Gulf Tornado/Patriot [Archive]

SAMXXV

14th Dec 2011, 14:35

The true facts of why the Patriot engaged the Tornado will never be elicited due to the US/UK "special relationship"...

As I understood it at the time, there was an almighty c**k-up within the Patriot software. This came out at a US briefing provided to a TLP course at Florennes (at which I was present) in June 1991. I was the UK SAM specialist on that course. The briefing was given to that particular TLP course because most of the aircrew had flown in GW1.

You have to understand that Patriot is a good system - when under total control of the (highly trained) operator - but it can be switched to fully computer controlled automatic mode. This relies on the pre-determined ROE (attack heading/airspeed/altitude etc. of a MEZ (Missile Engagement Zone) being correctly entered into the fire control computer. The US algorithms used by both US & US supplied Israeli systems during GW1 were flawed (mis-programmed if you will). There was utter panic by the US in June 1991 to supply new software to all US supplied Patriots worldwide!

In simple terms, what this meant was that an A/C entering the MEZ (threat area) could be complying & flying under 300knts - but Patriot recognised it as flying 330knts & launched automatically.....

IMHO the lesson to be learned was to do away with "automatic" systems & revert to the common sense & good training of the operator - but I doubt that lesson has been learnt by the USA.:sad:

14th Dec 2011, 14:43

there was an almighty c**k-up within the Patriot software. This came out at a US briefing ... in June 1991 That really is a c**k up if it lasted for 12 years. Really?!

just another jocky

14th Dec 2011, 15:22

Sam - it wasn't as simple as you say. My understanding was that the ac fulfilled multiple "threat criteria". Tragically, this led to the automatic engagement.

RiP Kev & Dave.

phil9560

14th Dec 2011, 17:02

Wasn't the Tornado/Patriot balls up during GW2 ?

Just This Once...

14th Dec 2011, 17:07

Yes, ignore the SAM fantasist posts. He has cluttered up previous threads recounting how the Dutch were called at TLP post-shootdown 12 years before it happened. He is a bit weird but one day he will take his fantasies elsewhere.

RiP fellas.

Lima Juliet

14th Dec 2011, 17:18

Mode 4 IFF has both a warning light and aural warning - both user selectable to off :(

PAC software was the main feature of the BOI and a 'shell shocked' SAM Bty that had been recently subjected to a rocket bombardment. Also the fact that none of the C2 assets warned the poor Tornado that their Mode 4 was not working.

Very sad events, indeed :(

LJ

MAINJAFAD

14th Dec 2011, 18:38

Mode 4 IFF has both a warning light and aural warning - both user selectable to off http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/sowee.gif

PAC software was the main feature of the BOI and a 'shell shocked' SAM Bty that had been recently subjected to a rocket bombardment. Also the fact that none of the C2 assets warned the poor Tornado that their Mode 4 was not working.

Very sad events, indeed http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/sowee.gif

LJ

In fact LJ, camp that the Bty was at had suffered an attack from an unknown source, namely one of the US Army SNCO on the camp had attempted to frag the divisional commander and some of his staff by rolling hand gernades into their tents. Camp went on alert, Bty lit up its radar (the ECS not being linked to the rest of the AD System), saw the forth GR4 without IFF coming up fast behind the rest of the formation (though in the safe lane). The Patriot operater thought SSM and engaged. View of a number of US Army personnel working on the MIM-104 system at that time that I met in threater was that the guy who fired that Patriot at the GR4 was a Muppet!!

ian176

14th Dec 2011, 20:31

Mode 4 IFF has both a warning light and aural warning - both user selectable to off http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/sowee.gif

Even on the Mk12? I've only ever worked on SIFF units where there was a bit of an emphasis on the "new" warnings for M4.

Lima Juliet

14th Dec 2011, 22:37

Yup, Mk XII had a green "reply light" and a "buzz" on the CCS every time your Mode 4 was interrogated. The trouble being that on TELIC, there were so many Mode 4 interrogators out there it buzzed and flashed an awful lot!

LJ

Distant Voice

15th Dec 2011, 05:46

LJ, that's fine. But what warning did you get if you were interrogated and your IFF did not respond because of a fault?

DV

Courtney Mil

15th Dec 2011, 12:21

Depends what the fault is. Generally the warning shows a "failure mode", but not failure to respond. However, there are supposedly some failures that may not trigger a warning. I think I recall the BoI suggesting that a power supply fault MAY have caused this to be the case with ZG710. I should add that my use of Mode 4 was F-15 and Tornado F3, rather than the GR4 so may be differences.

I don't want to get into any speculation about this personally, but the lack of 'respond' was always enough to make me nervous in these situations.

Courtney

Courtney Mil

15th Dec 2011, 12:40

I would add that the UK BoI's report allowed the US inquiry to report that WE had said there was an IFF fault (unknown to the crew) so the shoot-down wasn't their fault. I think we published the RAF report months before the US one.

Sorry if I'm covering old ground here.

Courtney Out!

Distant Voice

15th Dec 2011, 17:04

Are there any Bench Technicians out there? If there are, can you advise what failures trigger the failure light and tone? Also, the BoI Summary states that the Ground Crew checked Mode 4 just before engine start. How was that done? End to End testing or just BIT?

Why is it necessary to know that you are being interrogated on Mode 4? Is this a function of the Radar Warning Receiver rather than the IFF transponder?

DV

Lima Juliet

15th Dec 2011, 17:13

Like Courtney said, if you didn't have a buzz and/or light for a minute or so, something was up and best you get your 'parrot' checked by a C2 unit quickly! There were failure modes indicated by the IFF warning light on the Central Warning Panel - I'll look them up in my notes and let you know what they were.

LJ

Ivor Fynn

15th Dec 2011, 18:05

MAINJAFAD,

If memory serves me, I think it should be "the girl who fired that Patriot at the GR-4 was a muppetess"

Ivor

Lima Juliet

15th Dec 2011, 18:51

Here you go, straight from my notes circa 1995:

AMBER IFF CAPTION ON CENTRAL WARNING PANEL INDICATES:

-MODE 4 CODES LOST
-MODE 4 CODES NOT LOADED
-MASTER SWITCH OFF
-28V DC FAILURE
-MASTER SWITCH AT STANDBY & SYSTEM INTERROGATED (MOMENTARY)
-FAULTY MODE 4 (MKXII IFF COMPUTER DETECTS AN INTERNAL FAULT)
-TRANSPONDER FAILS TO REPLY TO MODE 4 INTERROGATION
-SIMULTANEOUS FAILURE OF BOTH TRANSMITTERS
-SYSTEM INTERROGATED BUT MODE 4 SWITCH TO OUT (IE. IT’S OFF!)

There was also a black/white failure test switch that only checked Mode 1 to 3 - so no good for Mode 4. I believe that SIFF has far more error detection than that above, but as Courtney says, there would be plenty of clues to a Mode 4 fail on the old system if you really understood it (sadly few really did and it was an ergonomic nightmare along with the HaveQuick radio).

LJ

tucumseh

15th Dec 2011, 19:24

Which begs the question why C-in-C RAFSC recommended "The Tornado IFF installation be modified to ensure that the cockpit warning is triggered in all failure modes". (MAAS para 19c). Para 19 concludes by stating this recommedation is being implemented.

This of course raises the issue of MoD(PE)'s DGAS2 being advised in 1998 that all aircraft IFF systems, especially Tornado, should be inspected for failure warning integration, using almost exactly the same words as C-in-C 6 years later. Also, DPA's XD5 in 2002. This, because the MoD IFF office habitually did not integrate such warnings and thought it acceptable to pay off the contract and knowingly deliver an an aircraft that was functionally unsafe. Both 2 Stars rejected the recommendations (also made by Boscombe), confirming the IFF office view that functional safety was unnecessary. In case you're wondering, yes, the same DGAS2 who was in charge of Nimrod and Chinook.

Courtney Mil

15th Dec 2011, 19:34

Thanks for all that extra info. I know my experience of it is a bit rusty and not on type, but everything you all say rings true in my head, especially the failure modes.

Of course, it's easy for me to say the absence of anything made me feel uncomfortable, but I know that's not easy to spot at the end af a long, tense combat mssion. Coming home is when it's easy to relax.

Courtney

Courtney Mil

15th Dec 2011, 19:36

Oh, of course, never forget that Patriot can also check Mode 1. But, IIRC, there were no Mode 1 codes entered into that SAM battery because they were "cut off" from their own network. So there is a lot more to all this...

Just This Once...

15th Dec 2011, 19:39

Perhaps a good time to remind people that Leon is quoting his notes from the F3, rather than the GR4. The integration of the IFF may have been a little different...

Courtney Mil

15th Dec 2011, 20:42

No, the installations may be different and the failure modes possibly, but unlikely. But IFF Mode 4 is IFF Mode 4. I've used it in three jets US and UK and it's pretty much the same fish. The failure modes he's describing chime with my recolection of the facts. We're not trying to second guess a BoI here, we would (generally) be foolish to try. So I'm not sure what your point is.

tucumseh

16th Dec 2011, 07:24

Perhaps a good time to remind people that Leon is quoting his notes from the F3, rather than the GR4. The integration of the IFF may have been a little different...

Correct. The point I made above is that, despite specifying a given performance (including failure warnings) the IFF office took the general view that "It works on the bench, so it'll work on the aircraft" and saw no need to check that it worked end-to-end. That is, verifying it had been integrated correctly and was physically and functionally safe. One "end" being the presentation of warnings and, arguably, reassurance that the crew had been trained to take "immediate action" upon a failure. (The warning is useless unless you know what it is and what to do). On the programme that gave rise to this issue in 1998, the crews had not been trained or the books amended. They fiddled with knobs until a hitherto (and still marked) "spare" actually switched off that annoying noise; rendering them vulnerable to friendly fire. The last is important because IFF office saw no need either for simulator modification or APs. As I said, 2 and 4 Stars agreed with them.

However, as well as being fraudulent, this ethos still causes major problems on programmes where the contract says "Fit equipment x" and the company do so - and MoD has no comeback when they find it doesn't work. "You asked and paid for it to be fitted, it costs more if you want it to work". This has become more prevalent as MoD rids itself of people who understand the concept of systems integration and its link to functional safety. And, crucially, HOW to do integration.

Another factor here is by what method was it fitted. DA Modification or Service Engineered Mod? To install and integrate an IFF with multiple warnings, especially aural, automatically breaches the SEM limits. For a start, the Service DA has no facilities to conduct the necessary integration testing - which in part leads to the "It works on the bench" (as a single LRU) notion. This follows the AMSO/AML decision many years ago to dismantle and destroy as many Integration Rigs as possible as a savings measure exercise, thus preventing even the DA, never mind the Services, from conducting proper testing without major expense and delay. Hence, Haddon-Cave's headline criticism "Savings at the expense of safety". (This precise example is what was given to him in evidence).

Yes, more to this than meets the eye.

Distant Voice

16th Dec 2011, 07:45

LJ

if you didn't have a buzz and/or light for a minute or so

Where was this light located, as it wasn't a failure light as such? And the ON/OFF switch?

AMBER IFF CAPTION ON CENTRAL WARNING PANEL INDICATES:

Just an AMBER for an IFF Mode 4 failure? Were the failure modes that you list displayed, or were they simlpy failures that you had been told about in training that would trigger a CWP Amber Warning.

Hope you do not mind me asking these questions but my training at Warton took place in 1989 on Saudi aircraft.

DV

APG63

16th Dec 2011, 11:52

DV, those are just the failures that would trigger a caption. As with so many things Tornado (and pretty well every other RAF a/c) the installation was done on the cheap and, perhaps, not quite ideal.

What Courtney says about seeing the REPLY or RESPOND light is right. On recovery to Ali, you'd get interrogated all the time. Lack of Mode 4 replies does trigger a warning in the head.

Same goes for RHWR. Patriot would often lock you up so any warning from that they may have seen, probably wouldn't have alarmed them (and would have been pretty quick too).

I think the RAF's BoI was VERY diplomatic and, IMHO, could have majored much more on a/c track, groundspeed, proximity to squawking a/c, lack of Mode 1 codes, etc, etc.

Distant Voice

16th Dec 2011, 13:43

APG63; Many thanks for that information. However, if the following failure modes were supposed to illuminate the amber IFF failure light on the CWP why didn't they?

-MODE 4 CODES LOST
-MODE 4 CODES NOT LOADED
-MASTER SWITCH OFF
-28V DC FAILURE
-MASTER SWITCH AT STANDBY & SYSTEM INTERROGATED (MOMENTARY)
-FAULTY MODE 4 (MKXII IFF COMPUTER DETECTS AN INTERNAL FAULT)
-TRANSPONDER FAILS TO REPLY TO MODE 4 INTERROGATION
-SIMULTANEOUS FAILURE OF BOTH TRANSMITTERS
-SYSTEM INTERROGATED BUT MODE 4 SWITCH TO OUT (IE. IT’S OFF!)

If, as you say, returning a/c were constantly being interrogated on Mode 4, why didn't alarm bells start ringing in the heads of the ZG710 crew, when everything would have been so quiet.

Considering the MoD "blown fuse" theory, would that have not have been similar to "MASTER SWITCH OFF", or "28V DC FAILURE, or "TRANSPONDER FAILS TO REPLY TO MODE 4 INTERROGATIONS" and as such triggered the CWP light? Of course one has to assume that all the failure mode signals were correctly integrated into the aircraft system and confirmed as being functional through end to end testing. The CinC's recommendation "The Tornado IFF installation be modified to ensure that the cockpit warning is triggered in all failure modes", indicates that they were not. So people like LJ, who believed that the CWP light would illuminate for all the modes that he has listed, were being mislead. The IFF system in the GR4 Tornado aircraft appears to have been delivered "Functionally Unsafe". I can not believe that Boscombe Down cleared such a system.

DV

Courtney Mil

16th Dec 2011, 13:57

I think APG63 is right, but if memory serves, when it was put in the jet they didn't realise that there were a couple of failures that didn't light the caption. I shall check for you, but I think one of these was if the system was switched on (the master switch was in the on position), but power to the RX was lost, then it wouldn't sense an interrogation and therefore not be concerned that it hadn't replied. There was also a particular power supply issue that I cannot recall just now, but may have it in my notes when I get home.

There were some changes later, so I would hope these issues have been fixed.

LESSON: Cheaper and safer to pay to have new kit integrated and tested properly in the first place! Oh, but we already knew that.

Courtney

dervish

16th Dec 2011, 15:32

I'm sure there is an excellent reason but...

If you accept the argument that failure to respond to an interrogation makes you vulnerable to friendly fire, why is IFF only Mission Critical but not Safety Critical? Or is this so in some aircraft and not others?

I can see that if an aircraft doesn't have IFF in the first place, then the crew are aware of the potential risks up front and plan accordingly. But it is surely a different matter if you have IFF, are trained that you have a problem if you get a warning, but the warnings aren't integrated. That would lull the crew into a false sense of safety.

Am I making sense? Grateful if anyone could enlighten me.

MAINJAFAD

16th Dec 2011, 16:59

Ivor Fynn: MAINJAFAD,

If memory serves me, I think it should be "the girl who fired that Patriot at the GR-4 was a muppetess"

Ivor

Patriot Guys I talked too at the time most likey didn't know it was a female EC either (we were well to the south with the F3's at the time).

Courtney Mil

16th Dec 2011, 17:11

Devish,

In a shooting war, there is never any point getting airborne with a missin critical failure, because it is judged that you cannot perform the mission. So if Mode 4 is an MC item, you wouoldn't bother getting airborne. Therefore, no safety issue.

Safety critical has different implications. So, in a shooting war (let's say your base is about to be bombed by Israel because you're developing nuclear weapond that they don't like;)) you may may have an ejection seat that is known not to work, but still chose to get airborne and try to do your bit for your country. You may even get away with it.

tucumseh

16th Dec 2011, 19:15

Surely this is the same debate we've been having for years on Mull, Nimrod, C130 threads.

Just because there are occasions when you would take the risk and go without, in this case IFF, doesn't mean you don't specify and fit (properly) in the first place.

So, assuming you're at the stages before making that decision, up to and including training for war fighting, the question Dervish asked (I think) is would you regard IFF as Safety Critical.

Let's look at the most discussed example - Chinook MoK, as applied to the FADEC software. The definition of Safety Critical is "Components whose failure could result in loss of life or serious damage to the environment in circumstances where there is no possibility of reversion to manual control”. I underlined "could" because for years MoD lied to every inquiry saying the definition was "would", which is entirely different.

In this sense, "manual" could be seen as the immediate action upon getting a failure warning. But, that pre-supposes the warnings are properly integrated. And if they haven't been, then how do you know to "revert to manual". Therefore, it could be argued it is Safety Critical, and that criticality demands end-to-end testing before take off - something which again was recommended and rejected. In other words, no compromises and everyone does their best to give the crews a fighting chance, by avoiding the avoidable, leaving them to manage the unavoidable. Or, at least, that's my opinion (and also the regulations); but I know it isn't shared and the regs are routinely ignored by very many of the senior MoD hierarchy.

Courtney Mil

16th Dec 2011, 21:07

Yeah, you're right, Tuc. The point is that Mission Critical pretty much always means "don't go" because there's no point AND you might die for nothing. Safety critical means don't go in peace time, but MAY be overridden by operational necesity.

As for the full and proper integration of equipment, yes, of course it always SHOULD be done fully and correctly. But that is not always the way. For example, a lot of kit cannot be afforded in peacetime, but becomes a necessity for an op. So we have a UOR. By definition, a rush job. We fly the jets and accept the risk. I'm not saying it makes it right. I'm saying that is what happens.

That risk is always signed off by someone. But that doesn't necessarily make that someone the "killer" when it all goes horribly wrong. No one ever considers how many more may have died if we hadn't had the kit - even if its integration was incomplete or flawed.

I'm not condoning this. I'm just trying to anser the question. After a few celebratory glasses of wine. I'll try to be clearer tomorrow.

Courtney

tucumseh

17th Dec 2011, 07:32

Courtney

Thanks, and I agree but would add -

Not being able to afford kit within the Defence budget is not the same as providing it and then wilfully failing to integrate it properly (rendering the aircraft functionally unsafe), but making the false declaration that the job is complete and paying off the contract.

In the case I mentioned, which gave rise to this question of failure warning integration and the recommendations Tornado be checked, the proper integration would have been carried out in parallel with other activities, with time saved at both Boscombe and during flight trials because they wouldn't have had to track down why none of the warnings were working. Not to mention the lengthy machinations in MoD(PE) while the aircraft office fought in vain trying to get 2 Stars to accept aircraft should be delivered safe, supported by valid Safety Cases.

The corrective action (not by the IFF office, who had been absolved from making the aircraft safe, rendering their existence completely pointless) was carried out by the aircraft office at a cost exceeding £4M and incurring 4-5 months slippage. That extra cost was, of course, the 2nd payment the company had received for doing this work. I had recommended MoD pursue free rectification / breach of contract, but it was decided this would have upset a few people, not least the original IFF PM and his mentor, so payment was made again, and something else chopped out of the design.

I explain this because it is wholly related to a number of issues regularly debated here. Wilful waste of money. Inappropriate procurement. Incompetent procurement. Delays. Unnecessary loss of life. Not that any of these concern the principals in this case.

Lima Juliet

17th Dec 2011, 09:19

Courtney/Tuc

There are UORs and UORs in my opinion. When complete UORs are procured as a complete system, ie. RPAS, aircraft, vehicles, boats, etc... things appear to be OK. It's when lash-up UORs are put into core equipment programs that things go wrong - Nimrod AAR, Mode 4, Snatch Landrover armour, etc...

As Courtney says, yes, OK for ops in the short term, but unfortunately we have a habit of running UORs on for decades - Nimrod AAR from 1982-2007 and Tornado IFF from 1991-2003 to name but a few.

I agree that MkXII Mode 4 wasn't the best of integrations (coupled to Havequick under UOR it was an ergonomic nightmare!), but it did have some failure mode indications - just not 100% fool proof so a blue-on-blue was always a possibility (but hey, when is anything 100%?). We also spent too long using the UOR when SIFF kept getting slipped year on year to pay for the uber-expensive Type 45, Astute, MRA4 and Typhoon programs (yes, there is a common denominator!).

It won't bring back the 2x GR4 aircrew mates and I'm pretty sure the American who pushed the button still "goes through hell and back" thinking about their action (and how they would've done it differently with hindsight). But we can learn from this and look for languishing UOR modifications such as these and push for them to be tested and fully integrated.

LJ

Just This Once...

17th Dec 2011, 10:20

...we can learn from this and look for languishing UOR modifications such as these and push for them to be tested and fully integrated.

Amen to that.:D

Courtney Mil

17th Dec 2011, 10:52

I totally agree with all the comments on this page. UORs often gave us (still do) what we needed in short timescales and when the defence budget (which has ALWAYS been squeezed) couldn't do everything the MoD wanted. And, yes, we always knew there were some risks. Usually better to run the UORs on rather than remove the kit altogether.

In the 80s and in some cases the 90s we weren't allowed to rely on our own EID to engage aircraft - largely because of the points made here. But it was better to have it for pesonal protection and to aid tgt ID. At least we and other friendlies could eliminate blues from the target list.

As I (think I) mentioned, the incident in questin was dreadful, but how many lives were saved because we had the kit? Without the "bolt ons" we wouldn't have been allowed to play with the big boys anyway.

Sorry if last night's post didn't make my points clearly. I was on a roll!

Courtney

Distant Voice

17th Dec 2011, 11:34

Did the UOR for IFF Mode 4 get installed using the Speial Trials Fit (STF) procedure?

Was the Mode 4 kit just a "bolt on" to the main IFF system?

DV

Courtney Mil

17th Dec 2011, 19:14

Guys, sorry about this. Checked my notes and the answer is:

"The IFF equipments are detailed in the confidential suppliment to the Aircrew Weapons Manual (CD101d-xxxx-xxx)."

Cannot offer more.

Courtney.

dervish

18th Dec 2011, 07:22

Excellent points everyone.

Good question on STFs Distant Voice. Their mismanagement has cropped up on other cases as well. Chinook and Nimrod wasn't it?

tuc

I had recommended MoD pursue free rectification / breach of contract, but it was decided this would have upset a few people, not least the original IFF PM and his mentor, so payment was made again, and something else chopped out of the design.

I remember this case. Fraud would be being polite. The company even had the cheek to lodge a complaint about a certain programme manager being too robust when he challenged what you mention. It was said the complaint was upheld and it entered his service record. Shame on the bastards who rolled over and well done the PM. :ok:

Distant Voice

18th Dec 2011, 08:51

Their mismanagement has cropped up on other cases as well. Chinook and Nimrod wasn't it

Correct, along with Hercules (HeART), Tornado (TART), and Puma (PART). All reviews carried out under the same CE (RAF).

DV

Distant Voice

18th Dec 2011, 09:52

Without the "bolt ons" we wouldn't have been allowed to play with the big boys anyway.

Was the Mode 4 kit a "bolt on" to the existing kit, or was there a complete IFF refit?

DV

Lima Juliet

18th Dec 2011, 12:41

DV

It was a complete refit - made by Thomson CSF if I recall correctly (my notes say NRAI-7). The later SIFF that incorporated Mode 4 and civvy Mode S was again a total change.

LJ

dervish

18th Dec 2011, 14:31

made by Thomson CSF

Who, IIRC, became Thales, who bought Racal Radar.

See above posts!

Courtney Mil

18th Dec 2011, 17:31

Leon, that's right, Dude. The IFF panel in the cockpit was replaced - so modes1-4 and C were all on the same box. Also all the old transponders and (part of the) interrogators had to be replaced. One of the reasons it wa a bit of a rushed job. I still say we were better of with it, albeit rushed, than without it, or to have waited to have a complete and fully tested integration.

Just my personal view.

Courtney

Chugalug2

19th Dec 2011, 08:46

There seems to be a very familiar ring to this tale. On the one hand it is portrayed (as by Courtney above) as an urgent mod necessary for imminent operational deployment, yet on the other as another example of basic airworthiness procedures being circumvented to supposedly save money (as posted by tuc):
Not being able to afford kit within the Defence budget is not the same as providing it and then wilfully failing to integrate it properly (rendering the aircraft functionally unsafe), but making the false declaration that the job is complete and paying off the contract.

In the case I mentioned, which gave rise to this question of failure warning integration and the recommendations Tornado be checked, the proper integration would have been carried out in parallel with other activities, with time saved at both Boscombe and during flight trials because they wouldn't have had to track down why none of the warnings were working. Not to mention the lengthy machinations in MoD(PE) while the aircraft office fought in vain trying to get 2 Stars to accept aircraft should be delivered safe, supported by valid Safety Cases.
Time no doubt was of the essence, it invariably is, but the wilful subversion of the Military Airworthiness Regulations is now such a familiar theme, together with the resultant death toll, that the bells are ringing loud and clear. As to the saving of money, as ever it wasn't, for yet more time and more money was spent, but only after yet more lives were lost.

Courtney Mil

19th Dec 2011, 08:58

Quite right, Chugs. It is a very familiar tale. And please don't get me wrong, I'm not condoning the wilful subversion of the Military Airworthiness Regulations, I'm just telling it as I saw it at the time. I think we knew the fit wasn't perfect, but I also think we were all happy to receive it.

It is, to my mind, an excellent example of why we should procure our systems as COMPLETE packages in the first place and then apply the mods as the technology becomes available or becomes a necessary capability. Better than waiting until it's all too late and relying on STFs, UORs, etc. Buy the insurance policy BEFORE you have the crash, eh?

Sorry, I think I may be stating the bleedin' obvious now.

Courtney

Chugalug2

19th Dec 2011, 10:06

Courtney, I can see your point that something, no matter how flawed, is better than nothing (though even that might be wrong). It is high time that UK Military Procurement rose above such abysmal and life threatening standards. Please don't apologise for stating the bleeding obvious. If there were one criticism of this forum and its members then it would be that not enough of them do just that. Unless and until there is an outcry from professional aviators that Military Airworthiness Regulations be enforced rather than subverted then the needless death toll will continue unchallenged.
The MOD and the RAF have proved themselves unfit to discharge the responsibilities of Airworthiness Authority and Air Accident Investigator respectively. Nothing less than an independent MAA and MAAIB, separated both from the MOD and from each other, will suffice. We have yet to achieve either and Flight Safety is compromised until we do.
Self Regulation doesn't work and in Aviation it Kills!

Courtney Mil

19th Dec 2011, 10:12

I can see the sense in that, Chugs. Just out of interest, do you think there is ever a case for cutting corners when operational imperative dictates or should the MoD always put safety first?

Chugalug2

19th Dec 2011, 10:30

Courtney, the MOD should put the Regulations first. If they wish to do otherwise they should put it to the MAA. That is why they should not be their own judge and jury. It is more likely though that Tactical Commanders might wish to so operate. The Regulations must cater for the realities of war. It is that which is always raised in argument against an independent MAA. It is a red herring, as any operational commander must have the freedom to call it as he sees fit. He must do so though in the knowledge that he will subsequently have to report and explain any deviation from the Regulations. Blokes clinging to the outside of an Apache being landed into a firefight in order to effect a casualty evacuation comes to mind for example.

Courtney Mil

19th Dec 2011, 11:03

Thanks for that, Chugs. I think you have a good point. The whole accountability thing appeals too. Well put.

Courtney

Chugalug2

19th Dec 2011, 11:20

Well thank you for such kind words, Courtney. The "accountability thing" is the very nub of it of course. If, for example, an independent MAA had given the go-ahead to the MOD to procure an IFF fit for the Tornado that was not fully integrated and had known failure warning issues, it would itself be liable to criticism in a subsequent IFF Related Fatal Air Accident Investigation report by an independent MAAIB. I have a suspicion that such accountability would tend to ensure that the fit would be got right first time round and even perhaps on time and within budget, though maybe that is expecting too much!

Distant Voice

19th Dec 2011, 12:01

Courtney, you said at post #35

I think one of these was if the system was switched on (the master switch was in the on position), but power to the RX was lost, then it wouldn't sense an interrogation and therefore not be concerned that it hadn't replied

If this was the case, then it would be very serious. If there is a common RX for all modes (prior to decoding) then it would mean that regardless of the mode selected the system would not be interrogated. So going to Mode 1 would not help.

DV

Courtney Mil

19th Dec 2011, 12:19

Yes indeed. I'm really stretching the limits of memory here and remember I'm talking F3 not GR4. Tempting to think the two installations would be identical, but there were obvious differences such as the additional interrogator function. I've been unable to locate my old (unclass, obviously) notes on this kit, which is a real shame. I do have a mate nearby who was GR4s. I'll seek his council.

Of course, that wouldn't have been the only single point of failure either. For example, wiring or antenna damage would be another inherrent week point that may cause an unalarmed failure.

Distant Voice

19th Dec 2011, 13:10

On the [old] types that I worked on, the system would operate with two antennas, normally upper and lower, for complete coverage. The feeds then went to an external switching unit, then to the RX. It is quite possilble, on the latest systems, that the feeds go directly to the RX, and are switched internaly.

DV

Courtney Mil

19th Dec 2011, 13:47

Yes, I do recall both V/UHF radios and IFF working like that. But I really don't know what happened in the Mode 4 refit or successor IFF.

melmothtw

19th Dec 2011, 14:13

Correct, along with Hercules (HeART), Tornado (TART), and Puma (PART).

Was there one of those for the Phantom?

flipster

20th Dec 2011, 17:46

Rather sadly, not!:sad:

Distant Voice

21st Dec 2011, 12:36

Was there one of those for the Phantom?

No, but there is one for Harrier

DV

ARINC

21st Dec 2011, 19:24

I comment rarely but...I'm frankly shocked at the detail in this thread....SIFF is a crypto system and totally unsuitable for discussion in any form on a public forum.

Just This Once...

21st Dec 2011, 19:39

Thank the lord ARINC is here as I was just about to publish all the keys possible, both in hex and binary for the 'old school'. Trying to get my Mac to talk to the Crazy 10 KEYMAT was a bit of a pain too...

dervish

22nd Dec 2011, 06:17

SIFF is a crypto system and totally unsuitable for discussion in any form on a public forum.

So was the IFF system under discussion. Their existence is not classified and MoD's technical failures were published in the MAAS. I don't see the problem.

Lordflasheart

22nd Dec 2011, 20:37

I recollect reading in the UK press, within days of this distressing case, that a returning F-16 was lit up by a Patriot radar. Rather than waiting around trying to conduct a meaningful radio discussion about his pear-shaped and unenviable position, the pilot shot off an ARM. Never heard any more on that story, it all went very quiet. LFH

Mach Two

23rd Dec 2011, 10:19

Yes, that did happen. It would have been early 2003, obviously, but I think I recall it being reperted as an accidental firing. No one was hurt in the incident so that was why the Americans were able to keep quiet about it and let another embarrasing story die.

The batteries had a nasty habbit of locking people up. Perhaps that was an object lesson to them not to keep doing it in a war zone to aircraft tooled up to deal with SAMs. There were many times I would have loved to have been able to do that.

COCL2

23rd Dec 2011, 17:48

on another forum theres a comment that the Patriots were sited too close together and the resultant error due to multiple cross-illumination marked the F-16 as a hostile

I've no idea of the veracity of this

Lima Juliet

23rd Dec 2011, 18:30

Well, the GR4 couldn't have fired an ALARM at the Patriot as it could only do PET shots. The F3 was modded to do targets of opportunity but a VSO stopped it being deployed - oddly enough he now has a senior job with the GR4's Design Authority ;)

COCL2

23rd Dec 2011, 18:37

"VSO stopped it being deployed"
was a reason ever publicly acknowledged?

30mRad

23rd Dec 2011, 19:02

LJ

You're wrong. GR4 could and can do reactive shots. There may have been an ROE restriction in TELIC 1 that prevented them, but more generally it is possible.

No ARM is faster than the SAM coming up at you so largely irrelevant to the conversation anyway.

Lima Juliet

23rd Dec 2011, 19:40

30mil

If you mean sitting there programming it back in 2003 - then I agree. But it isn't exactly targets of opportunity like the HARM Targeting System (HTS) is it?

Don't know what it can do now, but certainly in 2003 it was effectively PET from being programmed on the ground or slightly more reactive if programmed in the air - it was also the same when an exercise was run by STC EW in 2006ish with Nimrod R1, E-3D and GR4.

So maybe I didn't make myself clear, GR4 did not have anything like HTS in 2003 and F3 did but was not allowed to play. I don't believe a reason was ever publically acknowledged but there was some stuff in the press about "EF-3" - the guy who made the decision was an ex-GR sqn cdr and possibly there was an amount of protectionism?

http://fc03.deviantart.net/fs27/f/2008/094/d/7/Tornado_EF_3_Poster_by_Devil_505.jpg

Anyway, immaterial unless you consider that the GR4 (ZG710) shot down was on an ALARM mission, I believe? And also that the F3 had SIFF fitted by then so there is a chance the Blue on Blue may not have happened if flying the mission on the ATO vice ZG710?

Just a thought? And yes, I know that is the benefit of hindsight.

LJ

Chugalug2

23rd Dec 2011, 21:07

Sorry, you have lost me entirely now guys. Tornado gets taken out by Patriot because it is not squawking. Almost certainly that is because of an IFF failure. Even so, a failure warning could have alerted the crew and enabled them to declare as such. They do not because almost certainly they did not receive such a warning, as the fit is not fully integrated and does not allow of that. Nor is it compliant with the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations.
If I have all that right, and I will most certainly find out if I haven't, why are we talking about ALARM, PET, SAM, HTS, etc, instead of the AM that allowed this scenario to happen?

Lima Juliet

23rd Dec 2011, 21:39

Chug

It started with a discussion about an F16 with HTS firing a HARM at another Patriot battery that locked it up after this tragic event. Then we have been discussing the belief that ZG710 was on an ALARM mission and the F3 had been modded to do this better than the GR4 but denied a chance to play - the F3 was fitted with the better integrated SIFF. So the last post was the supposition that, with hindsight, the GR4 blue on blue should never have happened in the first place.

Do keep up 007!

Chugalug2

24th Dec 2011, 00:52

I'm sorry Q, I know how you love to play with your Hi-tech toys, but it all seems to boil down to:
the GR4 blue on blue should never have happened in the first place.
Well, duh! I think we all rather knew that, didn't we? It should never have happened, but it did. Another Airworthiness Related RAF Fatal Air Accident, two more victims of a dysfunctional system, with many more lives ruined, all for the want of both an Independent MAA and an MAAIB. How many more do we need to add to the list before that happens?

tucumseh

24th Dec 2011, 08:40

the F3 was fitted with the better integrated SIFF

One shouldn't speculate, but it is interesting to trace the sequence of events.

1998 - As a result of Boscombe Down trials, MoD(PE) DGAS2 (2 Star) advised to have all aircraft IFFs, but especially Tornado, checked for correct warning failure integration. Refused. Concerned staffs told to wind it in as the IFF man is a friend of DGAS2.
1999-ish - SIFF IPT formed (for a project other IPTs would allocate a single junior PM to).
2002 - DPA XD5 (2 Star) advised, as above. Laughs in face of concerned staffs, saying SIFF is on top of integration. Concern doubles - same people involved. Walks away when asked if retrospective action will be taken to correct past failures. Concerned staffs disciplined for being too robust with 2 Star.
March 2003 - ZG710. BoI Reviewing Officer recommends IFF failure warnings should be integrated.

If MoD wishes to refute what the RO said, they can. But the facts, above, are fully recorded. Until MoD stop compartmentalising these events, the problems will continue. This was a classic example. The failure was spotted on one aircraft. (Well done Boscombe). As IFF was "managed" by a single office, not by each aircraft office, it was reasonable to assume that if they refused to make one aircraft functionally safe, this ethos probably applied to others. This assumption proved correct, recommendations were made - at which point the compartmentalisation and protectionism kicked in. Wind your bloody neck in, you've made your aircraft safe (despite orders not to), so walk away. I know few agree with me, but in my opinion that's a sacking offence, even before the court case.

Courtney Mil

24th Dec 2011, 10:44

Thank you for insight there, Tuc. This thread really has got to grips with a very interesting issue, one that we all seem to have known a little about and now have the benefit of corporate experience. When do we publish our findings?

As we've strayed fleetingly into F3, I would add that it wasn't just the IFF 'boxes' that made it such a good "E" platform. It benefitted from its other sensors, including the fact that the forward IFF antennas were moved on the original ADV from the fin top to the wing nibs. The accuracy was remarkable. What a strange decission to do all that work to prove the EF3 concept and then not deploy it. Same happened with AMRAAM IIRC.

30mRad

24th Dec 2011, 16:40

LJ

Understand your point now. Yes your right, it was manual typing in the air, but IIRC the F3 had a psuedo HTS but range to tgt to get the accuracy made things spicy! I think the E3 was a great idea, esp with radar tweaks that were going on.

Chug

It wasn't the IFF aerieals it was the RHWR aerials.

Merry Xmas one and all, and RIP Kev and Ploppy

30 mRad

Lima Juliet

24th Dec 2011, 17:17

30mrad

Thanks dude. The other way to take data was 3rd party from an ELINT platform via JTIDS/L16. Happy Xmas, mate.

All,

If we're being technically correct then they were interferometers in the wing nibs giving a far better angle of arrival and the F3 could triangulate between 2 jets via the data-link - very clever stuff amongst a whole host of other clever mods to make the EF-3. Heaps ahead of a lot of other aircraft then and now in this role with both SEAD and DEAD.

Does anyone know if an EF-3 made it into any of the museums?

LJ

tommee_hawk

27th Dec 2011, 19:21

I understand that the responses so far are in response to a request for information after an incredibly tragic incident. Kev and I did our GR1 work-up together in Germany. He was a dedicated and loyal officer who would be shocked and disappointed at the depth of detail gone into on this thread. Guys, the truth shouldn't be hidden but most of these responses are so far outside the "Act" that they're almost meeting it coming back from the opposite direction. Please respect Kev, Dave and the OSA by taking care what you write. Remember what's written at the bottom of every PPrune page......

Chugalug2

28th Dec 2011, 11:56

th, I do not say that you are wrong, for in truth I do not know if you are. All I do know is that a regular ingredient of these threads concerning Airworthiness Related Fatal Military Air Accidents, be they concerning Sea King, Chinook, Hercules, Nimrod, or indeed Tornado tragedies, are calls to inhibit or even to stop all posts, either on account of adding to the grief of the bereaved or, as in your case, on grounds of security. In each thread more and more facts emerged of the scandal of incompetence, deceit, and plain malevolence at the highest levels of the RAF Leadership. You will understand therefore, I hope, that your call is met with a certain amount of reserve. The words "Crying Wolf" come to mind, though of course one day it may well be called for. The pity of it is that the RAF Leadership, for which you may or may not speak, has lost all moral credibility in this scandal. Military Airworthiness and Air Accident Investigation is not safe in its hands because of what it has done and has not done.
Self Regulation Does Not Work, and in Aviation it Kills!

Courtney Mil

28th Dec 2011, 12:13

Chugs,

I agree with you, although I wouldn't necessarily accuse TH of crying wolf. Your case about military airworthiness is well made.

In TH's support, I would just say that we should all consider carefully the security implications of what we post. We're grown-ups and should know where the line is drawn.

As for upsetting the living, as long as no one attacks the relatives, passes undue judgement on the deceased or speaks inappropriately, considered opinion on the failings of the "system" and its masters is healthy.

As with everything, care and balance are called for.

tucumseh

28th Dec 2011, 14:01

th

To repeat a previous post, the vast majority of what has been posted here is in the public domain. Certainly, in my case, when I say advance notice was given to 2 Stars in 1998 and 2002 of the systemic failing later identified (reiterated) in the BoI report (i.e. refusal to ensure functional safety), this is a simple matter of record and the subject of unclassified letters from MoD/Ministers to MPs (and hence, constituents). MoD and successive Governments have quite happily upheld the formal ruling that contracts may be signed off as complete and aircraft as safe, in the full knowledge they are not. MoD acknowledge this is a form of fraud, but openly condone it and protect those who commit it.

In this particular case, there would seem to be a number of contributory causes. The consensus is that if any one of these had not occurred, then the aircraft and aircrew would have had a very good chance of getting home safely. This can be said of most accidents discussed here. The key point and common denominator is that MoD disingeniously present their "findings" as a revelation and lesson to be learnt; when in fact the failures were predictable, predicted and ignored. That is, nothing in these BoI reports, or those of Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip, came as a surprise. Most are a simple collation of long known, and very public, facts. Whether or not this should have remained "classified" is another matter. MoD made that choice.

The final point I'd make is this. What makes anyone here think MoD are keen to correct matters? It is not they who have been proactive here. They did not hold their hands up and report systemic failures. They actively hid systemic failings that placed aircrew in grave danger when, as I have demonstrated so often, it would have been cheaper and quicker to do the job right in the first place. Properly integrated IFF failure warnings is a simple example. They were dragged screaming through numerous Coroners Courts and Inquiries until eventually some of the truth was reluctantly revealed and acknowledged. Senior staffs and politicians should be asking why these failings were concealed behind a tissue of lies for 20+ years. And ask why those responsible are routinely protected and advanced. And what, in God's name, makes these people suitable to manage amelioration.

just another jocky

28th Dec 2011, 15:14

Self Regulation Does Not Work, and in Aviation it Kills!

Chug, are you referring to pre-MAA days or do you consider the new setup to be fatally flawed also?

Chugalug2

28th Dec 2011, 17:41

In a word, jaj, yes. Let me ask you in turn, how could it be otherwise? Read tuc's resume above of the depth and extent of the MOD's, as UK Military Airworthiness Authority, Gross Negligence (to coin their own phrase), and dwell on the cynicism of then establishing a subsidiary body to assume that mantle which is described as "independent". Independent of the MOD? Independent of the cadre of VSO's that caused the problem in the first place and have been protected ever since by their successors? Independent of the ignorance and incompetence that now permeates UK Military Airworthiness as those who knew how have been got rid of because they would not be suborned, or those who were and are thus completely compromised?
Similarly independence is the key to effective and objective Military Air Accident Investigation, and the first body that it has to be independent of is the Military Airworthiness Authority itself, so that it may expose the airworthiness failures that relate to so many military air accidents.
So yes, I do consider the new setup to be fatally flawed, the word fatally being particularly and tragically apt.

Easy Street

28th Dec 2011, 19:54

Tuc,

I have keenly followed your postings over the years and am struck by the seemingly common thread that runs through each of them. While I am neither senior staff nor politician, may I ask the question you suggested?

Senior staffs and politicians should be asking why these failings were concealed behind a tissue of lies for 20+ years. And ask why those responsible are routinely protected and advanced.It seems to me that there is plenty of material that Mr Haddon-Cave would have been made aware of - did it fall outside of his narrow Nimrod remit, or was he specifically steered away from it? Your specific mentions of orders to ignore regulations, disciplinary action for following regulations, and acknowledged commercial fraud are surely something you could take to the police on a personal basis? And if the can of worms is already all but open, why has not some maverick MP taken it on as a personal campaign (in the mould of Tom Watson vs News International)?

Mach Two

28th Dec 2011, 20:06

To quote the well-respected Chuck Yeager, "Sometimes you get a pooch that can't be screwed."

tucumseh

29th Dec 2011, 08:41

Easy Street

Excellent questions.

The easy answer is one I was given a few months ago when I asked the same of an MP on the All Party Armed Forces Committee. There is no difference between Ministers and their Departments. Convention has it that they speak with one voice. As very few MPs have the slightest clue about their Ministerial brief, their default position is that their officials MUST be right. Convention dictates that to contradict the officials is to admit you don’t have a clue and that you, yourself, are wrong. That is the way it was explained to me when I asked why no Ministers were interested. The honourable exception in all this is Sir Malcolm Rifkind who spoke out (after he left office) when he became aware he had been misled by omission and commission on Mull of Kintyre. I believe his evidence swayed Lord Philip. What was omitted? The fact the aircraft was not cleared to fly.

Haddon-Cave was given detailed facts and written supporting evidence demonstrating the systematic rundown of airworthiness from 1991-onwards. The main submission to Lord Philip included all those papers, and more; the passage of time had allowed research to reveal the evidence that pushed this rundown back to a June 1987 policy by AMSO. The weight of evidence probably swayed him in general terms, but the natural reaction of both was to concentrate on one key issue that underpinned their recommendations. The legal mind introducing sufficient doubt, perhaps. In both cases, it was reasonable of them to assume MoD would understand all the failures that led to the ultimately flawed Safety Cases. But, of course, they don’t. That is why the ARTs have been sought, because they reported the failings in excruciating detail to the RAF Chief Engineer, whose job it was to govern the process. He did nothing; evidenced when the 1996 Puma ART reported the same failures as its predecessor in 1992. 4 crucial years, with MoK right in the middle.

And therein lies the problem. The self healing nature of MoD, the culture that incompetence is acceptable and the malign influence of retired VSOs. But in the past 11 months (since this was reported to Minsters and, in turn, to MoD) I really do see a difference. Not as a result of Haddon-Cave – he made an a*** of his report and blamed the wrong people. I believe he was swayed. It wasn’t so much who he blamed, but those he praised, that is the giveaway. He accepted all the evidence against them, but blamed others. I always ask this – “Who is protected by this decision?” and adhere to the basic principle of “Follow the lies, because that is where you’ll find the truth.” For example, he attributed a 1991 airworthiness failing to General Cowan, who only took up post in 1999.

No, the catalyst will prove to be the Mull of Kintyre verdict. That has reasserted Ministerial governance of the Department. We all read the pompous rubbish from Graydon, Alcock etc in their letters to the press. Post-verdict, the telling question is “Why the silence?”. The answer lies in the detailed evidence to Lord Philip. He did not need to publish it publicly, but you can rest assured it has been thrust under the noses of senior officers and officials. That evidence explained in detail the comment by Haddon-Cave that savings had been made at the expense of safety. Haddon-Cave had not explored the root of the problem, despite being dragged there screaming. That the savings had been thought necessary by the wanton waste that had created a black hole in AMSO’s budget in 1990 (as a result of the above June 1987 policy). Ring bells? That black hole was filled, in part, by robbing the hitherto ring fenced airworthiness pot. One problem was hidden, but the bow wave built up. From a personal perspective, my concern is that all this was identified and notified in January 1988. Who was it that did nothing? See letters to the press (above). As I said, self healing.

I don’t like getting into politics, but the Coalition is doing good deeds here. Say what you like about the cutbacks, but their appointment of Bernard Gray is potentially a major step forward. At the moment (!) he is not toeing a party line; he seems his own man and is following through proposals he made while independent of Government. His biggest battle will not be political, but with the above VSOs and officials, because radical change will reveal their past shortcomings. Importantly, it will reveal they KNEW of these shortcomings and the adverse effect they had, and sat back and did nothing. While servicemen died. Did you listen to “Buying Defence” on Radio 4 on Tuesday evening? In 40 mins of regurgitation, Gray came out with the telling phrase “Co-ordinating Authority”. Where does that come from ? I’ll tell you. The only Defence Standard dedicated to maintaining airworthiness. Last amended in 1991 (when AMSO chopped funding and stopped most activities) and finally cancelled 3 years ago. But quoted extensively in evidence to both Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip. Every experienced project manager knows that Def Stan is not only the procedures for maintaining airworthiness, but the template for all procurement. Got a problem? The solution is in those 2 books. If you don’t know them off by heart, you’re years shy of being experienced enough to work in the MAA and even further away from being a project manager!

Distant Voice

29th Dec 2011, 09:26

It seems to me that there is plenty of material that Mr Haddon-Cave would have been made aware of

What I find difficult to understand is that H-C spends some 174 pages dealing with the Nimrod safety case, and how people like Baber and Eagles failed to recognise the fact that Dry Bay No.7 did not have fire detection and suppression, and yet the abuse of the STF procedure and in particular an important witness statement at the Inquest, gets no mention. In fact H-C has the impertinence to state, "The Inquest produced little factual evidence of value to the Review" The witness statement indicates a clear violation of the Nimrod safety case; unofficial amendments to RTS document, equipment installed on the galley table, circuit breakers being used as switches etc.

The abuse of the STF procedure features in nearly all the ARTs produced during the 1990s, but nothing was done to correct the problem by the CEs (RAF) of the time. As Tuc says, H-C goes out of his way to praise these people for creating the "golden period" of airwothiness. From comments made on this thread it would appear that IFF Mode 4 on the Tornado was installed by the STF procedure.

The following is a recent statement issued by MoD, which shows how determined they are to prevent the truth being exposed;

I am writing to advise you that your requests are being refused under Section 14(1) of the FOI Act as they are considered to be vexatious. Furthermore, the Department has
decided that all future requests made by you on the subject of Nimrod engineering and airworthiness will be regarded as a vexatious request under Section 14(1)

DV

JFZ90

29th Dec 2011, 10:02

Was the IFF M4 on the ZG710 an UOR derived STF fit that was in the process of being fully integrated by the DA?

It is implied above that a UOR course of action may have been taken to avoid regs and save money (i.e. dubious reasons) - this view is perhaps a bit simplistic as the main reason is surely to save TIME (which can be shown to be a good reason). If you are offered a choice between UOR IFF in 6 months, or fully integrated by the DA in 3 years - it is surely obvious that both courses of action potentially have merit (albeit the early option carries greater risk to be balanced against the operational benefit). Even if you took such a decision to the MAA as implied above, they would not necessarily disagree, though ultimately they would just pass the buck to the relevant duty holder (who is of course the right person to make such a decision, if he has the right supporting facts, and is the right thing for the MAA to do).

It also seems from a quick skim that the Patriot battery and its actions were in effect 99% responsible - it is even dubious, given what actions the battery took, whether the crew being aware that the IFF was on the blink would have made any difference at all. Nearly all the (huge IMO) holes in the swiss cheese lie with the Patriot end of this sad event.

I'm not convinced at all that the IFF warning is the smoking gun some are implying - infact to do so is to distort true events which is a big no-no IMO when it comes to proper analysis of events leading to an incident.

The more and more the IFF warning is discussed as an issue, the more pressure you take off the surely more burning issue with the configuration and operation of the Patriot system - which should have us all far more worried from what I've read so far!

Mach Two

29th Dec 2011, 10:30

JFZ,

Your points are well made. The only thing I would say is that (in my opinion) the failure warnings weren't being regarded here as the cause, just a significant factor and was one of the questions raised by DV way back at post #5. It was important to explore that aspect because it was a symptom of a rushed (very urgent) integration, but, as you say, it does not represent a smoking gun.

M2

Chugalug2

29th Dec 2011, 11:02

Ah! The old smoking gun thing again, eh? If by smoking gun we mean a clear and unambiguous accident cause, then no, of course it wasn't. Likewise the infamous Chinook FADEC wasn't a smoking gun, nor the known phenomena of UFCM's, or control jams in one, two, or even all three axis. So we shall never why ZD576 slammed into a Scottish hillside taking all 29 lives with it. What we do know though is that it was Grossly Unairworthy, and was known to be so. That is what these accidents have in common. Both aircraft were in contravention of the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations, and both suffered unsurvivable accidents costing 31 lives in total.
As an aside, are we to believe that there was no crew action that could be taken to ameliorate the danger of a blue on blue had they known that they had an IFF failure? I find that hard to believe, but there again I was never a roughty toughty type and await clarification from those who are, or were...

Courtney Mil

29th Dec 2011, 11:12

To answer you last point there, Chugs, I cannot create a full picture of the air control environment on the day, but generally there are a number of measures. I shall just give two GENERIC examples. Close up with a squawking aircraft and tell EVERYONE you can that you have no M4. Now, the battery in question was acting autonomously so I would guess that getting the word through to them to go weapons tight might have taken a while, but we don't know how long before the engagement the failure occured. It is normal for ACOs to have lame duck procedures.

I say again, my examples here are generic and not exhaustive.

JFZ90

29th Dec 2011, 12:12

Ah! The old smoking gun thing again, eh? If by smoking gun we mean a clear and unambiguous accident cause, then no, of course it wasn't.

I was under the impression from some posts that it was to be considered the only or main issue to be discussed / investigated.

Likewise the infamous Chinook FADEC wasn't a smoking gun, nor the known phenomena of UFCM's, or control jams in one, two, or even all three axis. So we shall never why ZD576 slammed into a Scottish hillside taking all 29 lives with it. What we do know though is that it was Grossly Unairworthy, and was known to be so. That is what these accidents have in common.

Is it clear the IFF issue is related to airworthiness? If I recall, air safety, which includes airworthiness, excludes the effects of "hostile action". You could argue the functionality of an IFF system sits both sides of the line here.

As an aside, are we to believe that there was no crew action that could be taken to ameliorate the danger of a blue on blue had they known that they had an IFF failure? I find that hard to believe, but there again I was never a roughty toughty type and await clarification from those who are, or were...

I didn't say that, I said even though there may have been crew action that could have been applied, they may not have mitigated the actions of the battery.

If I read right the Patriot system declared it as a Anti Radiation Missile attack - this raises all sorts of questions as to how it was set up (what was the ARM 'threat' in this theatre, a Kh28? Was there really a credible capability existing in Iraq? From what launch platform, which airfield? Even if yes, what are its operational characteristics - isn't it basically a Mach 3 missile? How do you confuse the radar returns from such a threat with a GR4?

EDIT: I've just read this....

http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/32E5E281-139A-4674-978C-2E6DD999BDAD/0/maas03_02_tornado_zg710_22mar03.pdf

...very diplomatically put, but you can almost here the writers thinking "WTF" as they write about the "generic/broad" ARM profiles loaded into the patriot and training/doctrine that didn't appear to place much importance on focussing on the threats in theatre......

...some of the recommendations are revealing
a. make sure the US get the full report.
b. RAF liaison types must make sure changes are followed up in the US.

Chugalug2

29th Dec 2011, 13:15

The main issue, as per the OP, was the BoI report. Subsidiary issues, posted a little later, were:
Can anyone answer the following qusetions (1) At the time, did ZG710 have a IFF Mode 4 integrated failure warning feature? (2) If it did, was it audio or visual? (3) What pre engine start IFF checks were carried out by ground crew? (4) When did ZG710 have its last Major?
It seems that the answer to Q1 was no, it didn't. As to:
If I recall, air safety, which includes airworthiness, excludes the effects of "hostile action". You could argue the functionality of an IFF system sits both sides of the line here.
I'm not sure what you mean. Hostile action may well have caused the IFF to fail, if that's what you mean. Hostile action would not have then deprived the crew of a warning of that, for that had already been assured by its fit, unless you include as "hostile" the lack of "Duty of Care" by the Airworthiness Authority, aka the MOD, which I would consider a very appropriate comment, but I rather doubt that to be your meaning.
As to possible crew action had they been so alerted, I am indebted to both Courtney and you JFZ90 for your input. No doubt there were shortcomings in the Patriot end of the tragedy. There will always be such shortcomings in the "Fog of War", better then to make sure that one's own ducks are all in a row before they paddle into it, to grossly mix up the metaphors!

JFZ90

29th Dec 2011, 13:41

I'm not sure what you mean.

I mean you could argue its correct function under hostile action is not part of the air safety / airworthiness question. Hostile action can include EW / RF / jamming / exploitation attack as well as kinetic of course.

To draw a parallel, if you fit a jammer system to an aircraft, but it fails to defeat in incoming missile that e.g. has enabled a HOJ mode that was not known, this would clearly be outside of the scope of air safety as defined by the MAA etc. - though you could argue its not fit for purpose or operationally effective (as the baddies know how to defeat your technology).

IFF in some ways could be considered similar, e.g. its use of crypto for some modes is designed to deny exploitation by hostiles etc. This where the argument can get complicated as it can be argued that some aspects of its design are "military" and clearly intended to counter hostile action. Where you start including such capabilities into your systems, assuring the integrity of such systems can get complicated.

This is not to say that a warning of a power supply failure should not be provided if feasible - just saying it is not necessarily a simple matter..

Courtney Mil

29th Dec 2011, 13:50

Indeed, it is not a simple matter at all. And as I said way back near the start, we should also consider the difference between mission and safety - specifically "mission critical" and "safety critical" and the level of acceptable risk in training and on ops.

Chugalug2

29th Dec 2011, 14:28

Military Airworthiness is what it suggests, ie it is separate from, and different in many ways to, its Civilian cousin. The reason that you need a fully integrated failure warning in a Military IFF fit could not be made more clear than with this avoidable Fatal Air Accident. We have been told that it was so fitted on the F3 variant. Rather than look for Fairies on Pin Heads to count, let us just agree that the lack of it here meant that this variant was that bit more vulnerable if the slices of Swiss Cheese started their dreaded shuffling. You might well label this as Fitness For Purpose, it really makes no difference to the outcome. Never mind the lessons that the USA should learn, that is for them to get on with, the obvious lesson for us is to make sure that our combat aircraft are in future made fully airworthy militarily, which includes being fit for purpose. The only way to get to that far off place is to have a fully independent MAA and MAAIB ASAP, separated from each other and from the MOD. Anything less and the same sorry avoidable accidents will continue to be unavoided.

Mach Two

29th Dec 2011, 14:38

Yeah. A good summary. I see your MAA/MAAIB campaign. Self regulation doesn't seem to work in many places!

JFZ90

29th Dec 2011, 14:44

make sure that our combat aircraft are in future made fully airworthy militarily, which includes being fit for purpose.

At the risk of sounding pedantic, care is needed not to get these terms confused.

I think most would agree that "fitness for purpose" would include an assessment of a platforms ability to operate & survive in a hostile environment.

If you check the regs however, under the MAA02 Master Glossary, the definition of "Air Safety" here...

http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/C260ECF6-4E45-431C-8178-9B5E01B5A34F/0/MAA02MAAMasterGlossaryInitialIssue.pdf

is quite clear...

Air Safety
Is the state of freedom from unacceptable risk of injury to persons, or damage, throughout the life cycle of military air systems. Its purview extends across all Defence Lines of Development and includes Airworthiness, Flight Safety, Policy, Regulation and the apportionment of Resources. It does not address survivability in a hostile environment.

Of course platforms should be fit for purpose, but lets not get that confused as something that is part of airworthiness.

Mach Two

29th Dec 2011, 14:53

Yes, and I think that follows on from Courtney's earlier point about mission and safety critical. Thank you for the link too. I love the fact that this new MAA document refers to an 'aerodrome'. I suppose it's technically correct, but Collins declared the term obsolete earlier this year. Also interesting to note that the definition of Airworthiness Directive is "intentionally blank". Should we read anything into that?

thefodfather

29th Dec 2011, 15:02

Thankfully Collins isn't an aviation regulator, EASA and the CAA still refer to them as aerodromes so it's nice to see the MAA using standard terminology.

Mach Two

29th Dec 2011, 15:06

Yes, it's very nice indeed.

tucumseh

29th Dec 2011, 16:26

The hostile action of which you speak is included in the list of defined threats against which a Threat Assessment is conducted during Design and Development (as opposed to the TA before missions).

It is important to look at this subject in 3 distinct phases. 1. Attaining airworthiness, before Release to Service. This is a mandatory pre-requisite to; 2. Maintaining it and 3. Fitness for Purpose, which is actually what you speak of as it is an operational term in this sense. Crucially, the Safety Case MUST reflect the Build Standard in all 3 phases (which by definition means the BS must be maintained, which is the basic failure reported by MoD(PE) (to AMSO) in January 1988 the ARTs (to CAS and RAF Chief Engineer) from 1992. However, the regulations acknowledge that in exceptional circumstances the Safety Case may not reflect the actual Build Standard of individual aircraft or operational circumstances/emerging roles. The Apache rescue is an excellent example. But, they are crystal clear in that, regardless of whether it is a DA mod or a Service mod, the basic airworthiness must be attained and demonstrated in the first place. UORs allow circumvention of much torturous hoop jumping forced upon procurers, but not the airworthiness regs. I have never come across a case where it wouldn’t have been quicker just to follow the regs in the first place. In fact, the nature of UORs (where cost is less of an issue) means affordability is seldom an issue.

For example, the first two defined threats in the Def Stan are “inert projectiles” and “incendiary projectiles”. That implies hostility on someone’s part! Consider the C130 XV179 case. If these projectiles result in a fire risk, the defined mitigation is to fit Explosive Suppressant Foam. Note: You don’t have to think of the threat/risk, it is defined and so is the mitigation. The reader is pointed to MoD(PE) standards from the early 1980s. (e.g. DTD 5624, March 1981 and DTD 5627, April 1982). Both apply to fire suppression in Fuel Tanks and Dry Bays. That they existed in the first place means the risk was identified and funding committed to mitigation in, at least, the 1970s. That they were superseded meant someone was on top of their game and ensuring they were up to date. So far, so good. Implement these simple regs and you are well on the way.

What went wrong, and the Tornado, Chinook, Nimrod, Sea King etc cases share this common theme to a greater or lesser extent, is that the regulations were not implemented. THAT is why Haddon-Cave was commissioned, following ACM Loader’s statement to this effect in the XV230 BoI report.

What compounded this failure in each case, and what MoD refuse to address, is experienced staffs, both in Boscombe and MoD(PE), identified the risks, notified those responsible of their legal obligations AND the required mitigation – and were shown the door.

What further compounded these cases was MoD proceeded to lie through their back teeth and deny events which were a simple matter of record. Back to C130. In court they denied knowledge of ESF, saying it only came to their attention after the event. The legal people representing the families and the Coroner were singularly unimpressed when handed the aforesaid MoD specifications. Same on Chinook FADEC. MoD said “Not Safety Critical”. Lord Philip was handed the MoD policy directive from 1989 which proved it was. (DUS(DP)/924/11/2/9 dated 14th December 1989). I imagine he wasn’t impressed with MoD either. And so on. The individual cases are bad enough, but the cumulative effect and failure to “learn lessons” is appalling.

I could almost forgive the failure to integrate IFF failure warnings if it was a last minute, rush job, and the aircrew were warned. It wasn’t. I can even understand an inexperienced Project Manager or Engineering Authority initially overlooking it from the contract. After all, CDP ruled in 1996 he no longer required engineering experience in MoD – something Bernard Gray is now trying to overturn. We know typical IFF contracts didn’t seek a demonstration of installed performance, because the response from the IFF office was a child-like “It works on the bench so it’ll work on the aircraft” – if you don’t know what the installed performance is, how can you note any Limitations in the RTS? (In fact, the failure to integrate failure warnings is so fundamental it is not a Limitation, it is an Operational Constraint, meaning it is flagged at a much higher level and DEC are obliged to staff a requirement to remove it). However, what is truly unforgivable is the automatic response from two 2 Stars upon being notified aircrew were at risk due to failure to integrate failure warnings. They literally turned their backs and walked away, yet they were the last line of defence, supposedly providing “management oversight”. Overlook, more like. Their actions are reflected in the culture we see today in MoD, which Bernard Gray says he is trying to overcome. Best of luck mate.

John Blakeley

29th Dec 2011, 16:45

DV

I am surprised that nobody has come back regarding your treatment by MOD under the FoIA – your post 93 refers. I am equally surprised that after so many years of forgetting that the truth will always out as it now has started to on Chinook, Hercules, Nimrod, Sea King etc MOD again appears to be assuming that they can be judge and jury and hence get away with hiding behind their own “self-serving” interpretation of the rules. You do not say what action you intend to take, but it seems to me that you do not have to take this ruling “lying down”.

As I am sure you know, but for the benefit of other readers, Section 14 of the Act states:

14. Vexatious or repeated requests.

(1)Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious.
(2)Where a public authority has previously complied with a request for information which was made by any person, it is not obliged to comply with a subsequent identical or substantially similar request from that person unless a reasonable interval has elapsed between compliance with the previous request and the making of the current request.

There is no special definition of the meaning of “vexatious” within the FoIA (or indeed “reasonable”), but if we now look at some top level legal definitions it is clear that MOD’s letter to you is probably nothing to do with your alleged “abuse” of the FoIA, but, as you say yourself, is about keeping the lid on Pandora’s box. Indeed their statement that all future requests for information from you re Nimrod engineering and airworthiness are already considered to be “vexatious” would anyway appear to be contrary to section 14 (2) of the Act.

Vexatious: A legal action or proceeding initiated maliciously and without Probable Cause by an individual who is not acting in Good Faith for the purpose of annoying or embarrassing an opponent.

Probable Cause: Apparent facts discovered through logical inquiry that would lead a reasonably intelligent and prudent person to believe that an accused person has committed a crime, thereby warranting his or her prosecution, or that a Cause of Action has accrued, justifying a civil lawsuit.

Good Faith: Honesty; a sincere intention to deal fairly with others.

Cause of Action: The fact or combination of facts that gives a person the right to seek judicial redress or relief against another. Also, the legal theory forming the basis of a lawsuit.

I guess you would not see your requests as failing any of these “tests”. As before it would seem that MOD continues to forget the old adage that “when you are in a hole you should stop digging” – yet every time they unjustifiably try to silence or ignore someone like you with what you and many others would see as doubtful “legal” rulings MOD makes the hole larger – the classic from a few years ago was, of course, their interpretation (or rather misinterpretation) of the employment laws applying to pregnant servicewomen! But they have the legal and other resources to allow them to get away with it most (but not all) of the time! However, on the assumption that you do not accept that your requests are in any way vexatious and are following a logical theme (as opposed to wildly “lashing out” which could be seen as vexatious) I presume your next “port of call” will be the Information Commissioner with a request that he confirms that you are indeed not a vexatious “litigant” – since in the UK it is normally the “judge” (in this case the Information Commissioner) who would decide this and not an organisation like MOD.

Mach Two

29th Dec 2011, 16:58

Wow, Tuc, as ever a very informative and well-informed post. I wouldn't argue with anything you say there. However, (you knew that was coming, don't worry, just a perspective), from this pilot's point of view, I know there are imperfections in every system we are asked to operate and we could spend our lives trying to eliminate every gramme of risk from them. Personally, I accept a level of risk and understand the areas where a system (usually an aircraft, in my case) fall short of ideal, especially on operations.

Now, that is not to say that I do not (as I said) fully concur that the MoD has a huge duty of care. Quite rightly and this thread has highlighted numerous areas where they have, allegedly, fallen short. But there must be a balance and an acceptance by those that take the Queen's five pence that there is, at times, an element of risk, often due to budgetary constraints et al.

We could be in danger of regulating our aircraft out of the air or making new systems so expensive that we can no longer afford an air force.

I am playing devils advocate a little here, although I may be less risk averse than some. Bottom line for me is, yes, MoD's duty of care must be applied and enforced, but I would hate us to become so bound by regulation that it impedes our ability to get on with our job.

Reading this back, I may have slightly over-stated my case, but I hope you can see my point.

Courtney Mil

29th Dec 2011, 17:13

JB,

Very useful. I may be able to shed a little light here. I was in a Head Quarters when FoI became an issue to us. The rule was to destroy anything we didn't actually need, including documents and emails, on the grounds that if we didn't have them we couldn't release them to an FoI requester.

While I don't think our part of the organization was trying to evade the Act, it was clear to me (assuming I read the signals correctly) that the Centre was very nervous about it. Instructions about how long we had to respond and under what circumstances we could legitimately decline were very clear.

A view I have held for many years is that it's very easy to think of the RAF of the MoD as "them". There is no corporate "them". It's a bunch of people in a job for a couple of years in most cases. Especially those that have to deal with FoI requests. Mostly those desk officers scrabble around to find an answer, but often feel uncomfortable being the one to let something slip - often not fully understanding the politics/sensitivity of the issue. So they revert to safe mode and pull out one of the standard responses.

All the above is not to say that there a many pieces of information that the MoD would rather keep to themselves - PRESUMABLY, but I cannot state that for certain.

Fortunately, I don't have to deal with that sort of thing any more.

Courtney

JFZ90

29th Dec 2011, 17:52

John Blakeley

29th Dec 2011, 18:24

JFZ90,

Even if you are right about MOD possibly having a case, and I am certainly not accusing you of being wrong, it is surely a decision for the Information Commissioner to rule on - I am sure MOD will make their points forcefully enough!

JB

JFZ90

29th Dec 2011, 18:33

Even if you are right about MOD possibly having a case, and I am certainly not accusing you of being wrong, it is surely a decision for the Information Commissioner (IC) to rule on - I am sure MOD will make their points forcefully enough!

I've no idea who makes the decisions, maybe the IC was consulted? Maybe not as that would seem like overkill given the number of "UFO chasers" and other mentalists they have to deal with - DV could probably appeal to the IC, then he could see if the IC agreed with the MoD. If you read paras 3 and 4 of the guidance I found, I have a feeling......

Easy Street

29th Dec 2011, 18:58

Tuc,

Thankyou for your detailed replies! I am reassured by your views on Bernard Gray, but how confident are you that our current crop of VSOs can cut themselves free of the influence of the retired 'big beasts' that did all the damage in the first place? And I presume that you see the re-instatement of the Chief Engineer position as A Good Thing?

tucumseh

29th Dec 2011, 19:57

Mach Two

Thank you.

But there must be a balance and an acceptance by those that take the Queen's five pence that there is, at times, an element of risk, often due to budgetary constraints et al. I agree. My point is that many of the risks you are asked to take have often been identified, the mitigation determined to be achievable quickly and at less cost, but the more costly and less timely route taken to protect certain individuals. Or, in the case of IFF warnings, no action at all. I abhor that approach, mainly because people I regarded as friends have died unnecessarily.

Easy Street

Thank you as well.

And I presume that you see the re-instatement of the Chief Engineer position as A Good Thing? Hmm. You know what I’m going to say. Alcock was Chief Engineer and, because he was double hatted as AML, his name is all over the systemic airworthiness failings that led directly to so many deaths. If pressed, he may have an explanation, but his ludicrous letters to the press suggest otherwise and the later ARTs tell a story. Nothing was done. It is always about people and their willingness to do the right thing. In my experience, there aren’t many in MoD. The decision Alcock had to make upon receipt of, for example, CHART (Chinook, Puma, Wessex) in August 1992 was simple. Do I rescind the policy to rundown airworthiness (issued in my name in 1991!), or ignore the Inspector of Flight Safety’s recommendations. He did not choose wisely. A 1st year apprentice or a 40 year veteran 3 Star could make that decision – I’d vote for the apprentice if he stood up and did the right thing. In fact, the issues would be fresher in his mind because he’s taught them before being allowed near a toolbox! I know what my first day consisted of. A film of a post mortem, the message being “This is what happens if you F*** UP”. (But 2 years earlier I’d been to the real thing, which is a starker message!).

tucumseh

30th Dec 2011, 05:54

The practical problem when faced with this situation (and remember, this is not hypothetical, because the failure to integrate IFF warnings was flagged in 1998) is what happens when the project office refuse to correct the design, pay off the contract and walk away. There are a number of formal and informal routes. Informal resolution is better on a one-off failure. But this example had pan-MoD implications, because if they didn’t do the job properly on one aircraft, it is likely others were affected too. In this case, informal didn’t work because (a) they refused and (b) the 2 Star backed them up.

On my aircraft, muggins here agreed to ignore orders and make his aircraft safe. I had no control over the others; specifically, the Tornado office didn’t reply. But what to do about the overarching problem?

One route is the Constraints Working Groups for each aircraft. The user or Boscombe (RWTS in my case; same thing in practice) flags the fact they are vulnerable to friendly fire because they have no failure warnings. The CWG in conjunction with the likes of Warfare Centres decide if this is a Limitation or a Constraint. If the former, the user is sent away to develop a work-a-round. (Don’t fly in controlled air space?!). If the latter, it is tagged Critical, Major or Minor. (This is essentially the same process as the risk/ALARP discussion on Nimrod). If Critical, then DEC gets an automatic action to run a requirement to remove the Constraint. This is the answer to the oft asked question from Front Line – How do we influence procurement? Crucially, you also have Health and Safety Constraints. This one is a double whammy; both Critical and H&S. Getting approval to remove it should be a no brainer.

But not only is this a systemic failure, it is a serious cultural failure. And more than one CWG is involved, so the Chair, usually a lowly SO2, has to trigger the Conflict Resolution process. Usually 3 Tier, in this case he needs to find the DEC officer in charge of all aircraft carrying IFF, as a single directive is needed. The problem must be set out on paper in the form of a Board Submission (or Business Case in today speak) and staffed through about 6 ranks to this head DEC chap. The submission goes something like this: “Project office refused to make aircraft functionally safe, and paid off contract saying it was. 2 Star agreed this was fine and dandy. Please get him over-ruled. Request approval to commit £XXM to pay the company a second time. Oh, and switch on Legal, we want to sue them”. (Side note: Tread carefully. 4 Star supports him. He’s got a history, it’s not a one-off aberration. See Nimrod and Chinook). The result is every single officer in that staffing chain drops a brick and spends the rest of their tour trying to ignore it. The experienced ones bat it back to the poor sod who flagged it (me, not the CWG SO2), because the rules say they can. The 2 Star DEC never gets to hear of the problem, aircraft get shot down and people die. The major effort then becomes – for God’s sake don’t let the BoI, Coroner or families know. In fact, more effort goes into that damage limitation, the cost of which would have solved the problem on Day 1.

This cultural failure has been mentioned in numerous highly critical reports. Bernard Gray has been banging on about it. It is one reason he wants to get the private sector more involved – he hopes that culture doesn’t exist there, in the sense a company will have no qualms about submitting a costed proposal to make an aircraft safe or operationally effective at a fair and reasonable cost. But, does this merely delay the inevitable? Who makes the decision to commit MoD funding in his model? Companies routinely submit such proposals anyway. The system already relies on their proactive input. The problem is that the mandated formal contracts to provide continuous cover (and hence expertise) to maintain the Build Standard are no longer let. They are seen as a waste of money. And this is a failure to maintain that Standard.

This gets back to the “Co-ordinating Authority” concept, reiterated by Gray on Radio 4 (although it’s not clear if he knew he was reiterating). Had there been an appointed System Co-ordinating Design Authority (SCDA), as mandated, then this problem would have been flagged earlier than Boscombe did (to me). In this case, the “system” to be co-ordinated is IFF, Comms (audio warnings), aircraft (visual warnings) and any other system on the Interface Control Boundary. Three different companies – you appoint someone to co-ordinate, with formal contractual links to the others. It is the basis of all systems integration, and is simple. Companies want this degree of control exercised over their kit. It cost little, as there is very little materiel cost, mainly manpower. What is the crucial difference in this process? The answer is that if one invokes the mandated Def Stan (now cancelled without replacement!) the SCDA or DA is given delegated powers to commit MoD funding to resolve safety problems. MoD staffs are taught, wrongly, that committal of funding requires MoD approval. For very good reason the exception is (was) safety related.

Bottom line. What is likely to be proposed by Bernard Gray is actually a return to the tried and tested (and extant, but ignored) mandated policy. The model will be expanded as it will encompass initial procurement activities, but the basis is there (if you have an old copy of the Def Stan, especially Book 2, Specs 5 and 19. i.e. What we expect you to do, and how to cost it). Full circle. To avoid avoidable problems, implement existing regulations. No wheel reinventing required Bernard. Your practical problem is that, because the Chief Engineer ditched this system, you have very few who remember how to do it. THAT should be the focus of initial consultancy contracts. Not WHAT to do, but HOW to resurrect the mandated process.

Just thought I’d post this in case anyone thought I didn’t have a solution on offer! I’d be interested in the thoughts of anyone caught up in this system today. Long time since I worked in it (mainly because it’s a long time since anyone on MoD was allowed to!). Of course, there is more to it, but the framework is there already and much of it is already filled in. It’s the template for Time, Cost and Performance and always has been.

dervish

30th Dec 2011, 10:36

tuc

I've a little smile on my face. I can just see MoD getting back from xmas leave, having scanned pprune as usual for their policy ideas. The great "idea" is actually long standing policy, we've been found out, quick we have to change the report and rebrand everything under a new name. Hilarious.

JFZ90

30th Dec 2011, 10:37

Bernard Gray has been banging on about it. It is one reason he wants to get the private sector more involved – he hopes that culture doesn’t exist there, in the sense a company will have no qualms about submitting a costed proposal to make an aircraft safe or operationally effective at a fair and reasonable cost

I think its generally too early to promote (or otherwise) the changes that Bernard might make. One thing is for certain, the pitfalls he is trying to avoid in improving things are huge - e.g. in terms of adequately & effectively managing the supplier base. Sure there are things that are bad today, but there is still a risk he could make it even worse!

Courtney Mil

30th Dec 2011, 17:14

I would like to put forward a slightly different angle on this. Caveat: this does not necessarily reflect my views, it's just stuff I saw in 30 years as an RAF AD pilot and later as a desk/staff/trials officer.

During the period we're discussing here the Defence budget was tighty squeezed (I know, show me a time when it hasn't been). Like the late 70s and early 80s the Government's decission to buy Trident put a huge strain on the budget and took money away from other programmes. In fact, it lead to a lot of deep cuts - mainly for the Navy who were "lucky" the Falklands happened when they did (don't bother rising to that, you know what I mean).

Similarly, in the late 80s and 90s there was another programme that should (or maybe, COULD) have been well run and reasonably straight forward, but it wasn't. It was EUROFIGHTER and the dreadful politics involved in a four-nation (five to start with, but maybe I can come back to that another time) consortium and possilby 400 sub-contractors led to it eating increasingly huge amounts of cash, sucking money out of the UK defence budget.

As with so many of these programmes/projects, the MoD started to wonder if it was worth it and a number of well-respected senior people started to suggest that the money needed to be spent elsewhere. We even ran COEIAs (Combined Operational Effectiveness and Investment Appraisal for those not familar), which either showed the required political answer or sometimes failed to support the military case. But the answer was very blunt, "you're buying it, it comes out of defence spending and that's it!" I paraphrase, by the way.

Anyway, the result was that lots of other programmes lost out. None was cancelled (or maybe few were cancelled) as they were all deemed necessary to maintaining capability, meeting our senior ally's requirements, improving personnels' protection/comms, etc. I think you may recognise some of those projects.

So, what I'm speculating about is that cash was even tighter than normal, there were hundreds of "essential" programmes going on whilst a huge, additional black hole was sucking the life out of the budget. I went to many meetings where numerous ways of improving combat ID, personal protection, new radios, the SA80, etc, etc, were discussed and PMs (and their predecessors) had to accept funding holes to keep their projects moving - albeit slowly and, in many cases, in a less than ideal form. Future spending was taken "at risk" in the hope that money would appear from nowhere. It was a standard way of doing things and is what left us with the £38 billion black hole. Not because projects were pushed forward unwisely, but because the Government wanted them, but wouldn't guarantee the cash (that will attract some flack, I suspect). So many projects, mods, STFs, UORs were fighting for cash and most lost out to the big one. Tornado IFF M4 was caught in this same trap.

I am not defending or criticising the actions of anyone here, just opening another side to the discussion. But I would say this. Look at the criticism here (let alone anywhere else) for installing, incompletely, a life-saving piece of kit. Done by people, for all sorts of motives, some honourable, some self-serving I'm sure. Imagine the public response if, for example, the guy running the body armour procurement had said, "Well, it's not properly funded, we can't guarantee it's perfect so we'll cancel it for now."

I know I'm being dramatic and over-simplifying things, but only to make a point. I await slings and arrows for this, but just reporting what I saw. I learnt that this is not an ideal world. Of course, before then, I thought it was!

glojo

30th Dec 2011, 18:09

I am an outsider looking in on this tragic and very sad event and I guess in an ideal World every aircraft, every ship, every soldier would have all the very latest equipment that is so desperately needed to fight and survive when in a hostile environment. Sadly none of us live in this Shangri-La type world and these horrific events happen. I could post a lists of deaths that were avoidable but we are all aware of these many incidents.

The posts I regularly read on this thread feel me with pride to see the dedication and commitment of those that are determined to expose the truth, but what is the 'truth'? Should we refuse to deploy unless we are fully equipped with all the equipment we deem necessary, or do we up anchor and fight the good fight with what we have?

Our World is certainly not ideal, I wish it were and I am guessing we all know exactly where Courtney is coming from and every word of that post must surely be thought provoking?

John

Lima Juliet

30th Dec 2011, 20:13

Courtney

Well said, and I also concur with your analysis. There is little we can do for those that have lost jobs or have been given poor equipment; some of which cost our people their lives. We can't undo the past, but we can make sure that we don't do it again - can't we?

Well the Govt are telling us we must invest in this:

MOD Invests In Future Of Combat Air Systems (http://www.raf.mod.uk/news/archive/mod-invests-in-future-of-combat-air-systems-20122011)

We all know it will be late, over budget and probably have less capability than is currently available off the shelf. It will leave another hole, or just contribute to the current hole in the defence budget. Saving jobs in MP's constituencies, buying their votes and leading to more misery within HMForces (more redundancies and more "mend and make do" UORs and STFs).

It's so corrupt, I decided that I no longer wanted a part and declined my future post in the MoD at the front-end of a major procurement program for 2020 to 2030 - I also took PVR to work as far away from it as possible. Until this point, I thought that the UK always played with a "straight bat" but we're not much better than the corrupt local host-nation Police I used to deal with on detachments around the world - maybe, I'm too naive? I had hoped that when Nu Labour were outed that things would improve, but the Coalition seem just as hell-bent to protect their seats by buying off their constituents vice what we really want and need at the sharp end. Things will probably get worse with the introduction of the new Project SIRIUS officers' career stream - 18 to 24 months in a key MoD post, keep the Ministers happy and then progress to the next rank or command tour. Sadly, I can only foresee further trouble ahead as the stabilising influence of experienced SO1s and SO2s are dragged away from where the key decisions are made.

Lynx Wildcat, SAR-H, Hawk128, MRA4, Typhoon and Tornado F3 are all classic Govt meddling tales. We end up being told what we want by Min DEST various and we pay through the nose in lack of capability and lives.

LJ

Distant Voice

30th Dec 2011, 20:24

I understand what Glojo and Courtney are saying, if you go to war you can not expect everything to be perfect. However, I restate what I posted at #34,

The CinC's recommendation "The Tornado IFF installation be modified to ensure that the cockpit warning is triggered in all failure modes", indicates that they were not. So people like LJ, who believed that the CWP light would illuminate for all the modes that he has listed, were being mislead. The IFF system in the GR4 Tornado aircraft appears to have been delivered "Functionally Unsafe".

It is important that people who use kit such as IFF Mode 4 and body armour, to use Courtney's example, are aware of its "non-perfect" limitations. Of course you can only specify what they are if the installation is tested, and End-to-End testing was rejected in TART on the grounds of "shortage of LRUs, test equipment and trained manpower". Just because a piece of equipment appears to perform correctly on the bench does not mean the same applies to an installed system.

DV

thefodfather

30th Dec 2011, 21:37

DV

Another interesting post that highlights a key part of safety that is often forgotten in this debate. Accurate information and knowledge of safety issues, patricularly those relevant to a specific op task is key to enabling any crew to make the best possible decision. This is especially true when the s*** hits the fan, by which time it's too late. Although it does sound a lot like a proper SMS....

Courtney Mil

30th Dec 2011, 23:11

Thank you, guys. I think the point here is that there has been a lot of blame laid at the door of the MoD blokes and them alone. I cannot say how much blame should rest in their shoulders, but I think it is very important not to leave the responsibility of the politicians out of this. After all, whatever happens, isn't the Minister in the MoD ultimately responsible for everything that happens on his watch?

Think I might go quiet for a while now.

Happy New Year to you all. I mean that.

Chugalug2

30th Dec 2011, 23:22

Courtney, your concise summing up of the period in question rings bells for us all, I'm sure. All those projects, all those pressures, all those calls for so much with so little money, end up with a 2* lambasting individually an entire IPT, all of whom were present throughout, and specifically ordering them to suborn the Military Airworthiness Regulations, ie to ignore them but sign them off as complied with. That is the cost of all that "punching above our weight" that you recall, because someone had the bright idea to plunder the ring fenced airworthiness budget and to simply forget about airworthiness. Over 30 years later the cost goes on being paid, in blood and treasure. What amazes and appals me in all this is that professional pilots were party to this criminal activity. The Engineers, with some very notable exceptions, could not be depended on to collaborate in this desecration of their trade, and so were replaced with Adminers and Equippers who could be. But Aircrew SO's, who were the main beneficiaries when flying of a Flight Safety system second to none, bent to the task of demolishing it as ordered. It may be a sweeping denunciation, an unfair generalisation, but what happened was a classic example of "Evil happens when Good Men do Nothing".

Courtney Mil

30th Dec 2011, 23:54

Chugs,

Wow. From the heart, I think. I know you're right in your condemnation, but I'm very glad about your words concerning the enigineers. Some very professional people in my book. What a shame so many were silenced.

Happy New Year.

Distant Voice

31st Dec 2011, 10:16

Just a correction to my post #123. It was TART's recommendation for End to End testing that was rejected; by DDSMTor (RAF)

DV

Chugalug2

31st Dec 2011, 10:39

Courtney:
What a shame so many were silenced.
Indeed, but at the end of the day it is they who silenced themselves. The 2* that I mentioned issued a blatantly illegal order, which we all know must not be obeyed but rather reported. With very few worthy exceptions, most chose not to do so. Those who did were simply told that the order was indeed proper, and that disobeying it was a disciplinary matter. That did not of course mean that the order was legal, it plainly wasn't, but simply shows the corruption and negligence extant in the MOD and the High Command of HM Forces, in this case all the way to and including the SoS. I make the point though that it is never too late to speak out. Many must have lived with similar orders obeyed gnawing away at their consciences ever since. What happened then is not best just forgotten, water under the bridge, best to let sleeping dogs lie, and all the other opt-out platitudes, for the evil is still with us. Unless and until all this is laid bare, the MOD will be able to resist pressures to divest itself of control over airworthiness enforcement (or rather lack thereof) and air accident investigation (or skirting thereof). Unless and until there be a separate and independent MAA and MAAIB, avoidable airworthiness related military air accidents will continue to kill. That is why the silence has to stop!

Courtney Mil

31st Dec 2011, 11:01

Chugs,

I cannot argue with anything you say. You clearly know more than I about the disgraceful happenings. To be honest, it makes me wonder what I would have done had I found myself on the receiving end of those orders. I hope I would have done the right thing, who knows. I doubt I could have kept my mouth shut, it wasn't in my nature to let people get away with things I didn't think was right - probably more because of my rebellious streak than a matter of true honour.

Once again, your MAA/MAAIB push looks like to logical answer.

glojo

5th Jan 2012, 18:13

I have been thinking about all the excellent posts on this thread and a question has been in my head for a few days and will not go away.

There has been mention of an American F16 being 'lit up' by a patriot battery and the pilot of that aircraft was possibly not amused by that action

It started with a discussion about an F16 with HTS firing a HARM at another Patriot battery that locked it up after this tragic event. Then we have been discussing the belief that ZG710 was on an ALARM mission and the F3 had been modded to do this better than the GR4 but denied a chance to play - the F3 was fitted with the better integrated SIFF. So the last post was the supposition that, with hindsight, the GR4 blue on blue should never have happened in the first place.

Do keep up 007!

I accept there is a few years between these two incidents but could any British aircraft have detect when it had attracted the attention of these lethal batteries? If not why not.

If not and the Americans had it then..... Multiple questions as to why not fitted.

It is so easy to put most of the blame elsewhere but as usual with hind sight lots of what ifs could have avoided this awful incident.

War is a female dog that bites and at times bites VERY hard

Such a tragic, tragic loss of life.

John

Courtney Mil

5th Jan 2012, 18:48

Glojo,

I'm going to make a bit of an assumption here that the GR4 RHWR (radar warning receiver) was much the same as the F3's (apart from where the antennas were located). If I'm right, it certainly would have picked up the Patriot battery illuminating them, but that happens all the time. On ops like that the crews get used to being lit up by friendlies and, in my experience, never believe that the buggers are actually going to shoot you.

Actually, a lot of my air defence work in my early days was with the Royal Navy. You'll love this. One of the most difficult things to do on exercise was to join the fleet without getting shot down by them. And who can blame the guys sitting in their boats not wanting air assets to come near them without being absolutely sure our intent was friendly!

Your other questions there, way out of my league!!!!

Courtney

glojo

5th Jan 2012, 18:57

Excellent reply that I should have thought of... They knew that battery was there and as you rightly point out, pound to a pint of Guinness the cry wolf syndrome bit them..

I guess that second question was also answered by your reply :)

As if we would shoot you folks down... Now if it was a week-end or after 5pm on a week day then we would be really suspicious of any incoming aircraft!!

Note your 'boat' comment went waaay over my head.

BOAT he says.... blooming boat.. Not going to bite, not going to bite

I am off to fly my kite :)

Courtney Mil

5th Jan 2012, 19:06

Yes, I know. Done this before. Decks above the waterline. Turns to starboard, heels to port. Big boats and little boats. Wish I could fly a kite!

:ok:

30mRad

5th Jan 2012, 19:30

Courtney - you're right on the assumption ref RHWR similarities. I believe that there were some differences in PFMs to fit in with the different roles, but bottom line is that any threat and any friendly would/is in an op PFM for all the reasons outlined in this thread.

In pre-TELIC days the Rapiers at Ali would track our recovery and you'd get all the associated indications, but you assumed they knew who you were and wouldn't shoot you down! Fair to assume the same ref Patriot too I would think. Certainly did at the 'Deid later!

30 mRad

Distant Voice

5th Jan 2012, 20:56

I do not know anything about the Patriot radar system, but if it is anything like similar systems it will have various modes of operation; acquisition, track and lock on. Being illuminate in the acquisition and track modes is not too bad, but once the radar goes to "lock on" you should question the intent and make noises.

Some years ago, flying against the Soviet Fleet at North Cape in a Nimrod, I experience all the modes of a fire control radar. I still remember the continuous tone of "lock on". In this case there was little point in shouting "I am a friendly Nimrod, do not shoot".

DV

Courtney Mil

5th Jan 2012, 21:17

Indeed. Agree all the above. But lock-ons weren't that uncommon either. Those guys couldn't even get through to the battery, though. And lock to band with that system is very quick. Even at 18,000 feet.

Lima Juliet

5th Jan 2012, 21:30

DV

I know a little bit about Patriot and it would depend on the missile type; PAC-2 standard or PAC-3 standard.

I believe the major issue would be that PAC-2 that uses command guidance from the Patriot RADAR which switches to semi-active guidance using high powered illumination from the Patriot RADAR making hostile intent easy to detect, but, PAC-3 that uses a mix of command, inertial and low-power active missile guidance would be far harder to detect. Also, the newer PAC-3 may not have been in the GR4's RADAR Homing and Warning Reciever (RHWR) threat library - again, though, this is my conjecture.

That said, with a Mach 5 (ish) missile coming towards you, what difference is seeing it on the RHWR going to make?

Finally, I know that Patriot uses an ID matrix and that if GR4 had been fitted with Link 16/JTIDS (as it was supposed to have been over successive yearly upgrade plans that were cancelled) then the Patriot would not have been fired - Mode 4 or no Mode 4. Another own goal by the procurement teams and manufacturer.

LJ

glojo

5th Jan 2012, 21:53

Please do not dwell on my question folks as it can stir up memories that are best locked away in our little cubby holes that should perhaps be pushed into those far away corners.

My question has been answered and I am guessing a few folks are once more saying those oft repeated words....

'There but for the grace of God.....'

if GR4 had been fitted with Link 16/JTIDSLeon I say this with the VERY greatest of respect....
No amount of 'if only' will fetch those brave men back but let us all pray that this funding paid for other equipment that saved more lives than the two it lost.

Courtney also summed up that situation far better than I ever could: post #120 refers (http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/471577-gulf-tornado-patriot-6.html#post6927913)

PLEASE do not think for a millisecond that I am trying to belittle your very poignant post. Your observation will stick in my mind for a long, long time.

Respect to one and all
John

tucumseh

6th Jan 2012, 08:30

CM

Look at the criticism here (let alone anywhere else) for installing, incompletely, a life-saving piece of kit. Done by people, for all sorts of motives, some honourable, some self-serving I'm sure. Imagine the public response if, for example, the guy running the body armour procurement had said, "Well, it's not properly funded, we can't guarantee it's perfect so we'll cancel it for now."

What you say is very true in general terms. The important thing to remember on the IFF programme that highlighted these systemic failings in 1998 is this; It was fully funded and the contractor (who wasn’t the Design Authority for the IFF, but erroneously claimed to be, which meant there would be huge uncertainties over things like up to date drawings, Interface Control Documents, Radio Installation Memoranda, and hence valid Safety Cases) was contracted to fully integrate by the IFF office, not the aircraft offices.

It was only when Boscombe rejected the installation, citing failure to integrate failure warnings properly as an “Essential” (i.e. for all practical purposes, no RTS) that the aircraft offices were engaged. This in itself is a major failing – the equipment office failing to engage the aircraft office or Aircraft and Equipment Design Authorities on a programme requiring minor aircraft mods and MAJOR equipment mods (e.g. to the intercom if the convention was audio warnings, as it was on at least one of the aircraft). This is what raised the red flag. When asked if these mods had been designed (as we knew they hadn’t been embodied) all DAs said “Never spoken to the IFF office”. The cost of regression work on parallel design programmes was astronomical – the cost of ignoring programmatic integration.

The dismissive statement by the IFF office that “It works on the bench, so it’ll work on the aircraft” did not just omit one hoop to jump through, but many critical hoops. Not least, sub-system integration rigs (which had been dismantled and destroyed as a savings measure by AMSO some years earlier). No Co-ordinating Design Authority appointed (to co-ordinate Equipment DAs and accept responsibility for integration rig performance – which is then delivered to the Aircraft DA who undertakes to maintain that performance when installed). And so on. No mods to the simulator. No ATP amendments. No spares. Bottom line – Ask if there was a Safety Case re-issue. There wasn’t.

The programme was fully funded, so one is entitled to ask why the contract was paid off in full, knowing at least one installation was functionally unsafe (remember, Tornado didn’t reply when warned they may be affected and the 2 Stars refused to recommend fleet inspections) and major modifications had yet to be contracted, never mind installed. (Apart from anything else, this is a major fraud as false declarations must have been made). Given the aircraft that WAS made safe was told to fund this amelioration itself, to avoid criticism and awkward questions of the IFF office, where did these MILLIONS come from? THAT is what created the black hole in this case, and contributes to the greater hole we see today. The need to pay the same company AGAIN to do what they were already in default on. Contracting them again was directed from on high in DPA, against our wishes. (Why would you think them competent or honest when they had laughed in your face the first time round, while pocketing a huge profit for work not carried out?). They screwed up AGAIN. As usual, in stepped Westland and sorted it all out, under direction from MoD programme staff who ignored 2 Star orders. So, 3 lots of payment amounting to millions over the original (correct) level of funding. Plus, £1.6M on spares that hadn’t been procured (just for one fleet). Plus about £500k to upgrade the integration rig (that had been resurrected despite AML complaints, as it highlighted their previous waste).

This case is a catalogue of systemic failings encapsulating all that we have discussed for years on Nimrod, C130, Chinook and others.

Courtney Mil

6th Jan 2012, 08:50

Tuc,

As usual, your analysis of how the programme was run and all the unforgivable failings is undeniable and well put. As I am discovering here, there was even more bad (understatement) practice going on than even I thought - and I was pretty cynical about it all. And you are right, I was being general and, as Glojo says, trying to summarise the point with a slightly different slant on it.

I think the biggest thing you have shown me in this and other threads is how all these airworthiness failings are linked - procurement, installation, BoIs, etc, in a way that I had never fully mentally connected before.

LJ,

If everything was running properly and all the various units (surface and air) were fully integrated then, yes, JTIDS could have saved the day having a full network (or networks in fact) would get my vote every time. In this case, though, it probably wouldn't have saved the crew as the Patriot battery in question was still waiting for all their kit to be delivered from the USA. So they (probably) wouldn't have had their Link and the HQ couldn't contact them quickly enough to advise them of their Link picture. That's why they were operation autonomously.

Your points about threat libraries and detecting a Mach 5 missile are well made.

30mRad,

Thank you for your thoughts on the PFM.

Courtney

Chugalug2

6th Jan 2012, 17:41

tuc:
....... sub-system integration rigs (which had been dismantled and destroyed as a savings measure by AMSO some years earlier)
All roads it seems lead as ever to Rome.

Courtney mil:
....all these airworthiness failings are linked - procurement, installation, BoIs, etc, in a way that I had never fully mentally connected before.
Sounds to me like you've grasped the very point that the MOD doesn't wish you to grasp. By stove-piping each BoI, each Inquiry, each Review, each Inquest they try to make them seem like unconnected events. They are on the contrary all connected by the Gross Negligence of the MOD and VSO's.

Courtney Mil

6th Jan 2012, 18:10

Chugs,

Thank you. I always thought I was being cynical as one the "wasn't in the know". My experience of just one major project/programme made me see how shambolllox (good word, eh?) the whole thing was. But I'm only now starting see how right my suspicions were. And you're right, as are so many others here, the connections were well concealed.

I'm getting there.

Distant Voice

12th Jan 2012, 07:09

Supplementary memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Defence, Dated 27th July 2006

"The Inquiry was delayed considerably between May and August 2003 when the Board adjourned whilst awaiting the results of a QinetiQ report into the aircraft Indicator Friend or Foe (IFF) system".

Guess what? Neither MoD nor QinetiQ can find a copy of the IFF report.

DV

John Blakeley

12th Jan 2012, 08:01

DV,

Do you think they would have more success if they looked under "Identification" rather than "Indicator"? Or is this just another "indication" of MOD's poor staff work?

Just a thought.

JB

tucumseh

12th Jan 2012, 10:36

DV

Strange they can’t find the report. It would be necessary before one could issue an update of the Safety Case, which MoD claims was done; both for the original Special Trials Fit 189 and the subsequent DA Mods 2228 and 7246. Why, then, having (allegedly) complied with the requirement to do all this work, would one destroy the report – which the regulations require to be retained to support the Safety Case? The RTSA is required to have a contractual vehicle to access this information at any time. Did the RTSA reply, or the Tornado office?

The aircraft office may have got rid of it (after all, they were advised to check failure warning integration in 1998/9 and didn’t, which is pretty damning), but I doubt if Boscombe did – especially if they reported a problem. And the Aircraft DA, charged with doing the actual safety case work, would be both contracted and obliged to retain it.

Something stinks. In my opinion, post-crash the penny dropped that they (some combination of MoD, QQ and BAeS) had screwed up and the usual cull of incriminating evidence ensued. And it is routine for BoIs to be kept in the dark over such events.

EAP86

12th Jan 2012, 11:58

BAES held records aren't covered by FOIA.

tucumseh

12th Jan 2012, 15:11

EAP86

Contractors are routinely paid by MoD to hold and maintain MoD-owned documents; primarily under Design Authority or Design Custodian arrangements. MoD have a long history of ignoring this in FOI requests, taking the simplistic view that if the document is not to hand in the project office, then it doesn't exist.

There is a perfectly simple, mandated process for obtaining any MoD-owned documents from DAs or DCs (and this IFF report clearly falls into that category). The only question one needs to ask is - Do I want a maintained copy or an unmaintained copy? (Different form to fill in, which takes all of a minute to complete and e-mail). If the DA isn't sufficiently organised that he can't lay his hands on any given document in an hour or so, then he's in breach of contract! (If there is no contract, MoD are in breach of their own regulations, which is more likely). An infinitely cheaper way of managing FOI requests than refusing requests > managing appeal > claiming it doesn't exist > another appeal > ICO involvement > etc.

During the Philip Review into the Mull of Kintyre crash, Lord Philip resorted to seeking official MoD documents from retired staffs and people who had never even been MoD employees! AP3207 being one example (source of the Beyond Any Doubt Whatsoever regulation). There is no more easily understood example of systemic airworthiness failings than MoD being unable to produce such basic source documents! Also, MoD completely denied the existence of a Release to Service, the Master Airworthiness Record. Again, supplied by an outsider. In that particular case, Minister for the Armed Forces was forced to issue an abject apology to a widow. Given the multitude of similar examples, I think DV has a right to be slightly cynical.