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WASHINGTON– The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today proposed to substantially raise the qualification requirements for first officers who fly for U.S. passenger and cargo airlines.

Consistent with a mandate in the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, the proposed rule would require first officers – also known as co-pilots – to hold an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate, requiring 1,500 hours of pilot flight time. Currently, first officers are required to have only a commercial pilot certificate, which requires 250 hours of flight time. The proposal also would require first officers to have an aircraft type rating, which involves additional training and testing specific to the airplanes they fly.

“Safety in all modes of transportation is our number-one priority,” said Secretary LaHood. “This proposed rule reflects our commitment to the safety of the traveling public by making sure our pilots are the most qualified and best trained in the world.”

“Our pilots need to have the right training and the right qualifications so they can be prepared to handle any situation they encounter in the cockpit,” said FAA Acting Administrator Michael Huerta. “I believe this proposed rule will ensure our nation’s pilots have the necessary skills and experience.”

Other highlights of the proposed rule include:
A requirement for a pilot to have a minimum of 1,000 flight hours as a pilot in air carrier operations that require an ATP prior to serving as a captain for a U.S. airline.

Enhanced training requirements for an ATP certificate, including 50 hours of multi-engine flight experience and completion of a new FAA-approved training program.

An allowance for pilots with fewer than 1,500 hours of flight time, but who have an aviation degree or military pilot experience, to obtain a “restricted privileges” ATP certificate. These pilots could serve only as a first officer, not as a captain. Former military pilots with 750 hours of flight time would be able to apply for an ATP certificate with restricted privileges. Graduates of a four-year baccalaureate aviation degree program would be able to obtain an ATP with 1,000 hours of flight time, only if they also obtained a commercial pilot certificate and instrument rating from a pilot school affiliated with the university or college.

The proposal addresses recommendations from an Aviation Rulemaking Committee, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the FAA’s Call to Action to improve airline safety.

The proposed rule can be viewed at: [url]http://archives.gov/federal-register/public-inspection/ (https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=13373) The public may comment on the proposal for 60 days after publication on February 29.

Say it with me now....

"We just can't find enough americans to do these jobs...."

Pony up the bucks... then they'll come out of the wood work.

Exactly, the experience will not come free. Nor should it.

Aviation Today :: FAA Proposes to Raise Airline Pilot Qualification Standards (http://www.aviationtoday.com/the-checklist/FAA-Proposes-to-Raise-Airline-Pilot-Qualification-Standards_75826.html)

Good start.

Is it possible to obtain an FAA ATP without flying in multi- pilot aeroplanes, apart from the required type rating? Out of general interest?

Yes you can get an FAA ATP flying nothing bigger than a piper cub basically.

Not like its European counterpart that actually puts the "Airline" in Airline Transport Pilot (with the required 500 hours MPA)

But then again someone can spend their entire career needing an ATP to fly a 6 seat single engine aircraft in the US. It's not just a gimmick.

Interesting. Would this change the US employment market significantly? Perhaps higher starting salaries for new FO's at the regionals? :hmm:

Thanks

At the moment the US licensing system is not geared up to train airline pilots.

It is setup towards GA, leaving the rest of the training to the airlines.

Unfortunately, the airlines have not been filling the gap of knowledge from licence holder and maybe flight instructor to airline pilot.

I think it would be better to set upto two routes to the airlines in the US.

Cadet pilot via an approved airline specific training program.

Or x amount of hours from a 135 type carrier.

Flying 3000 hours around the pattern is not the same as flying for a 135 company, or indeed a properly conducted cadet program.

Just to be pedantic the FAA does not issue pilot 'licences' it issues 'certificates'.

When I got hired in 1979 everybody in my class was overqualified. We all had over 5,000 hrs and 1,000 jet experience. The US has never had a problem hiring qualified airline pilots.

I think if airlines paid a reasonable rate they could still get qualified pilots but they want the cheap labor from Embry Riddle with no time. They get what they pay for. Eventually these pilots will be qualified as they gain experience but initially they aren't. The passengers during this learning process are put at risk so the company can save money.

I am with you one this one, Bubbers.

It may feel great for any young pilot to be offered a fast position on a big jet with little experience, but in the end, with all the best training, you still can't buy experience. It's just like the saying goes with money, you can't buy taste.

As for flying around a pattern for 3000 hours is for sure different than a 135 company, I wonder how many pilot are insane enough to wander a bit further away than the traffic pattern! It might bring something else though: airmanship and decision making: being alone on airwork (crop spraying, site seeing, carrying news paper at night, etc) is not qualifying as 135 Ops, yet bring valuable experience that no training facility or program can sell to you.

As mentioned, it's in part to blame on the cost cutting from the airlines, to recruit with less experience and pay less, to try to show the passengers and the authorities they can replace 1200h flight time with 20 hours in a simulator and a solid ground course... does this look logical to anyone?

And it has nothing to do with being jealous of the next generation having it easier, but it still takes time and experience to appreciate some things.. just look at the Ferrari of a certain teenage singer! :}

Just my 2 cents.

Cadet programs are :mad:. There is nothing like being alone in a baron at night in icing conditions to build time. Or flight instructing instruments. Making decisions on your own. Evaluating a problem choosing a course of action and correcting it. I know because I've seen it. Cadets have no PIC until they upgrade and they spend the first 1000 hours of there careers flabbergasted, lost and feeling bad about themselves because they go from a 172 to a 777. All a cadet program does is save the company money. They get a guy that can do the job at min standard and pay him :mad:. Not acceptable. In my opinion that's the same as hiring a guy with 250 hours and paying him less that 20k a year flying a 50 ton jet. 1500 hours is enough to be in the right seat of a airliner depending on his/her experience. At 1500 hours I had a lot to learn as I still do now with twice that. The problem the US faces is the money. It's all about the money. It will take a while to have it's effect but eventually there will be no pilot training because it's not worth it to spend 5 years building time to get where they want to be. Flight schools will not be able to post direct entry into an airline. Which will reduced it's attractiveness. Which in turn will force the regional airlines to pay more.

The key word here is a "Properly-Conducted" cadet training program. In the never-ending tilt towards cost cutting at all costs, that is a very unlikely scenario. I don't think the airlines in the US will ever go that route as it is much too expensive for their tastes.

I have flown with some 200-hour wonders having gone through their airline's cadet program, and while they know all of the procedures backwards and forwards, they really are clueless when it comes to flying the airplane.

Give me someone who has 1000 hours of instructing under their belt over someone who has the bare minimum of sim/line training any day.

Yes you can get an FAA ATP flying nothing bigger than a piper cub basically


Bull Cr**, to use an Americanism. You can get a single engine ATP in the states, but is is not going to be in a "piper cub". More like a PC-12.

In the United States the ATP serves as the graduate degree for professional instrument flying. Be it in a scheduled airline, a corporate job or charter. And there is nothing wrong with that. Europe should wish that its aviation industry was a vibrant.

Good airmanship, judgment and instrument skills can be found in people from a range of backgrounds. And the best airlines try to employ all of them. Anyone surrounded by like minded clones is professionally stunted, and I feel pity for them.

DA-20,

You most certainly can get a ATP, single engine land, in a Piper Cub (heck, get your single engine sea while you're at it!), as long as it has the equipment required by the ATP Practical Test Standards for performing the prescribed area's of operation. Those are conviently available for easy reading, at the FAA.GOV website. You don't need a "complex" airplane, as is required for the Commercial Pilot Certificate, and the aircraft doesn't even have to be certified for actual IFR flight (practical tests are usually performed, as a matter of policy, in VFR conditions)

You can earn your ATP -Rotorcraft Helicopter in a Robinson R-22, if you so desire. Sadly, you can no longer get an ATP - Rotorcraft Gyroplane...that would have been a hoot.

In that vien, understand that each grade of certificate (sport, recreational, private, commercial, ATP) was held to a certain level of performance, and that performance was carried over from one grade to the next. If you showed competence in complex aircraft during a practical test for your commercial, single engine land, there was no need to demonstrate it on another practical test.

The ATP is nothing more than another rung on the ladder....another grade of ticket. We don't really view airline ops as the end all, be all as it seems to be in the rest of the world, so smaller equipment works just fine.

Remember, on FAA certs, there are grades (Sport, Recreational, Private, Commerical, ATP), Categories (Airplane, Rotorcraft, Glider, Lighter-than-Air, Powered Lift) and classes (single engine, multi engine, land, sea, helicopter, gyroplane, etc).

Instrument Ratings are applicable to airplanes, helicopters and powered lift. That will be noted on the certificate.

Type ratings only as required. If you do an ATP ride, however, you are generally awarded that type rating, if such a type requires it, since the checkrides are identical.

They can be combined in a pretty much unlimited manner on any one certificate, although not all categories and classes exist for each grade. And remember, they never US pilot certificates never expire, but you can go non-current, which is an easy fix.

Flight Instructor certificates follow the same format, although some classes are combined. For instance, a Flight Instructor certificate may have Airplane Single Engine, which covers both land and sea (you obviously have to have a SES on your pilot certificate). CFI tickets DO expire every two years if not renewed, which is mostly painless process.

There also other types of certificates...Ground Instructor, Flight Engineer, Flight Navigator, Mechanic, etc. They all look identical, except for what's printed on them. Pilot certificates have a blue DOT seal on them, while all the others are black, and if you have a good pass rate, you can qualify for a "gold seal" on your instructor certificate.

From the article:
ther highlights of the proposed rule include a requirement for a pilot to have a minimum of 1,000 flight hours as a pilot in air carrier operations that require an ATP prior to serving as a captain for a U.S. airline; enhanced training requirements for an ATP certificate, including 50 hours of multi-engine flight experience and completion of a new FAA-approved training program;

Looks like part 135 guys will get the shaft, as no 121 street captain options will be available to them if they need 1000 hours in what I am assuming is 121 operations.

He**, you can even get your ATP in a simulator.

The point is with the US system it's representative of expertise whereas with the Euro system it's more representative of experience gained with your hand held the whole way there.

FLEXPWR,

you might be interested in reading this:

https://senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id=1e21c535-2096-49c1-aaad-5688108b8e83

The new rules are to take effect in 2013, notwithstanding the 60 comment period. Remember, the US is an election, possible new president, new administration, new congress, and new senate away from the new rules taking effect.

Can you say the word Lobbyists?

Thank God the FAA do support GA - without it the industry would be dead.

With a smaller military and fewer experienced pilots coming through the commuter airlines face a hard road ahead.

PT6: "Flying 3000 hours around the pattern is not the same as flying for a 135 company, or indeed a properly conducted cadet program."

At least the 3000h GA pilot would be able to land the aircraft! Sadly the current cadet route in europe is failing to give students enough hands on flying and this will only get worse with the new MPL which has around 70h actual flying and the rest in simulators (which are great for proceedures and SOP learning but aerodynamically very limited).

Thus far, apart from quite a few tail scrapes (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Airbus%20A320,%20G-DHJZ%2012-08.pdf ,) strict SOPs, advanced aircraft and capable captains have held the system together.

Lufthansa and the 1980s BA cadet system were fine but the airlines are no longer willing to fund advanced training over the pond - in fact many now sell the front RHS without offering employment after so called "Line Training" / Pay to Fly.

Some concerned pilots are now going into print:

Letter to BALPA (http://www.pap2f.com/www.pap2f.com/Letter_to_BALPA.html)

CHIRP: 1/2012: "I find the present bunch of junior First Officers very keen
and motivated but sadly woefully undertrained. They
have been taught to master the Flight Management
System but not taught the basics of flying or landing the
aeroplane."

Angel,

The kind of cadets I'm talking about are of the Lufthansa variety. Lufthansa group being a company that does still fully fund cadet pilot training.

Looks like part 135 guys will get the shaft, as no 121 street captain options will be available to them if they need 1000 hours in what I am assuming is 121 operations.

135.243 requires an ATP for turbojet ops or planes with 10 pax seats or more or if it is a commuter operation under 119. But there aren't many street captains in the US except for start ups and they usually look for pilots with time in type which they most likely got at another 121 carrier.

Well, in todays reality lufthansa cadets have to pay back 60k€ once they start working on a lufthansa flightdeck. It is not free, however the pay and repayment schedule is very comfortable. By the way, initial basic training aircraft is a beech bonanza, advanced training is done on cessna CJ1s.

Thorough training is a key and something succesfull cadet programs do. However, do not confuse it with pay to fly programs where some might get trained and then put on the line simply because they paid up, wether they are able or not to do it right. The above linked accident is sadly something that came out of exactly that mindset.

The point is with the US system it's representative of expertise whereas with the Euro system it's more representative of experience gained with your hand held the whole way there.

Well, mine was a long time ago. Brit CPL, then Senior Commercial, then ALTP. (yep) So let me protest a bit, and paint a picture at the same time.

1962 ish. No hand-holding. DC3 FO. Viscount, 1-11, back to DC3 for first command. All based on being able to fly the aircraft . . . really fly it. Some of the routes were more than a tad demanding, and at first, done 24/7 with no weather radar. Got some serious thrashings in CBs then.

The exams took 3 days. Middle aged invigilators saying things like, 'Pens down, gentlemen, please.' Then about another three days on Performance A, First type rating, radio license etc., etc.

It was all SELF FUNDED - the initial IR costing circa six weeks wages a go. I have to say, the CPL written was a wake-up call for a young chap that had left school at 14 with no exams passed whatsoever.

circa 1985, for my American ATP I checked in Flight Training?? Testing?? inc. in San Antonio, I think it was. A man called Randy (his name was cast into his belt buckle) sat with his boots up on his desk. Somewhere from under his huge hat came a voice telling me I had six hours.

I took one, and wondered what the heck I'd missed. I rechecked the paper and wrote a long screed about why a performance question was wrong. It turned out to be the only question I got 'wrong.' Total time, one hour - thirty minutes.

The flight test was done in a 172 as the 727 operation had folded and the Seneca I was due to fly the next day got spread down a runway.

I don't think there is comparison, the Brit exams had given a Cambridge physics graduate a tough time. 'nothing that hard, but so much of it.' was how he described it. The American ones were a method of checking for a reasonable level of ability to BEGIN learning the science of aviation.

I've no issues with the American way, heck, I spent a week learning how to swing a compass in the UK, and I only ever did this once in the next 40 years.

It sounds like the Euro exams are very modernized. Just as well, really.

But as for the flying. Well, no one now is going to get a modern airliner with a skipper that's been through WWII. Some of those empty sectors were . . . educational. Airlines can't afford today's costs, there is no possibility of funding real flying training . . . unless of course, the cost is carried on the broad shoulders of the relevant nation.

The flight time for getting on with a regional is ridiculous! I paid my dues and to get on with a regional at the time, I had to have 2500 TT, 1000ME, and at least some time at a 135 operation. Now these kids are coming out of Embry-Riddle feeling entitled and cocky with the full expectation of walking into a RJ job at a regional with 250+ hours. As many of the previous posts state, you can't short experience and those 250 hour pilots jumping in to the right seat of an RJ are deer staring into headlights flying into PHL at night during bad weather. I know, I've had them over there in the right seat when I was at a regional. They can't multi-task worth a darn. In fact, you have to spoon feed them for what they can handle and you have to take on the extra slack.

I'm also a little irked also by this new proposal giving breaks to the aviation degree programs at colleges and universities. Really, those guys are better pilots than other pilots that came through good 141 schools? In fact, I taught at a 141 school where the local university sent their students for flight training! They graduate with their hot shot commercial license with an instrument rating and they think they are ready to fly lead for the Thunderbirds! Paaleeeease! Those degrees are pretty worthless and with the dynamics of this industry, they would be better served by getting a real degree in something other than aviation. At least they might be able to fall back on that real degree instead of slinging burgers when they get furloughed the first time. At the major I fly at, I've had some of those folks as interns and I've seen the cockiness first hand. These guys need to pay some dues and really appreciate what this industry is all about (while gaining valuable experience in the meantime!).

I can buy the military exemption since the fighter guys have short sorties and the military has excellent and tough training requirements.

So, there you have it...1500 hour minimum is not outside reason but it needs to be quality time as well! I would say that this whole thing is a massive knee-jerk in reacting to the outcry from the Colgan crash. Once again, our ridiculous politicians jump on to an emotional issue and legislate to gain positive notoriety where none was needed given the safety record of this industry. Amazing feat by the great regional captains we have out there covering for the rookies with very low time!

We should not be hiring underqualified junior pilots so the new rule will prevent that. Good for the FAA, bad for Embry Riddle.

Great: if you have flown 1500 hours in a crappy old Cessna and get one of those get a CPL in a week courses Commercial Pilot Training - Accelerated Commercial Pilot License - Flight Training Course (ASEL) (http://www.sunstateaviation.com/commercial.html) you are such a good Aviator! That will make our industry soo much safer!

What will the lawmakers come up with next: it is better to get a crappy medic who has put on 1500 bandaids then a properly trained Doctor because although he was trained better but only admitted 250 bandaids... Clearly it is quantity that counts and not quality in the land of the blind LOL

Ohh and while we at it: Don't bother to look at impossible workschedules, salaries at regionals that push pilots in bunkhouses, lack of oversight by the FAA, cheap training by the regional airlines and all the other reasons that where at the core of the ColganAir crash! Those things don't make for great soundbites in Congress so go for the easy mistake instead...

Rant over

@<hidden> RYR, Unless said pilots are a total dunce, a 1500hr pilot is going to have some more experience than a 250hr pilot who has spent half those hours with an instructor and 75% of the PIC time messing about practicing Steep Turns and Forced landings.

1500hrs is a lot to get. Unless the parents are fantastically wealthy, a pilot of that many hours must have had a job somewhere in GA.
Took me 2yrs to get 1300hrs while working 6 days a week.

RYR,

The problem in your example is that you're assuming the pilot mills provide "quality training".

The "mills"are IMHO 10 times better than the US "get any hour anywhere" approach as long as airlines are involved in the training. The whole point I am making is just that: it should focus on quality not politically mandated quantity! :ugh:

After the usual senseless drivel about how much better UK CAA trained pilots are compared to FAA trained pilots, we're finally getting to the point :


...they would be better served by getting a real degree in something other than aviation.


1. With the job market what it is at the moment, what would be a good way to stimulate wannabe pilots to get a real degree in a field that gives them a reasonable chance of a daytime job that transcends flipping burgers ?

2. What is wrong / unsafe about the current system (i.e. allowing for a low hour CPL in the right hand seat to build hours and experience) ? Is there statistical evidence on incidents or operational reports that support such a change ?

3. My first flight instructor was one of those aviators who got his ATPL after 1500 hours in a variety of singles, some of it instructing, most of it self flying, funded through his daytime engineering job. Earlier, he had his CPL through one of those accelerated courses (not the one advertised). He since paid for his own 737 type rating. With his judgement, skill and experience, I frankly see no reason why he would not qualify as a good FO on an airliner (not that he'd ever want that - he instructs as a hobby and is making 4 times the salary of a first officer while never leaving the ground).

4. What would the curriculum of a young aviation enthusiast that wanted become an airline pilot look like post the proposed FAA regulation ? Would it still be doable ? Or would you actually need to develop a two-track career ?

That is where we differ greatly, I'd put more trust in a GA pilot than I would in the average mill pilot. For one, their decision making/financial skills must be pretty weak to go spend +$50,000 when the same licenses, ratings and training can be received for $20,000 tops in the "get any hour anywhere".

Being not financially supported I paid by the hour working at a gas station and a steel mill later to get my initial ratings. Then working as a flight instructor and charter pilot getting my ME and ATP and a few corporate jet type ratings. A couple years then flying corporate in a 4 engine Jetstar was lucky enough to get my first airline job with a small company flying 737s. Most of this time was PIC but when I got my airline job I was lucky to get hired with 5500 hrs and 1500 jet, most PIC because the competition was fierce.

My pay was 700 per month on probation for one year which went to 19 months do to a furlough but I was happy. The largest airline in the US then bought us and I retired with a good sum.

I guess that is why I am not sympathetic to the pilot mill guys who now will have to pay some dues as I did not being able to have Daddy put them in the right seat of an airliner with 250 hrs.

I don't see any problem with pilots building time flying FAR Part 135 on-demand stuff. It builds character and good know-how because at most 135 operators the pilot has to do everything themselves. Also flying to random airports with little or no notice keeps you proficient at reading charts, adhering to procedures, and maintaining superior situational awareness.

However I don't think flying as an instructor creates quality pilots. I've found in many cases CFIs that are hired at my company struggle a great deal more during training than pilots coming from other backgrounds. Our check airmen and I have theorized about this and think it could be because as a CFI or CFII the instructor isn't building any actual instrument time. This coupled with the over-familiarity many instructors have with their home base, their lack of actual "stick" time, and the fact that training is usually conducted in fair weather makes for weak skills.

I think flight instructing is a good stepping stone into the 135 world, but from an airline perspective I think there should be a step between instructing and flying for a scheduled carrier.

That's just my two cents, though.

The "mills"are IMHO 10 times better than the US "get any hour anywhere"
approach as long as airlines are involved in the training...


You are entitled to your opinion.

But in my opinion, having worked in training, flight standards and a Chief Pilot's office, you are wrong. You find good pilots from all backgrounds, but to make one with an arrogant sense of entitlement, poor motivation and laziness -- that takes a pilot puppy mill.

Someone who has built 1500 hours clearly wants to be in aviation and has probably learned a few things along the way, both about aviation and life. They will have a degree of maturity and won't need a silver spoonectomy.

I'm sitting out here in Africa where there is a total plague of 250 hour CPL and above pilots fresh out of flight school. With the right contacts etc they move straight from a Baron/152 to co-pilot or cadet in the local regional airline. All of these guys are nice and have the basic right intentions but they're in a system which is more concerned with churning out certificates than any practical handling capability or knowledge. We're a disaster waiting to happen.

If the FAA wants to avoid taking the same path as we are, all kudos to them. If I'm sitting at the back of a "Heavy" anything into marginal conditions, I REALLY want to know that BOTH crew have more experience than I do, are both capable of making key decisions, and actually know what they're doing. If that means a basic standard of 1500 hours, that's the least I am comfortable with.

Cadets are at best a short cut method to getting the rating, or getting the requisite number of crew. Give it whatever name you like, insist on as much training gimmicks or checklists or whatever, at crunch time there is nothing like real experience. It might not be PC to bring this up, but would Air France have had a different result over the Atlantic with crew with more real experience.

Another point to consider - what other profession in the world takes a newly qualified individual with little experience and puts them in charge of training the next generation of individuals. Never understood that. For example I ended up being trained as a CPL by someone who had less hours than I did as a PPL!! Imagine a doctor with not even the experience of a first stitching case being put in charge of training someone who plans to conduct brain surgery..... Somethings seriously back to front.:confused::confused:

Read the above reports and tell me most people don't think they have to earn their RH seat. 1500 hrs make them earn it and make them safer pilots. No 250 hr pilot is really safe, he is just licensed. How would you like to get heart surgery from somebody just out of Med school? I wouldn't.

My first ATP student in the Citation Jet had no clue I had never trained anyone before. I waited until he passed to tell him, you were my first.

Just curious why the negative view towards U.S. pilots in the rest of the world. According to IATA, North America beats out Europe, North Asia, Africa , South America, Central America, Caribbean and Asia-Pacific in terms of safety ratings (based on hull losses). Historically the United States has the largest, busiest, and safest aviation system in the world. Yet the rest of the world berates and degrades U.S. licensed/trained pilots as inferior to colleagues in the rest of the world.

I am studying for the JAA/EASA ATPL written exams right now. Yes they are very extensive and there is a lot of material. But the VAST majority of the stuff I am studying is totally unrelated to anything I have used in nearly two decades of professional flying, and over a decade of airline flying.

Something I have often pondered

How would you like to get heart surgery from somebody just out of Med school? I wouldn't.

Happens all the time, under the supervision of a consultant surgeon.

Which is not dissimilar to a first officer flying under the supervision of a .........

Exactly right. Go to a "teaching hospital," which typically are the most revered such institutions--Sloan-Kettering, Cornell Medical, Boston Women's, etc.--and you will be operated on by a team of excellent students overseen by an excellent surgeon.

But ask me about my Sloan-Kettering prostatectomy 15 years ago and I will explain how my sex life was ended by a well-meaning student's "oops..."

Please don't be silly. Nobody is every operated by "somebody just out of Med school". A year or so after graduation as a general intern and then starting post-graduate training as a specialist. After that it'll be another two/three years of training/assisting before they're operating under supervision. Nobody operates "on their own" until they are board certified as a specialist.

The training is long and thorough - and in the old days (just like for you guys) it was much longer.

There is a lot of inappropriate arrogance about the higher level of academics required for the written exams in the JAA system.


Point is, it's irrelevant and provides no advantage in the real world. The Pilots of AF447 had JAA licences, where did that get them ?


I always find it ironic that, with the emphasis on 'Performance A' in this system there are so many accidents and incidents with misloading and / or incorrect computation of take off weights, v speeds and power settings by these same crews.

Hi there

Good point
Didn't have time to read the proposal.
Could it be that a type rating is valid only for the airline you are flying for?
At least they realised time has come to consider pilots as souls keepers and not costy figure.
I always have fight for pilot consideration and strict selection during all training and recruitment process just because this is a very special job that needs very special and highly qualified people.
The need for pilots is such that the prices are going to raise to the moon to get the most qualified and only rich airlines gonna survive.
This could have been avoided if managers politicians manufacturers and technocrats would have also been good professionals...
Time has come
Panic mode ON for recruitment teams
And that's only the beginning...

Please don't be silly. Nobody is every operated by "somebody just out of Med school". A year or so after graduation as a general intern and then starting post-graduate training as a specialist. After that it'll be another two/three years of training/assisting before they're operating under supervision. Nobody operates "on their own" until they are board certified as a specialist.

The training is long and thorough - and in the old days (just like for you guys) it was much longer.




You're absolutely right of course, perhaps I over-simplified my point. However, at some point the surgeon is going to stick a sharp pointy object into a live human heart for the very first time. If it goes to shit you can bet your bottom dollar that the supervising consultant isn't going to stand there and watch whilst you use your 'harder/longer' training.

Similarly, there is going to be a first time that a pilot sits in the RHS in an airliner. Once again, if it all goes wrong it doesn't matter if you've got 10,000 hours - you're unfamiliar with the system and chances are you're not going to be the one that rectifies the problem.

Making pilots gain 1500 hours before such a task doesn't ensure good pilots, it just means they have 1500 hours. Perhaps you could argue it shows their determination, but it doesn't particularly give an insight into their quality. I work with plenty of people who have 40+ years experience and I'd swap some of them for staff 6 months out of uni in a heartbeat.

No "perhaps" in it olde bean!

One person on an operating table with 100s of staff available nearby who can assist a well trained doctor is quite different to 200+ people relying on an inexperienced pilot when the experienced one has died or become capacity saturated by an unexpected in flight senario.:ugh:

Again how that co-pilot was trained and his/her own experience will determine the outcome. Sadly current airline training is woefully below current medical training in terms of over reliance on automation, poor selection (more about money and multiple guess questions in EU), and lack of mentoring by senior instructors/airline staff, degraded Ts&Cs and now lower fatigue protection through EASA FTL rule changes.

Forecasts 2012: Safety & security - Our expects place their bets on what to expect in 2012 (http://www.flightglobal.com/Features/forecasts-2012/safety/)

" there has been a loss of pilot exposure to *anything other than pre-packaged flight planning, followed by automated flight on the line. In unusual *circumstances - non-standard or not automated - a lack of pilot resilience has led to fatal loss of control (LOC) accidents, making LOC the biggest killer category this century - taking over from controlled flight into terrain in the last."

FAA system is looking better than EASA for both FTLs and airline pilot starter experience levels - 1500h is still a licence to learn and it needs defining in term of quality. But too many autopilot jet jockeys seem quick to criticise Flight Instructional hours - even though those Instructors are the very people who first taught and trusted them to fly an aircraft solo! Those (QFI/CFI/FI) skills were foundational for the future learning of these critics on heavier, sometimes faster machines !

Didn't take long for this to turn into a d!ck measuring contest between Europeans and Yanks / cadets vs GA pilots etc.

The real question is not who's better, it's will it or will it not raise the standard such that it will stop the predations of these airlines that are making kids pay for "line training" schemes and / or paying their FO's sub minimum wages.

If yes, then surely that's something we can all agree on, and hopefully we can all work together to pressure the authorities in Europe to adopt it also, and try to make it a worldwide minimum standard sooner rather than later.

Gentlemen, you got it all wrong. The FAA rule making regarding the 1500 hour qualification requirements is a kneejerk reaction pushed by ALPA to reduce the supply of pilots in the USA, hence driving up the pilot pay.

There is nothing wrong with that but you have to stick to the true reasons why. As Airline training in the USA under FAR 121 FAA supervise all operators the same. The assign POI is now limited to max two years with one operator, is does not matter if you fly for Delta or a small regional airline, the operation surveillance is identical.

The actual training is also identical, it does not matter if you fly an RJ or a B777 and the training requirements are absolutely the same. There are some few exceptions.

The majority of airlines in USA are now under the AQP program Ops Spec A34, Southwest Airlines refuse to participate due to cost, AQP is slightly more expensive that old fashion training. I take a 200 hour FO any day if he have received proper training, if he/she completed and AQP course with an airlines he is 1000 time better that a 1500 CFI. What is a 1500 CFI nothing more than 1 hour of traffic patterns 1500 times.

The airplanes we fly today is very electronic, and you manage the flight deck, 20 some years ago when I started you actually had now how to fly. (Just kidding, well almost) This is all about supply and demand, the world pilot pool is shrinking, and there will be a huge demand for pilots in the future, not in the USA but everywhere else, India, China etc. The airlines will lobby for lower requirements once the supply dries up.

So in the end it all comes down to training: and there is nothing and No Airlines in the world that can beat the FAR 121 training in the USA. I base that on my background, I have 20 years of Airline training background, all over the world, I have trained pilots in an airline environment in Middle East, China Russia, all over Europe and South America. This has nothing to do with the intelligence of the actual pilot it is strictly based on the cultural differences; the thought process is just different. A Chinese pilot is not taught critical thinking the way an American etc.

Peter,

For a bloke that is apparently as smart and widely experienced as you advertise yourself to be, why would you persist in such a ridiculaous comparison:

I take a 200 hour FO any day if he have received proper training, if he/she completed and AQP course with an airlines he is 1000 time better that a 1500 CFI.

Is anyone proposing that the "1500 CFI" would jump in the right seat with no training at all? Yet you insist on comparing him/her with a person who has "completed and AQP course with an airlines (sic)".

We are talking about prerequisite experience at the entry point to airline training.

Notwithstanding personality and related suitability issues, would I rather have a candidate who has been trained in a rigorous integrated course or a person who has been essentially self-taught? I'll take the former.

Would I rather have a candidate who has been trained in a rigorous integrated course and has been out in the real world for 1500 hours or one who did the same course but has no other experience? I'll take the former.

What I really want is a candidate who has been trained in a rigorous integrated course and has been out in the real world for 3-4000 hours, who has flown in several different classes of operations and who has flown in pistons, turboprops and may be even a light jet, all with reputable operators who have provided solid training, good safety cultures and performance-based supervision.

Can we all just start comparing apples to apples in these debates, please?

Just as a point of perspective.

Why do the Airlines want to hire the inexperienced and the 'integrated'? Why don't the airlines want to train their own 'Aircraft Managers' anymore? After all the aircraft and the Airlines safety record are critical business assets to any airline. Ask the CEO of a blacklisted airline how many premium bookings they get and it won't be many!

Simply put it is cost. Newbies cost less to keep, they have paid for their own training and it is only beholden on the Airline to train them to the minimum required for legal operation, i.e. LPC/OPC. The day to day line experience can be pulled along by experienced Captains, until the day comes that the experienced Captain suffers a problem and isn't there any more!

The whole cutting of the training has resulted from immense pressure on airlines to cut costs in a harsh, over capacity operating market. Why are airlines, $ for mile, the cheapest form of public transport in the world (notwithstanding Ming How the cheapest rickshaw driver in Bangkok but I believe he is a private enterprise)?

Perhaps when the passengers realise that they have a direct fiscal input into ensuring that those in the front, with whom they have entrusted their lives, are entitled to fair renumeration for their skill set then maybe Airlines will have the finances to invest properly in those who fly their aircraft.

While we continue to plumb the depths of cost cutting to provide 'Joe Bloggs' with a seat cost less than the fuel cost we will never see proper, considered, investment in pilot training. We will, generally, be the buffer that smooths out the fuel price spikes.

Personally I believe an Airline funded Cadet system, based upon pilot selection which considers skill and suitability, run internally either at airline cost or bonded, is a far better system of ensuring suitable entrants to the cockpit. Having 250 hours or 1500 hours is irrelevant if the basic skill set is not there or the applicant is someone who you can sit in a locked box for 12 hours with. I've seen military pilots with 3000+ hours who couldn't transfer their skill sets to civilian aviation and 250 hour Cadets who's willingness to learn and natural ability made them a fantastic asset in the cockpit. Obviously the inverse applies as well.

Correct selection based on personality and ability is the key, not the ability to pay. When they are in the job, allow them such a wage as to be able to live in a condition which is condusive to reporting for work adequately rested and refreshed. Allow a roster which does not induce fatigue due to over work or the demand for overtime in order to pay the bills.

This won't happen until the ticket prices reach sustainable levels.

All IMHO of course!

A109, S61N, UH-1D, MBB105, EC135, A319/320/321, B777

:E

Stilton:

Point is, it's irrelevant and provides no advantage in the real world. The Pilots of AF447 had JAA licences, where did that get them ?


The 2 pilots on commands have been hired at 200 hours, cadet scheme or the like.
After their CPL they had nothing else but Airbus experience (so no manual, no stall experience, even in the sim).

The FAA is 100% right.

Coming right at 200 hours in an airliner will make you miss all the basic training you'd get as an instructor, then charter/GA... pilot.

The Calgan 3407 crash was a wake up call for the FAA.
I hope the AF 447 could wake up the JAA.

4 Dogs,

You have a good point and I agree, the 2nd point that I faild to bring up is attitude, I have heard and seen numerous 1500 hr CFI's comenting on the their level of experience and with an attitude of they earned and pay thier dues vs the 200 hour guy.

I like training that is my forte, nothing beats good training, regardless of background and flight hours.

KAG,

The 2 pilots on commands have been hired at 200 hours, cadet scheme or the like.

It is not a scheme, it is about supply and demand, and cost.


After their CPL they had nothing else but Airbus experience (so no manual, no stall experience, even in the sim). This is a result of poor training, have you flown with a french guy latley?

The FAA is 100% right. Wrong, This was pushed through by the pilot union, decrease supply and increase pay.

Coming right at 200 hours in an airliner will make you miss all the basic training you'd get as an instructor, then charter/GA... pilot. So your point is to take the least expereinced pilot and make him an Instructor so he can learn? is that not an OXMORON

The Calgan 3407 crash was a wake up call for the FAA.

The Colgan crash was a result of screewed up work rules and duty time requirements in USA, However the airline lobbied from not adressing that issue due to cost and settled on increase the F/O requirements. If you look at the total picture and the outcome of the decision; In the long run you will eliminate competition and upstart airlines, the supply of pilot will be so low that the 1500 guy will be hired at all major airlines, there will be very few of them. Pilot pay will increase, that is a good thing.

FAA faild to adress the dutytime and work rules,
2nd Colgan is very well politically connected in the USA, and not an AQP airline.

Wirbelsturm,

Ask the CEO of a blacklisted airline how many premium bookings they get and it won't be many!

What is a black listed airline? and were can I get a hold of the list?

Here you go:

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air-ban/doc/list_en.pdf

Enjoy.

@<hidden> as usual, not very much to the point, right?

Of course all AF guys had other flying experience than just airbus after 200 hours of cadet school, read the report. In fact only the two copilots were cadets, the captain never was.

And surprisingly both colgan air pilots had more than 1500 hours. The first officer actually had pretty much the profile you demand, close to 1500 hours upon being hired by colgan, worked as an instructor, and then she just helps crashing a fit to fly airplane by selecting a different flap setting without command during a stall recovery, great GA training right at work.

All in all a very, well, light touch on reality in your post there. By the way, could you give us a complete list of qualifications that are absolutely necessary for airline flying that one aquires during those years as instructor, charter and GA pilot?

Peteroja:

You clearly have some insight into FAA/US flying but have missed the point regards what is happening in Europe who have far more experience than USA when it comes to hiring low houred pilots straight into RHS of an A320 after under 250h.

Suggest you read PPRUNE threads about the approved cadet schemes, Flexi Crew working conditions and Pay to Fly passengers (to get line hours on type) all of which have happened on UK airlines over the past 3 years.

Removing politics and heresay about the accidents mentioned will clarify the real causes:

Colgan: Stall/Spin accident - FTLs/Fatigue whilst contributory were not outside FAA legal rest minimums. The Q400 was not unflyable due to icing. It was pilot induced error and poor training with little experience - the Captain had failed previous flight tests and had low hours (around 600 total) on joining the airline The FO had 6 h of Instrument flying (all in nice conditions), no ice experience (all her previous flying was in dry Western USA), she did not monitor the aircrafts attitude or speed on approach and actually worsened the stall by retracting flaps (undemanded) whilst the captain was increasing angle of attack with aft control column and adding power (both actions made stall worse).

"The airplanes we fly today is very electronic, and you manage the flight deck, 20 some years ago when I started you actually had now how to fly. (Just kidding, well almost)"


Yes and no. This is rather out of date thinking in the light of so many recent accidents. Automation 20 years ago was hailed as the best thing since sliced bread. Pilots were told it could fly much better than they could.

Airbus Test pilots actually said Line pilots needed more training to understand the systems and Airbus logic. However, Airbus sales departments sold the aircraft as easier to fly with so many protections that airlines could cut the cost of pilot type ratings. The result was less training and more reliance on automation.

It is now recognised that pilots need to be more than FMS managers. They need to be able to fly again. For the past 11 years, Loss of Control is the biggest killer in Western Jet Airliner accidents.

This is why the European model of approved flight training/low houred cadet model is being questioned. 10 years ago it was CRM and SOPs and so the MPL was promoted in line with your statement about being autopilot managers, but the accidents are showing how under experienced pilots are even with 3000h Boeing/Airbus time because many don't know how to recover from an automation induced stall.

I hope the FAA don't adopt MPL in the USA as it currently stands. 70h actual flying and less solo time than a Private Pilot's Certificate means an over reliance on Simulators that are not aerodynamically close to real aircraft and lower student confidence in their raw data flying ability.

Sure there is a place for approved/cadet type schemes as long as there is full mentoring by airlines and real hands on flying, including upset recovery technique that should be practiced annually (for experienced Line pilots as well).

Lufthansa's cadet scheme works because they front up the costs and it includes flying a Citation long before flying the heavier aircraft on the line. The schools that sell MPL are very variable in what they offer self sponsored students.

It's not about bashing cadets - its' about challenging the schools and airlines who don't teach them enough. It should not be about bashing Flying Instructors either - after all who on earth taught you to fly? Who instilled in you a sense of airmanship? Who sent you first solo?

I would prefer to send my family up with the person who has given Quality flight instruction. I seriously doubt the CFI with 1500h would have spent it just doing pattern work - but at least such a person could land an aircraft!

Good CFI's have taken responsibility by sending their students solo, operated for over a year in Class C airspace, and (in the EU at least) operated in all weathers, taught how to recover from stalls and spins, practiced engine out forced landings, flapless approaches, short and soft field landings and navigated both night and day and in IFR even if that was mostly in a C172 than the current MPL any day!

Peteroja: Coming right at 200 hours in an airliner will make you miss all the basic training you'd get as an instructor, then charter/GA... pilot. So your point is to take the least expereinced pilot and make him an Instructor so he can learn? is that not an OXMORON
I have never said such a thing. You have your own way to comment reality.
I was speaking about building experience. You very first job doesn't have to be PPL instructor if you decide not to, but an airline job with hundreds of pax as your first job?
Anyway, the instructor route at the begining of the pilot career path is not something I ve just invented and that doesn't make any sense, that's in fact how most of the north american aviation career path starts and works.


Denti: Of course all AF guys had other flying experience than just airbus after 200 hours of cadet school, read the report. In fact only the two copilots were cadets, the captain never was.
I beleive I said: the 2 pilots on commands.
The captain was not at the controls, never was. In fact he came in the cokpit only when the situation was completely messed up already and already stalling like crazy when he came into the cokpit (he was outside the cokpit getting ready to sleep, maybe sleeping, when the 2 F/Os lost the control of the airplane).

I beleive the 2 pilots at the controls that day, 2 F/Os, were hired at 200 hours and never had anything else than Airbus experience. I could be wrong. Please quote the reference concerning the experience those 2 had.
It shows the system has failed.



All in all a very, well, light touch on reality in your post there. By the way, could you give us a complete list of qualifications that are absolutely necessary for airline flying that one aquires during those years as instructor, charter and GA pilot? Fair enough.
Before entering the cockpit of an airliner, I would do as the canadian system works (and I beleive this is the best system and has to be taken as a model): some captain (turborprop would be the best) mutli-engine before being called by an airline using single aisle jets (Jazz, Air Canada, West Jet...). There is no rule about that, transport canada has not written anything mandatory, but the fact shows that this is mainly how it works with a few exceptions.

Denti:

Re: AF447: Sadly the SO was the one who stalled the aircraft whilst the Captain was in the back asleep. By the time the Capt was in the cockpit he had very little chance of discerning what inputs the SO was making on the side stick. However, he did suggest a corrective pitch change (to reduce AoA - sadly too late) which if it and idle thrust had been actioned by the SO or FO much sooner would have saved the aircraft from the stall.

There are so many stall accidents/incidents in recent years with poor to zero recovery technique:

Colgan Q400 - power on stall
Turkish B737 1951 - rad alt fault/autoland stall
AF447 A330 - power on stall
Manx2 7100 - go around/power on stall
Sol Líneas Aéreas Flight 5428 - ice induced stall
Thomsonfly B737 Bournemouth G-THOF 3/2007: autothrottle disconnect - power on stall
Helitrans Norway: Fairchild Merlin SA226 - power on stall

Good Training and suitable experience count.

Angelorange: Exactly.

Those 2 F/Os had no professional and manual experience of the stall after their CPL and 200 hours! Not even in the Airbus sim! Sure enough: at the first instrument failure they had in their life (speed indicator?), entered because of their action in a stall, and stayed there because of their action until the crash.

The proof you don't start your career in an airliner (especially an Airbus) with no background experience.
The last pilot who landed an Airbus in the Hudson bay didn't learn how to fly on an Airbus. You have to get more than 200 hours and you have to get some multi captain IFR experience before starting on an airliner, as you won't learn to fly on it, you are supposed to be a pilot mastering the basics already, which asks a few thousands of GA/military experience. Cruise autopilot on Airbus (even a few thousands hours before your captain upgrade) won't teach you much when it comes to real flying.

The proof this systems doesn't work. It was a crash waiting to happen. In fact it did happen.

The FAA got it right. If you cannot get the airlines to hire using common sense (like in Canada), then you have to implement some rules.

You have it right. Get the experience first then fly airliners. I cropdusted, flight instructed, flew charter in prop and later jets then corporate then with many thousands of hours flew with over 100 people in the back. That way you can learn in little steps, not quantum steps.

In a C150 I would sample a little icing and IFR to build confidence and experience. I always had a way out. Nobody should go from flight school to the right seat of an airliner. What if you have a weak captain? Maybe he is sleeping and you have another new FO in the other seat while he is taking his break. The FAA did a good thing changing the rules.

peteroja:
So your point is to take the least expereinced pilot and make him an Instructor so he can learn? is that not an OXMORON?

No, it's not an oxymoron. The best instructors I have known confess that they learned an awful lot about flying through teaching others! That's certainly the case for me - students ask the darndest questions, and you have to provide an answer that completes their knowledge; in so doing, you improve your own competence.

I certainly did not want to get into a US vs the rest of the world debate. It was simply a question as to why the negative view towards US trained/licensed pilots when the data suggests they are every bit as competent as as the best in the rest of the first world.

As for the AF447 accident: I am an instructor on the A320 and we are now doing high altitude stall demonstrations during recurrent training. When given similar circumstances as the AF447 guys, less than half of the pilots can successfully recover even when they know it is coming. It is not because the pilots do not know how to recover from a stall, it is because pilots at all levels have not been trained in the dynamics of high altitude stalls. High altitude stalls are very different animals. Recovery at high altitudes require significant nose low pitch, to be held for a very uncomfortably long time, and you have to accept a VERY high rate of descent (15,000fpm or higher). AFTER that you have to have a very slow pitch up because a secondary is very easy to occur. Historically when training stalls pilots are taught to lower the nose to the horizon and add full power and to minimize altitude loss. You cannot recover from a high altitude stall using that procedure. If you read what happened, and know how to correctly recover from a high altitude stall, it becomes clear that the AF447 guys were caught off guard because the aircraft did not recover in a way they were accustomed to when training lower altitude stalls.

I have a lot more sympathy for the actions of the AF447 guys having trained and demonstrated high altitude stalls in Airbus FBW aircraft.

NED dude...Train the high altitude stall with ADR 1-2 switched off, or better yet, put ice on the respective pitots and watch what happens......particularly watch the THS reactions.., you may find even full nose down commands, while causing the pitch to be reduced, does not reduce the AOA sufficiently to "break" the stall, large amounts of nose down trim wheel inputs may be needed....food for thought...

As for the main topic....I suspect more hours rest, rather than more hours in the logbook would be more on target...but that costs the industry money so not like to happen...as usual lay the problem at the feet of the pilots...

@<hidden>: fair enough, training is a key thing. However flying 1500 hours around a circuit is not training how fly airliners in a multi crew environment. But yes, some airlines apparently save quite some money by not training enough.

@<hidden>, both FO's were cadets or 200 hour wonders. However one of them was an active glider pilot (the one with least experience), the other one kept his SEP rating active which means he flew outside of his job as well. If you mean that both had no other professional experience you are right, but both had flying experience beside their airbus flying.

Curious that you mention the canadian system. We send about 50 of our pilots over there every winter to help during high season traffic with various 737 operators. Half of those pilots will fly as captains, the other ones as senior FO's. All of them are 200 hour wonders, some even MPL-graduates, every year a few more.

I could cite quite a few accidents with pilots which had thousands of hours upon hiring and extensive professional experience in different types and still managed to crash healthy planes. I wouldn't begin to blame it on them flying around a circuit for 1500 hours or more or even flying around battlefields without being able to transfer their skills to the airline world. And then there are a few accidents with cadet pilots as well. However, seen in the general number of things only a few.

It is about the right amount and quality of training and selection, not about hours. Something the military discovered long ago and which some airlines managed to adapt to their needs, and some didn't. Even the new american rules from what i read will give a huge hour discount to those doing an integrated training syllabus with a respected training organization like embry riddle for example.

NEDude:
That's interesting to have the insight from an Airbus instructor.
High altitude stalls are tricky indeed, I was too fast to condamn them probably. The best being not to enter a stall, and for that we need manual experience I beleive. Look what happened as soon as the autopilot went off...

Denti: the vast majority of the canadian pilots have a step by step and progressive career path during which they have to face a large variety of aviation and situation when they reach their airline job. And sure enough we never hear from canadians airline pilots stalling airplanes and crashing them...
I 'd rather trust their training and hiring standard.

No, just not being able to follow an approach and crashing into hillsides, First Air last year for example. Or within a month an Arctic Sunwest Charters twin otter.

And remember, although flying is much more important in canada than elsewhere, it is extremely thinly populated, in fact it has just above half the population of france, not to mention all of europe which is around 500 million against 34 million. In that light there is really no doubt that accidents per hour, airmiles, or population is not all that much different between them, and europe has used cadet pilots in their major airlines for the last 60+ years as the norm.

We had a few notable stalling accidents lately and yes, that is certainly a concern. Much of that is more a problem of training than anything else. I know of airlines that did the bare minimum of stall training and others that do it as integral part of their retraining every 6 months. Sure enough you do not hear any of the latter ones stalling either. Even if they employ MPL students as the norm and only take in outsiders after very thorough retraining in times of need.

As per the list above:

Colgan pilots stalled despite extensive instruction and GA time before flying an airliner. Three turkish airline pilots did the same despite very extensive military experience which is on this site usually seen as the possible training par none. Three AF pilots did the same, all of them with GA experience beside their main job. I can't comment on the other accidents as i haven't read their reports recently and do not remember how their pilot corps were set up, however flight time as sole quality measurement is rather doubtful if you see those three accidents alone. Thorough and indepth training however could have prevented all of those accidents and that is what we have to demand from regulators and airlines alike.

Recovery from a stall is much easier when the stall is anticipated...

The employment history of the individuals involved in the various crashes described above has little bearing on the eventual outcome of the accidents. The training, the individuals had received, on the other hand, did have considerable bearing on the outcome. You can be taught to handle most scenarios in a sim, but the syllabus must be suited to the background and ability of the individual.

Stall recognition and recovery in an A330 is not something you get inherently better at because you have bored holes in the sky with a Baron or Metroliner for 2000 hrs (otherwise half of the incidents angelorange mentiones above should never have happened, including the Manx, Colgan and Helitrans ones) - but if you are unsuitable for operating any kind of aeroplane, chances are that you will be weeded out by the time you have hours enough to apply for the airlines - or you will have killed yourself, taking only a few pax with you.

Separating the wheat from the chaff (with minimum pax exposure) is what minimum airline entry standards ensure. The unsuitable ones will not get beyond the pistons or TPs while the good'uns get a seal of approval - you survived 2000 hrs in small aircraft with little or no support in the way of SOPs, operations or management support and still didn't kill yourself - so you're safe...

It is tough luck for the ones that can fine well manage on a cadet-direct-to-AB-course (because they do exist, and there are quite a few of them) - but until we get better at pre-screening suitable individuals, the darwinian process seems the safest approach.

Yes you can get an FAA ATP flying nothing bigger than a piper cub basically.
But, to fly for a -121 (airline) carrier, you need a Multiengine Land rating. And, with the new ATP requirements, you will need 50 hours of MEL time to get the ATP.

The US has never had a problem hiring qualified airline pilots.
In the summer of 2008, with HR depts at their most desperate (at the US regionals) Pinnacle and Mesa were hiring some pilots WITHOUT a Commercial License, and also some with less than 200 hours of Total Time.

Great: if you have flown 1500 hours in a crappy old Cessna and get one of those get a CPL in a week courses
The CPL won't help, as an ATP will be required, and the current requirements (other than Total Tiime) have been increased by Congress.

Someone who has built 1500 hours clearly wants to be in aviation and has probably learned a few things along the way, both about aviation and life. They will have a degree of maturity and won't need a silver spoonectomy.
That is what a lot of us were saying about the Colgan crash. Some pilots said they both had over 1500 hours (and the Capt had his ATP), so these changes wouldn't help at all. HOWEVER, if both of the two pilots had to get their ATP and all the hours required, BEFORE they joined an airline, they either would not have chosen to be pilots, OR, they would have been more motivated and would have built better professionalism along the way that would have prevented the crash...that is my opintion. The Colgan capt. actually started at Gulfstream Airlines, where you had to pay about $100,000 for your PPL/CPL/Instrument Airplane, and a certain number of hours of right seat experience as an FO flying a B-1900.

Could it be that a type rating is valid only for the airline you are flying for?
In the US a Type Rating is for a specific airplane certified type (as in DC-9 type in the US means DC-9, MD-80, MD-90 and B-717).
The ATP is for a Class: -MEL, -SEL, -Helicopter, etc.

Making pilots gain 1500 hours before such a task
It won't matter if they have 1500 hours or not. What matters is if they have the ATP. If they get 1500 hours of crappy experience, and they are not ready, they will not pass the ATP checkride. It is NOT easy, especially with the bare minimum experience required to sit for the practical exam.

The actual training is also identical, it does not matter if you fly an RJ or a B777 and the training requirements are absolutely the same. There are some few exceptions.
This is not true AT ALL, and this is an area where the ATP requirement WILL help. The training at Northwest and Delta, for example, is much, much better than the training at Trans States Airlines, USA Jet Airlines, or Atlas Air. They are ALL -121 carriers, and the training is quite different at each. When I trained at TSA they were NOT AQP, and USAJet/Atlas are not now on AQP either.

The FAA is 100% right. Wrong, This was pushed through by the pilot union, decrease supply and increase pay.
ALPA has been around a long time, and there had been no improvements in Flight/Duty/Rest or Airline Pilot Minimum Qualifications in decades.
This was pushed through by the families of the dead passengers on the Colgan flight, the Media that helped them, and the Congressmen/women when they listened to the CVR, and did some research on the sorry state of affairs at a crappy regional airlines in the US.

FAA faild to adress the dutytime and work rules,
The Flight/Duty/Rest Rules (for -121 passenger airlines) just changed DRAMATICALLY....and it was the first change since the 1950s or '60s.

I hope this helps the US a lot....it WILL help the non-American pilots, as there will be less US pilots going abroad for work.

Everyone talks about 737 and A340 pilots with regards to this topic, but this really doesn't affect the major carriers in the US. I'd be hard pressed to think of any Us carrier operating large jet aircraft that hire anyone with less than 1500 TT anyway. What this really affects are the small operators. Is 500 hours really that bad for the SIC on your Beech 1900D? How about the DHC-6 operation providing services to small Alaskan towns? Was 500 hours that unheard of to fly a fixed-gear aircraft that can hardly make 170 KIAS?

While I realize in other parts of the world these 19-seat operators are handled differently, in the US they are considered under FAR Part 121 if they want to fly more than four weekly round-trips. these "ma and pa" airlines have been painted with the broad FAA brush and have to meet all the same requirements as United and Southwest. Often these airlines are well-run and well maintained, with excellent safety records and acceptable pay, but also had thin profit margins due to low passenger loads. This was where young pilots went to learn. This rule makes it very difficult for these small, necessary airlines to continuing providing their services and in the end only the entrepreneurs and people of the small communities that need this air service are hurt.

It's easy to talk extremes, but realistically the small airlines pilots would have once gone to build their hours will shrivel up and you'll either fly on heavy iron or you'll be driving.

We all know Colgan had two pilots hired with minimum time so why do you try to say they weren't. Neither one was qualified when they got hired. Neither could handle a simple stall. You see the results of marginal pilots with marginal experienece. 1500 hrs isn't a lot so the pilot mills will probably suffer but it should be a minimum.. We all did it. It isn't that hard.

At the time of the accident the Colgan captain had 3300 hours and had been a captain at Colgan for two years. The FO had 2200 hours and was hired at about 1500 hours. How would hiring them to the Saab at 1500 hours instead of 800 have averted this accident? They were both experienced enough to work at the airline according to this new rule.

Where did the CA work before?

He paid for a 121 job, for which he would not have been qualified under this new rule, not sure about the FO though.

A large contributor to the lack of experience/decision making and overall capabilities in the current generation of pilots is they are rarely given opportunities by which to "cut their teeth". Instead going from a 172 straight into a jet or large turboprop and being unable/unwilling to fly near or (if necessary) past the limit. Then, when someday, the limit is quickly passed they have no idea of how to deal with it and end up a smoking hole in the ground.

You'll have to excuse me if I'm missing you logical connection here.

The captain had 3300 hours, mostly in large transport and commuter category aircraft. You feel that since this was in larger aircraft he lacked sufficient experience.

You feel if the captain had rented a Cessna 172 and flown for 1500 hours prior to flying at an airline he would be better experienced?

My point is that this new rule pretty much forces people to go from a Cessna 172 to a large transport category aircraft now that smaller air carriers that operate "intermediate" aircraft will start falling by the wayside to to increasing pressure from the FAA.

There are many problems working into the experience issue. I agree with your general premise that more experience is needed for this new generation of pilots, but I think this rule is counterproductive to that goal. What aircraft and type of operation do you feel is the proper step between flying a Cessna 172 and flying a Beech 1900D (which is where that captain "cut his teeth")?

There's nothing wrong with being "hired" into a B-1900 (I hold a different view for PFT) at the 250 hour level, albeit this should be "135 flying". The fact that he failed multiple checks and had to pay to get into a job speaks volumes of how incapable he was then. Though, I wouldn't want anybody to be a captain of a B1900 unless they first had significant PIC time in any small aircraft.

Cessna, Piper or whatever any other small A/C you choose the fact of the matter is that PIC time is PIC time. When you've got nobody to count on but yourself to handle the aircraft, manage your operation and keep yourself prepared you will not only build character but learn volumes about what it takes to fly any aircraft. Having significant "stick" time in aircraft which are operating at the limit and developing keen situational awareness in that environment is, to me, several fold more important than programming an FMS and flying a computer for the same amount of time. This sort of experience also develops a strong foundation for the learning of any new aircraft the pilot may find themselves in down the road.

The learning process for any aircraft should not be a matter of osmosis, as is often the case, but of applying insights developed in previous flying to the new aircraft under the watchful eye of instructors and check airmen, strong and experienced pilots will pass this process with ease while weaker ones will take a bit more time and eventually be signed off as "warm bodies" to learn on the line. The latter should not be happening, but often does.

To me, the "hours" of experience matter less than the "type" of experience (albeit a rule has to be made based on some sort of finite criteria). Furthermore, you can't get that varied type of experience necessary in aviation without having a good amount of hours, and 250 is not a "good amount".

Denti:

"europe has used cadet pilots in their major airlines for the last 60+ years as the norm."

This is not true. It has never been the "norm". The norm (as in the USA) was ex military pilots, regional Turbo prop upgrades and in the case of KLM Cityhopper/Air UK and Flybe - flight instructors.

Yes BA, KLM, Lufthansa all had their cadet schemes but these were (and in the case of KLM & Lufty still are) very well managed with no up front costs from the cadet.

The quality of their training far exceeded the current JAR/EASA Integrated and MPL cadet schemes that are sold through certain flight schools alongside selling Type Ratings and even Time on Type!

Sadly the latter is now the "norm" for the LoCo Jet airlines such as EZY and RYR.

Pay lots and enter a contractor holding pool:

https://pilot.cae.com/Programs/Ryanair.aspx

Pay £84k to join BA:
British Airways Future Pilot Programme | Oxford Aviation Academy - OAA.com (http://www.oaa.com/pages/schemes/british_airways)

Pay lots to join EZY:
easyJet MPL First Officer Programme | Oxford Aviation Academy - OAA.com (http://www.oaa.com/pages/schemes/easyjet)


Re: Stalls: Turkish was an automation fault with the Capt's Rad Alt that cut power and rounded out the B737-800 at a much higher altitude than 50 feet (but insufficient for any kind of stall recovery). The least experienced crew member was at the controls and no one mentioned the low airspeed due to a very late and high rate of decent - they thot the a/c throttled back to achieve late decent.

It's not about boring holes in the sky - it is about knowing aerodynamics and your aeroplane and practicing recovery in a real aircraft - not just a procedurally SIM which cannot give accurate representation. That aircraft might be an Extra 300 or a Citation (like Lufthansa Cadets use).


Island Flyer:

The issue was not how many hours the Colgan crew had at impact - it was their low experience at the recruitment stage:

Captain had just over 600h and had failed many exams including IR

FO had flown Single engine aircraft in Arizona (no bad weather experience) and had only 6h of actual IFR time before joining Colgan!

Those are very low hours overall.

As for the time on type - most of the Q400 time was on autopilot and with a serious lack of airspeed monitoring in the event and a stall made worse by undemanded flap retraction by the FO.

NEDude:

Glad to hear you are practicing high altitude stall recovery techniques. Hope it's not just in a SIM. Most pilots forget that FAR 25/JAR 25 test pilots always reduce AoA and allow speed to rise to around 20% above config stall speed BEFORE applying power. My comments on the stalling accidents mentioned "power on stall" because those pilots added power - that made things worse. In the case of AF447 adding power with full aft stick was more of a Terrain/Wind Shear Airbus technique not a stall recovery method.

NEDude - how many guys lost their airspeed and stalled the aircraft? An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.


AngelOrange - the Captain might have had 600 hrs of Captain time at Colgan, PIC, or in the Q400 but he had more than 600 hrs TT.

Turkish crash - Lack of thrust while on G/S. Nothing to do with 'roundout'.

Actually you can get an FAA ATP Single Engine in a C172 (or Piper Cub is suitably equipped). I have one!. .. it was a simple add on to the existing FAA ATP Multi Engine. Granted, there isn't much use for it... and only a few of us have them.. but even so...

Angelorange.


If you are seriously blaming the Turkish Accident on an 'automation failure'
you have lost the plot.


They stalled a perfectly functional Aircraft with two good engines on a clear day
because the Autothrottles didn't function properly.


That was inexcusable negligence and incompetence. :=

Quote: The actual training is also identical, it does not matter if you fly an RJ or a B777 and the training requirements are absolutely the same. There are some few exceptions.

This is not true AT ALL, and this is an area where the ATP requirement WILL help. The training at Northwest and Delta, for example, is much, much better than the training at Trans States Airlines, USA Jet Airlines, or Atlas Air. They are ALL -121 carriers, and the training is quite different at each. When I trained at TSA they were NOT AQP, and USAJet/Atlas are not now on AQP either.
]So ... what is it we are to glean from your reference that some airlines are “not” training under the authorizations of AQP? If you compare the training programs of two carriers, one training under the authorizations granted by AQP and the other one not, just exactly what differences are you expecting to see? You make the statement that the training at NWA or DAL being “much, much better” than the training at TSA. Not that I’m putting down the training at either airline, but the obvious question is then – how do you know? What makes these “better” programs better ... and where does the “not-so-good” program fail?

Stilton:

Please read comments and full accident reports:

http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/rapporten/Rapport_TA_ENG_web.pdf

angelorange: "There are so many stall accidents/incidents in recent years with poor to zero recovery technique: .....Turkish B737 1951 - rad alt fault/autoland stall"

In other words the automation was a contributory factor to the crash - yes the pilots should have picked up the fault earlier through better airmanship and monitoring (they continually cancelled rad alt warning) but they did not have sufficient height to carry out stall recovery at that extremely late stage. They would probably have been better off flying the whole approach on raw data manual throttles.

misd-agin:

"AngelOrange - the Captain might have had 600 hrs of Captain time at Colgan, PIC, or in the Q400 but he had more than 600 hrs TT."

He had 618h TOTAL time at the point of joining Colgan - that is the point about this thread and the new FAA 1500h minimums for hiring onto FAR 121. It is not about how many hours (mostly in the cruise on autopilot) he spent on the Q400 once he got the job.

I have read it angelorange and I reiterate:

They stalled a perfectly functional Aircraft because they did not pay attention to the speed.


It showed a complete and total lack of Airmanship.


If you can't fly an approach without functioning autothrottles or are dependent on them you have no business in the Cockpit.


To blame this accident on an automation issue is pathetic.

@<hidden>

That is my point regarding the ineffectiveness of this new rule. Requiring FOs to have an ATP won't fix the issue of pilots gaining quality time. In the past you could get your ME commercial and head over to some small 135 operator or an airline like Great Lakes and work your way up there, if you survived you were deemed worthy to proceed to the heavier metal.

This ruling is eliminating the option of pilots to go to Great lakes, Gulfstream International, or any of the other small 19-seat operators. And quite frankly as far as 135 goes, there just aren't enough low-end piston/turboprop 135 operators to fill the need.

What will wind up happening is we'll have pilots grinding out 1500 hours in their Cessna 172 either on their dime or as an instructor. It's my opinion that sitting in the right seat managing a student is not sufficient experience to manage an airliner in all weather conditions.

Of our pilots at my current employer, the former CFI's often fail checks and if by the grace of God are able to make it through their initial training are the worst instrument pilots I've ever seen. Why? Because most are not CFII but only train in VMC. To put it in perspective in 2011 we hired 18 pilots and 12 with under 1500 houts TT, of those 12, 6 had come from being CFI at local flight schools, the rest were either FAR 135 pilots or came from other airlines. Of those 6 CFI's one passed and he has since failed his first PC and had to take two re-attempts as required by ALPA contract.

The fact is that 1500 hours does not guarantee that pilot will have sufficient instrument times to show real experience. It did remove an option for learning light FAR 121 operations with smaller aircraft. I don't know about you but my real learning on how to "manage" an aircraft versus how to "fly" an aircarft only began once I started flying in all-weather conditions during commercial operations. The things my captains taught me were what kept me alive in the years to come once I upgraded. This rule really hurts that process.

I would rather have an 800 hour pilot that spent the last 300 hours flying in hard weather at night in an MU-2 than a 1500 hour CFI that spent all his time training in VMC in a C-172.

If we must insist on going this route, then the FAA should consider raising the maximum passenger capacity of an aircraft for FAR 135 commuter operations back to 19 seats.

The more realistic option would have been a crackdown on airline training and checking procedures to weed out those that continually fail their checks.

:ugh: It seems to me that the point is continually missed here.

Given the fact that prescribing a specific number of hours, unless you can prescribe exactly “how” those hours are gained (then there is always the problem of how that is going to be verified or verifiable) is always going to be problematic, the logical question remains ... what is the alternative?

The alternative is, and always has been, the amount and the quality of training received and assimilated. With very little effort, the type and the amount of training is usually verifiable and is almost always accurate – presuming the company that provided that training is still in business.

It would seem to me that a total number of hours of “experience” certainly can be one source of discriminator in determining who to hire, but it should belong somewhere down on the list of important factors. The most important factor, the only one that can be somewhat accurately verified and is so much more valuable, is the quality and quantity of training conducted and assimilated. What is wrong with having that kind of requirement clearly outlined in the regulations?

Additionally ... I, too, would like to understand the references to "AQP" - what is it about having completed an AQP program that says the pilot is so much better prepared than having completed a training program under the normal regulatory requirements?

To whom would the US issue green cards for pilot jobs? In your opening, you noted that Europe does not have enough pilots with those qualifications already, hence the airline cadet programs. China, Korea, India, UAE, and other Asia and Middle-East countries are already recruiting away from the US and Europe.

To start, those US pilots now attracted to Asian/ME jobs will find US jobs. Then more military pilots will leave the military early to get more-in-demand, higher-paying airline jobs. More "universities" will crop up and devise programs to satisfy the education option.

In the longer term, corporate and Netjets-type jobs will become more entry-level "jet jobs," and the airlines will recruit from them. Still, there is a good probability of a shortage of qualified pilots 5 or 10 years from now, and US airlines may try cadet programs as well and/or subsidize General Aviation with incentives to earn ratings.

With something on the order of 17,000 RJ pilots; a similar number of military pilots, and probably 5,000 to 8,000 biz jet jocks, the airlines aren't running out of pilots any time too soon. The RJ operators could have a problem, but the rapid phase-out of small RJs could fix that, too. Add in consolidation and the majors are not going to have a problem picking the best.

"Additionally ... I, too, would like to understand the references to "AQP" - what is it about having completed an AQP program that says the pilot is so much better prepared than having completed a training program under the normal regulatory requirements?"

AQP is a more extensive training program that 'trains to proficiency' rather than staking it all on a single check ride. Pilots will have to meet qualification standards as set forth by the program in each maneuver or event. The training will be keyed more to practical line flying situations than an unrealistic series of maneuvers and approaches that comprise of today's qualification checks.

Our airline is finishing Phase II and will begin small group trials soon. I have to say the program definitely seems to be more geared to actually qualifying pilots to fly rather than training them to pass the check ride. essentially the mentality will become 'train them until they can do it well, regardless of how many simulator sessions it takes'. Piedmont I know has increased its simulator training to 18 sessions (72 hours total sim training) to meet AQP requirements for initial new hires. National average sim training I believe is 32 hours total for initial new hires under the old program.

AQP is a more extensive training program that 'trains to proficiency' rather than staking it all on a single check ride. Pilots will have to meet qualification standards as set forth by the program in each maneuver or event. The training will be keyed more to practical line flying situations than an unrealistic series of maneuvers and approaches that comprise of today's qualification checks.

Our airline is finishing Phase II and will begin small group trials soon. I have to say the program definitely seems to be more geared to actually qualifying pilots to fly rather than training them to pass the check ride. essentially the mentality will become 'train them until they can do it well, regardless of how many simulator sessions it takes'. Piedmont I know has increased its simulator training to 18 sessions (72 hours total sim training) to meet AQP requirements for initial new hires. National average sim training I believe is 32 hours total for initial new hires under the old program.

So, I take it that you are of the opinion that all Non-AQPers simply “train the test” and as soon as the pilot trainees complete the requisite number of hours, they are deemed “proficient,” and are handed the keys to the jet? Come on … you no more believe that than I do. Actually, I think that the national average in the US for simulator training (soup-to-nuts training … where all the training is completed in an appropriately qualified flight simulator) is more like 28 hours – which is then normally followed by a simulator check (for whatever time that takes) and then is followed by a 4-hour Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) period. A lot of folks contend that this results in 32 hours of simulator training – which is true if you don’t count the time spent on the check and you count the LOFT time as “training.”

In reading your response I wonder if you’ve ever considered the impact on training time that happens with a slight adjustment in the training philosophy. For example, there are new “thought processes” that are making their way through the “halls of flight training venues” – all different, and all with commensurate impact on the overall process. The issue I want to highlight is what you have referred to as having “the training keyed more to practical line flying situations than an unrealistic series of maneuvers and approaches that comprise today's qualification process.”

Most often this process is described as a situational approach to flight training. Crews are told that they will be expected to be able to accurately assess the situation and determine how available resources can be used to resolve the situation. According to this approach, accurate situation assessment is what makes it possible to appropriately apply crew knowledge and skills to that situation. What this does is take the individual flight task, what used to be understood as the basic “unit” of training, and re-classify what is being trained. The new basic training unit becomes the flight “situation” and not the specific maneuver. AQP supporters (and others, admittedly) are motivated by the fact that accidents are often caused by a chain of errors that build up over the course of a flight and if those errors go undetected or unresolved, sometimes they result in a final, fatal error. Of course this is true – unrecognized, unnoticed, and/or unresolved errors can result in your day ending a lot more unpleasantly than you had desired. But following this particular philosophy, the question rapidly becomes one of “is the flight situation” more important than the “flight task that has to be flown,” … or is the “flight task that has to be flown” more important than the “flight situation.” As one can easily see, this approach pits one choice against the other – requiring one to be the recipient of the focused attention and the other to be dealt with as time or circumstances allow.

Under such an “event-based,” or “situational” philosophy (often referred to as “situational training” or “situational evaluation”) the critical aspect, the “flight situation,” now drives the thought processes and usurps the importance of the physical skills that must be exercised. So the training philosophy is now to understand that the combination of task and situation (maneuver and condition) produces a situational structure that determines first the CRM skills, and second the technical skills, likely to be useful in managing the event. For just a moment, let’s presume the task is to train or evaluate a pilot on a missed approach following an instrument approach procedure, where the missed approach would be made into an area of potential icing conditions. For the missed approach task, the crew’s awareness of the weather conditions in the terminal area and their recognition, consideration, assessment, and their collective decisions on how to make the necessary and proper accommodations for those weather conditions becomes THE critical determinant as to whether the event will be judged as “satisfactory” or not. With the “situation” being the most important function, the physical management of the airplane is instantly relegated to a lesser level of performance requirements. So, being late on the application of power, rotating to an improper attitude, or an out-of-sequence configuration change for the missed approach would all become secondary items to the crew’s recognition of the circumstances. Get the recognition and discussion (the situation) portion correct and all of the physical manipulation of the controls, which govern the resulting airplane flight path, may deteriorate to what some consider to be unacceptable levels, but the flight crew gets a passing grade because the critical aspects (the CRM attributes) were scored high. Training at its finest … ? ... perhaps not!

Additionally, if each flight task necessary for the complete and proper technical expertise to be trained and satisfactorily reached, particularly if each such task must be encountered only in a simulated line operational context, the overall time requirements would be dramatically increased. Anyone can do the math. How much time is involved in first taking off, climbing to some intermediate altitude, completing the appropriate check lists, preparing for the descent to the intended airport of landing, briefing the approach, setting the instruments, flying the prescribed arrival and the final approach course … all to get to the threshold and execute the desired “missed approach?” What if it were necessary to do it a second, third, or, heaven forbid, a fourth time? Imagine the simulator time that would be required to see that “missed approach” task accomplished only 4 times! How much better or more competently do think a trainee may perform this particular task after being expected to fly it under these circumstances? How many times would it take for the same task with an engine failed? How about with a tail wind … or crosswind? It’s relatively easy to see just how traditional training tasks – when they are required to be trained in a “practical line flying situation” may actually drive the airline to dramatically increasing the amount of time spent in the flight simulator … to learn the tasks that are otherwise learned – and learned quite well – using simulator times that are substantially less. Why such a program, training a normally qualified pilot, instead of taking 32 hours, may be required to consume, well, perhaps as much as 72 hours … or more!

So, I take it that you are of the opinion that all Non-AQPers simply “train the test” and as soon as the pilot trainees complete the requisite number of hours, they are deemed “proficient,” and are handed the keys to the jet? Come on … you no more believe that than I do. Actually, I think that the national average in the US for simulator training (soup-to-nuts training … where all the training is completed in an appropriately qualified flight simulator) is more like 28 hours – which is then normally followed by a simulator check (for whatever time that takes) and then is followed by a 4-hour Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) period. A lot of folks contend that this results in 32 hours of simulator training – which is true if you don’t count the time spent on the check and you count the LOFT time as “training.”

No, my opinion is not that our current standards just "train to the test", obviously some airlines are better at training than others, however I do know that some air carriers take advantage of the ability to "train to the test".

I can list a dozen air carriers using the standard system for checking that do an excellent job, and I can think of several that do not. It's not that the current system is bad, but it lacks standardization in the quality of training - leaving a lot of the responsibility on the air carrier. Some airlines do well with it like Expressjet, Horizon, and Skywest....while others train to the test and pump out undertrained pilots to save a buck. The fact is that AQP and N&O eliminates the ability of the airlines that look at training as a cost rather than an investment in safety to minimize training.

While I agree with you that training of situational evaluation and practical technical skills as a pilot are critical, I disagree in your assessment that AQP neglects the technical flying skills. Pilots will make their judgment and the instructors/check airmen will have the ability to evolve the situation and "force" a pilot to perform functions critical to the safe operation of an aircraft (such as a single engine missed approach). Additionally through careful monitoring of pilot deficiencies AQP allows for the training and checking of known weaknesses in a pilot's skill.

I know for a fact that repetitive mudane line operations can be bypassed during AQP training. Just like you can quick start a simulator during standard training, you can do the same with AQP. As for the line experiences, I can't tell you from my own experience because the air carrier I work for flies almost all its legs in under an hour.

I know one of our popular AQP test scenarios we developed for "task saturation" is a departure with a prop overspeed that requires an engine shutdown. The pilots can either return to the field (a small airport in mountainous terrain with only a VOR approach) or go to their destination 25 minutes away (a major airport with full facilities). On approach the weather degrades and they have to initiate a single engine missed approach. tower tells them the rain squalls are blowing through and visibility is up and down, the crew must decide whether to go to their alternate or try for another approach. Dispatch is simulated as pressuring them to land where we have maintenance. On their second attempt into the main airport the check airman may or may not cause another missed approach. If they go to their alternate they conduct a normal single engine landing.

That is one of twenty-four situations the pilot will encounter during initial new hire training. The check airmen and instructors will be able to draw on over 300 scenarios for training and evaluation. When training is complete all maneuvers that are listed in the PTS will have been accomplished, but put in a real-world context with difficult decisions and pressures. If the pilot lacks either the judgment, CRM, or technical flying skills on this evaluation, those deficiencies will be specifically trained until the pilot consistently demonstrates proficiency.

Our qualification standards (as I believe is the case with most AQP operators) do not allow for a crew to show non-proficiency in any area without that area being trained to proficiency. So in other words no matter how amazing their CRM, a pilot won't pass until they can perform a satisfactory missed approach as well.

No, my opinion is not that our current standards just "train to the test", obviously some airlines are better at training than others, however I do know that some air carriers take advantage of the ability to "train to the test. I can list a dozen air carriers using the standard system for checking that do an excellent job, and I can think of several that do not. It's not that the current system is bad, but it lacks standardization in the quality of training - leaving a lot of the responsibility on the air carrier. Some airlines do well with it like Expressjet, Horizon, and Skywest....while others train to the test and pump out undertrained pilots to save a buck. The fact is that AQP and N&O eliminates the ability of the airlines that look at training as a cost rather than an investment in safety to minimize training.
If you are saying that an overhaul of the training regulations would be appropriate … I’ll not argue with that premise. There should be NO airline, anywhere, that, as you say, “pumps out undertrained pilots to save a buck.” That may be a problem with the regulations – it may be a problem with regulatory oversight – it may be a problem with ethics of the airline management or training department. In any case, I am of the opinion that adoption of an AQP process – given all of what can be done under the auspices of AQP – provides far too many opportunities to at least compromise, or more likely, lose, the kind of airline training system that should exist in this, or any other, country.
While I agree with you that training of situational evaluation and practical technical skills as a pilot are critical, I disagree in your assessment that AQP neglects the technical flying skills.
I didn’t say that AQP neglects the technical flying skills … I said that AQP allows the neglect of technical flying skills; and, of course, any training program is wholly dependent on the credibility of those actually doing the job. Perhaps it can be better understood by reading their own words: “provided pilots are trained to a standard of proficiency on all objectives within an approved AQP curriculum, it is not necessary to verify proficiency by virtue of a formal proficiency check on every such item. Rather, the proficiency evaluation may consist of a sample of such items, in order to validate that the training to proficiency strategy has in fact achieved its objectives.” The obvious question arises … if a given task is trained and the proficiency of the pilot in accomplishing that task is not checked because that task has been presumed to have been trained to a defined level of proficiency – why is it that we have to endure a proficiency check for any task? Certainly, we all train with the objective of getting proficient. The instructor wouldn’t recommend us for a check unless he/she was convinced that we each would pass that check. Why don’t we simply stop at that point? Why conduct a check at all? Both you and I could probably develop a logical set of reasons why a check is really not worth the effort and the time that it takes. Don’t you agree?

Another quote from the AQP gurus … “the applicant may elect to categorize certain terminal proficiency objectives as currency items. Currency items refer to flight activities on which proficiency is maintained by virtue of frequent exercise during routine operations. Such items do not need to be addressed for training or proficiency evaluation purposes in periodic training sessions.” Seems simple enough … proficiency is maintained by virtue of frequent exercise during routine operations. Hmm. Why couldn’t we just list all the tasks that are frequently exercised during routine operations and eliminate those tasks from ever having to be revisited during training or proficiency checks again? It surely would cut down on the time requirements and therefore the cost … right?

Need more? How about this quote …“Each air carrier applicant, rather than the FAA, develops its own TPO's on the basis of an instructional systems development (ISD) process outlined in Advisory Circular 120-54, Advanced Qualification Program. Once approved by the FAA, these TPO's become regulatory requirements for the individual carrier. An AQP provides an approved means for the carrier to propose TPO additions, deletions, or changes as needed to maintain a high degree of aircrew proficiency tailored to the operator's line requirements.” In case you were wondering, the term “TPO” stands for “terminal proficiency objective” – the objective of the training. Re-read the quote. The carrier sets its own TPOs that become “regulatory requirements” for that operator, and then that operator is provided a means to add, delete, or change those TPOs, as they deem necessary, based on their own evaluation of their own airline’s “operational requirements.” Each airline is setting and modifying their own regulatory requirements? Wow, that sounds like a real stringent set of rules … right?
Pilots will make their judgment and the instructors/check airmen will have the ability to evolve the situation and "force" a pilot to perform functions critical to the safe operation of an aircraft (such as a single engine missed approach). Additionally through careful monitoring of pilot deficiencies AQP allows for the training and checking of known weaknesses in a pilot's skill.
Isn’t that precisely what the “traditional” training and checking provides as well? Pilots will always have an opinion (of course). Instructors and check airmen will always have the ability to “force” a pilot to perform functions critical to the safe operation of an airplane … if they are motivated to do so. What if the company asks them not to? Or what if the check airmen get together to allow their “buds” to skate, and maybe “force” all the “nerds” just a bit more? When and on what do you “force” and when and on what do you relax? Apparently, if there are enough complaints about something, there is the ability to legally change the standards. I was always under the impression that one of the reasons for having a set of training and evaluation standards for the tasks required was to ensure that everyone had to meet the same requirements – sort of a “leveling of the playing field” … and when everyone pretty much does their own thing … how is that possible any longer?
I know for a fact that repetitive mudane line operations can be bypassed during AQP training.
Just as ”mudane line operations” can be bypassed during “traditional” training. An AQP approval isn’t necessary for this.

That is one of twenty-four situations the pilot will encounter during initial new hire training. The check airmen and instructors will be able to draw on over 300 scenarios for training and evaluation. When training is complete all maneuvers that are listed in the PTS will have been accomplished, but put in a real-world context with difficult decisions and pressures. If the pilot lacks either the judgment, CRM, or technical flying skills on this evaluation, those deficiencies will be specifically trained until the pilot consistently demonstrates proficiency.
Two comments, here.
First – the number of scenarios available for training is impressive … but is this not available under the “traditional” training approach? There are some AQP supporters that describe an AQP program as a “proficiency based program,” as if a training program conducted under the “traditional” approach is not proficiency based, but instead, would be completed after spending the requisite number of hours “in training.” You and I both know that is poppycock – of the first order.
Second – if the training received is based on the PTS (the Practical Test Standards) how is that any different from “training to the test?” Are the other training programs out there devoid of some of those tasks? Do you know of any airline that incorporates a line scenario or a line-like approach to training? Let me help with the answers here … No! and Yes! Quite a few. Hmm. If this is true (and it is, I assure you) why is AQP necessary in the first place.
Our qualification standards (as I believe is the case with most AQP operators) do not allow for a crew to show non-proficiency in any area without that area being trained to proficiency. So in other words no matter how amazing their CRM, a pilot won't pass until they can perform a satisfactory missed approach as well.
I would think this would be one of the standards everyone should meet. I would expect the same thing from ALL airlines. There are no "non-AQP" operators who allow someone to demonstrate a lack of proficiency – again regardless of how amazing their CRM – without having to be re-trained and then demonstrate an acceptable level of proficiency. Should any airline - AQP or Traditional - find themselves in a position of having a pilot - regardless of how amazing their CRM - who is not proficient - collectively or specifically, that airline should keep that person off the line until he/she is retrained and can demonstrate a satisfactory level of proficiency - collectively - including each of the specifics.

Oh stop it FAA. Tell guys...." If you pull the stick BACK, the cows get smaller........if you push the stick FORWARD.....................the cows.aaaaah !.......Where are my EASA notes ?

Oh stop it FAA. Tell guys...." If you pull the stick BACK, the cows get smaller........if you push the stick FORWARD.....................the cows.aaaaah !.......Where are my EASA notes ?
Excuse me ... but what's this have to do with flying hours vs training? And what's the FAA got to do with it? Does EASA require a specific minimum number of hours before a person can fly for an airline? If so, what is that number and why was it selected? I wasn't aware that the cockpit crew on AF447 was terribly interested in cows.

In the UK, BA regularly take on 250hr cadets, after selection and type rating many go straight onto the 777.

Will these guys be able to fly in US airspace and land at US airfields? Or will they need to wait til 1500hrs before they get US trips?

I think you'll find that BA requires FOs to have 2500 hrs or more before they can bid onto a LH fleet - unless things have changed since my days there (not that long ago).

72 hours in a simulator... great, that's advanced training :eek:. It would sure replace 1500h in a real aircraft in real conditions, real icing, real ATC radio, noise interference, aircraft vibrations, night IMC, CB's, unexpected headwinds, unreliable fuel gauges, etc...

Errr, let me see, if I spend the next two weeks watching porn movies, study the Kama Sutra and play with myself, would that make me a great lover?

I don't think we can simulate everything, and you gotta do the real thing to get proficient. Preferably far away from an 80 ton airliner with 200 pax inside. :ugh::=

Flex

At last progress and sense. I personally always thought it was a scandal that someone could get a UK ATPL without flying anything bigger than a Seneca but I think the FAA not requiring f/o's to have a type rating was an even bigger debacle! This rule goes totally against logic after all the f/o is there (in part) to take command if the captain becomes incapacitated. So if I was sitting in seat 17A on an N registered 767 and the skipper keeled over I don't think I would take much comfort in the knowledge that the aircraft would now be flown by someone who hasn't got a type rating on it!

If you look at the training requirements under Part 121, PICs and F/Os get almost the same training. They are in class together so they'll have the same classroom training. They are normally paired together in the sim. The difference is the oral exam won't be as long (do you really care if the F/O can explain the difference between a momentary action switch and an alternate action switch) and there are 4 less manouvers on the check ride. No steep turns, no zero flap landing, no jamed stab approach and go around and if you have more than 2 engines they don't have to do the two engine out approach and landing.

72 hours in a simulator... great, that's advanced training http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/eek.gif. It would sure replace 1500h in a real aircraft in real conditions, real icing, real ATC radio, noise interference, aircraft vibrations, night IMC, CB's, unexpected headwinds, unreliable fuel gauges, etc...And since when does 1500 hours guarantee you that? If you're a CFI you will not have gained much actual night IMC, you will not have ever seen icing conditions, all you'll have done is local practice in fair weather. I can go rent a C-152 for 1500 hours and fly only in day VMC in the pattern and be ready for the airlines, right?

Again, my point isn't that higher standards aren't needed - it's that this rule doesn't fix the problem we encountered with the Colgan pilots.

@<hidden>BTDTB4 (http://www.pprune.org/members/376582-btdtb4)

I think we're on the same page. My point is that this 1500 hour rule doesn't help anyone - it just makes politicians feel good about themselves. All the actual problems that led to this Colgan flight are a direct result of inadequate airline training, not pilot experience. The training history of the Colgan captain indicates that he would repeatedly fail checkrides and training events, but the fact is in aviation persistence trumps skill every time.

With an overhaul of airline training and checking procedures we could "weed out" the weak pilots so we don't wind up pairing two individuals with below average skills. AQP is not the be-all, end-all of this but it's a step in the right direction.

You can't rate a pilot by numbers in their logbook, the true gauge of their ability is assessed during training and proven during checking. That's where improvements need to be made.

A lot of things can happen in 1500h. Never mind the night IMC. You could get stuck in a holding near a big airport due to traffic, wondering if you will have enough fuel to continue. You could get a faulty prop (fiber delamination) that shakes the aircraft so much you wonder if it's gonna hold together. You could loose brake fluid on one wheel during touch down. You could have an inflight engine shutdown over the everglades due to a stuck fuel gauge on a single engine aircraft (just switch tanks and you're good to go again, but my heart stopped...), you could get a cracked fuel pipe, a loose carburettor, a compass with a 30 degree error (yes it does exist), a radio failure...

All this happened to me before I had even 700 hours, and all VFR. This is not being overly unlucky, these are small annoyances that make you learn your priorities, and I had seen none of these in a simulator. Sure, quality training IS important, but let's not confuse a brand new shiny light twin piston with EFIS and autopilot, with quality training.

I am not alone to think the picture is wrong here, at least in this perspective: What is good training? Beside training styles and shiny hard cover books, besides the brand new EFIS light piston with GPS, it is THE TRANSFER OF EXPERIENCE. So if my instructor had done all (most of) his quality training in a simulator too, where do you get the experience from?

Even with the best training, nobody can replace exposure to real life situations. Try crop spraying, as one poster mentioned here. I have done it for one year on banana plantations in Africa, and no training or simulator will EVER replace that. Agricultural air work in the bush will sure teach any sim mogul a few things about piloting skills, precision flying, and the definition of a close shave.

Island flyer, I agree that training standards should improve, but I disagree with the statement that more flying hours has nothing to do with Colgan story. These pilots acquired their early experience (below 1500h) ALREADY operating with passengers in a regional, affiliated to a larger carrier. Not the way to go in my opinion.

There are various reasons the captain of a big jet is required to have more hours, way more than the mere 1500 needed for an ATP certificate. Insurance companies: they play also a critical role in defining experience requirements, because they run all their business on statistics.

I have been a trainer and a checker in flight and in the sim for a few years now, and the quality training (such called refering to big brand names) brings no more no less of a good pilot than the local flying club. I have found it's the motivation, the passion, the drive to learn and discover that makes the difference in a proficient individual. Not how much he/she can pay to get to the most prestigious school.

There is a problem I see with the "train to proficiency" concept. Of course every pilot must be proficient to the required standards. But I have seen sons of embassadors spending 18 months to do a PPL...they are not motivated, have unlimited reserves of cash, after 5 or 6 years, they will be trained to proficiency... but they engage no interest in what they do. They will remain pilots with poor skills, poor judgement, and just this feeling of entitlement and arrogance.

I read once "Good judgment comes from experience, unfortunately experience often comes from bad judgement..." maybe it was here on PPrune (a thanks to the forgotten quoter). Here is another one: 'Experience is the thing you acquire just after the moment you needed it..."

When was the last time anyone got really scared in the simulator? :zzz:

If you could teach a course that would prepare someone to be a proficient, safe pilot, you could also teach a computer to do it. The reason humans are necessary is because they're capable of parallel processing...loosely speaking "learning from experience". Certainly the quality of preparation one receives has great bearing on how quickly they learn from their experiences, but without the experience, the preparation just qualifies you to teach a class on flying airplanes.

There's a reason insurance companies require numbers in logbooks. Some very smart actuaries who have no emotional dog in the fight have determined that these numbers create superior pilots. I don't see any reason to argue with them.

the true gauge of their ability is assessed during training and proven during checking

Although this sounds logical, it's more complex today than earlier, due to the erosion of training standards.
At a major carrier the last 5 incidents all involved new trainers. The problem seems to be that t+c's for trainers at almost all airlines are unattractive. Effect is, that the 'wrong' pilots apply. The ones who want to boost egos or the young to enhance or protect their careers. The first are never, the second not yet suited to provide adequate training and checking (the companies love them though, very obedient).

Training needs a huge global quality boost before above statement can validate.

Some very smart actuaries who have no emotional dog in the fight have determined that these numbers create superior pilots

I don't really consent with that statement. Numbers alone can't do the job. However in the absence of the above, numbers are more efficient, because experience works even on less skilled pilots. At least better than the stereotype, short, cheap and mostly virtual sop-drill that todays airlines call 'training'.

It's a complex matter. Numbers needed to be increased, but the worldwide training disaster should to be addressed just as agressively.

And what was the reasons for thinking in such a thing, and why the military guys have more options than civilian

Gretchen: Agreed on all points. Numbers aren't the whole story, but the "numbers don't matter" crowd are dead wrong.

It's a complex matter. Numbers needed to be increased, but the worldwide training disaster should to be addressed just as agressively.Gretchen, I agree. This has been my point. I think a number of posters have thought when I refer to training it's to who is training the PPL, CPL, ATP. I couldn't care less who gives pilots their basic training at this time - I'm speaking about the limited scope of an airline looking at perspective employees (pilots). The only training that concerns me is the air carrier training.

I work for a regional airline much like Colgan, we usually provide pilots with their first airline job so many of our applicants come to us with no air carrier experience and limited flight experience (our requirement has been 1500h since 2004).

As a hiring company the 1500h is a nice objective limit to put on someone but in the end it means very little. Did that person really fly 1500h or did he just doctor his logs? Did he fly hard and learn the lessons we all would like people to learn in a C-172 or was he a pattern-rat that has never seen an emergency or unusual situation in his life? Is this applicant simply a moron that can handle an interview well? Did his instructors impart upon him accurate information or just make stuff up?

As the hiring airline I just don't know and have no way of finding out.

As an airline manager it's my job to be able to accurately assess their skills and hone them to be homogenous with company procedures, policies, and safety requirements. All that comes from an air carrier's training program. The airline training and checking is the only means by which a company can assure only qualified individuals are placed in those two front seats. As it stands now this training and checking lacks in its standards and effective execution. While this is less true for major airlines, regional airlines encounter the greatest challenges because their pilots typically lack practical experience. Even at 1500h a fresh applicant does not have sufficient experience to serve as a flight crew member. That's why this number is absurd and that is why the air carrier training program is the real issue at hand regarding these under qualified pilots. Unless we only hire military pilots or Part 135 pilots (of which there are insufficient numbers to fill the required staffing of the US's regional airlines) the regionals will have to take a part of the burden for the shaping of their pilots into professional pilots. That is what should be addressed by the FAA.

I think AQP and the upcoming changes to Subpart N and O will help standardize airline training and checking, but the FAA needs to perform more aggressive audits of training procedures. A culture will eventually have to develop in companies where training of aircrew is not seen as a needless waste but an investment in safety just like preventive maintenance.

Until the FAA addresses the core problem - air carrier training programs, specifically for regional airlines - all we'll get is ineffective band aids like this ATP requirement.

And what was the reasons for thinking in such a thing, and why the military guys have more options than civilian
Military flight training is more rigorous than civilian flight training, by far. Also, flying in the military -- regardless of whether it is in transports, tactical, helos, or other, is guaranteed to give the pilot experience and exercise his airmanship abilities earlier in his career more than most civilian flying (I give a nod to the professional bush pilots here).

So, the rationale is completely sound, acknowledging reality of the environment rather than sticking with a single number.

the regionals will have to take a part of the burden for the shaping of their pilots into professional pilots. That is what should be addressed by the FAA.

That is a huge problem. Regionals are more under financial pressure than the legacy carriers. If they logically bear the brunt of air carrier training, then the burden needs to be shared with the eventual poachers, the biggies. If left alone, quite obviously they'll cut back to the bare necessity, along the line the regulator allows.
Sharing the burden might implicate a transfer sum, once the trained airline pilot changes to bigger carriers. That is what you're referring to that could be addressed and controlled by the FAA.

A problem not encountered in the US but popping slowly up along the rising airline powers is that such countries tend to have ambitious nationalisation programs. This brings with it some astonishing careers for locals, like ab initio (250h) pilots right onto T7's or 330ies and long haul operations.
They build up hours quite rapidly, but not even close the equivalent and needed experience. Still they operate into and share all our airspaces.

How can we address that problem? These countries 'own' their regulators and these will follow their masters voice .....

That might prove the ultimate challenge to the FAA and subsequently Congress, if such carriers continue their expansion and domination.

@<hidden>BTDTB4 (http://www.pprune.org/members/376582-btdtb4)
I think we're on the same page. My point is that this 1500 hour rule doesn't help anyone - it just makes politicians feel good about themselves. All the actual problems that led to this Colgan flight are a direct result of inadequate airline training, not pilot experience. The training history of the Colgan captain indicates that he would repeatedly fail checkrides and training events, but the fact is in aviation persistence trumps skill every time.

With an overhaul of airline training and checking procedures we could "weed out" the weak pilots so we don't wind up pairing two individuals with below average skills. AQP is not the be-all, end-all of this but it's a step in the right direction.

You can't rate a pilot by numbers in their logbook, the true gauge of their ability is assessed during training and proven during checking. That's where improvements need to be made.

I agree that any number of hours (if it’s just a number of hours) doesn’t tell anyone much of anything about the person claiming those hours. What was being done during those hours would tell an interested party a bit more – but would still not necessarily convey the whole story. I also agree that in the Colgan case, it was more likely to have been caused by either inadequate training or a failure to assimilate what had been seen and practiced during the training received; but, in either case, training was the issue. As any experienced aviator on this forum will attest, it is a combination of training and experience that makes a pilot what he/she actually is – and does – in the cockpit on any given day. It is true that experience can make up for some lack of training – and it is also true that, to some extent, training can make up for a lack of experience. However, at least in my not-so-humble opinion, the weight of those two arguments goes easily to the favor of training – noting that experience cannot be overlooked completely.

If that is a correct premise – there should be at least some experience on which either the PIC or the SIC may rely when it becomes necessary. However, specifying the number of hours of experience is not an easy choice – and that is only partially because it doesn’t indicate what must have occurred during those hours. For decades the FAA has selected to use 250 hours. Why? Probably because that is (at least it was, at the time) the minimum number of hours required before a pilot could obtain a commercial endorsement on his/her pilot certificate. Since an airline was engaged in a “commercial” enterprise, that likely seemed to be the most logical position.

Additionally, there is a regulatory requirement that each airline pilot undergo that airline’s specific training program for pilots and complete an established number of hours of operating experience prior to their being authorized to hold a line and fly for that airline. Both the training program content and conduct, as well as the number of operating experience hours, are part of the US regulations. But, like almost anything else, if the training program is not rigorously constructed, reviewed, updated, and approved by those who know what is needed and know what tools are best used for that purpose; if the training is not then regularly conducted by those who know how to instruct and how to ensure that the instruction has “been assimilated;” if the evaluation is not regularly conducted, both thoroughly and fairly, by competent professionals who know what they need to see; if the operating experience is not conducted by someone with a “critical eye” toward determining if the person really has “learned” all that he/she needs to learn; and, every bit as importantly, if the pilot, individually and regularly, is not concerned that he/she really knows what is going on and whether or not he/she is ready to do the job on their own, or are, at any time, willing to “press ahead” when they do not “know for sure” that they can handle the waiting circumstances … the results are going to be less than what everyone expected originally. Clearly, when any of these aspects are not met, the end-point is simply not, and should not be, acceptable.

The point I am trying to make is that training is an incredibly important part of any airline’s operating philosophy and function. And it is a point that you have also made … that is, and I quote you, “…the fact is in aviation persistence trumps skill every time.” The regulations should be clearly written to provide a “level playing field” for all who participate and to provide an adequate level of operating safety. These rules and regulations should be structured to provide the skills necessary to do the job – and those rules and regulations should then be equally and fairly applied to all who participate. From my perspective, and that of many of my colleagues, the authorizations that are available through an AQP-approved training program manage to provide unacceptable numbers and kinds of deviations from this premise. Such deviations are accepted through a belief that the same goals may be achieved through multiple and, at times, widely differing approaches, where many, if not a lion’s share, of those “beliefs” have been formulated and applied by those whose aviation knowledge was obtained exclusively through simple observation and very little, if any, actual aviation industry background or experience.

I am quite sure that most of the airline operations using AQP are doing so with the utmost professionalism and care … BUT the fact remains that the opportunities for deviating from the kind of rigorous structure, balance, administration, conduct, review, and awareness described above are generously more opportune under an AQP program. It is these opportunities that, when acted upon, allow such deviations, inconsistencies, and faulty applications to go unnoticed and the consequences to begin mounting. I am not overlooking the fact that we can, and do, rely on the individual participants to continue to do their jobs effectively and professionally … but those actions should be in concert with the regulatory requirements to do so – so that all actions in these areas are equally (at least as equally as individuals can be equal in their efforts) realized in the overall aviation system. However, the fact remains that when these deviations constitute the persistence you describe, we wind up with the “trumped skill” you’ve also described, all the while believing that the right thing is being done. WE – you, me, and the regulator – together – if we use the authorizations available under AQP, are conspiring to trump those necessary skills – through inconsistency and inadequacy provided by those deviation authorizations.

I understand where you're coming from with your reservations regarding AQP. I agree it is a new program for many air carriers and as such is under intense scrutiny from the Administrator. Thus far my experience with AQP is that it has given the flight operations department at my company increased ammunition to procure more funding for pilot training from the executives at the company (who are always looking at training as a way to save a buck). As a result the level of precision in training has increased drastically. It does take dedication and a real willingness of the training department to adhere to the qualification standards.

With AQP we are given the opportunity to assess each pilot on an individual scale and rate as to whether there is an ability to "train out" the unsatisfactory habits that have caused them to be unable to adequately perform the maneuver. The qualification standards in AQP, in my opinion, are spelled out in as much detail as the PTS we used under Appendix E and H.

You are certainly correct in your assessment that AQP takes careful oversight by professional pilots and the regulating bodies. It's a double edged sword in that when applied correctly and in the spirit of providing proper training it is superior, but it does leave a lot of ability for an operator to "cheat" and turn out underqualified pilots. If this does not come with more rigorous oversight from the Administrator it could be disastrous for the industry. This also requires skilled and responsible check airmen - of which I am lucky to have available.

I think we may have to agree to disagree on this. In understand AQP isn't infallible and I respect your opinion and the professional manner in which you've presented it. You've definitely given me some food for thought. I do believe AQP has, at least in our case, increased the standards by which pilots are trained and allows us to more accurately identify weak points in a pilot's skillset and train it to proficiency. If I begin to see our program evolve into weaker training standards I assure you I will come here and eat my piece of humble pie for all to see. Though one way or another we are all going to AQP - the N&O requirements forthcoming in 2014 (I Think) are just a watered down version of AQP that will be mandated for all operators.

I understand where you're coming from with your reservations regarding AQP. I agree it is a new program for many air carriers and as such is under intense scrutiny from the Administrator. Thus far my experience with AQP is that it has given the flight operations department at my company increased ammunition to procure more funding for pilot training from the executives at the company (who are always looking at training as a way to save a buck). As a result the level of precision in training has increased drastically. It does take dedication and a real willingness of the training department to adhere to the qualification standards.

With AQP we are given the opportunity to assess each pilot on an individual scale and rate as to whether there is an ability to "train out" the unsatisfactory habits that have caused them to be unable to adequately perform the maneuver. The qualification standards in AQP, in my opinion, are spelled out in as much detail as the PTS we used under Appendix E and H.

You are certainly correct in your assessment that AQP takes careful oversight by professional pilots and the regulating bodies. It's a double edged sword in that when applied correctly and in the spirit of providing proper training it is superior, but it does leave a lot of ability for an operator to "cheat" and turn out underqualified pilots. If this does not come with more rigorous oversight from the Administrator it could be disastrous for the industry. This also requires skilled and responsible check airmen - of which I am lucky to have available.

I think we may have to agree to disagree on this. In understand AQP isn't infallible and I respect your opinion and the professional manner in which you've presented it. You've definitely given me some food for thought. I do believe AQP has, at least in our case, increased the standards by which pilots are trained and allows us to more accurately identify weak points in a pilot's skillset and train it to proficiency. If I begin to see our program evolve into weaker training standards I assure you I will come here and eat my piece of humble pie for all to see. Though one way or another we are all going to AQP - the N&O requirements forthcoming in 2014 (I Think) are just a watered down version of AQP that will be mandated for all operators.
First, thanks for your very kind comment. Second, the point I’m attempting to make is that all of what you’ve seen accomplished under AQP can be accomplished under the “traditional” training program applications. You say that “…qualification standards in AQP are spelled out in as much detail as the PTS we used under Appendix E and H” when actually, the regulatory language that allows training under AQP contains no specific criteria, per se. In fact, 14CFR part 121, subpart Y (“Advanced Qualification Program”), §121.903(b) states “Each certificate holder that obtains approval of an AQP under this subpart must comply with all the requirements of the AQP and this subpart instead of the corresponding provisions of parts 61, 63, 65, 121, or 135 of this chapter. However, each applicable requirement of parts 61, 63, 65, 121, or 135 of this chapter, including but not limited to practical test requirements, that is not specifically addressed in the AQP continues to apply to the certificate holder and to the individuals being trained and qualified by the certificate holder.” In other words, unless you have been granted a specific authorization under AQP to do something else, you will be required to “do business as usual” by complying with the same regulatory requirements that everyone else has to meet.

Of course, I agree with you that AQP is not infallible; just as any training program used by any part 121 operator is not infallible. But I do not agree that AQP has increased the standards by which pilots are trained. Indeed, the standards expected of pilots training for your airline may have increased, but unless the requirements used by your airline were not fully in compliance with the standards found in the existing rules, that increase you see is not due to a requirement of AQP. How do I know this? I know this because AQP includes no … none … zero … performance standards … for anyone, for any task. In fact, the material found on the FAA public Website that contains information about AQP clearly states the following:
“An AQP entails proficiency based qualification. That is, provided that pilots are trained to a standard of proficiency on all objectives within an approved AQP curriculum, it is not necessary to verify proficiency by virtue of a formal proficiency check on every such item. Rather, the proficiency evaluation may consist of a sample of such items, in order to validate that the training to proficiency strategy has in fact achieved its objectives. Terminal proficiency objectives (TPO's), together with associated performance standards, replace the FAA’s traditional event driven compliance requirements. Each air carrier applicant, rather than the FAA, develops its own TPO's on the basis of an instructional systems development (ISD) process outlined in Advisory Circular 120-54, Advanced Qualification Program. Once approved by the FAA (meaning the AQP officials), these TPO's become regulatory requirements for the individual carrier. An AQP provides an approved means for the carrier to propose TPO additions, deletions, or changes as needed to maintain a high degree of aircrew proficiency tailored to the operator's line requirements.”(underline added for emphasis)
This blurb starts out by making a statement that I believe is intended to allay any potential concerns before they materialize … “don’t worry, AQP training is better because it is proficiency based.” Really? Do they think that traditional programs are NOT proficiency based? Ridiculous! So – what’s the big deal? AQP or not – everything is “proficiency based!”

The only things an AQP-approved training program actually authorizes are deviations from existing regulatory requirements. Each of the deviations authorized under AQP may be requested under a traditional training program – but, each would be subjected to the scrutiny of a wider range of persons within the FAA, and each such request may be subjected to public notice and comment – which would allow competing airlines, and the public in general, to know and comment on each such request.

The only things an AQP-approved training program requires that are not required under a “traditional” training program are the following:
1) The training program must be constructed using an Instructional Systems Design concept (specified in an Advisory Circular published by the AQP office);
2) Specific data must be collected (that, once collected and examined, may indicate that a particular task, individual, or group of individuals might benefit from additional or remedial training or a change in a specific aspect of a particular training segment) and;
3) “…approved training on and evaluation of skills and proficiency of each person … to use his or her resource management skills and his or her technical (piloting or other) skills [must be accomplished] in an actual or simulated operations scenario” … quote from §121.917(b).

None of the requirements made by AQP are disallowed in a traditional training program and none would require anything beyond presentation of such additions to the Training Program Approval Authority (the Feds call this the “TPAA”), a review by that person (including whomever that person may choose to involve), and an approval by that person.

Additionally, I agree that, as you say, “…AQP takes careful oversight by professional pilots and the regulating bodies…” In fact, I would say that the same “careful oversight by professional pilots and the regulating bodies” is appropriate for ALL airline training and evaluation practices.

I am also familiar with Training modifications which you reference (i.e., the N&O requirements forthcoming in 2014) – at least as much as one can be by reading the Notices published in the Federal Register. Because there are virtually “no” performance standards under AQP, it is difficult for me to judge these proposed standards against any AQP training program because, first, AQP training programs are held as “proprietary” to that airline (and rightfully so, for the most part), but without something to compare … a comparison attempt would have to be considered “DOT” instead of “DOA” that is … instead of “dead-on-arrival”, it would be “dead-on-thought.” In fact, that everyone using AQP has differing standards (some actually describe it as “widely differing standards”) of performance for their crews is one of the concerns I have for adopting AQP … and, it also allows each airline to have differing standards within the airline, but different from fleet to fleet.

The Federal Register notifications for this pending rule change contained what the Feds called a “Technical Report,” where they described the specific tasks that would be “different” for an “AQP-carrier” from what a “non-AQP carrier” would have if the proposed rules were to be adopted as written. There were 6 AQP-airlines in the comparison (all de-identified). The stunning issue was that for “recurrent” training and testing, for each of those 6 AQP airlines the FAA recognized “differences” in how tasks the AQP-airline would have to perform from how the tasks non-AQP airlines would have to perform that approached 100% of the tasks! Said differently, almost 100% of the tasks referenced in the proposed rules were either “not addressed” or were addressed “differently” by each of the AQP airlines. According to the Report, “different” could mean either the task was different, was authorized to be ignored or substituted completely by another task (i.e., performing "windshear" recoveries instead of approach-to-stall recoveries! What's up with that?!?), or the way the task was to be performed by the AQP airline was different than what the nonAQP airline would be required to do – but, interestingly enough, not one of the tasks referenced was described – at all – the way the AQP airline would be required to perform it. To me, this report was a VERY enlightening revelation, and it is THE issue that got me to looking more closely at what an AQP authorization really meant.

The next thing I’ll likely hear from someone on this forum is that I spend a lot of words and a lot of time making my points. Guilty; and proudly so. I do this because if I’m going to be in this industry for as long as I hope to be, I surely want ALL of us to be guaranteed, as much as possible, that we ALL get the training that we need and that ALL of us meet exactly the same minimum requirements for competency and safety! Gaining deviations, substituting one task for another task, and allowing the adjustment of standards for the performance of piloting tasks on an airline by airline basis doesn't seem to me to be the way to achieve what I think are the necessary requirements to achieve what I would hope we all would like to have!

And since when does 1500 hours guarantee you that? If you're a CFI you will not have gained much actual night IMC, you will not have ever seen icing conditions, all you'll have done is local practice in fair weather. I can go rent a C-152 for 1500 hours and fly only in day VMC in the pattern and be ready for the airlines, right?
1) Renting an airplane for 1500 hours does not equate to being a CFI for 1500 hours. When you rent, you're flying when you want to and at your convenience. As a CFI, it is a job on which is relied for income. And although you still make go/no-go decisions, it is still not without the added pressure that flying is your livelihood.

2) Flying a rental for building hours does not equate to a CFI instructing to build hours. Not only are you teaching and demonstrating, but you're constantly looking for that fine line between how far to let the student "screw up" (we learn from those screw-ups) in order to facilitate learning and not bending the metal. And believe me, the little stick time that I got from instructing was definitely made up for by the instances of having to prevent bending metal. On top of all that, you're still gaining decision making and CRM skills that wouldn't be gained by just renting.

So, no. Renting isn't the same as instructing.

Overall, this is a good rule since it is better at encouraging a career progression approach to an airliner/corporate jet etc. vs pay to play. Sure, there will be those that slip through the cracks (like those resourced enough to rent an airplane for 1500 hours). But there are cracks in any system. However, without this rule, it encourages aspiring pilots to go through the zero to hero programs.

I know this because AQP includes no … none … zero … performance standards … for anyone, for any task. In fact, the material found on the FAA public Website that contains information about AQP clearly states the following:
“An AQP entails proficiency based qualification. That is, provided that pilots are trained to a standard of proficiency on all objectives within an approved AQP curriculum, it is not necessary to verify proficiency by virtue of a formal proficiency check on every such item. Rather, the proficiency evaluation may consist of a sample of such items, in order to validate that the training to proficiency strategy has in fact achieved its objectives…”

I’ve looked through what information I can find on the FAA website, and I’m not sure where you say this information may be found … can you be a bit more specific?

I’ve looked through what information I can find on the FAA website, and I’m not sure where you say this information may be found … can you be a bit more specific?

The specific area where this particular quote was taken is item number 3, at the following link.
http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/aqp/more/background/ (http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/aqp/more/background/)
However, all of the information under the Heading of “Distinguishing Features” at that same link are more than a little “interesting.”

The material found under the Heading of “Mandatory Requirements” at this same link is equally revealing.

I'm willing to bet that those that disagree with the 1500 hour rule are those who have not yet acquired those magic numbers. And those who have the necessary experience probably realize that those hours do count for something. Kinda like people without a university degree that say "it's just a piece of paper", yet those of us who have a degree know that it amounts to more than 4 years. Sometimes the sum of all the parts equal more than their number.

I'm willing to bet that those that disagree with the 1500 hour rule are those who have not yet acquired those magic numbers. And those who have the necessary experience probably realize that those hours do count for something. Kinda like people without a university degree that say "it's just a piece of paper", yet those of us who have a degree know that it amounts to more than 4 years. Sometimes the sum of all the parts equal more than their number.

It just may be that at least some of those who disagree with the 1500 hours are those who know pilots who have those numbers (...or more...) and still can’t do the job ... and very likely know of those who have not yet reached 1500 hours and are doing the job quite nicely ... thank-you-very-much.

I would suggest taking a step back, refocusing, and recognize that it is the “necessary experience” that is necessary – and that this experience is completely different from any preconceived number of hours. At the risk of sounding redundant ... it isn’t the number of hours that is the problem ... it’s the experience gained during whatever flight time is logged. If the “necessary experience” is gained – the number of hours it took is practically irrelevant ... as it is the experience that is, and should be, the focus. Unfortunately, I know of more than a few “pilots” who have more than 1500 hours (some substantially more), and I wouldn’t let them take my airplane around the traffic pattern!

I’m suspicious that you may not know anyone who actually spent “more than 4 years” getting that 4-year piece of paper.

In a perfect world every airline would make good training a company priority and spend what ever it takes to do it right. In the real world training is a cost centre and cost need to "managed" (ie reduced). In the real world, especially for Part 121 Regionals, the bare minimum of tick the box training is the norm. Meet the absolute minimum standard and you are good to go. I think the only reason that airlines could get away with this was because up until recently, new hires almost invariably appeared with solid Part 135 or corporate experience including ME and IFR time.

Sadly the massive diminution of terms and conditions has driven the experience level of new hires down. Expecting the airlines to spend the money to properly train a 250 hr new hire is IMO a fantasy. Demanding an ATR is not the ideal solution but it is not subject to interpretation. It will make sure that new hires bring some experience to the job instead of the guarantee that a 250 hour new hire will have none and be totally dependent on the quality and effectiveness of the airline training system.

Ha! Its a ploy by the Europeans to stop all their pilots from going over to the States in droves because it is more cost effective to train in the States and the training is more pragmatic - as opposed to cripplingly expensive. The training industry in the States will only be catering for richy richies of which there are less than normal poories.
The flood of thousands of pilots will cease and brilliant schools like some national schools in the States will go down the pan as there will be plenty of instructors, with few to train.

Surely, the difference between a twin Cessna in the filth at night is actually good training but is far removed from the ambiance of an airliner flightdeck and in-the-same-loop CRM and all the rest of it in the rarified atmosphere and noise at FL410

but, who wants to be a Captain anyway, until you have got well used to being in the right seat and benefitted from ever greater depths of absolutes and worldly knowledge from el Capitano.

Surely, the difference between a twin Cessna in the filth at night is actually good training but is far removed from the ambiance of an airliner flightdeck and in-the-same-loop CRM and all the rest of it in the rarified atmosphere and noise at FL410I'll take the real-world relevance of "filth" trained over "ambiance" any day.

Most of my friends went through flight instruction, charter, corporate and finally airline flying. They are all great pilots who never took any short cuts to the right seat. They didn't need to be told about what to do if you lost airspeed, they knew how to handle it. The airline didn't have to. AF lost airspeed and not one pilot knew how to handle it. That is what experience is all about. Experience should be something you come to the airline with, not what they have to teach you. Hire competent pilots and pay them what they bring to you. Don't hire new hires that are cheap and try to train them.

I wanted to clarify a few things:

This is NOT a 1500 hour rule. It will not matter if -121 airline pilots, including new-hire FOs, have 1500 hours.
What IS required is an ATP (a full, PIC ATP):
So, if a pilot has 1500 hours, but can't pass that ATP checkride, they are not eligible to fly -121. In fact, the FAA is proposing that some categories of pilots will need less than 1500 hours...but will still have to have a full ATP.

The new-hires will NOT need a type rating, just an ATP-Multiengine Land.

Pilots CAN still fly for the smaller carriers that have 19 seats or less, as they are able to operate under regulations called -135, which are less stringent than -121 (-121 is Delta, United, Freedom, Colgan, SkyWest, etc.).

From what we have seen the carriers in the US are not doing much to get ready for these regulations to start, which is 1 AUG 2013. It does not seem to me that they will be able to recruit enough pilots, and massive flight cancellations will occur. Maybe they are just hoping to lobby Obama and get his administration to change the regs-that is what FedEx/UPS did with regards to the new Flight/Duty/Rest regs.

cliff
VCP

Cliff,

You might want to read the NPRM. To keep E-R and other schools happy, they have proposed a "Restricted ATP" (the FAA's term.) They are up front that it will not meet ICAO ATP standards and they say it will not be valid for any operation that requires an ATP for PICs but it is an ATP and that's all Congress mandated. I would not call that a "full" ATP.

Also:

23. Add §121.436 to read as follows:
§121.436 Pilot Qualification: Certificates and experience requirements.
(a) No pilot may act as pilot in command of an aircraft unless he holds an airline transport
pilot certificate, an appropriate aircraft type rating for the aircraft being flown, and has
1,000 hours as second in command in part 121 operations, pilot in command in operations
under §91.1053(a)(2)(i) or §135.243(a)(1) of this chapter, or any combination thereof.
(b) No certificate holder may use nor may any pilot act as second in command unless the
pilot holds an airline transport pilot certificate and an appropriate aircraft type rating (my bold) for the aircraft being flown. A pilot type rating obtained under §61.55 does not satisfy (again, my bold) the requirements of this section.
(c) Compliance with the requirements of this section is required by August 1, 2013.

Pilots CAN still fly for the smaller carriers that have 19 seats or less, as they are able to operate under regulations called -135, which are less stringent than -121 (-121 is Delta, United, Freedom, Colgan, SkyWest, etc.).

The maximum seats for scheduled air service under FAR 135 is 9 or less. Air carriers operating 19-seat aircraft must be certificated under FAR 121. This went into effect in 1997.

The maximum seats for scheduled air service under FAR 135 is 9 or less. Air carriers operating 19-seat aircraft must be certificated under FAR 121. This went into effect in 1997.
Just a couple of wee nits to pic …

1. Persons (and I’m using the word “persons” in the regulatory sense) desiring to operate, or who are operating, civil aircraft as an air carrier or commercial operator are certificated under 14CFR part 119 (“Certification: Air Carriers and Commercial Operators”) not “FAR 121.”

2. The actual use of “FAR” happens to be the shortened reference for the “Federal Acquisition Regulations” which has nothing to do with airplanes, pilots, or anything of the sort.

3. 14CFR part 121 is entitled “Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations;” and

4. 14CFR part 135 is entitled “Operating Requirements: Commuter and On Demand Operations and Rules Governing Persons On Board Such Aircraft.”

5. Part 135 applies to those persons who were either issued an air carrier or an operating certificate and operations specifications under the requirements of part 135 or under SFAR No. 38–2 of 14CFR part 121 before January 19, 1996, or those persons who, after this date, applied for, applies for, or obtains an initial air carrier or operating certificate and operations specifications to conduct scheduled passenger carrying operations, and uses or expects to use an airplane belonging to one of the following groupings for scheduled passenger-carrying operations:
a) Nontransport category turbopropeller powered airplanes type certificated after December 31, 1964, that have a passenger seat configuration of 10–19 seats;
b) Transport category turbopropeller powered airplanes that have a passenger seat configuration of 20–30 seats; or
c) Turbojet engine powered airplanes having a passenger seat configuration of 1–30 seats.

6. Part 121 applies to those persons who hold or are required to hold an air carrier certificate or an operating certificate engaging or planning to engage in domestic, flag, or supplemental operations.

With respect to the question about requiring pilots to have logged a minimum of 1500 hour BEFORE getting hired by a US airline, according to information available from the US FAA public website, predictions for the US aviation industry – outside of the US commercial airline portion of that industry – indicate that all other flight operations will average approximately 34.4 million hours per year from now to 2023 (slightly less initially and slightly more toward the end of that time as the annual growth rate is projected to be approximately 3.2% per year, on average). An average of 34.4 million hours per year provides an average of 2.86 million hours per month over this period. The estimated requirements for pilot are that up to 500 pilots per month will be required to fill vacant airline FO seats for the next 10+ years. If each pilot is required to have logged a minimum of 1500 hours prior to applying for an airline job, this would require approximately 750K hours. Or, said differently, in order for 500 pilots per month to be able to log a minimum of 1500 hours prior to being eligible to be hired into the airline business, just a bit over 26% of all the hours flown outside of commercial airline service every month would have to be available to these “airline aspirants.”

Really you seriously just told me FAR means "Federal Acquisition Regulation" and then proceed to lecture me on the difference between 121 and 135?

I hope you're fully aware that FAR the common industry term in the United States for "Federal Aviation Regulation" in reference to Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The fact that I have to tell you this indicates that you have no clue about US regulations pertaining to aviation.

With regards to your assertion that FAR (Federal Aviation Regulations, aka Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations) Part 135 operators may operate in scheduled service under FAR (again, this is what we in the United States call Title 14 of our Code of Federal Regulations) with a passenger seating configuration I'm not sure what regulation you quoted as you provide no reference. Currently FAR (referring to the Federal Aviation Regulations) 135.1 (http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=70674cefad4dc94f7de16becdf0dc724&rgn=div8&view=text&node=14:3.0.1.1.11.1.3.1&idno=14) was revised to remove the applicability you quoted.

However, the 8900.1 Volume 2, Chapter 2, Paragraph 2-129F (http://fsims.faa.gov/PICDetail.aspx?docId=277AC858B70D661C8525734F0076653F) (Table 2-4) has an excellent chart that clearly illustrates that a scheduled operator with greater than 9 passenger seats or a payload of greater than 6500 pounds must operate under the rules pertaining to Part 121.


Scheduled Operations (common carriage passenger operation; departure, location, and time and arrival location offered in advance by the operator)
Common Carriage (holding out to transport persons or property for compensation or hire)
• Interstate, or
• Foreign, or
• Overseas, or
• Carriage of mail
• Turbojets, or
• Multi-engine airplanes with 10 or more passenger seats, OR more than 7,500 pounds payload capacity
• Within or between 48 contiguous states, entirely within a state, territory, or possession, or special authorizations
121

Domestic
----------------
• Turbojets, or
• Multi-engine airplanes with 10 or more passenger seats, OR more than 7,500 pounds payload capacity
• Entirely outside U.S., take-off or landing outside 48 contiguous states, or between Alaska, Hawaii, territories, and outside U.S.
121
Flag
----------------
• Airplanes with 9 or fewer passenger seats AND 7,500 lbs. or less payload capacity, or any rotorcraft
135

Commuter
----------------
• Airplanes, other than turbojets, with 9 or fewer passenger seats AND 7,500 pounds or less payload capacity, or any rotorcraft used in scheduled passenger-carrying operations with a frequency less than 5 round trips per week on at least one route between two or more points according to the published flight schedules
135
On-demand
----------------

The 30 seat restriction under FAR (Federal Aviation Regulations) 135 applies only to non-scheduled flight operations. All scheduled "commuter" operations are restricted to 9 or less. This is why Great Lakes, Aloha Island Air, and a number of other US commuter airlines converted to FAR (Federal Aviation Regulations, I'd for you to think I'm talking about the Federal Acquisition Regulations on an aviation website) 121 in the late 1990's.

Really you seriously just told me FAR means "Federal Acquisition Regulation" and then proceed to lecture me on the difference between 121 and 135?

I hope you're fully aware that FAR the common industry term in the United States for "Federal Aviation Regulation" in reference to Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The fact that I have to tell you this indicates that you have no clue about US regulations pertaining to aviation…………………………….(et al)

Whoa … slow down parder… I wasn’t trying to kick over your rice bowl – (and no, there isn’t any preconceived ethnic slander hidden in those words) – I was merely pointing out something because I didn’t have much else to do yesterday ……..

However … now that I’ve received such a response let me say that YES, I did REALLY and SERIOUSLY, just tell you that FAR means "Federal Acquisition Regulations." Why did I do that? Because “FAR” is the shortened reference to the Federal Acquisition Regulations. Don’t believe me? I’d suggest you look it up. Simply type “F” “A” “R” into your Google Search Engine and hit the “enter” key. I’d be interested to know what comes up at the top of the list that appears.

I am fully aware that a lot of folks mean the rules that govern the operation of airplanes when they use the term “FAR” … but that doesn’t mean that because it’s used that way that it is correctly used. How many times have you seen/heard someone on television or radio talk about “AXING” someone a question. AXING is what Lizzie Borden did to her parents – she didn’t have a long interrogatory with them. If you stood in front of me and told me that you AXED your business partner … I would likely smile – and ASK you if he got mad … or if he bled all over you … or some other form of “you’ve-got-to-be-kidding” sort of response to such a verbal error. Also, I think you’ll find that in my history on this forum I’ve rarely, if ever, lectured anyone on anything – although I have been tempted to do so - on more than one occasion. I have pointed out, and I’ll probably continue to point out, errors – both in word and deed – but for whatever its worth, I’ve always attempted to do it in a civil manner … sometimes reaching for a humorous twist … (I’ll leave comments on the success of those endeavors to others…). If I came across as less than civil in your mind – perhaps you would consider an apology from me for that indiscretion.

I am fully aware that a lot of folks have used “FAR” as a reference to the combination of regulations dealing with aviation … and it’s probably a carry-over from when the Civil Air Regulations were re-codified. The simple fact is that all regulations in the US are part of a code of regulations – and those that deal with aviation come under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (hence the shortened reference “14CFR”). Of course there are few “hold-overs” that don’t deal with regulatory issues all the time and that are likely not all that interested in the correct references for those rules and regulations. OK. Fine. Their choice … as it is yours.

So, when you explained that your airline and a number of other US commuter airlines converted to FAR 121, the fact is that you all “obtained operations specifications” under 14CFR part 121, and you did so in compliance with §135.2(b), which states “A certificate holder described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section may not, after March 20, 1997, operate an airplane described in paragraphs (a)(1)(i), (a)(1)(ii) or (a)(1)(iii) of this section in scheduled passenger-carrying operations, unless it obtains operations specifications to conduct its scheduled operations under part 121 of this chapter on or before March 20, 1997.” For your information the reference to “this chapter” in this quote, means Chapter I, Subchapter G – Air Carriers and Operators for Compensation or Hire: Certification and Operations.

The regulations that I was “quoting” are 14CFR part 121, (for its title), part 135 (for its title), and specifically §135.2(a)(1) for the references regarding the “groupings” of airplanes I listed as being applicable to all persons who applied for, applies for, or obtains an initial air carrier or operating certificate and operations specifications to conduct scheduled passenger carrying operations, and uses or expects to use an airplane belonging to one of the following groupings for scheduled passenger-carrying operations.

As to your reference to 8900.1, Volume 2, Chapter 2, Paragraph 2-129F … I’m not interested in sparring with you about what may or may not be included in an FAA Order (Flight Standards Information Management System – FSIMS) that is written to provide direction for the activities of aviation safety inspectors working for FAA Flight Standards. If those contents were to be applied as regulatory requirements to the industry, they would appear in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) just like all the other regulatory requirements. I was referring to regulations – things that are required by governmental law.

Again, my intent is not to generate a horrendous argument about what are and are not regulations – nor was I intending to besmirch your reputation or your professional acumen … I was merely pointing out – not very successfully it would appear – that the reference to FAR was not correct. It wasn’t correct the other day … it is not correct today … it wouldn’t be correct tomorrow. However, this IS America, and you can feel free to use its language any way you choose.

You are being pedantic to the point of stupidity. Even the FAA (http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/faa_regulations/)uses the term "FAR" to refer to the Federal Air Regulations. Not to mention the ever-popular FAR/AIM book available every year.

You are being pedantic to the point of stupidity. Even the FAA uses the term "FAR" to refer to the Federal Air Regulations. Not to mention the ever-popular FAR/AIM book available every year.
I didn't think we were going to get into a semantically charged exchange ... but ... I do not believe I am any more "pedantic" about the term "FAR" than you are "obtuse" with respect to the accuracy of what I have said about that term. Indeed, I used to think that I was familiar with the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM). However, as I am apparently not as familiar with it as you are ... would you care to point out for me where it is in that manual that any reference to the term "FAR" can be found? However, in any event, as I pointed out to Island-Flyer, the accuracy of the language used is entirely up to the user. Do you have any additional questions you would care to AX?

Although not a US citizen, I have had the pleasure to attend factory conversion courses on CV880M, B707, L1011 and B747 airplanes prior to my retirement from aviation. To obtain qualifications to operate these aircraft, I had to satisfy the FAA that I understood the FAR's before the issue of a license, so I am very familiar of the pertinent FAR's.

My Google says thus:The Federal Aviation Regulations, or FARs, are rules prescribed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) governing all aviation activities in the United States. A wide variety of activities are regulated, such as airplane design, typical airline flights, pilot training activities, hot-air ballooning, lighter-than-air aircraft, man-made structure heights, obstruction lighting and marking, and even model rocket launches and model aircraft operation. The rules are designed to promote safe aviation, protecting pilots, flight attendants, passengers and the general public from unnecessary risk.

Have a good day sir.

Air Rabbit, appears in AIM several times if you'd care to download the PDF and search...... FAR 91 is mentioned on the flight planning form examples, FAR Part 135 is also mentioned. Stop being a pillock.

My Google says thus:The Federal Aviation Regulations, or FARs, are rules prescribed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) governing all aviation activities in the United States. A wide variety of activities are regulated, such as airplane design, typical airline flights, pilot training activities, hot-air ballooning, lighter-than-air aircraft, man-made structure heights, obstruction lighting and marking, and even model rocket launches and model aircraft operation. The rules are designed to promote safe aviation, protecting pilots, flight attendants, passengers and the general public from unnecessary risk.
Have a good day sir.

Hi Rev. Dog … Thank you for your comments and for the civil manner in which you expressed them. I guess that the service provided by “Google” is largely dependent on what part of the globe the user is occupying at the time. From where I am sitting now, entering “FAR” into Google gets me a list, the top entry of which is the following:
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) https://www.acquisition.gov/far/
"Link to Reissued FAR in PDF printing purposes only ... Includes amendments thru FAC 2005-56, effective April 2, 2012 (Note: FAR amendments are updated on ..."

I’m not sure why so much “heat” is being generated over this, but … not ever having been one to cower in some empty corner when someone begins to wag his or her finger in my face, and to maintain the reputation I’ve gained on this forum over the last 7 years for desiring to be sure that the person (or persons) really do understand what it is I am saying, I’ll give this another try.

I am fully aware that there won’t be many airplanes that crash due the pilots referring to the FARs … but, the fact remains, despite all the nay-sayers and all the quotes provided from various publication sources other than the “horse's mouth,” the correct reference to the regulations we deal with on a daily basis is Title 14 of the US Code of Federal Regulations, followed by the specific “part” of that title, e.g., part 121, part 61, part 135, etc. It’s not critical nor is it even necessary to get that right … but consistent use of either an incorrect term or an outdated or archaic term, at least in most circles, does little to support the position of the person speaking.

As I indicated in my response to Mr. Island-Flyer, I am fully aware that a lot of folks used “FAR” as a reference to the combination of regulations dealing with US aviation issues – it would appear that some (many?) still do. OK. Fine. I also said that it was probably a carry-over from when the Civil Air Regulations – for which the shortened acronym, “CAR,” was used – and when these regulations were re-codified into the Code of Federal Regulations, it was an easy exchange to substitute “Federal” for “Civil” (i.e., Federal Aviation Regulations vs. Civil Air Regulations) and the acronym FAR followed quite nicely behind CAR. Completely understandable – and quite logical. However, the fact that there were already a set of regulations in use at that time, regulations that addressed the requirements that had to be met when the US government purchased items, the Federal Acquisition Regulations, commonly referred to as “FAR,” was completely overlooked. It has only been in the last couple of decades that the Federal Aviation Administration has made a concerted effort to correct this oversight … and the correction was to refer to any of the regulations published under the various “titles” of the US Code with the number of the title followed by the initials “CFR,” standing for Code of Federal Regulations, and then referencing the specifically applicable part of that title. Today, the emphasis is on publishing information with the corrected references. There are fewer and fewer publications from the Federal Aviation Administration that incorrectly use “FAR.” Of course, there hasn’t been a sweeping effort to make changes to ALL such documents, because it isn’t terribly important. But, it would appear that the requirement is when a particular document is published by the US government for update or modification, that publication will not include the acronym “FAR” for anything other than the Federal Acquisition Regulations … and when the term used to refer to rules or regulations applicable to aviation, the term “CFR” (or more correctly “14CFR” – or the appropriate title number preceding the “CFR”) will be used to properly refer to the regulation being cited.

Again Rev. Dog, thank you for your comments and I hope my response is taken in the spirit in which it is legitimately offered – as explanation – not argument.

...appears in AIM several times if you'd care to download the PDF and search...... FAR 91 is mentioned on the flight planning form examples, FAR Part 135 is also mentioned. Stop being a pillock.
The copy of the AIM I already have downloaded – and, by the way, here is a link for the Aeronautical Information Manual (http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/aim/) that I use - this one includes absolutely no references to the term “FAR” … but, then, this is the “official” downloadable version of the FAA published copy of that manual (you’ll note that the link takes you to the official FAA web site) and, indeed, I suspect there very well may be numerous other publishers offering their versions of the same document … and “good on them” for doing so. It’s just that the “source” I’d rather rely on is the FAA itself.

Additionally, I will offer a tip of my hat, in that I have to acknowledge that, while I usually try to keep abreast of most of the vernacular slights and verbal digs that float around, I’m afraid I’m unfamiliar with the term “pillock,” even though I’m reasonably sure it isn’t intended to convey a staunch level of professional respect. But, rest assured, I will give your comments all the consideration, thought, and attention they are due.

And here is the official direct from the FAA link that I used: http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/ATPubs/AIM/aim.pdf

Search for FAR 91 & FAR Part 135. Then look again at the HTML version.

FAR is common parlance in aviation circles, including the FAA - why would you latch onto the first acronym you found on Google that was clearly irrelevant and think/insist it was correct? God alone knows what you'd make of CRM.... Hint: it's not the first result Google throws up.

I’m afraid I’m unfamiliar with the term “pillock

British slang: Noun for Idiot, fool. Originally a slang term for the penis but fairly inoffensive now its this meaning has been forgotten. :ok:

Strange what a useless disagreement can produce?

Have there been any high profile crashes due to low time pilots making mistakes? The Colgan crash was with pilots with thousands of hours of time making bad mistakes. Why is this legislation even on the table? Is it just politics as usual?

British slang: Noun for Idiot, fool. Originally a slang term for the penis but fairly inoffensive now its this meaning has been forgotten.
Strange what a useless disagreement can produce?
Hmm… much as I thought … thanks (again) for the information … and you are most assuredly correct … it IS strange what a useless disagreement can produce! It reminds me of some research of the phenomenon known as “cognitive bias” conducted by 2 chaps, Justin Kruger and David Dunning, at Cornell University some time ago, demonstrating that unskilled persons sometimes suffer from “illusory superiority," often mistaking their ability/knowledge to be much higher than it actually is, and, as a result, causing them to be unable to recognize their own mistakes. Sometimes I wonder if attempting to provide additional or newer information to those who believe they already know all there is to know on a given subject is worth the time and energy it takes to break through that "I-know-it-all-now" or the "you-can't-provide-me-any-additional-facts-that-will-be-useful" kinds of attitudes. In that same light, Dunning/Kruger quoted Charles Darwin as having said "Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does knowledge."

And here is the official direct from the FAA link that I used: http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publi...bs/AIM/aim.pdf
Search for FAR 91 & FAR Part 135. Then look again at the HTML version.
FAR is common parlance in aviation circles, including the FAA - why would you latch onto the first acronym you found on Google that was clearly irrelevant and think/insist it was correct? God alone knows what you'd make of CRM.... Hint: it's not the first result Google throws up.
Geeze … I'm sure you are aware that you are citing a 729 page document that uses a specific term a total of 3 times – twice using reproduced “flight plan forms,” both of which are clearly 1982 forms, and once using an advisory circular discussing icing issues for part 135 operators, an advisory circular that was published in 1981.

Please, sir, if you are comfortable in relying on this kind of verification for your position, be my guest to continue doing so, as I suspect that the FAA police will not show up on your doorstep with an arrest warrant for “improper use of terms.” While I know of only a few in the FAA who regularly continue to use the term “FAR,” and none who adamantly continue to do so, I am not able to concur with your statement that it’s use is “common parlance” within the FAA. However, I do think it best to no longer point out to you what I believe to be an outdated term. Additionally, if it matters, you have my apology for your having to read my efforts to bring this issue to the attention of the other readers on this forum.

AirRabbit

I'll bet you are using that new fangled "first officer" term for "co-pilot", worst still "flight attendant" for "stews" or "hosties". :}

GF

You quite definitively claimed FAR wasn't mentioned in AIM, yet it was. Here's another reference to the FAA using it:

FAA Regulations



Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) (http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?&c=ecfr&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title14/14tab_02.tpl)

Air Carriers & Operators (http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/faa_regulations/)
Pilots, Flight & Ground Instructors (http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/faa_regulations/)
Commercial Space Transportation (http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/faa_regulations/)



Regulations & Policies (http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/)

And from the same page:

Do You Want To… ?



Look up FARs (http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?&c=ecfr&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title14/14tab_02.tpl)





If you'd care to search the FAA website you'll found 100s of references to FAR & FARs, including many very recent documents.

AirRabbit, time for you to indicate a reference for your claim that FAR doesn't mean what everyone else here thinks. Thus far Google is as definitive as you've got. Give us an official document that specifically says Federal Aviation Regulations are not to be referred to as FARs.

I'll stick to using the term "FARs" for aviation regs. To me, "CFR" stands for Crash/Fire/Rescue and using it is 1) bad mojo and 2) implies it might be needed.

Common usage within aviation circles is to use 'FAR' so that's what I use. I suspect there are even some who are ignorant of the 'CFR' naming convention.

Even though AirRabbit's whole string of posts is an exercise in ignorance I'll chime in one last time for the sake of spreading valid knowledge:

The 8900.1 is the guiding document for the FAA, it is law to the FAA inspectors as much as the FAR is law to aviators. And yes, FAR is an official designation in the 8900.1 for use in FAA documents:

8900.1 Volume 1, Chapter 1, Paragraph 1-46, Table 1-1 (http://fsims.faa.gov/PICDetail.aspx?docId=3B21BD11F2DA78BF8525734F0076652E) contains all FAA abbreviations, which includes:

"FAR Federal Aviation Regulations"


The abbreviations on that page are in alphabetical order.

And as an aside, the FAR (Federal Acquisition Regulations) are Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), while the FAR (Federal Aviation Regulations) are Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). So technically both are "CFR" by AirRabbit's argument.

AirRabbit, I'll bet you are using that new fangled "first officer" term for "co-pilot", worst still "flight attendant" for "stews" or "hosties". GF
Ouch! Is it really THAT obvious?

AirRabbit, time for you to indicate a reference for your claim that FAR doesn't mean what everyone else here thinks. Thus far Google is as definitive as you've got. Give us an official document that specifically says Federal Aviation Regulations are not to be referred to as FARs.
OK – admittedly, I’m torn. In one of my last posts, I distinctly recall stating to you the following...“Please, sir, if you are comfortable in relying on this kind of verification for your position, be my guest to continue doing so, as I suspect that the FAA police will not show up on your doorstep with an arrest warrant for “improper use of terms.” While I know of only a few in the FAA who regularly continue to use the term “FAR,” and none who adamantly continue to do so, I am not able to concur with your statement that it’s use is “common parlance” within the FAA. However, I do think it best to no longer point out to you what I believe to be an outdated term. Additionally, if it matters, you have my apology for your having to read my efforts to bring this issue to the attention of the other readers on this forum.
But now you misquote me (I’ve never said “FAR” doesn't mean what you and a lot of others think – go back and re-read what I said – conveniently provided above) and then you challenge me to provide you with an “official” document “that specifically says Federal Aviation Regulations are not to be referred to as FARs.”

So ... the dilemma is to continue to stand by my belief that it is probably better to longer point out to you what I believe to be an outdated term – or to, again, provide you with just exactly the kind of information for which you have asked. Probably to my regret, I’ll back up on my belief as to what is probably best and provide you a reference for just exactly what you have asked.

I contacted a colleague of mine at the FAA, an FAA inspector who’s been there for decades, and has been involved in a lot of the rulemaking efforts regarding pilots, airplanes, simulation, and training. The Flight Standards Service includes an Office of Rulemaking. That Office has what is apparently called “Rulemaking Work Instructions;” and before you ask ... no, I don’t have access to an internal document for this FAA Office; this document is apparently not available on the internet; and I’m not in a position to obtain a copy of such an internal document. I was however provided a quote from those instructions. If you care to pursue this further, I would suggest you contact the FAA Flight Standards Office of Rulemaking – and ask your question directly to someone there.
Use of the Term “FAR”
You must not use the term Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) in FAA rulemaking documents. The Office of the Federal Register does not recognize the acronym FAR as a reference to the regulations in 14 CFR. In fact, the term belongs to the Federal Acquisition Regulations, which are used in procurement. Further, it is not proper to use FAR as though it were a legal citation. See the following examples for the proper format for referencing FAA regulations:
First reference: 14 CFR part 91 14 CFR 91.875
Subsequent references: part 91 § 91.875
If you do not want or need to use specific section numbers, or have a general statement without a section reference, write “in the regulations” rather than “in the FAR”.
In most cases, logically minded persons would likely find this to be sufficient to recognize that FAR, while still used by many persons, and is continued to be found in some (many?) FAA documents, is a reference that is not being promulgated in the regulatory references that are being published by the FAA. That is apparently a decision made by the office that publishes ALL US government documents, the Office of the Federal Register.

My colleague’s note, to which the above quote was attached, says, “I know there are a lot of publications out there that still use "FAR" ... but that is because its not critical that we change to CFR in any given time frame and making all those changes would be terribly expensive ... except when it would be necessary to reprint or revise or update (or something similar) - and at that time it would make sense to change from FAR to CFR in those publications.”

As I’ve said now several times ... you (and anyone else here) are free to use whatever terms you desire to use, for whatever reason or reference you desire to use them. As I have also said, I doubt that anyone is going to “cite” you for “illegal use of terms.” In the same manner, I am going to continue to point out errors that I see – in both practice and description – and those who read my comments, as they have been in the past, so they will in the future, be free to believe or not believe my comments ... and that is their choice.

And now, I have but one more question of Mr. Island-Flyer:
Even though AirRabbit's whole string of posts is an exercise in ignorance I'll chime in one last time for the sake of spreading valid knowledge...

And as an aside, the FAR (Federal Acquisition Regulations) are Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), while the FAR (Federal Aviation Regulations) are Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). So technically both are "CFR" by AirRabbit's argument.
Does this mean that you agree with me ... or that you acknowledge the accuracy of what I’ve said ... or that I am, in your view, continuing to exercise ignorance? Not that it is truly necessary, nor am I particularly exercised over what your answer might be ... I'm just curious.

Regulations.gov (http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2010-0100-1352)

Look it up under:
"Due for comment in the next 15 days"..... then category (left side of page)
"Aerospace and Transportaton".. it will be the first proposal followed by input from others and any changes made.

This is a 51 page "easier to read" document of the proposed rule changes. You may find it interesting that 80% of Part 121 Regional Airline SIC do not have an ATP. More interesting 15% of Major airline SIC do not have an ATP (They don't need one unless they upgrade to PIC and may never have gotten one if their career path took them straight into a major airline right seat, without being a PIC in Part 121 - which of course was possible in years gone by).

So, not only will the Part 121 Regional SIC's get an ATP/Type Rating check ride before next Aug 2013 (subject to them having 1500hours), so will those SIC's sitting at the Majors in the right seat hoping for retirement and knowing or desiring never to upgrade.

Additionally, any existing Regional SIC's who (say, they are on reserve) don't fly much may be jumped in seniority for upgrade, if they a. aren't 23 years old, b. don't have 1000hrs Part 121, or c. have 1500 total time in order to have an ATP/Type Rating checkride before the August 2013 deadline.

Should be interesting to see how this plays out...

I guess with the kinds of regulations and authorizations facing us … I’d still like to find out why it is that the FAA continues to believe that having two different approaches to pilot training is good for the industry. I’ve looked … I’ve read … I’ve examined … however, I continue to come up short on understanding how a set of authorizations to do things differently will yield a better trained crew member. Perhaps if the “differences” were specifically set out so that we could understand just exactly what it is that would be expected of those conducting the training and those receiving the training, instead of relying on some kind of analysis of some sort of nebulous “data” that is supposed to allow us to sense or clairvointly connect with how much better trained a crewmember will be, perhaps the results might be able to be SEEN as “better.”

I’m not saying that we should leave things the way they are … I’ve seen too many instances where pilots with all the “credentials” in the world (i.e., fat log books, ATP licenses, multiple type ratings, and some with multiple employers … both domestically and internationally) sit next to you in the cockpit until it becomes clearly evident that they can’t find their backside with both hands and written directions! We need to do something … but what? Who is driving this boat? The unions? … there are unions representing airline owners, pilots, flight attendants, dispatchers, mechanics, air traffic controllers, etc., etc. Which of these organizations is the one to follow? Is the boat being driven by the non-aviator psychologists that now have us looking at AQP, CRM, FOQA, ASAP, VDRP, ASIAS, LOFT, LOE, event-driven training, and who knows what else – where each program is the panacea to all problems in aviation? Is the FAA a “name-only” group that exists to allay the concerns and fears of the traveling public? Is the FAA a “feel-good” organization where all the airlines can say that they “meet FAA regulations” when those regulations are written so that almost anything goes? Are WE the only people that have any responsibility to do things the right way … and if so, I have some concerns
1) How will we be able to convince our management that we need better tools and more time to conduct the training that we know is necessary?
2) Will it continue be that to get additional money from our management, we will have to show them ever increasing ways in which we are going to save money on training time? (anyone ever hear about a thing called a “Ponzi scam?”)
3) How long will it be before those who do training on “the cheap,” will walk away with all the ticket sales and everyone else will be forced to shut down?

...sit next to you in the cockpit until it becomes clearly evident that they can’t find their backside with both hands and written directions!

BTDTB4:

Just hypothetically curious...

If someone were to evaluate your performance as substandard, would you just 'walk away' amiably and say, "Well the system's working"...

or would you consider legal counsel?

Just hypothetically curious
If someone were to evaluate your performance as substandard, would you just 'walk away' amiably and say, "Well the system's working"...

or would you consider legal counsel?
I don’t “think,” I know that I would evaluate the criticism to see whether or not the criticizer does or does not have a point. If he does have a point, I would see if there was anything I could do to improve my abilities … and if I concluded that he does NOT have a point, I would certainly ask him/her to be a bit more specific as to why he/she believes my performance is substandard and find out what might be the “real” reason behind the criticism. I’d like to think that legal counsel might be a very last resort. For example … let’s say my performance was NOT substandard, and it was provable, but they wanted me fired anyway. So I go get legal counsel and bring a law suit. The suit is settled by allowing me to stay employed. Do you think that would be a good move on my part or not? I would think not. For a whole laundry list of reasons. The only way legal counsel might be considered worthwhile is if I could get a settlement that would pay me enough money to live on (hopefully live well on) until I found another job. In my experience, most relatively new hired persons are not going to be given such an opportunity.

...and if I concluded that he does NOT have a point...

Exactly. :)

...and your point is....

Are WE the only people that have any responsibility to do things the right way … and if so, I have some concerns

...sit next to you in the cockpit until it becomes clearly evident that they can’t find their backside with both hands and written directions!

...and your point is....

...that possibly you should be working for the regulator?

...that possibly you should be working for the regulator?
Yeah … right! Like “they” would want me … or more importantly … like I would want “them”! As in the second most quoted line from the movie “Star Wars” …
“Help me Obi-Wan. You’re my only hope.”

"Luke, use the enForce." :}

OK OK465 (geeze, that sounds redundant...:)) ... I'll give you a couple of points for that one.

Does any one know bout KNOTS AVIATION.....? I wanna know wheather their package is realistic, and also how genuine are they...? have any one gone through their programme....? please do advise bout this.....

CAPA assumes that 250 hour pilots will pay an extra $125,000 so that they can build time all the way to 1500 hours in order to apply for part 121 carriers :ugh:


US regional airlines continue to be tested | CAPA (http://www.centreforaviation.com/analysis/us-regional-airlines-continue-to-be-tested-55541)

Airlines: 4 Ways Regionals Are Even Worse Off | InvestorPlace (http://www.investorplace.com/2012/04/airlines-4-ways-regionals-are-even-worse-off/)

:sad:
I guess I shouldn’t be surprised at what the FAA continues to do. Sure ... setting a minimum time for the issuance of any given pilot certificate will ensure that the pilot has logged those hours. But, if there isn’t any indication of what had to have been going on during those hours – all you’ll be able to be sure of is that this pilot has logged those many hours ... and without some kind of airplane logbook verification ... you won’t even know if these are “real” flying hours, or Parker 51 time! Sure, if the requirement for a pilot certificate to fly in an airline cockpit goes from 250 hours (required for most commercial certificates) to 1500 hours (required for an airline transport pilot certificate) the applicant will have to have logged that additional 1250 hours. As anyone would recognize 1250 hours is 1250 hours ... a nice number ... but 1250 hours doing what? Personally, I believe that the answer to that question is at least as important as having those additional hours. I don’t know about the rest of the world, but I know that in the US, both the Air Force and the Navy have done a rather decent job of taking young men and women – many without any knowledge what-so-ever about airplanes – and after very slightly over a year, are able to produce reasonably competent pilots ... and to avoid all the fighter type/single seat issues – I’m looking strictly at the multi-engine airplanes that have multiple pilot crews – where these “brand-new pilots” wind up in the right seat. Are every one of them the new “ace of the base?” I doubt it. Do some of them have problems? I’m sure they do. But, far and away, the vast majority of these young men and women are well-trained and competent to serve as a “co-pilot” on these multi-pilot crews – and they do so with substantially less than 1500 hours!

My opinion is that this pending rule is certainly not going to provide the kinds of things that our fearless FAAers apparently believe it will provide. Additionally, with this exact same question about pending rules currently being contemplated by the FAA … I’m still trying to find out why it is that the FAA in the US continues to believe that having two different approaches to pilot training under part 121 is good for the industry. We have what is termed “the traditional” program requirements … and we have “AQP” – a regulatory authorization to do just about anything differently than what is prescribed in those “traditional” programs.

I still have the same questions I raised (or attempted to raise) elsewhere in this forum … do we expect the FAA regulations to be “an assistance” to having competence in the pilots that occupy airline cockpits? ... or ... is it essential to follow those rules to have the necessary competence in those pilots? I know the accident rates seem to be on a downward track – at least by some measures – like restricting such looks to part 121 operations, but with the growth in the industry, if we maintain the existing “accident rate,” we’re going to have an increase in the numbers of accidents. It’s simple math … the same percentage of a higher number is a higher number.

If everyone were to train precisely the way the “rules” say we must train … will that prevent incompetence from creeping into the cockpit? Will seeking authorizations to do things differently … i.e., an authorization under AQP (which still requires an FAA approval) … would that complete that connection and prevent incompetence from creeping into the cockpit? Does the FAA publish any “requirements for training” that make any difference at all? If they do … what’s up with having two different sets of “standards?” Why does the FAA publish differing standards in the first place? We are regularly told that a pilot trained under AQP is a more thoroughly trained pilot … and, certainly, they imply such thorough training provides a safer pilot. First, is that true? Second, if that IS true, is it because of the rules (or, more accurately, the authorization to deviate from those rules) or because of the professionals conducting the training – regardless of the rules governing their actions? Third, if it IS true that the rules ARE what makes the difference ... why the heck wouldn’t the regulator require the same training for ALL airline pilots? Am I the only one who gets lost in attempting to understand why we have to do what we are told we have to do when those who tell us what we have to do seem to have little understanding of what it is they want us to do? Otherwise, why have an alternative set of standards?

Each time I ask such questions here ... I get answers like “we’re allowed to focus our training on what those who are having problems really need.” Duh! Isn’t that the purpose of all training? Why do some believe that the “traditional” approach to training prohibits exactly this same kind of recognition and focus? From what I can see, this new “alternative” approach to training is highly dependent on psychologists and what they bring to the mix. I’m not anti-psychologist, per se ... but psychologists that are not aviators and believe they understand how pilots learn and what pilots use when they fly airplanes, and from that conclude that only training conducted in a “line environment” is worth valuable training time ... I tend to take with a grain of salt ... where that “grain” is the size of the “Rock of Gibraltar!” A couple of years ago, I had dinner with a group at one of the WATS conferences in Orlando, Florida. During an after-dinner conversation, I heard an FAA inspector say that he knew of one of the FAA psychologists who had specifically traveled to see, side-by-side, a Level D simulator and a Level 6 FTD, and after careful observation concluded that these devices were “...exactly the same except for the motion system on the Level D device!” One of my colleagues was in attendance as well and asked this guy what his impression was of AQP, CRM, FOQA, ASAP, VDRP, ASIAS, LOFT, LOE, and event-driven training. That inspector danced around the question, saying that he really couldn’t offer his comments, I think implying that his opinion didn’t count, but told all of us that we would have to decide for ourselves what we thought of relying on such processes ... very revealing ... very diplomatic ... and very disappointing.

Doesn't matter, Chief pilots and HR will continue to end run the FAA through exemptions, loop holes...continue to hire scared little robot marsh mellows that just want a seat in the aircraft.

Maybe it's always been that way, I don't know, and I am starting not to care. They will keep crashing planes for dumb reasons, people will keep getting killed, and they will keep making excuses for why people die. In the mean time, instead of putting better pilots in the cockpit, they will continue to try to make a better box that does all the flying...the answer of course being that the box flies better then a pilot...except if you have ice, or a jack screw problem, or any other non SOP, non robot response in the checklist, that requires a solution from a pilot...but gosh..that never happens right? So keep stuffing kids in the cockpit, insure each seat for a million bucks, then if there is a crash, tie it up for YEARS like Eastern did...who cares....when it all goes south, loot the company, short the stock go bankrupt. FAA doesn't care, SEC doesn't care..and most importantly the passengers just want a cheap tick anyway...

Doesn't matter, Chief pilots and HR will continue to end run the FAA through exemptions, loop holes...continue to hire scared little robot marsh mellows that just want a seat in the aircraft.

Maybe it's always been that way, I don't know, and I am starting not to care. They will keep crashing planes for dumb reasons, people will keep getting killed, and they will keep making excuses for why people die. In the mean time, instead of putting better pilots in the cockpit, they will continue to try to make a better box that does all the flying...the answer of course being that the box flies better then a pilot...except if you have ice, or a jack screw problem, or any other non SOP, non robot response in the checklist, that requires a solution from a pilot...but gosh..that never happens right? So keep stuffing kids in the cockpit, insure each seat for a million bucks, then if there is a crash, tie it up for YEARS like Eastern did...who cares....when it all goes south, loot the company, short the stock go bankrupt. FAA doesn't care, SEC doesn't care..and most importantly the passengers just want a cheap tick anyway...
Well … that’s an opinion …

So at the present time FOs can fly a Turboprop with 250 hours TT and NO type rating??? in the US.

Is that correct. If so at what size aircraft do they require a type rating to pilot as an FO, (Dash 8, F100, B737 ???

There is no requirement for an F/O to have a type rating under FAA regs. There is a requirement that they have training. In the airline world they have the same class room training as the PIC and only a couple less items in the sim. However the airline has the training records, there would be nothing on the certificate. The FAA created the SIC type just to keep foreign CAAs happy. A pilot can take their airline training records to the FAA and they'll issue a cert with the SIC type without any further training.

It would seem that actually formalizing the requirement for an F/O to have a type rating under FAA regs would be a good start in raising airline pilot standards which is the subject of this thread?

That is in the proposed rule. So now F/Os will have to do steep turns, do a landing and a go around with the plane out of trim, perform a missed approach from a non ILS approach (along with the miss from a ILS) and if the airplane has more than 2 engines, they'll have to miss out of the OEI approach, lose a second engine and come back and land VFR. And if the FAA think the flaps can fail up, they'll have to do a no flap landing. I had to do a no flap landing for my 727 type last century but the Feds finally figured out the odds of a Boeing having a total flap failure are about nill and they've dropped the requirement in most Boeings.

So are you safer with the F/O holding altitude in 45 degree banked turn? The problem will be having enough Feds or ADPs to give the types. Currently a company check airman can give a F/O check ride but you need a Fed or an air carrier designee to issue the type.

It would seem that actually formalizing the requirement for an F/O to have a type rating under FAA regs would be a good start in raising airline pilot standards which is the subject of this thread?

If the first officer is legally second in command then surely he should be certified competent (by being tested in the simulator) on all sequences that the captain is certified competent on. Obviously this is not so in USA!

If the first officer is legally second in command then surely he should be certified competent (by being tested in the simulator) on all sequences that the captain is certified competent on. Obviously this is not so in USA! Actually, much to the chagrin of many in the US, you are correct. However, I have taken the time to read through what the FAA has submitted as a proposed rule change ... but they seem to be dragging their collective feet in doing something/anything about what they are proposing.

Anyway, the new proposal was clear … that both pilots in the airplane would be required to perform exactly the same tasks, to the same level of competency, and, as a result would be qualified to operate the airplane in revenue passenger/cargo operations under the existing regulations in the US. In addition, the proposal went as far as to say that if the F/O had logged the requisite number of hours (i.e., at that time, 1500 hours) and had already taken and passed the written examination for the Airline Transport Pilot Certificate – and had been trained on the accomplishment of all of the tasks required of a Type Rating Candidate, that F/O would be eligible to be issued not only a Type Rating on the specific airplane type, but also the Airline Transport Pilot Certificate.

However – and apparently in the US government, there is always a “however,” … nonetheless, however, the requirement for actual operation of the airplane in that revenue passenger/cargo operation (in accordance with the existing authorities granted to individual airlines), each airline makes a decision as to what pilot will actually conduct the rejected takeoff, if rejecting the takeoff becomes necessary during an actual, live, for-real, takeoff. The thought behind this is that apparently at least some in the FAA believe that only the Captain of the flight should be given that level of authority, and because of the potential seriousness of the result, only the Captain should be authorized to initiate and complete that task. Of course, this means that should the F/O actually be making the takeoff and something were to occur prior to V1 speed indicating that continuing the takeoff might not be safe, it would fall to the Captain to take control away from the F/O (of course the F/O would have to positively relinquish the control – as it might easily serve contrary purposes if both pilots were on the controls at the same time) and then execute the rejected takeoff.

I am told that there was a significant argument within the FAA about whether this was a proper and/or a necessary function – some indicating that the F/O lacked the experience for making such decisions and that the F/O lacked sufficient control of the airplane to safely execute such a task (the thought being that the F/O did not have access to “nose-wheel steering”). I do not know how this particular disagreement was settled, if, indeed, it was settled. However, it seems remarkable to me that anyone would (or could, logically) believe that a F/O had all the necessary training and had demonstrated all the necessary skill through proficiency checks or tests to warrant his/her being authorized to operate the airplane through all that F/O’s typically operate … takeoffs, climbs, cruise, descents, approaches, landings, go-arounds if required, etc., yet do not have the sufficient training or skill to reject the takeoff.

Now apparently, the US Congress has entered the discussion through the passage of a law – requiring the FAA to establish a requirement that F/Os be issued some sort of Airline Transport Pilot Certificate – or that they have a minimum of 1500 hours of logged flight time before they are allowed to operate as a F/O (that specific point was not clear to me) – although there seems to be some conflicting interpretations about one or both of these so-called “requirements” … at least to the degree, it has been heard, that internal discussions within the halls of the FAA are on-going – some centering on what the “cost” will be to the individuals involved or to the airlines – but effectively stalling the finalization of what it will be that the FAA will require of airline pilots and whether or not there will be a differentiation between the Captain and the F/O with respect to qualification, experience, training, testing results, and so forth. Some observers might even get the impression that when the regulator can’t seem to get its priorities straight or make a logical decision … it will be next to impossible for airlines and individual pilots to come even close to complying with whatever it is they are to face.

My question is … who’s running the regulatory program in the US – the FAA, the Congress, the airlines, the public, the press, ??? … and this list can apparently go on to an embarrassing length.

It's not so much the F/Os don't have the skills but there has to a final authority. The regs say the PIC is that person. I've got a full type in the 744, I've got a tiller, it's still the Captain's call. My job is to keep it on the runway below V1 and fly it it off once we're past V1.

There is no requirement for 1500 hours under the law passed by Congress, only that everyone hold an ATP. Some of the aviation colleges have stomped their feet because now they won't be able promise students an airline career straight out of school and so the FAA is talking about creating a junior ATP if you went to a 4 college and got an aviation degree. So I would add another player to your list.

The FAA has given their estimate of the cost to the airlines and to individual pilots in the NPRM.

Considerations for new USA airline pilots:
1. There is going to be a shortage of new candidates...the costs of training for Private/Commercial are skyrocketing. Typically, new pilots were taking out loans of 40k-80k to get qualified, and are looking at typical initial salaries at the Regionals of 18k-22k. Already training for Private pilots is drying up...banks will not make loans with such prospects, and candidates choose more remunerative pursuits, with less initial required investment. Add to that, the Feds (post-Colgan crash) are close watching histories of busted check-rides, with 2 or 3 considered enough to deny any further chance of being hired or upgraded. Besides ckrides, the medical could down you at any time. Banks are NOT loaning to new pilots, with good reason.

2. The experience required to legitimately pass a PIC Type Rating ride for an ATP on a regional jet is usually much higher than the typical CFI flying 172s for 1500 hours has. This gap looks very wide...the training for this ride will take a factor of 1.5 to 2 times the standard training footprint, and may still not be enough, depending on the student. Typically the 250 hr co-pilot got experience watching from the rh seat...this valuable source of experience will be closed.

3. There are two exceptions to the 1500 hour requirement being considered: 1st, military pilots. The rate of military pilots being trained has been drastically reduced. Those that are there have a choice...a military career with guaranteed good pay and benefits, with good retirement AND respect, vrs. leaving the military and joining a Regional with crap pay and benefits, potential furloughs and bankruptcies, and probably a crap retirement (with exceptional luck). A pilot that made such a choice might be considered to lack the judgement to be a good pilot candidate...this is a modern Catch 22. 2nd, students graduating from formal flying schools. These usually graduate CFI's with Private and Commercial...they leave with NO heavy or airline background. To include any airline-type training would be prohibitively expensive, so you still have that huge gap referred to above. Tough times a'comin' I'm thinking. Sam

2. The experience required to legitimately pass a PIC Type Rating ride for an ATP on a regional jet is usually much higher than the typical CFI flying 172s for 1500 hours has. This gap looks very wide...the training for this ride will take a factor of 1.5 to 2 times the standard training footprint, and may still not be enough, depending on the student. Typically the 250 hr co-pilot got experience watching from the rh seat...this valuable source of experience will be closed.



When the paying public buy a ticket that says "United" or "American" or "Delta" etc etc on it and then get on a regional jet painted in "United" or "American" or "Delta" colours, I think they have a legitimate expectation they should be flown by a fully qualified crew not by a Captain some other guy/gal who is still learning his/her job.

You are right there is a big gap between what FO's are getting now and what they would need to pass a ATP ride and that is exactly where the problem is. I fail to see why doubling the training footprint to allow new hires to get to the required standard is in any way bad. One thing is for sure the airline bean counters consider pilot training a "cost" that must be minimized. The only way the bar is going to be raised is if the industry is forced by regulation to increase training. There is no way the airlines are going to do that on their own.

From BPF:
You are right there is a big gap between what FO's are getting now and what they would need to pass a ATP ride and that is exactly where the problem is. I fail to see why doubling the training footprint to allow new hires to get to the required standard is in any way bad. One thing is for sure the airline bean counters consider pilot training a "cost" that must be minimized. The only way the bar is going to be raised is if the industry is forced by regulation to increase training. There is no way the airlines are going to do that on their own.

Well, somebody is going to have to pay for this...the Regionals are on a shoestring (considering they have to pay millions to their CEO's owners, etc, and these costs are fixed). Two possibilities: expenses taken out of pilot/workers pay, or standards for ATP will be lowered. I suspect pressures will be put on Checkers to lower the standards, to lower the costs of training. Pilot/worker pay is now about as low as it can go.

Domestic only F/O's in the US do in fact have a type rating with an SIC limitation. We all had to file the paperwork to add these to our licenses several years back. No additional training was required however, as the existing airline training curricula retroactively satisfied ICAO's requirements for issuance of an SIC type rating.

Most international F/O's in the US do in fact have full PIC type ratings; this is done so that the captain can have a break on longer flights whilst two F/Os remain on the flight deck, the senior most of whom is delegated temporary command.

That is what AF did to make AF447 legal with two junior guys flying and the captain taking his required rest.

Random,

If you're only flying domestic you didn't have to get the SIC type. At least not per FAA regs. It was created to allow you to show foreign CAAs you have been trained on the aircraft. An FAA Inspector knows if you are sitting right seat in Brand A Airlines airplane, you have been trained by Brand A as an F/O. Sort of like adding "English Proficient." Since being proficient in English was a requirement to hold a pilot certificate, if you held a pilot certificate an inspector had made the determination you were proficient in English. But ICAO won't follow that logic.

There is no requirement for 1500 hours under the law passed by Congress, only that everyone hold an ATP. Some of the aviation colleges have stomped their feet because now they won't be able promise students an airline career straight out of school and so the FAA is talking about creating a junior ATP if you went to a 4 college and got an aviation degree.

PUBLIC LAW 111–216—AUG. 1, 2010
Section 217: AIRLINE TRANSPORT PILOT CERTIFICATION
* * *
(c) FLIGHT HOURS.—
(1) NUMBERS OF FLIGHT HOURS.—The total flight hours required by the Administrator under subsection (b)(1) shall be at least 1,500 flight hours.
(2) FLIGHT HOURS IN DIFFICULT OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS.—
The total flight hours required by the Administrator under subsection (b)(1) shall include sufficient flight hours, as determined by the Administrator, in difficult operational conditions that may be encountered by an air carrier to enable a pilot to operate safely in such conditions.
(d) CREDIT TOWARD FLIGHT HOURS.—The Administrator may allow specific academic training courses, beyond those required under subsection (b)(2), to be credited toward the total flight hours required under subsection (c). The Administrator may allow such credit based on a determination by the Administrator that allowing a pilot to take specific academic training courses will enhance safety more than requiring the pilot to fully comply with the flight hours requirement.(e) RECOMMENDATIONS OF EXPERT PANEL.—In conducting the rulemaking proceeding under this section, the Administrator shall review and consider the assessment and recommendations of the expert panel to review part 121 and part 135 training hours established by section 209(b) of this Act.
(f) DEADLINE.—Not later than 36 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall issue a final rule under subsection (a).

Whatever the exact outcome is, the bottom line is clear. Before you get to fly a Part 121 airliner you will have to have a much more training and experience then is required now.

This is ultimately a good news story for both US flight safety and for US pilots.

I have read this thread with interest.

Am I right in saying that, currently, an F/O on a 737/A320 flying domestic US, does not have to have a type rating?

Am I right in saying that, currently, an F/O on a 737/A320 flying domestic US, may not have practiced engine out flying in the sim?

Am I right in saying that, currently, an F/O on an international flight, may not have a type rating?

Depends what you call a type rating.

Am I right in saying that, currently, an F/O on a 737/A320 flying domestic US, does not have to have a type rating?

Yes

Am I right in saying that, currently, an F/O on a 737/A320 flying domestic US, may not have practiced engine out flying in the sim?

No. They will have almost all the training the Captain had. They will have engine failures on takeoff both before and after V1. They will shoot ILSs with an engine out and land and go around with one engine inop. They won't do steep turns, they won't have a second engine failure on a three or four engine plane and they won't do a zero flap landing.

Am I right in saying that, currently, an F/O on an international flight, may not have a type rating?

To keep foreign CAAs happy, the FAA created an SIC type rating. The F/O has their Chief Pilot or training department certify they passed their FAA approved F/O training program and takes the paperwork to the FAA. The FAA will issue a type rating limited to SIC only without any further testing.

That being said, many international operators get their F/Os full type ratings since they operate long flights with one Captain and two or three F/Os and someone has to hold a full type while the Captain is sleeping.

Thanks MI, very helpful.

You are right there is a big gap between what FO's are getting now and what they would need to pass a ATP ride and that is exactly where the problem is. I fail to see why doubling the training footprint to allow new hires to get to the required standard is in any way bad. One thing is for sure the airline bean counters consider pilot training a "cost" that must be minimized. The only way the bar is going to be raised is if the industry is forced by regulation to increase training. There is no way the airlines are going to do that on their own.

To keep foreign CAAs happy, the FAA created an SIC type rating. The F/O has their Chief Pilot or training department certify they passed their FAA approved F/O training program and takes the paperwork to the FAA. The FAA will issue a type rating limited to SIC only without any further testing.

For whatever it’s worth, the most recent publication of the proposed revision to the FAA rules regarding pilot training and qualification included statements that strongly suggested that the FAA was proposing doing away with the differences between Captains and First Officers with respect to both the tasks they each had to perform and the standards that had to be met when those tasks were performed by either pilot. My initial response was … it’s about time! But, foolish me … as is typical with regulators who are overly responsive to those they regulate, I now understand that the cost involved in making the training equal is being “reviewed” … because of the significant cost involved. This, together with the continuation of the AQP (where every airline participating has been authorized to do essentially whatever it is they would prefer to do – and does so with the blessings of the regulator) it would seem that the only purpose that the regulators serve is to “codify” whatever it is that the industry would like to have – which is the very best defense an airline could possibly desire should anyone ever decide to take legal action against them (“…but we’re only complying with FAA requirements…”) and these “like-to-have” motivations come – apparently directly from –the cost to that airline … the less the cost … the more they desire it. And it would seem that unless or until a body count of such proportions is achieved in a single “mishap” that the contributing circumstances can no longer be ignored … we are all going to see a proliferation of less training, less pilot qualification requirements, and substantially more dependence on airplane automation. Hmmm … is anyone suspicious of all the increased regulatory interest in “un-manned” air vehicles?