keen to call it capability

No, I suggest 'intent' could have been demonstrated with 'show of force' by a flight across down town BA.

'Capability' did exactly what Navaleye said, it demonstrated 'reach'.

That being said I don't think it demonstrated an ability to strike the mainland in strength.

"It is not HMG's policy to confirm or deny . . . "

There was a similar issue in 1964-65 in Confrontation. Admittedly this was only 19 years after first use and by 1982 the world had moved on a little when it came to sabre rattling.

There is some evidence to believe that Indonesia did not discount the threat from nuclear armed V-bombers. Who would pit just 4 Vulcans against an archipeligo of some 3000 miles in extent.

Similarly could Argentina discount a tactical nuke? You cannot apply our logic and thought processes to another culture. Remember also that they were not privvy to the AAR Plan. Even in 1982 I suspect that many people would have credited the Vulcan with a far greater range capability than it actually possessed.

Regarding the hole on the edge of the runway, I read somewhere that the Arg 'removed' the bomb crater spoil at night and replaced it come the dawn thus preserving an appearance of a crippled runway.

I have just ordered a copy of Air War South Atlantic Price and Ethell specialise in presenting a balanced opponents view although I suspect they may not throw any light on this matter.

due to there being no point sweeping for the strikers, Blackbuck, attrition or fuel load?

If I read your idea of 'sweeping' correctly it would have been no more than a vague chance of engagement in a very lean target environment.

The only way to have engaged subsequent BB sorties successfully would have been either costly CAP or timely intelligence and some form of radar controlled intercept. The low and practically random sortie rate would have presented a very low chance of a successful engagement.

[Lightning Mate]

.....of the Avro Vulcan flying all the way to Malvinas and back.

The islands are called the Falklands!

[Heathrow Harry]

The real value of the BLACKBUCK raids was that it added another problem to the many the ARgie defenders had -

Keeping a load of people up all night, every night, looking for vulcans is probably as valuable as actually hitting the runway - and you have to keep the radar switched on - which makes identifying it for Harrier strikes all that much easier

[Dan Winterland]

Not to mention the effect on Morale it had on the Argentineans on the Islands.

[glojo]

I still maintain that they were fully aware of the aircraft we had on the ground at Ascension and feel it might be wishful thinking to assume there were lots of sleepless nights worrying about an alleged long range bomber attack.

If all the tanker force were observed lifting off then an estimated time of arrival could be assumed and would we then assume a suitable defensive action be taken. We might have contained their warships in their home ports but that does not stop them from using all their electronic equipment to help detect aircraft entering their airspace although some equipment might have got the local residents complaining! :sad::ok:

and you have to keep the radar switched on - which makes identifying it for Harrier strikes all that much easier If only they did, then would the Shrike missions have been more successful?

[cosmiccomet]

The Mirage IIIEA were bought in two batches, the first one in 1971 and the second in 1978.

The first batch (10 aircraft) was capable of lunching the Matra 530 missile only.

The second batch (7 aircraft single seater) was also capable of lunching the Matra 550 Magic I, but those missiles were deliver just before the war in March 1982.

So the MIIIEA pilots didn't have any training in operating those missiles and only 7 aircraft were capable of lunching it.

The Argentine Air Force deployed its MIIIEA in two bases, Comodoro Rivadavia AFB and Rio Gallegos AFB.

But only the Rio Gallegos AFB was lunching MIIIEA missions to Malvinas.

Very few missions were flown armed with the MATRA 530 located in the center pylon.

The first mission on the May 1st, both MIIIEA were armed using a single MATRA 530, 2 MATRA 550 Magic I and the 2 DEFA 30 mm.
Both MIIIEA were radar vectored to a pair of SHR but the Cyrano IIbis couldn't lock any target flying below...so it was useless.

That's why the Argentine Air Force decided to retired the MATRA 530 because was causing drag and more fuel consuption without any real chance of hitting anything.

[Marcantilan]

Regarding how to name the islands (about Lighting Mate post), the UN suggests that could be named Falklands/Malvinas if were named in an english language context and Malvinas/Falklands in spanish.

Moving forward from that (I think arguments regarding that are elsewhere here), Blackbuck raids (specially the first one) were more important than delivering bombs to the target.

With Vulcan capabilities on mind, Argentine defenses were re-deployed and time and resource consuming measures were taken to minimize the effects of a bombing mission in the mainland: From darkening cities to redeploying radars, to rehearsing scattering planes (and actually happening those some times due to false alarms) and, the more important thing, to maintain alert planes on the runway (the few Mirage IIIEAs)

In my humble opinion, Blackbuck missions had a very limited military value, but a tremendous effect on the strategic planning from the Argentine side.

On a side note, Argentine had timely intelligence about planes departing from Ascension Island and its payload (specially the Shrikes mission) I don´t know how it was obtained, but war diaries of the Argentine radar on island and defense positions in the mainlad reflects that.

Regards,

[VP-F__]

The Black Buck raids may have had little physical impact on the runway at Stanley which was rapidly repaired but they had a substantial impact on the morale of the Argentine troops based there.
As for the name of the place, they are the Falkland Islands!

[orca]

PN,

No you completely misunderstand me. The point is that for Blackbuck to have had an effect we would have to demonstrate the fact that FAA jets supposed to be doing one thing were stopped and made to do another.

i.e. Fighters fragged for OCA sweep in support of the strikers would be re-tasked with DCA. The point is that if the fighters couldn't mount an effective sweep (looking for FRS 1 - nor Vulcan!) then there was no point sending them to do it. Thus they could be put on DCA. This is convenient - but it might not have been Blackbuck which forced their hand.

Another point raised is important. No-one should have been looking for Vulcans. They would have been looking for Vulcan. Very important distinction in my mind. Reach I will grant you, but with a single bomber? I am not as convinced as some that we were demonstrating much. (My opinion is irrelevant, as is that of all British people. If the Argentinians thought we were demonstrating reach then BB was a success.)

Next genuine question. By 'forcing' the Argentinians to keep their radar switched on - how exactly was it made vulnerable to attack from VSTOL aircraft?

And lastly - the interesting bit.

Marcantile, this is exactly what I was hoping for. How many fighters were dispersed and kept on high readiness? Why were there blackouts but the jets seem to have been kept well to the south of Buenos Aires? Did the Argetinians think that more than one Vulcan would come? What targets did the Argentinians think it could hit? Which were actually defended? Were the Mirage III thought unsuitable to go to the islands after 1 May because they lost to the FRS1?

As I have said before it is the Argentinian point of view that matters - the British view of capability, reach, non-kinetic effect etc is purely supposition without proof of what actually changed in the Argentinian plan.

Thanks everyone, very interesting thread.

VP-F and Dan Winterland, both of you mention the impact on morale. What is your source? Being bombed is horrendous (if 107mm fire is anyting to go by) but BB only put two sticks of bombs into a limited amount of real estate. Are you speaking for all troops on the island or just those at the airport? I have read some accounts of the infantry fighting that would suggest the morale in some Argentinian units was very good. This is also very interesting - thank you.

[Pheasant]

Impact on morale......what is more likely to affect morale - a) an occasional bomb dropped from mega height which will probably miss or b) nightly pin-point air-burst 4.5" shells right over the tented camps, gun and radar positions etc???

[Pontius Navigator]

No you completely misunderstand me. The point is that for Blackbuck to have had an effect we would have to demonstrate the fact that FAA jets supposed to be doing one thing were stopped and made to do another.

i.e. Fighters fragged for OCA sweep in support of the strikers would be re-tasked with DCA. The point is that if the fighters couldn't mount an effective sweep (looking for FRS 1 - nor Vulcan!) then there was no point sending them to do it. Thus they could be put on DCA. This is convenient - but it might not have been Blackbuck which forced their hand..

Yes I probably did misunderstand and I think it hinges on the definition of DCA and OCA in this context.

I assume OCA to be the sweep as you say looking to take the air battle to the Navy who would have to deal with both sweep and strike. Am I right in assuming you mean DCA being tasked to cover the mainland?

I would agree that OCA, as an independent mission, would probably have had a low probability of success unless the SHAR went up to play. As escort/sweep then the OCA mission would have had a high probability of contact and probably essential for successful attack by the strikers.

I can now see where you are coming from if you consider AD assets over FI as exclusively OCA whereas I had considered AD assets over the FI to have a DCA mission.

[orca]

The morale aspect is interesting, however may I proffer the following?

The British strategy for re-taking the Falklands was that of unopposed amphibious landing followed by advance to contact and infantry battle.

I have read that the Argetinians suspected (as a result of USMC thinking) that the Brits would mount an opposed landing ivo Stanley itself.

But I tend to think that the infantry battles fought mainly at night were the crux of the conflict. Whoever won those won the war. It is possible that the Argentinians could have stopped them by disrupting the British supply chain or by sinking the amphibious shipping prior to disembarkation. So to me Stanley becomes a bit of a side show. It would not have been a side show had we managed to close it (through bombing, NGS etc) but we didn't and our strategy was not that of 'laying seige' because we had a time pressure from the South Atlantic winter. Thus the Argentinians had to win the air-sea battle at San Carlos or the battles in the mountains. The British had to win both.

From what I have seen of the battlefields the Argentinian infantry had decent kit, were fed (although accounts vary as to how well) and certainly never ran out of ammunition.

Maybe our Argentinian sources could reflect on the effect the bombing of Stanley had on those in defensive positions elsewhere? Other than the C-130 kill by FRS 1 were any re-supply flights cancelled or turned back due to CAP, NGS or bombing?

[Art Field]

This forum has rather lost its way and become a deep discussion on the point of the raid rather than the ‘daring’ of the raid and its execution. For the Vulcan , Martin Withers and his crew achieved all that was expected of them, or rather that which was expected from a Vulcan crew since they were only the secondary team, thrown in the hot spot after a failure. The night refuels, which were as new to them as to the Victors and the complex formation procedures required high concentration in the cirrus of the South Atlantic. Some of the crews had to navigate using upside down North Atlantic charts as there were not enough South Atlantic charts. The refuels had to be on time and with correct transfers in spite of some equipment unserviceability. Fuel consumption turned out to be greater than predicted in the Vulcan causing rapid replanning of the recovery phase. Overall nothing like this operation had ever been planned let alone executed before and 75 aircrew had to get it right first time. Truly a Most Daring Raid.

[orca]

PN,

Sorry old chap, I was thinking of Mirage III in the OCA role sweeping for their strikers by taking on FRS 1 flying the DCA role over San Carlos.

The pickle for the OCA in this case is that they couldn't go in at medium level against the Sea Dart threat which would force them low, into the AAA and Sea Wolf MEZ, that those brave strikers were having such a hard time with.

[Pontius Navigator]

Impact on morale......what is more likely to affect morale - a) an occasional bomb dropped from mega height which will probably miss or b) nightly pin-point air-burst 4.5" shells right over the tented camps, gun and radar positions etc???

Pheasant, it depends where it misses.

There is also a difference as the 1000lb ers were, I believe, forged rather than cast and thus less effective as anti-personnel weapons. The potential for a random damage swathe over a mile long and a quarter wide, delivered in 6 seconds is. I suggest, a different order of magnitude from a number of accurately laid 4.5s.

The Sea Slug OTOH in an anti-personnel role was not designed to sooth them to sleep either.

[dalek]

The most daring (or foolish?) raid nearly attempted was the one way C130 SF sortie to take out the Super Etendards on the ground. The crew and SF survivors would then attempt to make for the Chilean border where Sea King helicopters would pick them up.
The C130 got as far as engine start at ASI before the decision to call it off was made.
It turns out the airbase was heavily defended by Argentine regulars, so the mission would have been suicidal.

[Marcantilan]

Other than the C-130 kill by FRS 1 were any re-supply flights cancelled or turned back due to CAP, NGS or bombing?

Hercules TC-63 was on a recon flight, and it was not a blockade runner, when shot down by Ward.

Besides that, most of the 33 resupply flights by C-130s had two or three attemps (and that means turning back to the mainland) before landing on the islands. Most flights were diverted due to frigates nearby, CAP or NGS. Same with the 16 resupply travels by F-28 and other Navy transport aircraft.

Regards!

[VP-F__]

VP-F and Dan Winterland, both of you mention the impact on morale. What is your source? Being bombed is horrendous (if 107mm fire is anyting to go by) but BB only put two sticks of bombs into a limited amount of real estate. Are you speaking for all troops on the island or just those at the airport? I have read some accounts of the infantry fighting that would suggest the morale in some Argentinian units was very good. This is also very interesting - thank you.

the source was my parents as I was only six at the time and have little recollection of the war in general. My parents reaction to the Vulcan's bombs was "what the hell was that!" One of my memories though was the attack on the Stanley airport following the Vulcan raid, I remember watching the rockets being fired as the harriers went down Stanley harbour from my bedroom in Stanley. The raids gave the Islands residents a tremendous lift and had totally the opposite effect on the poorly trained, fed and led conscripts.

[Pontius Navigator]

orca The pickle for the OCA in this case is that they couldn't go in at medium level against the Sea Dart threat which would force them low, into the AAA and Sea Wolf MEZ, that those brave strikers were having such a hard time with

Ah, this is an intelligence issue.

The strikers have to penetrate the FEZ and MEZ but OCA does not need to penetrate the MEZ in order to achieve OCA. They can achieve this by engaging the enemy air within the FEZ.

The real issue is where is the MEZ/FEZ.

Clearly the shorad with Rapier and Sea Wolf was in the SC Waters but the position of the SD MEZ would be the unknown. Therein would lie the problem for the fighters.

[Navaleye]

Aside from Cdr Ward's efforts several long range pot shots were taken at C-130s with Sea Dart. The CO of Exeter was very keen to go west of the islands at night to bring a few down, although ROE applied to to flight approaching the islands not leaving them. Permission was not granted by staff.

[cosmiccomet]

Mirage IIIEA were not capable to hunt the Avro Vulcan due to several reasons.

The first one is the range without air refueling, those airplanes were limited to 10 min at station over Malvinas flying higher than FL260.

So when the Argentine's long range radars were detecting the bomber at around 150 NM from Puerto Argentino, the MIIIEA have to be scramble from Rio Gallegos at not less than 40 min flight time...no chance at all to get an interception.

On June 10th, the Argentine Air Force Boeing B707-320 flying long range recce detecting three airplanes flying to Malvinas.
Those airplanes were presumed as Avro Vulcan or Nimrod, so a mission of four MIIIEA were lunched for hunting them but they couldn't get any contact when arrived to the target area.

[Milo Minderbinder]

Following from cosmiccomet's post..
The Argentines presumably suffered as much as we did from the lack of an AEW platform
How much difference would a couple of Neptunes fitted with AN/APS-20 have made?

[orca]

Marcantile and cosmiscomet - many thanks indeed.

My point isn't that the Mirage III EA would be of any use against a Vulcan strike on the Falklands having scrambled from the mainland. That would be a little daft.

The standard UK line is that the Vulcan caused assets that would otherwise have been used against the task force to be used to defend the homeland. From what we think so far the only unit to receive a change in orders was Grupo 8. Our Argentine sources are saying though that the Mirage III EA of Grupo 8 could only get to the FI at medium level and even then for a very short time. They had new and untried weapons and a radar that didn't look down. They lost two of their comrades on day one.

I cannot rule out BB as a factor in the decision to re-task a part of Grupo 8. But the Mirage III EA appears to have ruled itself out of offensive ops as well.

Marcantile - do you know what fighters went to Buenos Aires? The ones from Rivadavia or Gallegos? Did they operate out of Tandil? I make it about 900 miles from Rivadavia to Buenos Ares. Of the 15 single seaters left do you knwo what split there was between the three locations?

[cosmiccomet]

As far as I remembered is that the AAF left only two or three single seat MIIIEA plus the single 2 seater MIIIDA at Mariano Moreno AFB where the Grupo VIII was located at that moment in peace times.

The same happened in Tandil AFB where 3 two seats IA Dagger B and 2 or three single seat IA Dagger A remained at war time for Buenos Aires Air Defence role.

[Thomas coupling]

I was involved at the time and I distinctly remember us all looking at each other when the news broke describing what had been organised with all the pre planning, endurance flying, number of refuels, only to be completely astounded that they.................................missed the bloody runway!
Incredible waste of time and effort. A massive PR blunder if you ask me. Time has cooled things now, but I can't see the programme doing anyone any favours, stirring it all back up again. I suppose it depends on how the director/producer bias the programme.:rolleyes:

[Pheasant]

The question that should be asked is "Given the assets in the direct theatre of operations, why was the raid proposed in the first place, particularly given its complexity (in terms of assets required to execute)?" The raid would only ever have had a miniscule effect on the battle (due to the remote likelihood of weapon on target) and thus should have been discarded at HQ level.

[Pontius Navigator]

"Given the assets in the direct theatre of operations.

I think that is the point. The Vulcans and Victors were not in the direct theatre of operations. I think it was already mentioned that an essential C130 resupply mission would have kicked the BB mission in to touch.

The long range RAF effort added an additional indirect pressure in support of the task force. Can you come up with a better opening gambit of the crack of doom just before dawn broke?

The only thing better would have been a 9x16 round broadside from the Rodney. They would have arrived at the same time, no rolling thunder

[Archimedes]

The question that should be asked is "Given the assets in the direct theatre of operations, why was the raid proposed in the first place, particularly given its complexity (in terms of assets required to execute)?" The raid would only ever have had a miniscule effect on the battle (due to the remote likelihood of weapon on target) and thus should have been discarded at HQ level.

Yes, but as noted earlier, it was raised at War Cabinet level and Admirals Lewin, Leach and Fieldhouse - later joined by Admiral Woodward who invited his aviators 'to shut up' (when they expressed opposition to the raid) - were in favour. Given that CDS, 1SL and CinC Fleet thought it a good thing in terms of possible psychological effect, discarding the idea at HQ level was a tad unlikely.

The problem, I fear, is that the kabourophobic argument concentrates entirely upon the hackneyed old, tactical level perspective that the raid was a massive, ineffective waste of fuel and effort because of RAF insecurity and a desire to 'play a part' (which, of course, the RAF was doing through a variety of assets).

This approach resolutely refuses to consider other factors largely because of service parochialism. Even if you rule out strategic effect, then as part of what would now be called [Buzzwords]'the Influence piece' [\Buzzwords] it makes sense. The irony is that those in dark blue who damn the raids' premise run the risk of blissfully ignoring the breadth of thought, perhaps even strategic vision, of the three admirals mentioned earlier. They didn't care whether a bomb hit the runway or not, because CAS had told them how damned difficult that was to achieve. What they cared about was the possible effect on the junta, world opinion and possibly the tactical dispositions of the one Argentine AF fighter unit that was a dedicated air-to-air squadron.

[Widger]

and of course, we must not forget that the cold war was still in swing at the time and it probably impressed upon other persons as well!

[glojo]

Archimedes,
I think we all agree that those flag officers supported those missions, do you seriously believe they would say anything other than that? This was a joint operation and NO ONE should be trying to score points at the expense of the maximum effort against the common foe.

I get very tired of those that try to drive a wedge between the different services it is uncalled for and plain wrong. We should all pull together and perhaps try to find nice things to say instead of petty bickering. Those missions were RAF missions and unless they DIRECTLY interfered with the Navy side of the operation then of course the Admirals would say what they did.

What is being suggested by some folks is that just under 14,000,000Ibs of aviation fuel might have been an expensive price for the grand total of one dumb iron bomb hitting a concrete runway! (7 x 1.94million) If the RAF were happy with that then fine, but we could not supply enough aviation fuel to Wideawake and were acquiring it from our allies. Don't forget that those operations were taking up every single tanker in theatre which meant no other long range mission could be flown from that location until those tankers and their crews became available. No important crucial spare parts or equipment, no extended Nimrod surveillance flights. All these things had to wait until all those aircraft had returned and had all the necessary servicing carried out before getting these urgent items down to the fleet.

As I keep saying, if the RAF were happy with this and no valuable supplies or equipment were delayed getting down south then fine but I will tactfully suggest that the issue of resupplying the battle group may well have been an operational game stopper and perhaps a quiet word 'might' have been whispered in the higher corridors of that concrete frigate HMS Warrior. A quiet word in private whilst publicly toeing the quite correct party line. that is the way to conduct a war and I for one will suggest this is the way to conduct business.

There were numerous 'Daring' air missions by all three services and my own thoughts are this specific one was an amazing administrative exercise but I cannot get my head around its drain on valuable resources and how anyone can rate this specific operation as being the MOST 'daring' of them all, it just seems so wrong. (In my personal opinion)

We have seen how close air support missions flown by the Harriers might have been a far far greater morale killer and who knows the effects of the naval gunfire that kept the occupying force awake at night. The locals at Stanley were allegedly just curious about the Vulcan bombs thumping into the grass... at night, with nothing to see where they were from, they could have been weaponry from air, land or sea??? There was also lots of large guns keeping the locals awake and amongst those bangs we are asked to accept that a few extra exploding dumb bombs were going to have a significant effect on morale?? How does that compare with a daylight raid by Harriers that come screaming in at a great rate of knots at low level with rockets flying through the air. The noise of those aircraft is enough to get some soldiers messing their pants, the exploding rockets will perhaps just add to their fear.

I personally would suggest the latter will have a far greater effect on those poor souls on the receiving end?

Note
I am not for one millisecond suggesting any one specific service was flying those low flying Harriers, this was a joint operation flown by some VERY brave pilots from all of our armed services.

Apologies if I am not that coherent but hopefully folks can struggle through my witterings.

[Ken Scott]

How does that compare with a daylight raid by Harriers that come screaming in at a great rate of knots at low level with rockets flying through the air.

But that would have exposed the aircraft & their pilots to substantial ground fire and potentially heavy losses which have could have had a negative effect on our morale & a positive one on theirs. Black Buck demonstrated a long reach & a relative measure of invulnerability that had a very positive effect on British morale, certainly at home as I remember it. The effect on Argentine public opinion would have been the opposite I'm sure.

[Pontius Navigator]

As I keep saying, if the RAF were happy with this and no valuable supplies or equipment were delayed getting down south then fine but I will tactfully suggest that the issue of resupplying the battle group may well have been an operational game stopper and perhaps a quiet word 'might' have been whispered in the higher corridors of that concrete frigate HMS Warrior.

glojo, I think you answered your own question both here and in your earlier posting.

Admiral Fieldhouse had to decide if he wanted long range Naval surveillance , Vulcan operations or Hercules drops to ships.

The Admiral had to decide - not the RAF.

the relative priority that had to be juggled between demands of Vulcan, Nimrod and Hercules operations; and the physical limitations imposed by fuel stocks and parking space at Wideawake Airfield ……………………………………….We therefore had to balance the need for seven tankers to support long range Nimrod reconnaissance against a Hercules spares run to the fleet which required rather less, and the 100% tanking effort demanded by a bombing sortie

You would have to show that spares were delayed reaching the task force or that essential Nimrod reconnaissance missions were missed. Even if spares were delayed or sorties missed I think we can assume that the BB missions were accorded the proper priority at the time.

Just to refresh, actual BB missions were flown on 30 Apr, 3 May, 31 May 3 Jun and 12 Jun. Two others were planned with one scrubbed and one recalled. Hardly intensive operations that could interfere with the Task Force. The first two raids predated the Pebble Island raid by at least 10 days and the 3rd was after Goose Green. The 5th was on Stanley just before the surrender and "bombs were supposed to detonate in mid-air, not to explode at impact" which would have exerted even more pressure as the land forces pressed in on Stanley - certainly combined ops.

[500N]

Ken Scott

"that had a very positive effect on British morale, certainly at home as I remember it. The effect on Argentine public opinion would have been the opposite I'm sure."

+1


Not too sure why Thomas said the following.
"Incredible waste of time and effort. A massive PR blunder if you ask me."

.

[glojo]

Hi Pontious
I certainly do not disagree with any of your points, the BB raids would as we all accept take a huge degree of planning and as you rightly point out there were not many of them, but can we just say those raids took place on that one specific date and the tankers would be available for operations for all the other periods? (question NOT a statement)

Getting every single tanker asset available for a raid on the 33rd day of the month will require all those aircraft to be fully operational, fuelled up and ready to roll on that date, so how long would that take to ensure they were all on the ground, all serviceable and all ready to roll on the 33rd?? What are the ramifications for any long range missions for the preceding days of those missions?

Hopefully you can understand those questions as all tankers were required for these missions and to get them all available on the apron ready to roll on one specific date may well take time? I am just trying to get a grasp of the mechanics to organise what I personally call an amazingly complex operation. Apologies to orca for not developing his interesting part of the question and a thousand apologies to any of the crews that took part in these BB missions, I have TOTAL respect for what you did and hopefully we all accept I am NOT suggesting anything other than that these were pushing the realms of capability to the very edges of our expertise? :ok:

Apologies for being a bit slow Pontious but are you confirming what I have said or are you querying it?
The Admiral had to decide - not the RAF.

That is what I said :ok::O and fingers crossed we are all in agreement with that point.

I am NOT against these missions, never have been, never will be. They demonstrated a capability and I keep saying my only issue is with the 'Most Daring' suggestion.

Ken Scott
Yes those low fling missions did expose those brave pilots to small arms fire and and the very real risk of being shot down...., That is sadly what did happen to a few unlucky pilots. Hence you will NEVER hear me criticise the bravery, professionalism and courage of all aircrew and again I repeat that is why I query the title of this thread. I am NOT belittling the Vulcan raid, I am simply in the corner that states they feel other raids\missions may have been more daring!

Hopefully I have clarified my position and I wonder if the senior officer in command of organising these BB missions was getting Green Shield stamps for every gallon of aviation fuel or did they collect the Esso World Cup coins....

http://cdn.uploads-preloved.com/uploads/userphotos/10/0919/2318368-832m.jpg

[Fedaykin]

Right I am not usually a poster on this forum but some of the attacks on the success of this raid are starting to irritate especially as they appear to be more born out of Dark Blue vs Light Blue service rivalry! All the old hackneyed reasons for why it shouldn't be seen as a success have come out:

They missed the runway (they didn't)

They only got one bomb on the runway (As planned getting NO BOMBS on the runway could still be a success)

The Harriers could of done better (it would of required all of them to fly low over the base and they didn't have the payload or fuel for the same effect)

In the context of how the raid was planned it was an utter success, people seem to think the Vulcan was somehow meant to fly down the runway and drop the whole stick along its length...that just isn't how the mission was planned! As planned the aircraft dropped the stick at a 35 degree angle to the runway the intention being to actually straddle it as close to the middle as possible (thats how no bombs hitting can still be classed as a success). The whole point is for the bombs to come in steep and bury themselves in the ground before exploding...this will then cause subsidence making the runway unsafe for fast jet operations. This is EXACTLY what happened with Black Buck 1, they came in and managed to clip the runway almost bang on the centre as planned.

In the end we can conclude after the event that the Argies didn't plan to operate jets off the runway but at the time we didn't know that. Whilst the Mirages and Daggers couldn't safely operate off the runway at Stanley the Skyhawks of the Airforce and the Navy might of, operating off the Falklands they could of been far more dangerous! Considering that unknown it was entirely reasonable having a stab at the runway and the taskforce commander was all up for if it added further confusion to the Argentine defenders! The Vulcan was the best way to effect that, all the Harriers of the task force would of had to fly directly over the airfield at lower level to drop the same tonnage of bombs and with less effect then the stick dropped at higher altitude by the Vulcan.

Black Buck got one bomb on the runway...yes but considering that falls exactly within the mission plan they should be given a bit more praise then unfair stick!

[TEEEJ]

500N wrote

Not too sure why Thomas said the following.....

Because he is still thinks that none of the Vulcan bombs did any damage to the runway.

RAF News, April 26th 2002, has a piece from retired Air Commodore John Davis. Davis was the first commander of the operations wing at RAF Stanley. In relation to the runway crater from the first Black Buck mission Davis wrote "This rogue crater required a succession of repairs amid what soon became high intensity air operations."

[500N]

TEEJ
Thanks, that's interesting.


I can still remember the highs and lows of the conflict from a civilian perspective
as the BBC News came on each night and the papers in the morning.

[ZH875]

Considering the Vulcan was a Cold War Nuclear bomber, if it had been carrying its 'normal' cargo of instant sunshine, I don't think that not hitting the runway with 2 iron bombs would have made much difference to the destruction caused.

However, it was 1940's analogue driven technology, and even if it made no difference to the Argentine war effort, it certainly gave the British a lift.

And a bloody good beer call on the airfield when '607 returned.

ZH875 (see off crew for XM598 Black Buck 1)

[Marcantilan]

Well, I think the bombs of BB1 were less important than the message (we could hit the mainland...)

On the other hand why, if the Harriers could do better, the best anti-runway mission of the whole war was carried on May 1st? What happened with all the subsequent SHARs and Gr3 antirunway missions?

[TEEEJ]

No problem, 500N.

Some additional info.

RAF hit the target

Sir - Ewen Southby-Tailyour (Letters, May 5) is wrong in his description of the damage to the Stanley runway.

As Commander, Royal Engineers, I was responsible for its repair immediately after the surrender. There was one large crater caused by a 1,000lb bomb from the RAF Vulcan raid, and four smaller craters resulting from earlier Harrier attacks. (The Argentines had also created dummy craters to confuse our aerial reconnaissance.) Repairing the large crater and the large area of runway took about two weeks and 1,000 square metres of captured Argentine runway matting.

Lt Col Southby-Tailyour is, however, correct in stating that Argentine aircraft were able to continue to use the runway, despite the bombing raids, by temporarily backfilling the craters. This, perhaps, is why his "recce" did not spot the true extent of the damage.
Maj Gen G.W. Field (retd), Sedlescombe, East Sussex

From

Letters to The Daily Telegraph - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/letters/3639732/Letters-to-The-Daily-Telegraph.html)

[Navaleye]

It also makes you wonder why they pressed on with JP233 when the whole concept of low level runway denial was so flawed.

[orca]

I think I differ only slightly from the above post.

The plan.

1. What the BB crews did was remarkable.
2. The plan, I believe was sound, why not demonstrate reach? It might show the enemy that his homeland was under threat. It might trick the enemy into thinking we actually planned to target the mainland.
3. The plan, I believe was sound, Woodward thought Stanley might operate jets - any way of denying the enemy this freedom of manoeuvre should be exploited.
3A. As part of a concerted Joint venture the bombs could deny the use of the airfield to slow movers and Tac AT. Good plan.
4. The plan, I believe was sound, no-one else really needed the gas or bombs.
5. The plan, I believe was sound, no-one likes being bombed and the raid was likely to result in a lowering of the morale of some Argentinian troops.
6. It would at least give the junta something to worry about and the Sun something to shout about.

Execution.

What the guys did was remarkable, be it co-ord, tanking or actually employing weapons.

Debrief.

Here's where I differ from some. I have been fed the effects of the raid for 30 years. My hobby is military history. I want to find out the truth. The truth simply cannot contain phrases like 'It must have.' what i have heard for 30 years has largely been supposition based on how we'd have felt if someone had done it to us. I am free to research and debate bomber command, Singapore, the many Afghan experiences the Uk has had. Why not cast an eye over BB in the cold light of day? How else do we learn?

So to take the points in order:
1. The crew did a magnificent job. Indisputable.
2. We definitely demonstrated reach to ourselves and there is evidence that a small number of AAF jets* were re-tasked to AD of the homeland vice attacking our chaps. This was a close run encounter, single sorties were important.
3. Evidence suggests that the enemy never did intend to use the runway for fast air. Oh well, how were we to know.
3A. We can claim a 'disrupt' here but no more. Oh well...thems the breaks.
4. Good plan, no-one ran out of gas or bombs.
5. In all probability it did lower the Argentine morale but maybe not amongst the frontline elements. We have no way of knowing because we are working off assumptions based on the observation of troops around Stanley.
6. I cannot speak for the junta as I can find no record of their discussions. The Sun definitely did shout.

* If we rule out the twin seaters, that couldn't get to the FI due fuel load, and the jets based at Tandil which is 200 nm south of BA (so suspect they were simply left there when Grupo 8 deployed) we have evidence to suggest 2/3 Dagger were based in BA that could have supported the war effort in the south. Probably enough to man a QRA pair. This is significant - every little helps - but not a game changer.

Summary. BB was a sound plan. To some it appears a poor investment, others have spent a long time claiming effects that don't necessarily stand up to scrutiny. No-one needed the assets it used and it did have some effect on the enemy. From an aircrew point of view (perhaps demonstrated by future aborts and low sortie rate) it is remarkable that the guys achieved what they did.

[TEEEJ]

Marcantilan wrote

On the other hand why, if the Harriers could do better,....

The points were highlighted in David Morgan's book 'Dangerous Skies'

Also see post by 'Edmund Spencer'.

Post #357

http://www.pprune.org/aviation-history-nostalgia/297920-falklands-crash-sites-18.html#post4929686

Actually, we did try it! For a period of several days, may even have been a couple of weeks, we all carried a single 1000lb centreline bomb with a DA fuze of sorts on the way outbound from the carrier to the CAP station. The idea was to drop it over Stanley airfield at high level during the transit.
You can read about it in Sharkey's book and how it led to the greatest 'switch pigs' of the conflict. One of the difficulties in the Sea Harrier cockpit was that the 'pickle' button had several functions amongst which were missile firing, bomb release, camera run, acceptance of loft attack etc.

In the case of a bombs attack it was crucial to deselect the missiles, something Sharkey forgot during one of these bomb passes!! It also explains why John Leeming couldn't fire his missiles when behind an A4 (forgot to select) and ended up closing to one of the most spectacular guns kills of the conflict.

The Sea Harrier had absolutely no high level bomb aiming sight or capability whatsoever so the release point was ridiculously inaccurate. I have no idea where any of my bombs landed.One of the reasons Gordy Batt ended up dropping his free fall 1000lb bomb on the Narwhal was that he was carrying it after having passed over Stanley in bad weather and had been unable to sight the airfield. (Bloody good job it didn't go off!!!)'

[Milo Minderbinder]

Irrespective of the rights/wrongs success/failure debate as to whether the raids achieved anything, what everyone forgets is that we scored a spectacular own-goal with the first raid
Within days the UK press was full of detail as to how many tankers were required to mount the raid, thus making it clear to all that an attempt at anything more than a one-aircraft token (and probably suicidal) attack on the Argentine mainland was impossible
If their lordships had kept their mouths shut over the technicalities I'm sure the Argentines would have felt more restricted in their actions.

[Pontius Navigator]

It also makes you wonder why they pressed on with JP233 when the whole concept of low level runway denial was so flawed.

I wasn't going to say anything publicly but your mail box is full. That is some monumental thread drift.

[Courtney Mil]

Interesting post there, TEEEJ. The button that sat under the right thumb did pretty much all those things in lots of jets. Sorry to hear of so many switch pigs from the guys that claim to have won the war.

[Written with QWI hat on]

[Pontius Navigator]

CM, nothing new there. Several years before at a fire power demo one F4 should have salvoed 6x1000lb HE. The other two aircraft dropped but he didn't.

As they didn't want to risk landing with 6 live 1000lb bombs and an unknown reason for a hangup they elected a safe jettison and cleared 3 dummy Sparrow, a strike camera, a SU pod (fully loaded), and 4 training SW.

It was not possible to determine the reason for the failure to drop but . . .

Then of course where the switches were indeed all in the correct positions - splash one Jag.

Or more recently when a Jag dropped all his practice bombs neatly package in the CBLS.

Happened all the time. Of course I never made a switch pigs much.

[Courtney Mil]

Neither did I, obviously. But doesn't make it any better.

Oh, and the middle one wasn't a switch pigs. Exactly the opposite. A kill's a kill.:cool:

[orca]

I've always considered Ward's Sidewinder shot a little odd as there should have been a 9L growling away shouldn't there? I understand the thinking of getting your bomb pylon live and then having a winder up just in case, but from there on the excuse matrix is bare.

I believe I am right in saying that Leeming didn't know you had to select the missile master panel (low behind the stick) on to fire the 9L. I think he was new to the aeroplane.

Morgan's book also tells of Gordie Batt having a loft brief prior to launch at night IIRC.

(Respect and RIP to both of the above)

When did the camera on/off move from pickle button to the nose wheel steering paddle switch? Anyone know?

[Navaleye]

The min/max ranges of an AIM-9 at 300ft are very close. I suspect this was the issue. All the more reason for ASRAAM with a much longer range.

[orca]

Navaleye - sorry, I was talking about the 'negligent discharge' one. Having thought a bit longer about it I think I'm right in saying that the 9L used to growl on selection but then cooled to a hiss and growled again at target acquisition.

[Navaleye]

Suspect what you are talking about is Finger Pigs due to fatigue. Happens a lot in combat conditions. Interesting that AIM-9 only got 28% in GW1. Suspect it was used wrong. Got 80%+ plus down south.

[500N]

Back to the Vulkan, thought this might be of interest, Roy Ewans obituary in the Telegraph.

Roy Ewans - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/military-obituaries/air-force-obituaries/9141792/Roy-Ewans.html)

[Load Toad]

21x 1000Lb HE bombs going rapidly one after the other in the dead of night must have done wonders for the moral and nerves of a mostly conscript army living in cold & damp conditions.

[Pontius Navigator]

LT, quite. It was quite spooky from 3 miles away in day time when we were expecting it. Worse than 8 or 9 salvoed IMHO.

[Mike7777777]

I think that is the point. The Vulcans and Victors were not in the direct theatre of operations. I think it was already mentioned that an essential C130 resupply mission would have kicked the BB mission in to touch.

The long range RAF effort added an additional indirect pressure in support of the task force. Can you come up with a better opening gambit of the crack of doom just before dawn broke?

The only thing better would have been a 9x16 round broadside from the Rodney. They would have arrived at the same time, no rolling thunder

On a point of historical accuracy ;), I should mention that Rodney would have been very unlikely to use a full 16" broadside for coastal bombardment, too much collateral damage to Rodney Would have a mess of the runway though.

[exMudmover]

PSA RUNWAY ATTACKS

Mainjafad

“On the other hand why, if the Harriers could do better, the best anti-runway mission of the whole war was carried on May 1st? What happened with all the subsequent SHARs and Gr3 antirunway missions?”

The full story of this is complicated.

PSA runway was attacked by GR3s and Seajets several times after May 1. The Seajet night raid (Toss Bombing) led to the sad loss of a FAA pilot in a takeoff accident, and was not repeated. No hits were achieved.

1(F) pilots carried out two GR3 raids on the airfield with Sea Harrier defence-suppression support, neither of which significantly damaged the runway. (On the first of these the KRETS were improperly fused by Navy armourers, thus reducing their cratering effect). 1(F) had little control over bomb fusing and weapon loads for most of the war.

Next, on the suggestion of a 1(F) pilot, GR3s formated on Seajets in daylight Toss Attacks releasing 9 bombs per salvo. If this had been continued they would probably have achieved a deep-penetration hit eventually . However, RN Commanders refused to send more Seajets on Toss bombing raids. 1(F) were then tasked by the Navy to continue these alone, a pointless exercise as the GR3 had no Toss Bombing computer capability at all. (All weapon aiming throughout the war was fixed sighting)

Later on, as PW2 became available, 1(F) tried mutual designation in an extreme High Dive profile, using VIFF to stay out of the Roland/35mm envelope. No results were observed, and they were ordered to stop because HQ 18 GP advised them that their onboard LRMTS was ‘not compatible’ with the PW2s in use. (1(F) had been advised by CTTO several months before that they could, in emergency, use their own laser to designate.)

The full story is in RAF Harrier Ground Attack Falklands

[MAINJAFAD]

Thank's Exmudmover, I've got Jerry Pook's book, just not to hand. One other thing noted by Sqn Ldr Pook is that 801's QWI told him that 801's average miss distance was 400 yards with a medium level drop, while Ward's account states that 800 NAS were literally missing the aim point by miles. He also states the daylight mixed formation attempt was in fact very close and would have most likely caused major damage to the runway had it been tried a few more times. I bet if you work out the CEP of every bomb dropped by the two Vulcan attacks at the start of May, their average miss distance is a lot less.

[Ivan Rogov]

I suspect the hot middle east might have had a significant effect on the 9L success rate compared to the cold south atlantic among with a multitude of other factors :rolleyes:

[Engines]

Gentlemen,

I've deliberately stayed out of this thread to date, mainly to see what got said, and also to do some research with key participants (and I mean very senior key participants).

To start, Black Buck was a considerable feat of airmanship. To get a Vulcan over a target over that range was a brave and highly skilled piece of planning and flying. The RAF crews that took part deserve much credit for what they did. These are, I hope, indisputable conclusions.

However, it's my view (and by all means feel free to disagree) that these basic facts have become obscured by some regrettable attempts to overemphasise and overstate the effect and impact of the Black Buck raids. It's been claimed here and in other publications that the RN requested the raids, and that the RAF went along reluctantly. That's not true. The C4 trail asserts that Black Buck 'changed the outcome of the war' and that the safety of the Task Force 'depended on its success'. That's not true. Roland White's book makes similar claims that the missions 'achieved all their objectives' and goes on to claim that they directly led to the sinking of the Belgrano and the withdrawal of 'all Argentinian Mirage aircraft' to defend the mainland. To this day, the RAF's own website asserts that the raids 'placed a bomb in the centre of the runway'. It's not true.

Here's my conclusions, based on evidence from those in positions of command at the time, and in other positions of first hand observation. I'd also add that I was serving in 'Invincible' at the time.

Black Buck was an RAF initiative. The Task force Commander had, quite rightly, identified that any Argentinian move to base fast jets at Stanley would be a severe threat. Because of this, he decided that a combined operation was required at the outset of the war to deter any move to do so. The combined operation planned for 1st May against Port Stanley included a substantial Sea Harrier bombing effort, and also naval gunfire support. Very early on in the planning, the RAF (I understand, from witnesses, that it was Beetham) put forward the idea of adding a Vulcan raid from Ascension. The RN Task Force Commander accepted this offer with gratitude, and even defended it against some opposition from his own aviation advisers. To me, this appears to have been a sensible and realistic move - hit Stanley with as much 'stuff' as the UK could generate to stop any chance of fast jets getting based there.

So, the Black Buck raid on the 1st May was one part of a combined operation. There is no doubt that the aim was to hit the runway - no other aiming point makes sense given the bomb load. The fact (and it's indisputable from the first recce photographs) is that the stick (quite rightly aimed at cutting the runway at a 45 degree angle) essentially missed by about 500 yards. The first bomb in the stick hit the runway near the edge, the other 20 dropped well clear. The bomb did not hit 'in the centre', and it's unfortunate that some photos used since then (including the one on the RAF website) do not line up with the authoritative photos taken by the Task Force just after the raid.

The second bombing raid on 3rd/4th May was a complete failure, since the crew failed to arm the bombs before release and dropped 21 'duds'. This fact is omitted from 'Vulcan 607', which somewhat misleadingly limits its account to a single sentence saying that a crew 'got their chance on 3 May'.

The last bombing raid, on 12th June, also missed the runway. The photograph on the RAF website actually crops out the craters from this stick. The RAF's website account of these three raids is unclear at best, misleading at worst.

I can't, in all honesty, see that 1 bomb in the target area (the runway) from 63 bombs dropped represents a military success, and one has to conclude that the Vulcans' bomb aiming systems were not up to the task.

The airstrip continued to be used by the Argentinians without any major issues. However, the combined operation of May 1st (of which Black Buck was a part) certainly deterred any Argentinian move to base fast jets at Stanley, if it existed at all.

Some of the subsequent speculation on the impact of 'Black Buck' is again, in my view, aimed at trying to justify the raids against the lack of direct success. There's some evidence of minor reallocation of Arg AD assets, but there was never any serious planning to hit the Argentinian mainland (and I remember the Op Corporate ROEs with some clarity on that point).

Yes, it helped dent Arg morale. First hand accounts from those on the islands confirm that, but place as much if not more emphasis on the naval gunfire which happened at Stanley on a fairly regular basis.

In sum, I stick by my conclusions, which are:

1. The RAF were desperate to be seen to contributing to a war in which, due to the basics of range and absence of land bases, they were unable to participate in a direct combat role.(I'd add that their C-130 resupply flights were extremely important to the operation)(I haven't forgotten 1 Sqn, but they weren't there on 1 May - see my other posts on their professionalism)

2. Black Buck gave the RAF a way to be seen to be contributing operationally.

3. Their inclusion in the raids of 1st May and afterwards by the Task Force Commander was militarily sensible - why turn down an asset?

4. In the end, the actual military value of Black Buck bombing missions was marginal, due to inaccurate bomb delivery and the risks inherent in long range missions depending on a number of AAR events. Many sorties were cancelled or aborted. Sadly, a number of people have since overstated their effect. So has the RAF, and they continue to do so to this day. They should stop doing so.

5. The indirect military effects of Black Buck are probably less than have been claimed. In the end, the only thing that really mattered was direct action around, on and above the Falklands. The biggest blows to Arg morale were most probably the sinking of the Belgrano and the overwhelming ascendancy of the Sea Harriers. However, this is open to conjecture. Others can differ, and will probably do so.

6. What is not open to conjecture (in my view) is that the 'Black Buck' crews were brave, skilled and daring in carrying out a series of very long range sorties. They certainly deserved recognition and congratulation, and still do so.

Best Regards as ever,

Engines

[MAINJAFAD]

Engines

Ward is wrong about the 2nd Black Raid, as this photo which was taken by one of his own pilots from 801NAS in late May 82 proves!!!!! (He is right about a Vulcan dropping the bombs fused wrongly (they were armed however), however it didn't happen in May 82, which kind of cuts down the options on guessing which Black Buck raid it was).

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/0/0a/Stanley_runway_craters.jpg

The real strategic hit that the Vulcan could have put in would have been if that Shrike fired at the TPS-43F on the first Black Buck ARM mission hit that radar head on (just slightly damaged it apparently). That would have been a real game changer as it would blinded the Argentine to all of our air movements around the Islands for the later part of the war. The TPS-44 that the Argentine Army used on the Islands was U/S for most of the war after taking a near miss from a 4.5 inch shell on 11 May according to an Argentine operator of the equipment who posted his account of what happened to him in 82 on another froum.

[orca]

Interesting last post. What was the issue with the bombs? Fused incorrectly by the armourers?

[Archimedes]

Engines, with respect, as one who has said on several occasions that Admirals Lewin, Leach and Fieldhouse were in favour of the raid and more so than MRAF Beetham who was very sanguine about the chances of success, let me be clear that does not equate to me suggesting that the RN requested the raid.

MRAF Beetham presented the Vulcan raid as an option, with a sober analysis of the difficulties of success. The three Admirals mentioned offered the view that despite this, attacking Stanley airfield was worth doing because of their perceptions of the possible effects on the Argentines, which were not guaranteed. Admiral Woodward came into the picture at this point, agreeing with the assessment that the wider possible effect of Blackbuck 1 made it worth doing, over-riding the objections of some of his aviators who failed to see the wider possibilities that might emanate from the attack.

There is much in the history presented which is either confusing, open to debate, or just plain wrong. For instance, there is evidence from Argentine sources which contradicts the notion that Black Buck 2's bombs did not go off. There is evidence from Argentine sources (not Middlebrook, as I mis-remembered earlier, but Salvador Mafe Huertas) that Grupo 8's Mirages had their tasking rebalanced or altered. There is a claim that 'the secretary of state' (which one?) ruled out bombing the mainland, but given that Tony Benn and Tam Dayell can be found (via Hansard) warning of the gravest consequences of such an attack as late as 20th May - i.e. the day before Op SUTTON, it clearly hadn't been ruled out as categorically as some accounts suggest. We also have the problem that much of the running here has been made by Sharkey Ward and Roland White's accounts, both of which have.... shall we say 'issues'? I'd suggest that until we have full visibility of the documents - not long now - being able to interpret these events with something approaching certainty, or at least confidence, is difficult. The end result is that we end up attempting to interpret unclassified sources, or sources which have crept into the public domain, influenced by partial accounts and/or service allegience, or accounts which say, or repeat certain things (the clear rejection of an attack on the mainland) with confidence, when the evidence from the time, upon examination, suggests something a little different.

[Engines]

Archimedes,

Thanks for the response, and the very good points you make. I was not, I'd make clear, singling you out for the suggestion on RN/RAF 'push' for the raid.

However, I stick by my conclusion that the RAF devised the 'Black Buck' raid. I don't think anyone thought the RN devised it. If the RAF thought it would not have worked, I'd expect Beetham to say so. They thought it would, and the RN command (quite rightly in my view) took it into their planning. It was part of a combined assault on Stanley starting on the 1st, and in military/damage terms it was, to say the least, 'limited'. Once again, I will say that this does not detract from the bravery and skill of the crews and their feats of airmanship to get there.

On bombing the mainland, I recollect the ROEs quite clearly, and in my view while excitable MPs might have sounded of on the issue, the main focus of operations was on the Falklands and militarily defeating the Arg forces there. It's my view (honestly held, but as ever open to disagreement) that trying to assign a number of indirect 'morale' and 'reallocation' effects solely to Black Buck is a mistake.

Did it get a lot of coverage at the time? Yes, no doubt. UK papers jumped all over it. But, from the Arg comments I have seen, the 'Belgrano' sinking was the massive and singular 'hit' on the Arg public perception. Arg pilot morale was badly affected as SHAR kills climbed (thank you the US for 9 Lima). From my direct experience on the ground before the surrender, Arg soldier morale was crumbling from day one, especially among conscripts, more so after Goose Green, helped by poor leadership and inadequate logistics (including lack of food). We found emaciated remains of conscripts just a couple of miles from massive food dumps. A horrible sight.

On sources, yes, I agree that the full picture is not yet out. But there is one full picture that is, and that is the Task Force recce shot (yes, taken by a SHAR, but using an RAF camera) that clearly shows the bomb fall. It's the dissembling on that basic stuff that I find troubling, especially on an official RAF website.

Again (and sorry to repeat here) - my concern is that overstating the effect of Black Buck generates exactly this sort of exchange, which only serves to obscure and diminish the recognition the Black Buck crews deserve. An open and honest description of the raids, without trying to hype the results, would serve those brave people far better.

Best Regards as ever,

Engines

[bloodywild]

Downplayed ! I should think so ! the truth is to be found in Sharkey Ward's "Harrier over the falklands"
1 the jets couldn't use stanley runway, it was too short . At a cost of millions the runway is long enough now ! if the argies invade, they will have their Etendards there and we have no more harriers to take them on .
2 4 attempts one aborted because someone left the window open , one forgot to fuse the bombs , all for one hit at the very end of the runway, which did naff all.
at a cost of millions - yes millions of gallons of fuel
laughable, pathetic, another attempt by the raf pr machine to pretend it was involved.

[Q-RTF-X]

the truth is to be found in Sharkey Ward's "Harrier over the falklands"

Oh really !!! :}

[Pontius Navigator]

orca, see PM.

[Pontius Navigator]

On a point of historical accuracy ;), I should mention that Rodney would have been very unlikely to use a full 16" broadside for coastal bombardment, too much collateral damage to Rodney Would have a mess of the runway though.

Mike, you are probably right as coastal bombardment would have been late on in the war. I see she used to fire 4 or 5 gun salvoes in succession but she did against the Bismark.

<<At 09:44 Rodney now desperately short of fuel but determined to finish off the German ship, had closed to almost point blank range and was firing full nine gun broadsides into her.>>

But

<<After the battle Rodney Most of the damage was self inflicted;

· Inside smashed light fittings and sheared electric cables were everywhere, sanitary piping was ruptured, toilet bowls and urinal ceramics shattered, and various rivets and bolts in her structure sheared - probably during the firing of nine gun broadsides.>>

I recall reading one book where an army unit was pinned down in a hedge row by German machine guns in a wood across the field. A NGSO suddenly turned up and asked if they needed any help. A couple of minutes later it was like express trains going overhead and the woods erupted.

Even a 5 round salvo would have delivered around 10,000lbs in one bang!

[Pontius Navigator]

Your post is risable.

Downplayed ! I should think so ! the truth is to be found in Sharkey Ward's "Harrier over the falklands"

Right

1 the jets couldn't use stanley runway, it was too short . At a cost of millions the runway is long enough now ! i

No it isn't. Once Mount Pleasant was operational the Stanley runway was shortened again.

If the argies invade, they will have their Etendards there and we have no more harriers to take them on .

Harriers! Maybe but the Typhoon is rather more capable in that respect.

2 4 attempts one aborted because someone left the window open , one forgot to fuse the bombs , all for one hit at the very end of the runway, which did naff all.

Must be an Irish runway. The bomb was in the mid-point of the runway but admittedly off the centreline.

[Marcantilan]

ExMudmover: Thanks for your explanation! :ok:

[MAINJAFAD]

Orca

Last Vulcan attack in mid June dropped bombs fitted with VT fuses which should have been set to air-burst over the airfield. I got the chance to read the official RAF history (the secret one) in 89 and it stated that the fuze settings had been incorrectly set in the cockpit and this had lead to a unit inquiry. According to the wiki entry on the Black Buck raids, one of the sources at the bottom of the page states that an official history published in 2005 states that the fuze's had been set to impact and the stick had missed the airfield by a wide margin.

[glojo]

I asked the question about how many days it would take to get all available tankers ready to support these BLACK BUCK missions and the answer according to Air Marshal Sir John Curtis was three to four days…

He also makes it quite clear that the greatest concern at Warrior was the vulnerability of the Battle Group to air attacks. We are then told that the RAF could offer long range Nimrod surveillance but according to this Air Marshal that required a minimum of seven tankers.

So what he is saying is that the biggest concern of our most senior flag officers from all three services was the vulnerability of the battle group however during the four days prior to these missions there would be no surveillance missions. He also states that whilst these missions were being configured, other aircraft had to be redeployed away from Ascension to either the UK, Gibraltar or any other suitable location.

When the missions were being organised I would like to think the meteorological department would be consulted to offer an input as to suitable dates where the weather might stop air operations against our battle group?

The greatest concerns of the Command Team at Northwood was the Task Force’s vulnerability to air attack and the possible attrition of the Sea Harriers, not only from enemy action, but due to weather and the other hazards of operating in the South Atlantic in the middle of winter………………. The greatest threat to the two aircraft carriers was from the few Argentinean Super Etendard aircraft armed with Exocet……………………………………………………………………………………..

Unfortunately our ability to replay the Vulcan card was limited by three crucial facts: the availability of flight refuelling tankers; the relative priorities had to be juggled between the demands of Vulcan, Nimrod and Hercules operations and the physical limitations imposed by fuel stocks and parking space at Wideawake airfield……… As we have heard these decisions required three or four days’ notice in order to ensure the appropriate aircraft were at Ascension and to redeploy those aircraft that were not required back to the UK, Gibraltar or elsewhere. The upshot of this was that only five BLACK BUCK missions were completed. …………………………………………………………….
He then goes on to talk about what these missions achieved

So were the raids worth it, I have absolutely no doubt they were, especially the first one, which sent a very stark message to Argentina. If we could reach the Falklands then we could reach Buenos Aires As a result they moved a number of their Mirage jets north to defend the capital which significantly reduced their ability to escort offensive missions against the task force. Had they been able to do so it would have made the work of our Sea Harriers far more difficult.
Please forgive me for marking a few words with a blue font but I thought it was the politest way to highlight just a few of the points raised by the Air Marshal.

Point One
At the time of this conflict I am quite sure the bombing of the mainland was not a significant worry to that nation, they knew and we knew that having bombers hitting the mainland of Argentina would be political madness? However they KNEW beyond ANY doubt that we had submarines just off their coastline and I would suggest that was a far more significant threat? A threat to any ship that dared to sneak out of their ports or maybe we had special forces embarked on one of our boats? :suspect:

They knew the exact number of Vulcan aircraft we had at Ascension and also when they were taking off on their missions. They would have ample time to put up a reception committee without the fear of loosing those fighters, plus of course they would have early warning of their approach, so in the grand scheme of everything that was happening I ask myself how significant was that 'worry' about an attack on the mainland.

They had NO idea of how many submarines we had deployed off their coast, but they knew submarines were somewhere off their coast, they had no idea how close, or how far away those submarines were or what they may or may not do, and that to me would be a FAR, far greater 'worry' than the minuscule risk of their mainland being bombed by Dr Strangelove.

I would therefore very respectfully suggest the submarine 'worry' trumps the possibility that a bomber MIGHT attempt to get close to their mainland??

Point 2
orca has carried out some very in depth research into the number of Mirage jets that were moved and were capable of acting as escort to the offensive missions against our fleet. I am under the impression that this number might not be as 'significant' as it is alleged, BUT that may very well be me misunderstanding the posts from that highly qualified gentleman ?? (Question for orca to clarify)

What a significant number of posters seem to be unable to take on-board is the FACT that we are all commending those that took part in the BLACK BUCK missions… every single man jack of us.

We all recognise what went into the planning and implementation of these missions but are we still meant to accept they were the MOST DARING missions of that conflict… Note the words 'most daring'

The point keeps getting mentioned of how our flag officers did not object to these missions or even welcomed them, no one here disagrees with that. No one denies that our Admirals did not object to these missions taking place and we all agree that dropping bombs on the bad guys is good… Doing nothing is bad.

I have tried to answer the excellent point raised by Pontious when he states:

Just to refresh, actual BB missions were flown on 30 Apr, 3 May, 31 May 3 Jun and 12 Jun. Two others were planned with one scrubbed and one recalled. Hardly intensive operations that could interfere with the Task Force. I could say, All we have to do is look at what happened four days prior to each of these missions onwards to see whether they were indeed good value. BUT to me that is so wrong as I hate with a vengeance those that use hind sight to try and justify their cause. The fact was that there would be NO long range air support from Ascension for 'X' number of days all based around the actual mission dates. I hope you can accept that as an answer as it all depends on how much importance we place on:

The greatest concerns of the Command Team at Northwood was the Task Force’s vulnerability to air attack and the possible attrition of the Sea Harriers, not only from enemy action, but due to weather and the other hazards of operating in the South Atlantic in the middle of winter………………. The greatest threat to the two aircraft carriers was from the few Argentinean Super Etendard aircraft armed with Exocet Those missions did succeed in getting a few Mirage jets redeployed but the 9L missile had an ability of a different class that also redeployed those assets and would those few Mirage have altered that very one sided kill ratio?

Hopefully the RAF consulted with the Battle Group and explained that for the four days prior to each mission and until all relevant aircraft were bought back to Ascension there would be no long range surveillance missions, and no chance of any emergency flights to bring down stores or equipment.

Once those missions were completed it would be back to playing ‘Musical chairs' with all the aircraft that were removed to the UK, Gibraltar or elsewhere and get back to those supporting duties of trying to have some type of very much needed surveillance cover, plus the ferrying of desperately needed spare parts and equipment. We can only assume that this was explained in great detail because if a vital item of equipment was required then the relevant party was up the creek as the aircraft that was capable of bringing that item down south had in all probability been deployed 'up north' and would not be back until the other aircraft had all been redeployed away from Wideawake!!

Engines.
If an aircraft were to attack that runway at a 45 or maybe 35 degree angle of approach then how many bombs would we expect to actually hit the strip?

The RAF are the bombing experts and if they decided to hit that location those types of angle then I would like to believe a lot of thought went into that decision. I for one am NOT qualified to even dare disagree and I say that with the greatest of respect. To a lay person hitting that lump of concrete at an angle of either 35 or 45 degrees was pretty darn good.

In answer to a query relating to the amount of aviation fuel that was used then I have already stated that in weight but I would guess it would be about 1.7million imperial gallons and I wonder how much that would cost in pounds shillings and pence, or perhaps just in £'s :8 .

This was an RAF mission, they were happy with the cost vs effect and that is all that matters, we all know where I stand...

We won they lost

BUT............I will always maintain this was NOT the most daring mission.

Congratulations to all those that took part and I am NOT criticising their efforts, not now, not yesterday, nor tomorrow.

Let's PLEASE not get personal and start mentioning names of individual pilots, it is annoying, frustrating and unhelpful. In times of war we have all seen that pressing the wrong button is not uncommon, it should not happen, we train for it not to happen, but the reality is that button 'A' often gets pressed instead of button 'B' and we loose our money!! (old wrinklies will no doubt know where I am coming from (http://www.unicornkiosks.com/images/interiors/renters.jpg)) :*:O:O

[VP-F__]

As a Falkland Islander who at six years old lived through the conflict dare I suggest that the most daring raid as such was the total job done in ensuring that my Islands remained British.

Given that the Argies had taken the Falklands logic would suggest that they should have held onto them given the logistics involved to attempt what then took place.

There seems to be a lot of bitching over who's service was best but then I guess there always will be and each war that comes along provides commentators fresh chance to talk about the inevitable cockups that will happen.

As a kid who was fast asleep less than four miles from the impact point of the Vulcan's bombs and used to collect shrapnel that had fallen off his roof after the previous nights shelling could I just say how thankful I am to all that were involved (whatever service you were from) for enabling me to grow up being proudly British. :ok:

[Pontius Navigator]

The RAF are the bombing experts and if they decided to hit that location those types of angle then I would like to believe a lot of thought went into that decision. I for one am NOT qualified to even dare disagree and I say that with the greatest of respect.

It was simple maths.

Assume that the runway is 120 feet wide and the bombs are dropped at an interval of 0.24 seconds which equates to 144 feet. If attacking at 90 degrees it would be possible with a perfect attack not to hit the runway at all.

By attacking at an angle of 30 degrees the line over the runway would be 240 feet and you would guarantee at least one hit. Had the stick been dropped only a quarter second earlier then there would have been two hits.

[glojo]

It was simple maths.:ok: Gets my vote

Tongue in cheek

Some might go for s*** or bust and at 10,000ft do a dump where it might make a real mess or stink.. but clearly owt is better than nowt.

Like I said Pontius this was an RAF mission, they are indeed the experts and they did EXACTLY what they predicted.

The problem with the written word is that its meaning can so easily be misinterpreted. I am NOT being cheeky, sarcastic, or dare I say ... rude. The plan went for the safest option of hitting the runway. :D:ok::ok:

[Pontius Navigator]

Last Vulcan attack in mid June dropped bombs fitted with VT fuses which should have been set to air-burst over the airfield. I got the chance to read the official RAF history (the secret one) in 89 and it stated that the fuze settings had been incorrectly set in the cockpit and this had lead to a unit inquiry. According to the wiki entry on the Black Buck raids, one of the sources at the bottom of the page states that an official history published in 2005 states that the fuze's had been set to impact and the stick had missed the airfield by a wide margin.

There were two switch settings required. One activated the electro-magnetic fusing units (EMFU) and the other set an electrical impulse to arm the VT fuse. To achieve an airburst it was necessary to set the first to NOSE/TAIL (ie UP) and the second to VT (also UP).

If the first was set DOWN only the TAIL EMFU would be energised. If the VT was also set DOWN then no electrical impulse would be generated.

On return to base after a successful drop for ground burst - BB1 or BB2 - all 21 EMFU tail lanyards and fuse safety pins would be flaying around the bomb bay. The 21 nose lanyards would be in the EMFUs.

For a deliberate airburst attack - BB7 - then the nose lanyards would have been connected and the required switch setting would be Nose/Tail (UP) and VT (UP). If there was no need for a ground burst then the tail fuses may not have been fitted. If the Nose/Tail switch had been set to Tail (DOWN) as it would have been for BB1 and BB2 then there would have been no explosions.

[MAINJAFAD]

glojo

30th Apr and 3rd May don't count on the diversion of tanker assets as the only British aircraft that could get to the Falklands and back from ASI were the Vulcan and Victor. (On April 2nd the only aircraft that could do it was the Victor) Hercules and Nimrod AAR fit trials programmes were still in progress. Also no delay was caused to the early long range Hercules air drops as they didn't use AAR, but were fitted with up to 4 ex Andover overload fuel tanks in the cargo area.

The Argie TPS-43F and TPS-44 radar's were priority targets as they not only gave raid warning against offensive attacks against the airfield at Stanley and other places, but they were able to monitor SHAR CAP stations and transits (which allowed the Argies to abort attack and transport missions), plus workout the general location of the CVBG from the SHAR's / GR3's climb out / decent points, thus providing targeting information for the later Super Etendard attacks. (Having done 3 tours of the radar sites down there over 25 years over every month in the year, I wouldn't be surprised if the Argie radars did get the odd primary/IFF return off the ships and low level aircraft of the CVGB as I've seen the coastline of South America on the scopes of the West Falkland radar sites on numerous occasions where theoretically, I shouldn't have seen anything below 25000 ft. Anaprop and atmospheric ducting down there is really bad at times).

Harrier GR3's with SEAD capability didn't get down south until the final days of the war, hence again the only aircraft we had that had the capability to lug ARM's down south was the Vulcan (Buccaneer couldn't do it due to the fact they couldn't carry enough engine oil to last the length of the mission). Hence the Vulcan ARM missions were a very credible and in fact the only responce to a major thorn in the side of our operations.

[Navaleye]

Not a veteran but went down there twice after. Anaprop was a big problem sometimes. I remember trying to explain to my management that the surface target we held at 200 miles could not be real. Coventry engaged similar anomalies with 4-5 during the event.

[MAINJAFAD]

Navaleye

I've actually seen the QRA intercept over the horizon surface tracks down there, the first time was when the guard-ship (operating to the west of the islands) picked up a target using a radar on both its search radar and ESM systems well within the FIPZ. Both of the West Falklands radar sites picked it up as well and from what the computers were displaying on the scope it was at 2000 ft and seemed to be in an orbit. The Guard-ship ESM operator ID'ed the targets radar's as that of a C-130. Phantoms were scrambled, successfully locked on to the target with their radars which they thought was around 1000ft and called Judy. When they finally closed on the target they discovered it was in fact a fleet of Polish fishing trawlers!!!:eek::eek::eek:

[Navaleye]

Ha Ha, I can believe that. Rocks at 200 miles look like an enemy fleet, I never understood the physics of it but you get used to it.

[Pontius Navigator]

Deviation but we used to observe anaprop all the time when I was at school. On the beach at St Bees we could see the Isle of Man up in the sky with the sea out to the horizon below it. All ducting. It is just refraction of light in the atmosphere and it was sort of possible to predict based on the weather conditions.

A common cause of this phenomenon is an atmospheric event known as a temperature inversion, which occurs when a layer of warmer air forms above a layer of cooler air, reversing the normal altitudinal trend and interfering with the radar beam’s path. This often happens on calm, clear nights within areas of high-pressure; after sunset, the ground begins to lose heat quickly, cooling the near-surface air, while subsiding air aloft (associated with the high) warms as it sinks, eventually forming a relatively stable blanket atop the cooler air below.

The effect is not dissimilar to sub-surface convergence zone propagation.

[Thomas coupling]

As an observer in all of this, I am impressed by all the comments and knowledgeable inputs regarding the issue. Pontius has, it seems, hit the nail on the head on a number of occasions.:D
My conclusion then, as it is now, remains the same: This evolution was complex, demanding and dangerous. It was flown by competent crews in trying circumstances. Ultimately, though it was a PR 'stunt' by the hierarchy in the RAF to remain "engaged" in the action. From a strategic perspective it achieved the square root of nothing and it most certainly was NOT the most 'daring' raid of the war - far far from it.

I have a question for those in the know:

Why did the plan require the bombs to straddle the runway at almost 70 degrees? Surely a more acute angle to the runway direction would have resulted in a greater hit rate?

[glojo]

Good morning MAINJAFAD,
Thanks for that and I hope you do not think I was trying to give a distorted picture. I am using the words of an Air Marshal to avoid any Inter Service bickering that might take place if I simply made those claims. Fuel usage was a major issue as was the prioritising of the other numerous missions being flown.

If I were to ask any questions regarding those missions then perhaps I would ask why when flying SHRIKE missions did we not involve the Harriers? Get the Harriers to try and encourage the ground radar to light up but keep those valuable assets out of 'HARM's' way!! :sad::ok:

No ground radar switching on, then make hay... but lets try to take advantage of that weapon load that costs so much to fetch all the way down sarf and consider involving the Harriers to get the ground radar up and running.

If the radar does come on then introduce Mr Shrike to Mr Argie!!


Thomas Coupling has kindly asked the other question that I was going to ask regarding the angles of attack by the bombers.

I do accept that there were only a minimal number of pilots that could fly the Harrier at night but war is war or should that be 'conflict, is conflict and that could be a topic for another thread :)

Again I repeat.. Congratulations to every single member of the military and Merchant Marine that took part in that conflict.

John

[wiggy]

Why did the plan require the bombs to straddle the runway at almost 70 degrees? Surely a more acute angle to the runway direction would have resulted in a greater hit rate?


One for the mud movers I know but AFAIK if you go for too acute an angle, e.g. in extremis trying to align the stick with the runway, if you hit you'll hit with every bomb :ok: but if you miss, and put the stick to one side, then you've miss with every bomb :uhoh:.

It's a compromise.

(I'm sure someone will be along with a better explanation and a diagram soon)

[HTB]

wiggy

That's a good, simple and clear explanation; it also illustrates that a single aeroplane will not be very effective in terms of causing damage sufficient for runway denial. Multiple cuts are required to deny use in the short term and to make repair a tedious task.

Unless you're recce, when you deliberatley aim to miss the target (but by a precise distance):ok:

Mister B

[reydelcastillo]

In Ref to ANTPS 44

We were able to se the general position of the Aircraftcarriers based on when Harriers apear and desapear from the screen .- We were able to track most airplanes within the range of 120 to 160 NM . ( it's max range was 200 NM ) .-
Ships were seen on the screen at about 15 to 18 NM and that allowed us to track and direct the fire of 155 mm over them .- We were tracking Glanmorgan the night it was hit and updating its position every 15 seconds when we got hit with naval artillery from another ship , which left only the Rasit ground base radar to do the last tracking before the exorcet was fired .-
How far away could we track airplanes flying at low altitude ? : We were able to see the C 130 coming in to land when they were between 12 and 15 NM away , and they were coming low , very low .-

[Pontius Navigator]

My conclusion . . . Ultimately, though it was a PR 'stunt' by the hierarchy in the RAF to remain "engaged" in the action.

I think the mood of the country at the time was engagement. Had the RAF not offered support then it would have appeared to be disengaged.

From a strategic perspective it achieved the square root of nothing

You have the right to draw that conclusion.

Why did the plan require the bombs to straddle the runway at almost 70 degrees? Surely a more acute angle to the runway direction would have resulted in a greater hit rate?

Look at my post 119 again. I made assumptions of width of 150 feet (adjacent) and bomb spacing of 200 feet (hypotenuse) which gave a maximum cut angle of 45 degrees to ensure at least one hit. Eyeballing the photo above I would guess the angle at nearer 30 degrees. That is calculated as I said on the actual width of the runway and bomb interval in the stick.

Bomb spacing is determined by the release interval with 0.18 seconds being too short for the system, and 0.30 or 0.45 being more likely and the groundspeed of the aircraft. At the medium level bombing heights I guessed at 600 feet per second.

PS:

My sqn considered how it could become engaged. Deployment was ruled out not from a lack of a suitable base but because the distance between airfield friendly to UK was too great and we could not get there. The other option was out the box and we didn't fancy the idea of a limited number of one-way missions (I kid you not it was considered - briefly)

[reydelcastillo]

I would like to post what I saw that May 1st almost 30 years ago .-

The previous night we were told to expect the conflict to start early next morning , we were with the ANTPS 44 on top of Sapper Hill , we were having problems with it and the mechanics finish fixing it at about 0330 or 0400 Am on that May 1st .- A few minutes later a eco apears on the screen at about 70 NM aproaching from the NE , soon after some more splits on the screen show a total of between 5 and 6 .- Later knew it was the Vulcan with ECM .- I gave the alert to the Air Post Comand , they ask me to verifie and I did , from there on I tracked the Incoming Airplanes updating its position every minute until the Vulcan atacks the airport .- The Roland which was close to the Airpor and could have been in reach to target the Vulvan had been moved the previous day to the base of Sapper Hill to protect the Radar .- The alert was given to triple AAA but mainly because of lack of experience nobody shot at it .-

[AR1]

In straightforward terms of 'Daring' - Bold, Adventurous Then the raid was all of those. 'Most daring' ? Probably!
Militarily successful - in terms of its objective, most certainly not. Although I cant imagine it was a pleasant experience to have been billeted on the airfield when 21 bombs came down, or indeed thinking another 21 might be coming down the following night.

[orca]

Reydel,

Fascinating post - many thanks.

How long did it take you to realise it was a single aircraft and not the five or six you saw? What was your view of the damage caused?

How did you get on with the other Blackbuck missions as regards getting Roland to target them? Did you change any procedures as the war went on?

Thanks again. orca.

[reydelcastillo]

Thank You Sir

There were two Radars in Islands the ANTPS Westighouse ( 3D ) that belong to the Air Force and resposible to guide our Aircrafts into combate and the ANTPS 44 ( 2D ) Cardion which belong to the Army and was part of the Triple AAA .- Information from both Radars was send directly to the Air Post Comand ( Joint Air Post Comand / Air Force/Army and Navy ) .-

The Air Force Radar was initialy installed at the Airport and then moved at the edge of the Town , the Army Radar was installed at Sapper Hill .-

That first Raid was a wake up call , without doubt and amaizing raid because of the distance , the amount of refueling required and surely never expected .- It was never in my mind the posibility of having to encounter a Vulcan , we had analized and study the Harrier , not the Vulcan .-

[reydelcastillo]

I realized it was a single aircraft , many years later when it was told to me by a British Harrier Pilot .-

[reydelcastillo]

The damage : Severe in terms of that from now on we had to add the Vulcan with all its capacity ( Bombs and Shrike missils ) as another threat .- It may have not caused all the damage expected to the Runway , but it was a blow to the moral .-

[reydelcastillo]

For what I have read the next Vulcn Missions were flown at hire altitudes , regarding the Shrikes , that was a head ache in its self .- It was able to hit a Triple AAA Skyguard , and we knew they were going to come after us .- The Vulcan misions oth shrike became more simple to detect , they flew in an oval patern waiting to engage its target .- In some cases we were advice of its approach in others the airplane in the oval patern was seen and inmidiatly you must turn off the Radar until the threat is gone .-

Remember the Cradion is ( 2D )

The Vulcan Missions had a heavy moral efect .-

[Shack37]

The thread entitled "Falkland's Gamble" having been locked, for those interested, part 2 is being broadcast tonight on Ch5 starting at 2000 GMT.

Apologies all, it's a repeat.

[reydelcastillo]

It was also told that the Vulcan Pick Up a Harrier which acompany him half the way to the Airport .-

[Pontius Navigator]

The Vulcan Missions had a heavy moral efect .-

Maintenance of Morale is one of the principles of war.

I think that post confirms strategic effect.

[reydelcastillo]

It certeinly did Sir , It acomplished it's mission .-

[reydelcastillo]

I was hit twice by Naval Bombardment , but I still fear more the Vulcan .-
There is no Fox Hole were to hide from a Vulcan .-

[reydelcastillo]

Reply to Mr MANHAFAD on post # 122

I did have on primary the British Ships at about 15 MN and I did not have IFF Return from British Planes since we did not have the Nato Module for our Transponder .- Only modules 1/2 and 3 - It's correct what you have stated , we did know the aprox location of the fleet based on were the airplanes apear on the screen .- Note to this : Later on I found out that Airplanes flew low , beneath the Radra for some miles before landing on the carrier because they knew that we could track its location just by following the Airplanes .

[VP-F__]

The Air Force Radar was initialy installed at the Airport and then moved at the edge of the Town

the old tactic of locating valuable assets close to the civilian population to avoid it being attacked was indeed alive and well throughout the war. I did not realise this was the case with the radar but I know that it was the case with the surface launched exocets such as the one that hit HMS Glamorgan. They arrived on a hospital ship along with special forces (my Dad photographed it unloading in front of the house) and were only taken towards the airport area at night when it was safe to do so.

[cosmiccomet]

The MM38 launchers were transported by C-130H Hercules....I don't know what your dad was seeing but certenly it wasn't an MM38...

And by the way, Kelpers were traited much better than the Pirates did with the Argentine settlement in 1833...they were sent it by ship to the continent...

[The Oberon]

I believe that Martel was first considered for the ARM strikes but was considered too big once the radar had been moved to a more urban location. Shrike was asked for, given and used in order to localise damage.

[spekesoftly]

The thread entitled "Falkland's Gamble" having been locked, for those interested, part 2 is being broadcast tonight on Ch5 starting at 2000 GMT.

I don't think there is a part 2 ? CH5 is now showing a repeat (started at 19:00 GMT) of last Tuesday's programme.

[reydelcastillo]

Thank You Cosmicomet

Regarding this First Raid I would like to post two things that were told to me by British Veterans :

1) On that first Raid a Harrier acompany the Vulcan from one of the Carriers to about 40/ 45 NM as a precaution

2) On this Firts Raid the Roland was not brought into consideration for the planing of the Atack because it was thought that it could not be transported by Airplane to the Island .- Which in fact did .- But was at the wrong location that first day of Combate .-

[Pontius Navigator]

I believe that Martel was first considered for the ARM strikes but was considered too big once the radar had been moved to a more urban location. Shrike was asked for, given and used in order to localise damage.

I have no direct knowledge of Shrike or Martel but a comparison suggests that there were good reasons for the selection of the Shrike.

It is true we had Martel and that would have solved the procurement problem however:

The Shrike weighed around 390lbs compared with 1200lbs for Martel. In comparison with a bomb load that may not have been significant.

The speed of the Shrike according to one source M2.0 compared with the Martel at around 0.9. The higher speed offers a significant advantage which coupled with its smaller size would reduce its vulnerability to AAA.

The range of Martel is given as up to 60km compared with 40km of the Shrike. While the increased range is attractive if used it would give a flight time in the order of 3 times that of Shrike. A shorter flash to bang time is better.

I would conclude that the Shrike offered a significant tactical advantage in this scenario.

[VP-F__]

of course they did Cosmicomet, it would not have been within the spirit of war had they been bought in on that ship now would it? :rolleyes: I notice by your age by the way that you were only 8 years old at the time so your information is clearly from other sources. I am going on what my Dad (and plenty of others) witnessed right in front of us.
As for the history prior to 1982 that is for another thread elsewhere and not for getting in the way of the real topic of this thread.

[orca]

PN,

I think that we can confirm that Reydel's posts that the BB missions definitely did damage the morale of those Argentinian troops ivo Stanley - as we have all either suspected or supposed. This is of course logical as being bombed isn't nice. (Very interesting to hear from the receiving end and particulalry the comparison with NGS.)

I don't think we can state the effect was strategic because the reduction in morale might be geographically limited. Whilst maintenance of morale is a principle of war can it not be a tactical issue vice strategic?

What do you think?

[glojo]

We have to listen to what this gentleman says about the morale effect and if I was based anywhere near that airfield or radar installation then I would also be concerned, or worried.

We have heard how aircraft leaving Ascension were identified and their course logged so did this information get to the radar operators at Stanley?

I see one of the posts answers that query:

For what I have read the next Vulcn Missions were flown at hire altitudes , regarding the Shrikes , that was a head ache in its self .- It was able to hit a Triple AAA Skyguard , and we knew they were going to come after us .- The Vulcan misions oth shrike became more simple to detect , they flew in an oval patern waiting to engage its target .- In some cases we were advice of its approach in others the airplane in the oval patern was seen and inmidiatly you must turn off the Radar until the threat is gone .-

I have asked elsewhere a question regarding the altitude of the first BLACK BUCK missions and it looks to a degree that this has been halfway answered by the statement that the SHRIKE missions were flown at a higher altitude but reading that reply it really hammers home my observation about team work regarding those latter missions. With hindsight is it a possibility that the radar would have remained switched off because they knew the weaponry being carried aboard those bombers. was this an opportunity missed for the Harriers to come in whilst our enemy was blind? (polite, inquisitive question and NOT a statement)

Did Commander Air have pre warning of these missions and was the group ever asked to join in? I accept there was overhead night fighter support but I am thinking more along the lines of taking advantage of that radar equipment being switched off, or.... If the SHRIKE attacks had been successful, then instead of self congratulations, would it have been better for Harriers to have mopped up?? When a man is down, far better to hit him rather than wait for that person to get back up onto their feet! :sad:


For the information of reydelcastillo

We were tracking Glanmorgan the night it was hit and updating its position every 15 seconds when we got hit with naval artillery from another ship , which left only the Rasit ground base radar to do the last tracking before the exorcet was fired . Regarding being shelled on the night Glamorgan got hit, the chances are that this was compliments of the Yarmouth. On that specific night she was in the same area as Glamorgan carrying out NGS and that ship fired over 260 rounds of 4.5" calibre ordinance just on that one specific night!!! I have no idea how much Glamorgan fired, she had the same type weapons although slightly larger magazines\shellrooms, or indeed the third ship on station. Bottom line however was that there was an awful lot of high explosive raining down on those unfortunate soldiers. The third ship had to retire during the night due to a mechanical breakdown but she may have fired the relevant rounds.

Incidentally the British were aware of the approximate location of that Exocet launcher and Glamorgan should NOT have put herself in harm's way :O:O

Groups of warships would take turns going onto the gun line which would always mean going close in-shore and exposing themselves to enemy gunfire which regularly would exchange rounds with our ships so I would suggest this was also somewhat daring\risky. Especially as there was always the added risks of the area having been mined.

Two days prior to that specific shoot, Yarmouth had fired off 174 rounds and on that occasion she had come under fire from at least one shore based battery..

I have mentioned this just to let folks know that this naval gunfire support role was real, it was a nightly occurrence unless there were hurricane force winds which would rule out this nightly excursion. I cannot begin to imagine what the effects of multiple warships continually firing high explosive ordinance night after night for hours on end must have been, but to face that EVERY night and then during the day be on alert for incoming Harrier attacks must have been nerve shattering and quite literally soul destroying! ...

[Pontius Navigator]

orca, strategic - tactical - moot point I wouldn't try to argue either way.

[500N]

glojo

Interesting post.

So the Vulkans leaving Ascension were "were identified and their course logged"

Visually or by Radar and if so, by whom.

[glojo]

MkI eyeball ..

Merchant flagged vessels

[Milo Minderbinder]

If I've read the comments correctly, I get the impression the Argentines had prior knowledge of the availability of Shrikes - something which wasn't made public until the diversion on BB6

So
Who spilled the beans about the Shrikes?

[orca]

Does anyone have any idea what effort the British put into taking down these radars other than BB? It seems the BB crews went to great lengths to attack the radars but I haven't heard of anyone else doing it directly.

I can't remember it being mentioned in Ward or Woodward's book, although Jerry Pook does describe being tasked against a triangulated position for a radar - although not in Stanley I think. (Currently 2400 miles from my bookshelf so no quick reference available)

As for the air defences I remember in Morgan's book he had a Roland launched at him and obviously Mortimer was splashed by one, Pook saw one launched at Morrell's section during a Joint loft attack.

So the operators weren't exactly trigger shy - but it sounds like Vulcan was causing them to reactively shut off.

I know a feature of Pook's book is his frustration at the RN tasking of FW assets, particularly the poor (or non-existent) use of recce prior to a raid. Would it have been possible to find these systems from medium level or was the idea simply never floated?

[500N]

Mk 1 eyeball ?


Did they not fly one way first and then change course
or just unlucky ?

Am just asking.

[orca]

Sorry, immediate re-attack,

Isn't it interesting that the Argentinian response to NGS was to mount an exocet on a lorry and use a surveillance radar for surpic to get a shot off. But the response to BB was to turn off the radar due to the ARM threat. Probably demonstrates the esteem/regard/terror in which the defenders held the Vulcan. (As per the previous post about morale)

Can anyone confirm how the Argentinians found out about the Shrike? Was it intelligence led or simply a Shrike arriving one night?

The Argentinians accounts are very interesting as part of my thought process has always been to wonder what effect a single bomber would have. But it sounds like the defenders suspected as many as six aircraft were out there and if they (the defenders) were ARM aware they would also know there wasn't much they could do about it.

I think we can all agree that morale would certainly not be soaring in this situation.

[Pontius Navigator]

500N, evasive or deceptive routing is hardly feasible when you are fuel limited as the BB sorties were.

[reydelcastillo]

Gentelman allow me to answere one by one each post with the very few things that I may know .- And I apolagise for my misspellings .-

[reydelcastillo]

In Ref to Info received at the Radars regarding atacks .-

The only info once received before an attack was verbal late at night before May 1st and it only indicated that we all presume that the conflict was going to start early next morning ( which it did) .- I don't know the source I could even guess that the Icia Community may have done their Math and by themself came to the conclusion that it was going to happen .- I doubt that we by ourself would have any capability of detecting when an incursion originated at Ascension was heading our way . Unless some curious Rusian ship or airplane was in the Ascension area and by chance happen to know the Country Code for Argentina .

[reydelcastillo]

Reply to Mr Glojo in post 151 regarding turning off Radars when Vulcan approach

We only found out ( Us from the Army ) the existence of the Shrike capable of being launch by Vulcan after it hit for the first time our Skyguard .- Usualy we operated this way .- During the day the Air Force Radar was on duty to help guide our own Airplanes , the Army radar was also on duty to track British Planes during the day , and because we were able to see the ships when they approach the coast we remain on duty during the night until the last ship left the area ( 0330 aprox ) then turn off and back again on duty to try to catch the first Pac of the morning .- Having said this , the Air Force Radar with a range of 220 NM was ususally the first one to detect the presence of the Vulcan approaching and gave all of us the alert .- We turn off the Radar when Vulcan was detected and the Air Force Radar remain on , change Frecuencies and turn off and on to avoid getting engage .- When the Vulcan left the area , they let us know so we could come back on line .- Maybe besides seeing the Vulcan farther away than we did , they may have had other sources of info that alerted them of the Vulcan approaching , that I don't know .

[reydelcastillo]

Regarding the Harriers , if they would have been equiped with Shrikes , they would have knock out the whole AAA in the first few days of combat and left only the clear triple AAA ( no radar guided systems )

[reydelcastillo]

Regarding Mr Glojo on post 151 Ground artillery firing on British Ships .- This is what happen back then :

In the afternoon of May 1st the British Ships were seen for the first time and started the Naval Bombardment ,The ships were clearly seen on the Screen if I work the Rdara with a 1 degree negative and in primary Radar with no MTI as days went by the Officer in command of the 155 mm ( friend if mine ) told me one night that he was going to try and make a shot to the ships that were shooting at us .- I was seeing the ships in the Radar and when he made the first shot it happen to be that the Eco of the explosion shows up on the screen . From there on we started to do the math trying to predict the future position of the ship ( which travel at about 8 knots ) the distance at which they where ( about 7 to 8 NM and the time it took the 155 mm projectil took to reach the target ( about 55 seconds ) .- At first we didn't come close , but as day went by a Navy Officer was assigned to the Radar to do the math , and he did very well on it .- We were able to hit close several times .-

[reydelcastillo]

Reply to Mr Milo at post # 168 - I did not have prior knowledge of the Shrike , we came to find out about them after it hit the Skyguard .-

[reydelcastillo]

Reply to Orca at post # 161 - I found out about the Shrike after it hit the Skyguard - No previous knowledge of that capacity ( Shrike - Vulcan )

[cosmiccomet]

VP wrote,
of course they did Cosmicomet, it would not have been within the spirit of war had they been bought in on that ship now would it? :rolleyes: I notice by your age by the way that you were only 8 years old at the time so your information is clearly from other sources. I am going on what my Dad (and plenty of others) witnessed right in front of us.
As for the history prior to 1982 that is for another thread elsewhere and not for getting in the way of the real topic of this thread.

Dear VP, I don't know what your father or friends so back in 1982 but it wasn't a MM38 launcher off loaded from the ARA Almirante Irizar.

According to the real story, the MM38 luancher and guidance system was loaded in two C-130H from Espora (South East Buenos Aires) to Comodoro Rivadavia Airport and from there to Puerto Argentino airport.

If you have some Spanish language knowledge you can read a full article written by the one of the Navy Officers in charge of the developement of the SM38 Exocet.


http://www.irizar.org/820perez.pdf

[phil9560]

MK1 Eyeball means a human observed them - with one of their eyeballs :)

[Marcantilan]

Hello all, specially reydelcastillo.

It looks like AAF / Army units in the mainland had previous knowledge about Ascension plane movements and Shrike deployment.

I will come back tomorrow and post the (until very recently top secret) war diaries of some units, reflecting that.

Regards!

[glojo]

You have to remember that when these missions took place all or most other aircraft based at Ascension had to redeploy to the likes of Gibraltar, the UK and elsewhere. With 17 tankers plus the bomber taking off and all the other aircraft removed from Wideawake, then even if the Argentine eyes and ears were not 'wideawake' it would be something they could hardly miss!

I would be interested to hear about what surveillance equipment was carried aboard the much reported Boeing 707 that was used to monitor the seas en-route to the Falklands.

This type of free very valuable intelligence is something that would not be available IF.........if we had a conventional aircraft carrier or two in theatre. Argentina also had the early warning of radar and that would also have been the warning to give them lots of notice. The old HMS Eagle plus phantoms, plus Buccaneers, plus Gannet would have made that conflict a more comfortable ride??

I have heard lots of self congratulations with folks saying how these very complex flights were 'the most daring' but so far NOTHING to explain why they were the most daring. They were certainly without a shadow of any doubt, very complex, but was the only real risk factor compared to other air operations whether the aircraft would develop a mechanical defect which could happen in both war and peace? (polite question NOT a statement). There is clearly a risk factor when overflying a location you are going to bomb, but that risk is certainly NO greater than any other aircraft and when there is no radar and it is at night, is that risk a darn sight less? (polite question and again NOT a statement)

WELL DONE to all personnel that helped liberate those islands and give the people the freedom of choice

Thank you reydelcastillo for taking the time to reply. Interesting to read how those shore batteries operated. Respect to you guys and hopefully we can now all live in peace and let democracy decide future events.

In the 1960's there was a movement that demonstrated against war and had banners with the words...... 'Make love, not war (http://4.bp.********.com/-Dl4fyBzm9ow/Te2nPn-S2kI/AAAAAAAAFy8/F05zPwysi4w/s1600/Make%2BLove%2BNot%2BWar%2B-%2Btye%2Bdie.jpg)!! Let the politicians do their own fighting and let the rest of us enjoy living!

[high spirits]

I have read the last 4 pages or so. I think a certain individual is spoofing you all and is not who he says he is....just IMHO.

[Pontius Navigator]

then even if the Argentine eyes and ears were not 'wideawake' it would be something they could hardly miss!

While this may be true and there were probably many other clues. We must never forget the role of intelligence in this matter.

While the role of the intelligence officer "is to give the commander that information that he wants" may be true there are lots of other caveats.

Unpalatable intelligence may be held back at higher levels - remember 'morale'.

The secret squirrel mentality 'knowledge is power' - time and again in Vietnam intel was not passed to aircrew in case they were shot down. The very same intel that might reveal the risk of getting shot down.

Then there is C4I. Today at the click of a mouse we can find out information anywhere, any time and often extremely accurate.

In 1984 I was introduced to ASMA and its ability to pass twitter-type messages between two people or using a paging system send longer messages in near real time like this internet forum. It was revolutionary and much sought after by the RN. It was actually RAF funded and the RN only leased a few sets that had to be swapped between ships. Naturally secret squirrels got first look :).

In 1982 communications were much slower. The main method was by message teletype on capacity limited circuits - Flash traffic taking up to one hour and immediate 5 hours. Routine traffic would never have got through.

We thought we had an effective system; how effective was theirs?

From what reydelcastillo says their's was no better The only info once received before an attack was verbal(1) late at night before May 1st and it only indicated that we all presume that the conflict was going to start early next morning ( which it did) .- I don't know the source(2) I could even guess that the Icia Community(3) may have done their Math and by themself came to the conclusion that it was going to happen

1. Quicker but less detailed.

2. Secret squirrel protecting its source?

3. There are some good intelligence officers out there.

To suggest therefore that the intelligence was out there so they must have known overlooks the realities of the age and tends towards 20-20 hindsight.

[Yellow Sun]

In 1984 I was introduced to ASMA and its ability to pass PPRuNe-type messages between two people or using a paging system send longer messages in near real time like this internet forum. It was revolutionary and much sought after by the RN. It was actually RAF funded and the RN only leased a few sets that had to be swapped between ships. Naturally secret squirrels got first look .

In 1982 communications were much slower. The main method was by message teletype on capacity limited circuits - Flash traffic taking up to one hour and immediate 5 hours. Routine traffic would never have got through.


You were at least two years behind then PN. I used the Air Staff Management Aid (ASMA) extensively during Corporate. There were no terminals afloat at that time, but they did start to appear no too long afterwards. As for going to the secret squirrels first, that wasn't the case they were installed in ship's ops rooms.

YS

[taxydual]

Some insights from the Airships here.

http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/documents/Journal%2030%20-%20Seminar%20-%20The%20Falklands%20Campaign.pdf

[Pontius Navigator]

TD, thank you, saved to my Kindle for light bedtime reading.

[high spirits]

PN,
See post 163. It's like an episode of Fawlty Towers. Now read the rest and compare the spelling of some of some of the same words. I could be way off the mark, but I think you are being had.

[reydelcastillo]

Yes HS I am who I say I am - Check with Mercantiland " Historian and Author of the Book " Chasing the British Subs , Check with Cosmicomet , Pilot who flew to mayor Airlines and a Person who has study the conflict for long time , who I know peronally - As soon as you have PM working I'll be glad to provide you with more info .-

[reydelcastillo]

Replay to Marcantiland on post # 172 -

Thank You I did not know that , and this gives me the oportunity to express the following thought .- I have a deep respect for Historians and for those that have study the Conflict , they are the ones that have put together the accounts from both sides and are able to give us an accuracte account of what has happen .
We participants of the Conflict have only had a chance of live small parts in it , and this Historians and Persons who have study it are able to put together and show us a whole picture of whar=t has happen .- My respect to them -

[reydelcastillo]

For HS ,

Sir During the Conflict in the Islands :

Westighouse ANTPS 43 , 3D - Mayor Silva , later Brigadiere , author of the Book " Radar Malvinas " with a crew of 27 - The Radar with 3 consoles .- 220 NM Range - Air Force

Cardion ANTPS 44 , 2D .- Me - with 2 men , Radra with one console 200 NM Range - Part of the GADA 601 TRiple AAA -Army

Regards

[Yellow Sun]

When was ASMA actually introduced?

I don't know for sure, but probably 1980ish. Corporate did cause the roll-out to be accelerated and amended, units directly involved moved up the list very quickly. The link to ASI was invaluable. I cannot recall seeing any ASMA afloat until around 1984. The first attempts were none too reliable, but it improved rapidly after that.

By secret squirrel I was really 'abusing' station ops as a whole as the operational units had no direct access.

There really wasn't a need for squadron level access to ASMA and to provide it would have brought in a whole host of problems that it would not have been cost effective to address. Anyway, thrusting young flight commanders could cause enough mayhem with a direct dial telephone, giving them unsupervised access to a secure rapid comms system would have been a recipe for disaster!:uhoh:

YS

[high spirits]

Rey
Thanks, and I don't want to insult you so I will leave this thread. I remain unconvinced, mainly by your colloquial language versus your spelling. Some of it looks too deliberate for me.

If that offends, I apologise. I don't use the PM system through my own personal choice. As stated, I will take no further part in this thread, but sit back and watch with interest instead.

Regards

[TEEEJ]

HS,

I'm afraid that you are way off the mark. See posts on Military Photos by Reydelcastillo. Lots of posting history and information for you to pursue your theory.

View Profile: reydelcastillo - Military Photos (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/member.php?56866-reydelcastillo)

reydelcastillo | Foros Zona Militar (http://www.zonamilitar.com.ar/foros/members/reydelcastillo.5393/)

Reydelcastillo, thanks for your input to the various forums over the years. :ok:

[Pontius Navigator]

Back to one of the OP, Most Daring Raid.

Daring raid incontrovertibly; most daring, arguable.

Gritviken? Pebble Island? The Canberra attacks? The A4 in the Falkland Sound?

[reydelcastillo]

HS never leave the thread , there is no need to appolagise , we are the ones that appolagise because ou misspelings , remmeber English is not our native language .-

My Regards to You Sir .-

Thank You Mr TEEEJ is nice to read You Sir

I'm sure that as soon as Marcantiland and Cosmicomet wake Up ( because its already late in the morning ) both will be able to bring us pictures of the Bombing Raid and Marcantiland detail information of how was it that we knew ahead of time about this Daring Raids .-

I would also like to invite to the Forum Cris BV from Peru , a gentelman who has study in detail the Vulcan and Harrier operations in the Islands and Mr Jualbo from Spain , Ingeniere who has dedicated many years to analize each one of the air raids over the Falklands .-

[TheWizard]

Here we go again!!
Falklands bomb mission dismissed as 'RAF attempt to rewrite history' | This is Devon (http://www.thisisdevon.co.uk/story-15542755-detail/story.html?)

[orca]

My 20/20 hindsight statement for the day.

Would anyone else agree that we seem to have missed a trick?

We knew the Vulcan couldn't disable the runway, which the Argentinians hadn't lengthened anyway.

The Shrike seems, however, to have been a master stroke. The radars were obviously supplying the Argentinians with surpic for anti-shipping Exocet launch as well as 155mm fire. They were plotting a rough position for the TF from where CAP and CAS missions popped up. They were supplying a RAP (of sorts) for inbound strikers and Tac AT. They were working with Oerlikon and Roland.

It seems to me that the RN didn't really consider a anti-radar push. If it had it would have ordered more recce. The anti-radar effort from the RAF involved all the staggering work that the rest of BB did - and would also give all the secondary effects that we can't really agree on. But at least it was a mission that could succeed - and in causing soft kill etc seems to have worked.

Question for the UK side of the house. Was the BB7 air burst plan considering radars? Why did we revert to bombing after so few Shrike sorties? Was it anything to do with the divert of a previous BB? Could a Vulcan carry a mixed load?

Any RN types care to comment on whether we did actually consider the radars a threat or was 'poking the eyes out' not considered? Was it another case of thinking they couldn't have got it to the FI - a la Roland?

[bast0n]

Harry Bensons book of the Junglies at war in and around the Falklands has some wonderful stuff.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Scram-Gripping-First-hand-Helicopter-Falklands/dp/1848093624/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1331992503&sr=8-1

One or two stories may make it near the top here.

D

[TEEEJ]

TheWizard

Here we go again!!

For those that haven't seen the article written by Sharkey.

Sharkey's World: November 2011 (http://www.sharkeysworld.com/2011_11_01_archive.html)

You can imagine Sharkey winding himself up into a frenzy while watching the programme tomorrow!

[FODPlod]

I'm sure every little bit helped, as long as it wasn't at the expense of other, more pressing needs.

[TEEEJ]

Links to images of damage to the runway at Stanley.

Note area which appears to tie-up to the rogue crater from Black Buck 1. Or is the remnants of the earth mounds used to simulate damage?

http://img197.imageshack.us/img197/2484/03pista.jpg

Images showing Black Buck 2 craters in the foreground.

http://img5.imageshack.us/img5/5051/05pista.jpg

The other damage ringed is obviously not from Black Buck missions. Clearer image of the damage at following link. Lighter damage was created by bombs dropped from Harriers.

http://img12.imageshack.us/img12/808/02pista.jpg

From

Imágenes del conflicto de Malvinas < fotos > | Página 173 | Foros Zona Militar (http://www.zonamilitar.com.ar/foros/threads/im%C3%A1genes-del-conflicto-de-malvinas-fotos.258/page-173)

[reydelcastillo]

Great Images , as you can see and then compare , being under Naval Bombardment is " No Party " but for those have been under the flight pass of the Vulcan it must have been " Hell on Earth " - The alerts from incoming British Ships approaching the coast line for Naval Bombardment was given to all troops , so was the alert of Approaching Vulcan , the difference is that there is no way you can dig a hole deep enough to protect yourself from a 1,000 # coming down from those Vulcan .- Look at the size of those holes - Amazing Pictures -

Navel Bombardment as well as Artillery fiering at you , you can hear the whisel of the projectil , and you get use to predict were it will hit , if the sound of the whistle increases its heading towards you , so more less you are aware were it will hit , I have spoken with those that were in the receiving end at the Airport and none of them mention a whistle sound , what they stated is that it looks like if the earth is going to flip upside down and that the shock waves were even felt inside the fox holes .-

In Reply to Mr Orca post : I don't know why they did't go streight to the Radars at the bigining of the conflict , we all know that if you knock them down you leave the enemy blind .-

[Courtney Mil]

For those that haven't seen the article written by Sharkey.

Thanks, TEEEJ, I hadn't seen it. It is striking in one particular way. Having started out by stating that there is bound to be a lot of single-service PR aaround the 30th Anniversary, Ward then embarks on one of THE most blatant single-service rants I've seen in a long time. And I'm sorry, but I'm not taken in for a moment by his 'justification' that this all about avoiding procurement mistakes today.

The RAF, as Ward says, played very much a supporting role apart from the front line assets he mentions. That is undeniable and down to equipment scales at the time. He and his wonderful Harrier mates would have gone hungry very quickly without it.

The overall campaign is correctly perceived as a predominantly naval, amphibious and land force battle since, whilst the Royal Air Force contribution to success was considerable, it was mostly confined to personnel transport and logistics effort with a very small front-line part in the ground support of own forces. RAF forces directly involved in front-line operations were confined to one Vulcan, eight Harrier GR3s and one Chinook helicopter.

Interesting order in which to list the main players. Those that won the war and then the RAF. Hardly balanced. Actually, the war was won by the guys on the ground, with support from everyone else.

But the Sea Harrier could not have achieved victory in the air war without the dedication and professionalism of all those embarked in the Task Force.

Or the people that kept your supply chain alive.

The average age of these young lions was barely 20.

And the age of everyone else involved?

That 'paper' failed to convince me or hold my attention because it started out as just another piece of his self-opinionated FAA/RN/Harrier self-worship. Write something balanced instead. We already know how great the Harrier guys have always been.

For the record, I honestly believe that the Royal Navy is, in many ways, the most professinal of our armed forces and I fully recognise the magnificent job they did in the South Atlantic. It is Ward's 'Paper' that fails to impress, not the subject of his writing.

[orca]

Courtney,

What always amuses me (about the 'bl##dy crabs' arguments) is that there were so many Sea Harriers being flown by RAF pilots as well. Just to rattle some names off the top of my head you get Penfold, Morgan, Barton, Mortimer, Leeming.

I think that quite amazingly Pprune has managed to keep this particular thread intelligent and informative. The discussion about what BB did, didn't and could have achieved have been mature in the extreme for us!

The insight from the Argentine perspective has been fascinating.

[Courtney Mil]

Orca,

Yes, I agree. In particular, I'm enjoying the input from our Argentinean (Argentinian?) friends. And there is a lot of really good stuff coming out here. Most of it very well ballanced and well considered.

The importint thing in this case (back to the OP) is that the raid WAS daring. I didn't need Ward to spend a whole 'paper' telling us what a poor contribution the RAF made - doesn't detract from the great job the SHars and Hars did in '82. Perhaps just heading off the thought that someone might steal a tiny corner of his limelight.

The recognition of the RAF SHar guys is appreciated.

:ok:

[Marcantilan]

Well, documenting my previous posts.

Regarding Argentine intelligence about plane departing from Ascension Island.

http://i802.photobucket.com/albums/yy302/nestortacconi/DIARIOS%20DE%20GUERRA/Cdo%20Br%20I%20Mec%20XI%20-%20DG/img912.jpg

Look at # 515 (this is I Mech Br war diary. The Br was operating in the coastline, protecting Santa Cruz): Yellow alert, two Vulcans departed from Ascension island 290300May82, received from BAM (Military Air Base, San Julian in this case) And this is just one example.

Regarding previous knowledge of Shrike using. AAF operators trained since the beginning for anti radar procedures (also they developed a switch to turn off the radar from outside it). They "sensed" that Shrike will be given by US, but they think Harrier gr.3 will be the platform of choice.

On BB5, "certain" signals were obtained, and the TPS-43F radar was shut down several times, complicating the Vulcan target aquisition and, finally, just one of the missiles was a near miss (or a near hit?). The story was told by Mj Silva on his book about the radar (Diario de guerra del Radar Malvinas, Editorial Dunken, Buenos Aires, 2007 - I have my signed copy here)

About reydelcastillo, yes, he was there and he is who is claiming. I could assure that.

Regards!

[Courtney Mil]

Wow. A great piece of history. Thank you.

[glad rag]

The insight from the Argentine perspective has been fascinating.


Indeed it has. "And by the way, Kelpers were traited much better than"

So 30 years on and nothing has changed. :mad:

[reydelcastillo]

Thank You Marcantiland , by the way let me add this : Mr Marcantiland Historian and Author of the book " Chasing the British Subs " has some amassing pictures of the conflict and accurate details of several war actions.-

[cosmiccomet]

And believe it or not, it never gonna change until the islands soberanity is returned to Argentina.:=:=:=

[reydelcastillo]

Gentelman we now know who is who and we undestand each ones feelings , lets go back to work leaving Politics aside , we still have many pending info on this first BB Mission and the following BB Missions before additional information and Pictures could be brought up regarding other Air War Actions .-

Back to page one Please .- BB # 1

One thing I would like to add regarding BB 1 - Long time ago a radio operator from the Nimrods ( British Crew ) ask me if we suffer the same radio interference that they did from some Russian Station , my replay was that I didn't , my question is , has the BB Missions sufered interference from third party Countries ( Example Russia )

[reydelcastillo]

Well Marcantiland , the ball is in your court , Pointus Navigator has brought up " Your Subs " - We anctiously await for your accounts .-

[Milo Minderbinder]

Re the subs - and also the jamming question

These two news reports are interesting
The Times-News - Google News Archive Search (http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1665&dat=19820416&id=jW8dAAAAIBAJ&sjid=2CQEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5391,5064674)

The Miami News - Google News Archive Search (http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2206&dat=19820416&id=f5UlAAAAIBAJ&sjid=3PMFAAAAIBAJ&pg=2556,1247889)

Suggestions that the Soviets were actively jamming UK transmission to our subs.
Of course it could be an attempt at psyops to let the Argentines think we had four subs in the area..

[Navaleye]

What does POSSUB HIGH 4 mean to the regulars here ? Followed by a MK46 Launch in snake search mode. Target tracked making an evasion course at 22kts and deploying decoys. No whale and no 209. Possibly the only time the UK has attacked a Soviet submarine with a live weapon. I bet the laundry had a busy day the next morning. Shame is wasn't a Stingray.

[Milo Minderbinder]

Navaleye
have you been reading this by Marcantilian?

Falklands "What if...?" - Page 9 - Key Publishing Ltd Aviation Forums (http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?t=81971&page=9)

[Marcantilan]

Hi,

Re: Soviet subs.

Last year, the Boletin del Centro Naval (sort of Argentine Proceedings) published an article I wrote, about Soviets involvement in the war.

The article is here: http://centronaval.org.ar/boletin/BCN830/830-ESTELAS-SCIARONI.pdf and a rough translation is here: Soviets in Falklands / Malvinas (http://www.rnsubs.co.uk/Community/Forum/index.php?topic=3064.0)

It looks like some Soviet subs were in the Ops area.

What does POSSUB HIGH 4 mean to the regulars here ? Followed by a MK46 Launch in snake search mode. Target tracked making an evasion course at 22kts and deploying decoys. No whale and no 209. Hello, do you have any other details???

Two friends of mine, S-2E Tracker commanders, attacked (dropped a Mk.44 each) against a subsurface contact on May 5, 1982, near the Argentine carrier. The contact was sighted firstly visual / radar and later corroborated by sonar and on 9 MAD runs. Contact evaded. The scene commander classified it as PROBSUB confidence 1 and on the debrief was lowered to POSSUB confidence 3. No brit sub was there...

Navaleye
have you been reading this by Marcantilian?

Falklands "What if...?" - Page 9 - Key Publishing Ltd Aviation Forums (http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?t=81971&page=9)I wrote that article with all public domain sources. And I was wrong when pointing to Splendid. She was not there and developed some mechanical problems shortly after.

I don´t want to explain further in this topic (don´t want to drift off topic), but if someone want to open a new one about ASW ops on 1982, I will join ASAP.

Re BB1, sometime ago a poster in "Zona Militar" made this diagram about bomb it:

http://img855.imageshack.us/img855/4848/1demayo.jpg

http://img403.imageshack.us/img403/9545/bb1mf.jpg


Source: Operacion "Black Buck" | Página 3 | Foros Zona Militar (http://www.zonamilitar.com.ar/foros/threads/operacion-black-buck.1016/page-3)

It could be considered accurate?

Regards!

[reydelcastillo]

Thank You Marcantiland , very clear the path of BB1 , I would like to add this :
As Triple AAA realized that British Planes several times flew just above the reach of the 35 mm skyguard , they started using the exercise amunition which does not detonate , but does reach far above the range of war amunition .- This was intensively used in particular by the Skyguard sections at the Airport .- They state having hit some Harrier , that could very well be correct since some pictures have shown Harriers landing at the Carriers with just a hole in the fuselage .-
They put an excercise amunition every 3 or 4 war amunition .-

[glad rag]

And believe it or not, it never gonna change until the islands (http://www.pprune.org/#) soberanity is returned to Argentina.:=:=:=

And that will be for the people of The Falkland Islands to determine, not some asswipe on an internet forum, me old cock sparrow. :ok:

[Pontius Navigator]

Thank You Marcantiland , very clear the path of BB1 , I would like to add this :
As Triple AAA realized that British Planes several times flew just above the reach of the 35 mm skyguard , they started using the exercise amunition which does not detonate , but does reach far above the range of war amunition .- This was intensively used in particular by the Skyguard sections at the Airport .- They state having hit some Harrier , that could very well be correct since some pictures have shown Harriers landing at the Carriers with just a hole in the fuselage .-
They put an excercise amunition every 3 or 4 war amunition .-

You would need to qualify your statement. Which Harriers?

In Price and Ethell's work it was indeed noticed that some Harriers returned damaged and others didn't. It was the GR3 that were damaged whereas the SHAR was not. It was put down not to the use of kinetic rounds but that the GR3s flew very low and well within AAA range whereas the SHAR flew at greater altitudes.

I am not saying that you didn't hit a SHAR but that your conclusion is not certain.

[Courtney Mil]

As this thread is all about a TV programme that airs in 7 minutes, there may be a lull. For those that cannot see it, I'll post it somewhere after editing out the adverts and give you a link. I'm guessing some of you can't receive Channel 4 - you don't know what you're missing! :cool:

Link to follow.

[orca]

PN,

Reference SHAR battle damage.

The Stanley bunch put the round through Morgan's fin. AAA brought down Taylor at Goose Green and Thomas (801) took AAA that destroyed his radio - I think ivo West Falkland.

Not sure that any of the above has anything whatsoever to do with ammunition selection by Argentinian AAA.

I can't recall any accounts of people taking hits whilst en route back to mum.

[Pontius Navigator]

orca, thanks, I have yet to trawl through Price and Ethell fo rthe GR3 aspects.

[orca]

Iveson shot down ivo Goose Green, Glover shot down ivo Falkland Sound and Pook ejected en route Hermes due to catastrophic fuel leak.

Again - nothing ivo Stanley at medium level that I can think of.

[Maxibon]

No South Atlantic maps so turned a Northern Hemisphere map upside down; genius!

Hindsight is an amazing concept but this was an incredible feat of fuel planning and navigation, and remembering just how crap I was in the back of a Dominie in the 80s puts their feat in real perspective.

One bomb or all 21, it was a significant psychological effect.

Hats off.

[Mick Strigg]

"No South Atlantic maps so turned a Northern Hemisphere map upside down; genius!"

Unprofessional I'd say. We had maps on the seagoing squadrons. Was AIDU on leave or doing something similarly important?

[Archimedes]

Iveson shot down ivo Goose Green, Glover shot down ivo Falkland Sound and Pook ejected en route Hermes due to catastrophic fuel leak.

Again - nothing ivo Stanley at medium level that I can think of.

Ian Mortimer, shot down by a Roland while in a SHAR - fits the bill for ivo Stanley.

[Pontius Navigator]

Mick Strigg, what charts did you use then? What projection?

[Pontius Navigator]

I have amended my calculations at #119 using the accurate runway width and bomb spacing. The bomb fall over the runway would have been 240 feet. With a spacing of 144 feet, had the stick been dropped just a quarter second earlier then they would have been guaranteed two hits.

[orca]

Archimedes,

Yes, absolutely spot on. PN and myself were just musing as to whether the use of training ammunition for the Oerlikon actually meant hitting anyone - hence just the AAA vs SHAR in my first post and AAA vs GR3 in the second.

I don't know if anyone can seperate AAA from small arms fire in these instances?

Regards,

Orca.

[Courtney Mil]

It's simpler than that. Rounds of a different mass or with a different propellent have significantly ballistics from the ones the system is set up to use. So if the system is programmed to use HE, the ball rounds won't just go further, they will go somewhere else.

[Tankertrashnav]

Wasn't on Black Buck (civilian by then) but spent six years on tankers so I found the whole thing thoroughly absorbing. Yes, as always there will be nitpicks but this is a programme made for a non-professional audience, and I thought it a lot better than many I've seen.

Martin Withers and his crew were naturally given centre stage, but it was good to see Bob Tuxford and his crew featured as well.

Funny to think that when I first arrived at Marham I thought Dick Russell was an incredibly ancient pilot - now he seems younger at around 80 than he did 40 years ago! Also nice to see my old captain Jerry Price - the good-looking bugger's got a lot more hair than I have!

Most enjoyable :ok:

[reydelcastillo]

The Harrier >> David Morgan: The Sea Harrier's Baptism of Fire - Global Aviation Resource (http://www.globalaviationresource.com/reports/2010/davidmorganp1.php)

Im talking about damage that could been inflicted by 35 mm Skyguards not about shoot down Airplanes

The Harrier >> David Morgan: The Sea Harrier's Baptism of Fire - Global Aviation Resource (http://www.globalaviationresource.com/reports/2010/davidmorganp1.php)

as Pilot's MOrgan's Plane - Sea Harrier -

There are some other pictures with Airplanes with holes as the one shown here on Pilot Morgan's Airplane .- It will take me some time to find them , ill bring them as I find them .- The hole in this picture is an ordinance that did not explode , either because it was meant not to explode ( excersise amo , or because it fail to explode ) -

[TEEEJ]

Now available on Channel 4 oD

Falklands' Most Daring Raid - 4oD - Channel 4 (http://www.channel4.com/programmes/falklands-most-daring-raid/4od)

[reydelcastillo]

Both Excersise and Real Amo have the same wight , Mass and Propelent .- Obviouly the Excersise amo does not have autodestruction .- That is why it will continue its route towards the intendent target .-

[Courtney Mil]

Most enjoyable

Yeah, I thought so too. I think it showed, in a reasonably understandable way, what they did. Some gutsie decisions there. Hats of to them all. And before the backlash starts, NO, IT DOSEN'T DETRACT FROM ANYTHING ANYONE ELSE DID. Please don't start comparing this to anyone else's missions.

Actually, it was a very daring mission. The programme filled in a lot of gaps from while I was watching them depart from and (thankfully) arrive back at Wideawake.

[Courtney Mil]

reydelcastillo,

Ah, I see. Excuse my ignorance in this. So this is ground to air artillery? I was thinking HE that fused on impact, so didn't understand the difference in range. Got it now. Thank you.

[reydelcastillo]

Hi Sir , no this is Triple AAA .- I was making reference about 35 mm Triple AAA -

Why did we take fake amo / Excersise amo to the conflict , because one of the adjustments that need to be done is to check that both canons have theire projectiles meet at certain point in space , they call this fictitious point wrere projectils from both canons meet .- For that matter excersise amo is used -

[MAINJAFAD]

reydelcastillo

The round that hit Dave Morgan's Tail Fin on 1st May 82 most likely either exploded after it passed though the tail (most impact fused AA warheads are designed to have a short delay so that they explode inside the target if they hit it so that all of the explosive effect does some form of damage) or the deceleration of it going through the skins of the tail was not enough for the fuze to operate.

[reydelcastillo]

MAINJAFAD its a valid option , but my observeations would be : Bulet came from left to right , if exploded after passing through , sharpnel should be seen on this right side of the Fin since the explosion sends sharpnel in all directions .- That is why I think in this example it either hit and not explode , or hit with fake amo -

Regards Sir

[Courtney Mil]

If you can't see it any other way, here's my version with the adverts cut out.

Black Buck (http://www.projectoceanvision.com/videos/noindex/Black-Buck.mp4)

MP4 version. Take you 3 mins to download, then it's yours to watch.

Higher Res, streaming version to follow tomorrow.

[reydelcastillo]

What we post here is just bit and pieces of a conflict that happen in 1982.- It will bring small stories from those that have been in the Islands and from those that have supported the troops ..-
It will certeinly not change the outcome , because the outcome happen allready 30 years ago but will bring us the oportunity to find out small details that may not be yet in History Books .-
With all Respect to The Troops from Both Countries that 30 Years Ago meet at what I will call " The last of the Conventional Wars " .-

To Marcous Point : As you have seen Marcantiland , has dedicated many years to the Submarine World , his studies , Writings and Books are aimed in that direction , this is a Pilot / Aircraft Forum and Marcantiland is eager to show us what has happen underwater during the conflict .- How can we make this happen without making the Moderators angry at us ? Thanks

[Courtney Mil]

The mods are not devils, my friend. This is a fascinating thread, just let it develop as it will. No one should mind, so just press on.

[MAINJAFAD]

On a Lighter note, I saw Reydelcastillo's radar at RAF Locking when I was in the back end of trade training in 1985. Does anybody know what finally became of it (they were going to put it into service as the Radar Type 100 at one point but that never happened).

[reydelcastillo]

Was that the ANTPS 43 Westihghiuse , or the ANTPS 44 Cardion ?

I know that the Westinghouse had been put back in service and use in the Reserve Force and I've been told to track civilians Small Airplanes to assure that they complie with speed and altitude .- This was a 3 D Radar .-

[orca]

Not sure about the surveillance radars.

I know that the 'fun police' used captured Argentine Skyguard in the UK Low Flying System. Bizarrely enough it was one of few threats that the, similarly named, Sky Guardian (Sea Jet RWR) would spell out in full.

I thought the practice was (how to put this politely?) disappointing!

Sorry - thread drift - back to the heroes!

[MAINJAFAD]

Off Topic

The one at Locking was the TPS-44 (Cardion Alert Mk 2)

The Westinghouse TPS-43F was put into Regular RAF Service as the Radar Type 99 and was used until the late 1990's when it was then sold to Pakistan. One of the Unit's I served on were the first to use it (RAF Wattisham), though it had been passed on to another unit by the time I got posted on to that unit. However it did deploy to my next unit for a few weeks in the early 1990's and I've had a good look around it while in operation. Horrible purple CRT displays in it though !!!

The Skyguard radars we captured were also used (along with the guns) to form an Auxiliary RAF Regiment squadron at Waddington during the back end of the cold war, though they then disbanded and the radar's went to RAF Spadeadam to be used as threat emitters for EW training of aircrew. It was one of the them that is now used to monitor low flying areas.

Like wise back on topic

[reydelcastillo]

I've PM Marcantiland told him to bring us the Info on Subs , British Subs , Ours and the Russians during the conflict ,- He has some amazing pictures and details .-

Curiosities during the conflict :

1) On may 1st in the afternoon while clearly looking at the ships that approach to initiate the first Naval Bombardment , the upper tower of a Sub came above water close to the Ships , Not only me but several others saw it from on top of Sapper Hill .- A Pac from Mainland came in and atacked the ships , they retrieved just to come back at night .- What I saw as Sub disapear but I have ask in other forums and the answere was : It would have been against normal procedures to put your head above water in combate .- Others told me : Well you never know what those underwater guys may do , maybe they just wanted to see the Fireworks .-

2) That may 1st was the only time the ships came so close to land , the Roland as I told you was at the Bottom of Sapper Hill protecting the Radar , talking after the conflict with Regalini ( Comanding Officer for the Roland ) he told me .- That afternoon before our Airplanes show Up ,he had engage the ship that was closer to us . And I ask him why didn't you shoot , he told me :

Enrique I only had 10 missils If I shoot and miss , what explanation would I give to the Coronel , worse still If I shoot and hit can you figure out how angry they will get at us , they are going to be playing PingBall with us all day long - We are going to spend the rest of the War in a Fox Hole while this guys spend all theire amo only on us .-

He really thought that even doe the Ship had been engage , the shoot of the missil would have need to go in a streight line at only a few feet above ground and above water , and could eassily hit someones head , or a wave .-

[reydelcastillo]

MAINJAFAD that one was the one I used .- The Cardion .- Look how at the turns of Life , its Great .-

[Pontius Navigator]

It was stated that the Vulcan stopped doing AAR years before as it was too dangerous. I would agree it was sporty but that was not the reason why.

I did the AAR course in 1964 and we would have worked up to use the Valiants. The scheme was that route activation would be done with Valiants at Malta, Aden, Gan and Singapore and the Vulcans could then flow down the route.

The premature grounding of the Valiants cancelled that plan. Simply the Victor 1 replacements could not uplift enough fuel and needed to do tanker-tanker refuelling first. Route activation by Victors would take too long and the Vulcans could reach Singapore sooner.

By the time the Victor 2 was in service the requirement had gone away and the priority shifted to refuelling the Lightnings and F4s and trailing other FJ across the pond.

[ExRAFRadar]

Are the Skyguards at Spade still operational ? I worked on them in the middle 80's.

[Wycombe]

Enjoyed watching this last night, some good stuff, but it seemed to me a lot of "glossing over", particularly towards the end in terms of how they got safely back to ASI - apparently "a miracle occured" and that was it!

It does seem a pity, though, particularly bearing in mind Martin W's heavy involvement in the programme, that a link was not made (maybe at the end) to bring us to the present day and give plug a to VTTS....many more casual observers would probably be amazed to know that the man exercising XH558 over their heads at RIAT etc. 30 years on is the same guy who carried out this mission (albeit as reserve to.....:ok:).

[AR1]

Mainjafad, I passed through Locking in '85 whereabouts was the system? - I recall our '3D' being up near the hangars, but not the former Argentinian unit.

Back on thread. Good program that would have been accessible to everyone at it's narration level. - It really was daring.
Wonder how we worked things better for subsequent raids?

[N707ZS]

Didn't they have a second go and have to landed in Brazil? I thought they might of mentioned it for completeness.

[green granite]

Didn't they have a second go and have to landed in Brazil? I thought they might of mentioned it for completeness.


There were 7 Black Buck raids in all. The last one I believe was also flown by Martin Withers

[spekesoftly]

Two of the seven planned Black Buck raids were aborted (BB3 due weather & BB4 due tanker snag).

Black Buck 6 damaged its refuelling probe on the return leg and diverted to Rio de Janeiro.

[jindabyne]

I thought it was an enjoyable, informative and no-frills production. I understand that Ward has already gone into print with predictable denunciation ----

[unclenelli]

Yes XM597 (now residing at East Fortune) diverted to Rio with a U/S probe.
On landing they had <2000lbs of fuel remaining (not enough for 1 visual circuit!)
The crew were held for 9 days and only released because the Pope was due to land at the same airfield the following day (Imagine the media furore if JP2 was kissing the tarmac with an impounded Vulcan in the background!)
One Shrike missile was hung-up, and the Brazilians kept it.
XM597 sports 2 shrikes and a Brazilian Flag as it's nose-art!

[Tourist]

I also thought it was generally excellent, but there was a certain amount of uneccessary "lilly gilding", such as the footage of destroyed Pucaras and buildings in a manner that suggested that the raids were in some way responsible for their state. Linking the pics of the crater with the general airfield destruction was a bit dodgy in my view.

The raids were very impressive from the point of view of the participants, but the program should not attempt to credit them with more than they did in terms of destruction.

I'm not taking away from their bravery, I had a pucker just thinking about flying those things in the south atlantic with no fuel.