New Safety Notice Issued By UK CAA

[Geoffersincornwall]

This arrived yesterday. What conclusions, if any can be drawn from the contents, given the attitude to the use of AFCS in IRTs over the last 20 years? We all knew that what goes in the test goes in the course (in other words you are taught to pass the test - and little more) so why no requirement to demonstrate full understanding of the automatics in the test?

G.

1 Introduction

1.1 On 18 February 2009, an EC 225 helicopter with two crew and 16 passengers on board struck the sea 125 NM east of Aberdeen whilst conducting a visual approach to an offshore helideck at night. Fortunately all occupants were able to evacuate the aircraft into life rafts and were safely recovered by search and rescue services.

1.2 The final Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) Report into this occurrence (Aircraft Accident Report 1/2011 dated 14 September 2011) made the following Recommendation to the CAA:

“Safety Recommendation 2011-050
It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority encourages commercial air transport helicopter operators to make optimum use of Automatic Flight Control Systems”.

The CAA accepted this recommendation.

1.3 The purpose of this Safety Notice is to remind operators of the need to ensure the proper use of Automatic Flight Control Systems (AFCS) by crews through appropriate procedures and training.

2 Background Information

2.1 Whilst the introduction of AFCS in many helicopters has alleviated the piloting task by providing automated stabilisation and higher mode functionality, there have been a number of helicopter occurrences, including this one, in which the use of AFCS has been implicated in the consideration of findings or causal factors. The potential for hazard through inappropriate AFCS operation by the crew has been well-established.

2.2 For example in the UK:

• in February 2002 a police EC 135 crashed at night following the pilot’s selection/ de-selection of AFCS function;
• in September 2007 an EC 135 crashed at night after a disturbance from cruise flight and the pilot’s de-selection of the AFCS;
• in May 2011 an AS 332L2 under instrument flight rules unexpectedly pitched up and lost airspeed to capture and maintain the demanded rate of climb; and
• there have also been a number of level busts related to AFCS operation.
It is of note that the 2002 EC135 police helicopter accident resulted in an AAIB Recommendation that police operators should ensure that training in the use of autopilot systems be required to be covered by the operator during initial and recurrent line training and that the Unit Air Operations Manual contain instructions for the use of autopilot systems by pilots during normal operations.

3 Recommendations to Operators

3.1 Bearing in mind the above information, operators should carefully review the use and handling of AFCS by crews, with particular reference to the use of higher functionality capabilities such as ‘upper modes’ and flight management system coupling, to ensure that optimum use is made of this equipment.

3.2 Operators should give consideration to the particular circumstances of their operations and give best guidance to crews for the use of this equipment through operations manuals, reflecting this in the training and checking regime. During this consideration, the importance of retaining pilot competence in aircraft manual handling skills should not be overlooked and full use of simulator training opportunities should be thoroughly explored.

[zorab64]

Geoffers - whilst I can't answer the IRT question, this will be a reinforcement to some in the Police/EMS world who believe the use of higher functions should be maximised. Whatever peoples opinion of AFCS higher functions, there are still some who believe that they should stick doggedly to their '80s learning of the '70s technology they flew then, rather than embracing the spectacular technological improvements available to them in the machines they fly now. :ugh:
Knowing what your systems can do for you and, more importantly, understanding the idiosyncracies of the systems (as they're not all perfect) will do more to enhance safety than only plugging it in when things start to get difficult.

Interestingly, what isn't mentioned in the latest Safety Notice is the mandating of stabilised helicopters for those who fly around UK at night, required from April 2010. This was as a result of various night CFITs including Middlewich, East Mids Police & an AS355 into woods a year or 3 ago (all unstabilised, I believe) as well as the 2002 accident. The latter (stabilised) showing that AFCS systems aren't infallible and need comprehensive training and an understanding of their capabilities. :ok:

[212man]

There has been a 180° change in attitude by the UK CAA regarding the use of automation during testing and some of that is reflected in the guidance in Doc 28 (annex H.) This change has come about partly through changes in personnel and largely through greater exposure to operating the types by the FOTIs that fly the line with operators.

I remember 10 years ago sending an e-mail suggesting that we should be able to use the full range of AP Functions and couldn't understand why it was normal in the airline world despite the fact that the FCL and OPS rules were the same - just cut and pasted basically. I received a scathing response that essentially asked who I thought I was to question their wisdom! Some subsequent lobbying by my company and others at the TSLG meetings led to a reluctant acceptance that it might be ok to use the ALT hold to copy an ATIS - I think that was around 2003! The mindset was still that using an AP was just simple button pushing, with no skill or knowledge required, and it made life too easy.

I think one of the turning points was the head of training standards being on the JOEB panel for the S-92 which really highlighted how significantly different things had become.

Now they have FOTIs flying the S-92, the EC225 and 155, AW139 etc and I think the view is much more realistic and reflects the understanding that if you can't assess a pilot's ability to use the automation you may be leaving a potential danger unseen, till he demonstrates it with a bunch of pax in the back! Quite apart from anything else, to not use the automation will normally be a departure from the company SOPs and therefore contradicts the brief to fly the aircraft as if it were a normal commercial flight!

Both of my add type TRE checks for the EC-155 and S-92 were flown with the candidate briefed to use the automation fully, and my last renewal check likewise.

However, not all NAAs may share the same viewpoint.......

[Non-PC Plod]

In my experience of simulator instruction, I have found that the number one overriding factor which has caused students to depart from a safe flight condition has been poor use of automation. For people coming from a background of older-generation helicopters, there is a step-change in techniques involved when using FD higher modes. Whilst automation is viewed in some way as "optional equipment", there is simply not enough time or emphasis devoted to its use during TR courses. It seems we need a new generation of pilots, instructors and inspectors before this mindset will start to change - perhaps this is beginning to happen?
In the meantime, I am afraid we will continue to see accidents and incidents related to poor mode awareness, automation complacency, inappropriate SOPs, lack of cross-checking, and poor decision-making resulting from incomplete understanding of the equipment.

[Flounder]

I think the problem might stem from the view of the helicopter pilot as a hands-on, manual handling expert.

Unlike the long haul FW pilot who is derided for his position as a button pushing systems manager we helicopter pilots feel special because we get to manoeuvre the aircraft using the flying controls and actually do some "real flying".

Your average helicopter pilot may feel use of automation will be perceived as an admission of a lack of competence as things are getting busy and they can't cope. Rather than seeing that using the automatics to free up capacity to plan and execute a challenging phase of flight is the more professional and safer approach.

I certainly experienced the mindset early on in my career that flying an ARA fully coupled somehow showed you couldn't do it manually! Why would you want to? Some of the colleagues I flew with would happily couple NAV and ALT for the cruise but decouple to begin the descent to an approach to minima.

In my experience, requesting that the automatics must be used in an LPC/OPC (to evaluate competence) can cause some candidates to have a harder time than being asked to fly an uncoupled, single engine, non-precision approach to minima.

I believe the last revision of Doc 28 and the philosophy of Rob Calvert (formerly of the UK CAA) has begun to improve the mindset of the helicopter pilot and his/her use of automatics.

All of the above discussion also have the caveat ever present with the manual/automatic debate - never at the expense of the ability to fly the aircraft manually when the AFCS fails or fails to do what it is expected to do.

As the types we fly take on the complexity of FW systems a change of philosophy is required throughout the generations of pilots to immerse themselves into the AFCS of their type and learn it's peculiarities and anomalies.

Add to that it is not an admission that "I need help" when using the automatics rather "I am showing I am totally competent using the various technology available to me".

[Sir Niall Dementia]

I tend to go back to early days of North Sea flying (S61s, so nothing automatic at all) and view the automatics as a "competent co-pilot, lacking initiative." If you have them flying the aircraft for you then you have an awful lot more capacity to deal with all the other jobs such as checking weather, sorting out divs, briefing on the landing site/approach plate, sorting out customer hassles, you can get on with your job whilst keeping a watching brief on what the "co-pilot" is doing.

When converting on to my current type the trainers spent a lot of time on the automatics and it was a huge help when I was let loose on my own, but I have flown on the same type with others who went through the conversion course with a different provider and who struggled with the automation.

Thinking back to my first paragraph, does anyone remember Dave humble in the BIH S61 sim acting as "incompetent co-pilot with initiative"?

SND

[Helinut]

Certainly an issue. More training and operation/operator specific advice would help. The other aspect that is peculiar to onshore helicopters is the problem of maintaining IR/IFR currency in most operations.

In lots of ways we are the other extreme end of the spectrum from the archetypal airline pilot system monitor. We can be all hands on, they are never hands on. Everyone needs enough training and currency to be able to make full use of the AFCS and also be able to fly the thing manually.

Although it is not a replacement for training/practice we can inform/remind ourselves of our AFCSs with systems operation & training manuals. [Some of us do spend a lot of time on shift but waiting around]. In my experience, I have worked in several situations where it was quite difficult to get hold of these, which seems rather counterproductive. Sometimes manufacturers are too keen to "maximise the revenue stream", and only make available manuals for astronomical prices. In other situations, you even get trainers using the "information is power" method of (not) disseminating information, sadly.