AW139 Accident rate discussion

[Granny]

A few years back the BV234 Chinook was banned in the offshore industry because of a couple of accidents in the North Sea. Seems to me every other month a 139 goe's down somewhere or the arse end drops off while it is taxiing -how many accidents have these things had now in it's very short life?

[OvertHawk]

It does seem to be a worryingly frequent event. In fairness, however, one of the significant factors in the removal of the 234 from the North sea was the large numbers of pax carried, thus making any accident proportionally more severe - too many eggs in one basket.

But AW certainly have some serious questions to answer.

OH

[malabo]

My own view of the 139 is that it is a robust reliable aircraft suffering from the success of Agusta and regulator marketing - that the biggest possible engines in the smallest possible airframe will save your day. Doha crash -(non)pilot error, Spanish crash -pilot error, Korea crash -pilot error, China crash - pilot error ( until we hear otherwise from Agusta, hint: low alt 1.5 km from shore), Malaysia crash-pilot error, losing a couple of tails in Doha -pilot/maintenance?

Even where there has been a significant mechanical issue like in Hong Kong harbor, a skilled and trained crew was able to use the remaining aircraft capability to execute a safe landing.

Might be time for the industry to focus less on an engine quitting, which is almost nonexistent, and focus more of the available initial and recurrent training time on situations that actually have some risk. Of course this is counter to the notion that a pilot must be spring-loaded to deal with an engine failure on every takeoff at the worst possible time but that in true ETOPS fashion the second one will never quit. Beyond logic.

[Brian Abraham]

Might be time for the industry to focus less on an engine quitting, which is almost nonexistentYou need to focus on all possible aspects, to do otherwise is what causes accidents. The training regime of most operators involve tail rotor malfunctions, yet I don't personally know anybody who has had one, but I do know they happen. Reason to focus less on training for the event? Nonexistent event? Not a chance.

Engine failures? You can make statistics read what you want. For my part, an engine failure at CDP on a rig take off (S-76), and a couple of years later an engine failure at the begining of the take off roll on a runway in the same aircraft, tells me keep training for engine failures. The only two in 20,000 hours. Nonexistent event? Not a chance.

[The Sultan]

Malabo,

So what exactly was the cause of the Korean loss? Have you seen the flight data recorder or just assuming that it must be a pilot problem.

The Sultan

Remember that before the second Doha tail incident Hong Kong was obviously a bird strike.

[Savoia]

I'm trying to gain a picture of the 139's accident history. Anyone able to fill-in the blanks or tender more appropriate remarks or additional accidents please chip-in and I'll amend the table accordingly.

https://lh5.googleusercontent.com/-c_MiyYMRptw/TlE7dVmyk1I/AAAAAAAAEj8/7hpdmXwEr1Q/AW139%252520Accident%252520Log.png

lemonchiffon.

[parnaiocas]

02 jun 2008 - dubai - a6bbb - not disclosed
17 aug 2011 - china - missed yet
19 aug 2011 - brasil - pr-sek - pilot report hydraulic and lost of control.

[Savoia]

Parnaiocas, grazie.

https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/-xjggZXuc1n4/TlFE3BYOQmI/AAAAAAAAEkc/whnzWXTjBJc/AW139%252520AL%252520II.png

lemonchiffon

[Runway101]

Only the preliminary report was released for the Hong Kong accident.

[griffothefog]

2nd June 2008 was Abu Dhabi?

[parnaiocas]

Yes, Abu Dhabi.

Look at the ling below:

AW 139 Accident? [Archive] - PPRuNe Forums (http://www.pprune.org/archive/index.php/t-329600.html)

[ramblingrotors]

What about a/c #3 that crash during the initial flight test in Italy, any one know the cause of that?

[Savoia]

I've received a couple of PM's regarding the 139 Accident Log with various comments, notably that the Abu Dhabi (location now corrected) incident was most likely pilot error and that incident no. 6 (this year's Doha event) was probably mechanic error (a failure to remove some type of lock prior to start-up).

Herewith then is the latest version. Please do keep the comments coming so that one might compile a complete (and hopefully reasonably accurate) summary.

https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/-4x9jSSKrWa8/TlHtbULl_iI/AAAAAAAAEl4/21gX5fgFsaE/AW139%252520AL%2525203.png

[Mark Six]

Why are you classing the Hong Kong accident as mechanical failure? The investigation has not been completed. As far as I know bird strike is still being considered as the most likely cause of the tail rotor imbalance and there was nothing in the interim report to discount this possibility. Maybe the Sky Shuttle pilots can enlighten us???

[Epiphany]

The cause of the Abu Dhabi accident will never be revealed due to where it occurred and the fact that the two people in the cockpit were nationals - one of them a non-pilot VIP. The ex-pat pilot was sitting in the cabin (presumably pressurised into giving up his seat to the VIP).

[AS332L1]

An addition to your log for AW139 accidents 30th June Subang W Malaysia 9M-WAJ of Westar

[Epiphany]

That accident is on the list - number 7.

[Thai Pom]

^ The registration was not though :rolleyes:

[onwings]

These are alarming reports on this Helicopter, does any one know how many AW139s there are in service?

[onwings]

I heard a few coming to Nigeria Operations soon.

[ReverseFlight]

As far as I know bird strike is still being considered as the most likely cause of the tail rotor imbalanceMark Six, how do you know ? Have you seen the feathers and bird guts on the TR ?
Your guess is as good as anyone's, Savoia included.

[VEMD]

Savoia: A7-GHC=Mechanical failure due Pilot error & maintenance error:ugh::ugh::ugh:

[Mark Six]

"Mark Six, how do you know ? Have you seen the feathers and bird guts on the TR ?
Your guess is as good as anyone's, Savoia included."

ReverseFlight, I'm not guessing anything, just stating that bird strike is still under consideration "as far as I know", because this was the original theory and I haven't seen or heard anything further which discounts it as a cause.

From a letter sent to AW owners:

"... Immdeiately after the notification of the event, based on the reported conditions of the aircraft, AgustasWestland started a detailed analysis and a complete review of the Tail Rotor log reports; no aircraft issues were found.

Furthermore, based on the first examination of the recovered aircraft it appears that the incident effects are fully compatible with an external Foreign Object Damage (FOD), which caused a tail rotor imbalance damaging the components of the anti-torque system."

[Swinging Spanner]

Truly Perplexing

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

These are alarming reports on this Helicopter, does any one know how many AW139s there are in service?

I believe that there are now 400 in service as of AUG 2011 :ok:

[Savoia]

139 Accident Table

With the assistance of a number of Rotorheads I have been able to up-date and, where appropriate, amend the accident log.

As mentioned earlier, a Rotorhead with reliable information alerted me to the fact that the second Doha incident involved a mechanic who had failed to remove some type of lock prior to an engine start and that this might therefore be beter described as 'mechanic error'.

Similarly, if VEMD or anyone else has useful information which can assist in making the 'basic cause' more accurate then please either post or PM me and I will make the necessary changes.

I am still looking for:

- The date of the Spanish and Brasilian tragedies
- Any details of the South Korean crash
- The markings/registration of the Chinese Police 139

[Sanus]

The second Doha incident may or may not have been caused by 'mechanic error'. The link is tenuous. I'm told the 'tool left on the aircraft' event was well over 12-months before the TRB separation occurred.

[HLCPTR]

South Korea - 23 Feb
Spain - 21-01-2010

[North & South]

Brazil - Aug 19 2011

[Savoia]

Thanks to those who have contributed additional details.

Herewith is the latest version:

https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/-ElWnIGiHDYE/TlJzLfCS-yI/AAAAAAAAEmU/HkIgxLvr5ps/AW139%252520AT%2525204.png

[cayuse365]

I think you should also track incidents, ERA tail crease, engine failures, early removal of components, and a real evaluation of the training. What I am saying is let's prevent the accident, and don't rely on Agusta for post accident data which could be inconclusive, through no fault of there own.

[Runway101]

Chinese Police AW139 is listed as G-110011 on Aviation-Safety.net

[Savoia]

.
Are there any 139 mechanics who could elaborate just a little on the craft's hydraulic set-up. How many systems are there and are there a set of circumstances relating to a hydraulic system (or component) fail which could render the craft unflyable etc.

[HLCPTR]

Two independent hydraulic systems. A single failure is not likely to render the aircraft uncontrollable. Lacking any facts of the condition of the aircraft, I would keep an open mind as to the actual cause since there are other system failures which could be involved in a loss of control.

[Captain 139]

02 jun 2008 - dubai - a6bbb - not disclosed

Actual Pilot was in the back seat, the VIP was flying and liked to scare fisher man with low Fly by:mad::mad:!!!!!:mad::mad::mad::mad::mad::mad:

[spinwing]

Mmmmm....

Captain 139 .... re: A6-BBB if you only disclose part of the whole story (andI accept the whole story does get a bit complex) you run the risk of compromising your integrity. Best not say anything and leave this accident well enough alone.

:=

[Milo C]

The Spain's accident causes are not so simple. At least should be said Crew Error, but it would be unfair too. Look at the company procedures, training, management... That tragic event ( not accident) was anounced, and had many root causes, not just the pilot. You should write INAER policy as the main cause of those three deaths.

[Savoia]

I have received quite a number of PM's in relation to the Accident Table, some in appreciation for helping bring the 139's accident history into perspective, others offering caution over the potential misinterpretations which could arise from such a list.

I have also been invited to redefine the Basic Cause for a number of the accidents and which recommendations I have embraced without exception. The Table is therefore a collaborative effort among those members of Rotorheads who have tendered useful information for the purpose of enhancing its accuracy.

The recent flurry of 139 accidents has caused concern, especially among the unlearned, over the type's technical reliability but one thing I believe the Table has done is to highlight the number of 'human error' components which have been present in many of these episodes.

A point firmly driven home in one adeptly written PM I received, highlighted the technical complexity of the 139 stating:

"A ten day factory course is not nearly enough the LEARN this airframe. It is highly complex. The learning curve is a straight line upwards. I have been involved in the 139 for five years now, I learn something different every day I sit in that chair, I fly it with confidence armed with knowledge. I have taught myself well, am I an expert? Not hardly."

And also:

"The pilots are flying two main computers, that monitor every aspect of the aircraft, the software programs are complex and no one knows with certainty EXACTLY what happens when moving a switch or pushing a button. There are so many things that are not taught at the factory school. All information on the Agusta 139 is propriatory in nature."

And again:

"I fear there may yet be more "pilot error" accidents on this airframe. Prime cause, insufficient training, either lack of because the cost is prohibitive, or due to a risk matrix in which management personnel are making poor decisions, because the "numbers" are not aligned."

I think if anything the Table has (for me) highlighted the fact that the 139 is an aircraft which demands 'diligent operation' in that it would appear that some of the craft's systems represent a departure from 'the norm' (ie. the operation of less sophisticated aircraft) and therefore, for some, a step change from their existing experience.

I have received conflicting information over the Hong Kong incident. There is a post confirming FOD on or around the tail and I have PM's stating that this was a TRGB failure totally unrelated to any external influence - we will have to wait and see; as indeed is the case with the more recent accidents.

I still have no information whatsoever on the South Korean accident.

Herewith is the up-dated Table taking into account the unfortunate circumstances surrounding the Spanish tragedy:

https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-ID04WdsNFls/TlMxNPoTqjI/AAAAAAAAEnI/qaLEnlmkBf8/AW139%252520AT5.png

[Epiphany]

UAE, Qatar, China, Spain, South Korea, Brasil, Macau, Malaysia.......

Concerning - perhaps. I fly the AW139 and feel very safe in it, perhaps because I fly for one of the larger operators in a part of the world where safety and training are taken seriously and there are no 'cultural' issues. When these larger operators start having accidents with the AW139 then I will begin to get worried. Until then - no.

[Outwest]

Mods, can we get this thread back on topic? This accident timeline should be moved to the general 139 thread.

[Garfs]

because I fly for one of the larger operators in a part of the world where safety and training are taken seriously

Not sure if I agree training and safety are not taken seriously in all the countries mentioned above.

[212man]

Thanks ummmmmm

Good post!

[Epiphany]

Not sure if I agree training and safety are not taken seriously in all the countries mentioned above.

Garfs - you said that, not me.

[aegir]

Considering the Spain, it is an European Country, so Spanish Operators shall take seriously training, safety and all other aeronautical aspects.
Spain is under EASA regulations that are very strict!

[griffothefog]

EASA.... Wah wah wah wah.... of course the standards are higher than everywhere else... My arse :ugh:

[JimL]

I totally agree that Savoia's table is too simplistic; those who have been involved in the exercises to re-consider recent accidents (IHST, EHEST etc.) will confirm that each consisted of a large number of factors which contributed in some way.

The introduction of HFACS to the European model has illustrated that human factors is always involved - even when the most important contributory cause is the failure of a mechanism, part or design.

Probably the single most biased statement is the one that attributes 'pilot error' as the cause of the accident (as was the case in several entries in the table at one time). The fact is that the pilot is almost always there when the aircraft crashes. It is always far more complex than that.

Equally the statement (sorry to quote you 'aegir') thatConsidering the Spain, it is an European Country, so Spanish Operators shall take seriously training, safety and all other aeronautical aspects. Spain is under EASA regulations that are very strict! is all too simplistic. In no European State are Operations yet conducted under the auspices of EASA Operational Regulations - they are not yet finalised nor accepted and, even when they are, SAR will still be regulated by the State, not EASA!

Without prejudice to the Spanish accident; what needs to be examined is not the set of rules under which operations are performed but the safety culture within the organisation. Those of us who have been following these accidents will be extremely interested in the examination of all human aspects with respect to the HFACS model posted by 'Umm...lifting'.

Like a number of others, I welcome the discussion of these accidents - if only to improve the knowledge of those who fly the aircraft and who perform similar operations. What I would caution against is simplistic entry in a table which concludes the cause of the accident - in my opinion, no useful purpose is being served there.

I am not advocating the closure of the thread but let it serve the same purpose at those for the EC225 and S92 - a tool for education not a device for allocating blame or short-cutting due process.

Jim

[Savoia]

A table is a table and I am surprised that anyone would consider it a substitute for a report or rational debate in which hopefully fact-based details are espoused.

Perhaps for those frequently engaged in 139 operations or who have followed the fleet's operational history over some time, including accidents, this is old hat and woefully inadequate but .. the table is for those readers who, like myself, are not involved with 139 operations, know little or nothing of the type's operational history but are keen to get a grasp on what has happened in recent years.

As I say, those who have been following the 139's history from the outset may yawn but newcomers, unfamiliar with even the basic details surrounding 139 incidents, will doubtless appreciate the tabled summary. When someone writes about a specific accident newbies (and perhaps even some infrequent readers) may not readily recall the basic details of the event. Now that there have been several more 139 accidents a 'quick reference' should come in handy for those wishing to locate 139-related incidents within the context of the type's accident history.

Moving on, if these discussions should be fruitful, then might I pose a question regarding the extent of the 139's 10 day factory course given that one Rotorhead has communicated his conviction that the existing course is inadequate. For those environments/cultures (corporate that is) where training is perhaps in question wouldn't this be a starting point in reinforcing 139 operational efficiency. I mention 'starting point' as there are clearly numerous measures required in establishing and sustaining safe and professional operations but, strengthening initial proficiency might be a place to begin. Is the 10 day course sufficient and how effective are the methods used to measure this sufficiency on a person by person basis?

[Arcal76]

When a pilot crashed an aircraft in a CFIT accident,I do not see how we could blame anybody else!whatever conditions we have,when you are at the control,it is up to us to avoid accidents and very easy to blame anybody else.It is like when our media are saying an aircraft was down because of weather,well the reality is, the pilot who decide to fly in this conditions was not able to manage it.
Yes,it is a complicated aircraft,but the main problem is,it is not reliable.The number of Caution lights we got on this machine is creazy.The worst is,you shut it down and restart it and the light goes off.How can you trust this machine? We had one of our machine down for a week because they had to verify all electrical connections,it was not done properly at the factory(well,Agusta blamed another company who was doing the job???)So,you can have multiple failure created by the computer system who make your life difficult at the wrong time.

[squib66]

Arcal76 - the 'logic' in your first para could be undermined by your second para. In this day an age I'd hope we don't just blame a pilot after a CFIT but try to find and fix all the reasons it happened which might include aircraft system problems, inadequate training, fatigue due to a poor roster and so on.

Savoia - it might be a simplistic table but it still has a use - so thanks for taking the time to collate it. It would be great if it had a hyperlink to the investigation reports available.

[JollyGreen]

@Epiphany

Quote:
Not sure if I agree training and safety are not taken seriously in all the countries mentioned above.
Garfs - you said that, not me.

Maybe not, but it was definitely implied...

[calaim]

To have a good picture if AW139 is or not a reliable machine perhaps we should compare with other helicopters accidents history.
Try to check S76 A B C D.... with the missing MR blades or S365 and his fenestron, Puma, S92, EH101.

Perhaps by the end of that history record will find out that AW139 is a very reliable A model.

[griffothefog]

Folks,

Just putting this out there for discussion, but how come we have heard virtually NIL about problems with this type in the USA? They have been operating it in the GOM for what, 10 years and no accidents?

Please correct me if I'm missing something, but were they not originally manufactured in the states under the wing of good old BELL?

Does that perhaps tell us something, or am I just the devil in disguise :E

Where's that good old reliable 412 gone :{

[Thai Pom]

SN: 31001 on - AW139 made in Italy
SN: 31201 on - AW139 made in Italy
SN: 41001 on - Assembled in the USA

Cheers, TP

[Epiphany]

Jolly Green

Maybe not, but it was definitely implied...

I could say it was your assumption. I have worked as a helicopter pilot in many parts of the world (including many of the countries where these accidents occurred) and my knowledge of safety and training throughout the helicopter industry is based on experience. That includes maintenance standards.

aegir

Considering the Spain, it is an European Country, so Spanish Operators shall take seriously training, safety and all other aeronautical aspects. Spain is under EASA regulations that are very strict!

Does this mean that INAER are no longer using non-type rated co-pilots on two pilot contracts?

[aegir]

I don't know if Inaer are working unfair, in that case the Authority "should" intervene (in a perfect world, I know).
But what about the other Spanish Operators? Are all outlaw or we have someone the think safety it's important?

griffothefog (http://www.pprune.org/members/171058-griffothefog)
EASA.... Wah wah wah wah.... of course the standards are higher than everywhere else... My arse :ugh:

I didn't say that, but, compared to FAA for example in HEMS operations, EASA are more strict! The standard are high, sometimes too high and working it's not very simple...

[Savoia]

My question still stands; can one assist those immersed in operating cultures where safety and performance standards are more challenging to meet and maintain by ensuring that initial type conversion for both drivers and mechanics is adequate?

One PM I received says that the ten-day factory course is insufficient. Who determines that a driver has adequately absorbed the lessons on the course? Would a more in-depth conversion/induction be appropriate or a more rigorous method of assessing student understanding of the training delivered?

Finally, what is the client's role in this: ie. Petrobras, would they have a flight standards officer or if not, how about bodies such as OGP, do they make any distinction between the method of operation between some of the legacy operators such as Bristows and CHC and other regional (local) operators and would it (could it) be their role to proffer recommendations in this area if it is felt there is need to raise the standard of 139 initial induction courses?

[griffothefog]

aegir,

The whole point of my comment was, that the "lack of training" of SAR pilots in Inaer was discussed in depth after the fatal 139 crash in Spain under EASA rules and requirements....

I believe there were some very strong opinions expressed at the time.

[Savoia]

Would appreciate continuing recommendations as to the text used in the following (more detailed) table, in particular colums e, f and g. If you have more appropriate (but sensible) suggestions, please let me know.

FIRST DRAFT
https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/-8Jc_R0WvHhs/TlTZU7Lqd_I/AAAAAAAAEoA/jRTkk3UJYsk/s800/AW139%252520AT%2525206a.png
https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-aLd0gkXj5X8/TlTZUjZM13I/AAAAAAAAEoA/Tkr_yWekKkM/s800/AW139%252520AT%2525206b.png

Notes:

1. This Table is not intended to replace or substitute factual accident reports. It is instead a ‘quick reference’ resource for those wishing to obtain a ‘snapshot’ of AW 139 accidents to-date.

2. This Table is compiled for the convenience of members of the Rotorheads community who subscribe to the professional aviation forum PPRuNe.

3. Columns 'e', ‘f’ and ‘g’ have been composed with the assistance from members from the Rotorheads community and are a product of the recommendations and suggestions tendere

Squibb66 wrote: It would be great if it had a hyperlink to the investigation reports available.
Indeed, but, there are precious few reports available (that I can find). Of the nine AW139 accidents seven of them seem to have occurred within the past 18 months or so. The only report I can locate is an 'Interim Statement' from the Spanish authorities relating to the Inaer operated ship.

In the meantime I have drawn-up a list of the accident threads on Rotorheads:

1. UAE 2 JUN 2008: PPRuNe Thread (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/329624-139-down-abu-dhabi.html)

2. QATAR 25 AUG 2009: PPRuNe Thread (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/386491-aw139-lost-tail-taxying-doh.html)

3. SPAIN 21 JAN 2010: PPRuNe Thread (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/402948-sar-heli-down-almeria.html) / Interim Statement (http://www.fomento.es/NR/rdonlyres/70DD0C48-1459-407A-9D9F-99D00819505A/97971/2010_002_A_Interim_statement.pdf)

4. HONG KONG 3 JUL 2010: PPRuNe Thread (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/419960-sky-shuttle-139-ditches-hk-harbour.html)

5. SOUTH KOREA 23 FEB 2011: PPRuNe Thread (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/443772-south-korean-coast-guard-aw139-wreckage-found.html)

6. QATAR 2 MAY 2011: PPRuNe Thread (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/450392-yet-another-aw139-tail-incident-gulf-helis.html)

7. MALAYSIA 30 JUN 2011: PPRuNe Thread (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/456041-weststar-139-tail-incident-30th-june-2011-a.html)

8. CHINA 17 AUG 2011: PPRuNe Thread (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/461087-chinese-aw139-missing.html)

9. BRASIL 19 AUG 2011: PPRuNe Thread (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/461288-aw139-accident-brasil.html)

[griffothefog]

Com'on Sav,

Line 1 should read Abu Dhabi aviation, Abu Dhabi :{

DBX RF will definitely take offence :E

[aegir]

The whole point of my comment was, that the "lack of training" of SAR pilots in Inaer was discussed in depth after the fatal 139 crash in Spain under EASA rules and requirements....

I believe there were some very strong opinions expressed at the time.
ah, yes! I perfectly remenber the discussion.

[aegir]

http://www.cad.gov.hk/reports/Interim%20Statement%20-%20AW139%20B-MHJ_e%20.pdf

[Ian Corrigible]

Sav,

As ramblingrotors mentioned, there was also the loss of the first pre-production aircraft (I-ACOI) during autorotation testing in 2001, with the unfortunate death of Vincenzo Iellamo. Previous thread here (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/52179-ab139-crash-italy.html).

I/C

[Savoia]

Thanks for the various items of feedback both posted and sent via PM. Herewith is the 2nd Draft with as many of the recommendations as possible embraced:

2nd Draft
https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/-IWz1yM7TFs0/TlUI6fFFfCI/AAAAAAAAEoc/y7QbvYx3Slo/s800/AW139%252520AT%2525207a.png
https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Q_gcjG-1PwY/TlUI6nxTNlI/AAAAAAAAEoc/F83AocYu-5Q/s800/AW139%252520AT%2525207b.png
https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/-L_KvspSWBLA/TlUI65g_BOI/AAAAAAAAEoc/rtawD3LM6Jw/s800/AW139%252520AT%2525207c.png

Notes:
1. This table is not intended to replace or substitute factual accident reports. It is instead a ‘quick reference’ resource for those wishing to obtain a ‘snapshot’ of AW 139 accidents to-date.
2. Columns 'e', ‘f’ and ‘g’ have been composed with the assistance from members from the Rotorheads community and are a product of the recommendations and suggestions tendered.
3. This Table intends no inference; either supporting or criticising the AW139, but seeks only to communicate, as effectively as possible, the most basic information surrounding AW139 accidents to-date.

Additional Comments:

There have been several requests to include details of one of the AW prototypes but I have been inclined to exclude this given that it was pre-production and a prototype. Having said that is there anyone with details as to what actually happened?

A list of the PPRuNe threads relating to all the AW129 accidents appears on the previous page and now, thanks to Aegir we have a second 'official' statement bringing the total number to two:

Interim Statement Spanish Crash (http://www.fomento.es/NR/rdonlyres/70DD0C48-1459-407A-9D9F-99D00819505A/97971/2010_002_A_Interim_statement.pdf)

Interim Statement Hong Kong Harbour Ditching (http://www.cad.gov.hk/reports/Interim%20Statement%20-%20AW139%20B-MHJ_e%20.pdf)

Regarding the table I have now removed the comment re: possible bird strike (which someone had mentioned had come from AW) as the Interim Statement mentions nothing of this.

Having now spent far too much time on this and having read more than I ever intended about 139 crashes I have to say that the incident which I find most perplexing to-date (and in the absence of more detailed information on the recent accidents) is the Hong Kong Harbour episode. It will indeed be interesting to see what the verdict is on this one.

[Captain 139]

BOLLETTINO TECNICO N° 139-265
The technical content of this document is approved
under the authority of DOA nr. EASA.21J.005 DATE August 25, 2011


SUBJECT: PRECAUTIONARY INSPECTION AND QUARANTINE OF TAIL ROTOR
BLADES
REASON: to introduce a precautionary inspection and quarantine on tail rotor blades.

NOTE
This Bollettino supersedes BT no. 139-251
HELICOPTERS AFFECTED:
Part I: All AB139/AW139 helicopters equipped with tail rotor blades P/N
3G6410A00131 or P/N 4G6410A00131.
Part II: All AB139/AW139 helicopters equipped with tail rotor blades P/N
3G6410A00131 or P/N 4G6410A00131, having logged more than 600 flying
hours or more than 1500 landings whichever occurs first.

This almost mean the whole fleet.

DESCRIPTION: as a result of the first available information of the AW139 event in Brazil, while the investigation is ongoing and waiting for additional
information/analysis, as a precautionary measure this Bollettino prescribes
inspection and quarantine of the tail rotor blades meeting the criteria reported in the above paragraph.
In the meantime collection of all necessary evidence is going on in order to isolate the root cause and determine the final corrective actions.

[Captain 139]

This is all I have on this accident, the source is very good.

[aegir]

I quote parnaiocas (http://www.pprune.org/members/367304-parnaiocas)
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/461288-aw139-accident-brasil-2.html#post6662137

As for AW of China, then was recovered, but the government did not allow any information to be disclosed, since this was an operational failure. The pilot flew into the water during a rescue training. I saw the photo of the ANV being hoisted. Only the cockpit was damaged. The rest, including the TR, was intact.

[parnaiocas]

I confirm!


Yesterday 24/08/2011 had a meeting in Rio de Janeiro Agusta, attended by operators in Brazil AW.

They are implying that the most likely cause of the accident was SEK even breaking blades TR.

So tomorrow will be issued a BT with more instructions to be followed by radical Mnt, even without the issuance of the accident report.

The Pilot Test Agusta emphasized that this type of emergency response should be taken immediately. Otherwise, the panic will not be identified correctly, you can lose control of the ANV due to the strong imbalance.

As for AW of China, then was recovered, but the government did not allow any information to be disclosed, since this was an operational failure. The pilot flew into the water during a rescue training. I saw the photo of the ANV being hoisted. Only the cockpit was damaged. The rest, including the TR, was intact.

And this is the response of Agusta:

http://www.agustawestland.com/system/files/139-265.pdf

[VEMD]

What means SEK?

[Savoia]

Capt 139, thanks for confirming the registration of the Korean aircraft. The available information is sketchy indeed - in fact all I have been able to ascertain is that the craft crashed into the sea at night.

VEMD, see accident No.9. SEK is the registration of the Brasilian aircraft which crashed .. PR-SEK.

During the compilation of the table I received numerous PM's providing various aspects of information relating to several of the crashes. I am now awaiting further detailed information on both of the Gulf Helicopters incidents as it seems the information I was sent was (unsurprisingly) incomplete.

From communications over the past couple of days is does seem as though a stronger case is being built for a possible generic problem of tail rotor blade shearing.

Frustratingly, in the Hong Kong Harbour incident the critical piece of the evidence (the blade which may have sheared) could not be found. Also, the other piece of evidence which could have helped (the HUMS memory card) was not housed in a waterproof receptacle and the chips, being corroded, could not be analysed.

Hopefully the Brasil crash will yield more immediate and conclusive information.

[[email protected]]

Epiphany - still feeling very safe in your 139 having read that bulletin?

[noooby]

Can't speak for Epiphany, Crab, but after 6 1/2 years on the 139, I'm still happy with it overall.

Until I get further details about the Brazil accident, I'll go along with Agusta's BT, which is basically an extension of the inspection done on the blades each day by the AME's, but brings in an early retirement as an extra precaution.

I'd like further info on the supposed vibration issue that SEK may have had previously and why it was on the ground for 3 days because of it, as reported by North&South (if this is true).

Pretty much every wide body aircraft we fly on to get to our jobs (those of us touring in the oil industry) has had a catastrophic accident at some point in it's life and we still travel on them. 747 center fuel tanks exploding, MD11 entertainment system fires, A330 pitot icing, 767 thrust reverser operating in flight etc etc. Not to mention basically every type of helicopter we travel in too.

Agusta will fix this, just like Sikorsky, Bell, MD, Boeing, Airbus and the others have in the past.

Not trying to play down the seriousness of what could be a major issue with the 139, but I'll wait for some factual evidence rather than jump to conclusions about what could be the problem. Yes, we know from Agusta that a TR blade came off, but WHY? That is the question I'm wanting the answer to.

Now, lets see how quickly Agusta can support their customers. There are going to be a LOT of tail rotor blades coming off very shortly, and oil companies don't like helicopters sitting on the ground! More to the point, if the tail rotor blade does turn out to be a potential point of failure, how quickly can they design a new one and get it into production? Assuming that is, that the tail rotor blade design is a factor, rather than quality control or operational use.

Hopefully all parties involved will be pressing on with getting this sorted one way or the other as soon as possible!

[Epiphany]

Yes thanks Crab. I flew 5 hours today (including 3 hours IFR, 2 ARA's, 6 deck landings) and will probably do the same tomorrow as most of our 139's have less than 600 hours.

The 139 must be the most popular new helicopter ever introduced to the industry with >400 airframes flying worldwide and with a flying and serviceability rate that the RAF can only dream of.

Of the hundreds of thousands of hours so far flown by the AW139 in geographic and climatic extremes; flown and maintained by operators, pilots and engineers from both ends of the ability spectrum there have been 9 accidents. 5 of them were very probably human error related and of the 4 still under investigation my bet is that a further 2 were human error. For me that leaves 2 unexplained accidents out of 9.

If reports already received of the Brazilian accident are factual I fail to see how the crew were able to declare an emergency, state that they were diverting and suggest that the problem they were experiencing was hydraulic related if the aircraft had thrown a tail rotor blade.

I am no fan of AW mainly because I believe that they show an arrogance that is breathtaking (much like your own), their training is unprofessional and the customer support abysmal. However, I think that the 139 is undoubtedly the best multi-role helicopter of it's class that we have ever seen.

After 30+ years flying and 10,000 hours in helicopters I for one am very happy to be flying it and fully expect to be flying it for the remainder of my career.

[HLCPTR]

Excellent post Noooby.

[BlenderPilot]

Pretty much every wide body aircraft we fly on to get to our jobs (those of us touring in the oil industry) has had a catastrophic accident at some point in it's life and we still travel on them. 747 center fuel tanks exploding, MD11 entertainment system fires, A330 pitot icing, 767 thrust reverser operating in flight etc etc. Not to mention basically every type of helicopter we travel in too.

True, but for example there have been more than 1400 747's built in the last 42 years, those have flown I can't imagine how many hours, but the AW139 has only what 400 built since 2003? how many hours flown, years in production, and # of acft, vs. acccidents?

That makes the accident rate of the 139 gigiantic by comparasion.

[griffothefog]

BP,

With only 2 confirmed mechanical failures, I don't think its as bad as the picture you are trying to paint. What is high for the type is the number of pilot error accidents, which to me squarely points to an alarming lack of proper training or plain absence of ability :eek:

That leaves me to conclude that, 1. Something seriously wrong with training given by the manufacturer. 2. Continuity training by those companies involved is pants, or 3. Big question mark over the standard of pilots being pushed into those right seats.

Ive seen all three :cool:

[Savoia]

Some excellent comments in recent posts:


Epiphany wrote: I am no fan of AW mainly because I believe that they show an arrogance that is breathtaking, their training is unprofessional and the customer support abysmal. However, I think that the 139 is undoubtedly the best multi-role helicopter of it's class that we have ever seen.


Fully Agree. :ok:


Griffothefog wrote: What is high for the type is the number of pilot error accidents, which to me squarely points to an alarming lack of proper training or plain absence of ability. That leaves me to conclude that, 1. Something seriously wrong with training given by the manufacturer. 2. Continuity training by those companies involved is pants, or 3. Big question mark over the standard of pilots being pushed into those right seats.

Again, fully agree. :ok:

[Epiphany]

That leaves me to conclude that, 1. Something seriously wrong with training given by the manufacturer. 2. Continuity training by those companies involved is pants, or 3. Big question mark over the standard of pilots being pushed into those right seats.

Ive seen all three

Wish I had written that Griffo. I've seen all three too and for me that is the root of the problem and I fully expect there to be more pilot related accidents. The operators who have some kind of pilot selection procedure along with competent and regular check and training, annual dry-lease LOFT sim training and all the other safety barriers that I take for granted have yet to have a pilot-related accident.

[Hilife]

Two thoughts come to mind:

1. Pilot Error - Not one for believing in coincidence, why is the AW139 currently proving to be much more susceptible to accidents than other similar sized twins. Is it just down to crew training and selection as inferred, or is there also a cockpit ergonomics issue here?

2. Design - Is there any correlation between airframe serial numbers that have (or we suspect) suffered tail rotor blade separation and the 6400 and 6800 kilo weight certification?

[outta track]

I heard on the radio today that Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ) an operator of 3 airframes have grounded them until further notice.

[Squeaks]

I heard on the radio today that Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ) an operator of 3 airframes have grounded them until further notice.

Warwick Daily News (http://www.warwickdailynews.com.au/story/2011/08/26/rescue-choppers-grounded/)

EMERGENCY Management Queensland (EMQ) has temporarily grounded its three AW139 rescue helicopters following incidents in China and South America in recent weeks.

Current advice is that the overseas incidents appear to be the result of failing tail rotor blades and the three AW139s in the EMQ fleet will be grounded until the aircraft can comply with new maintenance and operation requirements introduced by the manufacturer as a result of the incidents.

The choppers regularly fly patients requiring emergency treatment from Warwick and the surrounding region to hospitals in Toowoomba and Brisbane.

EMQ said the safety of their personnel and those they transport was the top priority.

"If there is an issue with the aircraft it is better to temporarily take them offline than risk a tragedy," a spokesman said.

"EMQ will position its two other rescue helicopters, both Bell 412’s, to ensure maximum coverage across the state.

"It is not unusual to have one or more Government-owned helicopters offline at the same time due to the strict maintenance schedules EMQ’s helicopter fleet adheres to."

The spokesman said EMQ would work to have the three AW139 helicopters back in the air as soon as possible and would work with the manufacturer to ensure all safety concerns were satisfied before they returned to duty.

It is expected the helicopters will progressively start resuming operations in approximately one week.

[spinwing]

Mmmm ....

..... Design - Is there any correlation between airframe serial numbers that have (or we suspect) suffered tail rotor blade separation and the 6400 and 6800 kilo weight certification? ....

Problems perhaps have more to do with the accuracy and tenacity of the chaps doing the T/R Tracking and Balancing then anything else ????

With normal ops on this a/c being varied between 100 & 102% Nr depending on the ops requirement I would suggest the balancing of the major rotating components becomes paramount !!

:(

[noooby]

BlenderPilot, accident rates can and are misleading at times depending on what data is used.

Linking accident rates to hours flown is one of the worst ways to view accident rate data when you consider that around 80% of all accidents happen during the takeoff and landing phases of flight.

Put the AW139 accidnet data in comparison to takeoffs and landings. Do the same with a commercial airliner. Yes, the helicopter will still be worse, but the airliner accident rate will have jumped closer.

If helicopters could do 12 hour legs with one takeoff and one landing, our accident rate would probably be pretty darn good too!

[outhouse]

Viewing the table featured, some rather uninformed comments in the cause column for the Gulf Helicopters incidences. unless you have information relating the events directly to flight crew mismanagement I would suggest you amend the table.*:ugh:

[The Sultan]

Spinwing

Not sure what you are trying to sell, but tail rotor track and balance has nothing to do with the current issue on the 139. Currently the tail rotor blade is the focus of the investigation. The balance and pitch variations used even to the extreme of gross incompetence may have a long term impact on secondary airframe structure, but are just a flea speck on the loads seen on a hub or blade (they rotate so these adjustments are just very minor static load variations).

The Sultan

[turboshaft]

Brings back memories of the period a decade ago (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/142459-agusta-a109-2.html) when A109s/A119s were slinging TRBs and TRGBs. AW must have thought they'd left that all behind when they switched to composite TRBs.

[Helicap]

:ok:
Friends,
I haven't heard any comment regarding AW139 fragile composite Tail Boom. In fact I am Helicopter Pilot at 30 years. But this helo is probably the only medium size with full composite Tail I have seen.
As everybody knows: Composite are very resistant at compression and expansion forces but very fragile at torsion forces - just forces suffered by a helicopter tail. I will bet that if Agusta should install cameras to screenning this helo flights.....I am sure they would have many "surprises"......

[Nigel Osborn]

Queensland Emergency Services today grounded their 3 AW 139s for safety reasons. No more details on the TV news.

[Vandee]

Savoia,
nice job on the table/matrix.

Last week I was in Liege, Belgium. There was the 31250, owned by the Dutch police for a repair on the crosstube of the collective. It seems the crosstube was fitting wrongly in the factory (Vergiate).
The tube didn't fit in the brackets and was with excessief forces put in place. This concluded that lots of forces where needed to move the collective. The force needed where that high that the AP wasn't able to maintain altitude.

Something to keep in mind by the investigating of the South Korean Coast Guard 139. (31264)

[Savoia]

Vandee, grazie. The purpose of the table is to assist those (such as myself) who know little or nothing about the 139's accident history.

I was cautioned by a number of respected Rotorheads that the table runs the risk of being an over-simplification of what is unquestionably an involved subject but, I hope that despite this, it will in some small way encourage more meaningful debate (for some) as a result of offering a snapshot of the basic facts.

Early next week there shall be some amendements to the comments surrounding both of the Gulf Helicopters incidents and which will reflect the input of those who are close to these events.

Regarding serial no. 31250, she's a tidy ship and your comments regarding the flight-control installation seem intriguing. Signore Anderozzi heads up AW's Liège team so the Dutch Police will be in good hands. Lets hope it was a one-off incident.

[cteneto139]

Hello AW139 flyers,

Greetings from Brazil!

Regarding last information about AW139 crash in Brazil (Aug 19 2011)which came to me, I´d like to share with all of you that:

1-This last accident, is considering as TR Blade rupture (not officially confirmed yet). But, the last Agusta´s bolletin issued lead us to conclude something like that.

2-In our case, there was some blades, featuring cracks with less than 300h TT.

3-We are expecting further actions (by chance, more radical and effective actions beyond simple bulletins!) from Agusta and Authorities, but until now, nothing.

[noooby]

Helicap, who told you that the 139 has a composite tailboom?
The tailboom is composite construction, not composite materials.
The tailboom is Aluminium skins (Aluminum for you Nth American types :) ) bonded to an Aluminium or Nomex paper core. Nothing new there, the B212/412 use the same construction methods in the forward sections of their tailbooms, and have similar debonding issues (greatly reduced with Alpine Aero ejectors fitted).
There are next to no composite materials used in the construction of the AW139 from the codkpit doors back. Forward of the cockpit doors it is Kevlar, behind the cockpit doors is nearly all Aluminium.
Hope that clarifies things for you.

[industry insider]

Shell Management.

How can this happen? Shell having to ground a type which fully meets your hard won Shell FAR/JAR criteria? Just what sort of advice are your Aviation Advisers giving to your management? I think you should be auditing AW's manufacturing to tell them what they are doing wrong.

[blakmax]

Industry Insider

You and others have criticised Shell Management for his comments, which relate predominantly to operational management issues where I have no expertise so I will not directly join in the criticism of SM.

However, failures may also be driven by issues other than operational matters, such as structural deficiencies.

I think you should be auditing AW's manufacturing to tell them what they are doing wrong.

I have been trying to do this for ages with no response from AW or EASA. The frustrating issue here is that with correct design and certification procedures, properly validated processes and produced with appropriate control of humidity and contamination can actually produce adhesive bonds which will NEVER fail under any load case. Hence, to address SM's operational concerns it is possible to design and produce bonds which will not be the locus of failure even where operational airworthiness is violated. No matter what the pilot does, the structure should always fail elsewhere in the structure AWAY from the bond.

Now this is a radical concept, because if you can be sure that the bond will NEVER fail in certification testing or in service, then certification test costs will be reduced substantially. Also the cost of ownership will be reduced because in-service NDI will not be looking for interfacial disbonds (where it's value is limited anyway) it will be limited to secondary damage assessment such as in-service impact damage. That will significantly reduce the cost of ownership for the operator.

This is not an academic position based on theoretical bovine excrement. Applying these principles in a practical repair environment we have reduced bond failures for repairs performed in a large field repair facility from 43% in 1992 to virtually zero since then. The same principles applied to production will produce similar levels of difference in performance for bonded structures at original production.

The reason this does not happen now is that there is no regulatory requirement to demonstrate long-term bond durability during certification, and current damage tolerance analysis metodologies do not manage critical bond failure modes.

With respect to the current case, there may be two issues:

1. Micro-voiding due to moisture absorption by the adhesive during the production process. This reduces the bond strength significantly in joint peel, honeycomb peel and shear. It is NOT detectable by NDI. It is NOT managed by damage tolerance analysis (as currently used by AW). It results in disbonds. Nooby says The tailboom is Aluminium skins (Aluminum for you Nth American types http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/smile.gif ) bonded to an Aluminium or Nomex paper core. Micro-voiding is exacerbated by exposure of Nomex to the same humid environment. This is the problem with the tail boom disbonds and it may be the same problem for the tail rotors.

2. Again referring to Nooby's comment, the second issue is the durability of bonds to aluminium/aluminum. These are highly susceptible to environmental degradation usually by hydration of the oxide layer to which the adhesive is bonded. Hydration leads to disbonding at the interface between the adhesive and the metal. The worry is that short term strength and fatigue tests, NDI and damage tolerance analysis as specified by FAA and EASA will not prevent these failures.

These issues are addressed in a recent paper. http://www.adhesionassociates.com/papers/57%20Safety%20Risks%20in%20Applying%20Damage%20Tolerance%20A nalysis%20to%20Certification%20of%20Adhesively%20Bonded%20St ructures%20and%20Joints.doc

I have also provided advice on management of micro-voiding previously on this or other AW 139 threads.

Now to short-circuit those who believe I have an anti-AW position, I assure you that I have also raised the same issues with another significant helicopter manufacturer and they dealt with me directly and resolved a number of issues at an effective charge out rate far less than a junior helicopter pilot's pay rate. My interest is in flight safety, not bashing particular manufacturers.

regards

Blakmax

[industry insider]

Blackmax

If you were to audit AW manufacturing, I am sure the outcome would be most enlightening.

Alas my comments to SM were intended as a little tongue in cheek at his "expert" assertions on behalf of Shell whom he does not represent.

My point is that FAR/JAR 29 latest amendment is a worthy paper certification goal but there are other aircraft types (S-76) which while they may not fully comply, have a demonstrated safety record based on 6m flight hours.

I believe that these aircraft should not be ruled out of contracting for OGP companies based purely on a tick in a few boxes when the product certified to the latest paper standards is maybe not demonstrably safer, yet.

[Scotsheli]

I think you will find SAI pay very close attenion to AW and other OEMs, hence Shell took action before the OEM or the regulator.:D

...indeed you did - by making the AW139 your aircraft of choice for all new work I believe.

I'm sure once the real experts have got to the bottom of the issue they'll let you know and hopefully they'll have them flying again in time to spare your blushes.

Fixed your leaky pipe yet?

[RVDT]

Don't forget also that the list here is of hull losses.

There must be a proportionate amount of incidents that are NOT in the public domain.

[Soave_Pilot]

Emergency AD for AW139 Tail Rotor Blades, sounds scary. :eek:

Emergency AD Issued for AW139 Tail Rotor Blades | Vertical - Helicopter News (http://verticalmag.com/news/article.php?aid=17875)

[Balkanhawk]

The irish air corps have grounded their machines too.

Air Corps suspends some helicopter operations - RT News (http://www.rte.ie/news/2011/0825/aircorps.html)

[Teefor Gage]

What ever happened to all those comments from Shell Management? Has he been moderated? I wonder if the real Shell Management would agree with many of his comments in other areas of Rotorheads?
Sorry for the thread creep, but couldn'r resist it!:8

[Encyclo]

My point is that FAR/JAR 29 latest amendment is a worthy paper certification goal but there are other aircraft types (S-76) which while they may not fully comply, have a demonstrated safety record based on 6m flight hours.

I believe that these aircraft should not be ruled out of contracting for OGP companies based purely on a tick in a few boxes when the product certified to the latest paper standards is maybe not demonstrably safer, yet.

Right on :ok:

If you want to kick an aircraft off contract because it does not have the range or the payload, that's justified, but not allowing a 76 or 412 on a contract because it is not certified to the latest standard is absolute BS :ugh:

We have all seen how these latest standard certified aircraft have tragically demonstrated they are not exempt from catastrophic failures. 6M flight hours (76) or in the case of the 212/412, 12M flight hours does mean somthing.

[9Aplus]

Right to the point :ok:...

same approach can be extended to Mi8 types....
particularly last modernizations like Mi17 V5 or Mi171...
Total millions of flight hours means nothing if you ask your local CAA :}

On the other hand we see how FAR 29 can be used like chewing gummy
on example of S92 MGB issue...:sad:

We are over-regulated on one side, safety not yet accepted like culture rather like just popular SMS shortcut.
Only better relations/cooperation between regulators-industry-operators and vice versa, can lead us to some real life safety improvements.


In particular 139 cases, black clouds were visible more than year ago.... "Ostrich
engineering" was the only visible answer so far...:*

[Senior Pilot]

What ever happened to all those comments from Shell Management? Has he been moderated? I wonder if the real Shell Management would agree with many of his comments in other areas of Rotorheads?
Sorry for the thread creep, but couldn'r resist it!:8

Shell Management has chosen to delete a number of his posts on this and on other threads. Since many of his posts are preserved as quotes in posts made in reply to his comments, his deletions are somewhat superfluous :rolleyes:

[Savoia]

Following the receipt of further information surrounding Qatar 1 and 2, the comments associated with both of these accidents have now been amended.

Regarding Qatar 1 Gulf Helicopters appear to be abrogating any responsibility in respect of their response to the event stating that AW carried-out all the work to the tailboom (repair and inspection). Commentators are however questioning the extent of the inspection as well as some of the procedures (relating to flight operations) prior to the aircraft being grounded. One member of PPRuNe mailed me to say that the tail-collapse occurred while trying to initiate taxi with the parking brake on and there are other comments besides.

In respect of Qatar 2 I cannot make any headway. I have received several PM's from people 'in the know' claiming (categorically) that a 'locking tool' of some description had been left attached to the tail rotor, a claim that Gulf Helicopters emphatically denies.

In such circumstances all one can do is hope that the investigating authorities are competent, thorough and impartial so that the industry may discover the truth.

Herewith then is the latest instalment of the table now reflecting the above-mentioned discoveries:

Issue No. 3
https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/-tta10pQCpyQ/Tl3lN5HdjHI/AAAAAAAAEtk/nwSbtIlejKs/s800/AW139%252520AT%2525208a.png
https://lh5.googleusercontent.com/-QKpfSlqnZEQ/Tl3lN63oeWI/AAAAAAAAEtk/sdaDocVAEAw/s800/AW139%252520AT%2525208b.png
https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-hpMnVHRtbaQ/Tl3lOTzcleI/AAAAAAAAEtk/hFP5yyOk-uQ/s800/AW139%252520AT%2525208c.png

Notes:

1. This table is not intended to substitute official findings relating to AW139 accidents. It is instead a ‘quick reference’ resource for those wishing to obtain a ‘snapshot’ of the AW139’s accident history.

2. Columns ‘e’, ‘f’ and ‘g’ have been composed with assistance from members belonging to PPRuNe’s Rotorheads community and are a product of recommendations and suggestions tendered by those claiming knowledge of the subject matter.

3. This table seeks to neither endorse nor criticise the AW139 product, but to communicate as effectively as possible the most basic known details surrounding AW139 accidents.

4. Accident No. 2 (A7-GHC) [Qatar 1]: The available information (via members of PPRuNe) indicates that a) A flight deck incident involving lack of familiarisation with the aircraft’s autopilot resulted in a landing with tail strike. b) The aircraft apparently continued to operate after the tail strike despite opposition from one member of the flight crew. c) The aircraft was then grounded for 10 days during which time (according to an unofficial spokesman for Gulf Helicopters) AW carried-out the necessary repairs. d) There are doubts (in the minds of some) regarding the extent of the repair carried-out on the tailboom with some indicating that no “deep” inspection occurred. e) Gulf Helicopters say: “No damage was evident on the tailboom structure as inspected by both Gulf Helicopters & AgustaWestland representatives, all above board and correctly handled, just that no one could see or detect the fact that the composite honeycomb core had in fact sheared internally down the centre thereby not showing up by delamination 'Tap testing' or NDT.” As a result of these comments the accident has been attributed to both structural and human failure.

5. Accident No. 6 (A7-GHA) [Qatar 2]: Conflicting reports dominate this incident. There are accusations that a “tool” or “locks” were not removed from the tail rotor and which resulted in a blade shear. Gulf Helicopters emphatically denies this stating that it is a “good theory” but “not true”. The complete contrast in statements between Gulf Helicopters and external parties has meant that this accident has now reverted to ‘Under Investigation’ status.

AW139 Accident Threads on PPRuNe and Official Publications:

1. UAE 2 JUN 2008 (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/329624-139-down-abu-dhabi.html)

2. QATAR 25 AUG 2009 (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/386491-aw139-lost-tail-taxying-doh.html)

3. SPAIN 21 JAN 2010 (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/402948-sar-heli-down-almeria.html) / INTERIM STATEMENT (http://www.fomento.es/NR/rdonlyres/70DD0C48-1459-407A-9D9F-99D00819505A/97971/2010_002_A_Interim_statement.pdf)

4. HONG KONG 3 JUL 2010 (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/419960-sky-shuttle-139-ditches-hk-harbour.html) / INTERIM STATEMENT (http://www.cad.gov.hk/reports/Interim%20Statement%20-%20AW139%20B-MHJ_e%20.pdf)

5. SOUTH KOREA 23 FEB 2011 (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/443772-south-korean-coast-guard-aw139-wreckage-found.html)

6. QATAR 2 MAY 2011 (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/450392-yet-another-aw139-tail-incident-gulf-helis.html)

7. MALAYSIA 30 JUN 2011
(http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/456041-weststar-139-tail-incident-30th-june-2011-a.html)
8. CHINA 17 AUG 2011
(http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/461087-chinese-aw139-missing.html)
9. BRASIL 19 AUG 2011 (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/461288-aw139-accident-brasil.html)

Accident Photos (TRB's):

https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/-inQ0rWpLmpI/Tl3lQIjYaDI/AAAAAAAAEtw/5ACbylqO9Z4/Qatar%2525202%252520TR.jpg
'Qatar 2' 2 May 2011

https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/-62xImbTPI1I/Tl3lQ7pRdkI/AAAAAAAAEts/Y28nGCb5EiQ/Brasil%252520Crash.jpg
Brasil 19 AUG 2011

[aegir]

Thank you for your work Savoia.

You can add the Priliminary report on Brazilian accident added by patatas (http://www.pprune.org/members/182986-patatas) on http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/461288-aw139-accident-brasil-3.html#post6671873

http://www.abraphe.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/PR-SEK-Relat%C3%B3rio-de-Seguran%C3%A7a-de-Voo.pdf

[KLALA]

Where-you-get-your-information-that-was probably mechanic error (a failure to remove some type of lock prior to start-up).

[k2000]

Dear all pilots AW139,
since 4 years i am flying the 139 we had several problem with this great machine tail vibrations even when i grounded this AIRCRAFT but the operator did not take seriousely this problem until know this machine has a orgonomy cockpit and tail problem.for the orgonomy cockpit the way how the sas realyse botton is located on the syclique is wrong and specialy by night flight if you press the botton sas realyse the AUTOPILOT 1 -2 will desangage and you will lose the motion how to activate the attitude mode so the pilots will lose the flight motion with unstable flight by night specialy dangerous for No IFR experianced pilots for the seconde problem is the tail rotor vibrations problem AGUSTAWESTLAND should dont lie to the oparators.
THanks a lot and god bless all pilots.

[Epiphany]

I take it that you pressed the SAS release button during a night flight and scared yourself? Well we all make mistakes and I am sure you won't do it again. Instructors can only teach so much and it is up to professional pilots to read the RFM and understand the location and function of switches and buttons and which ones not to play with (normally red ones).

I am amazed at the amount of AW139 pilots I see who will happily correct AP problems in flight at 150 kts by de-selecting and re-engaging AP's 1 and 2 with no verification and little thought to the consequences.

Next time you are in the sim ask the instructor to fail both AP's when you are flying at 150kts (preferably in IMC). You will have much more respect for those little buttons after that I guarantee.

[nightskywalker]

Originally Posted by Savoia
Regarding Qatar 1 Gulf Helicopters appear to be abrogating any responsibility in respect of their response to the event stating that AW carried-out all the work to the tailboom (repair and inspection). Commentators are however questioning the extent of the inspection as well as some of the procedures (relating to flight operations) prior to the aircraft being grounded. One member of PPRuNe mailed me to say that the tail-collapse occurred while trying to initiate taxi with the parking brake on and there are other comments besides.

In respect of Qatar 2 I cannot make any headway. I have received several PM's from people 'in the know' claiming (categorically) that a 'locking tool' of some description had been left attached to the tail rotor, a claim that Gulf Helicopters emphatically denies.


Savoia,

if you looked at Note 4, QHC has taken into service 9A-GHC even after the severe tail stike occurred during operations (such condition has been not fully declared at the moment of the subsequent accident on the tarmac).

Looking at the QCAA report - confidential, not shareable but available on every Maintenance Manager desk :E - all the stress tests conducted with the relevant authorities representatives on a set of Tail Assy (even with major debonding modes) have provided negative results.

There is no connection between the accident and the taxiing phase, but between the energy released by the accident which has compromised the Tail Assy.

Moreover, regarding the TR Blades - it is obviously visible that the failure mode is the same, but it is not possible to demonstrate, if not during an investigative assessment, which is the root cause.

[9Aplus]

QHC has taken into service 9A-GHC

A7 not 9A :=

[PO dust devil]

I am not flying 139 but I would like to ask if making a torque limit might take the long term stress out of the tail rotor and drive train. I see this as one consideration when mitigating tq and trgb and trb issues even if it did cost performance.

Discussion?

DD:ok:

[hillberg]

Pt 29? The true testing starts with the first owner, Looking at the design with slab sides on both fuslage & boom you can see the design flaws. weak T/R? like the carry over of designers of other aircraft,Same people same problems.

[nightskywalker]

9Aplus,

correct, sorry, it was a typo :}

PO dust devil,

any evidence of torque scratches on drive train in any accident. TRDS and xGBs have other quality concerns, however in such cases HUMS comes in help in a very effective way.

[PO dust devil]

NSW Copy that, but if there's some latent weakness in the TR drive system from MGB to TR wouldn't less TQ be a reasonable limitation?

FWIW, I am not type rated - but if they were my aircraft on my operation, I would consider a local restriction to that effect notwithstanding loss of payload or performance category brag rights. Until someone came up with a definitive explanation anyway.

The silence from the manufacturer regulators and all is hurting my ears......

DD

[North & South]

The silence from the manufacturer regulators and all is hurting my ears.....

DD
Can I make your words mine as well??

[PO dust devil]

Feel free.....Just be aware some people don't like the way I blaspheme, use profanity and swear. I am guilty of each and worse.:D

DD

[Clue Stick]

:cool: In preceding three years of flying Aw139, I have come across three events wherein the Pilot has pressed SAS release button, where as the intention was to press FD disengage/standby button.On analysis we realized that these pilots had a habit of using thumb for pressing SAS release button instead of recommended middle finger. If thumb is used as a habit, you are likely to mix up between the two buttons i.e. SAS and FD.

[Epiphany]

I find that looking at which button you are pressing first helps tremendously.

[griffothefog]

Epiphany,

Don't be a smart arse, those buttons are not lit at night when the biggest f*ck up's happen and you know it. That is one of the main screw up's AW made in the cockpit.

Safe flying bro. :ok:

[Savoia]

This must have been asked many times before but .. can't AW relocate one or both of the switches/buttons if this would (even in the smallest way) help mitigate future 'finger trouble'?

And, if AW are a little slow in applying such changes would it not be possible for individual clients to request this modification in much the same way as the Aussie defence force requested that EC install twist-grips in the Ecureuil?

[Geoffersincornwall]

You can have it any way you want if you are prepared to pay. Cockpit ergonomics are of course a bit subjective given that one man's heaven is another's nightmare depending on what you were flying before.

Given that both the FDS/By button and the A/P OFF button (curiously misnamed) have to be close at hand it is a toss-up what to do with them. One useful modification to the A/P Off button would be to provide a tactile cue - like a very sharp spike on the top of it. Joking apart there is some food for thought there but that would probably be negated by those that insist on wearing gloves..... maybe we stick with the sharp spike idea!!

We could ask for the LNAV button to be labelled 'FMS' and the NAV button 'VOR' seeing as that's what they do and given that we have a plethora of buttons that include the word 'NAV' in them on both the Guidance Controller and the Display Controller.

All in all it does show that our beautiful beast can be improved upon. Are going to tell them or shall I? No, you had better do it.

G.:E

PS. Please list in your next post all the things you want to improve when the 'B' model arrives giving details of your proposed solution. No-go areas - TR ..... I think we can safely say that that is work-in-progress.

[Savoia]

Are going to tell them or shall I?
I suspect that my 'brothers' at Agusta are already none too pleased about my table although, to be fair, the table has showed (at least to me) the remarkable extent of the 'human error' component in 139 accidents several of which (as already mentioned) seem to have links to the autopilot and related systems.

One presumes that operators have access to AW customer feedback. Failing that it would do no harm if a number of 139 operators were to unite in voicing their concerns .. if indeed their concerns are aligned!.

[Epiphany]

I was not being a SA Griffo. Granted the buttons are not ideally located but they are quite obviously in different places on the handgrip - one on the top and the other on the side. Even at night you can clearly see the FD release button on the top. I tell the PNF that I intend to cancel the FD, look down, press the button and hey presto (or e presto! in Italian) - job done with no brown trousers.

5 minutes in the hangar every so often refamilarising the location on these important buttons is not a bad idea if there is any doubt. Or AW could spend millions redesigning it of course.

Safe flying to you too.

[[email protected]]

Yes that CAS acknowledge button could be better placed elsewhere - it caught me out in an over-water hover at night when I inadvertantly initiated a go-around instead of acknowledging the cabin-door open message:O

[prehar]

I have been caught landing on a Offshore deck, where during the transition shake, trying to hold the cyclic firm , had me disengaging the APs .One has to be careful not to touch the AP release switch specially while landing during the transition shake or in gusty ,turbulent conditions .
I have seen it happen to others too ...to imagine it happening when the tail rotor vibrations are high ......!! ??
I would have liked to see that switch at the bottom of the cyclic similar to the cyclic AP release switch on the Bell 412 / 212 .To be operated by the little finger .

[Geoffersincornwall]

Amazing how much good a few sim sessions can achieve when it comes to knowing which is which. Would be interesting to know if there is any correlation between poor button awareness and lack of sim time.
G.

[griffothefog]

Example..... rotor brake fire in the 109 due to all recency in the 139 :{

Not me hee hee hee..

[Savoia]

Griffo wrote: Example..... rotor brake fire in the 109 due to all recency in the 139

Is this because the 139 brake can be applied continuously whereas in the 109 it has to be 'fed'?

Geoffers, a question for you! Evidently there are only a few 139 sims available. Just how much is a sim (ball park)? Is there an existing and accepted ratio of sims to operational aircraft and, if the number of operational 139's has yet to reach a level which could support more sims is there no place for operators and perhaps even clients to support their cost in cases where you have a 'new' type and the sim numbers need to grow?

Wouldn't AW be interested in supporting access to regional sims in those areas where the 139 is operationally tasked in full-time commercial applications?

In the meantime ..


5 minutes in the hangar every so often refamilarising the location on these important buttons is not a bad idea if there is any doubt.

.. seems sensible!

[212man]

Just how much is a sim (ball park)?

Level B about $5m
Level D about $10+m

[griffothefog]

Savoia,

The 139 RB is the opposite to the 109, so you could start the little fella with the RB on thinking that it is off if you have most of your recency on the big un :eek:

It has happened....

[Geoffersincornwall]

Out of interest how much sim time did you get on the 139? Any kind of tactile cue to assist with both collective and cyclic buttons would definitely be a step forward. You can comfort yourself that selecting the GA is a common mistake on recurrent training but I have not thought to see if this can be correlated with the training delivered to date for that candidate.

G.

[Fortyodd2]

"selecting the GA is a common mistake on recurrent training"
Different type but on more than one training ILS in the 135 I've pressed the "GA" button and instead of climbing I've noticed the windscreen wiper doing it's thing! (and apparently, I'm not the only one!).

[ShyTorque]

The same position (and similar type) of one particular button on two types I flew was a bit of a worry when doing loads over water......

Load release button on the first type = Floats arming switch on the other. Both were almost identical thumb buttons, under the same type of guard on the cyclic...

Never accidentally inflated the floats myself but I know a man who did....

[P_DomingueZ]

By the time we have been following these bad happens with the 139 , the AW actions is not enough for the moment . Agusta Westland should not limit its helicopter at this time wich is very very bad , limitations such a gross weight reductions , less airspeed during cruise , Weight X altitude X IAS will not be applied . and I argue WHY NOT ? maybe cause the 139 sounds to be a SUPER AIRCRAFT? I can remember when S92 had the MGB issues and Sikorsky imediatelly has limited the aircraft FOR SAFE .
My wish is can see Agusta taking another effective action nothing about limiting components lifetime .Maybe something that might scratch 139 market at the moment but will save our ass and the other friends !

[9Aplus]

One of small operators, found today root cracked tail blade....
Spare helicopter of near size is AOG too, fortunately after
whole day of := :mad::ugh::confused::} - they managed to borrow
one blade from bigger state related brother....
:ok:
:D
Happy End, but for how long.....

[cayuse365]

Was there a tailboom incident in Austrailia last week?

[blakmax]

Cayuse 365

Turkeyslapper posted a report of a disbond of the new design tail boom on the AW139 stream, posting 1389. Maybe it was that case?

[aegir]

http://www.fomento.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/C6E653F5-E80D-42A8-9562-B8EB29B71E0F/113643/2010_002_A_ENG.pdf

I haven't read it yet but I've see that there are about 20 safety reccomendations.

[Cleared-HOT]

Have they got systemic problems with the 139 or are these mainly one off occurrences each time - just curious.