Military madness; Why?

[TBM-Legend]

Around the World we are seeing defence projects spinning out of control failing to deliver on-time and on-budget.:mad:

Here in Australia, billions are sunk into failed projects and huge cost over-runs and loss of capability and all of this is dismissed by both military and Government leaders as yet another 'oh dear, we'll do better next time'... :hmm:

Why are we unable to manage this process?:ugh:

[Kengineer-130]

The size and complexity of most projects mean they will take xx number of years to implement. Over the course of that time, the original aim & need for the item will no doubt change and the goal posts move. Adding onto that, most items are bespoke for the required role, often featuring new technology, so there are bound to be hiccups, teething problems or even complete re-designs required to overcome unforseen problems. Add to that far too many people sticking thier oar in, and trying to "save" money, it all add's up to a hideous mess that is over budget, over timescale, under performing and unreliable :hmm:

[BBadanov]

The answer is the buy COTS (or MOTS), and if that only satisfies 80% of the requirement, then so be it. Don't tinker with it, and don't make yet another orphan.

[MATELO]

Over the course of that time, the original aim & need for the item will no doubt change and the goal posts move. Is that a polite way of saying "management will move on", leaving somebody else to pick up the pieces.

[diginagain]

I want to know how you can sink billions in loos of capability :E

[Kitbag]

I want to know how you can sink billions in Quote:
Originally Posted by TBM_Legend
loos of capability

http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/evil.gif

I don't know, but I'm sure there's a Committee sitting on it

[The Old Fat One]

Because whenever the commercial world (where profit is king) meets the public sector world (where career protection and an easy life is king) blood is spilled (the blood in this instance being the tax-payer's money).

It was ever thus.

Content yourself in the knowledge that most of the money is just going round in a circle.

[Whenurhappy]

Part of the problem is the lack of any personnel on projects (military or civil service) with a jot of commercial experience. The IPT 'Commercial' Officers (Contract Officers in old speak), typically B or C grade, have no, repeat no commercial savvy.

I had the dubious experience of having to run the family business (a small engineering firm) at a moment's notice from a young age before I joined the Service; at least I learned about the difference between an invoice and a statement; basic tax principles (eg the difference between sales tax exempt and zero-rated sales tax), the need to determine a fixed price before placing an order, basic industrial relations and basic contract law - basic business dog-f*k that in my experience, few civil servants and military have any knowledge of.

For example, years later working in the RAF Infrastructure Organsiation, I was shocked to find few of the 'Works' officers had ever ventured on to a building site, let alone having any knowledge of procurement, design and construction (the default was, 'we use a consultant') thus had absolutely no idea what things actually cost to procure or build. The Screwfix catalogue was a revelation to many - 'Oh, so a shower cubicle only costs that much?' The 'professional' DE personnel were rarely any better. I subsequently served as Customer 1 for a large programme and remained similarly shocked with the naivety of so many people on the customer side.

Whilst in Afghanistan a few years ago I attended a meeting on the expansion of KAF; the US and Canadians have extremely experienced civil engineers there; the RAF had a young officer who had done a week-long Exped Ops course and had previously served as OC PSF. It was not only cringing to see the reactions of our Allied professionals to her lack of knowledge; it was professionally embarrasing to the Service.

Luckily I have moved in to more interesting work over the most of the last 10 years, but I have little confidence that the situation has improved. I stand to be corrected.

[diginagain]

I say, chap, any chance of editing that into a smaller font?

Bless you.

[Wensleydale]

Undermanning within the PTs means that they work excedingly hard with few resources to come up with a solution that is passed upwards. The bean counters then come back and say "do it for 40% cheaper". Start again from scratch. Another - probably less perfect solution - is found. This is again sent upwards and again, the response is "make it another 10% cheaper". A frustrated PT team start again and come up with a solution that is within estimates and goes some way to meeting the requirement. After a year of contract negociations, when the contractors regularly change their funding estimates, an agreement is reached that satisfies all parties. At this point, the treasury changes the goalposts and cuts the funds available by half: some very frustrated PT personnel start all over again, and some pi**ed off contractors say "why are we doing this?" and add their administration costs for 2 years to the bill.

The end result is nearly 2 years of expensive delay with no solution in sight and a UOR (that will cost twice the original estimate of 2 years previous) rapidly approaching. Meanwhile, the service members of the PT have been posted on and the number of CS posts has been reduced to fund the more expensive UOR.

Work in the PT is rapidly becoming impossible due to the constraints being placed upon it and the moving financial goal posts from the "customer". I suppose the a service analagy is the cost in man hours of producing the business case for T&S.

:ugh:

[Pontius Navigator]

Whenur, quite right. As my own works officer at home I knew when i was being taken for a ride at work. Unfortunately I was occasionally caught out when I wasn't looking.

£6.5k to put up a flag pole. Well it also came with its own 7 foot chain link fence topped by 3 strands of barbed wire, a flight of steps and a hand rail. I asked why the fence only to be told there was a vandalism problem as a different site in a different situation.

We had to remove the barbed wire as the flag would catch on it!

[Wander00]

Ref Posts 8 & 11. The lask of professional building engineers in uniform has always been a problem on stations - ie the young Admin Sec Fg Off up against an archirtect or two and gruff project managers from industry. Happened when we were taking over the refurbished bunker at Neatishead, and a major problem for me (even as hoary sqn ldr at Mt Pleasant) as OC SSS taking over £450M worth of facilities from the contractors - the Army had a RE Major, with a civilian "construction" qualification doing the job for them. I worked on the basis of "does it do what it says on the tin?" - ie when the dog compound fence was not high enough to keep the police dogs in, I refused to take it over - wails from PSA and the contractor, and the first of several interviews with the stn cdr from Stanley. It was when they tried to get me to take over the airfield lighting, with loose wires sticking out of the pedestals that I nearly flipped - that got me a face to face with the one-star equivalent PSA head honcho on his grounded ship! Nevertheless, it was aleays a bit of an unequal struggle.

[jindabyne]

TBM

Prior to year 2001, I regarded the Australian DMO as a relatively efficient organisation - in my experience, certainly better the UK MoD equivalent. But that view was expunged following the Howard Government's decision in June 2002 to join the JSF programme, abandoning at a stroke all ongoing effort to seek a long-term replacement for the F-18 Hornet via the usual and well-established regulatory processes. Stunning at the time, this decision was taken after 'clandestine' meetings between Australian and US Defence Material officials had taken place over the previous twelve months, all without the knowledge of the ADF or DSTO. A whiff of corruption lingered awhile, to be overtaken by some of the more recent dubious RAAF procurement decisions. But at least you retain a decent-sized air force (relative to GDP/population) compared to that of the newly-raped RAF.

[Pontius Navigator]

Wander, you remind me of the 'new' ASI Ops in 1984. The plans were approved by an 'expert' Slops. His replacement during the next 6-month tour went completely hands off as he would not be there when it was ready. We got the benefit.

It was an L-shaped building - Comcen at one end, Admin at the other and Ops had the corridor in between - no desks or consoles. The 'notice board' provided was a standard 2x3 board and that was that.

Fortunately we had the ex-VC10 sqn ldr (him from the Dom War Stories) who had just redesigned and built a sqn ops. He drew up the plans and did a fair amount of the carpentry too to actually build an Ops 'room' although it remained a through passage from Comcen to Admin.

[F3sRBest]

Accepting yes, that all is not good in the Defence arena, we would do well to realise that in the broad scope of Public Sector 'mega projects' Defence as a whole doesn't do too badly! For UK, Millenium Dome, Olympics, Wembly etc etc. The one good one that stands out as the exception is BAA T5.

[Rigga]

Keng-130 has half the problem - but one issue is that the Private Sector that is almost always contacted nowadays is a very, very large conglomerate with a huge corporate structure and huge "corporate self-defence" systems to pay for as well as its design and development staff.

In the "Old Days" that contact was always to a smaller, independant company like Avro, Blackburn, English Electric or Gloucester who had far less overheads, less time in committee's and more dedicated time on project, where quick and early development mean profit as soon as possible.

How long did the Bucc take from concept to getting in the air?

I really don't know, but I'd bet it was less than a UAV's entry into service today.

That doesn't sound like Progress in modern production to me - or success!

[Compressorstall]

When you buy a car, you go to the showroom, see what closest matches your requirements and what you can afford, and then you haggle a bit to save money and then pay up and drive off.

In the military a bunch of people of 2 year tours come up with the requirement and industry seeks to match it, then after 2 years, another bunch of staff officers tinker with the requirement and industry reacts to the requested changes, then after 2 years come more staff officers, then comes the development, then service entry, then obsolesence issues because it has been so long since the requirement... And so it goes on...and all the while things keep changing...

[TBM-Legend]

You don't need protracted processes that take years to look at the case for the introduction of new equipment and the selection thereof.

In Oz we took the C-17 and Super Bug projects through to the end in a couple of years on time and on budget. Why? Because we purchased off the shelf proven technology. Good enough for Uncle Sam then good enough for us. As someone once said never buy the "A" model of anything...

Small nations like us cannot afford the luxury of developing our own versions of high tech stuff to be built in small quantities. The R&D for a start has be be amortised over such few units the economics just won't cut it.

Singapore is a great model for getting things done. Years ago a friend of mine worked for Northrop when they sold F-5E's to them. He was part of the sales team of three people who meet with PM Lee, the Defence Minister, Head of Finance, Chiefs of Defence Force and Air Force and a couple of others in Lee's office. Three hours later basic deal done. Off the shelf models purchased and the support train developed during the aircraft build time. Voila, all on time and budget. Also my friend told be Lee pushed the pricing himself!

[4Greens]

Having done some military auditing in my time, a major problem is the posting cycle. Two years on a job and move on just when you understand it.

[Ogre]

Just want to clarify a subtle difference, "Off the shelf" (OTS) comes in two flavours. COTS is "Commercial", which covers the sort of stuff you can buy in any high street store. MOTS is "Military" which means that it has been designed and manufactured specifically with the military customer in mind.
Everyone keeps shouting "we can buy this stuff in <insert name of high street store of choice> so why is it so expensive?" The easy answer is that is has been designed for civil use, and does not need to go through the rigorous environmental tests procedures that military kit does. For example, any black box that goes on an aircraft has to undergo vibration testing (there is a mil-standard tests with different parameters for prop, jet and rotary aircraft!). I seriously doubt that any COTS box will meet the standards, even if it says it was designed to be taken four wheel driving!
MOTS kit has been through these tests, but with so many other things you get what you buy. If you want it changed for any reason, you have to engineer the change THEN re-test it to the same standard to ensure it still complies. This all adds to the costs.
So we can buy off the shelf and live with the restrictions of the kit, or get kit built to do what we want where we want to do it and pay the price.

[Rigga]

Okay... So which of these military standard tests are NEEDED and which aren't?

Why do civil standard black boxes have to get 'vibrated'?

[emergov]

so, when Mr Lee ignores the procurement process iot bargain down the price of some generation-before-last jet aircraft, he's a genius, and when John Howard buys inolvement in a project which will see Australia at the forefront of fighter technology for decades, he is an evil despot?

Similarly, when Brendan Nelson ignores the normal processes to buy F-18E he is a criminal moron because F-111 can still cut it...oh wait, no, he's also a genius just like Mr Lee, but ....

wait, aren't you just talking bollocks, TBM?

If it was easy, or intuitive, then ex-FLTLTs would be hired back on contract to make these decisions and win the day. It isn't easy, and there are a bunch of competing priorities on every project, so it often goes wrong.

Buying FMS, (which is different to COTS and MOTS) is the only option for limiting technical risk - except when the US is already up to it's neck in technical risk (JSF). In any case, it just transfers our risk to the US military.

The only thing you can safely say is that buying old, last-generation military equipment is less risky than buying new equipment. Whether or not that equipment meets the requirement is another question entirely.

[Ogre]

Rigga

The point is that we use military standards to show that the equipment will survive the environment they will be operated in. The boxes need to be vibrated and still operate to show that when they are fitted to an aircraft they will continue to function, there is no point fitting a box that's going to shake itself to bits by the time you get off the ground!

Which standards are needed? Well some of it depends on the customer, but if you rock up to fit your new box onto an aircraft and it doesn't comply with the standards then it won't be allowed on!

[TBM-Legend]

EMERGOV:

If you read what I wrote I said the Super Hornet and C-17 projects set an example as GOOD buying for the ADF. Howard and Nelson can take a bow on those.

Many other projects are flops.....trying to second guess on new rather than mature technology is risky business when one considers the small numbers of things we buy.

The F-35 will probably be another F-111. Bad start, good result. More Super Hornets and buy F-35's later in the cycle perhaps!

Wedgetail will never fully meet the capability sought I'm told. What would have been wrong with a lesser number of B767 AWACS ala Japan??

[emergov]

I think we agree here.

The competing priorities part cannot be overstated in my book. The AS government has a long-held policy of ensuring a level of local industry involvement. This creates jobs, and ensures a market for some very specific and difficult to maintain qualifications. No-one is a fan of QANTAS sending its maintenance off shore, but plenty of people question why the govt will reward defence contracts that retain aerospace and marine engineering jobs in Australia.

FMS is the way to go for rapid acquisition of proven equipment, but then we find ourselves locked into an upgrade and sustainment plan not of our choosing. When a specific operational requirement comes up, due to a local threat, or local conditions, or introduction of some legislation like crash worthiness, we have to think long and hard about venturing away from the terms of the FMS contract.

In the mean time, we have DSTO, ARDU, and other agencies specifically to ensure we can do these mods, but when we do, everyone cries foul about 'Australianising' the equipment.

Govt wants value for money, but also wants top-end equipment. Govt distrusts defence because of bad projects, but are utterly reliant on defence opinion when choosing those contracts. Defence wants proven kit, govt wants assurances that the kit will last for years and years and still be relevant.

It's not like buying a car at all, really. It's more like buying a power plant in a national park with someone else's money when no-one knows if Australia First or the Greens will set policy next year.

[Bushranger 71]

Hello all.

Pre-Tange Re-organization of Australian defence in 1974, hardware acquisition planning was managed pretty efficiently within the relatively armed forces departments with small public service components embedded and the military were properly under political control with individual service ministerial representation. Now, the military is subjected to public service domination and hardware acquisition is managed under a separate ministry. DMO and DSTO have undue political clout and their relationship with large multinational arms conglomerates seems pretty murky.

The main thrust of defence policy is support of low productivity largely foreign-parented defence industries which are siphoning money out of the country. Both major political parties are supporting long-range unrealistic and unaffordable increases in defence spending to benefit such industry which is really uneconomic job creation. It does not seem to matter that unproven costly acquisitions, with multiple associated capability gaps, are actually diminishing defence preparedness and there seems a continual shrugging of shoulders at all levels re acquisition and operating costs. We are only now seeing the tip of a very big iceberg regarding flawed costly equipment acquisitions aiming toward a mythical Force 2030 structure and there may have to be a big reality check sometime soon.

Australia has often been suckered into becoming a launch customer for unproven hardware lured by offset orders for industry. The nation would be much better prepared militarily if it were a lagging customer after upgrade programs for new hardware have become established evolving from operating experience worldwide. Similarly, it seems smarter to put some existing hardware through approved factory upgrade programs overseas, even if they might be lacking in some capabilities considered essential by our defence dreamers. There are a plethora of modular upgrade systems created these days certified for adaptation to a wide array of military hardware so low risk enhancements (minimal R&D) are achievable either locally or offshore.

Australian political and military leaders are being neglectful of their responsibilities to maintain continuous adequate and credible military preparedness and unless there is radical change in defence organisation and culture, the present unjustifiable and unaffordable waste of much taxpayer funding will just continue.

[Straight Up Again]

From my viewpoint as a lowly engineer working on military projects (aviation and naval, UK and Aus) there are several problems.

The personnel problem on the customer side is plain (2 year tours, not much experience etc), though a lot of my current customer PO is permanent civil servants.

Also, there is much wrong with the major contractors. To win the bid, you have to put in the most believable lie you can. You have to say you will be cheaper and quicker than the competition, without being caught bullsh.tting.
Even many projects that say they are "on time and on budget" are only in that position due to the latest adjustments/agreements with the customer. Schedules are almost meaningless.
I am asked how long it will take to do a task, I say, for instance, 2 weeks (10 days). The manager then tries to give me 7 days, and looks pissed off when I say "no, 10 days". There is a major lack of understanding on the part of project managers, schedule is king and leads to the god of money. If you don't meet the schedule, you get extra 'help' and have to waste time explaining things to them, and generating more metrics/recovery plans/schedules to satisfy them.
The idea of a major contract is to do absolute minimum possible to meet the requirements, doesn't matter how suitable to product is. (e.g. controls for a video recorder on one screen of an MFK, yet tape counter on a completely different page :ugh:)

The major contractors are also getting snowed under in process and standards (reporting, metrics, reviews). You have to have all these things to show you are a competent organisation, and individually each makes sense. However, you end up with so many of them that they take so much time that nobody gets the core work done. My current project has more people faffing around on contracts and commercial stuff than we have engineers doing the core job.

I think for Aus the whole Australianisation thing sometimes costs more money than it generates (well, a lot of the time to be honest). I'm all for keeping cash in the country (and me employed), but the cost and time blowouts to come up with a unique version of something scary. I don't think we have the economy to support the buying habit of Australianisation. I reckon let the better off countries buy the 'A' model, then when the bugs are ironed out, we'll get some, probably still quicker than waiting for it to be Australianised.

Even fixed price contracts are not the cure people had hoped. If the customer stuck rigidly to them the penalty payments and liquidated damages etc would drive the company under, and you wouldn't get any product. Maybe that needs to be the new attitude, pick a couple of smallish projects and ruthlessly implement the contract, no leeway. The government wastes some money in the short term, a couple of companies go under / get swallowed by competitors, Other companies get the message and suddenly become more realistic in pricing an schedule. Not a great vote winner though, politicians may have to find a new job.

I am often stopped from doing a job to the best of my abilities because all we want is the minimum effort for the cheapest cost.

Basically, I'm looking to get out of engineering and do something completely different. The dissatisfaction with how these military projects go is not just on the customer side. Sorry for the war-and-peace rant. :O

Anybody in Aus looking to employ an ex-engineer? :rolleyes:
(probably not after that rant, thank god for internet anonymity)

[scran]

Sorry Bushranger, can you confirm what separate Ministry handles major defence acquisitions please................

[Like This - Do That]

The personnel problem on the customer side is plain (2 year tours, not much experience etc), though a lot of my current customer PO is permanent civil servants.

I've recently read Neil Sheehan's "A Fiery Peace in a Cold War", and noted that the subject of Sheehan's book, General Bernard Schriever, was effectively in a development / procurement / acquisition role, working with civil servants, industry & contractors for a decade. None of this 'dip in for 2 years before escaping back to a REAL posting' business. GEN Schriever was even promoted from Colonel to General over this part of his career - ie he was the ICBM acquisition / procurement / development man in the USAF.

Not saying we post talented SQN LDRs / MAJs etc to DMO or various projects from project inception to Sqn service (no matter how long); nor saying we ought to build our own ICBMs :} (OK I'm being silly); but there may be scope in this regard to minimise the posting cycle sh1t fight for projects of vital importance.

What would it take? Would would the costs be for both the service & the member concerned? What precautions would be needed to avoid 'customer capture'? What incentives would be needed to attract talented SMEs to 'opt out' of the posting cycle for 6-10 years?

[Bushranger 71]

Hello Scran.

I erred; there are now 3 separate ministers governing the Defence organisation, Minister for Defence, Minister for Defence Material, Minister for Defence Science & Personnel plus a Parliamentary Secretary for Defence. Appreciable shuffling of politicians through defence related appointments since 2007.

Both DMO and DSTO now have their own separate ministerial clout whereas the military is subordinate to the Secretary of Defence/CDF diarchy under the Minister for Defence. Once upon a time, each of the armed forces had their own ministerial representation with public service elements embedded in the respective military departments and that worked well.

In theory, DMO ought to be just a project co-ordination agency but it certainly wields more power. If I recall correctly, former Ministers for Defence Fitzgibbon and Faulkner both expressed frustration at being unable to exercise adequate control over processes in DMO.

My point is nothing works effectively unless appropriately organised and the whole defence structure is really a fragmented dysfunctional mess; but I doubt that the politicians (of either major political party) have the fortitude to restructure back towards a semblance of the system that once worked pretty efficiently. Things may get a whole lot worse if DMO gets spun off into a separate corporate entity, which has been proposed.

[TBM-Legend]

The so-called "corporatisation" of Defence is creating massive inefficiencies and cost to the military. All aspects are over managed with fewer people at the coalface.

In reality we run a small military and if you look at budgets vs. numbers compared to other countries we must be blowing alot of loot on 'hot air'....

[scran]

Bushranger,

Thanks.


I wonder, however, if we went back to a Minister for each Service, would we be any better off - or would we have Minister's fighting each other, whereas now, supposedly, the senior Minister (i.e. Defence) is the descision maker.


I do agree that the two "junior" Minister's and Parlimentary Secretary don't seem to do any value-adding to the entire process...............


(edited for spelling.....)

[Winco]

compressorstall

When you said :

'When you buy a car, you go to the showroom, see what closest matches your requirements and what you can afford, and then you haggle a bit to save money and then pay up and drive off. In the military a bunch of people of 2 year tours come up with the requirement and industry seeks to match it, then after 2 years, another bunch of staff officers tinker with the requirement and industry reacts to the requested changes, then after 2 years come more staff officers'

You missed out one other vital thing....... the people that went to the car showroom in the first place, couldn't even drive a car!!!! Now that's where the main problem lies!

Winco

[Bushranger 71]

Hi again Scran.

There is ongoing unfettered Australian Public Service recruiting for highly paid positions in DoD and DMO so civilian domination of the defence realm is growing prodigiously. If the organisational structure was streamlined along the following lines, huge efficiencies would be achievable:

a. abolish both of the Material and Science & Personnel ministries,
b. downsize DMO and DSTO making them agencies subordinate to MinDef,
c. establish cells of DMO within DoD and the respective armed forces headquarters,
c. vest personnel management within the Secretary of Defence/CDF diarchy, where it belongs,
d. create parliamentary secretaries for each of the armed forces subordinate to MinDef; and
e. vest authority for all defence expenditure in MinDef.

These measures would dilute the public service domination of the defence realm and reinstate more traditional political control of the military; also generate big savings in manpower costs enabling labour to be diverted for other national needs.

Dare I say that defence budgetting could also be pruned to an affordable and adequate 7.5 percent of federal government revenue, not the near 10 percent as now and projected to unrealistically increase out to 2030. That would really cause some soul-searching regarding wasteful spending. Tying projected defence expenditure to GDP is just deceitful smoke and mirrors stuff. Former MinDef Fitzgibbon was on the right track pulling back defence outlay projections to the 4 year budget estimates process but then Parliamentary Secretary Combet reverted that to a 10 year horizon due to lobbying from largely foreign-owned defence industry.

Are such reforms realistic? Sadly, the political will probably does not exist within either of the major political parties; but pretty bold action is essential if the existing shambolic scenario is to be remedied. Perhaps the biggest obstacle is that so many former politicians, senior public servants and military chiefs have been or are now riding the Defence 'gravy train'. Just check who were/are directly employed in influential appointments by the multi-national arms conglomerates and/or as lobbyists on mind-blowing financial packages.

[Straight Up Again]

Not saying we post talented SQN LDRs / MAJs etc to DMO or various projects from project inception to Sqn service (no matter how long); nor saying we ought to build our own ICBMs (OK I'm being silly); but there may be scope in this regard to minimise the posting cycle sh1t fight for projects of vital importance.

What would it take? Would would the costs be for both the service & the member concerned? What precautions would be needed to avoid 'customer capture'? What incentives would be needed to attract talented SMEs to 'opt out' of the posting cycle for 6-10 years?

Tempting people in Uniform to a long period on one project may be difficult, but having somebody on a PO for 10 years may also have problems.

How much does their military effectiveness dissapear over that time? i.e. if you have an Army SME from an armoured vehicle background, will he lose some of his effectiveness as he gest further away from operational, and indeed operational concepts and other kit (not from his project) change? (genuine question, I don't have a military background, but know that test pilots do limited tours usually before going back to a squadron)

I still think you would need some short term people on the project to keep an input from the end user perspective, but maybe less of them and in less important positions, or else you may end with on time, on budget, meets the requirements kit that is actually bugger all use.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi Straight Up Again.

I have seen a few gripes from DMO sources regarding military representative posting turbulence but ponder whether this might just be deflecting criticism regarding some of the ill-managed projects.

I cannot recall changeover of particular project officers being much of a problem when the armed forces managed their own projects. Pretty easy to arrange say a couple of months overlap where there are no subordinate continuation staff.

Methinks there would be a simple solution if the military resumed responsibility for project management with DMO cells embedded in the respective service headquarters. Simply invite military retirees to involve in projects as there are thousands just annoying their wives and itching to do something constructive. I drink beer with many in their late 80s who are still sharp as a tack and this invaluable national resource should not be wasted.

An outside the square solution I know, but it seems to me the problem is easily solved with some flexible thinking.

[TBM-Legend]

A bit of common-sense , experience in the field plus some business smarts are required.

My friend's son was up until recently in the Army [infantry] and served in Timor and ME theatres. His unit was involved in combat boot trials not long ago. Each man was issued with three different makes/styles of combat boot. This required them to field trial them and report through a convoluted paperwork process on the suitability etc etc of each type and to rate them 1 to 3.

The boot that was rated 3 by the majority was the one selected by DMO for production. Afterwards an order came out that soldiers were not allowed to wear privately sourced boots as "they had selected the 'new' combat boot"!!!! A joke I'd say...

This is typical of the bull**** in procurement. He also said he and his friends used US boots where possible as they were easily available in fractional fittings vs. the "new" boot that was limited in available sizes and numbers.

Apart from a weapon, boots are an infanteers' major asset...