Floods & MRH90 [Archive]

finestkind

19th Jan 2011, 06:19

Criticism is easy to do and a bit of a right after the fact. More pertinent is to also offer solutions. Given the boys and girls of the ADF work pretty hard particularly when deployed overseas and in particular over Christmas, away from families when would a suitable stand down period be? Given they are often away on exercises or tsunami, earth quake, flood etc relief and away from family when would a pertinent time for stand down be? Given that the ADF is not a humanitarian organisation which assets would you keep working over the summer period when would a suitable stand down time be? Given that the stand down period is often only two weeks when, well you get the gist.
The personal of the ADF are not different to anyone else in the community. Every member is more than willing to dig in and help out particularly in times of crisis, have a look at recent history. But the difference from our local population is that every member must wait and be told when and where to go and what to do.
Like everything that is Government based, infrastructure cost money. We all complain about our taxes but all want that hospital, ambulance, policeman when the need arises. I don’t want to see a cop when I’m 10klm over the limit but where are the buggers when some ones on a rampage. If you want better humanitarian capabilities pay for it.
Possibly crewman do get winch training. So ??? Where are the winches?
Billions spent, on what. Do you expect the Super hornets to do pass’s dropping loaves of bread? Where are the assets? Well either deployed, under maintenance etc.
More than happy to expand the ADF and include some more assets to be utilised for emergency civilian situations. Has already been thought of 20 odd years ago with an idea of using a fixed wing amphibian to be ADF utilised (very happy SAS here for amphib ops) and then on standby for water dropping during summer seasons. Why didn’t it happen, ask the pollies.

Where is this thread headed. Are we unhappy with the ADF, the people in the ADF, the fact that the ADF is not on permanent work up.

Code3

19th Jan 2011, 06:30

Despite what has been posted on this thread the BlackHawks at Oakey ARE winch equipped.

Pera

19th Jan 2011, 06:43

The ADF is not established to provide assistance in natural disasters. There's no spare cash to be ready just in case.

Not allowed to have spare capability these days... it's a waste of money :ugh:

paul 2007

19th Jan 2011, 07:26

Interesting to read all the comments posted. Personally I think that ADF personnel have done an excellent job and are to be congratulated in there efforts. :ok:

MRHs didn't assist as they are still working up and are not yet in serviceWe have had 1st deliveries of these A/C about 2007/2008 - seems to be taking a long time to get these into service considering other countries are using them already.
Did the other countries also have issues with the floor / ramp / sling etc as well?

I guess the greatest concern is the engine problem a short time back and a chance of it reoccurring.

Eventually when the Sea Kings and Blackhawks are replaced by 46 MRH90 and if there should be another engine problem then potentially we could see a situation where we have NO helicopters available (of this size) till the engine situation was resolved.
Last time the aircraft did not fly for a number of months.
.

Wiley

19th Jan 2011, 07:49

Reports on Sydney radio today that interstate Army Reserve personnel are not being authorised to work on flood relief / clean up because there is no money available for Reserve pay. (the same reports say that local Reservists are expected to work for no pay.)

I can more or less confiirm this as I know a Reservist who has been working full time at Russell Hill on a project that needs doing - and he is desperately needed to complete the job - but he has been (for want of a better phrase) 'stood down' ('let go' if you prefer), since the budget for Reserve pay has been exceeded some months ago by a very large margin.

ozbiggles

19th Jan 2011, 09:44

Wiley, spot on. Even some local reservists can't be deployed because there is no money. Funny thing is they would go out as volunteers.
This from the same government that also cut a capability they shouldn't have until the MRH was up and running.
Having said that if there was a delay getting the ADF involved it wasn't because the troops at the coal face were slow. As mentioned if Govt says go, Defence would be there.
From what I have seen the efforts of Army Aviation (Blackhawk, Chinook and Kiowa)and Navy have been outstanding. They probably need to be kept on a leash from being too keen. Lots of good work from all the rescue helicopters involved.

Hydraulic Palm Tree

19th Jan 2011, 12:01

Not critical of what those who did fly did. Surely Oakey has a call out mechanism? It will from now onwards, that's a fact! Seems crazy to have hangars full of aircraft whilst people were needing water in Condamine or dying on roofs in Grantham. Regardless of it being a training base, the aircraft could have been generated and on an appropriate NTM to assist....name me one of the personnel there, military, reservist, contractor or APS that wouldn't have wanted to help!

As for not have winches....so what....when people are dying, a marlow rope with a figure 8 and a a harness attached to the cargo hook is surely an acceptable solution which can be appropriately risk managed......or would we rather watch people die with a dozen Kiowas, half a dozen Blackhawks and a 412 tucked up in bed.....

TBM-Legend

19th Jan 2011, 12:12

FINESTKIND

Ever heard of aid to the civil power? It is an ADF role.

Let's not forget that the ADF is fully funded by the citizens of Australia not the "government"!

When our fellow citizens are in trouble we must ALL be there.

Agree that the accountants view of defence whereby we'll have one multi-role type to do everything in a general area is flawed. There have been and continue to be issues with machines that will affect a whole fleet - then what?

Having a minimum of two types [including engines] etc reduces risk. Even South Korea recognises that by buying F-15's in batches with different engine types.

Bushranger 71

19th Jan 2011, 19:18

Those in Australia who misguidedly believe that provision of aid to the civil power is not an overriding consideration in defence capabilities employment should have a careful read of Defence White Paper 2009.

Backtracking to the emergence of the RAAF helo force around 1963. Iroquois were all fitted with rescue hoists and often deployed in flood relief events thereafter, including the 1974 happening throughout Queensland and New South Wales involving Iroquois based at Amberley and Canberra (Fairbairn), plus of course deployment to many other parts of Australia and regional nations for aid to the civil power. One 9SQN aircraft was lost in the 1974 floods as a consequence of short shaft failure with 2 aircrew killed and other casualties. The ability to swiftly deploy Iroquois by C-130 for such needs has been forsaken by procuring helicopters that are somewhat unsuited for speedy tactical air deployment. Forget landing C-17 into scruffy remote airstrips because other operators including the USAF and RAF will not entertain.

The Kiowa is a very cost-effective aircraft in multiple roles and similarly the Iroquois (Huey II) which outperforms most other military helos in utility battlefield support roles in terms of versatility, cost-effectiveness and hot and high performance. The larger Sea King is very versatile for naval support needs, including ASW; so, who originated replacement of these types by super-expensive substitutes that cannot perform the same roles cost-effectively?

Operating costs are Kiowa $2,865, Iroquois Huey II about $5,000, Blackhawk $20,659, Sea Hawk $45,317, Sea King $23,616 (DoD 2007 data). Arguably, some of these costings seem excessive but how much per flying hour for MRH-90?

The Chinook, Blackhawk, Iroquois, Kiowa collectively continue to adequately perform combat roles worldwide with established manufacturer upgrade programs available; similarly for other naval support helos. The unit cost of such upgrades are low compared with becoming locked into acquisition of absurdly expensive relatively unproven replacement types that arguably will not be able to cost-effectively perform basic helo support functions. The whole ADF helo rationalization program requires an urgent rethink.

oldpinger

19th Jan 2011, 20:53

TBM

Ok, so as a serving member who wants to help I just jump in my multi million dollar helo and leap off to the rescue. Get a grip, we are responsible to the taxpayer for the cost of all this equipment and the best use of it. Of course we all want to help, but it's the GOVERNMENT that decides where to put us!

Rant over!

finestkind

19th Jan 2011, 21:57

TBM, don't think I alluded to the fact that aid to civil power was not an ADF consideration/role. In fact I did state that they are often called upon, directed by the Government and away doing civil aid not only in this country but elsewhere.
As bushranger said "Those in Australia who misguidedly believe that provision of aid to civil power is not an overriding consideration in defence capabilities employment should have a careful read of Defence White Paper 2009." Very true, a consideration but not the core business and as BR succinctly put it, although an over riding consideration has been severely eroded over the last number of years due to more costly less effective airframes.

Let's not forget that the ADF is fully funded by the citizens of Australia not the "government"!

Quite correct, so? The Government directs the ADF not the citizens.

When our fellow citizens are in trouble we must ALL be there

No argument but I am not to certain of your point. Again I stated the ADF personal have to wait to be told when, where to go and what to do. They cannot just take off to give hand, with or without equipment.

BR talks about cost effectiveness and utility. Should have kept the Huey, should have kept the Caribou or an updated version.

My back is up over the indication that the ADF and its people have not done the right thing. The ADF and its people cannot do anything unless they are directed to or already have in place an approved and authorised plan of action. One for flood relief, one for fire relief.

Christmas stand down is nonsense. Why. When do you suggest we stand down people that have spent the last Christmas away/overseas. The ADF call it a stand down because people are still on call, not a shut down.

herkman

19th Jan 2011, 22:03

I agree with bushranger, Good Morning Sir.

Experience not youthful energy should be what we are looking for, it is pointless to have the flashy new models on the flight line, if we lack the means to operate them. Also the flash models often will not do a good job as the less updated machine, because for many of the tasks involved the flash model is an overkill with a corresponding higher operating cost.

The best value for money we ever bought was the UH1 series helicopter, and I personally think they should have been retained, but upgraded to the latest series.

We should have a plan for both usage and procurement, as an outsider looking in, we seem to buy the flavour of the month, instead of what is fit for purpose.

My attitude is that if the US forces did not buy it, then we should look hard and long at whether we should.

Aircraft out of Europe appear often to be lacking in operational aspects and can be very expensive to operate.

I suspect that the RAF and other operators are going to find them very expensive to operate, hope I am wrong.

Regards

Col

Hydraulic Palm Tree

20th Jan 2011, 06:58

Finestkind

Wiki says that there are 57,697 full-time active-duty personnel, 21,248 active reserves and 22,166 standby reserves. It also state that about 3000 are deployed at any one time. Those that spent last Christmas away got leave following that duty, and would, I'm sure have given their stand down to potentially save a life or assist with the recovery.

They cannot just take off to give hand, with or without equipment. Of cause they can. That is why they have a Commanding Officer and risk management profiles....''I'm sorry I can't get airborne to rescue the family on the roof in Oakey as CDF hasn't said I can....'' what a load of horse brasses! Why do we give people rank, command and authority if they cannot use common sense.

Did Oakey for example call the local councils (and their parent HQ) and say íf you ask through official channels we can have XX Blackhawks and XX Kiowas and a 412 ready in XX days'. If not, they should have done as the personnel on that base live in the local community and should be seeking to assist in anyway they can, even if it means playing the system! Does the ADF have an effective recall system........?

ftrplt

20th Jan 2011, 08:26

FFS.

There where 2 Sea Kings out for 12 hours in the Lockyer Valley the day after the flash floods who picked up 97 people between them and a few Blackhawks that were out and about (from Oakey I assume). Thye flew in very bad weather the whole day and its debatable whether more assets could have been effectively used that day given the weather and the general level of unknown as to where people needed help. Not hitting each other would have been the biggest problem with more assets given the weather.

The next day there where in the vicinity of 9 Helo's operating from AMB, which quickly lifted to (guesstimate) around 15 to 20 helo's. The day I looked on the ramp this week there where at least 8 Blackhawks, 4 or so Kiowas, the two Navy Augusta's, 3 Sea Kings and a Chinook.

It gets to the point where there are too many assets available and deconfliction and safe operations (not running into each other) becomes the limiting factor.

There are currently 150 AMB based RAAF personnel out every day in the Ipswich area assisting in the clean-up; again that number is about right and any more would see people standing around looking for work. This is Ipswich only, there are plenty more Army about in the city and the Lockyer.

And OBTW; we still have our day job to do.

If you dont know what response the ADF supplied, then dont crap on with idle comment. It was about right all round - balanced and useable; any more would not have been able to be utilised. Dont forget the ADF response is in support of the Govt / Council effort and is at civil direction.

finestkind

20th Jan 2011, 10:07

HPT,
Do you honestly think anyone is debating the point that in-service personal WOULD NOT GIVE UP THEIR LEAVE TO SAVE LIVES. Get a grip.
My beef is with someone bitching about a stand down period over Christmas. Lots of people, police, nurses, ADF work over Christmas. To say the ADF shouldn’t have a stand down period over Christmas is rubbish. Did all those personal work last Christmas, nope. Did those that did have leave at some other time, yep and that was just brilliant to have leave with the family but miss out on Christmas with the kids.
Yep let’s see the last flood that bad was in 1974. We have a certain amount of capacity and resources. Why don’t we have the capability with the ADF helo’s for fire fighting? What is more likely over summer, a catastrophic floods or fire. Back to my last post, if you want the capability pay for it.
Yep you are so right, launch the fleet. We don’t have any SOP’s, authority, briefing’s but we are just gunna launch and save the day. What a load of drivel. And no doubt if a helo pilot was at his aircraft and was informed that someone was in imminent danger and had details of where and had a crew and had the aircraft ready to go, yeah I can guarantee he would have turned and burned and taken the consequences later, but where any of those things lined up??????
As for the rest read ftrplt’s post.

TBM-Legend

21st Jan 2011, 00:43

Oldpinger

In the olden days we had people on standby for these sorts of things. Much planning took place in the period prior to the Xmas stand-down on likelihoods/contingencies. [I worked 7 Xmas days in a row eg.] Of course the general holiday break should occur for all non-essential people especially those returning from tours o/s.

Mate when people are losing their lives getting going is real urgent no matter who pays. It could be you or your family next.....

[Obviously must be authorised for f$$%ks sake.]

Here there is no attempt to criticise the guys and girls who participated at all. They are to be highly commended actually. The argument is about the overall preparation and early deployment. Also we've spent big bucks of helicopters that don't seem up to the task [MRH90]..
Chopper engine woes for defence force | Herald Sun (http://redirectingat.com/?id=42X487496&xs=1&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.heraldsun.com.au%2Fipad%2Fchopper-engine-woes-for-defence-force%2Fstory-fn6bfmgc-1225992010054&sref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pprune.org%2Fdg-p-general-aviation-questions%2F440261-chopper-engine-woes-defence-force.htmlSo) :eek:

reacher

21st Jan 2011, 04:16

TBM - I'll expand on my orignal post to try and make it easier to understand.

The govt, via JOC, issued a DACC requirement as part of an OPR to 5 Avn Regt towards the end of the year (like they always do). That requirement was for:
four jets (S70s), for three online
with wings and jugs
and spt pers
with xx hrs clear per jet
on 48 hrs NTM

In all the spare time B SQN has had during the lazy second half of 2010 that involved CATA, TLAG rotations, MTF MRE, HAMEL and actually trying to take some leave, crews and support pers were identified, jets were serivced and had big "DACC - Do not touch" signs on them. By mid Dec 10 crews, jets and spt pers were ID'd and warned out for the 48 hrs NTM requirement over their approved leave period.

Here's the kicker TBM. 5 Avn got the call (from someone of authority, not just off the CO's back) on NYE to encat the DACC requirement. Three hours later the first two jets had lifted and were enroute. And they've been working and saving lives since.

This small example of only ONE aspect of the DACC response clearly shows that the prior prep was not an issue. WRT early deployment of aviation assets, write a letter to your local MP asking for an explaination as that's where those decisions are made.

TBM-Legend

21st Jan 2011, 04:46

Reacher.

All points taken.

Mine is one for the "higher up" echelon that seem to need remind about the possibility of tragic events coming on us with or without notice.

For example in my days at Willitown the SAR Huey crew[s] were always on immediate recall and would spend their time at the base. We rescued a crew from a container ship [Sigma] on a Sunday afternoon as she was blown off her anchor into the beach. In Townsville 35 Sqn had a SAR callout for both Caribou and Hueys right through the period. At Nowra when I was there we had flash floods and helos airborne within a couple of hours but that was 30 years ago....

I will never criticise the boys and girls on the front line rather the opposite my point is resourcing and organising....

Turkeyslapper

21st Jan 2011, 05:31

TBM

I am not sure the level of readiness that you needed to maintain in order to support the civil community 30 years ago is really needed now. The East coast of Australia these days has probably a dozen very capable multi engine IFR machines (many of which utilise NVDs, automatic appraoch and hover etc) whose core job is SAR/EMS on call 24/7.

Granted to ADF needs to maintain a response capability for these extreme events however there probably isn't the reliance on military machines there was 30 years ago.

Job well done to all civil and military operators :ok:

Turkey

finestkind

21st Jan 2011, 06:42

Reacher,

Thanks for the details BUT it won't be enough for some on this thread. The expectation will be that all assets will be on-line with all the crew and maintainers ready to launch with 2 hours NTM.

Same in my time. We had the nominated number of aircraft suited up with the support pers ready to go at, if memory serves me, 24hours NTM.

Wiley

21st Jan 2011, 10:32

Turkeyslapper makes a good point. 30-40 years ago, the military was pretty much the only kid on the block with a credible rotary wing element for disaster relief. Today, there are any number of civil opertors with all sorts of kit, some of it, (thanks to, IMHO, some really flawed decisions on retirement/replacement of the military's rotary wing force), probably better suited to civil disaster relief than much of the military RW equipment.

I was very much in the thick of it in a Huey in both the '73 and '74 floods, doing, (if I say myself), some pretty silly things (with the benefit of hindsight) to get people out of some very tricky situations. We flew from first light to (usually) just after last light, and I was too knackered at the end of every day to take up any of the many offers of a free beer from the many people we brought in from flooded farms. It was usually just a stubby while we did the post flight paperwork, then back into town for a meal and straight to bed.

We spent the first few nights on task camping in the civil terminal at Narrabri airport, and would have to pack everything up and have it out of sight each morning before the pax started arriving to take the morning ANSW F27 flight to Sydney.

We had exceeded our mandated maximum monthly hours before two weeks on task. I remember contacting Op Com to tell them of this. Their reply was: "Keep flying."

I remember coming into (forget the town now. I think it was Wee War) with... shall we say "a goodly number" of Aboriginal children literally filling every square inch of space available in the Huey's cargo compartment to find a Caribou had come in while we were away packed with television crews and newspaper reporters. Luckily, my Crewman spotted all the cameras, allowing me time to put down briefly on the airfield with the Caribou blocking the view between us and the cameras. Kicked off "a goodly number minus seven" children and our second Crewman, then hover taxied in to unload seven grinning children for the cameras.

At least one of the media types did ask where the "goodly number" of kids who wandered in to the terminal area from behind the Caribou a few minutes later, shepherded by a lone RAAF Crewman, came from. We shrugged and said: "dunno; from out of the sky".

It's also instructive to see the way the mainstream media reported our efforts then versus they way they have reported the AAAvn crews equally great efforts in the recent floods. Back in 73/74, with Vietnam still fresh in the collective media mind, we were still all warmongering killers of women and children to most of the media types of the day and the only time I recall them taking any notice of us was when Reg and his crew were killed up near Wee War - and then they were just looking to get one of us to say something controversial on camera.

I can recall one of our highly esteemed superfitters (Hoss, are you still out thre?) made a point of exaggeratedly scratching his genital area any time the media pack approached with cameras rolling. (In those far off, genteel days, that was enough to ruin the shot for the evening news.) We loved them about as much as they loved us...

Point0Five

21st Jan 2011, 10:47

Thanks Wiley, that's one of the best posts I've seen on PPRuNe for some time. :D

ftrplt

21st Jan 2011, 12:03

not to mention 30 / 40 years ago, we didnt have mobile telephones, pagers, internet, remote work computer access capability, CO's with Blackberries etc etc etc.

Contact and callout was a different beast even 15 years ago.

Mine is one for the "higher up" echelon that seem to need remind about the possibility of tragic events coming on us with or without notice.

Do you really think that with the number of 'Operation Deny Christmas' events that have occured in the not to distant past that the "higher up" need reminding??

Bushranger 71

21st Jan 2011, 18:38

Elaborating a bit on Wiley's post #31.

There was virtually continuous rain throughout Queensland and New South Wales for about 2 weeks preceding the 1974 floods. During the preceding 2 years, I held the staff appointment of HOPS at Headquarters Operational Command Glenbrook (Penrith) having got the post and cell established and had just been posted back into 9SQN at Amberley.

Packing up and cleaning a married quarter was the usual 'fun' and shampooing of carpets made them all go mildew. As the flood situation developed, I got fired up to Amberley post haste as all other squadron execs were out flying. Squadron aircrew accommodation was then a very cramped little building and some demountables on the edge of the tarmac (3 years post-Vietnam) and a mess. On day 1, I launched an Iroquois southwards toward flooded NSW and learned an hour or so later that it had crashed en route with fatal consequences resulting in recovery action, notifications and associated admin. I was then despatched to Townsville to co-ordinate the Air Force flood relief effort in northern Queensland.

My wife had to handle the final aspects of removal, then drove up through flooded NSW in a long wheel base Landrover with 5 kids including a baby less than a year old. Nil communications when she arrived at Amberley to find me gone and had to paddle around to find milk and somewhere to camp. The removal had of course been disrupted and I got back to Amberley about 2 weeks later. 'Exigencies of the Service' I guess, but it all got too much after 5 interstate postings in 6 years so I baled out in 1978.

Bushranger 71

21st Jan 2011, 18:59

Several mentions this thread re a Bell 412 operated by Army Aviation; yet this media bit on 6 July 2010 said 5 Iroquois were being retained for training purposes: Army Iroquois choppers become national treasures - Defence News - Department of Defence (http://www.defence.gov.au/defencenews/stories/2010/Jul/0706a.htm)

Can somebody please explain?

emergov

22nd Jan 2011, 10:18

AVNTC acft evacuated the entire township of Condamine on very short notice, despite them not having a notice to move. They pretty much self-mobilised in expectation of the call.

All Black Hawks have hoists, and they are fitted 90% of the time.

MRH 90 has not yet reached any operational release, quite delayed now. They would have been excellent for the types of ops the guys did in the Lockyer Valley and Condamine, in poor weather, bad light and thunderstorms. They all have hoists too.

The ADF cannot deploy its assets to help out at a local level unless there is a clear risk to life - and even then there must be a request from the local authority before actually doing anything. The chain for DACC requests can be tortuous but can be reduced to a phone call from a policeman to a soldier if life is immediately at risk.

BR71 as far as I know, the five hueys mentioned are just those that are able to be flown, as warbirds, I believe. The rest are not intended to be airworthy.

eg

TBM-Legend

22nd Jan 2011, 11:50

where the S76's from AMB deployed? Seems like a great cab for the mission in their area.

Folks make no mistake there is no-one here taking shots at the Army/Navy girls and boys. The comments are based on the overall preparation for disasters etc plus where are the new [fantastically over rated????] MRH-90's bought at great cost by the Australian taxpayers for Her Majesty's ADF......they were supposed to be operational years ago....

Hydraulic Palm Tree

22nd Jan 2011, 19:43

emegov

despite them not having a notice to move

That is the point - they should have a NTM, even if it is 48 hours. Seems stupid to have a base full of capable assets that are not on a formal NTM for DACC.

And my point made earlier still stands:

Did Oakey for example call the local councils (and their parent HQ) and say íf you ask through official channels we can have XX Blackhawks and XX Kiowas and a 412 ready in XX days'

finestkind

22nd Jan 2011, 21:26

HPT,
On stand down, such as Christmas, everyone is put on a recall list. They must give details of where they are and be contactable. There is a dedicated number who are on stdby to move within a certain time. As for why aren't all the assets ready to go, read reachers post. To have assets on a NTM they need to ready, maintenance signed off with hours to fly and capabilities ready to go. If you wish for the whole fleet to be that way then you had better, in the aviation side, cancel all other flying, operational included, for the, at least, last few months of the year to get these airframes ready, then listen to the bitching about having assets and aircrew sitting around doing jack ****.

Emergov's point on self mobilisation was that the personal went in off their own bat before receiving the recall, not that they were not on NTM. Undoubtedly I’ll bet personal that were not on NTM also went in.

As for calling the civilian authorities I would be very surprise if part of civil emergency procedure did not have SOP’s for the civilian authorities to contact the required people in an emergency. Even today if everyone start calling and asking do we come in and all senior, semi senior rank start contacting civilian authorities, “do you need us” it would turn into a shambles. The next compliant is why don’t the ADF/civilian authorities have a working plan, ...... they do.

TBM we have what we call a Sixty Minutes test. If we do/did something and sixty minutes got hold off it would they be able to make it look like a cock up. Launching a “new aircraft”, no matter when it should have been signed off, without being signed off is a recipe for disaster. Unfortunately in this PC time and fix the blame not the fault, if someone had launched the MRH 90’s and we had lost one, particularly with fatalities, not only how would sixty minutes view it but you can bet there are members of the general public who would have kicked up a stink. You want your cake and be able to eat it, then you had better accept responsibility for doing so.

Out of thread. Is there an auto correct that would change cock up to dog up?

TBM-Legend

22nd Jan 2011, 23:20

yet more delays!

Fraser says that Australian Aerospace is closely cooperating with the DMO to try and overcome the delays, which are likely to add six months to service delivery for the Army.
The prime contractor “has some initiatives on offer that we will take to try to restore the rate of effort to what it should be in order to catch up. But at this point in time we are behind schedule for army.”
The first Army operational capability was scheduled to comprise a deployable troop of four aircraft by April 2011.
“At the moment we are looking at a September or October [2011] timeframe. We will take as much action as we can to recover that, but that is where it currently sits, due to the low rate of effort.”

ftrplt

22nd Jan 2011, 23:33

where the S76's from AMB deployed? Seems like a great cab for the mission in their area.

The SAR contractor tends to re-deploy the S76 they are basing at AMB during periods of reduced activity; I dont believe the S76 was in AMB at the time.

despite them not having a notice to move

That is the point - they should have a NTM, even if it is 48 hours. Seems stupid to have a base full of capable assets that are not on a formal NTM for DACC]

Its not a point - its an opinion. Response to civil emergency is not the primary responsibility of Defence; therefore to expect the entire ADF to be on a NTM ridiculous. Notwithstanding, the POINT is that there were sufficient assets available for search and rescue & flood support as the weather allowed and as crew recall was able to be actioned. More assets in theatre WOULD NOT have provided more support, they would have struggled with deconfliction and I expect assets would have sat around unutilised.

And my point made earlier still stands:

Quote:
Did Oakey for example call the local councils (and their parent HQ) and say íf you ask through official channels we can have XX Blackhawks and XX Kiowas and a 412 ready in XX days'

Again, its not a POINT, its a question. DACC doesnt work that way, if the civil agencies cannot support the contingency with civilian assets, then they approach Defence for support. Defence commits assets that are on NTM to support the effort requested. Again, the weather on the day of the Lockyer Valley flash floods was so poor that I doubt any more airborne support could have been provided over and above the support that WAS provided - Sea Kings and Blackhawks.

The comments are based on the overall preparation for disasters etc plus where are the new [fantastically over rated????] MRH-90's bought at great cost by the Australian taxpayers for Her Majesty's ADF......they were supposed to be operational years ago.... ]

The ADF was prepared, and provided the support that was requested BY the civil agencies - there were 20 or so helo's operating from AMB for at least 10 days, I doubt more assets could have been utilised. The MRH-90 (which isnt in service) wasnt needed.

Whther or not the MRH-90 is fantastically over-rated, expensive, or late; is irrelevant to the question of preparedness and the overall Defence response.

reacher

23rd Jan 2011, 00:46

:D

If you have more questions about the MRH project TBM, I would again direct you to question your local MP as the A SQN guys are working with what they've got. The fact that IOC might have moved right has nothing to do with the guys operating them, or even the upper management. I'm sure it's a very familair story to ADF aviation.

A SQN achieved a lot of inital aircraft quals towards the end of year working around the various limitations imposed from AA. They are in a much better place now than 12 months ago.

Hydraulic Palm Tree

23rd Jan 2011, 07:15

ftrplt - nice handle. Done much operational work yourself apart from airshows.....? Now that's a POINTed question!

Of course I expect the whole of the ADF to be on NTM, whether its a VHR of 60 mins or 3 months, everybody has to be on a NTM of some kind.

Again, the weather on the day of the Lockyer Valley flash floods was so poor that I doubt any more airborne support could have been provided over and above the support that WAS provided - Sea Kings and Blackhawks.

According to the RAN CDR on TV this morning the viz was 800m, so really not that bad and as for deconfliction, there were a few more assets than 4 operating over central Baghdad and it seemed to be manageable; perhaps you juts haven't had the experiences to coordinate and deconflict appropriately.

You also seem to be able to quote current doctrine quite well, obviously been to Staff College. Its a shame that the doctrine didn't meet the operational requirement; not doubt the LI Team will be updating the books over the next decade....!

I hope you don't quote ''but the doctrine doesn't let us do that'' when the Chinese come over the fence!

finestkind

23rd Jan 2011, 08:36

Hmm quite right HTP. If you haven't got operational experience then you aint got nothing. Excuse me a minute while I throw up.

Also quite right, the whole of the ADF should be on NTM. I mean let’s not be logical about this, just because we don't have the assets to move the whole ADF doesn't mean anything, we'll just march them everywhere.

Also quite right about a lot more than 4 assets operating over Baghdad and they probably just launched everyday without clearance or authorisation or anything else. Makes sense to me.:}

When the Chinese come over the fence you had better have your chopsticks ready. Do you honestly believe we would be able to mount any real resistance.
.

Hydraulic Palm Tree

23rd Jan 2011, 09:03

If you haven't got operational experience then you aint got nothing. .
Some would be helpful...

Excuse me a minute while I throw up
So you don't have any either....?

Also quite right, the whole of the ADF should be on NTM. I mean let’s not be logical about this, just because we don't have the assets to move the whole ADF doesn't mean anything
If they are not on NTM then the ADF must be a most effective fighting force....?!

we'll just march them everywhere

Unimog/M1/Landrover?

Also quite right about a lot more than 4 assets operating over Baghdad and they probably just launched everyday without clearance or authorisation or anything else.

The point made (or was it an opinion) was weather and deconfliction not clearance or authorisation.

When the Chinese come over the fence you had better have your chopsticks ready. Do you honestly believe we would be able to mount any real resistance

No, just stay at home, don't respond to the non-existent call out system, don't bother being proactive!

cj0203

23rd Jan 2011, 09:20

How handy would 5 or 6 Iroquois be for exactly this type of work. Invaluble.

Bushranger wrote;

Several mentions this thread re a Bell 412 operated by Army Aviation; yet this media bit on 6 July 2010 said 5 Iroquois were being retained for training purposes: Army Iroquois choppers become national treasures - Defence News - Department of Defence (http://www.defence.gov.au/defencenews/stories/2010/Jul/0706a.htm)

Can somebody please explain?

I know one of those 'training aids' (A2-279) is sitting on the firepad at the Raaf Amberley fire school. Sadly, I think in the name of 'training' it's going to get torched. Damn shame.

http://i1013.photobucket.com/albums/af259/cj0203/Photo430.jpg

National Treasures, yeah right.

finestkind

23rd Jan 2011, 23:28

HPT

Hmm maybe I am incorrect but it seems to me that the tone of your post is that without operational experience a persons experience and professionalism is lacking.

You sound like one of my old FLTCDR when giving reasons as to why crew, that were not part of his purple circle, could not do an Op i.e “you haven’t done this before so you haven’t got the experience to do it (how does one get the experience) Or you’ve done this before, we need to give someone who hasn’t done it a go”.

If they are not on NTM then the ADF must be a most effective fighting force....?!
I am sorry but I just don’t get your point. Do you believe the ADF should always be on NTM. When this occurs assets are set aside to be utilised if called upon. We do not have enough shiny toys or personal to set aside for all the ADF to be on NTM whilst carryout other duties. There are areas that have a certain amount of ready to go stuff but from the aviation side if you wish for this capability we probably need to double our strength in a lot of areas.

The point made (or was it an opinion) was weather and deconfliction not clearance or authorisation.
Are you suggesting that weather and deconfliction has nothing to do with authorisation or clearances? Well my lack of operational experience is certainly showing as in all my flying authorisation and clearances always, as main brief points, had significant relevance on weather and deconfliction.

No, just stay at home, don't respond to the non-existent call out system, don't bother being proactive.

Proactive, lovely word. Shall we invade China?

There is a recall list which all personal are on, which is significantly different to a NTM.

Apologise for thread creep and dick swinging

Hydraulic Palm Tree

24th Jan 2011, 07:15

finestkind

without operational experience a persons experience and professionalism is lacking. No, I said but some would helpful.

Do you believe the ADF should always be on NTM.

Yes, of course. It could be 90 days, but it is still a notice to move.

Are you suggesting that weather and deconfliction has nothing to do with authorisation or clearances? Well my lack of operational experience is certainly showing as in all my flying authorisation and clearances always, as main brief points, had significant relevance on weather and deconfliction.

You know that is not what I said, so stop trying to turn around the fact that you clearly have no idea about operational risk management rather than authorising a training trip in the local area. It could have been worth risking the lives of additional crews to save those that were in peril; it might not have been That is what balanced risk management is about. have you ever authorised a sortie where the odds of the crew coming home were less than 50/50?

Mate, you can probably speak for Amberley, but are you so certain that Oakey had a recall plan and that the details in the duty officer's folder were correct........

finestkind

24th Jan 2011, 10:14

HPT

If something is helpful and you haven’t got it isn’t that lacking?
More hair splitting. Isn’t NTM, not just pack you kit and go, about having the resources to do so?
My apologise for misinterpreting the below.
Quote:
They cannot just take off to give hand, with or without equipment.

Of cause they can. That is why they have a Commanding Officer and risk management profiles....''I'm sorry I can't get airborne to rescue the family on the roof in Oakey as CDF hasn't said I can....'' what a load of horse brasses! Why do we give people rank, command and authority if they cannot use common sense.

My experience and knowledge in risk management profiles is obviously seriously lacking. How do we do a RMP without knowledge of the area of operations, the number of assets involved, the conditions, threat, and actual target, the number of targets involved. I would have thought that there would have been a bit of planning and not just the CO has given the ok to go and said the risk is mitigated because we are saving lives.

No I have had the luxury of not having to place aircrew in a 50/50 situation. Does that mean I am not capable of doing so, basically who gives a flying f what I can or cannot do. What is your point? That you have been there and done that.
Fantastic well done and congratulations if you have and I sincerely mean that.

However if you have all this knowledge and experience why are you bothering posting here and not being pro active and sorting out the mess?

Bushranger 71

25th Jan 2011, 23:23

Hello all; herewith some anecdotal stuff which might be of interest.

The Australian military (not ADF until post-1974) only acquired significant helicopter capabilities in the early 1960s and there was a paucity of civil emergency service helos around the country in those days, as some have mentioned. The RAAF in particular then very frequently became involved in what was termed 'national commitment' tasking, which also embraced support for regional nations such as famine relief and influenza epidemics in PNG.

In our vast continent, flood events are very frequent either side of the Great Dividing Range. The big river systems that flow inland are fed by the annual monsoon and similarly the shorter northern rivers flowing to the coast; and both lots of waterways are impacted by cyclonic storms which vary in frequency and intensity. The southern eastward flowing rivers flood pretty often due to east coast low weather events.

Without tracking back through unit histories, it seemed that Air Force Iroquois became involved in flood relief operations, perhaps around every 2 or 3 years. After the historic 1974 floods, 9SQN based at Amberley was also active again in this role in 1976 or 1977. I recommended several pilots and crewmen for awards for their efforts, which they duly received. Hopefully, there might be appropriate recognition for some of the ADF personnel involved in the recent happening.

Operating lessons always emerge from such situations and herewith mention of some that may have got lost in the mists of time.

When operating over virtual inland seas and in low visibility conditions, navigation can of course become a problem so we included older 'Shell' road maps in the nav bag. They had the locations of service stations marked thereon which usually had a conspicuous oil company logo mounted on a very high pole and these were quite visible in flooded surrounds.

Scene of action co-ordination sometimes became difficult with many emergency services agencies then in their infancy and somewhat 'boy scoutish', so the best person to deal with was the senior local Police Officer. Those guys are very much in touch with their local/regional communities, cool in handling crisis situations and most importantly, have the power to act unilaterally.

A Sea King driver mentioned limited visibility of 800 metres in the recent flood event being a difficulty, but that is okay for helo ops; although rescue hoist activities in driving rain can be tricky which is why some aircrew were decorated for previous efforts. The image illustrates some wet season conditions encountered during Vietnam War operations. Large dead trees poking above the jungle canopy were often very hard to see and my safe operating height for all considerations (in fair or foul weather) was about 100 feet above the foliage or terrain. The tracer at centre frame was I think door-gun suppression.

http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/LoVisWetSeason640x480.jpg

Command and control has been aired. Years back when exercised at functional command levels (Fleet Headquarters, Field Force Command, RAAF Operational Command) authority to act was appropriately delegated; although going further down the chain, some local 'warlord' base commanders tended to interfere too much in unit responses to their parent command directions. Flying unit executives who were good leaders (and perhaps unambitious) had no qualms about acting unilaterally when appropriate; for example, I recall an occasion at Amberley when a private phone call was received at the squadron advising a nursing sister had been seriously injured in a vehicle accident not far from the base. Nobody hesitated: aircrew bolted out of the crewroom and 9SQN swiftly launched an Iroquois with some Air Force medical people on board. The casualties were very quickly deposited into medical care. Unfortunately, the very popular lady succumbed to brain stem injury.

A potentially big problem I see with ADF organization is the virtual sucking up of much decision-making into Canberra, especially the new Joint Force Headquarters, where even the CDF seems likely to get involved in the tasking of say one piddling C-130. Command should be exercised at the lowest practicable levels, to get the job done efficiently.

Just thoughts that may help foster debate.

Hydraulic Palm Tree

25th Jan 2011, 23:44

Well said Bushranger. In my opinion AAAvn is risk averse in the extreme and really doesn't understand about delegated authority. The trouble is that this attitude was caused by the witch hunt type inquiries following a number of aircraft losses.

FoxtrotAlpha18

26th Jan 2011, 01:32

Just to clarify, and despite the report in the Herald Sun, the MRH 90 has NOT been placed on the list of Projects of Concern....yet...

finestkind

26th Jan 2011, 03:02

Bushranger,

Totally agree and as stated the ADF has become risk adverse. But can you really blame the CO's, XO's? There is no need to imagine what would happen if someone launched an asset and it was lost or worst still lost with civilians on board without the CDF giving his approval. Minimum would be a manslaughter charge I would think. Back to fix the blame not the fault.

Undoubtedly under review of the recent events if new procedures are needed they will be forthcoming.

Bushranger what would have happened if the Iroquois had come to grief? It would have be unquestioned that the action was acceptable and unless something stupid had occurred (an out of cat captain or similar) then that’s just part of the role and risk. Same scenario today and someone will get hung drawn and quartered for not waiting for the appropriate authorisation which has been taken out of the hands that should control it.

Apart from the 1974 flood has any other flood been as catastrophic as this one. We do, even if in different parts of the country, have floods on a regular basis but do we have floods and if we do how often, of the type that hit Lockyer Valley and Toowoomba?

Bushranger 71

26th Jan 2011, 05:58

Hi finestkind; you raise some interesting points.

Firstly; disaster relief events all differ in nature and scale so cannot really be accurately categorized as one being worse than another and the risk of flying feats required might vary significantly between smaller happenings and larger commitments. Dare I say, the overriding bulk of helo effort required in most flood relief situations will be airland recovery of people and logistic support which some might term pretty routine stuff depending on weather conditions. Initial response efforts may of course involve more rescue activities in adverse weather situations. We should also look beyond flood relief at bushfire, regional volcanic eruptions and earthquake intervention operations and maybe ask the question: 'Does the ADF any longer have an adequate capability for swift tactical air deployment of helos for regional aid to the civil power requirements?'

Secondly; in the incident I referred to in post #51, it may not have even been a squadron executive who decided on immediate response, just a more experienced pilot exercising some common sense and good judgement and he would have been supported to the hilt by his CO and flight commanders, whatever the outcome. In those days, there was adequate flying to maintain currency and thus categorization status whereas today, AAAvn boys and girls seem to be struggling to get more than a few hours a month. This of course is a direct consequence of foolish ADF helicopter force rationalization planning instead of progressively optimizing the proven cost-effective types that were in service. The flying currency scenario will likely worsen downstream when the Defence hierarchy eventually wake up to the huge jump in operating costs for outrageously expensive types being introduced.

I do feel very sorry for those serving today regarding the culture that has emerged within Defence concerning military justice in particular. Air Force Courts of Inquiry into aircraft accidents/incidents were generally very equitable and objective processes and subject to further review at higher levels of authority and there was seldom if ever to my knowledge any persecution of some aviators whose judgement may have been astray in particular happenings and many subsequently achieved well career-wise; but that management approach may no longer be in vogue in the ADF. If military officers are vested with the responsibility to run flying units, they must also be able to exercise the authority to effectively perform their roles. Threat of career damaging sanction if their actions do not conform with the current Defence version of 'political correctness' is unlikely to see the best aircraft operators and leaders remain within the military.

finestkind

26th Jan 2011, 09:51

Thanks Bushranger,

Totally agree, but a combination of an expanding population with development in areas that are questionable makes it more likely that more aid will be required. Very difficult to plan on an agency (whether ADF or civilian) when we don't know the size of the aid requirement. Do we plan on tsunami evacuation for Sydney, Brisbane or Townsville and have a capability that is big enough to do so but then may well remain semi idle( very helpful for minor disasters) for decades awaiting the disaster, basically over compensating. I would suggest we just don't have the economy for that. How do you plan for something like New Orleans, Katrina? We may be able to have a quick reaction time for an event but will we have enough assets?

Fully agree that with authority comes the right to exercise it, from a basic aircraft Captain to an exc. But that was even being eroded in my time. By the time I had completed my first tour it had changed. Once the Captain made the decision but then it was phone home and get approval. The days are gone whereby and operator could say go and get the job done.

Unfortunately that has become our culture and I know of a few officers how have stuffed their careers by making a stand. I don’t think it’s just about careers though, there are a number of actions that can end up with someone standing trail and being prosecuted. Losing a career is one thing, wiping out your life through either financial penalties or jail term is something else.

Bushranger 71

27th Jan 2011, 15:36

Hi again finestkind. The question of sufficient resources gets back to effective usage considerations. Initial response usually requires resources suited for rescue activities; but thereafter, the requirement is mainly logistic support, as proven in multiple flood relief involvements over the past 40 years. Although a differing scenario; during 1ATF Vietnam operations, a single UH-1H Iroquois could provide most of the routine daily logistic support requirements for 2 infantry battalions and other supporting arms deployed outside Nui Dat in Phuoc Tuy Province in about 6 to 8 hours flying. Pallets of artillery ammunition, coiled barbed wire, diesel fuel bladders, etcetera were usually externally loaded by Chinook.

Pre-1989, rescue hoist equipped Air Force Iroquois squadrons were based at Fairbairn (Canberra), Amberley and Townsville with additional permanent SAR detachments at Darwin, Williamtown NSW and Pearce WA. In those days, Iroquois equipped squadrons generally achieved aircraft on-line availability between about 75 and 83 percent and Hueys were also often deployed by C-130 where necessary for military training and aid to civil power needs. Resources usually available for disaster relief tasking were generally then quite adequate and would be today, if that force structure still existed.

At risk of drift toward the thread 'Why no helo transport...?', Australia would have adequate military capacity for aid to the civil power requirements had continuous credible military preparedness been maintained through progressive optimization of types in service, particularly regarding the tactical airlift and helicopter fleets. Instead, a defence industry benefit policy aiming toward creation of a mythical Force 2030 structure has generated capability gaps and deficiencies. If ADF equipments are now less suited than previously for speedy reaction to requests for aid to civil powers, particularly regarding assistance to regional nations, then the national capacity for appropriate swift assistance in military scenarios has also diminished.

Australian DoD planners perhaps now have a mindset that 2 smallish aircraft carriers (LPDs) - and maybe another platform from the UK according to recent reports - will eventually suffice for providing regional disaster relief assistance, but questions arise regarding responsiveness and of course cost-effectiveness. Assuming one such ship was in home port, how long would it take to round up a crew, embark a suitable helo component with associated support gear and transit to a regional scene of activity? Methinks too long for immediate response needs, but some of our Fleet Air Arm colleagues might elaborate.

Felix the Cat

28th Jan 2011, 00:10

I am no great fan of the green machine but much of this thread is speculation and conjecture. I guess that it is why it's called a rumour network. :sad:

you clearly have no idea about operational risk management rather than authorising a training trip in the local area. It could have been worth risking the lives of additional crews to save those that were in peril; it might not have been That is what balanced risk management is about. have you ever authorised a sortie where the odds of the crew coming home were less than 50/50?You should ask a couple of them. The training centre aircrew conducted very appropriate and timely operational risk management to conduct rescues and save lives, particularly on the Tue of the Lockyer Valley flood. Expect to see more about this after all of the investigations are complete.

That is the point - they should have a NTM, even if it is 48 hours. Seems stupid to have a base full of capable assets that are not on a formal NTM for DACC.Everyone in the ADF, except trainees, is on some sort of NTM. This is, in the case of Army, determined by Forces Command. The training centre was placed on a 24 hour NTM before the floods but reacted to the Condamine floods in about 2 hours.

Mate, you can probably speak for Amberley, but are you so certain that Oakey had a recall plan and that the details in the duty officer's folder were correct........ Well I am certain and can say that it was achieved with a pre-prepared 'recall plan' as you call it, by a duty officer who had all of the correct information.

According to the RAN CDR on TV this morning the viz was 800m, so really not that badThe RAN CDR is hardly going to point out on national TV that they were flying below helicopter VMC is he? You yourself would know how the ADF can go after its own kind :ok: Several pilots I know (army, navy & civil) spoke of the worst weather they had ever flown in.

Did Oakey for example call the local councils (and their parent HQ) and say íf you ask through official channels we can have XX Blackhawks and XX Kiowas and a 412 ready in XX days' Yes.

I am not sure the level of readiness that you needed to maintain in order to support the civil community 30 years ago is really needed now. The East coast of Australia these days has probably a dozen very capable multi engine IFR machines (many of which utilise NVDs, automatic appraoch and hover etc) whose core job is SAR/EMS on call 24/Spot on Turkey. And imagine the outcry from operators if the ADF starting moving in and displacing paid civil operators in some of those lucrative areas such as bushfire fighting etc

Those that spent last Christmas away got leave following that duty, and would, I'm sure have given their stand down to potentially save a life or assist with the recovery. There were literally hundreds of training centre members ringing up to ask to be recalled and another sizeable number who just turned up to work anyway.

Oakey helos are training assets on a training base, hence no winches and no crews on duty during Xmas stand down period. Incorrect. All S70s are fitted with a winch and the centre did have crews on 24 hr NTM.

There is absolutely no disputing that the recall of personnel and the employment of ADF assets could have been much better but lets work from a basis of fact not prejudice eh HPT? :cool:

As for MRH-90, irrespective of the reasons why, they are not operational yet. Simple.

Bushranger 71

1st Feb 2011, 01:07

Hi Felix. Why on earth has the ADF become locked into this ridiculous 'risk management' jargon? It has forever been the case that the risks of any aircraft operation should be evaluated by aircraft commanders and/or flying unit executives before launch. The guys doing the job have to be vested with the authority to make sensible decisions.

Some seem a bit off track re the potential availability of so-called emergency services helos. Many of these operators are sponsored by big business primarily for aero-medical evacuation purposes and where we reside, one often goes past for recovery of road accident casualties. A slightly different situation for those funded by governments like the Queensland EMS where there may be more flexibility in operational usage; although there would likely be some public criticism if they were not expeditiously available for medevac functions which is their primary utilization (some of my Air Force colleagues have been flying with them for years). The military usually only gets called upon for helo support when civil air resources cannot be committed, are insufficient or unsuited.

And, why is Army Aviation now operating a Bell 412?

BBadanov

1st Feb 2011, 01:46

Defence Press Conference today talking about troubled projects with Def Min, and Min for Def Procurement. They said MRH90 was delayed 12 months in entering Navy service (ie Sea King replacement) and 18 months in entering Army service.

The journo question about how the poor record of MRH90 would impact the NH90 decision (ie S-70B replacement) was completely lost on the junior minister !! They really are aware of what's going on.

cj0203

1st Feb 2011, 08:09

Bushranger,

Would you believe I think Army aviation is using 412's (not in Army colours though) for loadmaster training since the UH-1H's were retired. Not completely certain but I was told that. Seems ridiculous that the Army Hueys were 'replaced' in 2007 with a helicopter still not operational. Classic! :confused:

Chris

Felix the Cat

1st Feb 2011, 14:08

Why on earth has the ADF become locked into this ridiculous 'risk management' jargon?

Well it started following the '96 crash and has grown from there. However, the whole ADF aviation community now conducts 'AVRM'. Works well when conducted properly. Appalling waste of time when it becomes a box ticking exercise.

And, why is Army Aviation now operating a Bell 412?
Because it's cheaper to train new loadmasters on a contract 412 than to waste black hawk hours doing the same thing. Once the hueys retired there was no other suitable platform.

MTOW

1st Feb 2011, 19:28

What's the hourly cost of a 412 -v- a 205?

(Not even going to go anywhere near the benefits of keeping how many crews current flying a half dozen very green 205s.)

TBM-Legend

2nd Feb 2011, 05:33

The MRH90 really is a heap of ****e...

Added to the list of projects of concern....
Australia adds MRH90 helicopter to Projects of Concern list
By Greg Waldron

The Australian government has added the NH Industries MRH90 transport helicopter to its Projects of Concern list, with the acquisition to undergo a major review this month.
MRH90s on order for both the Australian navy and army are behind schedule, with the maritime version delayed by 12 months and the army's by 18 months, say minister for defence Stephen Smith and minister for defence materiel Jason Clare.
The troubled helicopter programme will now undergo a "high-level comprehensive diagnostic review".
"Delays are due to a series of key issues, including engine failure, transmission oil-cooler fan failures and the poor availability of spares," says the Department of Defence.:}

and today we have no amphibious capability with Manoora and Kanimbla forced out of service due rust.....Tobruk is also on its last legs [OOS 2012]..:uhoh:

Where are the heads on pikes of the people who make these decisions??

FoxtrotAlpha18

2nd Feb 2011, 05:43

It HASN'T been added to the list!:ugh:

It's undergoing a 'gate review', after which it'll either be given the :ok:, or it will then go on the :suspect: list and remedial action will be taken.

Until then, don't believe everything you read!

The helo itself is a ripper, but there are issues with its support and with the speed at which European 'lead' customers are developing their programs, and hence the :mad: is flowing downhill to us.

cj0203

2nd Feb 2011, 07:10

Dust off those Hueys :ok:

Bushranger 71

2nd Feb 2011, 07:12

Apologies for thread drift but some crystallization seems warranted. Consider this wisdom from a comprehensive US Army analysis of Vietnam War operations:

‘The (US) Army's decision to standardize on a utility tactical transport helicopter has far-reaching implications on every operation from its planning to its execution. Literally hundreds of our key battles could not have been fought without a light, agile machine that could go into improbable landing zones at a critical time. Had the Army chosen to build its airmobile tactics around a ‘platoon carrier’, different and less flexible tactics would have been forced on our commanders. As we move to replace the Huey fleet, we must never lose sight of the essential characteristics that made the Huey invaluable to the Infantry commander. Technology offers so many tempting alternatives that one can easily forget the basic problems of squad tactics. The vital lessons whichwe learned in the ‘sizing’ of our helicopter fleet dare not be forgotten.’– Lieutenant General John J. Tolson

The Iroquois was unquestionably the benchmark for battlefield utility helicopters. The Blackhawk which emerged from the UTTAS project created a 'heavy utility helicopter' about doubling all up weight and rotor downwash, increasing technical complexity and multiplying operating costs several fold. The MRH-90 goes a step further and is termed a medium lift helicopter in some propaganda, albeit a light one if some wish; but with the similar significant penalties of the Blackhawk, let alone the outrageous unit cost.

Flight refuellable Blackhawks would have very useful roles to play in Australia's region of military interest for special operations functions, long range submarine support and within our vast area of international responsibility for search and rescue; but alas, the ADF does not have a C-130 air refuelling capability.

The bottom line is that the ADF has sacrificed a true utility helicopter capability and with it the capacity to quickly deploy such air resources by C-130 for military tactical needs, aid to civil powers or whatever. When I discussed this aspect with a civvy in Defence after Iroquois decommissioning was decided, he flippantly responded: 'The MRH-90 will be too expensive to use at the coal-face of combat and we have in mind to buy another light utility helicopter to replace the Iroquois'! Sort of bugger the taxpayer.

Australia could acquire 50 virtually as new Huey II for around $100million or less by having those remaining also put through the Bell Helicopter Modernisation Program. That is probably around the cost of 2 x MRH-90, so why not negotiate a reduction in the 46 aircraft order if it is not measuring up and restore the essential real battlefield utility helo capability?

Taxpayer dollars should be expended on maintaining continuous adequate and credible military preparedness, not on some futuristic notions of unproven downstream capabilities.

Prompt letters to MinDef Stephen Smith are suggested.

Turkeyslapper

2nd Feb 2011, 08:16

Because it's cheaper to train new loadmasters on a contract 412 than to waste black hawk hours doing the same thing. Once the hueys retired there was no other suitable platform.

How come the Navy can do aircrewman training with a AS350....bit cheaper than a 412 (or Huey for that matter).

ozbiggles

2nd Feb 2011, 09:56

I might be wrong here but are all the army choppers at MK? Still a little close isn't it? Forecast gusts to 55 knots and Hamo getting gusts to 60Plus knots at the moment.

TBM-Legend

2nd Feb 2011, 10:14

on the 7pm news the Army helos were at MK.....

I guess with Rocky still getting over its traumas they figured this was far enough south...

Doors Off

2nd Feb 2011, 12:56

Huey II or no Huey II, Cairns airport closed at 10am today, so no C130 deployable aircraft could make it there in the back. An aircraft with uber range eg: S70-A9, MRH-90 and a rotor head that can handle turbulence eg: S70-A9, MRH90 can self deploy and carry a useful load.

End of the day the ADF is doing the best it can. All of the staff in AAAvn are doing the best that they can under the regulations and resources that the coal face receives.

Spending more money on another type, with different cockpit configuration, different engine, different flight limitations etc, etc will take a new training course, more staff, more spares, more logistics etc, etc and not offer any real battlefield capability. The "Cheap" cost of a less capable helicopter soon adds up when you go beyond just the ticket price.

Eurocopter is not to blame, the ADF signed the contracts. Maybe some letters to Minister Smith about the ADF's amateurism in contracts would not go astray either. I would be surprised if the spare parts numbers for Hueys, Kiowas, Caribous, Hercules etc were so scant, maybe if the ADF held such small spares for those aircraft then questions would have been asked in their service lives about availability?

Godspeed to the crews heading north for Cyclone Yasi relief. You have our support. I hope that the noise complainers in those areas don't complain when you are rescuing people. Fly Safe and Good Luck.

Bushranger 71

3rd Feb 2011, 03:05

Hello Doors Off.

The initial post this thread queried whether the MRH-90 had been used for flood relief operations and if not, why not? The discussion has unsurprisingly drifted toward the adequacies or otherwise of some helicopter types and, in a broad sense, the continuing decline in ADF response capabilities.

I did not intend to imply that any helos would be better deployed by tactical airlift for flood relief support – that would only be worthwhile if ferry time was much too long for a timely response. But we do live in a vast land and requirements will emerge for airlift of helos over long distances for military and/or other national commitment tasking. This capability also proved essential for operations throughout the regional archipelago from the early 1960s onwards. My point is Australia's defence planners and Army Aviation in particular have foolishly cast asunder an invaluable response capability for military requirements and (secondary) aid to civil powers in our region.

Methinks the politicians and defence fraternity are largely in a state of denial regarding the continuing decay of ADF capabilities and military credibility generated by collective incompetence concerning flawed hardware acquisitions resulting in multiple serious capability gaps. Orienting defence planning toward a mythical Force 2030 structure is just asinine as maintaining continuous adequate military preparedness should be the aim.

Consider this statement on 01Feb11 by Minister for Defence Stephen Smith: 'I have the highest regard for Dr Gumley, as I have the highest regard for the Secretary of Defence, as I have the highest regard for the Chief of the Defence Force and the Service Chiefs. We're dealing here with an institutional problem that the institution of Defence itself has to grapple with and come to terms with. In the past there has been too much of an attitude or a culture that, irrespective of the cost, irrespective of the outcome, a Defence project was somehow immune from rigour.'

And this bit from Minister for Defence Material Jason Clare re the MRH-90: 'It's a very important project and part of the rigour that we need to maintain here is to make sure that defence at the highest levels, in this case the deputy CEO of the DMO will chair what we call a gate review or a high level defence review, with the assistance of independent experts, to provide advice to us on what are the necessary steps for government and for defence and for the companies responsible to make sure that this project is fully implemented as quickly as possible.'

Seems an awful lot like a group think 'love-in' to me and I agree with my long-standing naval aviator friend TBM-Legend that there should be some 'heads on pikes'. But that will not happen in the military as the contract appointments for CDF and all of the Service Chiefs expire mid-2011.

Regarding the somewhat unproven MRH-90. There seems unwillingness among defence agencies to advise specific unit costing for this helicopter and also performance information. Maybe some of the Oakey fraternity might be willing to provide aircraft unit cost, ISA +20C IGE and OGE altitude capabilities at max operating gross weight, plus hourly operating cost! If that information is made available, then we might have an interesting debate (on another thread?) regarding the adequacy of this helo for regional operations compared with others being replaced.

See this link for an interesting read: Australian Government, Department of Defence - Stephen Smith MP (http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/SmithTranscripttpl.cfm?CurrentId=11357) . Considering the problems emerging with the Air Warfare Destroyer project, it is a bit hard to have confidence regarding the 2 aircraft carriers (LPDs) to be largely fitted out in Australia.

0497

6th Feb 2011, 12:26

I recall there was a planned Light Utility Helicopter project, it is still on? (something like A109s, Huey or EC-135/145s)

The US Army and National Guard recently bought a buttload of EC-145s for non-combat duties (replaced UH-1s).

Wiley

12th Feb 2011, 20:49

I received a couple of private messages in reaction to my post number 31 on this thread which caused me to troll through some very old notes I'd written almost 25 years ago about my time flying Hueys (on a Commodore Amiga, then the cutting edge of computer technology!!!). I knew there were a couple of flood stories in there. Here's one, as I said, written quite some years ago.

The media today have made much of the fortitude displayed by Queenslanders in the recent disasters. You'll see from my comments that we had a similar reaction to some of the farmers of northern NSW who we worked with back in '74.

You'll also see how quickly (imagined) high drama can descend into farce.

IT WAS NEVER LIKE THIS FOR JOHN WAYNE

Disaster Relief is one of the few times the general public actually sees their Defence Dollar at work. These Disaster Relief trips are almost always to the country areas, although the Brisbane floods in the early seventies were the exception, where the RAAF choppers and the Army worked right in a major city.

The very unusual circumstances of a flood or bushfire bring out the very best - and the very worst - in people. People who have lost literally everything are often to be found working untiringly to help others. I saw a couple of cases in the floods of 1971 and ’74 where farmers whose property and homestead were under water, and whose stock were drowned or starving in their thousands, just worked at the State Emergency Service from dawn to dusk, helping others where they could.
The spirit of these country people left this city slicker in awe. Homesteads are usually surrounded by levee banks in the flood prone areas. These banks usually protect the homestead from the floods, but if the floods are particularly high, they are ‘banked’, and the homestead is flooded. Some graziers and their families would simply move up into their ceiling along with what furniture they could carry. They would lift a couple of panels of corrugated iron on their homestead roof for ventilation and light, and sally forth daily to tend what stock they could reach.

One such family caused me particular embarrassment one day in 1974. We would be airborne at first light - around 5.00 am - and would fly right up to last light every day at the flood peak, and the number of beers we were promised after a rescue but were too exhausted to redeem that night still causes me some distress to this day when it’s my buy!

At the end of a very long day we were flying past a homestead where we saw the pitiful sight of the house flooded up to the door lintels, a roof panel torn up, and the farmer and his family frantically waving to us. Taking the scene in in an instant, we surmised that the levee had recently been breached, and the family was in dire straits. We were short of fuel and last light was fast approaching, but we could not leave these people in such a terrible situation.

The problem was that the homestead was your typical farmstead: three sides of the house were inaccessible to us because of silos and outbuildings. The only side where we could even approach the main farmhouse was at the front, and that had high tension power lines right across its front. But this was an emergency, this was John Wayne stuff, these people had to be rescued, and minimum fuel and last light were both approaching. (God protect the innocent from young men - like myself in this instance - stretching the rules in a rescue situation.)

The only way around the problem was to come to the hover some twenty metres out from the power lines, descend until the landing skids were in the water, and hover taxi forward very slowly in under the power lines, the fast-spinning main rotor only feet under the drooping wires. Thoughts of the mountain of paperwork that would descend upon me if the rotor clipped the power lines were not far from my mind, but these people appeared to be badly in need of help, stuck in the roof of their flooded home.

The man of the house climbed out onto the roof, dived into the water, and bravely struck out through the whipping spray of the rotor wash towards the chopper. The Crewman hauled him aboard. Still holding a very exacting hover under the power lines, I waited for the rest of the family to make the plunge and swim out to the chopper. But Mum and the kids were making no attempt to move. Instead, they sat there grinning and waving to us, no doubt glad that rescue was at hand, thought I. But how to make them swim over? Perhaps they couldn’t swim? We didn’t have a lifeline.

The dripping farmer grabbed for the spare headset, and I backed out from under the power lines while we sorted this out. I wasn’t staying in under those power lines while we discussed getting the family out.

The farmer reached for the transmit button on his headset like he’d been using one for years. “They’re over there!” he shouted, pointing to the north. (God, not more people to be rescued!)

“Who?” called the Crewman.

“Me cattle,” answered the farmer, brandishing a pair of wire cutters in his gnarled hand.

“Your WHAT?” I replied.

“Me cattle,” he repeated, smiling as though he hadn’t a worry in the world.

With a fuel gauge bouncing around the absolute minimum, and a sky ever darkening, there was no time for further discussion: “Out,” I ordered.

The farmer happily stuffed his wire cutters into his hip pocket, handed the headset to the Crewman, and jumped overboard, striking out for his home - and we were all made feel a little foolish as our brave ‘John Wayne’ rescue attempt was turned into something approaching a farce.

We flew on to Walgett, landing well after dark, and watching the fuel gauge very closely as we approached the field.

We discovered that evening that the farmer had seen the choppers flying to and fro, and got a message out to see if one of the small Army choppers could take him over the river to allow him to move some of his cattle to higher ground. (The Army choppers were doing this when possible.) On seeing our chopper passing, he assumed that his message had got through, so they waved to us to show us where they were.

I was not able to explain to the farmer why we were so short with him. He probably to this day tells all and sundry that those RAAF blokes are a bloody rude lot. How he intended to get the job done and get back to his farm in the dark is another mystery to me, but I’m sure he’d have coped without thinking twice about it.

As far as I know, the family stayed up in their roof until the waters receded, when they moved downstairs, dried out, and continued with their lives. The spirit of these people is just amazing.

On the other hand, I saw men with political ambitions unashamedly misuse the RAAF and SES assets to curry favour with the ‘right’ people. This was the cause of some ill feeling between the RAAF crews and these opportunists. Through friends who lived in the region, I made a point of following the career of one of the worst offenders in this area. He went on to become a very important man in one of the political parties - and there’s only one - in the region, obviously reaping his rewards from all those ‘right’ people he had helped during those times.I'm sure I'm not the only one who'd love to read some of the stories from the AAAvn crews involved in the recent dramas.