Managing time critical checklists!

[A380 Jockey]

I recently completed my licence renewal simulator check(very successfully,I might add..).
On one particular exercise I was asked very politely but extremely candidly to 'please expedite the procedure'.
This exercise was an engine fire on one of my engines..
Now I am a trainer myself,but not wanting to take anything away from this 'green' TRI,it got me thinking.
I was always taught thru the entire course of my flying history,AND thru the course of my training history that when you have an emergency that is time critical but not time starved,slow down your pace and buy whatever few milli seconds you are able to,therby giving you the space(AND time) to take sensible decisions. These are,after all, life altering decisions.
On discussion,his thought was that I could do better by 'hurrying up the checklist' of a 550T aircraft. I had actually done 4 items in about 30 seconds which could easily have taken close to 60 had I stuttered or stumbled.
Having seen several,innumeral students and trainees cut wrong engine(s),and fire the wrong fire shot in the wrong engine,pull the wrong generator drive and switch the wrong hydraulic pump,turn the hydraulics off for the fuel pumps etc etc,I have come to establish the golden rule that when you have to rush something,please take your time. Or 'hurry up slowly'. Apparantely,my training hasn't sunk thru enough minds. Or maybe it is incorrect to begin with...
Would appreciate your comments on my chain of thought..
Howsoever correct or otherwise it might be. Many thanks. Cause I am really dissappointed. If for nothing else....in myself.

[PJ2]

A380 Jockey;

I will share a similar experience in hopes of providing perspective on what shouldn't be felt as a "disappointing" comment. I certainly understand the feeling - let me explain why.

We were being checked by a government ministry check pilot recently qualified on the A320 and the ride was being run by a designated company check pilot.

We were going through a drill, engine fire or hydraulic failure as I recall and executing the ECAM drills and reviewing the STATUS pages as per the books.

One of the comments at the end of the ride was, "too much talking during the ECAM action drills...I want a 'curtain' drawn down between you two so that one flies the airplane and one does the drill".

Our 'talking' during the drills was the CM2's confirmation with CM1 that he wished the APU started (due loss of one generator)...confirmation that it was to be a Config FULL landing, (calculations for landing distance application) and full review and confirmation of understanding of all STATUS items. In other words...SOPs.

We were confused, angry and certainly disappointed because that's what went on the report. That the SOPs were thus and we had been trained, (very well) in them and had had fine reports on previous rides doing the same thing did not alleviate the feeling that we'd not done well on the ride.

I did respond, in writing, to our Chief Pilot and the Ministry. I learned in discussion with others that our experience was not unique with this particular inspector. The ride was thankfully viewed "in historical perspective" but even then it was still not easy to forget.

We are examined as no other profession. We submit the validity of our licence to medical and standards checks essentially every six months. If either hiccup, we cannot work and must fix whatever the problem was before we can practise our craft again. No other profession is as stringent. Sensitivity to what is understood as unjustified criticism (vice a "suggestion") when we are our own severest critics, is both a fact of the profession and a result of setting extremely high personal standards.

We pride ourselves in achieving and problem-solving, and it is more than "ego". It is our "service to our passengers" which I believe is primary behind this standard. In this high standard I suspect the medical profession is the same, although in many other aspects the disimilarities between aviation and medicine are topics of concern, discussed elsewhere.

When our personal standards are placed under such scrutiny, even the most minor comment can be disappointing if truly unwarranted. In my view, as a 35-year retiree off the A330/A340, your standard of "taking the necessary time" is absolutely spot on; it is no time to rush a drill or a checklist or an ECAM action process.

The Airbus has designed the ECAM process such that it requires completion. One can get into a lot of trouble if, while rushing, some steps are missed.

Recalling the drill again to find out why something went off the rails is worse and less safe than completing the drill deliberately and at a pace commensurate with all cockpit crew members' comfort.

If one needs to get the airplane on the ground, that is an airmanship call, not an ECAM or Airbus requirement, (a red Land ASAP contemplates that the drills are still completed), and a check pilot's need for you to increase the pace requires a discussion after the session on "why?"

FWIW

PJ2

[A380 Jockey]

Many thanks for at least agreeing with some of my POV's,if not endorsing them. Very heartening to know others feel similarly if not exactly the way I do.
Feeling better already. And more endorsed....:ok:
Thx PJ2

[411A]

Recalling the drill again to find out why something went off the rails is worse and less safe than completing the drill deliberately and at a pace commensurate with all cockpit crew members' comfort.

If one needs to get the airplane on the ground, that is an airmanship call, not an ECAM or Airbus requirement, (a red Land ASAP contemplates that the drills are still completed), and a check pilot's need for you to increase the pace requires a discussion after the session on "why?"


Yes, take your time and do it right, the first time will save your hide, make NO mistake. So-called 'rushed' procedures are NEVER a good idea.:}

[safetypee]

Views on the subject:-

When time is short and odds are long! (www.iscram.org/dmdocuments/HarbinAugust2007/Day3_DecisionModels/ISCRAM_Hollnagel_final.pdf)

Time-to-Think-and-Time-to-Do. (www.scribd.com/doc/47277809/-Time-to-Think-and-Time-to-Do-Hollnagel-013)

Fostering successes rather than reducing failures. (www.scribd.com/doc/47279623/-Fostering-successes-rather-than-reducing-failures-Hollnagel-presentation)

Efficiency-Thoroughness Trade-Off. (www.ida.liu.se/~eriho/ETTO_M.htm)

“Life can only be understood backwards, but it must be lived forwards.”

And don’t forget Merton’s “Laws of Unanticipated Consequences” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unintended_consequence)

[Landroger]

Respect to you guys who have to put your jobs on the line, from time to time. I am neither pilot nor ex-military, but I have a point of view which supports your position. Many years ago I used to work with an engineer whose skills and work ethic I greatly respected. He was an ex-RAF Weapons Electronics Officer in the Vulcan, at a time when some of his electronics included a very large bomb indeed.

He explained that on occasion things would go wrong, his panel would light up red and every breaker in the place would trip. He had been taught and his experience had shown the truth of the teaching, that ones first action in those circumstances, was to "sit on your hands."

I have never been in the sort of situation to which you refer, but I have never forgotten his phrase and in difficult situations you may be sure it is not I who confuses action with progress.

Sit on your hands is terribly good advice for giving your brain time to make the right decision, not just 'a decision'.

Roger.

[EW73]

In PJ2s example regarding the comment -

One of the comments at the end of the ride was, "too much talking during the ECAM action drills...I want a 'curtain' drawn down between you two so that one flies the airplane and one does the drill".

I see that comment as one which perfectly applies to the three-man flight deck, where the situation ..."that one flies the airplane and one does the drill". was the ops normal in most non-normal situations.

maybe he was from the Golden Era!

And a very good practice it was too!

EW73

[safetypee]

The presentation below follows the same theme as the references in #5, but considers a range of aspects from the individual to the organization. Perhaps a lesson for the future of safety?

Why Things That Go Right, Sometimes Go Wrong. (www.abdn.ac.uk/~wmm069/uploads/files/Aberdeen_ETTO.pdf)

“It’s the black wire to the red wire, right?” (slide 31)

[Atlas Shrugged]

There is absolutely NOTHING that EVER needs to be done in a hurry in an aircraft.

[PappyJ]

Yes, take your time and do it right, the first time will save your hide, make NO mistake. So-called 'rushed' procedures are NEVER a good idea.

No truer statement exists!

[rogerg]

As my instructor used to say, "why is there always a time to do it again, but never time to do it right"

[Sciolistes]

I always remember a particular HPL ATPL exam question along the lines of "How much time should you spend dealing with a problem?". The correct answer was of course "As much time as you have available." I thought it was brilliant despite being blindingly obvious, and yet totally overlooked and seldom have I seen such behaviour.

[Tee Emm]

There is absolutely NOTHING that EVER needs to be done in a hurry in an aircraft.

Apart of course from finding yourself in a high speed spiral dive in IMC exceeding MMo and the radar showing all red from proximity of cloud covered granite :ok:

[KBPsen]

I have found it fairly common among "new" TRI/TREs to want things to proceed at a faster pace. Perception of time is a relative thing and very different when watching rather than doing. At the same time it is my experience that the "new" are often concerned whether there is enough time to complete the entire sim program.

[PEI_3721]

‘Hurry’ is tied to ‘rush’ which is defined as to move or act swiftly. However, if the word was ‘expeditiously’ – acting or doing with speed and efficiency, then the required action might be clearer. However, both definitions require moderating by 'accuracy' - thoroughness.
These aspects depend on the context of the situation, the required action, and time available; aspects of awareness and knowledge. In my book, expeditious actions (thinking and acting) are required for an RTO, and warnings from EGPWS/TAWS, Windshear, ACAS, etc.
Not all red warnings require such action, often the difference between these is the ability to undo the action, i.e. an engine shutdown and fire drill may be more difficult to undo that an EGPWS pull up, conversely failing to pull may have no undo capability.

Thus ‘know before you go’ (SOPs) comes to mind to aid the decision to trade one aspect for another, (ETTO) as in #5 & #8.

[PJ2]

EW73;
I see that comment as one which perfectly applies to the three-man flight deck, where the situation ..."that one flies the airplane and one does the drill". was the ops normal in most non-normal situations.

maybe he was from the Golden Era!
I flew DC8s in that "era", with three (and four, with the navigator until 1974) crew members, and yes, that's the way it was done...in an emergency, one flew and did the radio work, one did the drill(s) and one monitored and assisted; BTDT. Even then, one always verbally asked for and got-before-actioning, confirmation from the pilot flying on all non-reversible items such as fuel control levers, throttles, fire-pull handles, generator/IDG disconnects and so on. Still do today.

Those kinds of communications were not what was being referred to here.

If I must, I can assure you that the inspector was not from that "Golden Era"...he wasn't nearly old enough and was not experienced in large aircraft/airline operations. I'll leave it at that.

In two-crew aircraft such as the A320/A330/A340 series, the ECAM drills were then and are today carried out very specifically and there are times when communication between crew members is required. One example among many I can cite is the review of the status page where both pilots must be aware of inoperative and/or system and performance limitations.

I'm not going to bleed on here, EW73 - you have to take my word that both the inspector and the experience were outliers. I'm posting these remarks quite candidly in order to assure one poster and perhaps others, that this kind of stuff happens and it means nothing overall but it still affects one. The remarks I see are universal...that rushing is to be avoided at all costs and only makes a mess, a point that I made in my first response.

PJ2

[Stickies]

Recommended good read for your new TRI/TRE would be the interview given to the Royal Aeronautical Society by one of the the QF32 (A380 from SIN 4th Nov.) crewmembers,1st class CRM and not a rushed moment in sight!

[SR71]

Yeah but that QF32 flight bothers me for another reason....there were 5 of them onboard the flightdeck and it still took 2 hrs to get the bird down.

Had there been 2 pilots, would it have taken 5 hrs? Is that reasonable?

A system that spits out 43 ECAM messages in the first ~60 secs and then 10(?) subsequent messages, some contradictory, expecting a 2 man crew to deal with it is a triumph of technology over commonsense isn't it?

Even the 5 man crew admitted the messages were confusing and not assisting the process of building up a mental model of what was going on.

[bfisk]

To answer the OP: going through initial type-rating (in the sim), I went from overwhelmed, slightly confident, via down again, to cocky. Unfortunately, the cocky "let's git'er done" feeling on the flight before the skill test resulted in shutting down both engines after an engine fire - the right one with condition lever and the left one with the firewall valve. We had been joking about it beforehand, that you'ld have to be pretty thick to pull a stunt like that, that it was just a matter of paying attention.

Let me tell you, that the ear-defening silence of two stopped engines, just above 1000', in solid IMC, taught me one thing and one thing only: sit on your f-ing hands until your head is cool!

You are never that short of time, that you don't have time to do things right.

[Gulfcapt]

A380, you did it right.:ok:

You musta gotten in the way of the TRI's answr 2 a txt. :ugh:

Best,
GC

[A380 Jockey]

So many thanks guys, I can't do it enough.....!!!
Feels good to be endorsed by such a plethora of experienced airmen.
Thanks GC. Incidentally the ride in question was my own LR/Tri upgrade,being done by a snotty 'new school' Tre. Surprise surprise....I know what you're thinking. Yes,he's dating the boss's daughter....:cool:
Qe sera sera..

[Big Pistons Forever]

There is a great story of an age 59 1/2 Captain doing his final sim ride on the Crowd Killer before he retired. The TRE was a young hotshot and blew up one engine just as the captain was rotating. With the firebell blazing and all the bad red lights on the captain smoothly established the exact correct attitude while controlling yaw so that the aircraft heading never budged, with positive ROC established he called gear up and then leaned forward and started winding the clock on the panel. The attitude of heading never budged and after a few seconds of winding he calmly called for the engine failure/fire checklist.

The young checkpilot stopped the sim right there and demanded to what he was doing. The captains reply. "Son, nobody ever killed themselves winding the clock, but plenty of guys have killed themselves hurrying the emergency procedures ....."

[Sciolistes]

There is absolutely NOTHING that EVER needs to be done in a hurry in an aircraft.
Boeing QRH agrees with the exception of donning the mask and responding to a loss of thrust on both engines.

[A380 Jockey]

Even donning the mask gives u AT LEAST 5 secs of TUC. WHick is more than enough to don a quick donning new generation mask!
The "all engine failure" is a walk in the park, if at a resonably comfortable altitude. Even at Sully's low altitude it was handled so very calmly and collectively. I'm quite sure...nay quite certain, that the results would've been dramactically different had it been done otherwise.....:ooh:

[Bergerie1]

Like the other old (but not bold) pilots who have posted here, I agree that you need to take your time and get it right. These were my golden rules (albeit on aircraft of an earlier age):-

1. Modern aircraft are easy to fly, they are very reliable and have good handling characteristics, therein lies the danger. It is all too easy to be unprepared for the rare occasions when it all goes wrong and you really have to fight for your life.

2. Most events do not require instant action. The ones that do are regularly practised on the simulator so that they become routine. Such things as rejected take-off, engine out after V1 and wind shear recovery are good examples where an instant and correct response is required.

3. For all other events there is time to assess the situation. This is absolutely vital because it is imperative to avoid the false hypothesis and to embark on the wrong course of action.

4. Know your aircraft. A good knowledge of the manuals, where to find information, how the aircraft works and what the systems do and how they do it saves time when you have to do things in a hurry, giving you more time to think.

5. If you are to assess the situation correctly you need to shed workload and buy time, therefore hand over control to the other pilot and make maximum use of the autopilot.

6. Be like a doctor. Observe the situation, diagnose the problem and then prescribe the correct checklist. Remember that the checklist is the best compendium of actions available to you, it has been thought out by people who really do know what they are talking about (the manufacturer, test pilots, the CAA, your own airline) and they will have done so in the peace and quiet of the office when there is plenty of time to think. Remember also that for every item in the check list someone may have died for it. So follow the checklist. It is also the means of coordinating the crew.

7. Now comes the difficult bit, when do you chuck the checklist out of the window? Well, if it is imperative to get on the ground ASAP (it is on fire and likely to fall apart at any moment) all aircraft are still like Tiger Moths. Even in a modern jet you only have to slow up to around 240kts and stick some flap out, slow up a bit more (say to 180kts) and stick some more flap out, put the gear down, stick down landing flap and then stick it on the runway. You won’t have gone far wrong – the other bits are not essential – EXCEPT – you must remember to de-pressurise before landing otherwise you won’t be able to open the doors and evacuate the aircraft.

8. ABOVE ALL, GUARD AGAINST THE WRONG HYPOTHESIS.

[Sciolistes]

The "all engine failure" is a walk in the park, if at a resonably comfortable altitude.
I was referring specifically to the actions intended to get at least one engine in a timely manner.

[Escape Path]

The young checkpilot stopped the sim right there and demanded to what he was doing. The captains reply. "Son, nobody ever killed themselves winding the clock, but plenty of guys have killed themselves hurrying the emergency procedures ....."

That's experience right there. You cannot buy that :D

Bergerie1: Massive post, sir! :ok:

[stiffwing]

"There is absolutely NOTHING that EVER needs to be done in a hurry in an aircraft."

I disagree

The only thing that has to be done immediately without discussion is GPWS recovery, except in Day VMC where there are no terrain issues
Everything else can wait

[SKS777FLYER]

Some quotes: "There is absolutely NOTHING that EVER needs to be done in a hurry in an aircraft."

I disagree

The only thing that has to be done immediately without discussion is GPWS recovery, except in Day VMC where there are no terrain issues
Everything else can wait

Maybe there is sarcasm in those quotes because if not, I'm guessing that neither poster has ever had a near mid-air or sudden wild airport ground traffic. Probably never experienced a fire on the flight deck or an explosive de-compression at FL430. Probably never experienced a hardover rudder on a cat stroke of an aircraft carrier. There exists a long list of possible events while manipulating the pointy end of an aircraft that need addressed PRONTO w/o the need of committee or political correctness awareness, not to mention multiple checklist management, to increase the occupants odds of seeing another sunrise or sunset.
Capt. Sully Sullenburger might have a word or two to offer about such events.

[A-3TWENTY]

There are examiners and examiners.

I`m flyng for a chinese company and there is one guy who likes to put you a failure.Then the pilot requested a vor to be in holding over and comply with the drills. In the middle of their procedure , he got an engine fire which after the ecam actions didn`t extinguish.

Of course , pilots decided to leave the procedure thew were donig , gave priority to the fire and got back.

They were criticezed becoause of the rush to return .
I Can`t understand.

Bye

[Bergerie1]

Atlas Shrugged

There are some things that do require instant action, as I hinted at in item No 2 in my previous post, and as has been expanded upon correctly by SKS777FLYER. However, I think all three of us are agreed on the need, normally, to take one's time and to act calmly and methodically - as demonstrated rather magnificently by the elderly captain who wound the clock!

My reasons for not normally rushing into action are (1) to guard against taking the wrong initial actions; and (2) to avoid the wrong hypothesis.

This latter point is subtle and important. If something alarming happens suddenly and you fixate on the wrong hypothesis it is almost impossible, when under stess, to re-evaluate the situation and to change your mind. You are then in danger of carrying out a set of actions which may well be the right ones for the false hypothesis but not appropriate for the actual situation.

[A380 Jockey]

I guess some of us are still trying to figure out the difference between doing something quickly and getting things done quickly.
SKS,ever heard of the phrase 'hurry up slowly'...?
:cool:

[Atlas Shrugged]

I guess some of us are still trying to figure out the difference between doing something quickly and getting things done quickly.


My point, exactly.

Acting quickly and hurrying are two vastly different things.

[Tmbstory]

Atlas Shrugged:

It depends on how many seconds you have left to recover the aircraft before ground contact.

Tmb

[isaneng]

As I'm still flying on a 4 man flight deck, I still have the luxury of running checklists with one other person dedicated to challenge and response. As an instructor/checker for the last 20 years, I agree wholeheartedly with the recurrent comments above. The debrief remarks from post #1 seem to come from a relatively new examiner, and perhaps are more indicative of his inexperience than anything else. I know that it took a few years before I became more than 'technically' competent as an instructor, as my own experience/airmanship/maturity grew. As a military man, (who else has aircraft old enough for a 4 man flight deck....), we have had a good central training system for many years now (although budget restraints now limit the number of coloured pens for diagrams..), but perhaps more importantly we have had a wealth of experience to draw upon for our instructor cadre. And that experience was frequently accompanied by time on different types and roles. My perception is that the appointment of TREs etc in many companies often has a political input as well as professional, but I stand by to be corrected!

[Microburst2002]

Here there are to opposing variables:

time to carry out the drills Vs good team working

If you split the crew in two, you can do the drill in a shorter time, but at the expense of team working and all its safety benefits.

I advocate for the team working, more time consuming, approach. It is my opinion that the old Aviate-Navigate-Comunicate and Manage means:

1-both pilots Aviate (one handling, the other watching carefully and making sure that the handling pilots is handling and that the handling is adecuate, assissing him and bringing to his attention any discrepancy or doubt about the flight path, automation modes, etc...). PNF will not carry out anything else as long as the Aviate part hasn't been assured

2-both pilots Navigate (one handling, the other monitoring, assissting). PNF will not do anything else until the Navigate is assured

3-both pilots Communicate (one using the mike and talking, the other paying attention to what is said, then both making sure the other one knows what has been said). The communicate part has to be done, if necessary (sometimes it is not). If there is any necessary communication, it must be done before managing the drill. Otherwise the crew can go on with the drill directly

4-both pilots Manage (the PNF carriying out the checklist, then both pilots assessing the situation, then making decision)

YOu can save time but letting PF do Aviate and Navigate while PNF does comm and checklists. The question is: Is time so important?? Most of the times, it is not, in my opinion. It is better the team approach than the time approach, except when circumnstances are very critical, when time can be the top priority.

I have observed that many captains have the tendency of neglecting flight path while they monitor what the F/O is doing in the overhead panel after they have prompted them to start with the drills. I have seen this happen many times in the sim. A very clear simptom of this is the THR LK single chime every 5 secs, for instance. In such cases captains destroy the team and pull the F/O out of the Aviate-navigate, while they does neglect it as well. This is very dangerous, and there is no reason to rush (normally).

You have to be very very good to split the team and still ensure Aviate, Navigate, Communicate and monitor the PNF's Manage with the same level of redundancy that you can obtain working as a team.

[Dimlightbulbs]

Most of us know what needs to be done right away, vs what we can take our time with.

What isn't always obvious is the recognition that the guy behind you in the box might be using his position to wind up the pilots, create undue stress etc.

I'm not above firing instructors, I've done it. Some guys just shouldn't be teaching.

[grounded27]

There will allways be grey between airmanship and procedure. The airlines and CAA's wish to push to the latter.

[Idle Thrust]

Reminds me of the old tale:

YOUNG BULL - Lets run over to that field and do a couple of heifers.

OLD BULL - Let's WALK over and do the lot!

[3holelover]

.....still, I'd have been happier to hear that Jeffrey Skiles had hit the ditching switch sometime before they hit the water, rather than plodding through checklists he must have known he couldn't complete.

[Microburst2002]

In high stress situations something that seems very sensible can be a big big mistake so it is probably better to do the drills as written, in the order they have been written, rather than act instinctively.

[A380 Jockey]

Beiger 1...great post!
I think there is a lil misconception here of the word 'hurry' and 'slowly'. To me,a hurried action is one where ur hands move before your brain. And a 'slow' action is one where your hands only move where your brain has been a few (milli)seconds ago. There and only there lies the difference. Think about it ..

[Meccano]

PJ2, I thought your post was wonderful. It articulated perfectly what we all see happen far too often on checks. I'm almost tempted to print it off and bring it on my next Sim ride.

Airbus380 Jockey - I've heard that 'curtain' reference before, from an Airbus Instructor (I mean a member of Airbus's own training cadre from Toulouse).
When he spoke those words, myself and my Sim companion (another Captain) looked at each other with mouths agape....because it went right against EVERYTHING our airline was teaching us in its CRM program.
But that is indeed what Airbus want, in their Big Green Book!

Since then I've moved to a different company, and again had the joy and pleasure of attending a course with some of these Airbus in-house Sim Jockies.
I found it a most distasteful experience.

In my previous company they had been allowed in on that one occasion to do some training because of manpower shortages in our own training department. But, since our company did not operate to Airbus SOPs (we had our own) Mr.Froggy had to adapt to ours.
That included taking down the 'curtains'.

This time things were different. I was on 'their territory' (Airbus facility) and my new company operates slavishly to Airbus SOP's.
Some of the Airbus instructors were good.
Very good even - as indeed they should be!!

But one or two were arrogant and opinionated, in the way that only the French (and sometimes Germans) can be.
One particular individual (ex French Airforce) reeked of contempt for Commercial pilots, and made it very clear that most of them were second rate compared to him. He constantly reminded us of his ex-fighter pilot status, and bragged about how he had turned down a boring Air France job (yes, this guy had never flown a Commercial flight in his life).

He was one of the 'Rush Rush' brigade. Also the 'Shut Up' brigade, and the 'Airbus Mouth Music' brigade. I can honestly say it was one of the most humiliating experiences I've ever had in a Sim - to have to listen to that braggart sighing and grunting from the back seat if anyone put a word wrong. I learned nothing from him, and couldn't wait to get out of his reach. One of the worst 'instructors' I've ever met in my career.
Perhaps your instructor was a product of this kind of Airbus trainer.

On a final note I'd say this - as aircraft have become more complex, and as the funds available to Training Departments have been cut - it has become the practice of TD's to pile more and more into Sim slots with no regard for the actual time taken to complete the exercises. No allowance is made for Sim malfunctions or breakdowns, and many elements of the Sim program have to be done in an unholy rush, or dropped altogether from the program on the day. This is pointless and frustrating, and does NOT create an atmosphere conducive to LEARNING.
And that's the WHOLE POINT OF TRAINING.

[Pitch Up Authority]

It is simple, there never is a curtain

Time critical applies to recall items, alerts at warning level and situations where the physical integrity of crew and/or passengers is at stake.

At all times the PF must be able to follow what the PNF is doing and visa versa.

Monitoring the flight path and configurations has priority and verbal confirmation by the PF of non-reversible items executed by the PNF is a must.

Given the above requirement it is the PF who sets the pace at which the checklist of time critical items are executed. Starting the APU is not time critical and can wait.

It is essential that the PNF continues to monitor the flight path in between checklist items a long as critical terrain and obstacles are not cleared, he must take the time to do that. The PNF will do that in between items as necessary in order to conduct an effective monitoring.

The PNF will assure himself that the PF is aware of each item of the checklist that is being executed, verbal confirmation is not needed to complete this task. This will set the pace for the PM.

This will assure that no time is lost and any effect of checklist items upon aircraft flight path control are spotted by the PF as they occur.

So the terms slowly, too fast or slow are irrelevant.

The real issue is not to loose time while completing the above mentioned tasks and not to do more than is required.

[Last Ditch]

I have been referenced to this "curtain" only during the Smoke Procedure.
Never elsewhere.
Why should the smoke procedure be treated any different??
As a PF, I would hate to be reeled into direct law without mutual understanding and consent.
Any comments will be appreciated. Thanks.