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TBM-Legend
3rd Mar 2011, 04:10
Announced that RAAF will get a 5th C-17 in lieu of two more C-130J's.

GreenKnight121
3rd Mar 2011, 04:39
Deal is not certain... the decision is pending the answers received to the request they sent to the US about pricing & production slot availability.

rjtjrt
3rd Mar 2011, 04:44
Not certain but unlikely not to go ahead as the Minister of Defence announced it personally and on TV as well.
OurLabor Party polis are sensitive to loosing face as the opposition is right up them at the drop of a hat.
That being said, the current minister sems to be competent, although I have not heard any opinions from serving members about how he is perceived.
John

500N
3rd Mar 2011, 05:00
Maybe the Gov't has learnt that buying "off the shelf" does have some benefits.

Question for those more in the know.

I understand the need for the C-17 but how needed are the C-130's in the longer term scheme of things ?

Will we end up with too much large, long term strategic capacity and too little
C-130 tactical capacity and landing options ?

.

0497
3rd Mar 2011, 05:38
I understand the need for the C-17 but how needed are the C-130's in the longer term scheme of things ?

Will we end up with too much large, long term strategic capacity and too little
C-130 tactical capacity and landing options ?


I can't see them getting any more than an additional 5th or 6th C-17s (A330s also provides a lot of lift). So plenty of room for something smaller.

The Caribou replacement plans calls for something like a C-27j (ie. 10t cargo). There might also be plans for more Army Chinooks.

Flyingblind
3rd Mar 2011, 06:00
The two C-130J's were to partly replace the lift lost when the 'Bous were retired.

The additional C17 has been on the cards for awhile. Part of the reason given is disaster relief in country and our area of ops. Apart from others far away they are the largest lift asset able to assist in time of dire need.

Other than that if you've got half a Billion in unspent funds that will be taken back into central coffers why not spend half on a new airlifter?

herkman
3rd Mar 2011, 06:51
Blind billy could see that we were going to run into the same problems that the RAF had with flying hours. Many of us ex logistic flyers had been pushing for this move.

As the hours go up and the C17 have done more hours than was intended there is a real chance that on occasions you will have two not one as planned out of service.

The RAAF is finding that the hours on their J models are climbing as is the fatique factor on both the centre section and the mainplanes. The new engines have also created problems in that area and this I suspect is why the latest J models have a longer life centre section.

The RAAF C130 fleet since 1958 have flown over a 1M hours with no loss of life and only one small accident when the nose wheel failed in an A model in the sixties.

Both the C17 and the C130 along with the Boo have served us well but the C130's like our British friends are heading for either major work or replacement.

As the proposed purchase of two more C130's would have created logistic problems as they would have been latter block numbers.

We are down to only 8 H models being in service.

Regards

Col

herkman
3rd Mar 2011, 06:55
Some of our long haul problems would go away if we put cargo floors in the refuelers.

Believe it was killed on cost basis but Airbus are building the A330 with cargo floors.

Regards

Col

Trackmaster
3rd Mar 2011, 08:50
I think you will find a production slot has already been allocated.
It is my understanding this matter was being discussed in Long Beach 12 months ago.
There was a Long Beach sourced story in Aviation Week mid last year talking about the 5th RAAF C-17 and a separate joint purchase with the K1W1's.
I would think the cost of the Christchurch earthquake has probably scuppered that deal although RAAF C-17s have been very busy flying people and material across the Tasman.

TBM-Legend
3rd Mar 2011, 12:51
indeed. This deal was done some time ago. Smith was only pretending to hedge. Cost for #5 is simply the aircraft this time....

* Also RAN has been allocated delivery slots for MH-60R. The changeover from S70B's will be like introducing the Super Bugs. The aircraft need a minimal conversion, basic GSE in place already, Sim gets upgraded and then replaced, maintainers do a differences course. Fits on all 'boats' too without any mods.

Lost Again..
4th Mar 2011, 22:58
I believe the H Herc's are now down to 7 frames and the last one has come out of DLM. Happy to be corrected, the guys at the coalface don't get told anything by ALG. ACAUST apparently told guys at SAW about H extension to 2016 and there's rumours abound that QDS and Marshall have been asked to quote on this. If they don't keep the maintenance schedule though for DLM's it will probably be a moot point and Jul 2013 retirement will look pretty solid at which point the J's will fatigue out even quicker.

5th C17 should help their fleet out with maintenance and availability.

There was also an accident/incident? in 2008. C130H doing tacex had a nose gear scissor join snap after T+G on dirt strip in west NSW. Crew did fantastically (and were recognised for this) to get it on the ground without crashing.

Like This - Do That
5th Mar 2011, 01:49
Over the 2005 - 2006 period 1 AUD bought on average 0.75 USD; now AUD USD parity. Wonder how this will affect the cost of the 5th C-17?

I think the original program cost US$780m ie no change from A$1b at the time.

But that's all by-the-by .... reckon we'll get to do LAPES with 'em? :E

TBM-Legend
5th Mar 2011, 02:35
what about another and make it six?

Flyingblind
5th Mar 2011, 06:26
LAPES would be fun but not likely to happen to Australian frames, AMTDU may trial a few loads just to prove we can do it.

C17 is a strategic asset, let the C27J's do LAPES when we get them. :ok:

Old Fella
5th Mar 2011, 06:42
500N poses the question "How needed are the C130's longterm"? Given that the RAAF has been operating C130's since late 1958 the type have certainly etched their place in our Air Force history. I cannot comment on the C130J (they don't have a seat for a Flight Engineer), however having operated the A-E-H variants I am sure that the C130 will be on the RAAF inventory long after I'm a mere memory. In fact, former C130A A97-212 is still in operation, the sole Aeroproducts equipped C130A still flying. It is now N131EC and owned by Earl Cherry. As mentioned, the only two major failures in 53 years of RAAF operations have been two instances of NLG strut failure. One on an A model in Medang around 1974 where the axle fractured and broke away from the bottom of the strut and one on a H model a couple of years back which was of a similar nature as I understand it. Long live the Lockheed Legend.

If it ain't Boeing I'm not goin' (unless its a Lockheed)

Like This - Do That
5th Mar 2011, 07:06
let the C27J's do LAPES when we get them.

I'm counting the days, the months, the years ... hopefully not the decades:eek:

That particular capability gap is a great wide gulf. AIR 8000 Ph 2 just doesn't seem to excite Ronnie as much as I think it should .... I hope ALG is whispering in the Govt's ear this weekend down at Avalon: "buy Spartans ... buy Spartans ... buy Spartans"

back end o' the bus
5th Mar 2011, 08:20
So!! currently the 4 frames we have are NOT being fully utilised (fact-even with flood/cyclone/NZ assists), so we get a fifth, then we eventually pull out of Afghan, resulting in even more of a C-17 static display team!! At least there would be one advantage..it would give the engineers another aircraft to practice on.....and god knows they need the practice... on a darker side it gives them another chance of creating a large smoking hole in the ground.
There is hardly any maintainance support after midnight and NONE at weekends...
But hey at least they have more restrictive crew duty than the actual crew that fly it! and any route revolves around them...
The Sqn is run by engineers so maybe the desicion should be run past them first, then the rest of the Sqn and Air Force could fall inline...
Apologies, a bit of a rant, but true... honest indian....:ugh:
Should we not put the surplus funds into valuable training that most of the Air Force critically needs!!:D

TBM-Legend
5th Mar 2011, 08:50
don't worry after A/Stan [if there is an after] there will some other place where the action is.

Australia nearly bought C-141's moons ago for the strategic airlift but we kept rattling around on 12 hour jaunts in C-130's instead. The mix of the Herc and Starlifter would have been great. At least the Govt has come to its senses and realised the size of our country and region.

All new aircraft fall under the spell of the ginger beers but the novelty wears off...:}

back end o' the bus
5th Mar 2011, 09:13
Whilst the engineers have a WGCDR in ALSPO that can dictate to the SQN the ADF WILL BE RUN BY ENGINEERS....Tail wagging dog syndrome in extremis!!!
No worries we're not exactly a global defence force are we!!!!!!!!!:ugh:

TBM-Legend
5th Mar 2011, 09:21
The F-111's went back and forth a few times between the squadrons and the MU...

"yes you may have an aircraft for a mission if you ask nicely and never change the schedule was often said"

Old Fella
5th Mar 2011, 09:24
Back end o' the Bus. Your comment re: C17 engineers needing the practice begs the question. "Why do they need practice"? Are you saying they lack the requisite skills or are the aircraft so reliable that the engineers have little unscheduled maintenance to do?

herkman
5th Mar 2011, 14:49
Whilst the engineers may flex their muscle, let the proof be found in the pudding.

With heavy aircraft the RAAF has a record second to one in safety and the condition of our aircraft are the envy of many.

Regards

Col

Bushranger 71
5th Mar 2011, 15:01
Australian defence planners seem to believe that 2 x LPDs (aircraft carriers) will be the ultimate answer for deployment of military forces offshore (albeit sluggishly with substantial protection penalties) and they have really neglected tactical airlift capabilities for quick response, especially throughout our neighbouring tropical archipelago characterised by numerous rudimentary airfields and limited aviation fuel storage.

No argument that more C-17s would be beneficial, but the USAF and RAF will not operate them into scruffy airstrips and the MRTT will be restricted to airliner standard airfields, also requiring complementary freight handling gear.

The C-27J might be a good Caribou replacement if acquired downstream, but will not substitute for essential C-130 tactical deployment capability.

The obvious need is for more C-130 capacity and modification of C-130H to provide flight refuelling and gunship capabilities for long range/endurance firepower. The Herc transportable Iroquois has been shed and disposal is intended for Blackhawk despite Australia not having any capacity for long-range flight refuelable helo support for submarine operations and search and rescue within our vast area of international responsibility.

The ability to quickly deploy M113 armoured personnel carriers by air has also been somewhat compromised because DoD was conned into stretching the standard vehicle (via a now 10 year behind schedule program), thus taking up more cargo hold space.

ADF military preparedness/credibility is shrinking as inexcusable capability gaps continue to emerge throughout the thinly-veiled unified force while billions of dollars are being squandered on inappropriate flawed programs, aiming toward a mythical Force 2030 structure.

An unjustifiable huge outlay of $3.5billion seems intended on just 24 very expensive MH-60R helicopters (or the even more outrageously costly NFH90) whereas easy fitment of the modular AQS-18(v)-3 Dipping Sonar System to Sea King and/or Seahawk would provide an adequate cost-effective ASW capability.

$3.5billion would be much better spent on another 12 x C-130 and enhancement of existing Hercules assets (plus flight refuelling modifications for some Blackhawks); but the question arises whether such vast amounts of funding are affordable with ongoing compounding annual increases in defence expenditure projected out to Year 2030 that will soon cost Australian taxpayers near $30billion per annum?

Frazzled
6th Mar 2011, 08:04
For a moment there I thought Bushranger71 was going to turn this thread into another anti MRH90 rant:O

Anyway go for the extra C-17. They can carry heaps more than a Herc and can even get 3 blackhawks in the back where a C130 can only squeeze in one!

Even better - cancel one or two F35's and take the fleet to six. Like I mean it is not as if the fast jets atually deploy these days. (Is it any rumour the F18's are being transferred to Training Command?:E).

As for the C130 fleet - the H's days are numbered - too many years at low level have taken their toll on the airframes. And the army keeps buying equipment that either won't fit into the back or is too heavy.

The RAAF could do with the J's what the Army does with the Chinook's - trade them in on newer J's - ones with electronic locks, flip top rollers, high speed ramps and other newer mods.

Orrrrr, go european and get the A400 - still a prop but bigger, can carry more and go further than a C130. I mean the it's not like the eurpoeans would sell us a dodgy aircraft now would they guys - just look at other fine eurpoean products we have got - tiger, MRH, tankers - surely we couldn't go wrong going eurpoean.

Frazzled:ugh:

Old Fella
6th Mar 2011, 09:22
Frazzled. I think the RAAF would prefer to stick with the Lockheed product for many reasons, not least of all 53 years of operating the type in four different models. The Airbus is totally unproven, not yet in service and very much more costly per unit to acquire. Add to that spares, support equipment, tech and aircrew training as well as a Simulator. With the C17A and the C130 mix I think Ronnie has it pretty right, except for a replacement for the Caribou. King Air's are by no means a Caribou replacement but the Spartan may well fit the role.

GreenKnight121
6th Mar 2011, 16:44
For a moment there I thought Bushranger71 was going to turn this thread into another anti MRH90 ranthttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/embarass.gif

It's in there.

Br71 wouldn't be Br71 if he didn't find some way to stick that in no matter what the subject.

An unjustifiable huge outlay of $3.5billion seems intended on just 24 very expensive MH-60R helicopters (or the even more outrageously costly NFH90)

Bushranger 71
6th Mar 2011, 17:22
Hello Frazzled and GreenKnight 121; your sarcasm unnecessary and I think you have missed my point re Australia needing sufficient tactical airlift capacity to quickly deploy say a battalion group sized force with suitable mobile supporting arms into pretty rudimentary airfields around the neighbouring island archipelago. The closer they can be lodged to any prospective scene of action, the lesser the need for additional intra-theatre transportation, at least in the short term, which compounds the logistics and cost of mounting an operation in remote areas.

The C-17 of course provides a much improved strategic transport capability and the LPDs will enable some considerably slower deployment of forces and their hardware (with significant escort overheads); but neither will necessarily be the most cost-effective insertion/extraction means in some circumstances. As for Australia committing to further military involvement much beyond our neighbouring island chain in the future, that seems to me a tad unlikely.

In multiple threads, I have questioned why Australia did/does not progressively optimise proven in-service military assets (like Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk, Seahawk, Sea King, Caribou where cost-effective) in lieu of prematurely involving in hugely expensive replacement programs acquiring significantly unproven hardware. Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky are now offering local upgrade of what they consider relatively low time ADF Blackhawks and Seahawks for sale to other nations, which is of course an enticement (bribe) to swing sale of the MH-60R. But if enhancement of these types can be accomplished in Australia and they are in demand by other nations, why then are they being replaced in the ADF at huge cost?

I am sure the Herc guys can confirm just what useful military service was achieved by other nations from the C-130A and E models disposed of by Australia and doubtless, the USAF and/or USMC would really like to get our C-130H for refurbishment and conversion for special operations functions. We shed the B707 creating yet another capability gap and reputedly, some smart operator has now leased one of them back to us on a lucrative contract!

The RAAF once had 2 full strength Hercules squadrons totalling 24 aircraft with integral Air Force maintenance (except for aircraft depot level servicing at Qantas) which perhaps enabled about 14 aircraft continuously available for operations. What on-line availability is achievable today from maybe only 19 operable C-130 with more out-sourced maintenance? And when the new smell wears off the C-17s, can we expect any better than 50 percent on-line availability?

Shrinking military capacity is not only applicable to the Navy as a like situation prevails throughout the whole ADF because Australia has embarked on overly-ambitious futuristic defence planning which is costing the nation dearly and primarily benefiting the major arms conglomerates. A big financial reality check will confront our defence planners sometime soon considering the other expenditure priorities facing a growing nation.

knowitall
6th Mar 2011, 17:46
"just look at other fine eurpoean products we have got - tiger, MRH, tankers - surely we couldn't go wrong going eurpoean."

How are those seasprites working out for you?

MTOW
6th Mar 2011, 20:44
Someone mentioned fitting a Blackhawk into a Herc. Is that do-able without a major de-construction? There wasn't a lot of space remaining with a broken down Huey.

reacher
6th Mar 2011, 22:19
Here we go again....:rolleyes:

Doors Off
6th Mar 2011, 22:39
I think that B71 might be a Googlebot with automatic cut and paste.:rolleyes:

The C17 really has been a top purchase, both in capability and contractual model. All the help that has been provided to our regional neighbours (Pakistan, Indonesia, NZ etc) in times of need is exceptional. A 5th aircraft will be a big plus.

Doors Off

rjtjrt
6th Mar 2011, 22:59
knowitall
How's the Nimrod going for you?
It would be a mistake for Europeans to underestimate the poor reputation here of European Defence suppliers.
There appears to be arrogance/condescension displayed by European defence suppliers to any customers who are not European- it is wearing thin here.

Wiley
7th Mar 2011, 05:00
Doors Off, and now reacher, if you both are serving officers, I find myself hoping you're really junior serving officers, for the open disrespect you display to a retired officer - and veteran - who's flown more real combat sorties than you've had kindy lunches is distressing, to say the least, and could only be forgiven by allowing for the exuberance of youth.

If you're not junior officers, you're something infinitey further down the food chain - Russell Hill PR lackeys employed to preach today's ADF heirachy/multi national arms companies line (which, let's face it, for far too many years now has amounted to the same thing, almost verbatim).

Rather than dismiss what Bushranger71 says out of hand as you sprout the "company line", apparently without question, (as you, Doors Off, have done with some regularity with totally unnecessary personal abuse thrown in on this and other threads), why not take a moment to ask yourself if Bushranger might not have some basis for his (to you) apparently silly ideas.

Have either of you actually taken the time to do a comparison of the hot and high performance of the Tiger, MRH-90, Blackhawk with the Super Huey? If you're serving officers, I can only assume the information should be easily available to you. How long would it take you? An hour or two? (Just a hint for young players though from one with considerable first hand experience of promised performance figures from EADS versus actual performance figures, be very, very skeptical on any figures you get from a European helicopter manufacturer. But if either of you are even remotely associated with either the Tiger or the MRH-90 programmes, I'm assuming you'd know that already.)

You might not accept it, but it's a fact that money available for Defence spending, both acquisition and day to day operational costs, will become increasingly hard to find in any future government. (Don't think that the Libs, if they ever get the Redhead out of Bogan-villa, won't pull a David Cameron on you, while if Labor stay in power, they'll have to find the money to give Bob Brown what he wants from somewhere [as well as the carbon tax], and you can bet Defence will be the proverbial canary in the coal mine - the first to fall off the proverbial perch from oxygen starvation.)

I can assure you, Bushranger 71's call for the retention and upgrading of existing airframes, along with his championing of the Super Huey is not the rantings of an old war horse who wants to stick with the old charger he knows. It's more a voice in the wilderness saying that almost nothing we've spent (far too much) money on lately is delivering (or has yet delivered) the goods. The one exception, as you'll find Bushranger 71 agrees with you on, is the C-17. However, if you'll take a moment to read what he said about the C-17 in his last posts, as great an asset as it has proven itself to be for the ADF, it, along with the Navy's new aircraft carriers, simply cannot do the job a C-130 or a C-27 could do in getting an ADF force close into a crisis area in what could righly be called our strategic backyard - PNG or the Pacific Islands - in good time.

In our current situation, with the bulk of our Army committed to the Middle East, another C-17 at the cost of not acquiring more C-130s (or a real Caribou replacement) makes sense. However, some seventy years ago now, this country was in exactly that same situation, with the bulk of its Army, Navy and Air Force committed to the Middle East and Europe, when the situation at home changed dramatically - and very, very quickly.

If there's anyone out there who is absolutely certain we'll never find ourselves unexpectedly in a similar situation again, I have a bridge I'd like to sell you. One owner, freshly painted...

Bushranger 71
7th Mar 2011, 05:12
You are in sniper mode again Doors Off. I never said the C-17 was not a good buy, especially for strategic transport; but it is more limited in application than the C-130 for tactical operations throughout the regional archipelago due operating constraints regarding scruffy airfields.

Somebody might care to answer these questions:

How did/do Army Aviation get Blackhawks to and from East Timor, initially and now? (Perhaps C-17 operations there might now be acceptable).

And how did the RNZAF get their Iroquois there when they had to provide relief helo effort?

TBM-Legend
7th Mar 2011, 06:32
These debates mirror the bean counters view of warfare and military hardware.

The 5th C-17 is a very low risk acquisition given we have the rest of the support infrastructure in place. Makes good economic sense.

Bit like the Super Hornet buy given that we are buying an upgraded model of something we are familiar with. This I'm told was a big reason rather than going for the Strike Eagle. The crews require around a five hour conversion from the A model to the F model. Of course F-111 drivers and WSO's are different but they would be with whatever was purchased.

The J model Herc was another good buy for the same reasons.

Helo wise, the M model Blackhawk and some more Chinooks might have been a better option than the MRH90. Works for the biggest user of battlefield air - the US Army. I was told at Avalon by someone at high Navy operational level that the MRH90 has some big limitations for at-sea operations - no auto blade fold [limits ops in heavy weather etc] and the composite structure cannot be field repaired like metal. The corrosion argument is a furphy as the 37 year old Sea Kings don't have corrosion issues but rather old and unreliable avionics.

The message really is to cut your cloth to suit your budget and ops needs, not either of these.

emergov
7th Mar 2011, 07:05
If doors off and reacher are snivelling lackeys and probably in bed with Eurocopter, then why isn't anyone accusing BR71 of being a Bell / Textron plant, trolling for business for his re-engineered Hueys? You can't have it both ways.

The reason the Black Hawk exists is because of the lessons learnt and the vulnerabilities discovered in the Huey, arising from Vietnam. MRH90 / NH90 is a newer take on this twin turbine, AFCS, crashworthy, very powerful style of aircraft.

Everybody loves the Huey, but no-one really wants to take it to war. They built over 10 000 of them, and there are not many left around. Why is that? Could it be that things have moved along since 1958? An EH Holden with a nice modern engine will still have its butt kicked by a new Commodore.

Bushranger 71
7th Mar 2011, 08:52
Maybe recall of some previous military activities in our regional archipelago might better illustrate points I have tried to make regarding tactical airlift flexibility.

For those unaware; Iroquois transportation by C-130 requires removal of main rotor blades, rotor head, mast, tail rotor which are then stowed in manufacturer protective containers or secured to purpose-built transportation rigs. Preparation takes about one hour and the aircraft with ground handling wheels fitted to the skids is then wheeled nose first into the C-130 cargo hold and all of the removed gear stowed beneath the Huey fuselage.

Exercise 'Sidewalk' PNG in 1970 was pre-Vietnam deployment training for an SAS squadron. The helo requirement was for 5SQN based at Fairbairn (Canberra) to deploy 3 Iroquois to Wewak by C-130.

Wewak had limited airfield apron area of pretty low pavement strength and a small crane was pre-arranged locally for lifting of Iroquois mast and assembled main rotor system. Herc arrivals were at 20 minute intervals and the detachment of around 12 aircrew and maybe 6 or so maintenance personnel swiftly removed all gear under Loadmaster supervision, wheeling the first Huey onto a grassed verge for re-assembly. The groundies began assembling the Iroquois and the first Herc was taxying for departure as the second one arrived in the circuit. Process repeated and also for the third C-130 another 20 minutes later. The first Iroquois got airborne for a test flight as the third Herc was taxying for departure, about 1 hour after the first arrival. Slick teamwork between Hercules and Iroquois squadrons.

Forward to 1976 with 9SQN based at Amberley having 8 aircraft deployed in 3 separate detachments across the northern Indonesian/PNG archipelago to support Army Survey Corps operations for virtually the whole year. Additional C-130 deployments of 4 aircraft to New Zealand for a major combined forces exercise, SAS training in WA and earthquake relief at Guadalcanal are some other commitments I recall. Just guessing now, but probably about 30 C-130s in and out of Amberley over the year ferrying Iroquois and personnel far and wide, mainly into northern airfields with airstrips and parking aprons of limited pavement strength

C-130 tactical deployment capability is essential throughout the island archipelago including for sizeable capacity utility helos with adequate hot and high performance. The Huey II fits the requirement and the ADF could have 50 for just $100 million.

But; militarily asinine shedding of the Iroquois capability (for which service chiefs from CDF down should be held accountable) is not the main thrust of this post, which is principally to emphasise the need for adequate C-130 capacity for swift deployment of a whole range of military gear appropriate for operations in Australia's neighbouring regional wet tropics archipelago area of potential military interest.

TBM-Legend
7th Mar 2011, 11:41
I think what you're really saying is that Australia needs a utility helicopter capability in addition to a battlefield chopper capability. The US Army now has the UH-72A [EC145] for this task. The issue in Australia is the misguided concept of a single type multi-rolling in an attempt to reduce the number of types needed as we have relatively few numbers of machines in many categories.

reacher
7th Mar 2011, 11:47
No company line here, about as far away as possible in fact. What I was expressing was my dismay at having to go around this buoy yet again. Yes I am an officer in TSV but I'm also watching A SQN deal with what they are given, not looking backwards wishing to introduce yet another piece of kit. I have no doubt BR71 has every good intention backed up with plenty of experience however the fact remains we are getting MRH and there's not much we can do about.

FWIW the push for a LUH will come more from the ARH program (and 173 if recent events are taken into effect) than the MRH as the guys in DWN quickly find out just how much of tail is required for that little possum.

As for the C17 if it survives the recent media beat up WRT the SDR, Navy amphib capability and Gus about to retire then so much the better. And while they don't have an issue with getting in and out of Dili apparently the locals don't really appreciate them.

As for points of agreement, I'm very on board with the AAR and gunship re-rolling of the H's. If only someone in 16 BDE (or is it now Standards Br in FORCOMD) would sign off on the risk for AAR with the new MH-47G we are getting....Hang on, that's right we were meant to order them but ended up ordering the Foxtrot and doing the Aussie mod. Again.:D

Bushranger 71
7th Mar 2011, 15:39
Hi reacher; your post # 39 very interesting.

Army Aviation drove the push to shed the Iroquois and the ADF helicopter rationalisation strategy misguidedly aimed mainly at reducing the number of types in service to about 4; but it has already proven farcical with the leasing of others which would not have been necessary had they simply put some well-proven types in service through manufacturer uipgrade programs. Now, the aim seemingly is to shoot for the EC135/EC145 at maybe 3 times or more the cost of a Huey II, subjecting the taxpayer to further abuse with apparent shrugging of shoulders by many within the Australian Defence realm!

But back to my theme regarding C-130 tactical capacity. If Project Air 9000 is being quietly massaged yet again seeking the MH-47G in lieu of the MH-47F, what are the defence planners in Canberra going to do regarding C-130 flight refuellers for helo operations?

TBM-Legend
7th Mar 2011, 20:39
BR71, in a way you're correct. The brass massage the situation to achieve their desired outcome. I was talking to folks about the Sea Kings the other day. With an avionics upgrade they could continue to operate for at least another ten years. The airframe hours are quite low at an average of 8000. [there is a an H-3 water bomber in WA right now on contract that has 49000 hrs on the airframe they said!]. Keeping a dozen or so upgraded Hueys [when we own them] as utility ships would be smart.

Bit like the old days when the RAAF did not operate any small comms aircraft and we'd send a Herc or P-3 to pick up the CAS or whomever for a trip from Richmond to Williamtown etc. How good was that for the use of valuable equipment?

Brig Fraser was hell bent on four types only in the ADF.:ugh:

emergov
7th Mar 2011, 21:03
Black Hawks generally self deploy to East Timor when they change out for major servicings, but they are transportable by C-130 with a similar amount of disassembly to Huey. Mrh90 is also transportable in C-130 with some disassemble, but they haven't done it yet because the C-17 is far easier and quicker.

AIR 9000Phase 5 (CH-47 upgrade) is not looking at MH-47 anything, nor is it going to modify the aircraft to any great degree. The project will by vanilla CH-47F and fit a hoist and crashworthy seats.

There is no LUH project. Many are hoping there may be some future link to the Helicopter Aircrew Training System (HATS) where we might in future procure more of the same type to easily gain a fleet of LUH, but there is no formal project or even approval to do the analysis.

TBM, your navy contact has a point, but the proposal to fix that problem by retrofitting auto blade fold would have added about 25% cost to each airframe, and huge program risk. Composite repair is a problem that will be solved by training and specialist equipment.

As for performance, I don't understand why we should take NHI's figures with a grain of salt - in fact they have been quite conservative compared to the actual aircraft - and then accept a Huey II / Ultra Huey brochure as fact. MRH90 will lift, at 35deg c, OGE at 1500ft, nine 300(+) lb soldiers in crashworthy seats off an amphib ship, with ballistic protection, door guns and ammo, loaded EWSP, Floats, FLIR, weather radar and four crew to fly a 90nm radius mission and hold for 30 minutes before getting back on the ship. Huey II won't, and unfortunately for upgraded Huey, that is the Capability requirement.

More C-17 is a tops idea though. Let's drop 10 JSF and a submarine and get two more.

Bushranger 71
7th Mar 2011, 21:22
Am baling out of this thread now, probably much to the relief of some. Sadly, I foresee the ADF becoming more or less operationally neutered through multiple ill-conceived hardware decisions and this will become progressively more obvious in the helo sphere.

But post #36 warrants some final response as you are way off track again Emergov.If doors off and reacher are snivelling lackeys and probably in bed with Eurocopter, then why isn't anyone accusing BR71 of being a Bell / Textron plant, trolling for business for his re-engineered Hueys?
I have nil involvement with the aircraft industry and any information I have offered regarding the Huey II was conveyed to me at my request by a former AAAvn airframe driver who is a Bell Helicopter representative.The reason the Black Hawk exists is because of the lessons learnt and the vulnerabilities discovered in the Huey, arising from Vietnam. MRH90 / NH90 is a newer take on this twin turbine, AFCS, crashworthy, very powerful style of aircraft.You seem brainwashed or are very susceptible to manufacturer propaganda re the Blackhawk and MRH90 so consider this wisdom from a comprehensive US Army analysis of Vietnam War operations:

‘The (US) Army's decision to standardize on a utility tactical transport helicopter has far-reaching implications on every operation from its planning to its execution. Literally hundreds of our key battles could not have been fought without a light, agile machine that could go into improbable landing zones at a critical time. Had the Army chosen to build its airmobile tactics around a ‘platoon carrier’, different and less flexible tactics would have been forced on our commanders. As we move to replace the Huey fleet, we must never lose sight of the essential characteristics that made the Huey invaluable to the Infantry commander. Technology offers so many tempting alternatives that one can easily forget the basic problems of squad tactics. The vital lessons whichwe learned in the ‘sizing’ of our helicopter fleet dare not be forgotten.’ – Lieutenant General John J. Tolson

Blackhawk and MRH90 are not light and agile being roughly twice as heavy as the Huey II, between 10 and 20 times more expensive to purchase (depending on cost sources referenced) and at least 4 times more costly to operate. And, the Huey II is superior in hot and high performance.

See also my post #164 on the 'Why no helo transport thread?...' thread regarding Iroquois battlefield survivability and crashworthiness.Everybody loves the Huey, but no-one really wants to take it to war. They built over 10,000 of them, and there are not many left around.I am sure the RAAF would he willing to take the Huey II to war, if they still had a couple of squadrons.

At Year 2007, there were still around 5,000 Iroquois versions in service around the world with UH-1Y now in production and Huey II upgrades nearing 200. Long supportability is envisaged due to commonality of components with commercial versions. The USAF ordered 24 Huey II in 2005 with a glass cockpit option and also recently snapped up the last 6 Hotel model Hueys discarded by the US Army, presumably for upgrading to Huey II.

Better to stick to facts in forums.

Au revoir.

TBM-Legend
7th Mar 2011, 22:11
The USAF has recently selected the Blackhawk as its Huey replacement for missile site support. AW139M offered but AF chief wants to standardise as the USAF already operated H-60's.

Some great arguments here but we will never be able to wind back the clock even if it was 'right' then and now. Decisions are taken and that's it.

Another funny from the Navy on the MRH90 cabs they have is that they are being asked to remove the word NAVY from them.....mmmm:hmm:

The reason given was that it costs thousands of dollars to change the nameplate if aircraft are swapped with Army. The Navy has a requirement to carry sonobuoys in their machines for at sea SAR purposes alas the MRH90 has no provision....

* USAF Huey 11's are for Iraq AF and other foreign users who buy or are given US equipment.

scran
8th Mar 2011, 06:48
With respect BR71 - re your comment about UH1Y being in "production" - when briefed by Bell in 2001 they went to great pains to explain that the Y was not a "new" aircraft/airframe, but rather a Mod to an existing one. They needed to do this to be a Government "embargo" on new types.

So from memory - you had to supply about 3 panels from an older Huey to get a UH1Y................;)

Is this still the case or have they beat the Government "ban"?

TBM - what are/were the 4 types BRIG Fraser wanted?

I know for Army it was Tiger, NH90 (or Blackhawk) and CH47 - ie: Recce/Gunship, Medium/battlefield lift and heavy lift. The obvious loss back in 2002 or so during Air 9000 discussions was Kiowa as the "General's Taxi" - :eek:

TBM-Legend
8th Mar 2011, 06:58
Four types:

1. CH-47F
2. MRH90/NFH90
3. Tiger ARH
4. AS350B/B206 - replacement for this not yet determined

Frazzled
8th Mar 2011, 07:59
Hello again,

Sorry for the late addition - don't always spend time on teh computer.

Blackhawks can fit into a Herc as someone else said but as well as taking off the blades you have to take off some fairings, let down the struts to the main landing gear to get it over the ramp hinge. Also, the herc can carry one - the c-17 can carry three with crews!

Seen a C-17 get into Dilli in '07/08 so no dramas there but nothing around (unless you're talking VTOL) will land as short as a Bou, in strips as rugged as a bou will operate in so forget the fixed wing option - go more chinooks perhaps. I don't remember sweating on a landing in the 'bou until the field was less than 2000ft.

Haven't flown huey but flown C model chinooks and Blackhawks and love the blackhawk - bet the guys are wishing they got Mike models but at the end of the day the line swine don't hand over the cash for what they want - someone else holds the purse strings and the line drivers make do with what they got - kinda like being married.:ouch:

Forget about the H's they are knackered - the only ones wanting to keep them are the nav's as they effectively out of a job in ALG when the H retires.:oh:

Happy to have and extra C-17. As for the Herc - I worry that with what the army is buying will make the herc into a caribou. Let me explain:

When the army changed over from the series III landrover to the 110 the caribou lost any ability to transport a 4x4. The 110 had flared wheel arches and would not physically fit into the back of a caribou so effectivley cutting out of one of its roles. With the 110 about to be replaced by something bigger/heavier the herc may find it in the same boat. And no it probably won't be one of their requirements to fit in the back of a C130 when they have a shiny C-17. So the herc becoomes the new caribou. Also, the floor loading on a J is no different to a E or H so if something has a heavy foot print then it may not be able to carry it. That's why the A400 might be better long term but only after another 5-10 years of OPERATIONAL service. Tired of ironing out the bugs for everybody else!!

But if you want to buy some J gunships then I'd be there in an instant:E

Frazzled:ugh:

Barry Bernoulli
8th Mar 2011, 08:45
nothing around (unless you're talking VTOL) will land as short as a Bou, in strips as rugged as a bou will operate in


Viking Air DHC-6-400

Harbin Y-12

PZL M-28

Casa C-212

Frazzled
8th Mar 2011, 09:36
:D stand corrected.

Though would like to see you get them past DMO:O

0497
8th Mar 2011, 10:44
When the army changed over from the series III landrover to the 110 the caribou lost any ability to transport a 4x4. The 110 had flared wheel arches and would not physically fit into the back of a caribou so effectivley cutting out of one of its roles. With the 110 about to be replaced by something bigger/heavier the herc may find it in the same boat. And no it probably won't be one of their requirements to fit in the back of a C130 when they have a shiny C-17.


All of the contenders for the light armored 4x4 project are 7-8t (Contest to replace Land Rovers | The Australian (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/contest-to-replace-land-rovers/story-e6frg8yo-1225940260718)). Upgraded M113s are now 18t - they're due to be replaced within the decade and expect the new AFVs to be heavier at >25t

Andu
8th Mar 2011, 11:11
Arguing that the capability requirement is wrong is pretty much the reason why RAAF lost combat helicopters in the first place.Care to elaborate, emergov? It ain't the way I heard it.

FoxtrotAlpha18
9th Mar 2011, 01:04
ADF airlift c.2028...

5-6 x C-17
5 x KC-30A
10-12 x A400M
12-16 x C-27J

46 x MRH 90
7-8 x CH-47F
18-25 LUH (nacent Air 9000 Phase 9)

GreenKnight121
9th Mar 2011, 03:07
when briefed by Bell in 2001 they went to great pains to explain that the Y was not a "new" aircraft/airframe, but rather a Mod to an existing one. They needed to do this to be a Government "embargo" on new types.

So from memory - you had to supply about 3 panels from an older Huey to get a UH1Y................http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/wink2.gif

Is this still the case or have they beat the Government "ban"?

UH-1Y Huey - Utility Helicopter - Naval Technology (http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/uh_1y/)
In April 2005, the USMC decided that the helicopters will be built as new rather than remanufactured, starting from the third low-rate initial production (LRIP) batch in 2008.

From June 2009:
Bell UH-1Y Joins the USMC (http://defense-update.com/products/u/uh-1y.html#more)
The UH-1Y modernization is part of a comprehensive 'H-1 Upgrades Program' launched by the Marine Corps, replacing the current H-1 fleet with 90 newly built UH-1Ys, 10 remanufactured UH-1Ys and 180 remanufactured AH-1Zs.

scran
9th Mar 2011, 06:24
Knight 121 - thanks for the clarification. :ok:

Barry - OK - now name an aircraft that will take the same payload as a Bou into the same strip as a Bou....... :E

FA18 - ADF fell out of love with the A400 when we decided on the C17 (in my opinion - why consider a paper aircraft when you can have a real aircraft parked on the tarmac within 6 months).


The airlift study did look at the entire continum (did I spell that right? - don't think so). I doubt you will see the A400 as suggested.

In 2028 it could be:

5 x C17 (the line must be getting close to closing, so unless they get a LOT of new orders...) Strat air

5 x KC30 (part time strat air)

12 - 14 C130J (strat/tact lift)

10 or so C27

(but I'm out now - so don't have any close knowledge......:)

Barry Bernoulli
9th Mar 2011, 06:28
scran,

Over what distance?

Any of the above, in multiple taps or with multiple aircraft. Why would you have to do it in a single tap?

At the end of the day, exactly what are you trying to achieve?

ozbiggles
9th Mar 2011, 09:39
because the more taps the more risks, the more time, the more crews, more damage to the strips, more maintenance, more costs and therefore the less time for more tasks, more rest......
Like the reason we got C17 instead of more Hercs....

FoxtrotAlpha18
9th Mar 2011, 21:19
The airlift study did look at the entire continum (did I spell that right? - don't think so). I doubt you will see the A400 as suggested.

The A400 has come a long way since the airlift study was done (as part of White Paper?).

AFHQ is keeping a very close eye on A400M, especially as Army is going up in scale and weight on all of its vehicle projects. There is thought that it would make an ideal C-130J replacement in the mid 2020s, unless Lockmart progresses its 'wider gauge' C-130 concept.

Look for the C-130Hs to be extended to 2016 too as an SRP initiative... ALSPO and the contractors have already set the wheels (props?) in motion, pending Govt giving the OK.

As for the comment somewhere above that the only thing the RAAF will get to replace the Hercs in another Herc...don't be too sure. There is still a lot of dissatisfaction with the J, particularly with the engines and with the OEM's level of support. They don't make 'em like they used to...

rjtjrt
9th Mar 2011, 22:40
Given the apparent cost anticipated for an A400M vs the cost of more C-17's, plus set up costs, is it not just as cheap to buy more C-17's rather than A400M's, as counterimntuitive as it may seem at first.
I relise a fleet structure of:-

ADF airlift c.2028
5-6 x C-17
+10-12 more C-17
5 x KC-30A
0 x A400M
12-16 x C-27J

looks like something from an airpower dreamers fertile imagination but if it costs the same why not?
I guess a problem with this is C-17 production longevity.

TBM-Legend
10th Mar 2011, 01:24
On the news that Australia has offered military airlift assets if required to Libyan crisis!

I guess we feel that our C-17 fleet [of four] and our hard pressed C-130's can be in all places at once.

BBadanov
10th Mar 2011, 02:14
The news reporting I heard was the possibility of making a commitment of 4 x C-17s to support a NFZ. I wonder if PM Gillard (at the UN today) has checked with Def Min (who is in London today) or with CDF. We own 4 x C-17s, that does not mean we can deploy 4. Could probably deploy 2. I would suggest politicians don't understand this. :ugh: But it's a good time to push the argument to acquire a further 2.

FoxtrotAlpha18
10th Mar 2011, 02:32
Given the apparent cost anticipated for an A400M vs the cost of more C-17's, plus set up costs, is it not just as cheap to buy more C-17's rather than A400M's, as counterimntuitive as it may seem at first.

Well, yes...but an A400M will get into almost any strip a C-130 can, which is a lot more strips than a C-17 can get into! Plus, you may not always have C-17 size loads and distances to carry, so an A400M will take those at a more econimical rate.

Same argument applies for C-27J and C-130J. :ok:

Andu
10th Mar 2011, 02:45
I'm sure there are quite a few drivers/airframe within the ADF, particularly the AAAvn rotary wing drivers, who'd be happy with damn near anything - that worked.

As for the A400... hmmmmm. Given their previous 'form', I suppose I shouldn't be surprised to learn that the Oz planners, ever after the Tiger, the A330 and the MRH-90 are still considering buying European.

back end o' the bus
10th Mar 2011, 03:11
FA 18, mate "you're talking hoop!"

a C-130 can, which is a lot more strips than a C-17 can get into!
:ugh:

Barry Bernoulli
10th Mar 2011, 03:56
Airlift c 2028

6 x C17

5 x KC30

16 x KC390 (inc AAR for CH47) Embraer’s Multinational KC-390 Tactical Air Transport Program (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Embraer-Launches-KC-390-Tactical-Air-Transport-Program-05380/)

still won't have made a decision on the Caribou replacement


I admit that the above are all a bit fanciful, except the last. With the double tandem landing gear the KC-390 will carry more and bigger stuff than a Herc with a lighter footprint that a C-27 into strips with 40cm potholes. This also makes it ideal for helicopter refuelling because it can provide that service where it is needed. It would be a bit embarrasing for the RAAF to bring the C-27 into service at the same time that less-developed nations are starting to operate something twice as good.

FoxtrotAlpha18
10th Mar 2011, 06:32
Backender...read my post again...carefully this time!

scran
10th Mar 2011, 06:42
Barry - what Oz said. :E

FA18 - the lift study was not directly linked to the White Paper (and I'm talking the 2000 WP here), but started sometime after - around early to Mid 2002 from memory.

I'm pleased in a way that AFHQ is looking closely at the A400M. More importantly - is DGAD and his staff? :cool:


Opinion back then (early 2000's) was that we would go either A400M or C17. There were a couple of pushes by the A400M team. I'd left IA by the time the C17 buy came around, and while I can't put my hand on my heart and say the C17 buy actually killed any A400M interest (in Capability Development rather than AFHQ) I'm sure it would have certainly cooled it off.........


Certainly I could see where the aircraft might be used as a C130J replacement, but I'd be concerned that the 400 is possibly a bit big (noting Army's requirement to always add weight) and by then there may be a more suitable C130J replacement.

I can't see us ever having C17/A400M/C130J all at the same time but. Would you agree with that?

Frazzled
10th Mar 2011, 07:06
what is the cost of a c27j compared to a C130J??

What's the STOL of the 2 aircraft compared side by side??

Is c27j worth getting or just get more Herc's and let teh chinooks do the caribou type stuff

Frazzled:ugh:

BBadanov
10th Mar 2011, 07:34
Frazzled: Is c27j worth getting or just get more Herc's and let teh chinooks do the caribou type stuff

That is exactly why the Caribou replacement was put off, after C-295 was selected over C-27J in the first place. No doubt, having seen C-27J at AVN last week doing aeros it is an impressive airframe - but can a C-130J and CH-47F mix do that job? If so, makes sense.

herkman
10th Mar 2011, 07:38
Over the last 40 years we have bought stuff off the European market and in the main it has been a very expensive exercise.

Not only have the aircraft been found to be lacking in performance but the aircraft have been expensive and product back up very poor.

And buying from the USA has no assurances that it will be better. The C130J is a case in point and maybe it is time really to sit down and evaluate what we really need and more importantly whether we get value for money and if the aircraft can meet the role for which is intended,

The A400m is in its early days and I expect it will be very expensive to buy and operate.

Time for us to stop grand standing and take a long hard look at our situation. Our C130J's are not going to give the service that previous models did. We have let the H models go by the way and the E models were ditched because we did not take the hard decisions and upgrade them. Now today six of them fly as Super E's for the PAF who are very happy with them.

When will we ever learn.

Regards

Col

Barry Bernoulli
10th Mar 2011, 08:28
OZ said,

because the more taps the more risks, the more time, the more crews, more damage to the strips, more maintenance, more costs and therefore the less time for more tasks, more rest......
Like the reason we got C17 instead of more Hercs....


"the more risk": risk is a function (multiple)of likelihood of an event and outcome of an event. If you operate a smaller capacity aircraft into an airfield, then the risk will typically be reduced by the square or better of the reduction; for example, the putting a -8 into an airfield that is marginal for B737 may halve the likelihood of an overrun accident. It will also halve the consequence (half the px, half the price etc). So, for the same risk exposure I can put twice the pax through the airport.

"more crews" agreed, but they come into the total cost model, so if they're affordable, why not?

"more damage to strips". Bollocks! If a bridge on a highway says '20t limit', I can run an 18 ton truck over it as often as I want (based on the maintenance and inspection schedule for the bridge), but I may damage it if I put a 25t truck across it. Impact is an inverse function of load.

"more maintenance". What does that mean? More effort, more money, more down time? It is only a factor if it adversely affects productivity. Look at the total cost model.

"more costs". I suggest you compare operating cost models. I would like to see an analysis that supports this.

"less time for more tasks" I don't understand.

"more rest", for who?

A couple of other points.

- To add, say, 10t to the cargo capacity of a vehicle, you generally have to add substantially more than 10t to the gross weight in engineering of the vehicle; ie: you add weight to carry weight; eg, to carry 10t more payload you will be putting 20t more into the strip each movement. That kills pavements.

- the argument for more payload is only relevant if you need to deliver the payload. What is the demand across that sector? Its a bit pointless putting a 767 into Rockhampton because you can if you are only going to have an average pax load of 75.

- more taps (flights) = more choices for the customer. They can travel at 5:00pm rather than 4:00pm. Couriers have more options to make a flight for critical consignments. Customers like that!

I reckon that what is happening is like FedEX letting the truck drivers choose the fleet instead of the distribution managers. That would see FedEx trying to squeeze a Kenworth K200 B-double down a suburban street near you. "Here is your jiffy back Maam, sorry about the Magnolia and your kerb...but damn she's a nice rig eh?" or "Hello Maam, I left your jiffy bag down at the corner of Bruce Hwy and Main Street 'cause I couldn't make the turn, but damn I've got a lot of jiffy bags".

500N
22nd Mar 2011, 14:24
I see we now have 4 C-17's in Japan after 2 more left Perth at the request of Japan.

So now that leaves how many for Ops ?

.

herkman
22nd Mar 2011, 23:11
The fifth C17 should be delivered to the RAAF by the third quarter of this year.

This will happen as the USAF has agreed we can one of the frames that is in build now.

The reason that this can happen is that are buying aircraft that are of a stock standard and so we really are buying off the shelf. Maybe we are learning and the "aces" are being ignored.

The case for the A400M is indeed a cause of concern.

The aircraft is totally unproven in military service, could be a dream but every aircraft including the C130 and C17, had a settling down period early in its life. Even the C130J has had and still has development problems. The C130H was in the total picture the best C130 model we brought. Shame they have been flogged to death, meeting what the army considered to be their needs.

The A400M is an expensive aircraft to buy.

It will be an expensive aircraft to both fly and operate.

I hope for all the operators sakes that I am wrong and it goes a dream.

What should be done as a matter of urgency, is to have a proper freight floor fitted to the KC30 and that too will be good value for money.

Regards

Col

500N
22nd Mar 2011, 23:17
Interesting re the A400M

Also, since we seem to operate 90% of the time with the US, does anybody factor in to the equation the logistics trail required if something goes wrong while OS ?

At least with an "off the shelf" C-17, at least the opportunity exists that parts and / or qualified staff are likely to be on the ground.


Or maybe someone wants to retire and hang the A400M hat on the rack as "his" baby.

.

Frazzled
23rd Mar 2011, 08:42
I'd settle for more J's - flip top rollers, electronic locks, high speed ramp - maybe a couple set up for gunship role to support SOTG :E:E

Frazzled:ugh:

TBM-Legend
23rd Mar 2011, 12:02
My C-17 RAAF friend tells me that generally the support for the machine is great. Parts are supplied globally by Boeing and users pool parts/engines/maintenance to keep em flying.

J model Herc could be like that but with A400M being limited to Europe [???] the logistics tail kills it.

Bit like robots in A/Stan were all operators of Talon and Dragon Runners use a common robot hospital. Broken ones in a serviceable ones out...:ok:

Bushranger 71
24th Mar 2011, 07:39
There seems a realisation in some quarters that Australian military force deployments are more likely to bend toward company group scale requirements than larger brigade or battalion group expeditionary forces. And, like it or not, military chiefs will have to become more accountable for the operating costs of mounting operations.

Larger scale deployments to ports and airheads require significant overheads in cargo handling gear and provision of in theatre secondary transportation, so the desirable capability for swift deployment is direct airland into multiple rudimentary airfields around our regional area of military interest.

The MRTT may be suited for operations into some airheads, but my sombre view is the JSF/Wedgetail/MRTT constellation will collectively prove another hugely costly debacle, although let's not digress.

More C-17s would be good and they can go to some places beyond airliner capable airheads, but not to all airfields that might take a C-130 for direct deployment closer to potential scenes of action. The C-130J has not been the quality aircraft like predecessor models with some former RAAF C-130A & E models refurbished by other nations and still operating worldwide. Australia's C-130H may have been flogged but would be quickly snapped up by other nations for refurbishment; so why not put them through a factory rebuild program rather than buy more of the still deficient C-130J?

C-27 and Chinook are principally intra-theatre capabilities for locations not accessible by C-17 or C-130. The question arises will the RAAF ever see the C-27, which I much doubt because the intended compounding increases in defence expenditure will simply be unaffordable and some roles will probably have to be shed by all 3 of the ADF arms. As some say, expansion of the Chinook fleet may be an alternative, but at what cost in additional numbers to provide an adequate force?

What might add some more substance to this interesting thread is detailing of operating costs per flying hour for C-17, C-130, MRTT, Chinook, Caribou and an estimate for C-27. For too long now, the Service Chiefs have got away with ignoring this aspect in force structures planning and conduct of operations.

The message re operating costs may soon be driven home when they are realized for Tiger, MRH90 and whatever is acquired for the so-called naval combat helicopter.

500N
24th Mar 2011, 07:54
Bushranger

The Helicopter Landing Ships, if and when they ever get operational plus Chinnooks should be able to get enough soldiers to most places needed
as would a Caribou but that's in the past.

Old Fella
24th Mar 2011, 11:37
500N, HLS/Chinook combination is far too limited to even mention in the same breath as the C130. For over fifty years the C130 has proven to be extremely versatile in operations from deserts to Antarctica and all points in between. Just as the C130/Caribou/Huey all working in concert provided the airlift capability to keep the people of the New Guinea Highlands fed when their crops have failed, the C17/C130/Blackhawk combination would be equally capable. The C130 is a much more valuable asset than many realise. As Bushranger 71 has stated, the C130 A-E-H models have operated/are operating with distinction. The J model is still not capable of doing some of what the H model is capable of doing.

Andu
24th Mar 2011, 12:04
It would seem like a major step forward if those with the last say in purchasing major defence equipment for Australia could get their heads around the rather startling idea that we, as a regional player with a limited defence budget, would often (always?) be far better off with the not absolutely cutting edge, (and therefore all too often unproven), futuristic Big Boys' Toy but rather something that has been proven to work. And resist tweaking any such purchase (as has all too often been our defence purchasers' habit) to make it different from the proven product.

The C-17, (unfortunately, the lone exception that proves the rule), is perhaps the prime example of how our major defence purchases should be done.

Bushranger 71
24th Mar 2011, 20:26
Hi 500N; re your post #78. The point I keep trying to make here is the need for suitable fixed wing airlift capacity to swiftly deploy/redeploy modest size (company group) forces cost-effectively and as close as practicable to prospective scenes of action throughout the neighbouring archipelago, limiting the amount of in-theatre secondary transportation necessary. In other words; timely and cost-effective operations.

Amphibious support ships of whatever class are more of a somewhat sluggish though valuable follow-up capability and can of course provide a range of helo services in particular for in theatre support.

I have been jousting re the submarine requirement in another forum and some extracts perhaps worth repeating here.

DWP2009 embraces the following bits re Australian Defence Policy:

'...Central to this policy would be a capacity and willingness on Australia's part to employ military power when required to deter and defeat armed attack on Australia without relying on foreign combat or combat support forces.

In terms of military strategy, it means the ability to conduct independent military operations in the defence of Australia by way of controlling the air and sea approaches to Australia, and denying an adversary the ability to operate, without disruption, in our immediate neighbourhood, to the extent required to ensure the security of our territory and people'...

Deterrence of interference with regional trade corridors is realistic; but defeat of armed attack on Australia is militarily impractical. The primary emphasis in foregoing policy is on capabilities for regional operations and not for wandering the world, although governments might choose to also engage in international combined operations, if Australia has suitable capacity. But the taxpayer rightly deserves that adequate and credible military capabilities for regional operations be continually maintained.

Hoping not to get too much thread drift here, but methinks Australian defence capabilities planning got skewed in the aftermath of East Timor intervention. For what its worth, the 'Planning and Selection' detail on this Wikipedia link Canberra class landing helicopter dock - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canberra_class_landing_helicopter_dock) illustrates how an arguable over-emphasis on sealift capacity has been allowed to override adequate fixed wing airlift considerations. What seemed a logical requirement for some smallish replacement amphibious support ships with about 6 helicopters embarked (perhaps something akin to the beaut Chinese Type 071 LPD outlined on this link: India Defence Update: Article (http://www.demo14u.com/news128.html)) somehow morphed into aircraft carriers capable of embarking between 16 and 24 helicopters.

There still seems a notion among defence planners that there must be helo capacity for so-called combat air assault which was largely discredited as a concept of operations during the Vietnam War, albeit that some nations still apparently believe LPH style warships are a worthwhile military asset. No credible military commander would entertain assaulting any military objective considering the inevitable scale of casualties and likely hardware losses, so sensible amphibious concepts are more ship to shore shuttling of troops and gear plus providing offshore basing for logistic and other support.

Henceforth, the ADF will not have the most suitable balance of military transportation capabilities for regional operations in my view, although what is being/will be introduced must of course be made workable. But fixed wing airlift capacity warrants urgent reconsideration, before C-130 resources in particular degrade further.

Frazzled
25th Mar 2011, 10:15
Old Fella, ref your post about the J. It can do a lot more than it is currently doing if the there weren't alot of Nav's/FLT ENG's trying to protect their careers by extending the H. The J is strectched - therefore more pallets, flies higher, faster, more fuel effiecient, has TCAS, a proper auto pilot that can actually level off from a climb/descent. not to mention ATCS.:cool:

I have heard that flying a J on three engines is like flying a H on four. AND there are 2 less crew (saving 2 salaries).

The J is only limited by the hirearchy. Like an pensioner with a iphone - the senior ranks just don't understand:rolleyes:

Don't hate it, embrace it:)

Frazzled:ugh:

Lonewolf_50
25th Mar 2011, 13:23
Blackhawk and MRH90 are not light and agile being roughly twice as heavy as the Huey II, between 10 and 20 times more expensive to purchase (depending on cost sources referenced) and at least 4 times more costly to operate. And, the Huey II is superior in hot and high performance.

Bushranger71, I do not find your assertions valid in this passage from a few pages back.

1. For Huey II (which I think you mean to be the UH-1Y?) to be 10-20 times cheaper than Blackhawk, they would have to cost 1-2 million, which we know is not the case. It's run by two T-700's, which is about where your first one to two million would get soaked up. :p L's used to cost betweel 7-10 million back in the 90's, I think the M's are coming in under 20, but with the size of a US Army order and a multi year contract, odds are that pricing on that bird will vary, as you mentioned. I don't see anyone flying a UH-1Y away for less than 6-10 million, do you?

2. I have flown both Blackhawk (L model) and Huey (E and L model, single engine) and do not concur with your point on agility. (However, if your "agility" point is on the deployability of the Blackhawk or H90, rather than its handling stick and rudder wise, I think I see what you mean.) For those down playing the UH-1Y in this thread, the USMC appear to be pretty happy with the new 4-blade tail, 4 blade head, and its improved high hot and heavy performance. Afghanistan is a tough place to run a fully loaded helicopter in the summer time, that's for sure.

3. Your numbers on "cost to operate" are based on some data, I presume? I do not get how you derive "four times as high" from BH to others. I am also not sure which Huey you are basing your cost point on. Maybe your data are due to Australia having small fleets of any given aircraft, and some costs not spreading as well as others. Not sure. Cost per flight hour on Blackhawk and Seahawk, for example, were somewhat different a couple of decades ago, in part due to their different operational environment. But I don't have figures to hand that I consider reliable for current ops, so I'll not comment further.

4. Comment to anyone on "automatic blade fold" and Maritime helicopters.

It's a load of crap.

I operated SH-2F with manual blade fold, and SH-60B with auto, and I do not buy this tripe about how your "operations" are limited by manual bladefold. In my experience, I found manual to be much more reliable, faster (with a trained crew) and utterly lacking the profound operational limitations that arose time and again when the blasted blade fold failed to work as advertised in actual conditions. (Slip rings and corrosion were one of many problems.)

However, the Rube Goldbergs of the aviation world won that round ... auto blade fold appears to be here to stay. I suppose that some of the annoying features that plagued me may have been overcome in the intervening years. I hope so, anyway.

C-17: great capability, but I think the analysis of how to balance scarce money on airlift is extremely dependent on ROC and POE. (Required Operational Capability and Predicted Operating Environment). We discussed this some months back, BR71, and I note that your current deployment model is a company sized fight ... in what time frame and with what follow on forces in what timeframe???

How one phases the operation is crucial to how one builds the transport scheme to support an op.

The more I think through your point, the more I appreciate your concern on Hercs being given short shrift, given the expected tactical scenarios you envision the Aussies engaging in for the near to mid term.

That said, the C-17 is a fine bird, and more to the point, a bird that gives the POLITICAL leadership a larger number of options and flexibility than hercs ... the Japan event being a fine case in point.

But, if the armed forces are to provide security for some serious Aussie homeland and local area fighting and defense as a primary role, then perhaps the C-17 is a luxury, and a boosting of the Hercs a necessity.

This thread has been most educational. Thanks to all.

TBM-Legend
25th Mar 2011, 14:02
From a meeting I had today Ronny RAAF is planning on the final C-17 fleet being six ships...

Bushranger 71
26th Mar 2011, 04:17
Hi Lonewolf 50; you make some interesting points and I hope some thread drift might be forgiven in answer.

The Huey II and UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey) are different Iroquois derivatives. The Huey II is a totally refurbished, rewired, re-engined UH-1H airframe with multiple performance upgrade features and lots of optional enhancements, including various glass cockpit options. This link gives a broad overview but more comprehensive info is available from Bell Helicopter: Bell Helicopter - The Bell UH-1H (Huey II) (http://suat.bellhelicopter.com/en/aircraft/commercial/bellHueyII.cfm).

Over 200 Huey II are now in service worldwide including military and civil versions with long supportability envisaged due to component commonality of multiple Bell types. The hot and high performance of the Huey II beats the pants off any other utility types and it just has to be the bargain of the century at around US2million for enhancement of a UH-1H acquired by Bell from stored US reserves. Conversion of wholly-owned UH-1H would of course be cheaper.

The twin-engine UH-1Y Venom was originally intended to be an upgraded UH-1N but that subsequently changed to new airframe production. The primary difference is a cabin stretch of about 530mm but also other enhancements. The overall project cost of the USMC AH-1Z/UH-1Y program seems pretty expensive, but the bulk of that outlay is for the AH-1Z. I have not yet seen any unit cost figure for a UH-1Y but I wager it would be appreciably cheaper than the MH-60R or the NFH90 while having many of the desirable naval support features for shipboard operations.

Herewith a little bit of related nonsense received last week from an 'Advisor' to the Australian Minister for Defence: '...even upgraded Iroquois helicopters would not provide a contemporary level of crash protection for Defence aircrew and personnel required by current policy...' The practice of writing absurd type specifications for military hardware has been going on worldwide for years in response to lobbying by arms manufacturers against consideration of competitor equipment. The Australian DoD is clearly writing out consideration of cost-effective helo types like the Huey II and UH-1Y despite their growing use elsewhere in the world and actively in military operations.

The necessity for 'light and agile' utility helicopters was highlighted by Lieutenant General John J. Tolson, US Army in a very comprehensive analysis of Vietnam War operations. Agility in my sense means the capability of rapidly and efficiently adapting to changes which the Iroquois does well in both aircraft handling and versatility considerations. Blackhawk is roughly twice as heavy as the Huey II with several consequent operating penalties; similarly for the MRH90 which is touted in many references as a medium lift helicopter. The ongoing need for a light and agile machine seems to have been further endorsed with the advent of the UH-72 Lakota into US Army service as a so-called 'Light Utility Helicopter'. Unit cost seems a bit rubbery, perhaps between US5-8million; though still not comparable with the Huey II in my view for capacity, performance, flexibility and versatility.

Helo operating costs outlined previously (for FY2007) were supplied by Australian DoD. Blackhawk is quoted at $20,659 per flying hour and Huey II would be about $5,000 or less.

But back to the thread theme.

The C-17 is indeed a great bird and substantially enhances Australia's military airlift capacity and more of them would be a wise move; but it cannot operate into many low grade airfields in our regional tropical archipelago (without higher risk of engine damage in particular) that are accessible by C-130. Over many years, the RAAF became very skilled at C-130 deployment of Iroquois and M113 APCs to provide an appropriate level of support for military deployments in remote areas. Running down C-130 capacity (and discarding the Iroquois) somewhat forfeits the tactical ability to deploy/redeploy smallish quick reaction forces swiftly in remote areas whereas operating other airlift capacity into airheads or airliner compatible airfields requires the provision of secondary in-theatre transportation means, substantially escalating the overheads of mounting smaller scale military operations. The Herc enables highly desirable great flexibility in military planning.

These extracts from Australian Defence Policy (Defence White Paper 2009) are pertinent:

'...Central to this policy would be a capacity and willingness on Australia's part to employ military power when required to deter and defeat armed attack on Australia without relying on foreign combat or combat support forces.

In terms of military strategy, it means the ability to conduct independent military operations in the defence of Australia by way of controlling the air and sea approaches to Australia, and denying an adversary the ability to operate, without disruption, in our immediate neighbourhood, to the extent required to ensure the security of our territory and people'...

Military capacity to deter interference with regional trade corridors is a realistic and affordable requirement; but defeat of armed attack on Australia is militarily impractical in my view.

The primary emphasis in foregoing policy is on capabilities for regional operations, although the government might choose to also engage in international combined operations and strategic aid to civil powers, if Australia has suitable capacity. But the taxpayer rightfully deserves that adequate military capabilities for regional operations be continually maintained.

Bushranger 71
27th Mar 2011, 19:13
Hi Frazzled; re your post #82.

Because the C-130 airframe is so wonderfully versatile, it is adaptable for a broad range of special operations roles. I have crawled over some such birds and they mostly require additional aircrew members to operate specialised gear and command missions. The larger flight deck of earlier model Hercules has been adapted in varying ways to provide additional crew stations with some also having modular units installed in the cargo hold.

I have not been on board the C-130J, but the reduced crewing and stretched cargo hold make it more like a civilian air-freighter albeit with short-field characteristics. When the 'J' model was being introduced to RAAF service, experienced Herc qualified friends commented that some black boxes had been repositioned to just above the ramp, somewhat impeding loading of higher gear for which earlier models had been cleared; but maybe that problem has been overcome.

Post-Air Force, I spent a decade in airline flight training when glass cockpit technology and computerised flight management systems were coming into vogue. Beaut stuff of course enabling crewing economies for airline operators; but the varying ability of aircrew to assimilate a whole lot of floating data soon became apparent. Not a problem in routine operations; but when the pressure comes on, some information that gets displayed is not always adequately absorbed.

These days, glass cockpit enhancements are available for most types of aircraft, but there seems some risk to me of overloading the ability of aircrew to stay ahead of the game in stressful combat roles, unless there are adequate crew members to cope with all of the essential information monitoring in addition to just driving the aircraft. Designing military aircraft flight decks around crewing economies is arguably not altogether wise.

RAAF C-130H would be eagerly sought and refurbished as necessary by other operators if discarded by the ADF.

Old Fella
28th Mar 2011, 02:25
Frazzled. My comment regarding the C130J was not intended to be a "put-down" of that aircraft. I am aware that it is a fine aircraft but it has not yet, to my knowledge, been developed in RAAF service to be used in some of the roles in which the A, E & H all had demonstrated their abilities. Yes the "J" can carry more in payload and can fly faster. The cruise altitude is not normally a problem, unless things have changed where FL260 was the max with passengers (Due no supplementary oxygen for pax and the time to get down to a breathing altitude))

As for "saving 2 salaries", I would contest that assertion. In the C130 world, pre "H" model at least, the Flight Engineer carried out all the maintenance required away base on almost all operations. One or more of three different "Fly-away Spares" kits were carried and as well as performing the inflight duties of Flight Engineer the F/E was responsible for any rectifications required, It was only on longer duration exercises or trips such as Staff College tours that any technical ground crew were carried. So, who do you think might perform that role today? Not the pilots I'll wager. I do not know with any certaintity however I would believe that at least one, if not two, technicians would accompany the "J" model on most flights. Not much of a salary saving I think.

Far from hating the "J" model, I believe it is a fine aircraft following in the traditions of it's forebears. If you have not had the experience of operating the "H" or earlier models of the C130, don't underestimate their value or capability.

Lost Again..
28th Mar 2011, 07:51
Two tech's are carried on away J tasking, usually more if it's a complicated task. Haven't checked the latest P&C but I believe 1 LAC & 1 CPL are still slightly cheaper than a single FSGT or above FENG on flying pay/disability.

MEAO sucks up most of the J training capacity so things like MFP, PLF, PLAT haven't been followed up. Other stuff was cancelled like wedge or postponed like RAPSL.

Moving beyond ABNOPS to higher tier capability will be interesting. ARDU did a human factors study 6 years ago specifically into this and recommended more crew members to handle the load on tasks that warranted it. This will never happen with the career's that have been staked on a modern flight deck arrangement. Funny enough the Marines with the MC130J and AFSOC with the HC130J are employing a 4 crew flight deck. I guess the RAAF knows better.

Old Fella
28th Mar 2011, 08:10
Lost again. Doesn't matter how you look at it, replacing one flight crew member (F/E) with two technical ground crew is not cheap. Those two personnel are not available at home base, so either the maintenance crews are left short at home or additional personnel are required to be brought on strength. Maybe a technically qualified Loadmaster, such as was the case with the Caribou (in the days when they were classified as Loadmasters, later Creman Tech, and finally Flight Engineer) but were in fact also the "flying spanner". As for the Nav's, I expect a Nav is carried on Tactical sorties where the "J" is used in that role.

TBM-Legend
28th Mar 2011, 08:28
The C-17 is here to stay. A 6th one will be ordered before the shut-down of the line.

fleebag
28th Mar 2011, 09:26
So much for mots

ADM: C-130J upgrade cost blowout? (http://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/c-130j-upgrade-cost-blowout)

Lonewolf_50
28th Mar 2011, 12:41
Bushranger71: thanks for the response. While Huey II payload per mission is less than Blackhawk, I appreciate the clarification and cost (per flight hour) references.* If I can get my hands on current US Army cost per hour numbers, (and the basis for calculation) I'll see how they compare to what you cited. MH-60R is heavier and more expensive for a lot of reasons. In re your deployability concerns, certainly not in the ball park.

The crashworthiness criterion for utlity helicopters is a specification that also owed its genesis to lessons learned from Viet Nam operations. I am neutral on the topic: as aircrew, you want to be able to walk away from a controlled crash and not, like in the SH-2F, have things like the radar rack end up in your lap when you sit in the rear seat. The weight penalty has its own downside, of course. FWIW, a friend of mine walked away (actually swam away) from crashed SH-60 thanks in part to the crashworthy criterion of the S-70 series pilot seats ... and he still had back problems for years, thanks to that crash. Lacking that energy absorbtion capability, he'd have fed the fish instead.

Again, a most educational thread.

Getting there with the most capability per unit of cube & weight of tactical (or strategic) lift is a problem planners won't stop trying to optimize any time soon. :8 That rock keeps being rolled up the hill ...

* = looked at the numbers and I see the internal payload is very similar, depending upon how you arrive at "useful load" numbers. The major difference is external load bonus to the Blackhawk. Internal load is close enough, based on the stats offered for the Huey II and Blackhawk, to make the decision on economics an interesting one.

Lost Again..
28th Mar 2011, 22:29
Old Fella. No navigator is ever carried on the J in the tactical roles. The two pilot's run the show themselves. The only times nav's were "kind of" used was during the initial JPADS OT&E as a PADS operator. The ABNOPS standard was re-written about 5 years ago and dumbed down to the current level to allow quicker training. The test will be when they take a J to Red Flag or other high tempo exercise and see if it works in these roles. The USAF and RAF are still running around with Talon II's or C130K's on this exercise.

I agree about the cost of 2 tech's to be honest with the loss of two bod's on the flightline. However, since the Sea King at Nias crash, the number of jobs that a FENG's is legally signed off to fix has been drastically reduced and the H requires a rescue just as often.

Old Fella
29th Mar 2011, 03:29
Lost Again. Very interesting to read your comments regarding the crewing of the J and also the reduction in areas of responsibility for the currfent F/E's. As one of the "Old Brigade" of C130 F/E's I am not surprised at the changes which have been made, although I must admit to being disappointed that it was necessary to do so.

Many things have changed I guess, such as the way in which candidates for F/E training are selected and the backgrounds of some chosen. Is the reason the "H" requires rescue as often as the "J" due to the limitations on the F/E or the reliability of the "H"? Short of having to have an engine change, prop change, a hydraulic system pump flush or some other major airframe component change "Rescues" were very uncommon in the days when only relatively long-term ground technicians were considered for training as F/E's and they were trained by the respective squadron using current F/E's as instructors for all ground subjects and in the simulator.

Having been gone from the RAAF for thirty years I know times have changed, not always for the best it seems. If you don't want to go public please PM me. I am interested to know how things works these days.

Wiley
29th Mar 2011, 04:06
Back in the days of A and E models, (and I'm assuming little would have changed with the 'H' model), on a long trip, the FE would take away two very large boxes, (as I recall, but am ready to be corrected, the 'A' kit and the 'B' kit), containing a rather large number of parts to replace those likely to go wrong while away.

It was not unusual for the FE to have to replace quite a large number of instruments and other sundry items during the week away on a Vung Tau or Phan Rang service. With the bits from the A and B kit in place of the originals, the aircraft would depart Darwin perfectly serviceable... but arrive in Richmond u/s, with multiple entries in the -500, because the paperwork required by the hapless FE to transfer all those parts from the A or B kit inventory and onto the aircraft inventory was formidable and extremely time-consuming.

So the FE and the co-pilot, (much to the horror of any pax who visited the flight deck for a smoke), usually spent a major part of the cruise between Darwin and Richmond ripping out all the serviceable bits and replacing those that could be replaced while maintaining safe flight with the original u/s bits... which the poor bloody ground crew had to turn around and replace again after the aircraft arrived.

Stipid? Everyone acknowledged it. But apparently, it took less time and work (for the FE at least? :)) than leaving the serviceable A and b kit pieces in place.

I'd be willing to bet that something very similar happens with the H model to this day.

Old Fella
29th Mar 2011, 04:38
Wiley Those A & B kits were the cause of more than their fair share of "back busting". You can recall, I'm sure, lifting the darn things into and out of the aircraft. There was also a C kit, which I think had a couple of fire bottles in it. You will also likely remember that many of the items in the kits could only be used when on the ground and as a consequence the FE, often assisted by the LM, would be stuck rectifying defects well after the rest of the crew had left for the bar. In fact I recall one trip in an A model, where we departed Richmond with four overhauled engines and the aircraft just out of a "D" check, on a Staff College jolly. Within 18 hours of flight time three of the four engines had to have the duplex oil scavenge pump removed and the seals replaced, no small task. Two showed the tell tale signs (oil dripping from the oil cooler flap actuator) after landing and one let go in flight with a subsequent shutdown and diversion into Honiara. Anyone with any significant hours on the A model will know what I'm talking about. I am not sure just how it is done these days with the H model, but up until I left the RAAF in '81 it was still the FE who looked after the aircraft away base on almost all tasking.

herkman
29th Mar 2011, 09:19
Yes I recall on many occasions as the Load I had the joy of assisting the Engineer with rectification of defects. Even though we were not technically adept, many of us would jump in and assist and many times did one task whilst the engineer would do something else. When the engineer leader was on the plane not only did we assist but at the end when he was checking what had been done, he expected that I brief him on how I did the task and my understanding of what to look for.

I am sure that in today's Air Force things would be very different and maybe they should be, but never the less in the back of my mind I have a memory, after our tasking had been extended, the engineer and myself pulled the C service which had become due. When we got home I expected to see the techo's pull the service again, but that did not happen, they just turned it around and sent her out again.

The fact that they have reduced the flight engineers role, in no way is it critical of many of the engineers. It is caused by the Air Force deciding that new staff did not need the knowledge and ability.

Now that was a step backwards.

The ability of the Load on the J model has been enhanced and the LM now performs both the pre and after flight checks.

Regards

Col

Bushranger 71
29th Mar 2011, 21:08
Hi again Lonewolf 50; re your post #92 and hoping not to drift too much off good airlift discussion this thread.

Somewhere in these forums was mentioned a fully-equipped ADF soldier weighs 300 pounds! Ridiculous of course because they would not be able to run and/or fight efficiently and soon become cripples. However, it would be of interest to know just what figures are actually used these days for airlift planning purposes in both fixed and rotary wing realms.

During Vietnam War ops, a fully-equipped RAAF Hotel model Iroquois manned by 4 crew and with full fuel carried 7 troops; although when working with NZ forces, fuel was usually reduced by about 200 pounds because Maori warriors are generally big heavy men who mostly draped themselves in belted ammunition.

Just to finalise your Huey II capabilities queries. Lots of enhancement options which would trim payload a bit, but H2 has the internal lift capacity for 10 troops (a notional infantry squad/section) with reconfigured simple clip-in fabric seating. A bit crowded which is probably why the UH-1Y cabin has been stretched around 530mm.

The H2 cargo hook capacity is 5,000 pounds and maximum operating gross weight increases by 700 pounds for external loading which translates to lift potential of around 3,000 pounds on the hook, more if fuel loading and/or 4 man crewing is reduced. Less than the Blackhawk of course but still pretty useful.

Re aircraft crash-worthiness features. I do not take a bean-counter view of war-fighting, but rather having adequate resources and capabilities to get the job done. Having more of employable lower cost assets assures sustainment of operations compared with lesser numbers of very expensive kit. Risk is inherent in military operations and overly-expensive cocooning against harm is arguably somewhat impractical. If I were a theatre commander, I would be quite satisfied with a bunch of very modest cost Huey II and enhanced M113 APCs for example, although they might not have the expensive inbuilt protection features of contemporary costly vehicles.

There are differing qualities between UH-60M and Huey II, but obviously much commonality in roles performable. If accepting that some casualties are inevitable in military operations, Huey II at $2million is clearly more cost-effective than UH-60M at maybe $20million.

500N
29th Mar 2011, 21:27
Bushranger
Re "Somewhere in these forums was mentioned a fully-equipped ADF soldier weighs 300 pounds! Ridiculous of course because they would not be able to run and/or fight efficiently and soon become cripples."

300 pounds is only 136kgs.

If I looked at what my weight and gear was with Standard equipment carried (and this was before the days of Steyr, Helmet, Body Armour)

Self 90kgs
Webbing 12kg
Pack 50kg
SLR 3.2kg
TOTAL 155.2 KGS
= 342 Lbs


Apologise for the thread drift. Great thread.

reacher
29th Mar 2011, 23:13
That figure is probably closer to a Patrol Order (Heavy) once you take into account some form of armour whether it be MCBAS, TBAS, Eagle Marine or whatever and the extra water and ammo that go in the day packs. Once you look at Marching Order than you've got all that plus an extra 15-20kg in pers kit and associated loss of space on whatever means of TPT you take.

Thankfully a lot of dismounted work is supported via Bushmasters (hopefully in overwatch) so most of the kit can be left with them but there's still a whole shed load of gear that the average guy is lumping around all day everyday.

Forget the M113s, the Bushmasters are saving too many lives over there ATM. The flat bottom (on both the LAVs and M113) just doesn't cut it anymore.

Without the tab data to compare on hand, how many of each can the Herc and C17 carry of each? The M113s are unlikely to be deployed anywhere that has shown to develop and use EFPs so that only leaves the Bushmaster as a deployed IMV, PMV (whatever it's called today)

Cougar
30th Mar 2011, 04:24
Agree with Frazzled.

The J is an amazing aircraft - beautiful to fly, great to operate, gutsy, robust and can cop a bollocking and get up and fight another day.

Has been limited by naivety by non-J operators, E/H fraternity (F/E, Nav and pilot) willing to stick the dagger in it's back every time they can, lack of money thrown at it (bought it without required spares/logistics pipeline and still hurting from it) and lack of man power to develop it.

It cannot do half the roles of the H because 1) Navigator union won't let it 2) lack of manpower to do test and evaluation for those roles 3) it is stuck on operations.

To be honest, I am sick of the J bashing that goes on - so are all the other nations out there with Js. The RAF J v K issue was massive - now the Ks are gone, but the J bashing continues.

In summary, the J could have been an absolutely brilliant aircraft in RAAF service - but due to beauracracy, it will always be remembered for being mediocre.

Shame, shame, shame. :yuk::yuk::yuk:

Bushranger 71
30th Mar 2011, 19:09
The overriding ADF force deployment priority now seems for sealift, but equipped troop weight and air-portability characteristics of hardware impact significantly on airlift capabilities, both at the sharp end of war-fighting and for regional quick reaction requirements.

Back in Vietnam War days, good infantry commanders kept their troops 'light', I think averaging around 220 pounds just carrying a smallish pack in addition to their other essential kit. When operating with cavalry in direct support, provision of water in particular was a lessened weight problem. If no tracks supporting due to terrain or whatever, the Iroquois were used very well for 1ATF elements routine maintenance demands (hash and trash in US parlance) including water, clothing, rations, etcetera - providing hot meals to the infanteers after a hard day when they were drenched and shivering gave all of the 9SQN aircrew a buzz.

I raise this aspect because the much heavier weights being quoted impact significantly on what fixed and rotary wing might notionally carry. For example, a theoretical infantry squad/section of 10 'light' troops at 220 pounds would require 2,220 pounds of payload availability whereas maybe 3,000 pounds or more would be necessary for heavily encumbered troops with fuel loading perhaps being restricted for some aircraft types. Cabin space is of course also affected by bulkiness. So, all of the idealism regarding necessity for utility helos in particular to carry 10 troops might not be achievable; although I cannot recall prior involvement with any Australian infantry outfit where sections were more than 6 or 7 strong. Having pursued disability pensions for Army guys who have suffered serious musculo-skeletal injuries from being physically overloaded also makes me wonder re the wisdom of present day equipping of ground-pounders.

But back to APCs. See this link regarding another big hardware modification screw-up: Australia’s M113 APC Family Upgrades (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Australias-M113-APC-Family-Upgrades-05133/) . It seems that stretching of the M113 hull by about 0.67 metres was ill-conceived and the question arises what impact might this now have on numbers of vehicles that can be airlifted in C-130 and C-17?

Reacher; I beg to differ re your post #100.

The M113 did a fantastic job in Vietnam ops but Australian cavalry units have been much under-credited because they operated a lot in direct support of other elements and cav unit histories became sparse. A few were lost/damaged by IEDs and RPGs but a pretty low loss rate considering the magnitude of their operations. The threat (risk) from higher technology weaponry such as EFPs (Explosively Formed Penetrators) or whatever depends on the availability and intensity of such armaments; like MANPADS for instance which have really not substantially dominated battlefields.

The pretty light M113 has essential off-road capabilities for wet tropics operations and is air-transportable, although how now affected by modifications is unknown. But upgrade of 431 vehicles for the ADF is still in train, so presumably they would not just be stored because the Canberra lot might be fearful of some losses and casualties. If committed to military operations at any time, best use has to be made of assets in service.

Lonewolf_50
30th Mar 2011, 20:12
Hi again Lonewolf 50; re your post #92 ...
Hi again. :)
Somewhere in these forums was mentioned a fully-equipped ADF soldier weighs 300 pounds! ... However, it would be of interest to know just what figures are actually used these days for airlift planning purposes in both fixed and rotary wing realms.
Depends on the mission. The "in the bush" figure is probably less than the "in MOUT" figure, since the body armor imperative that our own army seems to have undertaken adds weight. My light infantry friends typically use a 60 or 80 pound ruck, plus weapon, as the training load for a road march. With a man weighing 170-200 pounds, you are in the high 200's already, your heavy weapons squad well over that. The figure, 300 lbs, is probably a good one for generic planning. Also depends on how many "days of supply" of food the trooper has in his ruck. That will depend on the mission, and will vary mightily, particular in a bush mission versus a more urban mission. That in turn drives how you phase in and deliver (more Hueys, eh?) your basic water food and bullets to the fighters.
During Vietnam War ops, a fully-equipped RAAF Hotel model Iroquois manned by 4 crew and with full fuel carried 7 troops

MTOE requirements for Blackhawk that I am familiar with are for an 11 man infantry squad per, plus crew. That's with one in each seat, and all of his stuff wedged in. I have anecdotal evidence some Sikorsky pilots (who were down there at the maintenance end, not as mercs) over a decade ago about how the Columbian Army used their "bought by the US State Department Blackhawks" during bush operations.

Seats out, and quite a few more than 11 troopers per Blackhawk on the outbound missions. No 80 pounds of kit either.

Lots of enhancement options which would trim payload a bit, but H2 has the internal lift capacity for 10 troops (a notional infantry squad/section) with reconfigured simple clip-in fabric seating. A bit crowded which is probably why the UH-1Y cabin has been stretched around 530mm.

Aye. Part of the limits on Blackhawk internal load, in pounds, is the lbs per square feet (200, IIRC) for the floor. Not sure if they upgraded that for M. Can find out. The 11 seats, all with "x" amount of flex/crash protection, was a decision taken.

The Marines didin't get 13 men to fit into a UH-1Y, which is their notional infantry squad. (Won't digress into the doctrinal arguments between our Marines and Army on whay an 11 or 13 man squad ... )
The H2 cargo hook capacity is 5,000 ...l pretty useful.
Yes indeed.
Re aircraft crash-worthiness features. I do not take a bean-counter view of war-fighting, but rather having adequate resources and capabilities to get the job done. Having more of employable lower cost assets assures sustainment of operations compared with lesser numbers of very expensive kit.
Quantity has its own quality.

Part of why I was sad to see Comanche die was that you could deploy quite a few more of those per C-17 than Apache. For RRF, most missions don't require the Full Monty 16 Hellfires Apache load. What you need is more armed birds, and eyes, and sensors, in the air, fast. Comanche carried six, which is most likely enough.
There are differing qualities between UH-60M and Huey II, but obviously much commonality in roles performable. If accepting that some casualties are inevitable in military operations, Huey II at $2million is clearly more cost-effective than UH-60M at maybe $20million.

As I have read this thread, I have had to remind myself that you are operating on an Aus budget assumption. This requires a far more critical eye on the bang per dollar than a US budgetary driven choice.

But when you mention the acceptance of casualties, that gets to some profound cultural and political differences not germane to this thread. On the other hand, as your (Aus) force is far smaller, a significant body bag count may hurt your overall posture than we yanks. This might inform why you have seen a sea change in the "accepting casualties" planning assumptions in the year 2011 that may not have been as dire in 1970 or so.
The overriding ADF force deployment priority now seems for sealift, but equipped troop weight and air-portability characteristics of hardware impact significantly on airlift capabilities, both at the sharp end of war-fighting and for regional quick reaction requirements.

While it depends on what you mean by "quick" I quite agree. At the sharp end, having vertical lift in plentidude can make or break the ground commander's mission in the first 72 hours.
The pretty light M113 has essential off-road capabilities for wet tropics operations and is air-transportable, although how now affected by modifications is unknown.
Outside of my area of understanding, but of interest to me nonetheless, and of course a key driver of "what airframes and why" for the fast reaction force to ride.

Cheers. :ok:

Bushranger 71
30th Mar 2011, 21:16
Great discussion Lonewolf 50 and concur your thoughts re the Comanche. Also feel that all varieties of AAH would be better suited for majority of intimate battlefield support with multiple cannon/gun systems fitted in lieu of hugely expensive Hellfire rounds and area weapon 2.75in/70mm rockets. Depends of course of what needs to be countered; but I am drifting off thread again!

Cheers for now.

reacher
30th Mar 2011, 23:35
B71.

I'm not arguing, the recent deployment history of ASLAVs, M113s and Bushmasters proves both of our points.

Primary use of LAVs in 'stan are in the gun car role with Bushy's to tpt troops due to IED threat. I currently have mates over there and more about to go, one in particular is very happy he's going over as the boss of a Bushy Tp rather than a LAV Tp primarily for the survivability of the Bushys.

M113s deployed to Timor in '99 and again in '06 where the treat level dictated it would be survivable and suitable.

As for fitting the streched M113s in a Herc I was always under the assumption that the Hercs required a COMD waiver before lifting one, which was driven by the load factor. Granted extra length will equal greater weight it's kind of redundant when the original M113s required COMD ALG waiver anyway. As for fitting more or less into a C17......

Old Fella
31st Mar 2011, 01:21
Cougar I hope you are not including me in those whom you claim "are willing to stick the dagger in the back of the J". Truth is, it is not as well developed as were the, A and H especially, previous variants. The reasons for that may well be as you claim. I am sure the J model is not mediocre in any sense and it obviously should be able to be utilised in any role it's predecessors were. I don't know with whom you serve or what you have flown. I do know that the C130A-E-H all performed remarkably well in the roles for which they were each used and, in their day, were equally as "brilliant" as the J model.

herkman
31st Mar 2011, 01:55
Here Here

Old Loadie

0497
31st Mar 2011, 07:15
The Marines didin't get 13 men to fit into a UH-1Y, which is their notional infantry squad. (Won't digress into the doctrinal arguments between our Marines and Army on whay an 11 or 13 man squad ... )

I believe the USMCs prime troop mover is the CH-46 and recently its replacement, the MV-22 - two squads (three fireteams per squad).

Lonewolf_50
31st Mar 2011, 12:58
Correct.

I was drifting off into an old (90's era) dispute regarding why a Blackhawk variant was NOT chosen for the replacement for the CH-46, Marines, as it was for the CH-46 Navy, VERTREP, and got myself a bit mixed up. UH-1Y was never going to be the prime vertical assault aircraft. Sorry for the confusion there.

Part of why the Marines were not in the least bit interested was that the doctrinal squad of 13 wasn't going to fit in a Blackhawk ... but the real reason was that V-22 was coming.

In the mid to late 90's, the engine and airframe issues with the Frog were serious business. Boeing was approached with the idea of repoening that line, and as I understand it, the amount (in billions of dollars, half a billion, two billion? can't recall which figure was correct) Boeing (Philadelphia) was going to charge NAVAIR to do that was, this being Clinton years austerity, a non starter. At that point, V-22 was all that was possible, since in about 1999 or so, the last CH-53E was delivered from Sikorsky ... there had been some talk about going "all CH-53" but I don't think the Marines, nor NAVAIR, were ever serious about that.

"Marinized Blackhawk" (CH-60S now MH-60S) for VERTREP was a crap idea and remains a crap idea ... but since that is what was purchased, the Navy had adapted and gotten good service from a basically sound airframe.

How doesthat digression fit into this topic? The issue of cost for things that move people, parts, and petrol for a Rapid Reaction mission. The Clinton era austerity (in a relative sense) drove some curious DoD decisions (see also the KMAX non night, non IFR proposal for VERTREP flown by contract civ pilots, another idiotic idea, Clinton era, mid 90's, a decision finally scrapped) on final equipment and kit acquisition ... similar to the general fiscal austerity AUS faces on an annual basis while having to make hard decisions, program and otherwise, on how to get the kit needed for the mission with scarce dollars.

TBM-Legend
6th Apr 2011, 06:56
Australia is to buy a near-new surplus British navy amphibious landing ship at what appears a bargain $100 million pricetag.

Defence Minister Stephen Smith said Australia had been successful in its bid for RFA Largs Bay, a 16,000 tonne landing ship launched in 2003 and commissioned in 2006.

The ship is set to be decommissioned as a cost saving measure under the UK government's Strategic Defence and Security Review released last October.

Advertisement: Story continues below
Mr Smith said Australia would pay 65 million pounds or $A100 million at the current exchange rate.

He said the book value was around 130 million pounds.
:ok:

herkman
6th Apr 2011, 09:52
Thank goodness for a well proven vessel and a well proven design.

Saw an article recently on this very vessel.

Lot to be said for buying product with a proven history of service.

Better than those two rust buckets the USN conned us into buying,

Regards

Col

TBM-Legend
6th Apr 2011, 09:59
The USN did not con us. A friend of mine was on the initial review of these vessels and they were effectively told what to write by the RAN who desperately wanted a helo amphib platform quickly.

He said they knew of the rust issues then. The USN were moving out of them because they were at the end of their lives.

500N
6th Apr 2011, 10:07
If they wanted one that quickly, then why not create another Atlantic Conveyor ? Better than the wasted $ on the 2 rust buckets !!!

TBM
You seem to know a bit about it, why wasn't the requirement planned well in advance or was it just another Major purchase cock up ?

.

Frazzled
6th Apr 2011, 11:39
Yeah but can a C-17 land on it??:E

Frazzled:ugh:

500N
6th Apr 2011, 12:00
"Yeah but can a C-17 land on it??"

As per usual, the ADF had wild and wonderful ideas about capability, so it was asked for in the tender document, the supplier said yes it could, it was delivered and paid for and then 6 months later the ADF found it couldn't do it.

So all is normal, our purchasing and procurement hasn't changed :O

Bushranger 71
6th Apr 2011, 17:41
Digressing from air lift to sea lift; 4 x Bay Class LSD amphibious support ships cost the Brits roughly $500million (Bay Class Large Amphibious Landing Ships Alternative Landing Ship Logistic [ALSL] (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/rfa-alsl-program.htm)). 2 x Canberra Class LPD aircraft carriers will cost Australia around $2billion plus.

4 x Bay Class (or similar capacity ships) would have been pretty well-suited for Australia's regional amphibious support requirements and a helo hangar could be fitted to accommodate say some optimised Sea Kings (which have foldable rotor blades, etcetera).

DoD and Navy have both stated there will be significant escort/protection resource penalties to support Canberra Class operations (intelligence brief, RAN Canberra class LHD's. - Armchair General and HistoryNet >> The Best Forums in History (http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=60008)) with the LPDs also requiring about 4 times the crew complement of Bay Class.

Australian defence planners seem to have lost the plot re what would have been adequate and cost-effective sea lift capacity.

TWOTBAGS
6th Apr 2011, 21:16
Naval Procurement - Canadian Shipbuilding - JSS Project - Landing Ship Dock - Bay Class LSD(A) - Modest Proposal - CASR - Enforcer Class - Damen Schelde - Albion Class - Defence Procurement - Cantabria AOR - Protecteur Class - Canadian Shipyards - Jo (http://www.casr.ca/mp-bay-class-lpda-jss-daly.htm)

Close but not quite..... more like £500M at time of purchase for the 4.

At A$100M today its a bargain compared to what we have paid out before.

Bushranger 71
6th Apr 2011, 21:42
Hi Twotbags. Agree a Bay Class is great value at $100million and final all-up cost for 4 ships seems as you have said; but see the first link in my post #116. Initial overall cost projection for 4 ships was GBP300million - at present exchange rate of around 1.57, a bit less than AUD500million.

On those indications, I ponder whether we will see a cost escalation of the Canberra Class LPD project to somewhere around $3.5billion overall for just 2 ships?

TBM-Legend
6th Apr 2011, 21:47
B71 seems to miss the point that the ex-RN ship is not a combat assault vessel but rather a support vessel. It only carries small numbers of troops compared to a battalion plus uplift on the Canberra class vessels. Also looking again at a Timor type situation the LSD complements the larger vessels.

For once defence has made a good decision....:D

Bushranger 71
6th Apr 2011, 22:05
Hi TBM-L. Mate; no credible military commander in his right mind would 'assault' anything anymore, which is why many nations are moving toward smallish amphibious support vessels.

Heliborne combat assault is a discredited concept of operations and amphibious ops are generally ship to shore streaming of resources and provision of floating logistic bases. Largish embarked helo air components are not really necessary.

The resource penalties involved in operating aircraft carrier style LPH or LPD are prohibitive within realistic defence expenditure, as Australia will once again learn when the LPDs are introduced.

Frazzled
6th Apr 2011, 22:47
oh.. sorry thought I clicked on the C-17 thread

TBM-Legend
7th Apr 2011, 01:02
...and we await the order for the 6th C-17 for the RAAF. That is the plan I'm told from the "Stallion Battalion"...:D

BBadanov
7th Apr 2011, 07:44
...have heard the same R. 5th I have heard is coming off current USAF production run, to be delivered 3rd qtr this year.

Bushranger 71
7th Apr 2011, 20:54
See the MC-130J Roll-out thread for some interesting reading; also these links:

MC-130J rollout accelerates AFSOC recapitalization | Air Force News at DefenseTalk (http://www.defencetalk.com/mc-130j-rollout-accelerates-afsoc-recapitalization-33265/)

Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_Martin_C-130J_Super_Hercules#Harvest_HAWK)

Lockheed MC-130 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_MC-130)

It seems others also recognize the essential need for maintaining C-130 capabilities, in addition to C-17.

BBadanov
7th Apr 2011, 22:16
Yep, 4 x MC-130J would be a suitable C-130H tactical replacement.

TBM-Legend
7th Apr 2011, 22:55
It has been said before. An operational balanced fleet is where we are headed.

C-17 x 6 [one more to be ordered]
C-130J x 12+
C-27 x 10-12 [?]
KC-30 x 5

Bushranger 71
8th Apr 2011, 01:16
And, it has also been said before that the KC-30 is a virtual airliner, not tactical air transport.

Maybe 6 x C130 would be needed to swiftly move an infantry company group with some mobile firepower into some rudimentary airfields where C-17 cannot go. Assuming 50 percent online availability, that would require maximum Herc effort; but some might be operating elsewhere in the world. The RAAF once had 2 x 12 aircraft C-130 squadrons and the need arguably still exists.

As for C-27 Spartan, it might never be acquired due to compounding funding difficulties for Australia's other national economic imperatives. And the worldwide economic consequences of likely US economic collapse might force a total recast of Australia's defence capability planning. See these disturbing articles:

http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article24771.html

The stench of US default | Bill Gross, PIMCO | Commentary | Business Spectator (http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Bill-Gross-US-debt-PIMCO-bonds-pd20110331-FFVT3?OpenDocument&emcontent_spectators)

TBM-Legend
8th Apr 2011, 03:15
B71 you're only looking at one scenario. Trooping by KC-30 is a better idea than a flock of Hercs flying across the country/world at 280kts burning up hours. C-17's are operating into reasonably forward areas in A/Stan which happens to an Australia AofO right now. Agree on funding issues for C-27 but why send a Herc to carry a few bods or bits...?

Bushranger 71
8th Apr 2011, 04:03
Yes TBM-L, I am looking at one scenario based on 50 plus years of comprehensive RAAF experience in our regional tropical archipelago where there are numerous airfields probably unsuited to C-17 operations. The forward airfields in Afghanistan have perhaps been enhanced for C-17 ops.

It is far more cost-effective to quickly deploy smallish forces as near as practicable to the area of operations than having to utilize KC-30 or whatever into airliner suitable airheads with need for cargo handling gear and additional in-theatre transportation for on-move of troops and equipment. Similar problems with slower sea lift and especially for movement of heavy military hardware in the wet tropics.

My basic point is our defence planners seem to be dismissive of highly desirable flexibility in mounting operations and have focused mainly on strategic movement of larger expeditionary forces.

We could have had an optimised C-130 force including AAR and AC capabilities for money wasted (in my view) on the KC-30. Hercs would have been adequate for F-18 tankering, provided potential for flight-refuelable Blackhawks and long range/endurance all weather firepower for remote area operations. Why has Australia not learned from US operating practices?

Like This - Do That
8th Apr 2011, 04:18
BR71 another take on potential US financial difficulties is that nations like Australia will have no choice but to stop riding the US security coat tails. If the US becomes profoundly less able to project power and employ battlespace effects ..... who will?

For stoushes we don't choose - fine, we won't choose them. But what about the stoushes we DON'T choose, but choose us instead? I'd have thought that there is a pretty good chance of the defence vote having to increase beyond the current estimates. Not a certainty, but can't be ruled out.

In which case - bring on the C-27Js! In fact, bring on the C-27Js regardless.:ok:

Another alternative is to look at the drum you've been beating - why does our defence budget buy so little compared to other middle powers? Not an easy comparison to make: there are strategic horses for courses; some things appear in some nations' budgets which are external in others' budgets; current operational tempo; etc etc. Has our history of procurement debacles left us without systems and capabilities we ought to have? No doubt, but we're hardly unique in that regard.

Gundog01
8th Apr 2011, 05:27
Aus $ was pushing 1.05 USD seems like no better time to buy US....

C-27 x 10-12 [?] Place the order today.

TBM-Legend
8th Apr 2011, 06:15
KC-30's are planned to refuel the C-17 [US practice if needed] as well as the Wedgetail and other KC-30's. This is in addition to fighters and coalition aircraft. The secondary uplift of troops and freight boosts our resources.

No argument about a KC/MC-130 configuration either. We have "sneaky pete" C-130/P-3 assets as well, just not advertised.

About the AofO, we can't predict our next role or area given the global nature of fast changing events.

flighthappens
8th Apr 2011, 06:40
No argument about a KC/MC-130 configuration either. We have "sneaky pete" C-130/P-3 assets as well, just not advertised. Until now :oh:

500N
8th Apr 2011, 06:46
It's not that secret.

flighthappens
8th Apr 2011, 07:04
Haven't come across the security classification "Not that Secret" before.....

TBM-Legend
8th Apr 2011, 07:19
what I mean't is that we don't designate our aircraft as EC's or EP's etc etc like some other countries do.

500N
8th Apr 2011, 09:45
"Haven't come across the security classification "Not that Secret" before....."

OK, how about it's in the public domain.

herkman
8th Apr 2011, 14:15
From a role/function, if the KC30 was equipped with a cargo floor their function would be the same as the KC135R, The KC10 and so on.

We are restricting the use of the KC30 after all they will not always be tasked for AR and just to carry troops. Under floor space is I believe restricted compared with main cabin. Other wise the troops and their vehicles would require two types of uplift aircraft and that could restrict tasking.

Either way the uplift capacity needs improving.

As for the C130H let us not repeat the C130E problem and lets get them into upgrade. The RNZAF is putting theirs through that beaut shop in WACO Texas and my understanding they are coming out almost as new airframes. After all there is at least one 1958 airframe still flying in the USA and with the Aero Products props to boot. My understanding that it is about to get zero time main planes and a new centre section.

In the meantime six of our E models now fly with the PAF as super E's.

Regards

Col

Bushranger 71
8th Apr 2011, 17:20
TBM-L; some thread drift in response unavoidable so herewith repeat of bits from Defence White Paper 2009 aired previously:

'...Central to this policy would be a capacity and willingness on Australia's part to employ military power when required to deter and defeat armed attack on Australia without relying on foreign combat or combat support forces.

In terms of military strategy, it means the ability to conduct independent military operations in the defence of Australia by way of controlling the air and sea approaches to Australia, and denying an adversary the ability to operate, without disruption, in our immediate neighbourhood, to the extent required to ensure the security of our territory and people'...

Deterrence of interference with regional trade corridors is realistic; but defeat of armed attack on Australia is arguably militarily impractical. The primary emphasis in foregoing policy is on capabilities for regional operations and not for wandering the world, although governments might choose to also engage in international combined operations, if Australia has suitable capacity.

However, the strategic basis for DWP2009 already warrants review by national intelligence agencies. The US will inevitably be forced to withdraw from South East Asia (China's First Island Chain) toward American territories in the South West Pacific (China's perceived Second Island Chain). The US island fortress Guam is the same distance from Darwin as is Canberra so the ANZUS alliance will henceforth be more focused on Australia's immediate neighbourhood. China appears not to have any territorial ambitions beyond its regional FIC, but has an economic stranglehold on Australia and thus no need to exert military pressure. In effect, China's growing economic strength in our region could be seen as a defacto form of security assurance in parallel with the US alliance.

The fundamental weakness in Australian defence planning is focusing on a mythical force structure 2 decades downstream instead of progressively optimising in-service hardware (where cost-effective) to continually maintain adequate and credible military capabilities for regional operations. Multiple capability gaps have emerged from flawed hardware acquisition planning, ergo the prudent acquisition of a Bay Class amphibious support ship for $100million.

There are ongoing manufacturer upgrade programs for aircraft that Australia intends shedding so it would seem wise to suspend the Defence Capabilities Plan, put the C-130H through the factory refurbishment program as 'herkman' suggests, spend another $100million on 50 x Huey II to recover forfeited utility helo capability, perhaps another $100million or so optimising Sea Kings and acquiring some more. These comparatively modest cost actions would materially enhance capabilities for regional military operations and restore some credibility in defence planning.

TBM-Legend
8th Apr 2011, 23:09
B71: all points taken however we now have to live with the decisions taken. The issue is to work out what to do next. You will never reverse the current decisions good or bad.

I agree that we could do much better with less ie. C-130H rebuilds etc. I spoke to the CO of Sea King squadron recently and he would be very happy to see them upgraded; mainly a an avionics fit and they could soldier on for another ten years or so. The people in charge are obsessed with fewer types is better no mater what the cost it seems.

herkman
9th Apr 2011, 00:27
The problem is that the planning process is made without a clear understanding of what our REAL needs are.

We bought the C130E when in actual fact going down the line were higher HP C130's and whilst they may not have been full H models they would have given us a better operating situation particularly as most of our take off and landings were done well above the standard plus 20 day.

We kept the A models which were really not suited for long range operation and lost the chance to trade them with Lockheed, who wanted to turn them into AC130 gunships.

Then we buggered around with the 707 buy to a stage we had to go onto the world market because Qantas had sold most of their frames. Then the contract with the Jews was far from satisfactory for the AR conversion, and we could have bought KC135R's cheaper and quicker than we got the 707 into AR service.

Then there is the little bou, we were talking of converting them to turbo props in 1968, but the army bitched about another fuel they had to deploy, guess which fuel the army tanks use now.

The people who have the operational knowledge and and hands on should be listened to instead of the chair born leaders who often have had nothing to really contribute that would make the purchase a real good deal.

The aircraft that we have clearly bought off the shelf, after we have defined what we need are the ones that were good buys. Going back to the C47, Neptune and on to all four of the C130 buys all have done a good job. As did the various models of the UH1's. I could but will not list all the junk that the three services have bought that was not fit for use.

We need to have the best of information so we can plan on what operations we will have to conduct to ensure that we get what is best suited for the job.

Regards

Col

Wiley
9th Apr 2011, 01:53
Col, from some of the comments you've made, I suspect your name may well appear in my log book.

Back on to the subject in hand.

The killer issue overriding all else in these purchases that go wrong (or, given how many there have been, should that be "these-purchases-that-go-wrong"?) is one that Bushranger 71 has touched on already. The Department of Defence has ceased being about providing the best and most suited equipment for our soldiers, sailors and airmen to go into battle with - (or perhaps more importantly, to be able to project Australia's interests quickly and effectively and therefore not to have to go into battle with). It has instead become, to an overwhelming degree, a Department of Defence Industry, with its main aim being to provide the biggest returns to the people who will build said equipment.

Like many such skewed ideas, it started out with noble (or as noble as things can get in the halls of government) ideas of providing the maximum number of jobs for Australian workers and developing local industry. However, as defence equipment has become more complex and so expensive to buy, local defence companies have found it impossible to bid as stand alone contractors, and so very few have survived as independant entities. Instead, almost all have become branches of major European or US defence conglomorates and the local jobs such purchases generate are all too frequently short term or so so uneconomic in terms of what the taxpayer has to fork out to generate those jobs, it's just not worth it. And, most importantly, much if not most of the profits now go overseas.

Insisting on a specialised local product, (which involves huge added expenditure, as well as very long delays), has also been been shown - in almost every case - to be a disaster, and after huge outlays far in excess of what originally budgeted for, in some cases, (Seasprite), resulting in no product reaching the end user at all, while in others, (Tiger), political pressure has resulted in the end user being forced to take delivery of a product that clearly was not reaching many of the promised performance parameters set down in the original contract and promised by the manufacturer. This too has resulted, to date at least, in no product reaching the end user, and the end user having to accept that when the (incredibly expensive) product eventually arrives, many years after it was due, it will not perform as promised.

Added to this is the very ignoble aspect of some people at the top, both the civilian 'suits' - (and I stress that I include very senior politicians among these 'suits' - just look who some ex-ministers of the Howard government are working for now) -and those in uniform who have allowed the job they have been promised post-retirement, or the job they hope to win post-retirement, to colour their judgement in what company should be chosen for a particular contract. (This is by no means peculiar to Defence.)

In short, a very unhappy situation, and one that, if the Australian population was not so apathetic, (or perhaps just plain ignorant) about how much has been spent - and continues to be spent - to so little effect, would be causing an outcry as loud as is currently being made over the ill-conceived carbon tax.

In an attempt to bet back onto the topic of this thread, the C-17 purchase has shown how any such purchase should be done - and for this country to be running a fleet of King Airs in lieu of a Caribou (or its modern day equivalent) fleet is a travesty of the first order and one that will cost us dearly should we ever have to go into battle in our local area.

Barry Bernoulli
9th Apr 2011, 08:39
Wiley said:


for this country to be running a fleet of King Airs in lieu of a Caribou (or its modern day equivalent) fleet is a travesty of the first order and one that will cost us dearly should we ever have to go into battle in our local area.


The DWP2009 say that "Australia should continue to play a leading role in supporting internal stability and effective governance within the countries of our immediate neighbourhood, which makes sense from both a humanitarian and a strategic perspective."

If someone were trying to destablise our immediate neighbourhood, how would they get around from place to place, could the ADF match/counter them, and where would the ADF have to go in order to do that?

BR71, I expect that you would have some astute observations regrading this?

Bushranger 71
9th Apr 2011, 20:19
Bravo herkman and Wiley your latest posts.

BB; shedding of the Caribou was really stupid as they performed an invaluable role throughout the regional archipelago and in Vietnam during their service. Doubtless, the C-27 Spartan would be a good replacement; but I have reservations about funding being available over the next decade or so for kit envisaged in the Defence Capability Plan, despite supposed quarantining of planned increases in defence expenditure out to 2030 by both of the major political parties. Australia is facing too many other economic imperatives and voters will inevitably complain more about defence as they come under escalating cost pressures.

The King Air move was arguably even dumber than sacrificing the 'Bou, but I think it is all about preserving the Air Order of Battle. If squadrons are closed down while a requirement exists in the DCP for a replacement aircraft, there is lessened justification for that project to materialise, especially if the politicians are forced downstream to consider defence spending economies. On another tack, given the parlous status of the Joint Strike Fighter project, it would seem prudent to mothball 1 or 2 fighter squadrons to extend the in-service life of the F-18; but if the F-35 dies (as seems possible), those lost flying units would probably never be recovered. The same reasoning could be applied to the Order of Battle for Navy and Army.

While the Service Chiefs are now more subservient to the Public Service defence machinery and the job creation posturing of politicians than was the case pre-Tange Re-organisation in 1974, military leader influence in some of the inappropriate force structuring decisions over the past decade in particular should be highlighted. CDF support for the hugely costly and unnecessary ADF helo fleet rationalisation plan and withdrawal of the long-range F-111 from service - which could have been cost-effectively enhanced for maritime strike - are just 2 examples of leadership shortcomings. As I see it, military history will not judge him kindly.

TBM-Legend
9th Apr 2011, 23:21
Don't mention ADFA...

Poor leadership evident here on all levels.

ftrplt
9th Apr 2011, 23:50
Bushranger,

the Caribou was dead as a viable and maintable airframe - simple as that. No amount of sustainment money was going to make it last any longer.

The King Air decision was all about providing a gap fill capability of some description and help maintain a workforce mass that is going to transition basically every platform over the next decade. You need to maintain a level of 'spare' capacity to introduce new types whilst maintaining capability with the old.

Not to mention in an environmebt where pilots course graduates are waiting up to 18 months for conversions in ALG, its not a bad thing to have a cheap option to generate experience and captaincy in junior aircrew. The King Air does provide valuable and cost effective outcomes - it shouldnt be thought of as a Caribou replacement, its an option to generate some form of capability with remaining elements of what was the Caribou workforce. The cost of this capability is relatively small especially with rationalisations achieved with the merger of the Army KA capability.

No one argues that airlift capability is reduced without a dedicated light transport - its all a decision on how best to apportion limited acquisition funds (which are different buckets than sustainment) - and a prioritisation decision. Light tactical transport just happens to be assessed as the low priority in competition.

It is always interesting to hear the 'veterans' sprouting how obvious the answers are, and that the current leadership are completely clueless - give them some credit for having a clue. Your belief that maintaining the 'long range' F111 as a viable and cost effective maritime strike capability clearly indicates you dont have as much a clue as you think you do.

Slezy9
10th Apr 2011, 00:05
withdrawal of the long-range F-111 from service - which could have been cost-effectively enhanced for maritime strike

We already have a long range maritime strike platform - the AP-3C, and I do mean long range!! It does not need someone out there hours before to sort through the contacts and work out which one is the HVU, it can do it for its self.

As for cost effective, ha ha ha. The F111 was sucking an insane amount of cash for each and every flying hour. $100000+ per hour.

Just let the F111 die......

Bushranger 71
10th Apr 2011, 00:25
ftrplt; off the theme I know and ignoring your rude opinion of me, maybe you should think a bit more outside the propaganda square.

An estimate of enhancement cost for the F-111 to maintain a good capability out to about 2030 was around $2.5billion whereas the Super Hornets will cost something like $6.5billion.

In a 3 or 6 month snapshot of Afghanistan ops for the USAF, offensive air racked up 10,000 hours with 4,000 hours of tankering support.

Super Hornet requires K-30 to achieve things the F-111 could do without tankering so that does not equate to cost-effective operations in my view.

Andu
10th Apr 2011, 01:56
ftrplt, I think all of us 'old veterans' see the reason (and the sense) in maintaining some semblance of experience levels for RAAF light transport crews in use of the (hopefully interim) King Air. I just think most of us are appalled that the powers that be allowed such a need to become necessary.

Why the light transport force was allowed to reach such a state is instructive.

It's no secret that there are some at Russell Hill who are holding out for the Osprey to replace the Caribou and the Chinook. Myself, (and ignorant old veteran, so wtf would I know), I think the Osprey would be a huge mistake, a mistake along similar lines to the (I think, misguided) choice of the Tiger and the MRH-90.

Buying the Osprey would be hugely expensive, both in purchase price and in hourly operating costs, and the ADF would end up in a similar situation to what they currently have with helicopter support - unable to afford enough airframes to provide meaningful support to all but a very few ground units, and with hardware so expensive per unit, we simply couldn't dare to put them in harm's way lest we lose one. (Someone, a serving member, I understand, has already made this same comment here about our current helicopters - the the loss of one helicopter in Afghanistan is 'politically unacceptable'.)

Such sentiments cause a choking sensation in those of us old enough to remember the attitude of quite a few in the Australian Army to the RAAF's tactics with the Iroquois in Vietnam. Many in the Army wanted the RAAF to operate their helicopters the same way the US Army operated, where the utility helicopter was treated almost as a throwaway item. It was the ill feelings (and the Army-created myth) generated by that clash of cultures that led to the Army taking over the helicopter force in 1988-9.

If there's someone out there who honestly believes that AAAvn have presented the ground units they support with a better product to the same number of units than the "5 star hotel, 10am to 3.30pm, Monday to Thursday" RAAF (the utterly bull**** myth some in the Army would have the younger ones who don't know any better to believe), I'd like to hear them argue their case.

ftrplt
10th Apr 2011, 04:57
maybe you should think a bit more outside the propaganda square

exactly what propoganda square would that be - the one that doesnt necessarily agree with the Carlo Kopp view of the world and with some understanding of the real capabilities (now and future) of the F111 vs its sustainment costs?

An estimate of enhancement cost for the F-111 to maintain a good capability out to about 2030 was around $2.5billion whereas the Super Hornets will cost something like $6.5billion

whose estimate and what 'good capability' would that be?

offensive air racked up 10,000 hours with 4,000 hours of tankering support

so what?

Super Hornet requires K-30 to achieve things the F-111 could do without tankering

what things are those? Throw away statement with no facts.

I note you haven't offered an opinion on the fact that the Caribou was unsustainable.

My statements were not in any way presented as slights on you or your history - just a statement against some of your opinion being presented as fact, and using that opinion to make invalid claims against some senior leadership. Your claim that the Bou was 'sacrificed' and the 'F111 retirement was a poor reflection on CDF' are the statements that I have a problem with.


Why the light transport force was allowed to reach such a state is instructive

because there just isnt enough money to compete with other requirements considered more important based on the current strategic view of the world and the priorities that are set by Govt.

We would all love to have a strong light transport force, based on goverments view of the world its has just not been a high enough priority in the last decade. Its clear you dont agree which is fine, but dont assume its occured due to ignorance.

choice of the Tiger and the MRH-90

Almost all members in uniform with knowledge in this area agree with this statement - its a pity that the military doesnt always get to choose equipment best suited to its needs.

If there's someone out there who honestly believes that AAAvn have presented the ground units they support with a better product to the same number of units than the "5 star hotel, 10am to 3.30pm, Monday to Thursday" RAAF (the utterly bull**** myth some in the Army would have the younger ones who don't know any better to believe), I'd like to hear them argue their case.

I dont think such a person exists - big decision to move em back to Air Force though, which there is certainly some thought to do. Pretty hard politics though!

It's no secret that there are some at Russell Hill who are holding out for the Osprey to replace the Caribou and the Chinook

Cant say I have heard this and I doubt it would have much sway at all at the higher levels.

Gundog01
10th Apr 2011, 10:15
The Kingair replaces the Caribou in only one way.....generate candidates with 300 PIC to complete Flying Instructors Course.

Only a hand full of Bou pilots remained to Fly Kingairs and 2 dozen techos at best.

I think in 10 years when the RAAF, Navy and Army has changed every airborne platform in their inventory we should assess the ability and leadership of the people running things at the moment.

Old Fella
10th Apr 2011, 11:21
As one of those "old veterans" whom, it seems, some would have everyone believe should be denied an opinion I simply offer the undeniable fact that our RAAF has been allowed to be "disenfranchised" in terms of maintenance capability due to the "out sourcing" to civil maintenance organisations.

It would seem to me that this loss of numbers of serving maintenance personnel, the run down of airlift capability diversification in now not having an aircraft capable of performing the tasks previously undertaken by the Caribou and no rotary wing element in the RAAF certainly leads me to believe the RAAF is not the force it was.

We have the Super Hornet, a stop-gap measure, the King Air which it may be argued is in no way capable of much in comparison to the Caribou and it seems a less than adequate training organisation within ALG if pilots are having to wait 18 months for conversion. The RAAF will achieve it's tasking, as it always has, however to do so is becoming increasingly difficult as our aircraft inventory shrinks.

ftrplt
10th Apr 2011, 13:10
This is starting to get way off thread, but:

some would have everyone believe should be denied an opinion

no one is being denied an opinion - its when opinion is presented as (incorrect) fact - i.e bollox - then its only fair to make a call on it.

RAAF has been allowed to be "disenfranchised" in terms of maintenance capability due to the "out sourcing" to civil maintenance organisations

yep - harking back to the 'good old days'. Are you sure that the overall ADF maintenance capability is reduced because the RAAF workforce has been reduced - what is the basis of this 'fact'. (example - a significant historical cause of J model reduced availability has been spares inventories, not maintenance capacity)

the run down of airlift capability diversification

Are you for real - the RAAF's global airlift capability has never been so good - its agreed that light tactical is worse but look at it in relation to what the ADF has been involved in for the last decade or so. As already acknowledged its a limited budget acquisition prioritisation decision. C-17's, stretched J models and Chinooks supporting the guys in the desert - a pretty big improvement of the all C130 fleet of decades past. Just how would a light tactical transport be contributing to defence outcomes as directed by Govt in the last decade?

We have the Super Hornet, a stop-gap measure

What is the basis of fact for this 'stop-gap' assessment?

than adequate training organisation within ALG if pilots are having to wait 18 months for conversion

It wouldnt have anything to do with a number of C130 airframes deployed on operations for the greater part of the last decade would it?

Heathrow Harry
10th Apr 2011, 14:12
The F-18's are "stop-gap"???

What are you waiting for? The Millennium Falcon???

If its good enough for the USN and USMC what do YOU want???

Bushranger 71
10th Apr 2011, 20:47
If someone were trying to destabilise our immediate neighbourhood, how would they get around from place to place, could the ADF match/counter them, and where would the ADF have to go in order to do that?
I think post #143 is very pertinent and apologies BB that I was not more specific regarding your query.

Australia's past involvement in PNG is relevant. Post-WW2 ,Qantas and TAA, which were then both government-owned, provided a range of air transportation means often used for military purposes in addition to RAAF Dakotas. Under Australian government administration, the 2 battalions of the Pacific Island Regiment were trained and mentored by the Australian Army with extensive patrolling along remote and very rugged western border areas to counter intrusions. Post-PNG independence, there was substantial provisioning of Australian military air support for the PIR vide C-130, Caribou, Iroquois with much positioning of drummed Avtur by C-130 and Caribou in particular.

There is uncontrolled air movement all over the northern archipelago as ground means are often impossible or too arduous. Customs and immigration control is pretty non-existent beyond a few major centres so it is quite easy for people who might have subversive intentions to move around.

As a slight aside, Australia is not too dissimilar. I flew the Darwin-based Dakota in the early 1960s and some tasks were monitoring of the old wartime airstrips around the coastline and maintaining the Navy sponsored coast-watcher network, which was based on mission-run beaut little aboriginal communities around the northern coast and on nearby islands. We occasionally found aircraft tyre tracks on remote airstrips and the Aborigine coast-watchers, who took their responsibility seriously, often reported suspicious aircraft movements.

An incident perhaps of interest. In January 1963, pre-Confrontation with Indonesia, the coast-watchers at Millingimbi nabbed 5 Indonesians who had come ashore in a small vessel. We flew out there with a Navy IntellO and the Sergeant of Police from Darwin (the only one armed) and discovered 2 of the group wearing military green shirts. We tipped out several baskets of maggoty food to find epaulettes with Indonesian insignia and other documentation. They were perhaps a bit unlucky to be detected considering the vastness of the Australian coastline, which is arguably impossible to adequately monitor. We took the Indons back to Darwin and they disappeared into the 'spook' system with nought publicly said, although there were other similar happenings.

Only small groups of people are necessary for generation of subversive activities and if appropriately skilled, could disrupt communications and power sources for example to create political strife. The federal government has admitted that identification fraud is now so sophisticated that illegal entry to Australia via routine airline transportation is common and we also have a wide open back door via New Zealand. So it is unrealistic that Australia can be militarily defended.
It is always interesting to hear the 'veterans' sprouting how obvious the answers are, and that the current leadership are completely clueless - give them some credit for having a clue.
Ftrplt; veterans are usually pretty forthright about matters military because they have mostly taken on board the lessons from combat experience and Australia's prior military involvement. This does not seem to be the case with the higher echelon of Defence. Senior public servants involved in capabilities planning largely have no military background and combat experience is very thin among the reigning military hierarchy from CDF down.

The Defence Capability Plan is a shambles with capability gaps emerging everywhere, hence the knee-jerk Super Hornet acquisition, leasing of tankers, no gunship capability since mid-2004, shedding of utility helo capability, civilian helos leased by Army and Navy, unplanned acquisition of a Bay Class amphibious support ship (although a good move), leasing of King Airs in substitution for Caribou, etcetera. There seems a tendency among the serving fraternity to blame DMO entirely for this parlous situation without also questioning the influence of the military leadership.

I think the whole planning process got derailed in the aftermath of East Timor intervention with emphasis becoming bent toward movement of largish expeditionary forces and creation of an enlarged hardened and less mobile Army as part of a mythical Force 2030 concept. Had acquisition of some smallish amphibious support ships like Bay Class been initiated at that time (in lieu of aircraft carriers), the RAN would have been better oriented toward regional archipelago operations and existing amphibious support deficiencies might not have emerged.

I would argue that defence planning priorities are back to front in that capacity for regional archipelago operations should have primacy and tactical air transport is a vital function. Defence planners and politicians are somewhat ignoring the lessons from Australia's regional military involvement post-WW2.

Andu
10th Apr 2011, 22:05
Air force eyes 18 more Super Hornets as delays dog our new fighter | The Australian (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/air-force-eyes-18-more-super-hornets-as-delays-dog-our-new-fighter/story-e6frg8yo-1226036923907)

DEVELOPMENT of the revolutionary Joint Strike Fighter, intended to provide Australia's air defence through this century, is running well behind schedule and the RAAF may need to buy 18 more Super Hornets for $1.5 billion to fill the gap.

So tell me, ftrplt, having read the article above, what's your definition of "stop gap"?

You've cast a few extremely thinly veiled (if veiled at all!) personal insults at veterans who've posted here, so let me return the compliment with knobs on. From the tenor of your posts, to me, you come across as a Department of Defence PR man and not much more.

The Howard government bought 24 Super Hornets for $6bn in 2007 to fill an earlier strategic gap left when the RAAF's F-111 bombers were withdrawn ahead of time because of concerns about fatigue.

ozbiggles
10th Apr 2011, 23:36
Children stop it.
A very good thread with some interesting points (and conflicting ones) is in risk of becoming like the backbar after a long and boring dining in!
Lets ease springs and return to well argued, if different, points of view.
By all means ask each other to back things up, but nicely....surely we remember the rules of banter.....or uckers!

ftrplt
11th Apr 2011, 08:14
Andu,

please point out where I have insulted anyone - I have made some fairly strong rebuttals of opinion. There is no insult in the use of the term veteran (my father was one!) - I am entitled to defend the senior leadership when I believe those who dont have all the facts (for example people retired who may have previous expertise, but arguably not 'current') make assertions against the current leadership based on their personnal opinion of what the priorities should be.

As in all walks of life its very easy to cheer or jeer from the cheap seats.

I'm definitely not PR - why waste time trying to guess my motive without attempting to rebut my points?

The query about 'stop-gap' is subtle - the SH capability was acquired as a Bridging Air Combat Capability (BACC), as a hedge against JSF delays. Looking more and more like a good decision.

My point was the original post used the 'stop gap' acquisition of Super Hornet as an example of bad leadership decisions - my point is that it was a good leadership decision! (albeit one actually made by the then Defence Minister!)


Bushranger,

dont get me wrong, I am in now way saying that all acquisition decisions have been good, or even close to good. My point is that (generally) all those stating that' lack of a light transport capability' is purely because of poor and/or stupid senior leadership - are missing the point as it is more about lack of acquisition funding to buy all capabilities required vs the highest ranked priorities.

Government directed ADF Activities since 2003 is a major contributor to the prioritisation decisions.

One of the key issues with capability acquisition is that funding is not all about total value, its all about when the spend can be scheduled - automatically leads to prioritisation conflicts (blame Financial policy here).

If the ADF hadnt been involved in the Middle East continuously since 2003 (C130, P3 and now C17) nor chasing people smugglers across the oceans - I genuinely believe we would have a viable light transport capability now. Caribou was stretched as far as humanly possible, maybe with an element of 'hope' that a replacement would have got across the line by now - unfortunately it didnt.

Lonewolf_50
11th Apr 2011, 16:30
An estimate of enhancement cost for the F-111 to maintain a good capability out to about 2030 was around $2.5billion whereas the Super Hornets will cost something like $6.5billion.
Bushranger: a comment on the ability to keep old airframes alive.

A variety of program and budget and cost decisions time and again run into, ten years later, parts, vendors, and sub contractors either jacking prices for parts up, or simply not making the parts any longer. This kind of "death of a thousand small cuts" creates downstream cost burden legacy (see F-111) platforms since industry time and again finds it uneconomical to support small numbers of these old airframes.

I have recent personal understanding of non-trivial problems in supporting non-glass cockpit, and legacy avionics in the US Navy's T-44 trainer. This is a few years ago, mind you, but what it amounted to was a cheap, legacy program becoming significantly more expensive to support and sustain due to parts obsolescence ... sure, industry would get us repair parts, and significant mark ups. Fatigue life is a separate (but non-trivial) related issue.


With that in mind, you then run into "pay me now" with a bit more, or "pay me later" when you have no choice but to upgrade -- at the systems (sorry, $ystem$) level.


On that basis, and on the criterion of fewer maintenance man hours per flight hour, the Super Hornet may not have been the weak decision you suggest it is. (My being a Yank in no way biases this, as both are originally Yank platforms ... :) )
Super Hornet requires K-30 to achieve things the F-111 could do without tankering so that does not equate to cost-effective operations in my view.
I suggest that your modern archipelego operations would benefit from the F-18's availability.

I may misunderstand your mission requirements for the fighter arm, but if you need to loiter, it's good practice to launch, tank, then proceed on to your mission. That was a common practice for our Navy, and became increasingly common in the more recent fights due to the need to loiter and await calls for fire ...


As a last point, which is related to one of my first contributions, the political flexibliity that the government accrues from an additional C-17 for "non mil" operations (see the Japan example) seems to me one of the reasons that the pol folks allocate the money to a platform that is "dual use" rather than "tactical military use" in terms of its capability.


I'll paraphrase a discussion Colonel Harry Summers had with a NVA counterpart some years after the Viet Nam War


"It doesn't matter how good you were tactically if, at the strategic level, your country was aiming at the wrong target with the wrong weapon."


To put that into the context of the discussion here, with regard to how to spend short dollars to meet Australia's overall strategic needs, I'll open with the Axiom that a nation's military tools and capability are acquired to serve its strategic interests, (the use of armed forces to achieve politically defined ends) which requires competence at the tactical level, and a suitable tool kit.

That said, the strategic interests aren't always combat critical, but the uniformed folks happen to be
a) damned good at what they do
b) dependable,
c) organized, and
d) available without negotiation or yet another contract needing to be ironed out.


Your C-17 is thus a tool that gives the Australians a strategic capability that serves her strategic political interests. (We in the US consider C-17 Strategic/intertheater lift and C-130 tactical/intratheater lift). The risk decision made regarding what the uniformed folks will make do wit at the tactical level for most plausible scenarios is the same old thing ... where "worse case scenarios" are to be found, that was a risk decision taken. (Having spent a few decades on the uniformed end, I appreciate your frustration with how the pols time and again do that to us :p.)


The next question is: at what level does Australia deal in strategic infrastructure development in their near abroad? Non-military, government funded aid that helps upgrade or create higher quality air strips ... that allow larger planes to phase in Australian forces on an as needed basis when the speed of air transport is a tactical requirement ... that's not mil equipment money, but it's money spent for the local theater of operations that would aid and abet your mission accomplishment.

Does Australia do this or not?

That isn't a weapons procurement question. It is a theater level strategic question (both pol and mil) that uses "dual use" money to position a military capability that your services will need in the case of rapid reaction force deployments.

Bushranger 71
11th Apr 2011, 20:10
Ftrplt; just to kill off a couple of issues.
Exactly what propoganda square would that be - the one that doesnt necessarily agree with the Carlo Kopp view of the world and with some understanding of the real capabilities (now and future) of the F111 vs its sustainment costs? A while back, I was invited (and privileged) to be involved in an Air Power Australia related group compiling submissions to the New Air Combat Capability study conducted within the Australian DoD. The group of about 10, some only recently retired, included very experienced pilots and engineers embracing 4 x Star rankers and 2 test pilots. Collectively, comprehensive experience and knowledge of high speed aircraft design, operating and maintenance considerations including intimate awareness of F-111 enhancement and sustainment aspects. All capable of outside the square thinking and Carlo Kopp's brilliant scientific mind added to the analytical potential of the group.

Well-researched evaluations of potential options and costings were presented to the NACC study team and information offered contradicted evidence by a now retired (male) Chief Defence Scientist and senior military officers to Senate Estimates hearings for the Joint Parliamentary Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. The validity of much misleading information peddled by Lockheed Martin concerning the Joint Strike Fighter was also justifiably challenged considering the now parlous status of that project. You might find Hansard for the last few years very interesting reading in that regard.

2 years ago, a young Navy bod just out of recruit training at HMAS Cerberus visited a neighbour who told him I had RAAF service and without any preliminary discussion, he launched into a derogatory tirade about Air Power Australia. Similar stuff has emerged in other forums from contributors who have identified themselves as being involved in the DoD realm. Instead of the APA website being viewed as an invaluable broadly based information resource for matters military, they seem cast as the enemy by Defence because some of the material published dares to challenge woolly thinking. Those who have worked in Canberra know that much time is spent defending decisions made by people with big egos who cannot be seen to suffer loss of face.

But enough of that aspect.

Lonewolf 50; you again raise some good points.

Years back when I flew Sabres, we pined for flight refuelling; but it took many years for the Air Force hierarchy to become sufficiently supportive, even though AAR capable fighter and strike aircraft had been acquired. It does offer great tactical flexibility, but ups the cost of mounting operations for assets with shortish range capabilities. That is why the attributes of the F-111 were so well-suited to Australia's regional operations, but that's now a dead duck. Herkman highlighted it would have been much more cost-effective for Australia to just lease some enhanced KC-135R from the USAF than indulge in a flawed program to convert RAAF 707s and now acquire a somewhat uncommon military KC-30 that does not even have a cargo floor.

Australia operated extensively throughout our nearby island chain during WW2 and subsequently; but dare I say there now seems a lessened awareness of military operating considerations in this very rugged and somewhat forbidding wet tropics region where Australia annually contributes hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign aid. Australia did develop some airfields in PNG but no longer has much influence on how they are managed.

Despite policy emphasis on capabilities for regional operations, defence planning seems more oriented toward gearing strategically for wars in other parts of the world than equipping appropriately for closer to home regional operations. Would it not be wiser to also acquire a 24 hour all weather long range/endurance AC-130 firepower capability for example, which might be much more effective in foreseeable regional operating circumstances than say the Super Hornet or F/A-18 with tanker support, and bring forward acquisition of C-27 in lieu of some other project?

Australia's Defence Capability Plan is clearly a farce and really needs freezing for a top level review of just where the nation is heading with defence structuring. But, both of the major political parties are presently bent on unaffordable increased defence spending out to 2030 and the Federal Cabinet comprises politicians who are blindly committed to taxpayer subsidisation of employment via motor vehicle and defence industries in particular. Add to that, the involvement of former Prime Minister Rudd who generated the overly-ambitious Defence White Paper 2009 and prospects seem low for improved prioritisation of defence spending, unless forced upon the nation sometime downstream by world economic circumstances.

I remake my earlier contentions; Australia could have more credible defence capabilities by progressively optimising in-service hardware (where cost-effective) rather than indulging in acquisition of costly relatively unproven hardware. And, priorities need to be better sorted if we are able to react adequately to short-notice (more tactical than strategic) regional requirements, moreso than building towards a mythical Force 2030 for military circumstances nobody can envisage.

Perhaps enough now said re this broader discussion as this has been a great thread regarding air lift in particular.

Lonewolf_50
11th Apr 2011, 20:46
Just a quick comeback, and thanks again for the response.

Depending on what you percieve the ROC and POE to be, AC-130 is a great choice until everybody and his cousin has IR and night vision equipment. Not sure how soon that will be ... and AC-130 tends to be a night operator only for air to ground missions. On the other hand it is brilliant in that role. :ok:

However, for much cheaper local Close Air Support (albeit with virtually NO Air to Air capability) I suspect Predator would be a better choice, or Reaper, than either F-18 or JSF. The trick is to get them and the local control suites at a decent price from Uncle Sam ... and to find a runway long enough to handle that particular aircraft. I won't ask if you all have considered that, as we are on a public forum.

As to JSF, even we in the fat and rich land of DoD appropriations in Yank Land find its fly away cost to border on extortionary (to say nothing of F-22). Since you already have the Hornet, (and Super Hornet?) and you have posited to us a local fight as the requirements driver (not WW III with the Chinese, who will tend to use economics to fight their larger war, I agree) then you need not go with Bleeding Edge Tech for strike. The Viper/F-16 is still with us, and it's over thirty years old. It's doing a great job in the CAS role, and has done for two wars now. I see the Super Hornet doing as well as the Phantom did, in terms of longevity.

I now understand the tanker versus fighter issue better in re F-111, but cannot any of your C-130 be put up with tanking kits? :confused: Yes, that hits the tactical lift yet again, and possibly restores your entering argument that more Hercs is the better idea.

Cheers. :)

Old Fella
12th Apr 2011, 06:05
ftrplt When one retires there is no automatic dumping of knowledge or experience. I was always told that I could learn much by listening to what older and more experienced folk had to say. The tone of some of your rebuttals of the opinion of others indicates that those opinions should be dismissed.

The present day RAAF maintenance force is no less able than in previous eras, however the ratio of enlisted maintenance personnel to civil contracted maintenance personnel is much less than in past times. This of itself is not a problem, except that the civilian personnel are not subject to being deployed in the same way enlisted personnel are.

The Super Hornet, as worthy an aircraft as it may be, was from the outset perceived to be a "stop gap" acquisition to carry the RAAF through until the JSF arrive. Minister Nelson said as much when announcing the order.

As for the 18 month wait for newly graduated pilots to be trained to ALG aircraft, that is an indication, to me, of failed forward planning and a waste of manpower. I would have thought that in this day and age the bulk of training could be performed in the simulators available today.

You may not agree with much of what us grey headed old folk think, but there is no profit in the way in which you respond to those points of view. I don't know what you do for a living, but I do know what many others here have done and that they have probably benefited from that experience.

Bushranger 71
13th Apr 2011, 21:45
Hi ftrplt. Hoping not to trigger further debate off the air lift theme; but herewith informative links that I omitted to include in response to your post #150:

Analysing "The ADF Air Combat Capability- On the Record" (http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-051107-1.html)

Revisiting history–Australia’s decision to field the Super Hornet #auspol #military | ELP DEFENS(C)E BLOG (http://ericpalmer.wordpress.com/2011/04/09/revisiting-history-australias-decision-to-field-the-super-hornet-auspol-military/)

TBM-Legend
13th Apr 2011, 22:19
B71: Much old stuff there. Carlo and his mob are extremists in the other direction. He'd have importing the entire Russian inventory ranging from fighters to tanks...

The Super Hornet with its AESA radar is a magic piece of kit. Superior to anything in our area. For the money we should follow the USN model with around a 50/50 mix of fighters. This also allows for a transition of half the combat fleet at a time to new equipment rather than the big block obsolescence plan which runs down a capability completely when we re-equip

Bushranger 71
14th Apr 2011, 00:19
TBM-L; dated info sure, but nonetheless valid. I do not agree with all views expressed by APA, but parties involved in submissions to the NACC study were intimately involved in enhancement and sustainment issues at the higher levels while still serving. They were well abreast of matters involved including upgrade of radar, sensors, etcetera - AESA gear is now being adapted to multiple types so I would not get too carried away with the SH sales pitch.

Overlapping phasing of acquisitions would be wise provided in-service types are progressively optimised (where cost-effective) to maintain adequate and credible military preparedness and to maximise capitalisation on initial investment. Because this has not been happening, multiple capability gaps are emerging which is inexcusable; also the amount of taxpayer funds squandered on ill-conceived projects that have been well aired on this and other threads. As said earlier, the Defence Capability Plan is really shot to bits.

Arm out the window
14th Apr 2011, 00:38
Old Fella, I think one of the main issues with ALG training is a lack of experienced QFIs - the old story.

TBM-Legend
14th Apr 2011, 01:42
B71: I'm not carried away by any sales pitch but rather comments from a couple of friends who are involved with our Super Hornets. They, not me, say it is a game changer.

A critical issue on procurement of key strategic assets is the supportability of these items in time of heightened tensions and conflict.

You will recall the Swiss having an issue with the Porter in Vietnam and the Swedes with the Carl Gustaf weapon. These are minor compared with major assets if push comes to shove.

BBadanov
14th Apr 2011, 02:10
TBM "You will recall the Swiss having an issue with the Porter in Vietnam and the Swedes with the Carl Gustaf weapon"

...and I think the Mirage couldn't be considered for Vietnam either.

Bushranger 71
14th Apr 2011, 18:48
Hi again TBM-L. On reflection, I have to challenge your assertion in post #164 re Air Power Australia. They are not extremists and do not advocate acquisition of Russian origin hardware. Utilising his worldwide contacts, Carlo Kopp generally provides a very objective scientific analysis of military equipment capabilities and APA mainly strongly promotes acquisition of US origin gear.

The plethora of reference information and discussion material on the APA website is not easily found elsewhere in the public arena (although Janes is also a good source) and is doubtless used extensively around the world for reference purposes, as indicated by very high volume web statistics. I would wager there are many within the Australian DoD who frequently visit the APA website seeking technical information, despite their continual campaign to discredit APA who deign to challenge the 'group think' behind many flawed acquisition decisions.

Regarding supportability of strategic assets in your following post; enhancement of the F-111 would have made it fully supportable to beyond 2020 – see this link again: Analysing "The ADF Air Combat Capability- On the Record" (http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-051107-1.html)

Bbadanov; re your post #168. Comprehensive USAF offensive air support was available to 1 Australian Task Force in Vietnam, mostly based at Saigon and Bien Hoa just 50 or so kilometres away, and was often on station within about 10 minutes of request. There was no need for deployment of RAAF close air support resources, although Canberras were sometimes used in that role; but many would agree that the Mirage was not a good choice for Australia.

Getting back toward the thread theme; this Air Power Australia segment offers pretty broad discussion on AAR and air lift: Aerial Refuelling and Air Lift Capabilities (http://www.ausairpower.net/aar-lift.html)

TBM-Legend
14th Apr 2011, 23:45
B71: Carlo, of course makes some sense. He does, however, look at very theoretical models which in the main ignore either the fiscal or physical realities. The F-22 for example is not available for export. It has many problems in keeping them on-line and is very very costly to fly. The USAF are moving T-38's in as adversary aircraft to support them to save money on flying hours in ACM etc.

The F-111 debate is long lost - let's move on.

The real issue for defence right now is getting the funding to buy "shoes and socks" for them. ie. operating budgets are being cut in all services leaving us exposed in training etc etc

Wiley
15th Apr 2011, 02:16
Long delays in the training pipeline are nothing new. I think it took me 7 months to complete my Herc conversion, the main problem being that whenever an aircraft tasked for an operational trip went u/s, the squadron simply grabbed the trainer aircraft and the QFI and his studs were left standing on the empty Richmond apron.

This became such a point of contention that (I think it was) the very next course after mine was treated as an 'away trip', i.e., the aircraft was tasked for the conversion course in the same way any aircraft was tasked for any other operational task and the QFIs and the conversion course all went up to Darwin (much to the relief of the long-suffering residents of Windsor and Richmond) and did the whole conversion course up there in a matter of weeks. (I don't recall that anyone ever tried to snaffle their aircraft if a transitting aircraft went u/s in Darwin. I think it was written into the op. order that that was not going to happen.)

If the shortage is QFIs rather than airframes, (although I'd be willing to bet that finding a spare airframe for training is as much a problem today as it was in my day), surely Ronnie could take a leaf out of the airline book and do 99% - if not 100% - of the course in the simulator with the majority of the training, bar the final checks, done by simulator instructors rather than QFIs?

Finding sim. instructors from among the reservist ranks (ex-captains with oodles of time on type) should not be a problem on the C130, although I accept there wouldn't be too large a pool of ex-C17 drivers to drawn on yet.

I know this would involve thinking outside the box, (sorry for the grossly overused cliche, but in this case, it fits), but with the sims. available today, there's no reason a student needs to go anywhere near the aeroplane until he does his first operational flight. (The first time I set foot in a B777 as a crewmember, I had 300 paying passengers down the back.) I know the QFI fraternity might resist what some would see as an infringement into an area that traditionally has required the magic qualification, but I can assure all that for a sim.-based conversion course, a QFI is not required.

Standing by to be shot down in flames, for, as has been pointed out to others (and me) already, I'm just a silly ond fart, and what would I know?

Captain Sand Dune
15th Apr 2011, 02:44
Why stop there? The RAAF should have been using simulators for pilot training years ago. Bit too "out of the box" for some, though.:rolleyes:

Like This - Do That
15th Apr 2011, 03:59
Wiley, CSD, my first CO had us brand new subbies in to his office on march in for a 'get to know you' kind of deal, as many (all ?) of us have done. It didn't really go how I'd anticipated it. This chap was (is) a genuine thinker, not at all bound by convention.

Throughout training at RMC we were constantly told to "think outside the box" but of course as soon as one did so, the DS went berko because we'd deviated from doctrine :\

So my CO says to us jube LTs: "Think INSIDE the box - it's a good box!"

He went on to tell us that the IMAP was rubbish and that 'mission command' didn't apply below DIV level. We weren't all that sure how to react - was this some kind of test? :eek:

So there are plenty of folks in Russell / JOC / AHQ / etc who will say "think outside the box" but very few who either can, or who are allowed, or who have even identified the box in the first place. :ugh:

TBM-Legend
15th Apr 2011, 04:09
RAF Top Guns grounded by lack of spare parts for new jets


by Tom McTague, Daily Mirror 15/04/2011


SCORES of RAF fighter jets have been grounded – because bungling MoD pen-pushers did not order enough spare parts.

Top Gun pilots are unable to train in the state-of-the-art £126million Typhoons, leaving our air defences and attack *capability drastically weakened.

Just eight of the UK’s 48 Typhoon fighter pilots have enough training to take part in attacks on Colonel Gaddafi’s troops, the influential Commons Public Accounts Committee reveals in a damning report out today.

It comes just two days after Typhoons over Libya carried out their first attack. Defence sources said it was “no coincidence” they dropped the two Paveway II bombs on tanks just 48 hours before the MPs’ highly-critical report was released.

The report found that the RAF is having to take spares from other aircraft just to keep the required number of Typhoons in the air. The committee said the MoD had warned the problems were likely to continue until 2015 until supplies reach a “steady state”. The scathing report found: “The department relies on a small group of key suppliers who have the technical and design capability to build, upgrade and support the Typhoon.


“Problems with the availability of spare parts have meant they’re not flying as many hours as the department requires. The department admitted it had not been managed well enough.”

The problem is the latest in a long line of bungles over the £20.2billion fleet of Typhoons, which will cost £3.5billion more than originally planned.

Britain has also cut its order to 160 of the planes rather than the initial 232.

Committee chairman Margaret Hodge said: “This pattern of decision-making is more about balancing the books in the short-term rather than ensuring value for money over time.”



***ADF facing similar problems...

Lost Again..
15th Apr 2011, 06:23
285Sqn has both a level 5 C130H and C130J simulator. These are fully booked and pretty hard to squeeze more copilot / captain conversions through. The days of circuit bashing as a B Cat Copilot are long gone.

The sim and QFI availability is the constraint. 285 / 37 already has plenty of Qantas reservists that they call upon. Again it's an issue of "xxxx course is running yyyy to zzzz" but unfortunately reserve QFI's have their primary job to do first and are not always available. On top of that it's pretty hard for a reservist to maintain all mission qualifications with only ~30 odd reserve days a year.

QFI's are used mainly for the hands and feet instructing. Otherwise an IQ or CQ (new 2FTS term = CQ(T) and CQ(CC) respectively) can be used for the mission related skills like airdrop, form, nvg etc.

Bushranger 71
15th Apr 2011, 19:20
The basic problem with armed forces sim instructor resources in Australia may be the inflexibility of the present military reserves system. There is an enormous reservoir of very experienced retired service (and airline) aviators who are just hanging around annoying their wives, playing golf or going to a 'men's shed' to keep themselves amused. It should not really matter if they might be in their 70s or even 80s, so long as they still have the mental ability to effectively perform the conversion training functions (on the ground). There are many fossils doing so around the world in the airline game and I did it myself for a decade.

Australia is not adequately capitalising on its huge retired military resources, but could do so with more flexible thinking. Retiring ages are silly for reserve forces and the main criteria should be medical condition appropriate for roles. Call it a 'Dad's Army' concept if you wish. Put another way, why would simulator/ground trainers even need to be military reservists when they could just be directly employed on flexible contracts?

ozbiggles
15th Apr 2011, 22:45
I think you will find the military does 'believe' in using reservists for these and other roles.
The issue is under current management, there is no money for this and many other things.
Which is why I don't think you will see a Tactical Airlift capability restored until about 2 years after we discover again why we needed one in the first place!

MTOW
15th Apr 2011, 23:55
285Sqn has both a level 5 C130H and C130J simulator. These are fully bookedCan you define 'fully booked'? As in fully booked with three 4 hour sessions a day (and no back of the clock), or 'fully booked' as in five four hour sessions a day with the dog watch for maintenance?

Re the use of reservists: ozbiggles is right. If what I've been told is to be believed, Russell Hill would come to a grinding halt without the large number of reservists they currently employ. (I was told that someone asked the current CAF what would be a good collective noun for a group of reservists and he replied "a vital" or some such word.)

However, this widespread use has led to a huge cost blowout, and the military have told by the bean counters to lay off or drastically reduce the hours of many reservists, some of whom who were employed on quite important projects. (Wayne getting us back into surplus by 2013 overrides all else.)

Bushranger 71 has a point. Rather than use active reservists, most of whom are holding down an airline job, ex-service people could be employed for the job as contract civilians (as Boeing does in their worldwide simulator training programme). I think you'd find there'd be quite a few ex-Herc driver retirees out there who could be tempted back to the bat cave if the package was flexible enough.

But it would involve a bit of an attitude change by the uniformed men at the top - and they haven't been renowned for that to date.

flighthappens
16th Apr 2011, 00:59
already happens in some FEGS

Milskil Integrated Defence Solutions > Home (http://www.milskil.com/)

Wiley
20th Apr 2011, 22:41
Lost again, you haven't answered MTOW's question: ("Can you define 'fully booked'?") to you comment that "285Sqn has both a level 5 C130H and C130J simulator. These are fully booked."

Do you mean "fully booked" as in

(a) a 24 hour a day cycle, 7 days a week - (as most civilian simulators are used) - or

(b) 'fully booked' as in 0800 to 1700 Monday to Friday?

If the answer isn't (a), an outsider would be tempted to ask, if the RAAF does indeed have a large number of trainees who, for years now, have waited inordinately long times to complete their training, WTF not?

FoxtrotAlpha18
21st Apr 2011, 02:51
I would wager there are many within the Australian DoD who frequently visit the APA website seeking technical information, despite their continual campaign to discredit APA who deign to challenge the 'group think' behind many flawed acquisition decisions.

I would suggest than rather than visiting APA to seek technical information, Australian DoD people visit it to see what they're up to now, or for a good laugh! :E

Trackmaster
21st Apr 2011, 03:31
Couldn't agree more.
I particularly enjoyed the NOTAMs that once came from an alleged former Russian Air Force pilot, or as APA put it "a former alleged Russian Air Force pilot". His Russ-Lish was superb, but it did have a certain Australian flavour to it??? ;)

Andu
27th Apr 2011, 05:42
Back on Apr 20th Wiley asked the question (originally posed by MTOW some time earlier):

Lost again, you haven't answered MTOW's question: ("Can you define 'fully booked'?") to you comment that "285Sqn has both a level 5 C130H and C130J simulator. These are fully booked."

Do you mean "fully booked" as in

(a) a 24 hour a day cycle, 7 days a week - (as most civilian simulators are used) - or

(b) 'fully booked' as in 0800 to 1700 Monday to Friday?By the absence of an answer, can we assume that the answer was 'b'?

Or, more likely, 0800-1700 Monday to Thursday and 0800-1530 on Fridays?

Old Fella
27th Apr 2011, 06:20
Unless things have changed dramatically the RAAF Simulators are used weekdays only, with maintenance carried out "after hours". If there is a shortage of instructors, which traditionally has been a secondary duty for squadron personnel, there would be little scope for the simulators to operate other than weekdays during normal hours. It would seem to me that, as others have pointed out, the knowledge and skills of former crew could be utilised to reduce the time to get new crews "on line". Sure would beat the hell out of spending one's day in the local "Men's Shed".

BBadanov
27th Apr 2011, 08:21
The sim instructors are ex service aircrew (I know at least 2 are retired QFIs) who are civvie contractors. First lot trained with Boeing in the US. I guess some back-up secondary duty for some pilots as required. Civvie contractors is the way to go, become specialists and could stay for years, well into their 60s.

FoxtrotAlpha18
27th Apr 2011, 23:10
Can't speak for current ops, but not too long ago the two C-130 sims were working pretty constant two shifts, five days a week, with maintenance performed overnight.

Wiley
28th Apr 2011, 00:03
This is what civil sim. operators call 'running flat out'.

Session 1: 0600-1000
Session 2: 1015-1415
Session 3: 1430-1830
Session 4: 1845-2245
Session 5: 2300-0300
Maintenance: 0300-0600

....seven days a week, 365 days a year, with the odd scheduled session lost to maintenance if required. (And if the owner of the sim. has unused time, they usually advertise the spare time to other operators, and that spare time [usually those awful back of the clock sessions] is almost always snapped up.)

And the fixed base procedural trainer (which I assume the RAAF has for the C130 and the C17 as well as the full flight simulator), while not usually used 'back of the clock', is similarly heavily booked during heavy training periods, like conversion courses.

So in any given week, any one sim. can handle 35 four hour sim. sessions. I've been involved with sims in three airlines and that's pretty much the way they all do it - because their beancounters rightly see that whatever it might cost to staff and run them, simulators used this way, to maximum capability, save money - lots of it - and deliver productive crews, available to operate when and wherever needed, in minimum time.

If the RAAF's having trouble with long delays in initial training (as they seem to have been for some years now) and with maintaining currency for qualified crew, maybe it's time they took a closer look at the way civil aviation does it.

Simulators have such fidelity today that asymmetric procedures (and for that matter, any emergency procedures) do not need to be (make that should not be) done in the aircraft anymore. If the RAAF didn't know that already, it should have learned that after the loss of the 707 at Sale. (How many years ago was that now?)

Similarly, many of not most specialist categorisation training could be done in the sim. The QFIs won't like it, as it will turn them into vampires - (almost permanent residents of the 'bat cave') - but it's a fact. You also don't need QFIs to do most of this training if it's done in a sim. This again would involve a change of thinking from standard RAAF practice, but again, it's a fact.

It seems to me there should be some ambitious young Wing Commander out there who should ask to be given command of the RAAF's transport sim. program and the wherewithal (=$$$) to turn it into a 24 hour a day, seven days a week operation and he or she would unplug a major bottleneck.

Andu
1st May 2011, 08:16
Interesting that this thread has slipped to half way down page 2 with no comment from those now in the RAAF system on the last post.

Gundog01
1st May 2011, 10:38
Wiley,

Regardless of how many hours there are available for a simulator to be used, the squadrons simply don't need it that much. There may be 50 (only a guess) 2FTS grad waiting for a conversion but the operational squadrons simply don't need more pilots, that is the reason they aren't training the backlog....not becasue of sim unavailability.

My squadron boggies are averaging 300hrs a year. That is not healthy. We simply don't need more boggies, getting less hours and leaving thinking they have done a tour.

Bushranger 71
1st May 2011, 23:45
If the Australian DoD is at all interested in cost-effectiveness regarding military capabilities; why not the BT-67 for overcoming the gap in tactical air transport capability? See: BT-67, An Overview (http://www.baslerturbo.com/bt_67_overview.html) and this thread: http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/327371-job-afghanistan.html

The piston-engined DC3/Dakota was operated successfully and extensively throughout the regional tropical archipelago for years. The stretched and enhanced turboprop BT-67 now has pretty impressive cargo capacity and performance. Unit cost only somewhere around $6million so another great bargain, like the Huey II.

Problem is Australia virtually gave away its large fleet of pretty low time Dakota airframes instead of storing them at say Woomera, so finding sufficient now on the world scene might be difficult. Similar story of course for the RAAF C-130Es re-introduced into military service with Pakistan in 2005, after refurbishment. (SIGH!!!)

Frazzled
2nd May 2011, 10:33
Andu,

Sims start at 7am (5days a week) and last one finshed between 7pm to 11pm depending on schedule and availability of QFI's at 285SQN - all 6 of them (4 RAAF , 2 civies).

Probably nice to increase that number but the RAAF just can not go out and increase manning like a private firm does. In these days of SRP and Zero cost the extra people have to be deleted from other locations to increase the numberof QFI's, not so easy when no one wants to see their empire reduce.

politics politics don't ya just love it:{


Frazzled:ugh:

Andu
2nd May 2011, 11:45
Thanks for that Frazzled. As for your suggestion on the other thread, I think there'd be quite a few who wish it could be so.

Bushranger 71
4th May 2011, 04:25
Hi Gundog01; is the relatively low 300 hours per annum for transport jocks on some aircraft types a function of lower aircraft on-line availability or lessened airlift demand?

Digressing somewhat to create awareness of a brilliant work which all should read - it largely reflects the dysfunctionality within the defence scene in Australia. See: http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/TPL_FullText_2.9.11.pdf

ozbiggles
4th May 2011, 09:40
Neither
Try budget and cost.

Gundog01
4th May 2011, 23:39
B71, at my squadron it is due to operating 30% over CE to try and get 2FTS grads flying. Nothing to do with aircraft on line or lessened demand.

scran
5th May 2011, 11:32
Gundog - 30% over CE - I assume it is junior pilots that cause this.

Can I ask what manning of supervisory positions is? I.E. : do you have full manning of those positions, or are you short at all.

I'd imagine a shortfall in those supervisory positions coupled with an over-abundance of junior jocks would cause massive problems...........

Gundog01
5th May 2011, 14:24
Scran, all excess CE is 2FTS grads. All exec positions filled with senior pilots and a good pool of second/third tourists to fill the middle ranks.

Bushranger 71
5th May 2011, 18:11
Gundog01; I find the situation you describe curious.

I usually involve in a bi-monthly fighter squadrons luncheon frequently attended by some of the senior RAAF echelon from CAF down. I recently asked a Group Captain from Canberra: 'How are we going these days for pilots?' and his response was: 'We are always short of pilots'.

There has always been an outflow to airlines and not so long back, the Air Force was 'importing' pilots from other nations - maybe this is ongoing to maintain an experienced core. Excess junior pilots will only result in lowering overall experience gained during flying tours, as you have already mentioned; but has the training system been slowed so the surplus of 2FTS graduates awaiting type conversions can be absorbed?

The flying instructor nucleus for the RAAF was significantly diminished by shutdown of 1BFTS and loss of the helicopter flying training component once embedded in No. 5 Squadron at Canberra, when battlefield support helos were transferred to Army Aviation - multiple QFI posts at 4 helicopter squadrons were thus also forfeited. Is flying instructor strength at unit level now a limiting factor for type conversions?

Barry Bernoulli
6th May 2011, 08:12
fighter squadrons We are always short of pilots

Oils aint oils.

Lost Again..
7th May 2011, 08:18
@MTOW, Wiley and Andu
Apologies for the late reply. I'm wearing 3 hats at work and organising a major training course so we have guys ready for TS11. I try to forget work at home to get a break.

Regarding the SIM, 0700-2000 is pretty normal for training use. More is available and can be negotiated with the operator. In between it's down for maintenance, block upgrades and development for role expansion. That's what I meant by fully booked. All available sim slots are filled.

To operate 24/7 would require more instructors and the loss of any OT&E for new procedures/hardware/role expansion. Our sims are used for development, not just raise/train/sustain. It's been said before but increasing numbers means another FEG must lose. Personnel manning is neutral. To increase our CE means the body must come from within the existing structure. I'll give an example, for those that remember the ABNOPSO position coordinating tactical training. Now it's been rolled into an ops job at the same time with long range planning. Same work, double volume as you cover both responsibilities. Oh and keep flying at the same time, instruct, maintain currencies, do that minor project for an upgrade, investigate an ASOR, do a QA on fraud, keep your IR up to date, finish the required courses for promotion, sit in as deputy when the FLTCDR takes leave, draft PAR's/PRP's etc.. :E

The merging of jobs decribed above freed up a position. Loss of Dev FLT at 285 freed up some more and now you have some people who can man up 4Sqn, 2Sqn, 36Sqn etc...

The other item that consumes resources is the continual retraining when we block upgrade. The 5.4 J is not the same as a 6.1 or 7.0 J. These must be planned for as the last upgrade took the J sim offline for months as it did for each airframe going to 5.4. The currencies had to be managed so that nobody went uncurrent during this period. Block upgrades are ~2-3 years apart.

To answer a previous question. Herc's do no EFATO or double assymetric training airborne, it's all sim based. The 707 accident forced a rethink of this training.

Our training woes are being worked on. I just wouldn't like being a bograt pilot awaiting basic conversion at the moment.

Andu
7th May 2011, 09:03
Thanks for the reply, Lost Again. It seems very, very similar to times gone by. You seem to be manfully trying to fit a quart into a pint pot, much as we were back then.

500N
21st Dec 2011, 04:49
C27J Spartan seems to be the front runner between the two bidders in Australia.
Claim for $300m saving on planes

THE battle to win the $1.5 billion contract to provide Australia with new combat transport planes has heated up, with a document from a US bid prompting a European competitor to suggest that its offering could cut as much as $300 million off the project.
The tender for as many as 10 new ''battlefield airlifter'' planes to replace the air force's DHC-4 Caribous, which were retired in 2009, has been under way since September this year.
Battlefield airlift is the rapid movement of troops and equipment within a conflict zone and requires planes that can make truncated landings and take-offs on short or poorly made airstrips.
Advertisement: Story continues below
Defence Minister Stephen Smith has said the two planes being considered are Airbus Military's C295 and the American-manufactured C27J Spartan, which is used by the US Air National Guard.
What is unclear is whether the Australian government will have a tender process or simply choose the Spartan via a US ''foreign military sale'' option, which can reduce complexity in the tender process.
The possibility of a US foreign military sale was increased yesterday, when the US military's foreign sales arm notified the US Congress that it had given information to Australia about the purchase of 10 C27J planes.
The US Defence Security Co-operation Agency revealed it had provided Australia with an estimated cost of $950 million for the planes, training and logistical support.
That does not include the cost of local facilities and other ancillary issues, which can increase the price by as much as 45 per cent, meaning the overall cost could rise to about $1.5 billion.
The notice prompted a spokesman for Airbus Military, Ted Porter, to call on the Australian government to create a competitive process to allow Airbus to prove the C295's value for money. ''We believe that a competition - rather than a sole-source supplier - is in the best interests of Australia and the Australian taxpayer,'' he said.
Mr Porter said the Spartan burnt more fuel per hour than the C295 - as much as 60 per cent - and that could see the C295 saving as much as $300 million over the 30-year life of a 10-plane fleet.
Mr Porter pointed to recent comments by a Defence procurements officer, who said the competitive tender process for the navy's next-generation helicopters achieved a saving of 25 per cent.
The Tiger and MRH-90 helicopters, are both on Defence's projects of concern list and are both designed by an Airbus Military subsidiary, Eurocopter, and manufactured here by Australian Aerospace.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Andrew Davies said he believed it was likely that Defence would opt for the US-manufactured version. ''We've had a number of problems getting European aircraft into service over the last few years,'' Dr Davies said.

Read more: Claim for $300m saving on planes (http://www.theage.com.au/national/claim-for-300m-saving-on-planes-20111220-1p40j.html#ixzz1h94ANdLk)


Got to love the last line - maybe they are learning !

"''We've had a number of problems getting European aircraft into service over the last few years,'' Dr Davies said."

Wiley
21st Dec 2011, 04:56
An interesting debate about the same topic here: http://elpdefensenews.b l o g spot.com/"Big Money for Caribou Replacement".

The C-27 is by no means ideal, but God help us all if we go European again.

500N
21st Dec 2011, 05:05
I like some of the comments.

"Both the C-295 and C-27 are good aircraft however they are not a "replacement" for the Caribou."

"As we know the Caribou was retired on a lie."


Not sure they're really after a 1:1 replacement but rather a light tactical transport that can carry standard pallets."

I didn't think that they were after a 1to1 replacement either.
I do wonder if we do need something like the Caribou, however we
now have some bigger ships so not sure if the Chinnook can do some of
the work it once did.


"God help us all if we go European again."
AMEN