Greatest ever blunder in the history of the UK aircraft industry?

[Al R]

Do we never learn? Following on from the 'Best Value' thread, this slightly more ignominious award seems to have more than a few likely candidates. Starting with..?

BBC News - Former BAE workers' call to save scrapped Nimrod planes (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-12117535)

Plus ca change.

[L J R]

Greatest ever blunder in the history of the UK aircraft industry?:uhoh:


......combining a number of UK aviation companies into BWoS:ugh:

[manccowboy]

Unfortunately no one is listening, we are rapidly approaching a no return point.

PA5 (which has flown) has already suffered severe damage with some heavy handed rescuing of serviceable parts :{

:sad:

[Pontius Navigator]

Believing a policitican.

[just another jocky]

Cancellation of TSR2?

[david parry]

Chiefy doing Slams on a Buccaneer outside the line shack..... and jumping the chocks ending up against the shack .. spoilng a good game of uckers,and a standeasy for the line crew :oh:

[L J R]

5 posts and that old chestnut is raised.....

[orgASMic]

Square windows?

[Tallsar]

I assume we are defining this thread as a blunder by UK manufacturing industry itself rather than politicians or the MoD or UK airlines? If so that will cut out quite a few options...and TSR2 was never a blunder...not by industry (excepting it was built at a factory where it could not be flight tested from!).....just political ineptitude, prejudice and cowardice.:ugh:

[just another jocky]

L J R...we've not all been around as long as you nor have the time to trawl through all the threads, so that "old chesnut" me old fruit, may well be a new one to many, and anyway, the point is totally in keeping with this thread.

Kindly remove oneself from one's high horse. :p

Tallsar, I assume differently! ;) Just remember what they say....

[Fareastdriver]

(excepting it was built at a factory where it could not be flight tested from!).....

So was the supersonic Convair B58. First flight was strapped to the bottom of a B36.

[Squirrel 41]

A serious answer to this question?

For me, probably scaling down HS Trident 1 (DH 121) to meet the BEA requirement. Boeing were terrified of the original spec Trident 1, as it would've done very nasty things to the 727 (1831 built); instead, BEA insisted on a smaller, less capable aircraft and the result was Trident 1, 2, 3 - a total of 117 built.

S41

[BEagle]

Fairey Battle, Blackburn Botha and Saro Lerwick, to name just a few....

But one of the very worst must have been the Percival P.74 helicopter - of which it was written "The first flight had to be aborted when the aircraft failed to fly".......:hmm:

TSR2 wasn't an industry blunder - it was killed by politicians and Lord Mountbottom.

[Evanelpus]

The whole Comet debacle is, without doubt, our biggest boo boo to date.

I know it came at the wrong time but the time it took for us to investigate the cause of the two crashes and to do something about it, enabled the yanks to overtake us in the race for mass jet transport aircraft.

The rest, as they say, is history.

[Pontius Navigator]

Britannia, too late,

Belfast, too slow,

Argosy, too heavy

Javelin, nine lives and still never supersonic

Andover, too clever

Nimwacs, just too . . .

or

Brabazon
Princess

[jindabyne]

LJR

......combining a number of UK aviation companies into BWoS

The blunder is that we didn't do that much sooner after 1945 - we persevered too long with too many aviation companies, instead of consolidating the industry around two or three well-managed major organisations.

BEags

TSR2 wasn't an industry blunder - it was killed by politicians and Lord Mountbottom.

Aye to that

[thegypsy]

I suggest you all read a book called Empire of the Clouds ( When Britain's Aircraft ruled the World) A Litany of cockups, political ineptitude ( both Labour and Conservative in equal measure) and crass management. Aircraft put into service before they were ready etc etc

As regards the TSR2 John Farley said it would never have been any good as it didn't have enough wing Page 240

[NutLoose]

A serious answer to this question?

For me, probably scaling down HS Trident 1 (DH 121) to meet the BEA requirement. Boeing were terrified of the original spec Trident 1, as it would've done very nasty things to the 727 (1831 built); instead, BEA insisted on a smaller, less capable aircraft and the result was Trident 1, 2, 3 - a total of 117 built.

S41


That and on the orders of the UK PLC HS travelling to the USA to Boeing in a technology sharing exercise and handing over the all the data on the Trident in what turned out to be a one sided technology sharing deal, this gave the USA the technology to build the curved intake duct for the rear engine that they had thought impossible.... and produce the 727 in the first place.

Handing over the moving tailplane concept data to the USA allowing the Bell X1 to crack the speed of sound, whilst scrapping the Miles M1 that would have and was later proved to have been capable of taking the record, long before the USA.

[NutLoose]

Nearly forgot......... The Bristol Brabazon.... still Filton got some decent hangars out of the project!

[draken55]

"That and on the orders of the UK PLC HS travelling to the USA to Boeing in a technology sharing exercise and handing over the all the data"

And add all the other technological knowledge we were obliged to share with the US as a result of the Lend Lease agreements we had entered into! To be fair though, the Cousins did give us their Polaris and Trident technology:O

[Heathrow Harry]

Listening to BA on aeroplanes such as the Trident and the BAC-111

We were always going to be left behind by the Yanks on military hardware - it costs so much - but we stood a chance with commercial aircraft (see Embraer, Airbus and the Canucks for how to do it properly)

[Heathrow Harry]

hmm the Yanks did give us the material which helped keep us fighting in 1940-41 tho'.............

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

And allowed that we could pay back what we already owed them!

[Pontius Navigator]

Listening to BA on aeroplanes such as the Trident and the BAC-111

We were always going to be left behind by the Yanks on military hardware - it costs so much - but we stood a chance with commercial aircraft (see Embraer, Airbus and the Canucks for how to do it properly)

Don't blame BA, blame BEA.

How about the Fairy Delta 2 or the Saunders Roe SR71 or the Bristol 188?

Cock ups, political will, or were they simple experimental machines? On the former Dassault managed to develop it did they not?

Or the Fairy Rotodyne.

[sandiego89]

So was the supersonic Convair B58. First flight was strapped to the bottom of a B36.

Fareastdriver, IIRC the B-58 was built at General Dynamics Fort Worth, co-located with Carswell Air Force base- and had plenty of runway. The one hung beneath the B-36 was a static test airframe never intended to fly. Think it went to Wright Patterson AFB under the B-36 for destructive structural testing.

[Neptunus Rex]

Tallsar
(excepting it was built at a factory where it could not be flight tested from!)A better example is the Blackburn NA 39 Buccaneer. A supremely successful aircraft, built at Brough. However, they had to be transported by road to Holme-on-Spalding Moor for sufficient runway length.

No doubt the folding wings helped traverse the Yorkshire lanes.

[Pontius Navigator]

It was not only the UK that built aircraft at airfields where they could not take off or land. The Russians built the Bison near Moscow; it could take-off but not land.

It was a simple matter for the Air Attache to count them all out . . .

[Jig Peter]

Was a bit surprised to see your quote of John Farley's opinion of the TSR2, as on page 240 of my copy of A View from the Hover he's talking about displaying the Harrier.

As far as major blunders go, how about the cancellation of the Miles M52 ?
Followed by the passing of its details to the cousins for their Bell X-1 ?

[foldingwings]

(excepting it was built at a factory where it could not be flight tested from!)

Not a problem for the Bucc - just road-dragged them from Brough to HOSM for flight testing!

Foldie:ok:

PS. Sorry, Neptunus Rex (that'll teach me to respond before reading all the thread)

[Jig Peter]

Memories of Tim McLelland's excellent TSR2 book tell me that the reason TSR2 was built at Weybridge and transported to Boscombe was that Weybridge's "Toppish Neddies" were convinced they were the senior partner and weren't going to have "their" new aircraft flown from an upstart rival's airfield (I paraphrase, of course). Further, their first idea was to have it fly out of Wisley (!!!!), and Boscombe was a compromise, after they were brought to realise that Wisley wasn't on.

[thegypsy]

Jig Peter

I was referring to Page 240 of the book Empire of the Clouds where the author quotes rightly or wrongly John Farley's remarks regarding TSR2 not your book written by John Farley:hmm:

[Jig Peter]

Thanks for that - he certainly made his point* ! But I still badly wanted to fly (and by that I mean operate) it at the time - and I still think the Bulgemaster was one of the ugliest ... Though I know its crews liked it (apart from the instrument layout).
Cheers,
JP

* Mr Farley talks about trouble for the TSR2 if it had to mix it with MiGs, but as Mosquito-like operation at very high altitude plus near-sonic low level was the idea, I doubt if mixing it was really the idea ...
I know, I know - that "old chestnut" all over again, but for this (and no doubt many another) "Old Cold Warrior", the bruises still ache at times ...

[davejb]

To be fair,
some of the bad reputations reflect use beyond the shelf life - the Fairey Battle replaced the Hind and Hart biplanes, for example, and whilst the RAF found losses unexpectedly high flying the Battle in 1940, I suspect the crews were still better off than in a Hawker Hind. The B.E.2 (many variants) was probably a decent plane in 1912, but it was still in use years later when it was hopelessly outclassed.

So, I'm going to vote for the Meteor - which doesn't deserve it, really, probably - as so many pilots were killed by it.

Dave

[flipster]

I suggest you all read a book called Empire of the Clouds ( When Britain's Aircraft ruled the World) A Litany of cockups, political ineptitude ( both Labour and Conservative in equal measure) and crass management. Aircraft put into service before they were ready etc etc


I would also recommend Bill Waterton's 'The Quick and the Dead' - the 2 books together quite neatly outline the almost complete incompetence of British aviation manufacturing, airline/military management and that of their political masters post-WWII. C0ck-ups like the Miles M1, Brabazon, Saunders Roe flying boat V bomber thing, Duncan Sandys, Javelin, TSR2, Trident, VC-10(sidelining by BEA), Nimrod AEW and Haddon-Cave are just the punctuation marks in a seemingly unending story of self-serving porkers (both mil and civil) with their noses buried in the trough of taxpayers' money (ie yours and mine). A great pity.

[Hipper]

The TSR2 - with hind sight, did we actually need it?

Could it have played a part in the Falklands war perhaps?

Would it still have been available for Iraq?

[Rigga]

Comet windows - biggest blunder by designers, who probably then went on to be knighted and promoted and later to form "Waste-o-Space" as their first corporate conglomerate business model designers.

Waste-o-Space then went on to form Euro-Somethingorother and went Global, building vehicles, ships, subs, planes, software, munitions, guns, bombs, missiles, houses, potatoes and dolls - none of which seem to work as advertised.

Now, That's go to be the biggest blunder in UK aviation history!

[Tallsar]

Much of TSR2's design philosophy, background test data (eg TFR) and systems were carried forward to Tornado,and can still be found to some (maybe more minor) degree even in Typhoon and other modern platforms - TSR2 had a small wing deliberately to ensure a low response ride at low level...and the Jaguar benefited from this design approach subsequently - as a turning fighter ....that was never really going to be its forte!!

Thanks for the wider view as to why TSR2 ended up flying from Boscombe and not either Weybridge or (Warton)...but that in itself (with hindsight) was a blunder. It resulted in undue delay in the first flight and because there was insufficient resource at Boscombe (from BAC)..the flight test plan was slower than originally envisaged...which by default fed into the hands of the new Labour Government and gave them significant ammuntion to cancel it.

As for my vote for the biggest blunder...I would argue, in the light of the previous poor decisions re BAC 1-11, VC 10 etc etc...and even Concorde (despite its technological achievement and beauty) - we were on the verge of getting it right in the commercial field...the BAC 3-11 (airbus equivalent)...but we backed down and gave the lead tothe French and Airbus.....perhaps our biggest post war aerospace blunder of all given the size of the subsequent market....It would have kept UK aerospace in the
in the top league like Boeing
Cheers
:ugh::{

[SASless]

I see the UK's gift of fifty of Whittle's best to the Soviet Union as being a wee bit of a cockup!

[mr fish]

not getting the martin baker MB5 into service.

way too late etc, but what a fantastic looking (and performing) ship.


i was of course going to mention TSR2, but having recently digested tim mclellend's exellent book, i've had a change of heart

[GeeRam]

Perhaps letting Rolls Royce supply 4 x RR Kestrel V12's to Messerschmitt to enable the prototype Me109 to be ready in time to compete in the new fighter competition for the Luftwaffe......which it subsequently won against the Arado Ar80, the Fw159 and the He112 :ugh:
I wonder how history may have been different had we not allowed RR to do that, and the Me109 hadn't been ready and the RLM had chosen a possibly inferior a/c as it's main fighter....????

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

Rigga. any t**t can be wise and clever after the event.

[Samuel]

British author Bill Gunston wrote a serious article some years ago on the very same subject. His conclusion, [and I recall this from a few years ago] was that without the "Buy British" bankroll of the aircraft manufacturing industry, it would have gone belly up at the time of the Comet disasters.

I can think of a number of aircraft types , for example, which were absolutely inferior compared to what was available to the US, the Century series fighters for example, but were foisted on the RAF because they were British. The point was surely made when the RAF had to fly both B29 Washington, and Sabres because there was nothing in the UK inventory to fit those tasks. Wherever you care to look at aircraft types, in whatever role, we had second best. Beverly and Hastings were light years behind turbo-prop US equivalents.

We in NZ were similarly pressured by the way! In 1967 when ANZ opted for the B737 instead of the BAC 1-11 there were questions in Parliament, but the facts were that the B737 was a far superior aircraft for NZ routes. They also bought the F27 Friendship in preference to the Herald, again because the F27 was a much friendlier proposition. From the 1960s right up until the present day, no British aircraft was ever given serious consideration by ANZ.

Bill Gunston was right!

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

Perhaps it's a pity that ANZ didn't share their expertise on Friendships with these chaps then?

http://cdn-www.airliners.net/aviation-photos/photos/6/1/6/0004616.jpg

[Samuel]

Mount Cook was/is a wholly owned subsidary of ANZ with specific routes. It now operates under the ANZ Link banner, using ATR aircraft. The BAC replacement [ATP?] was never given a look despite one being demonstrated in NZ.

[John Farley]

What about the Canberra in 1949? The US bit our arm off to have that.

In my view we concentrated our national funds more on bombers in the late 40s early 50s and these turned out to be as good as any at that time.

Later the US became the largest operator of Harriers and Hawks (as the Goshawk)

I suspect (know) it is harder to sell military aircraft to the US than it ever is to buy them. I think your poor old UK industry did quite well on that basis.

[LookingNorth]

Jig Peter - I have Damien Burke's more recent TSR2 book and the story of "which airfield" is rather different in that one. Basically - Vickers in charge (and they were - no doubt about that), wanted to use Wisley (as with Valiant, VC-10 etc.), English Electric wanted to use Warton (longer runway, clearer airspace), but once both companies were merged into BAC the Vickers component agreed to use Warton but were overruled by... Ministry of Aviation, who chose Boscombe Down. This remained the case for a year or so until delays meant BAC(Vickers) suggested Wisley again (to save a month of dismantling/transporting to Boscombe/reassembling first aircraft), and Beamont at BAC(EE) objected as engine problems and weight growth meant reduced safety margins at Wisley and any immediate re-land case would force use of Heathrow (with heavily populated surroundings). So back to Ministry Men's choice of Boscombe. McLelland version seems to be just Beamont's version of events.

Reading Burke's book it seems the greatest blunder of TSR2 was not cancelling it sooner, or perhaps believing RAF when they wanted mach 2, rough field, kitchen sink etc. all in one jet.

[walter kennedy]

..the special relationship ...

[Whenurhappy]

Correct me if I am wrong, but BAe tried to sell the militarised BAe 146 to the RNZAF in mid 1988, IIRC. I have pics of one when I was at woodbourne, and wondered who on earth would purchase a STOL tact AT aircraft without a rear-loading ramp. A Bonkers Design. Samuel - perhaps you were there at the time?

[Pontius Navigator]

The point was surely made when the RAF had to fly both B29 Washington,

The B29 was a wartime development for one theatre and its contemporary was the Lancaster. For the post-war confrontation the B29 happened to be suitable. The USA then developed the B36, 47, 58 and the ultimate weapon the B52 whereas we developed the V-bombers which were medium bombers and much more capable than the B36 and B47. So like for like we were evenly matched in building aircraft for a particular mission.

Wherever you care to look at aircraft types, in whatever role, we had second best. Beverly and Hastings were light years behind turbo-prop US equivalents.

Again an inaccurate comparison. The Hastings was a match for contemporary 1940s transports like the C54 and the Beverley was perfect for its designed role; it was simply mis-employed. Its equivalent was possibly a C119 or C123.

Where we did fall behind was in turbo-props such as the Britannia and Belfast and in jets the VC10 v B707 etc.

You might have argued that the Lightning was no match for the F4 but it was much better than the F102/106 and perfect for its role at that time.

From the 1960s right up until the present day, no British aircraft was ever given serious consideration by ANZ.

Other than the Canberra, Fightener, and Hawk.

[henry crun]

PN: I am certain Air New Zealand did not give any consideration to those three aircraft you mention in the last line. :p

[Pontius Navigator]

Henry, at risk of taking the bait, :ooh:

[JFZ90]

What about the Canberra in 1949? The US bit our arm off to have that.

In my view we concentrated our national funds more on bombers in the late 40s early 50s and these turned out to be as good as any at that time.

Later the US became the largest operator of Harriers and Hawks (as the Goshawk)

I suspect (know) it is harder to sell military aircraft to the US than it ever is to buy them. I think your poor old UK industry did quite well on that basis.

Interesting that you mention 3 UK fast jet types exported to and used by the US - 2 of which are still in service.

Some glass half empty types might say thats not many.

I can't think of any other foreign aerospace industry that has exported a fast jet for operational use by the US, ever*.

When you think about it that says quite a lot about how good our aerospace industry actually was.



* I could be wrong of course, but I can't think of any!

[Cpt_Pugwash]

Not strictly operational use perhaps, but didn't the US buy some Kfirs for the Aggressor squadron and DACM training?

[Pontius Navigator]

Borrowed a carrier too.

[JFZ90]

Not strictly operational use perhaps, but didn't the US buy some Kfirs for the Aggressor squadron and DACM training?

I included operational to exclude "red eagles" and aggressors etc. Stuff they 'acquired' to practice shooting down doesn't count, as by definition that being foreign is part of the 'spec' :)

[Samuel]

The USA then developed the B36, 47, 58 and the ultimate weapon the B52 whereas we developed the V-bombers which were medium bombers and much more capable than the B36 and B47. So like for like we were evenly matched in building aircraft for a particular mission

All very true PN, but the topic is aircraft blunders, and the V-Bombers weren'
t blunders, but were alo unavailable at the time the Washington's were leased.

Where we did fall behind was in turbo-props such as the Britannia and Belfast and in jets the VC10 v B707 etc.



The Britannia was too late a design to make any impact on the world market where pure jets prevailed, the Belfast : well only ten ever built at huge expense to keep the workers happy. The VC10, again, lovely aircraft but couldn't foot it on cost grounds with the major airlines. The list goes on really; Trident, Vanguard , Herald, all not bad aeroplanes. just not commercial.

Other than the Canberra, Fightener, and Hawk.

The Canberra was the right choice at the time, but had a relatively short service in the RNZAF, 12 years or thereabouts. The B170 served us well, true, but as far as I know the Hawk was never given serious consideration. Crossing the Tasman might have featured!

John Farley. Yes the Canberra was a brilliant design and far superior to anything the Americans could put up at the time, That's one success! The Goshawk is surely a very different aircraft to the Hawk it came from?

[Samuel]

Correct me if I am wrong, but BAe tried to sell the militarised BAe 146 to the RNZAF in mid 1988, IIRC. I have pics of one when I was at woodbourne, and wondered who on earth would purchase a STOL tact AT aircraft without a rear-loading ramp. A Bonkers Design. Samuel - perhaps you were there at the time?

Whenurhappy. I had no involvement other than in the after-match gossip, which was really in the vein that no one took the BAe proposal seriously.

I recall a sales pitch, but your old mate Pat Neville was CAS at the time and he would have died laughing at the suggestion the RNZAF buy such a dead beat type, totally unsuited for any role in transport. He would have enjoyed lunch on BAe though! Now beats the hell out of golf balls in Taupo!

The type was never particulary well-received in NZ, and I have heard that the maintainers didn't like it. There was a mob of them in the Ansett colours parked up in Aus for a long time; they may still be there!

[tornadoken]

The strict A to the Q is none: the industry itself made very few Product Investment decisions, thus few chances to get them wrong. The UK State, incarnate as Air Ministry (then MAP/MoS/MoA...) for RAF (and, 1918-1939, RN), and Imperial A/W, BOAC/BSAAC/BEAC, did most of the Requiring, defining and paying.

The Q is itself moot, as implying lost opportunities for hefty sales of novelties not instantly copied. The Q also ignores the inconvenient detail, that BAE has made profits on dramatically hefty sales of Airbus wings and bits of Boeing wings, either after repaying taxpayers' Launch Aid, or without calling on us at all. Every other UK aircraft type that achieved a half-decent sales run was taxpayer-subvented, one way or another. So, of course were F-27, Caravelle, the Embraer and Bombardier ranges. (Let me leave WTO to deal with City, State, Federal taxpayers and Boeing).

The biggest fluffed decison within the competence of industry Boards was to surrender General Aviation. Nothing post-WW2 to follow up the sector from Moths to Anson.

Each candidate "blunder" here posted involved Ministers making decisions under uncertainty: none was done capriciously. So: 9/46 sale (not gift) of Nene and Derwent was to our valiant Ally, with whom we would have to live after the departure from Europe of GIs before US' 1948 Presidential Election. They were bartered for Ukrainian grain, intended to pave the way to a long term, $-sparing means of feeding our people. Uncle Joe in 1948 in Berlin had other ideas.
So: DH (with Fairey and Hunting) getting the 1958 medium haul type wrong was due to listening to the sole funded Customer. Their Boards would not have put up 50%, nor MoS the other 50%, of R&D for a product with no Customer.

The book and this Q dodge a killer Q: Why should taxes prop up Air? If firms see a market Just Do It! and find investors, like all other ideasmen. Bristol, Hawker Siddeley, Rolls Royce, Vickers did so in other sectors. UK Aero's Product Investment risk aversion was not due to blunders, but to blinkers.

[NutLoose]

JFZ90Quote:
What about the Canberra in 1949? The US bit our arm off to have that.

In my view we concentrated our national funds more on bombers in the late 40s early 50s and these turned out to be as good as any at that time.

Later the US became the largest operator of Harriers and Hawks (as the Goshawk)

I suspect (know) it is harder to sell military aircraft to the US than it ever is to buy them. I think your poor old UK industry did quite well on that basis.
Interesting that you mention 3 UK fast jet types exported to and used by the US - 2 of which are still in service.

Some glass half empty types might say thats not many.

I can't think of any other foreign aerospace industry that has exported a fast jet for operational use by the US, ever*.

When you think about it that says quite a lot about how good our aerospace industry actually was.



* I could be wrong of course, but I can't think of any!

Actually all 3 are still in US service!

WB-57 Home (http://jsc-aircraft-ops.jsc.nasa.gov/wb57/)

All be it a tad modified

http://jsc-aircraft-ops.jsc.nasa.gov/wb57/images/S99-13956L.jpg

[Flyt3est]

Naa, I can black cat the lot of you.. Now THIS is what I call a blunder..



East Lancashire Typhoon fighter jets face the axe (From Lancashire Telegraph) (http://www.lancashiretelegraph.co.uk/news/business/8783568.East_Lancashire_Typhoon_fighter_jets_face_the_axe/)


:ugh:

[Pontius Navigator]

Samuel, Hawk was memory fade. I meant the Jet Provost/Strikemaster.

Accepting that the airliners worked, just too late and non-commercial, ie overspeced for a limited market, the Belslow and the Dragmaster had to be blunders.

[John Farley]

The Goshawk is surely a very different aircraft to the Hawk it came from?

Good job too, I would not fancy sitting in a Hawk towed off the cat by its nose leg or doing a no flare arrival into the No3 wire with a Hawk main gear and no hook.

[Whenurhappy]

Yes - the Andover was a much-loved aircraft in the RNZAF and the STOL characteristics were widely used around the Pacific - landing on beaches and rough strips. It also proved to be a good way to gather your mates up for 21st, engagement and wedding parties, on 'weekend crew trainers'. One was laso barrel-rolled, resulting in a GCM.

BAC/BAe did propose a Maritime version of the veritable Andover; indeed the Kiwi ones did have a secondary SAR role, increadulously using the E-190 as a search radar. I recall bobbing around in the Waitemata Harbour , waiting for the 3-cannister Lindholme gear to be dropped up-wind. It was dropped about 200 yards down wind...

But the military BAe 146 could not be taken seriously; it could not self-deploy (because of the need for an external side ramp) and it is utterly unbeleivable that such projects were allowed to run (presumably with tax-payers money) in the 1980s. But there was also the Nimrod AEW project running...nobody's mentioned that yet?

[Samuel]

It's amazing how clever some people were in persuading those holding the purse-strings to part with money on projects which Blind Freddy himself could see would be doomed. Just imagine if all that ingenuity had been directed to actually giving the air force what it wanted.

I only ever saw one Belfast, and it was at Auckland for some reason...and parked next to a USAF C133.......like an ad for Jenny Craig.

[Jig Peter]

People sneer at the Belfast(slow), but should remember that its original purpose was to ferry components of the Blue Streak rocket to Woomera - in the far-off days when Britain had a space programme - and the rocket's diameter defined the fuselage diameter. This didn't really need "speed" as such, and an economical way of getting the aircraft relatively quickly lay in using the Britannia wing attached to the "fat" body. Short's in Belfast (town) being as always in need of work, the aircraft seemed "right" politically as well as in the rocket programme's timeline, though why 10 were ordered is a bit odd ...
That the aircraft programme was left hanging when the Blue Streak programme was crushed (an aerospace blunder) isn't a surprise, and cancelling that as well wouldn't have gone down well, now would it?
Belfast thus was inherited by the RAF, rather than specified by MoDAir, and so might well have been looked down on by Their Airships (pure speculation on my part, of course).
Surely it wasn't a bad, or even poor, aircraft in itself, just misused. That others were better adapted to Air Force needs is by the way ...

PS. Never even seen one myself, so no axe to grind. Now the lineal descendant of the Hamilcar glider inherited by Blackburn from General Aircraft's a whole other can of worms ... But wasn't that a Brown Job thing ?

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

the Me109 [sic] hadn't been ready and the RLM had chosen a possibly inferior a/c as it's main fighter....????

The Germans had other comparable fighters on the go at the same time with no help from Rolls Royce (Heinkel alone had two, the He 100 and the He 112) - these aircraft got nowhere because the Bf 109 was so good, but could have been brought on had the Bf 109 not worked out so well.

sale (not gift) of Nene and Derwent was to our valiant Ally

Ally my @rse! The Soviets were never allies, any more than Israel and the Arab countries were allies during GW1, they just happened to have the same enemy. Even a cursory study of the relationship between the USSR and the (Western) Allies shows how one-sided the relationship was!


The B29 was a wartime development for one theatre and its contemporary was the Lancaster


Strictly speaking this is true, in the same way that the AEW Shackleton was a contemporary of the E-3 because we had one at the same time as the US had the other - but to suggest that these British aircraft were anything like as advanced or capable as the US equivalent is, to me, unsupportable.

[Pontius Navigator]

Strictly speaking this is true, in the same way that the AEW Shackleton was a contemporary of the E-3 because we had one at the same time as the US had the other - but to suggest that these British aircraft were anything like as advanced or capable as the US equivalent is, to me, unsupportable.

The Lancaster was a contemporary of the B17. The B29 could be developed as the US had both need and capacity.

To compare Shackleton and E3 is a nonsense except so far so you might call it a blunder to even consider not getting the E3.

The Shack was, in its AEW guise, a development from the Sky Raider/Gannet, and as an airframe certainly contemporaneous.

From the 60s the UK produced too little, too late, and too costly.

[Pontius Navigator]

Jig, it was the Belslow not because it was spectacularly slow but because it was spectaculary badly designed at the back end and had to be much modified to allow it any range and speed.

Belslow therefore had multiple meanings.

[Jig Peter]

Thanks for that, PN - I remember in my days driving "non-prop" (and faster) aeroplanes wondering at the problems so many military freighters (not all British) showed evidence of airflow problems "down at 't back end" during development - though Lockheed got it right first time, and it seems as though the "Bearbus" has too.
Thinking about back end problems reminds me of the "converted de Havilland from Woodford", but I won't go there ...
Tks again ...
:8

[Samuel]

The Javelin! Was it the only RAF fighter ever to be banned from some aerobatic manoeuvres?

I believe , and I may have read it here somewhere, that a USAF exchange pilot flying Javelins commented "it was the only aircraft he'd ever flown where the amount of power available perfectly matched the drag".

[Jetex_Jim]

Hansard shows. Sir William Robson Brown (Conservative) in the parliamentary debate on the 1966 Plowden report on the British aircraft industry made the following statement:
“Production costs in the (British aircraft) industry are something which I cannot comprehend. With wage costs 40 to 50 per cent. lower than they are in the United States, our manpower production costs are 2½ times higher.”

The introduction of multinational projects finally forced the UK aircraft industry to stop relying on craftsmen to fill the gaps left by lack of tooling and incomplete engineering drawings. Other nations had learned this decades earlier.
The German Messerschmidt 109 took about 4,000 man hours to manufacture compared to 14,000 man hours for a Spitfire.

Eli Wallace had come up with the concept of interchangeable part in 1798, the manufacturers of the Comet had yet to catch on nearly 200 years later. Or that much we learn from the Nimrod MRA4 saga.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

The Lancaster was a contemporary of the B17.


Indeed, although designed for different tasks. But in your previous post, you stated that the Lanc and B-29 were contemporaries, which is somewhat misleading!


The B29 could be developed as the US had both need and capacity.



We certainly had the need for an advanced aircraft design, and the capacity to build them! What we lacked though was the technical skill. Had we been able to develop an aircraft as modern as the B-29, Bomber Command's losses would have been significantly lower. Instead the brave men of Bomber Command had to make do with decidedly 'old tech' aircraft like the Lanc and Halifax, and paid dearly for it.

[GeeRam]

The introduction of multinational projects finally forced the UK aircraft industry to stop relying on craftsmen to fill the gaps left by lack of tooling and incomplete engineering drawings. Other nations had learned this decades earlier.

Quote:
The German Messerschmidt 109 took about 4,000 man hours to manufacture compared to 14,000 man hours for a Spitfire.

That’s quite an unfair comparison really as….

At the more for the time, traditional construction of the Hurricane only took about 5,000 man hours to build, and the Spit was the first stressed skin monoque fighter UK industry had designed for production – and Mitchell was more used to designing flying boats and hand built racing seaplanes rather than fighters for mass production.

And the 4,000 hrs build (closer to 5-6,000 really from what I've read) for the 109 came at a very high cost to it’s pilots due to it’s very narrow track undercarriage which was a direct result of the design compromise Willy Messerschmitt took to get that light weight/low cost and low man hours build figure per airframe as he put the main u/c attachment points on the fuselage to simplify construction, assembly and wing structure. The result was a very narrow wheelbase and rather weird angles on the wheels themselves which was certainley one the big factors in it's reputation for being a pig to take-off/land and ground handle.

[twochai]

I would be very suspicious of any quoted manhour figures.

There are fabrication hours, there are subcontract fab hours, component assembly hours (in house/outsource) and final assembly hours. It gets even more complicated when some functions are are carried out in different factories. And where do you measure, at which point on the learning curve are you talking about?

The net result: unless a very careful, objective, comprehensive comparative study is undertaken by a knowledgeable person or organisation, with unfettered access to all the records, I would assume any quoted manhours to be purely speculative or, at best, slightly educated guesses.

oh, yes, I forgot... and, believe it or not, there are many reasons in many organizations to not tell the truth!

[Jetex_Jim]

oh, yes, I forgot... and, believe it or not, there are many reasons in many organizations to not tell the truth!
Too true. However, the Hansard quote, if that is to be believed, suggests that high number of manhours per airframe was something not just confined to the Spitfire/109 case.

Quote:
Hansard shows. Sir William Robson Brown (Conservative) in the parliamentary debate on the 1966 Plowden report on the British aircraft industry made the following statement:
“Production costs in the (British aircraft) industry are something which I cannot comprehend. With wage costs 40 to 50 per cent. lower than they are in the United States, our manpower production costs are 2½ times higher"

It is also worth noting that the much vaunted Canberra, when manufactured in the States, had to be completely redrawn by the Martin company from a pattern aircraft. The British, highly labour intensive, specifications and processes were just not compatible with American methods. Likewise the RR Merlin when it was manufactured by Packard.

British aircraft engineering was more like low volume luxury car manufacture than the volume methods that were used by Germany and the USA. Which is to say very labour intensive but having the sole advantage of not requiring much capital investment on the part of the manufacturing company. And then wonderfully profitable when 'cost plus' military contracts were available.

[Ali Qadoo]

If we're talking about "greatest ever blunders" I'd like to nominate the decision to take the Fairey Battle of its day, the Tornado, and turn it into an air defence aircraft. The second biggest blunder was committed by the highly-paid light blue help who accepted the wretched thing into service - OBEs and Knighthoods all round, hoorah!

And before anyone gets out the PPRuNe flamethrower, this is NOT a dig at all the fine people who operated, maintained, supplied etc the GR1, GR4, F-3 etc over the years.

What's truly scary is that from the time the F-4 was finally clapped-out and obsolete, say 1985-ish, (I did 2 tours on them so I do know what I'm talking about) to the F-3 eventually becoming a halfway decent platform, the UK effectively took a major air defence capability holiday. Guess we were lucky nobody called our bluff.

[Dr Jekyll]

Slightly OT, but what alternative to F3 would you advocate? F15 and I believe F14 were considered.

[Ali Qadoo]

Dr J,

In answer to your question, IMHO the F-15 would seem to have been the logical choice, provided of course it could've been adapted to take a refuelling probe....and the engines changed to Speys! Probably would've needed a Martin-Baker seat too but I'm sure that wouldn't have been beyond the wit of man to sort out.

A Q

[Jig Peter]

To continue the comparisons of British working practices with others, in the 1970s I was working in the Ruhr on a multinational project to supply gas pumping staions to the pipeline from Siberia to West Germany. Major suppliers were in the USA, Norway, The Netherlands, France and Scotland as well as W. Germany itself. The power to drive the pumps and associated electriocal and hydraulic systems was provided by US-designed industrial gas turbines.
Not long after my arrival, I was asked to see if I could find out why the turnover of workers from Scotland was much higher than from other countries. Talking to them I was told that what they found intolerable was being classified as "inefficient and bad workers" by German supervisors, for consistently taking longer to complete a task than others. What the Scottish lads were used to was "fettling to fit", while the standard practice at the Ruhr factory was to reject any part that needed such "fettling" and get a replacement, while also reporting the discrepancy for corrective action further up the supply chain. This, to the canny Scots, was a "shocking waste", which added to the resentment at being classified as, basically, unskilled by a shift supervisor under pressure to deliver.
Explanations of the different attitudes to parts arriving for assembly calmed the situation somewhat, but within a year all the Scots had gone back home with their craftsmans' attitudes unchanged and a poor opionion of German working practices.
However, the tight schedules set by the customer in Moscow were met, which was the main thing as far as we were concerned.
That what we delivered then sat in the snowy wastes far from Moscow for months because the customer's teams could not meet the schedules imposed by "the men from the Ministry" was another matter entirely ...

[Al R]

If we're talking about "greatest ever blunders" I'd like to nominate the decision to take the Fairey Battle of its day, the Tornado, and turn it into an air defence aircraft. The second biggest blunder was committed by the highly-paid light blue help who accepted the wretched thing into service - OBEs and Knighthoods all round, hoorah!

Ali,

Out of interest, hindsight etc blah, but was that believed to be the case at the time? If there was a messageboard like this around then, I wonder what it would have said.

[Willard Whyte]

Slightly OT, but what alternative to F3 would you advocate? F15 and I believe F14 were considered.

I seem to recall rumours F/A-18 was offered too in 'land-ised' form.

[frodo_monkey]

Dr J,

In answer to your question, IMHO the F-15 would seem to have been the logical choice, provided of course it could've been adapted to take a refuelling probe....and the engines changed to Speys! Probably would've needed a Martin-Baker seat too but I'm sure that wouldn't have been beyond the wit of man to sort out.

A Q

So you would have bollocksed up the F15 for what reason?!

Sod MB seats and replacing perfectly good engines, the F15E would have been the choice of champions!

But in all fairness, although it took a long time to be developed into what it was promised to be at the start, the F3 once equipped with JTIDS, some decent weapons and a developed Foxhunter was actually a pretty damn good bit of kit... OK, you're never going to win a knife-fight in a phonebox in it, but in terms of range, endurance, avionics, weapons (and not getting to the merge in the first place) it did surprise quite a few people :)

[Mike7777777]

Re: OP's question. The answer is as per UK Engineering Ltd generally, particularly automotive and nuclear power generation: short termism, incompetence at many levels and politico interference. 1968 Jag XJ6 was long way ahead of the rest of the world, as was AGR, but typical Brit approach of releasing too early and allowing customers to continue R&D to achieve the finished product eventually kills world-beating products.

On a small scale, perhaps only slightly ahead of man-in-a-shed, we can still adminster a sound thrashing to the opposition, eg most F1 teams are based in the UK.

No matter how good the Comet or Concorde were or could have been, if it's built to a price then it has to be built to the cheapest price on a production line. This is something that UK Engineering Ltd has always struggled to achieve against fully resourced opposition.

I could go on ...

[Willard Whyte]

frodo, learn to recognize sarcasm, or cynicism, dear chap!

F3 may well have been developed into an 'acceptable' piece of kit, but could F-15 have been acquired for a similar price, and what capabilities would be lacking, if any, if it had?

[frodo_monkey]

I'll refer you to my second paragraph old boy... The F15E was definitely the way to go!

[Brian Abraham]

The following comes from the Epilogue of "The Quick and the Dead" by W.A. Waterton, Gloster test pilot. His chapter on the development of the Javelin, for which he was test pilot, provides something of an insight into the workings of Brtish industry also.

A quote from John Farley re Bill Waterton, "He was considered a bad trouble maker back in the 50’s because of his insistence on telling the truth about the aeroplanes he tested. Jeffery Quill was his biggest fan – which says it all really."

Remember when reading that the following was written in 1955

WHY BRITAIN HAS FAILED

What I have to say here is not directed against any individual or firm: it is intended as an overall indictment. For a parlous state of affairs exists throughout almost the entire airframe industry, and members of the Society of British Aircraft Constructors (together with Government officials, Services chiefs and civil servants) must share the burden of responsibility.

An individual firm is only publicly limelighted when a particular project, after enthusiastic advance publicity, is proved a failure. But virtually every firm has its unsung, discreetly hidden mistakes.

Many people knew, for example, that the Bristol Brabazon was an acknowledged flop before it was half-completed. Money spent: a reputed twelve million pounds. There was the great Saunders-Roe Princess flying-boat let down by its engines, and written off for its original purpose at an estimated ten million pounds. A further twenty were said to have been spent on the Supermarine Swift. It was hailed as a world record-heater, issued to the squadrons-then withdrawn as a failure. Now it has been salvaged to appear in the role of a fighter reconnaissance aircraft.

But there have been others, to swell to even more gigantic proportions this figure of £42,000,000-almost all of it public money.

Yet no major aircraft company has closed down since the war, irrespective of colossally expensive failures. Indeed, they would not be permitted to, for two reasons: politically it would be unsound to throw thousands of people out of work, and it would be strategically unwise to allow a firm to put up the shutters when, in a national emergency, it would need time to take them down again. And firms know this.

Illustrating this is the case of the post-war fighter which neither the R.A.F. nor the Navy wanted. But it was built in quantity nevertheless because (and the story is an open secret) the manufacturing firm told the Ministry of Supply: "Either we get an order or we close down." Blackmail? An ugly word. . . .

Nor is it easy, when an aircraft flops, for one man to be accused as the guilty party. He is only one cog in a gargantuan, creaking machine.

It all starts when the requirements for a new 'plane are drawn up by the Service or airline concerned. Since five to seven years will pass before the 'plane gets into service, considerable crystal-ball gazing is inevitable. Needs are largely determined by (a) what the "other chap" is likely to put in the air at that time, and (b) what is possible technically and what manufacturers say they can do. Invariably (b) decides the day, irrespective of requirements or anything else.

Yet the industry is often defeatest in its estimation of what can be achieved technically~not surprising when it has failed to exploit the latest in tools, techniques, materials and ideas. 1 remember the R.A.F. asking for a clear-vision cockpit canopy, only to be told it was impossible. None the less, American Sabres were flying at the time with just.such canopies-not the vision-restricting hoods of British fighters with their great area of metal. So fed-up was the R.A.F. about this that Central Fighter Establishment got their hands on a couple of Sabres, took a canopy from one, went to a contracting firm and set it on its fighter-just to show that it could be done.

This is no isolated case. Time and again I have known the R.A.F. and M.0.S. to be told they could not have what they wanted-and they seemed powerless to do anything about it. (Subsidized by the Government, the aircraft companies are on a safe thing: whoever loses, they win. They sit tight and smug.) Emasculated by safe Government contracts, none of our manufacturers has had the courage to invest his money in a much-needed light aircraft. In the same way, we have no helicopter to compare to the Americans', and no proven long-range civil airliner (with the exception of the Viscount and possibly the Britannia).

I digress. . . .

When the customer has decided upon his needs, an official specification is issued to approved firms by the M.0.S., and those interested submit design studies from which usually two are chosen. They might be radically different from each other, as were de Havilland's 110 and the javelin, and the Vulcan and Victor, or remarkably similar, like the Swift and Hunter. For insurance reasons (and to keep the industry busy) both firms are set to build prototypes, and orders go out for ancillary equipment. (Here, as I have said, there is a strong argument for standardization: time and money could well be saved if a strong directive urged-and challenged-firms to wrap their shapes and new ideas round common wheels, brakes, generators, etc.-as they do engines and armament.)

At this stage, and throughout, payment is made for design work, materials, tools and tooling, jigs, development work, flying, modifications and changes. An order is guaranteed for production, and to the lot is added overheads-often a hundred per cent.-plus a fixed profit. This is known as "cost plus" and the more the cost the more the plus. Tools and buildings are loaned or rented to firms and if contracts are slashed or 'planes unsuitable the firm is paid compensation.

Within three to six months of its first flight, the general pattern of the prototype's behaviour and performance is usually determined. This is something that cannot be rushed, for although the customer ought to come into the picture early on, a firm must be granted a reasonable period in which to make necessary modifications: a project that starts badly might work out well-and vice versa. But no more than a year should be needed, and firms made to work to that deadline. At the end of those twelve months there is no reason why one of the two prototypes could not be selected although not by examining the results and figures presented by the manufacturers, as often happens now. Instead, it should be done as we did it at Central Fighter Establishment -by the practical method of flying one 'plane against the other in side-by-side climbs, accelerations, decelerations, dives, tail-chasing turns and rolls, with camera guns firing. After such trials there would be no doubt of comparative performances, for even mock attacks are a thousand per cent. more reliable than paper figures and individual tests. Yet, incredibly, these vital and logical trials do not come until a 'plane is actually in production.

Shortage of prototypes is another time-wasting bugbear, for if you lose one or two very special aeroplanes, as we did with the Javelin, progress is delayed for months-even years. Recently Air Chief Marshal Sir John Baker, the C.A. (Controller Air) pointed out that twenty English Electric P.1's had been ordered to speed development. Had the new prototypes come along at regular, frequent intervals of, say, three months in the first place, it would have been something to shout about, but the second did not arrive until about a year after the first-the same as in the past.

Once the new aircraft has been selected, the other should be dropped without more ado-unless it has qualities to suit it for some special role. Both firms should then concentrate on producing the new 'plane; the winner's design staff dealing with technical problems and changes as they arise, the loser's getting to work on fresh designs for the future. As things stand, only the winning firm produces the new 'plane, while the other ambles along often manufacturing old stuff contracted to keep the workshops occupied. Otherwise, both are given orders for their separate 'planes resulting in double sets of costly jigs, tools, ancillary equipment and testing for minute production quantities. This is presently happening in the case of the Victor and Vulcan, making for high costs per production unit and duplication headaches in R.A.F. stores, ground equipment and training, both flying and technical.

Let the design staff admit their faults, and if too many occur, break them up and install people who are competent. Faults are common to all new aircraft, and are nothing to he ashamed of. Let there be an end to this business of "getting by", ignoring what the test pilots and ground servicing people say, and covering up. It should not be necessary to wait until someone is killed, or until faults are spotlighted in service and 'planes grounded en masse, before modifications are made.

The trouble is that few British firms understand development work. A new prototype is built-and that is pretty well that. Consequently our production aircraft do not fly at all as well as they should, and are rarely little changed from their first prototypes. The users get So per cent. aeroplanes instead of go per cent. aeroplanes. We could learn here from the Americans. They ran into serious trouble with their Super-Sabre, and their Convair Delta F102 was badly down in performance. Yet within three months the Sabre was comprehensively altered-given a redesigned tail, controls and wingtips-and was out of its troubles. The 102'S faults were corrected with equal hustle. Britain has demonstrated nothing to compare with these methods. Witness the Comet, for example: a brilliant conception, let down by its aerodynamics, engineering and handling-nothing like a 100 per cent. aeroplane. Externally, the Javelin, Hunter or 110 have hardly altered since prototype days. There has been no wasp waisting to make them conform to the area rule and so raise speeds by up to 25 per cent.

Under existing arrangements, the people who design the *planes are usually responsible for their development and, like proud parents who have produced a misfit, they are reluctant to admit the fact, and are furious when other people criticize. As I see it, when a prototype flies it should be taken right out of the hands of the designers (who thereafter become no more than consultants) and passed to fresh minds, dedicated to making the 'plane efficient as quickly as possible, regardless of all other considerations.

The Services blame the M.0.S. when the right aircraft do not arrive in the required numbers at the proper time. It is true that the Ministry has much to answer for, but the Services cannot claim not to know what is going on. Both the Navy and Air Force have officers attached to the Ministry, and an airman is Controller Air. He is responsible for ordering, and for controlling testing and development, and since he has a seat on the Air Council, that body can hardly plead ignorance of the state of the new aircraft and their faults. The R.A.F. and Navy may not he getting the aircraft they want-but they seem to be keeping pretty quiet about it.

These are some of the factors contributing to the overall picture of the muddle, inefficiency and lethargy which are in varying degrees responsible for Britain being almost an also ran in the aircraft stakes. If it is doubted that we do only just manage to scrape into third place-trailing behind America and Russia-consider how their development has leapt ahead. Both have produced in quantity fighters which can "break the sound barrier" in level flight, and heavy bombers are in service twice as big as our largest. Soon a United States' bomber the size of our V-class machines is to be flown at supersonic speed in level flight, and the Americans have flown 500 m.p.h. faster than any Briton, and a good deal higher. The Americans claim, further, that they have four fighter aircraft capable of winning back any new record our P. i could set up. and knowing a considerable amount of both sides' claims, I do not doubt the United States' boast. We have dropped flying-boats while the Americans have progressed with advanced designs, and there is the lack of helicopters and light 'planes to which I have referred. With safe Government contracts, our manufacturers lack the incentive of real private enterprise to challenge the Americans and Russians. In all but name and the distribution of profits, they are already nationalized in a way. Nor is there the incentive of pride-the pride of airmen-for the heads of the industry are almost exclusively financiers, accountants and business men. (One notable exception is Rolls Royce, where the executives are engineers first and administrators second.) Experience has led me to believe that heads of firms fear the return of a Labour government and the threat of nationalization, and so argue, "The Socialists will have the lot so let's grab what we can while the going is good." They have further covered themselves by pouring money into overseas plants. And remember-an aeroplane factory is equipped to manufacture many articles, so the change-over can cope with a variety of circumstances, especially overseas.

One thing is certain: the firms have not ploughed back the money they should have done. A walk through a British aircraft factory and then an American or Canadian one would soon prove this point. By comparison our firms are back-alley garages. Even though some of our groups and enterprises boast of over 60,000 employees, they are composed of a mass of small units, more often than not working against each other or duplicating each others' efforts. There is not one firm in Britain which could manufacture 'planes of the size of the defunct Brabazon in quantity. What firm here has the plant or tools to build the one hundred plus giant airliners ordered from Douglas? They lack the vast presses, stretch presses, milling machines, shapers, drop hammers, and even the abundance of small hand-power tools of North America, and as a result we are building 'planes almost identically in the way we did fifteen or twenty years ago, despite the revolutionary demands of the jet age. javelins are built in much the same way as Spitfires, and there are none of the heavy rolled or milled "skins" used in America, and only a token use of titanium. And, this delay of the airframe structural revolution hinders and limits aerodynamacists and designers.

This modernizing of our factories is a priority task, for as things stand we cannot introduce even existing American designs-far less think of progressing ahead: we haven't the means of transferring them to the production belt.

Not only have we failed to keep pace on the engineering side, but we are way behind on the aerodynamics which dictate the shape of new aeroplanes. For years few companies, for instance, had their own wind tunnels. Farnborough did most of this work and, not unnaturally, was overloaded, with the result that many tests were left undone. High speed and supersonic tunnels are still at a premium. The lack of these tunnels has meant the absence of much important research, and we have tried to muddle through by guess and by God. Logically, such methods are impractical in the jet age. When the United States sent her pilots through the sound barrier for the first time, the flyers knew, from ground missile and wind tunnel tests, what to expect. Our chaps still have to "suck it and see" when exploring new ground.

The Government has been blamed for our lack of fullscale research facilities, and although it is true that they have passively done nothing to shake things up, it must not be forgotten that the industry, operating on public money, has made vast profits in the past ten years, and insufficient of it has been ploughed back for this purpose.

So we see that in both research and engineering facilities we are way behind current requirements, and there is yet another factor to consider: personnel.

There are keen brains and excellent engineers and aerodynamicists in the aircraft industry. There are also many deadbeats-a hangover from the war and pre-war years; people, many in responsible positions, who are hopelessly out of their depths, and who are doing their damnedest to see that no one who knows his stuff is likely to reach a position where their shortcomings will be laid bare. They exist at all levels, from director to labourer, and they haven't done a decent day's work for years. With many it is politics, first, last and always-not 'Is this the best way to do the job; will this produce the best possible aeroplane quickly and cheaply?" but "how is it going to affect me and how much can we sting the Ministry?"

So the good men are kept down---even forced out-by the bad. Pay, too, is generally far from generous. Only recently an employer said to me: 'We're trying desperately to get aerodynamicists, but they've got the nerve to want a thousand a year." During the war the industry was able to get all the brains it wanted, and cheaply; today the mathematicians go elsewhere-to football pools firms, for example. Even a chief aerodynamicist, the man who determines, lays out and advises on the shapes and sizes of aircraft and their parts, often receives little more than £1,500 a year. Ten thousand would not be overpayment for a first-class man. To my mind this is one of our biggest failings. Directors baulk at the thought of any one individual under them getting big money. They revolt at paying two competent experts £5o each per week, yet cheerfully pay ten incompetents £ir to £20 per week to muddle along and accomplish nothing.

There, then, are the main reasons for Britain's failure: the smugness of firms whose initiative has been destroyed by safe Government contracts.... Dilatory and inefficient methods and the lack of proper organization. . . . A failure to understand development work. . . . Lethargy on the part of the R.A.F. and Ministry of Supply . . . . The shortage of engineering and research facilities . . . . The choking effect of lay-abouts and hangers-on. . . . A general tight-fistedness in the wrong directions which, among other things, prevents the industry from obtaining, and retaining, the best brains available. Last and most important is the failure at all levels to think and act big. How is the situation to be remedied? As things stand no one at a sufficiently high level anywhere has had guts enough to stand up and call the cards. No Service chief has yet risked his rank by revealing the truth. Nor has any M.0.S. official. One or two M.P.s often hit the nail on the head, but the situation demands far more than lone voices from the Opposition back bench.

1 feel that nothing less than a Royal Commission will do to investigate thoroughly the aircraft industry and the procurement of aircraft-one whose findings will not be hidden by dust and quietly forgotten, but a body whose conclusions will be acted upon without delay. For the sands are running out.

The aircraft industry, the M.0.S., the Services, air transport firms, airlines, all need looking into. Indeed, so does the nation's whole aviation policy, for there are too many sectarian interest., at work in divergent ways. A strong man is required, for only by ruthless measures will things be changed. If the Services do not get what they want they must say so-and the responsibility laid fairly and squarely at someone's door. Contracts for specifications, price and delivery must be honoured. If a firm fails, let it fail and be taken over as a national arsenal. The industry talks private enterprise; very well, let it take the risks of private enterprise as well as the profits.

There is nothing wrong with British air matters that honesty, frankness, ruthlessness in the right quarters, and hard work, cannot put right; but it must start at the very top, or a lead must be given from the very top. The well being of the entire nation is above that of individuals and firms.

[Dr Jekyll]

Illustrating this is the case of the post-war fighter which neither the R.A.F. nor the Navy wanted. But it was built in quantity nevertheless because (and the story is an open secret) the manufacturing firm told the Ministry of Supply: "Either we get an order or we close down."

What was this then?

[Pontius Navigator]

DJ, the Venom perhaps, built in RAF and RN models?

[green granite]

Or the Supermarine Attacker?

[oldgrubber]

I know it's received mentions in the past but if you watch the 4 part documentary style UTube story of the Rotodyne, it shows just how much we have lost, not just with the aircraft itself, but in the industry.
What industry thrives without competition?

Cheers

[NorthernKestrel]

twenty English Electric P.1's had been ordered to speed development. Had the new prototypes come along at regular, frequent intervals of, say, three months in the first place, it would have been something to shout about, but the second did not arrive until about a year after the first-the same as in the past.


Very interesting to read that in 1955 the folk developing the Frightning was having the same problems as the Lightning II today - getting enough aircraft into flight test!

[Jetex_Jim]

WHY BRITAIN HAS FAILED...
A pretty damning inditement, and all the more fascinating considering it was written by, a man in the know, and at the time that present day 'nostalgists claim to have been the high point for the British aircraft industry.

[Jig Peter]

When Martin started their Canberra/B57 programme, the reason that a "sample" Canberra had to be used to "get the drawings and things" right was that English Electric naturally worked to British Standards (BS) right down to the sheet metal thicknesses, nuts, bolts and such while, again naturally, Martin worked to US Standards. Conversion to US Standards was therefore a normal part of the task and nothing for which to reproach EE, or British industry.
Getting a canopy on it from which the view was better than "limited" (but within the state of the art when Mr. Petter designed the aircraft) was another matter, and the British attempt, on the B.8, may have given the pilot better vision, but left the Nav in an "unenviable" situation - but it was a cheaper solution, it was said, pending the always imminent arrival of TSR2 the Wonder Horse.

Incidentally, until much later, Ford worked to US standards in the US, and to Metric in its UK and German factories. When the company decided to build its first "world car" (long before the Mondeo) which would be built in all its worldwide factories, the company decided to change its US factories to Metric standards

[Pontius Navigator]

Or the Supermarine Attacker?

I suggested the Venom as both RAF and RN had it and the RAF did not have the Attacker but had the Meatbox.

The Venom, which served both, may have been the one they didn't want.

[Jetex_Jim]

When Martin started their Canberra/B57 programme, the reason that a "sample" Canberra had to be used to "get the drawings and things" right was that English Electric naturally worked to British Standards (BS) right down to the sheet metal thicknesses, nuts, bolts and such while, again naturally, Martin worked to US Standards. Conversion to US Standards was therefore a normal part of the task...
That's perfectly reasonable. However, it's hard to believe that they needed an entire aircraft in order to achieve it. Surely, if the drawings were comprehensive enough, even in preCAD days, they could have been converted? Perhaps you can clarify, my understanding was that they were all redrawn from scratch.

[Jig Peter]

When BAC Weybridge proposed the 3-11 to oppose the A300 from Airbus, Hawker Siddeley, who had been in the project from very early days, were already well into the design of the A300 wing and fully integrated into the programme. HSA's financing was sais to be "private venture risk-taking", though I believe there was German money involved, for Hatfield's reputation for excellent wing design was widely recognised, and one of the reasons for Boeing's interest in the Trident's early days. Airbus needed HSA's wing,while BAC had decided to keep well away from the unproven Airbus idea.
The 3-11, I believe, got rather short shrift when UK government money was asked for. Given that Airbus had already published its ideas for future developments of the A300 - right through from what became the A310 to the A330/A340 - the 3-11 must have seemed a lonely "stand-alone" project, while there was some real evidence of "family planning" on the Airbus side, both French AND German.

[Jetex_Jim]

What the Scottish lads were used to was "fettling to fit", while the standard practice at the Ruhr factory was to reject any part that needed such "fettling" and get a replacement, while also reporting the discrepancy for corrective action further up the supply chain.
'Fettling to fit', rather than rejecting parts not manufactured to sound tolerances does seem to have been the norm in British aircraft and car factories. And we know how that turned out..

[Tallsar]

JP...thanks for that more detailed perspective....and of course we all know how good the Airbus wing design has been over the decades since :ok:...one of our few remaining areas of world class expertise...so something was indeed preserved from that decade of drastic cuts and indecision and self-destruction etc.

That said...rather like that described in the 1955 precis on the state of the UK industry above, what was clearly lacking was a sense of National vision and confidence...based on clear political and industrial determination to maintain Britain in the forefront (or return us to the forefront maybe more apt). It needed a politically accepted vision that mass air travel was on the way and that even if we did not overtake Boeing, Lockheed, MacDak and Airbus as No1, with the right product made at the right price, we could at least take a very large and profitable share of that market.....We all know that a multinational committee driven product can turn out to be more expensive or create expensive delays for a variety of reasons...Given the recent lessons of Comet, Trident and the more successful 1-11, I feel sure the 3-11 was the right idea to make its mark.

Subsequently of course, we gradually withdrew from being such a player in the ever growing mass airliner market, despite some smaller successes based on late 50s/early 60s designs such as 748, 125 and Jetsream...even the 146 was a bit player in the great scheme of things..and in the end we gave up on those too....

To me this is the greatest blunder of all...the UK not being in the lead in civil aircraft design and production and subsequent profits adding to our prosperity (coming into the UK not some foreign account), high tech industrialemployment and prestige...we have no other choice now but being a bit player (however large) in a European conglomerate....C'est la Vie I suppose.

[Mike7777777]

Incidentally, until much later, Ford worked to US standards in the US, and to Metric in its UK and German factories. When the company decided to build its first "world car" (long before the Mondeo) which would be built in all its worldwide factories, the company decided to change its US factories to Metric standardsIndeed. There was a time (late 70s/early 80s?) when Ford sold cars in the UK with metric, imperial and US fasteners. Fortunately, most of the UK/US stuff was just about interchangeable as I recall (Whitworth and UNC, or was that UNF? Too long ago now) The wonders of threadology!
What the Scottish lads were used to was "fettling to fit", while the standard practice at the Ruhr factory was to reject any part that needed such "fettling" and get a replacement, while also reporting the discrepancy for corrective action further up the supply chain. Of course, no place on the production line for fettling, but if you want to attain performance beyond the capabilities of the non-fettling opposition then fettling is an absolute requirement.

[Jetex_Jim]

I'm reminded of an American expression, which applied to British sports cars and Lightning aircraft. (Oft told to those more accustomed to machines that don't leak fuel over and oil all over the asphalt.)

"It's not broken. It's British."

[Finningley Boy]

Supermarine Swift, no good as a Fighter, apparently it use to stall when the cannons were fired?:confused:

Good as a Tactical Recce aircraft (FR5) though I undertand!

FB:)

[Jig Peter]

I'm afraid I can't help you on the details of Martin's methods when "re-standardising" the Canberra, but I always found that having a full-size example was useful (if available) when a drawing wasn't clear enough to my not-very-expert eye !
:8

[Jig Peter]

I've a feeling that the reason Weybridge didn't get UK government support for the 3.11 - even after the major changes to the A300 after RR pulled out - was simple shortage of money, and perhaps a cynical attitude of "If we go in with Europe and the thing fails, we stand to lose less than if we go into competition with it".
Being no enthusiast for putting engines on the back end of a larger aircraft than Caravelle/DC-8/One-Eleven, I didn't think that putting 2 RB211s was the right way to go, but I'm no expert !

[JG54]

IIRC, the cannon installation in the Swift added to the already marginal handling characteristics at altitude for reasons of weight distribution rather than hot gas ingestion problems. I understand that Sapphire Hunters were prone to that particular problem though. :ok:

Regards,
Frank

[NutherA2]

understand that Sapphire Hunters were prone to that particular problem though. :ok:

IIRC the Avon powered early Hunters F1 & 4 suffered from this until the fuel-dipping mod was incorporated; the Sapphire powered F2 & 5 did not.:ok:

[Jig Peter]

'Twas the Avon which stuttered when the Hunter fired its guns ... There was scurrilous rumour that RR used a version of the Sapphire's compressor in later Avons. I think Dr Hooker confirmed that in his book "Not Much of an Engineer" and from experience I remember that later Canberras didn't suffer from the low-speed hang-up problem when spooling up for take-off in a cross-wind. I think it was because the 2-position inlet guide vanes changed their setting at a certain rpm on the early Marks and you "lined up" roughly into wind till those rpm were reached, after which you swung the aircraft onto the runway heading and headed for the Wild Blue Yonder. OK(ish) for singletons, but not very practical fo formation take-offs ...

[JG54]

NutherA2 & Jig Peter:

Thanks for the correction :ok: Post in haste, repent at leisure etc....

What a marvelous donk the Avon became, though - a true success. (Thread not withstanding, there were some!).

The Sapphire has always seemed the poor relation in comparison despite its many applications (and J65 license) - wonder why - perhaps lack of a developed reheat system? I suppose any future was put paid to when RR absorbed Armstrongs though...

Regards,
Frank

[NutherA2]

The Sapphire has always seemed the poor relation - wonder why
As far as I know it was the only engine to suffer from centreline closure, which really was a nuisance.

[JG54]

As far as I know it was the only engine to suffer from centreline closure

:eek:

Hopefully modded out / solved at some point?? (Pictures Javelins & Hunters falling from the skies....)

Regards,
Frank

[Modern Elmo]

Not long after my arrival, I was asked to see if I could find out why the turnover of workers from Scotland was much higher than from other countries. Talking to them I was told that what they found intolerable was being classified as "inefficient and bad workers" by German supervisors, for consistently taking longer to complete a task than others. What the Scottish lads were used to was "fettling to fit", while the standard practice at the Ruhr factory was to reject any part that needed such "fettling" and get a replacement, while also reporting the discrepancy for corrective action further up the supply chain. This, to the canny Scots, was a "shocking waste"


Compare to:

Eli Whitney

As early as 1798, Eli Whitney had turned his talents to the manufacture of firearms. He had established his machine shops at Whitneyville, near New Haven; and it was there that he worked out another achievement quite as [important] as the cotton gin: namely, the principle of standardization or interchangeable parts.

What is Standardization?


Standardization is the foundation of all large-scale production. Manufacturers produce separately many copies of every part of a complicated machine to use on an assembly line. Standardization also allowed owners of machines to order and replace any broken or lost parts, taking it for granted that the new part would fit easily and precisely into the place of the old.


Eli Whitney was one of the first manufacturers in the world to carry out standardization successfully in practice. Eli Whitney wrote that his objective was "to substitute correct and effective operations of machinery for that skill of the artist which is acquired only by long practice and experience," in order to make the same parts of different guns.
Eli Whitney went to Washington, taking with him ten pieces of each part of a musket. He exhibited these to the Secretary of War, as a succession of piles of different parts. Selecting indiscriminately from each of the piles, he put together ten muskets, an achievement which was looked on with amazement.

...

Eli Whitney - Firearms and the Birth of Standardization (http://inventors.about.com/cs/inventorsalphabet/a/machine_2.htm)

[Modern Elmo]

People sneer at the Belfast(slow), but should remember that its original purpose was to ferry components of the Blue Streak rocket to Woomera

But why was it necessary to fly Blue Streaks to Woomera?

Present day Boeing Delta and Lockheed Atlas* missiles are assembled in northern Alabama and transported to KSC Florida and to Vandenberg AFB in Mexifornia via barge and ship. There is a canal and rivers which connect northern Alabama to the Gulf of Mex.

Wikipedia sez: ... The CBCs are built in Boeing's factory in Decatur, Alabama. They are then loaded onto the M/V Delta Mariner, a roll-on/roll-off cargo vessel, and shipped to either launch pad.

The Atlas and Delta missiles are probably bigger than Blue Streaks. I do not see why the Belfast had to exist in order to get Blue Streak missiles to Australia.


* ( Neither the Delta nor the Atlas is used as an ICBM. Instead, these missiles are used to launch DoD payloads into orbit. The present day Atlas is an entirely different design than the Atlas ICBM of the 1950's and '60's. The newer Atlas and the old Atlas share the same name, but not much more. The older Atlas and the Blue Streak must have been similar. Both used liquid oxygen and kerosene for propellant. )

[Modern Elmo]

Here's Wikipedia re Blue Streak:

... Post-war Britain's nuclear weapons armament was initially based on free-fall bombs delivered by the V bomber force. It soon became clear that if Britain wanted to have a credible threat, a ballistic missile was essential. There was a political need for an independent deterrent, so that Britain could remain a major world power. The use of an American missile would have appeared to hand control to the United States.

In April 1954 the Americans proposed a joint development programme for ballistic missiles. The United States would develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) of 5,000 nautical mile (9,300 km) range, while the United Kingdom with United States support would develop a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) of 2,000 nautical mile (3,700 km) range. The proposal was accepted as part of the Wilson-Sandys Agreement of August 1954, which provided for collaboration, exchange of information, and mutual planning of development programmes. The decision to develop was influenced by what could be learnt about missile design and development in the US. Initial requirements for the booster were made by the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough with input on the rocket engine design from the Rocket Propulsion Establishment at Westcott.

De Havilland won the contract to build the missile, which was to be powered by an uprated liquid-fuelled Rocketdyne S3D engine, developed by Rolls-Royce, called RZ2. ...
...

Eventually the project was cancelled because of its lack of credibility as a deterrent. Some[who?] considered the cancellation of Blue Streak to be not only a blow to British military-industrial efforts, but also to Commonwealth ally Australia, which had its own vested interest in the project
.
The missiles used liquid oxygen and kerosene propellants. Whilst the vehicle could be left fully laden with 20+ tonnes of kerosene, the 60 tonnes of liquid oxygen had to be loaded immediately before launch or icing became a problem. Due to this, fuelling the rocket took 15 minutes, which would have made it useless as a rapid response to an attack. The missile was vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack, launched without warning or in the absence of any heightening of tension sufficient to warrant readying the missile, if such a circumstance were ever likely. ( But every engineer and scientist had to have known about the drawbacks of liquid oxygen oxidizer from the beginning of the program. And why assume that the Reds could knock out all or almost all British MRBM's in a surprise attack? I suspect that many Atlas ICBM's were deployed above ground.-- Elmo.)

To protect the missiles against a pre-emptive strike while being fuelled, the idea of siting the missiles in underground silos was developed. These would have been designed to withstand a one megaton blast at a distance of half a mile (800 m) and were a British innovation, subsequently exported to the US. ( I'm not sure that the missile silo idea originated in UK. Can anyone comment on this? -- Elmo.) However, finding sites for these silos proved extremely difficult and RAF Spadeadam in Cumbria was the only site where construction was undertaken. This was also the site where the RZ2 rocket engines and also the complete Blue Streak missile were tested. The best sites for silo construction were the more stable rock strata in parts of southern England, but the construction of many underground silos in the countryside carried enormous economic, social, and political cost.

( Shoulda thought of that earlier in the program. -- Elmo. OK, Atlas ICBM's in the USA could be based farther from population centers than MRBM's in the UK. Not as much Not in My Backyard trouble in USA.)

[I]As no site in Britain provided enough space for test flights, a test site was established at Woomera, South Australia. Whitehall opposition to the project grew, and it was eventually cancelled on the ostensible grounds that it would be too vulnerable to a first-strike attack. Admiral of the Fleet Lord Mountbatten of Burma had spent considerable effort arguing that the project should be cancelled at once in favour of his Navy being armed with nuclear weapons, capable of pre-emptive strike. Around £84m had been spent.

...

Civilian programme

After the cancellation as a military project, there was reluctance to cancel the project because of the huge cost incurred. Blue Streak would have become the first stage of a projected all British satellite launcher known as "Black Prince": the second stage was derived from the Black Knight test vehicle, and the orbital injection stage was a small hydrogen peroxide/kerosene motor. This launcher never progressed beyond the design stage.

This also proved too expensive, and the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO) was set up. This used Blue Streak as the first stage, with French and German second and third stages. The Blue Streak first stage was successfully tested three times at the Woomera test range in Australia as part of the ELDO programme.

Although a total of eight launches were made of the multi-stage vehicle, the French and German components proved unreliable leading to the project's final cancellation, and the end of Blue Streak. The final launch was made at the French site of Kourou in French Guiana.

So, it seems that some Blue Streaks, at least the first stages thereof, made it to Australia and to Kouru without a Belfast.

[herkman]

I cannot remember the exact year but I suspect 1960 when I was at Air Movements Richmond, when the first of the Blue streaks came through.

But carried by USAF C124B's and we were told the RAF had no airplane to uplift them.

Regards

Col

[hanoijane]

As an outsider, in reply to the OP I'd have to offer...

.... your industry's inability to produce a modern, simple, reliable, mission-flexible, capable and quite unique aeroplane.

What's that? It did? And it was called the Hawk 200? AND YOU DIDN"T BUY AND DEVELOP IT?

You really are a nation of complete w*****s.

[Jetex_Jim]

Standardization is the foundation of all large-scale production. Manufacturers produce separately many copies of every part of a complicated machine to use on an assembly line. Standardization also allowed owners of machines to order and replace any broken or lost parts, taking it for granted that the new part would fit easily and precisely into the place of the old.
Yes this really is the point. Regarding, for example, Nimrod The legacy airframe components were difficult to integrate with the new build elements and they give an insight into just how bad the older generation aircraft were. There were differences of up to 4 inches in length between parts of the legacy fuselage components. By comparison, for the Boeing B777, which first flew 15 years ago, Boeing claim each aircraft to be within 3/100th of an inch of each other over a fuselage length of 200 feet.

[NutLoose]

Quote:
Incidentally, until much later, Ford worked to US standards in the US, and to Metric in its UK and German factories. When the company decided to build its first "world car" (long before the Mondeo) which would be built in all its worldwide factories, the company decided to change its US factories to Metric standards
Indeed. There was a time (late 70s/early 80s?) when Ford sold cars in the UK with metric, imperial and US fasteners. Fortunately, most of the UK/US stuff was just about interchangeable as I recall (Whitworth and UNC, or was that UNF? Too long ago now) The wonders of threadology!


Still happens today on Aircraft, buy any puddle jumper from Europe such as a Socata or Robin ( cringe) and the Airframe will be metric but the US produced engine will be A/F, UNC and UNF and have US Fasteners..

[Fareastdriver]

Still happens today on Aircraft, buy any puddle jumper from Europe such as a Socata or Robin ( cringe) and the Airframe will be metric but the US produced engine will be A/F, UNC and UNF and have US Fasteners..

I do not think Teledyn or Textron are going to rework Continental or Lycoming engines to metric standards just to suit a handful of European manufactured aircraft.

[lasernigel]

The wonders of threadology!

There is the crux of the matter, our system has a thread for every purpose whereas the metric system doesn't. ( unfortunately should be had not has as most are now redundant).

Seem to remember vividly a TSR2 accompanied by a Lightning either side coming over our school in Blackpool at low level, so it must have originated from Warton for its flight.

Valiant must rate as a blunder, not many built and those that were had tail failures.

[Jetex_Jim]

Eli Whitney
As early as 1798, Eli Whitney had turned his talents to the manufacture of firearms. He had established his machine shops at Whitneyville, near New Haven; and it was there that he worked out another achievement quite as [important] as the cotton gin: namely, the principle of standardization or interchangeable parts.


American manufacturers quickly embraced interchangeable parts. Henry Ford was proud to proclaim that no files were used on his production line, all the parts fitted perfectly, and were interchangeable. This had the further advantage that spare parts could just bolt in, again without rework.

There are significant intial costs in mass production, drawings have to be very carefully prepared with all dimensions and tolernaces specified in great detail, and components made to higher tolerances if they are to be assembled without rework. Often tooling, parts which must be manufactured in order to manufacture and form other parts, must be made. Consequently the start up costs are much higher.

In 1930s while Germany was stamping out the first Beetles priced so that workers could drive them on the new autobahns, the British car manufacturers were still proudly elitist and held on to methods which called for a level of ‘fitting’ during assembly. This approach was presented as a virtue, the low volume luxury car makers held that their cars were built by craftsmen and this was promoted as exclusivity.

The British aircraft industry of the 1930s worked in a very similar way to its car manufacturers. And, borrowing the rational, they held that skilled fitters were essential whenever airframes and aero engines had to be manufactured. When the war was imminent and the British government wanted to increase aircraft production big problems were encountered when experienced mass producers attempted to adopt the aircraft industries' drawings and processes. Even relatively straight forward sub-assemblies such as bomb racks, when sent out to be manufactured by manufacturers such as Hoover and Electrolux, created problems. The supplied drawings were not always complete and tolerances were insufficient to define parts that could be assembled without extensive hand rework. The subcontractors ended up redrawing the original blueprints produced by the aviation big boys such as Avro and Handley Page to the standards that were customary in vacuum cleaner manufacture!

[ACW599]

I'm sure I've read somewhere that when Packard were initially invited to manufacture the Merlin, they advised Rolls-Royce that they couldn't make them to the RR drawings because the tolerances were either unspecified or far too wide for mass-production...

[tornadoken]

599: maybe you are remembering: The Man “who put power into the Merlin” Sir S.Hooker, Not Much of an Engineer{Airlife,84}: Ford/UK (for the Trafford Park Agency Factory) came to him with a "problem": he assumed they would confess that RR's tolerances were beyond auto-skills; but it was the reverse: inter-changeability, essential to permit Model T to be “repeatable” by diluted labour, alien in Aero, required precision beyond RR’s practice. Ford took a year to engineer “very good” Merlins, seen as 30% cheaper than RR.

This was however not a "blunder". Few/no Aero products will be built in auto quantity.

[Carry0nLuggage]

So, it seems that some Blue Streaks, at least the first stages thereof, made it to Australia and to Kouru without a Belfast.

Blue Streaks made their way to Woomera by sea. They were taken by road from Stevenage down the Great North Road and thence to the London docks where they were loaded as deck cargo.

As a small boy I watched a couple start their jouney this way. Getting the load through Knebworth was a squeeze - no A1M in those days! :eek:

[XV277]

In 1930s while Germany was stamping out the first Beetles priced so that workers could drive them on the new autobahns, the British car manufacturers were still proudly elitist and held on to methods which called for a level of ‘fitting’ during assembly. This approach was presented as a virtue, the low volume luxury car makers held that their cars were built by craftsmen and this was promoted as exclusivity.


You can make the comparison with the American and British aviation industries, and in they way they worked. Spitfires were hard to produce (in terms of man hours) due to the amounbt of hand-produced metal work thaty was needed for the complicated curves. Mustangs were easy to produce because the Americans used mass-production techniques - stampings for complicated shapes for example.

[Pontius Navigator]

Valiant must rate as a blunder, not many built and those that were had tail failures.

1. It was the main spar not the tail.

2. It was not Vickers but the MoS that supplied the spar metals in a new and unproven alloy.

Vickers produced an excellent aircraft and also a high-speed low level version that would probably have bested the Vulcan and the Victor except that the RAF had not yet realised it needed a high-speed low level medium bomber.

By 1955, even though the Air Staff had realised that target marking was an outdated tactic and the new bombers would be quite capable of finding their targets in all weathers using radar, the cancellation of the B.2 Pathfinder variant gradually became apparent as a mistake. It was just beginning to be realised that high altitude penetration of Soviet airspace was going to be a lot more dangerous in the future.

YouTube - Vickers Valiant B2 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jCbzOQwJfd4)

Spot the cuckoo at about 1.24

[Jig Peter]

It's true that aircraft are not built in numbers like cars or vacuum cleaners, but, to produce aircraft in the numbers per week that Airbus and Boeing do absolutely demands PRECISION and Standardisation at every stage of the build process, from suppliers to final assembly. Customers, too, with large fleets, don't want to have aircraft that are nominally the same, but in the details that count, are diefferent enough to cause problems in on-time operation. The A320, for example, is being turned out at 38 - 40 per month and recently the company announced it was "studying" an increase to 44 p/m, and Boeing must be at similar rates for the 737. Airbus recently announced that it has just reached the 10,000 mark in total orders - 4000+ for the A320. (far from the totals of DC-3s and B-17s, I know, but the modern jet transport is a different fish-kettle from its war-time predecessors.)
Airbus had many years of experience of major sections being built by different firms in remote sites and flown to final assembly - a system which Boeing decided to adopt for the 787, with less experienced builders of some major sections, which has led to problems and delays, not all of which are attributable to their other decision to go for an "all-carbon fibre" construction. They'll get over it, of course, but are some 3 years behind schedule, by which time they'll have got the Precision and Standardisation bit sorted.
PS Software has to be standardised too, as Airbus found out after, to save money, two major factories used different versions of CATIA on the A380. Cost 'em, that did ...

[Pontius Navigator]

Customers, too, with large fleets, don't want to have aircraft that are nominally the same, but in the details that count, are diefferent enough to cause problems in on-time operation.

But they had to learn that lesson too with aircraft like Vanguard and Trident practically ordered like RAF aircraft and bespoke for one mission.

[Krystal n chips]

" Customers, too, with large fleets, don't want to have aircraft that are nominally the same, but in the details that count, are diefferent enough to cause problems in on-time operation.

But they had to learn that lesson too with aircraft like Vanguard and Trident practically ordered like RAF aircraft and bespoke for one mission."

Sadly, that is not quite true with regard to one particular blunder.

Those of you who operated / maintained the 748 / Andover can thank whoever you never encountered the final variant....the ATP.

Conforms to both of the quoted paragraphs with ample room for expansion as to why the type should have been dumpted on any range you care to name and used accordingly thereafter.

Only type I can think of where the manufacturer had a "hearts and minds" meeting for some very p£$sed of customers...not to mention the IFSD suffered by Loganair....on the delivery from Woodford to,er, MAN.

Each one was truly, "hand crafted"...

[Jig Peter]

Still wildly off-thread, B U T ... Within a fleet, the need is that every bit of the individual aircraft must be standard - pipes, ducts, wiring harnesses etc. Somewhere on Pprune recently I saw a mention that the Comet fuselages on the MRA4 were out by inches, while on the B777 any discrepancy's measured in thousandths. The discrepancies in internal systmes must be mind-boggling, no?
When you're knocking up, basically by hand, aircraft in a "hobbies shop", as someone said about Handley Page, to fulfil an order for say 50 aircraft at the most, you've got little incentive to invest in sophisticated jigging and you won't get the accuracy that is now needed for a production passenger jet, for which you've got orders for thousands and are delivering at a rate of, say, 10 per working week.

PS - Sorry Mods for drift ...
JP

[Pontius Navigator]

JP, quite. I was making the point that Trident and Vanguard were also ordered in small numbers so again jig costs were the issue.

I was going to comment on the delivery rate of the Vulcan - 1/month - then saw the Airbus was at 38/month.

I wonder what the economics of producing one V-bomber at 20/month for 5 years compared with one per month over how ever long? I think across the 3 types it was less than about 1/month over the 10 years over 3 manufacturers.

[ACW599]

>599: maybe you are remembering: The Man “who put power into the Merlin” Sir S.Hooker, Not Much of an Engineer{Airlife,84}:<

It may well have been; either there or L J K Setright's classic The Power To Fly. Unfortunately I lent my copy of Hooker to someone and it never managed to RTB.

Is it a vicious rumour or is there any truth in the anecdote that no two Tucanos are the same size?

[Tim McLelland]

It's true that there was an indecent amount of company rivalry involved in the TSR2 story and the first flight saga was a classic example. It was pretty obvious that the aircraft should have gone to Warton from the start but Vickers clearly thought that the aircraft was their project - and the way that the Government acted simply reinforced this notion. It was Vickers' pre-occupation with VC10 and BAC-111 which encouraged the project to be gradually exported to Warton.

As for whether we needed TSR2 it's back to politics. If we'd remained East of Suez then we obviously would have needed it, but for the European theatre the aircraft was perhaps over-specified. But as has been said, TSR2 eventually led to Tornado which was (for once) the right aircraft for the right role.

I guess one could conclude that no aircraft could be too good and it would have been great if the RAF had received an aircraft which was actually over-specified for the roles to which it was assigned. But everything comes at a price and nobody can doubt that we simply couldn't afford TSR2. Likewise, we can never know just how good TSR2 really would have been. On paper it promised to be a brilliant aircraft but as the flight test programme was hardly even started, and the avionics were still in their infancy, we will never know for sure.

[FODPlod]

This is absolutely horrific if true. £4bn's worth of unique kit that's critical for safeguarding our nuclear deterrent, performing long range Search & Rescue and a dozen other important functions. Whose woeful ignorance, not to mention criminal negligence, is responsible for this stupidity?Chopped up for scrap, Britain's £4 billion fleet of Nimrods (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8269676/Chopped-up-for-scrap-Britains-4-billion-fleet-of-Nimrods.html)


The Government has been accused of “gross vandalism” after industrial cutters have been moved onto an airfield to begin chopping up nearly £4 billion worth of the world’s most advanced reconnaissance aircraft.

On Monday private contractors hired by the Ministry of Defence will take chop off the wings of the first of nine Nimrod MRA4 aircraft. To avoid government embarrassment each £400 million aircraft will be draped in tarpaulin and dragged to a remote corner of an airfield where they will be “brutally” dismantled.

Politicians and defence workers have accused the Government of acting too swiftly as the implications to national security have not been fully understood.

The termination of Nimrod was a surprise announcement in last October’s Strategic Defence and Security Review and the MoD is insistent their destruction will go ahead...

[Rossian]

...I know someone who was heavily involved with the "hearts and minds" meetings about the ATP.
It was a Loganair captain who eventually raised the problem of the toilet ventilation system which seemed to be directed straight to the flight deck, "Within a few secs I can tell the fact that the first user of the bog had a vindaloo last night and I AM P&&SED OFF ABOUT IT. SORT IT OUT!!"
The "solution" was to let the bog contents be flushed all the way to the end of the tube which led to the emptying valve on the outside skin of the aircraft. Fine, until after a reasonably long cold soak at height when the techie plugged in the doms trolley at the destination the frozen contents wouldn't empty. Captain now has dilemma of next load of pax and a full bog. Still not happy!!
"OK" says the company, "we'll wind a heater wire around the tube which will keep the contents liquid. Job jobbed".
Well - not quite.
"You never mentioned a thermostat" said the company, when the complaints about the three foot long tube of almost boiling sh%t were logged.......
It would be laughable apart from the fact that that sequence of events actually happened.
I think it was perhaps because the company used a toilet of their own design rather than buying one that already was proven to work from someone else.
The same toilet was used in the Nimrod as well and was deeply unpopular for similar reasons.

[teeteringhead]

Is it a vicious rumour or is there any truth in the anecdote that no two Tucanos are the same size? .... Did hear from a very reliable source that just as they entered service (Cranwell? Linton?), a whole ruck of them were lined up smartly on dispersal for a publicity picture.....

...... when it was discovered (by the photog!!) that you could line up the noses ...... or the tails ....... but not both!

[Pontius Navigator]

The same toilet was used in the Nimrod as well and was deeply unpopular for similar reasons.

Which brings to mind a war story.

A GSU Trapper, AEO IIRC, went to the bog but omitted to take his headset with him.

Once securely seated and job done he couldn't open the door. With no headset he could not call for help either.

Oddly none of the knockers noticed his plight :}

[Jetex_Jim]

A recent book on the Lancaster relates how 'Bomber' Harris tried long and hard to persuade Shorts to cease manufacture of the abysmal Stirling and start making Lancasters, or even components of Lancasters. Shorts, however would have none of it, claiming that it would take too long to retool for the Lancaster. I'm inclined to wonder just how many lost lives could be attributed to a cost accountant's reluctance to invest in tooling (even British wartime levels of tooling) and, of course the lost 'cost plus' production that such a switch over would have entailed.

[draken55]

I thought that Beaverbrook and MAP had assumed total control of what got made rather than the manufacturers by the time the Lanc arrived.

However, had someone told Avro to incorporate a ventral turret on the Lanc, many lives might well have been saved.

[Pontius Navigator]

draken, while that may be true a ventral turret would have had a significant effect on its bombload and range. Would Harris supported a fortress route?

[draken55]

PN

By 1943 the RAF new that the front and even mid upper turrets were seldom used at night. It dropped the latter for the Dams raid and later on both were often dispensed with. Nothing was ever done to counter the Schrage Musik Night Fighter attack profile for reasons that remain a mystery.

Another point worth mentioning is that some heavy nighfighters like the Me110 weighed down with radar and cannon had a heck of a time catching Lancs. Greater speed may have been more of a defence than four 0.303 Brownings.

The boffins did fit active radar to tail turrets but that only served to illuminate our aircraft as targets to the enemy once they had discovered this.

[Fareastdriver]

They tried a ventral gun, as opposed to a turret on both the Halifax and the
Manchester and then removed it. If a tail gunner could not see a German night fighter approaching in the dark I fail to see how a ventral gunner would.

[Pontius Navigator]

Another point worth mentioning is that some heavy nighfighters like the Me110 weighed down with radar and cannon had a heck of a time catching Lancs. Greater speed may have been more of a defence than four 0.303 Brownings.

Very true. As for Schrag Musik, I'm not sure when they knew about it, certainly I hadn't until Alf Price mentioned it. One problem was, I imagine, the lack of survivors.

The other problem with a ventral turret, it would also vie for space with the bomb bay. If it was sited futher back, like the ASV on the Shack, it would have had to be retractable like the B17 which would also increase weight and, as you say, reduce speed.

[draken55]

"If a tail gunner could not see a German night fighter approaching in the dark I fail to see how a ventral gunner would"

A tail gunner could, when in luck, pick up an attack from astern but not one were an aircraft made a climbing attack from below. As the target was the wing fuel tanks, an aircraft was more likely to be lost. However, even after aircraft returned with battle damage that after tests confirmed cannon fire from below, it was not at first believed then seems to have been ignored.

Fitting radar to assist the tail gunner see in the dark had the opposite effect by illuminating the aircraft and with it the bomber stream.

Bomber Command was still being hit hard by the Luftwaffe well into 1945 although NF Mossies helped reduce losses. Electronics were seen as the answer perhaps as it was easier to fit black boxes than make changes to the production line.

Worth comparing this approach to the B-17 where a chin turret was fitted to the B-17G as a direct consequence of head on attacks in daylight.

[tornadoken]

jetex #136: the problem, late-1942, was not the inadequacy of Stirling quality but of quantity. British Strategy was for Strategic Bombing as the Second Front NOW!, but despite the wholesale re-casting of the auto industry into 4-Motor shadows, deployment was languid. Minister of Aircraft Production Llewellin was fired and fervent nationaliser Sir R.Stafford Cripps put in, 11/42.

Harris wrote to him, 30/12/42: Stirling Production Group had “virtually collapsed (makes) no worthwhile contribution to our war effort in return for their overheads (should be) wholesale sacking of the incompetents who have turned out (c)50% rogue a/c from (Harland…'T)he incompetent drunk’ who ran (Short.)” C.Bryant,S.Cripps,Hodder,1997, P330; C.Messenger,Bomber Harris,Arms&Armour,1984,P92.

RSC put in AWA to displace Short at S.Marston Agency Factory from the last 108 Stirling III; Oswald Short was evicted from his own patch,11/1/43, but the firm's sloth was irredeemable. RSC sought to implement Defence(General) Regln.78: appropriation to ensure efficiency. War Cabinet Minutes W.M.(43).41,16/3/43,P121, WSC: “is it worth (a Commons) row?” RSC: “Some (production problem cases) are very big concerns. Present difficulty is with the Bristol Co. (on absent Buckingham. Hard) to put a Controller (in: they are scarce. If we resolve the position at Short, it will with others) be easier to make voluntary arrangements.” WSC: “very well, go on then and have your row: it may hamper MAP in future.” Bevin: “I think it will upset the industry”; “I don’t” said RSC. Short's was nationalised and put under Harland management. Stirling remained in (low volume, later in transport variant) production; notions of changeover to Lancaster lapsed as volume grew from the existing Lancaster Production Group.

Stirling was not all bad: : “it could not make a decent operational height (a) pig (on) taking off and landing (but) in the air it was a darling - it could turn inside a Spitfire” D.Richards,The Hardest Victory,Hodder,94,P.311. Not, I suggest, the greatest blunder.

[Jetex_Jim]

tornadoken thanks, as usual for an in depth explanation of the Shorts situation.

That the RAF were baffled for so long by the losses subsequently attributed to Schräge Musik is very odd. During the First World War RFC pilots had used the technique of firing upwards with success against Zepplins. One might have expected a few senior officers to recall that.

The concept of removing all turrets from the 4 engine bomber force was proposed by some junior members of the RAF Operational Research group. (see Freeman Dyson, Disturbing the Universe for more on this). Flying a stripped down Lancaster with a crew of two was viable and the performance advantages might well have kept them clear of most radar equipped nightfighters.

I've read that some Lancasters were initially fitted with a ventral turret but this space was subsequently occupied by the H2S installation. However, German nightfighters were frequently equipped with an H2S detector called Naxos. And there was a tail mounted version to give warning of Mosquitoes equipped with AI Mk4 which operated on the same band.

Bolting kit on, rather than removing it, seems to have been Bomber Command's preferred remedy. Perhaps persuaded, I wonder, by an industry that would sooner add more bits than build a lighter, cheaper plane in the first place.

That after the war the policy of flying high and fast with the unarmed V-Bombers and the Canberra seems to show the wisdom of those Operational Researchers who were ignored in war time.

[tanimbar]

Freeman Dyson wrote of his experiences during WWII. He joined, aged 19, the Operational Research Section (ORS) of the Royal Air Force's Bomber Command on July 25, 1943.

Read his account here - Freeman Dyson, operational research and the night bomber offensive - Topic Powered by Social Strata (http://forums.ubi.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/23110283/m/8981038786)

It covers Schrage Musik, and how it was missed, together with comments on the effectiveness of removing, essentially useless, turrets.

Opportunities missed ..... Sad, very sad ............

Regards, Tanimbar

[Jetex_Jim]

Thanks, tanimbar. Dyson on those proposed turret-less Lancasters.
Smeed and I agreed that Bomber Command could substantially reduce losses by ripping out two gun turrets, with all their associated hardware, from each bomber and reducing each crew. The gun turrets were costly in aerodynamic drag as well as in weight. The turretless bombers would have flown 50 miles an hour faster and would have spent much less time over Germany. The evidence that experience did not reduce losses confirmed our opinion that the turrets were useless. The turrets did not save bombers, because the gunners rarely saw the fighters that killed them

[Pontius Navigator]

Thanks, tanimbar. Dyson on those proposed turret-less Lancasters.

Which probably accounted for the subsequent post-war unarmed bombers when everyone else added guns from B-36 onwards and the Russians to this day even on transports. That tail gun certainly worried the old DF guys and still worried the F4 guys closing for a VID or even a Fox 2.

[Mike7777777]

The benefits of hindsight: remove defensive armament from RAF heavy bombers in 1943. Subsequent news headlines "our boys have no defence over Germany".

As per several (many) previous posts on Pprune, the Mossie (or similar) should have been the bomber of choice over Germany (with hindsight), but no-one in a position of authority at the time would have instructed Avro et al to build twin engined bombers with no defensive weapons instead of four engined aircraft bristling with machine guns, in case the decision was wrong.

Perhaps the greatest blunder is - as always - building aeroplanes designed to win the previous conflict.

[Jetex_Jim]

"our boys have no defence over Germany".
Quite, but they can outrun every nightfighter in the sky and turrets don't help much against anti aircraft guns.

but no-one in a position of authority at the time would have instructed Avro et al to build twin engined bombers with no defensive weapons instead of four engined aircraft bristling with machine guns, in case the decision was wrong.
Perhaps, but there would have been little cost to removing all the turrets from one squadron of Lancs, and then see how they got on. That is what the OR boys wanted. Moreover, this was not hindsight but a conclusion made at the time but not passed to Harris.

As far as I can recall no one suggested an entire bomber force composed of Mosquitoes. (I don't see a Mosquito carrying a Grand Slam, for examle.) The suggestion was to strip the turrets out of the 4 engined bomber force.

Of course, if all the numerous RF transmitters that the RAF habitually flew to Germany with - making them easy prey for even none-AI equipped nightfighters that were fitted with RF homers, were removed or turned off, then, so much the better.

[Pontius Navigator]

Remember too that the Wellington could fly as high as 40000 feet pressurized as early at 1941. At that height it would have been invulnerable but admittedly not able to carry much or a bomb load but is could have flown over Germany in daylight which would have eased the navigational problems.

[Mike7777777]

Quite, but they can outrun every nightfighter in the sky and turrets don't help much against anti aircraft guns. With hindsight, with regards to Me110 and JU88, yes. Other, faster, nightfighters were available. But from the info at the time it would have taken a brave man to make the decision to remove armament from heavies.

Moreover, this was not hindsight but a conclusion made at the timeThat conclusion could not be valid (at the time) because the full info re: causes of bomber losses was not available (at the time) eg Schrage Musik

As far as I can recall no one suggested an entire bomber force composed of Mosquitoes Previous threads (perhaps Nostalgia). See Mosquito losses in WW2. Grand Slam was not particularly effective at shortening the war, more an exercise in "Can we build it? Yes we can!" Lots, or even several Mossies bombing the U-boat pens when under construction on the French coast would have been a more effective use of resource IMHO (with hindsight!)

But as with all these things, the Germans would have responded. Windows was very effective over Hamburg, the Luftwaffe modifed their tactics, Windows was subsequently not as effective. If the average speed of the bomber stream increases then, eventually, more high performance nightfighters would appear. Me262s (probably) caused a sharp increase in Mossie NF losses at the end of the conflict.

[TBM-Legend]

Many Lancs were 'field' modified to fit .50 guns in the ventral position. .303 and even a 20mm was tried. The early Lanc ventral turret was limited by the sighting mechanism and was removed. The H2S radar created a problem for a ventral gun due to its position however not all Lancs flew with them. The Lanc in the Australian War Memorial was not fitted eg.

[Pontius Navigator]

The Lanc in the Australian War Memorial was not fitted eg.

Not fitted or fitted and removed?

The BBMF Lancaster does not have the radom whereas Queenie at East Kirkby does. Given BBMF Lancaster's post-war role it is highly likely that it was removed.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

However, even after aircraft returned with battle damage that after tests confirmed cannon fire from below, it was not at first believed then seems to have been ignored.


It seems shocking that the Int Os and those above them refused to believe the eye-witness accounts of numerous crews - "vertical fire followed by destruction of a bomber", and even came up with the totally spurious concept of Scarecrows, rather than investigate the accounts of Schrage Musik properly. A similar attitude was experienced by those Fighter Command pilots who first encountered the Fw 190 in 1941, but were told that the radial-engined aircraft which were decimating them were "just Hawk 75s which the Germans captured from the French". Did the hierarchy really believe that Hawk 75s, which had proved inferior to the Bf109E in 1940, would be used by the Germans on the Channel Front? And that, if the Germans did this, the H75 would suddenly be able to beat Spitfire Vs? Good to see those on the front line getting the support they needed from on high...some things never change...:*

[chiglet]

Remember too that the Wellington could fly as high as 40000 feet pressurized as early at 1941. At that height it would have been invulnerable but admittedly not able to carry much or a bomb load but is could have flown over Germany in daylight which would have eased the navigational problems

So what about the Junkers Ju86p [Recce, Service Cieling 39500ft] at least one shot down by a modified Spitfire? Could a Luftwaffe fighter not be modded? if so, end of

Sharage Musik, why no countermeasures? The Luftwaffe did NOT use tracer ammo! Ergo... wtf?
As always, I stand to be corrected [Matron....:suspect: ]

[tanimbar]

First, Freeman Dyson's account makes it clear he thinks there was a failure of insight, not hindsight, regarding Schrage Musik - a failure he believes he shared. An honest and brave assessment of his involvement. But, he was only 19 or so and straight from school.

And, just posssibly, the higher-ups in Bomber Command made the right decision in not removing the turrets. By 1943 they would have known that the bombers would be called upon to strike infrastructure etc. in France/Low Countries in support of the invasion. Many of these ops were at lower elevation than those over Germany, and turret guns might prove very useful against German fighters. Plus, there might be daylight raids.

Those responsible for strategy in Bomber Command might have thought that removing turrets would aid the bombing campaign in Germany, but would then have to be retro-fitted to suit the invasion campaign and later low-level efforts.

If so, they would reason that ripping out turrets is far easier than putting them back in: hence, for strategic reasons, do nothing!

And, did they have an eye on later, low-level, operations against the Japanese?

Just a thought (but I don't expect it is new).

[Al R]

Not sure if its a blunder, but this (from 1995) resonates.

RAF may lease US jets if Tornado is scrapped - News - The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/raf-may-lease-us-jets-if-tornado-is-scrapped-1602785.html)

[Jetex_Jim]

That conclusion could not be valid (at the time) because the full info re: causes of bomber losses was not available (at the time) eg Schrage Musik Nevertheless, the decision to remove the turrets would have been the correct one. (you never reach a point where full information is available.) Turret-less Lancs would have flown faster and higher. To suggest that this would have been pointless because eventually a fighter would have come along to catch them isn't much of an argument against. Had the war gone on long enough the German Wasserfall surface to air missile might have come along and it had a projected maximum altitude of 60000ft but that didn't stop designers striving for higher altitudes until the 1960s.
Grand Slam was not particularly effective at shortening the war, more an exercise in "Can we build it? Yes we can!"
Really, and what of the other weapons that Barnes Wallace designed, Tallboy and Upkeep? It took a Lanc to lift them. Perhaps you consider the sinking of the Tirpitz, the Operation Crossbow attacks, oh and the Dams raids to have been trivial?


The ability of High Command to delude itself is related by Dr RV Jones in his story of the battle of the beams. Knickebein, etc. In this Jones explains how his first problem was to persuade the British High Command that the Germans actually needed electronic bombing aids. They were convinced, in 1940, that accurate bombing could be done, at night, using conventional techniques. Surely a breathtaking example of hope over experience? Later, of course, Harris still endorsed only area bombing, even though by 1944 617 squadron were capable of such precision as the Saumur tunnel raid:June - August 1944
Saumur rail tunnel — The sole operational north-south route on the Loire. Nineteen Tallboy-equipped and six conventionally-equipped Lancasters of No. 617 Squadron attacked on the night of 8/9 June 1944. This was the first use of the Tallboy bomb and the line was destroyed — one Tallboy bored through the hillside and exploded in the tunnel about 60 ft (18 m) below, completely blocking it. No aircraft were lost during the raid.

[Mike7777777]

A decision to remove turrets may have been the correct one when viewed 70 years on, such is the benefit of hindsight, but it would have been seen as gambling with men's lives at the time. The German response to Allied successes was (generally) fairly rapid and effective where resources permitted, tactics for dealing with Window (I might have typed Windows previously, the shame) being a prime example, Tiger tank in response to Red Army T34 and KV-1 another.

The average speed and height of the RAF bomber stream over Germany certainly increased during the conflict, the average speed of German nightfighters increased by a significantly greater amount, compare RAF (night) losses with USAAF (day) over Germany in the last few months of the airwar

The balance of the airwar at night always fluctuated, even as late as Jan 1945; after Big Week it was all over for the Luftwaffe day fighters. And with hindsight(!), Bomber Command should have switched the heavies to daylight raids, leaving the Mossies to operate at night.

Certainly Tallboy was an effective weapon, but it was never going to win the war in the West in 1943/44, although effective area bombing of industrial targets might have (Speer). Alternatively, finish Berlin by Jan 1944 with a force comprising primarily of Mossies, each able to carry 8000lbs of munitions to Berlin on a dark winter's night ..

There's no doubt that Upkeep was a magnificent example of British engineering, created by a tenacious designer and delivered in perhaps the finest and most inventive feat of arms in the airwar 1939 to 1945. But it wasn't followed up, allowing the Germans to rebuild the dams (Wallis was reportedly furious), so the overall effect on German industrial production was minimised.

Re: Saumur raid: very effective use of the Tallboy, but it doesn't win the war in the West.

Re: Tirpitz, the Tallboys were again certainly effective, but against a target that no longer presented a serious threat to the Allies. The sinking freed RN assets (particularly capital ships) to prepare for service in the Far East, which - in hindsight(!) - made little difference to the outcome.

Re: Crossbow, Mossies were the most effective means of dealing with V1 launch sites.

Re: had the war gone on long enough? What-if scenarios - by definition - are opinion. Type XX1 wins the Battle of the Atlantic, Red Army rolls into Berlin? Wasserfall stops USAAF day bombing, night raids intensify, Red Army rolls into Berlin?

[JonnyT1978]

So many to choose from!

1957 Defence White Paper. So many promising aircraft and projects consigned to history. Reportedly the Saunders-Roe was a very viable contender for the contract for the West-German Luftwaffe eventually won by the F104G ('Widow Maker'). The only projects to survive were the Lightning, which although 'survived' could have been developed much further, and the ill-fated TSR-2.

Failure to properly rationalise the industry in the post-war period. Too many small manufacturers facing up to the 'big Americans' and therefore lacking industrial and financial clout. When the firms were rationalised, it was done poorly and inefficiently, leaving us with perhaps too few and just BAC (lately BAe) which has proved perhaps too big and powerful (in political circles at least...)

Wilson Govermnent Defence Cuts (mid 1960s). I could have just gone down the TSR-2 route with this one but that's a well trodden path so I thought I'd keep it broad. Granted the P1154 had its flaws, not least the conflicting requirements of the RAF and RN but to bin all that indigenously developed technology - such as Plenum Chamber Burning - and instead burn the cash on the most powerful, largest and yet slowest Phantoms in the world does seem somewhat mad. TSR-2 was a terrible shame but yet I can't help feeling that it wouldn't have quite matched up to the expectations. That said the way the cancellation was handled was nothing short of shameful and again we lost a lot of good technology in the process. Granted (again) the UK government couldn't have envisaged the protracted development of the F-111 and the associated cost-escalations, but the bigger problem was the 'capability gap' it left us with meaning the Vulcan had to soldier on for nearly 20 more years until the Tornado replaced it.

Scrapping of the 'conventional' carriers. Pretty simple this one. 'Proper' carriers with Phantoms (I never said they weren't good aircraft!) and Buccaneers and a very competent maritime AEW aircraft in the Gannet = a pretty good deterrent to Argentina even contemplating invading 'Las Malvinas'

Some others in brief:

Failure to see the Miles M-52 through to completion

Giving the Americans and the Soviets jet engines 'on a plate'

Lack of development of the Buccaneer (perhaps Mountbatten was right?)

Failure of De Havillands to engineer the first Comets properly, given that metal fatigue was a known phenomenon by this time - pilots of Hawker Typhoons whose tails parted company will testify to that!

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

The balance of the airwar at night always fluctuated, even as late as Jan 1945; after Big Week it was all over for the Luftwaffe day fighters.


I would wager that the 8th AF crews who experienced the Sturmgruppe attacks in summer/autumn 1944 might beg to differ! Not to mention the (admittedly limited) contribution of JG7 and the other jet units in the last few months of the war. It's true that by the end of 1944, the day Jagdwaffe was incapable of offering effective opposition to USAAF raids, but this came about well after Big Week; it resulted from the horrendous losses sustained over the Invasion Front and the USAAF's success in disrupting the German oil industry, and the transfer of many day fighter units to the Eastern Front to counter the last Soviet offensives.

[Madbob]

The biggest blunder I think was not to MASS produce the Mosquito as a bomber.

In terms of materials it cost much less than an 4-engined bomber, it carried only a crew of two and could carry a 4,000 lb bomb load (the same as a B17) all the way to Berlin.

Its survival depended on its ability to fly higher and much faster than the other allied bombers were able to and it could have operated by day or night. Any losses would have been much more sustainable as (not that this is to diminish the sacrifice made by the crews of the "big" bombers) as "only" two crew would be potentially lost with each aircraft.

Imagine what a force of 1,000 Mossies would represent. Better still, being faster in the long nights of winter they (with a new crew) could even have done two sorties per night. How's that for force multiplication?

Just my 2c - but I even suspect that they would have been a popular choice for the aircrew faced with the alternative of a Wimpy, Manchester, Stirling, Halifax or Lanc.

MB

[aw ditor]

Madbob


You can't get the wood!

A D'.

[SASless]

Giving the Americans and the Soviets jet engines 'on a plate'



Your gift to us was during the World War....the gift to the Russians was during the Cold War....big difference I suggest.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

the gift to the Russians was during the Cold War


...but so soon after the Second World War had finished that the slightly naive attitude of "the Soviets are our staunch allies" still prevailed. So it was that, during 1946, Winston Churchill made his 'Iron Curtain' speech, just as the Attlee Government was offering up the Nenes as a goodwill gesture...oops...

[tornadoken]

"Gift" Derwent/Nene: US: 11 March,1941 Lend/Lease deal was to suspend patent/IPR protection in the greater interest, and to roll up who-owes-who what till Victory. When that was done in July,1946 (by Maynard Keynes on UK side) "Reverse Lend/Lease" was computed with $800K for all-things-Whittle, to arrive at a net number. The 1947 licence, RR:P&W for Nene, "the needle engine", and the 1948 one for Tay, as J42 and J48, were done on negotiated commercial terms.

USSR: in October,1946 Uncle Joe was not yet seen in the colours he later displayed. UK had a $ bridging Reconstruction Loan, but needed ongoing $-sparing sources of food and other material. GIs were onway home, all planned to be gone by November,1948 Presidential Elections. It seemed a good idea to be on good terms with our near-neighbour. 10 (later,30) Derwent (to be RD-500), and 10 (later,25) Nene (to be RD-45 & VK-1) were bartered (not a gift) for Ukraine grain. This is, clearly, an oops blunder in hindsight, given the subsequent Berlin Blockade and Cold (Korea, Nene/MiG-15: Hot) War...but a legitimate alternative history What-If has the whole East:West confrontation as avoided if US/UK had not tried to encircle/contain Joe. Why, for example, did B-36/(B-29D) B-50 and Avro Lincoln continue in production after VJ Day?

[Fareastdriver]

Why, for example, did B-36/(B-29D) B-50 and Avro Lincoln continue in production after VJ Day?

Probably for the same reason that the Soviets initiated the production of the TU4. They certainly did not need it on the German front.

You have to remember the attitude of the Atlee government to the Soviet Union. The Labour members of Parliament were singing 'The Red Flag' in the House of Commons.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

USSR: in October,1946 Uncle Joe was not yet seen in the colours he later displayed


Disagree. Stalin never changed that much - even before 1945 the USSR was spectacularly unco-operative (shuttle bombing? Tirpitz attacks?) while of course sucking up all help/resources we offered. As Churchill demonstrated in his speech of March 1946, he was already well aware of the emerging threat. Giving the Nenes to the USSR was appallingly naive.

[Mike7777777]

I would wager that the 8th AF crews who experienced the Sturmgruppe attacks in summer/autumn 1944 might beg to differ! Not to mention the (admittedly limited) contribution of JG7 and the other jet units in the last few months of the war. It's true that by the end of 1944, the day Jagdwaffe was incapable of offering effective opposition to USAAF raids, but this came about well after Big Week; it resulted from the horrendous losses sustained over the Invasion Front and the USAAF's success in disrupting the German oil industry, and the transfer of many day fighter units to the Eastern Front to counter the last Soviet offensives. Crews wouldn't see the bigger picture. Galland knew the game was up in April 1944, pilot shortages were probably the Luftwaffe's biggest problem (other than some idiot deciding to invade the Soviet Union of course), resulting in novices being thrown into the fray. Jets were a waste of resource for the Germans (hindsight!).

[Jetex_Jim]

Jets were a waste of resource for the Germans (hindsight!).
How very true.

And if they'd have know how the war was going to turn out they wouldn't have started it.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

Crews wouldn't see the bigger picture


....but they would strongly disagree that "it was all over for the Luftwaffe day fighters" as early as Feb 1944 when Big Week happened!


some idiot deciding to invade the Soviet Union of course


Not to mention the same idiot picking a fight with the USA as well! But yes, the Soviet Union was the Germans' biggest problem.

[Pontius Navigator]

Not to mention the same idiot picking a fight with the USA as well! But yes, the Soviet Union was the Germans' biggest problem.

I didn't realised he picked a fight with the USA, I thought someone else did that.

[Duncan D'Sorderlee]

Germay (and Italy) declared war on the USA on 11 Dec 1941.

Duncs:ok:

[Pontius Navigator]

Only in support of Japan. It was really a formality.

[Fareastdriver]

Not really. the Tripartite Pact was a defensive treaty. There was nothing written into it that one had to join in with another's adventures. Should that have been the case Japan would have overrun Indo China and the Dutch East Indies a lot earlier than they did.

[draken55]

"Germany (and Italy) declared war on the USA on 11 Dec 1941"

And by doing so avoided the risk that the USA could have been at War with Japan but not the Axis Powers in Europe. In 1941 it was still not a certainty that the majority of the US population was convinced another War in Europe was of real concern to them. Hitler solved the problem no doubt to the relief of FDR and Churchill.

[Pete A]

Hello to all,
my first post.

I must say since discovering this site I have been absolutely blown away by the stories, explanations, theories, etc. you have provided on many topics. Thank you so very much for your contributions to enhancing my knowledge but also for showing me how little I really do know.

Now, on the topic of the British aircraft industry, the American aircraft industry has been through similar problems in the past as well. This from an article on Eastern Aircraft found in a US Navy magazine:

General Motors was contracted to assume production of Wildcats and Avengers so that Grumman could focus on designing and manufacturing newer types of aircraft.

To get started, Eastern Aircraft, as the new division was known, had to first tear down some highly productive automotive assembly and parts lines - ironically, the types of facilities that had attracted the US Navy in the first place.

All the plants had to undergo procedural and work-force transformations as well as physical ones. Eastern needed to form a new supplier network of more than 3,000 sub-contractors to obtain aircraft materials and parts.

The division's 9,000 employees required re-training by plane manufacturers, colleges and vocational schools. And because plane manufacturing was still a more manual process than auto-making, the work force had to be more than doubled and staffed mainly with unskilled people who required basic tools instruction.

The General Manager of Eastern said, "Let me confess at the outset that I am a 'Johnny-come-lately' to aircraft production. My entire career has been devoted to problems of automotive manufacture . . .in the field of aircraft manufacture, I don't pretend to know all the answers."

GM staff had come to their new business steeped in the principles of standardised mass production.....their re-orientation began soon after Eastern Aircraft was formed when they asked Grumman for complete parts lists and engineering data.....in the automotive process, designers had normally directed suppliers and manufacturers through fully detailed requisitions and drawings. At aircraft firms, as Eastern discovered, extensive use was made of hand tailoring by highly skilled mechanics guided by discussions with engineers and sketches.

Eastern unhappily learned, many of the specifications it needed were in the worker's heads....

Grumman itself, became Eastern's first supplier. Because the US Navy insisted that the two manufacturers produce planes with interchangeable parts, it was decided that one more step should be taken to guide Eastern. Grumman shipped finished Wildcats and Avengers for study and copying. Unfortunately the reverse-engineering tactic only proved how undefined aircraft standards were. Many of the components did not conform to the specifications of the drawings provided.

The engineers then adopted ship-builders techniques. They laid out full-scale outlines of aircraft and over a period of months (while hand-building aircraft in the meantime) produced drawings of the exact dimensions required of the thousands of parts needed. Thus, purchasing and tooling standards were finally set and documented.

Regards

Pete A.

[Jetex_Jim]

Pete A.
This is an interesting post and reveals some new information that I've not seen elsewhere.

That at least some of the American aircraft industry learned lessons from the volume manufacturers is instructive. What is interesting, and cuts to the original question posed by this thread, is that UK industry had, at the same time, the opportunity to learn the same lesson. The UK too had its shadow plants, car and other volume manufacturers, who had to go to lengths to get the engineering out of the heads of the craftsman and down onto the drawings.

The difference being that by the 1960s the American aircraft industry were building as separate components the various spacecraft of Project Apollo which all came together, and fitted, for the first time in the assembly building at Cape Kennedy. While back in the UK those first Nimrod airframes, the ones that would eventually furnish the legacy components of the MRA4, were being manufactured with as much as 4" difference between copies of the 'same' unit.

The UK caught on eventually but what a pity it didn't learn sooner from the expensive lesson it paid for in WW2.

[etsd0001]

An interesting last few posts. It reminded me of something I read recently in Sir Stanley Hooker's book 'Not Much of An Engineer'. In it he talks about when RR wanted to get Ford's in Manchester to produce the Merlin.

Ford went down to Derby to have a look at the blueprints and announced they couldn't manufacture engine to these drawings. RR assumed they meant that the tolerances were too fine, but Ford said it was quite the reverse, they were too course! Ford explained that they produced many thousands of car engines where all the parts had to be interchangeable between engines and RR standards were not good enough to achieve this interchangeability.

In the end Ford's took away copies of the blueprints and re-drew them to their standards.

[BEagle]

Ford explained that they produced many thousands of car engines where all the parts had to be interchangeable between engines and RR standards were not good enough to achieve this interchangeability.

I find it hard to believe that the hissing, wheezing piece of sidevalve junk blessed with 36 bhp when new, capable of propelling my 100E Anglebox from 0-60 in 29.7 seconds of frenzied mechanical stress, was ever in the same league regarding tolerances as a Rolls Royce Merlin...:\

[jamesdevice]

biggest mistake?
Supplying those jet engines to Russia in 1948
Without those the Russian jet development would have been delayed by at least ten years. No Korean War. No Vietnam war. No Badgers. No Bears. No Berlin Wall. No Cold War
Those bloody engines enabled the Russians to play catch-up so quickly that they became the threat they did.
But did we learn? Did we heck. So Wedgehead Benn allowed Hawker Siddeley to send the HS4000 high-power locomotive to Russia in the 1960's so they could copy that as well

[500N]

"biggest mistake?
Supplying those jet engines to Russia in 1948
Without those the Russian jet fighters would have been delayed by at least ten years. No Korean War. No Vietnam war. No Badgers. No Bears. No Berlin Wall. No Cold War
Those bloody engines enabled the Russians to play catch-up so quickly that they became the threat they did."


I never knew that. Just did some research, what a stupid thing to do and then the allies were surprised at the performance of the MIG in Korea !!!

[jamesdevice]

Labour government of course.
Both times. One has to wonder just how much the labour leaders of the 1940's -50's -60's really were in the communists pockets

[yourmun]

And there was me thinking that the Bear was a turbo-prop:ugh:

[Halton Brat]

Britain's world-leading jet engine technology was also gifted to the USA during WW2, enabling General Electric to become the giant that it is today.

Air Commodore Sir Frank Whittle (naturally, a Halton Apprentice) never really got the rewards that he deserved for his work; Britain has a long & glorious history of invention which is only truly brought to fruition by other nations. At the root of all this lies a national malaise, suspicion & ambivilence towards innovation, strongly rooted in governments of various hues; bring on Mr Dyson, I say.

On the subject of the aforementioned purveyor of domestic vacuum contraptions, I was recently party to a conversation where an account was related regarding the accidental spillage of the contents of a Cremation urn. It would seem that a vacuum cleaner was utilised to recover the granular remains of the dearly departed. I could not resist enquiring if this amounted to "Dyson with death"..........

Profound apologies to all...........have a good weekend chaps :)

HB

[jamesdevice]

"And there was me thinking that the Bear was a turbo-prop"
Once you have the basic compressor design concepts in hand, it doesn't take much more to add in a power shaft
Besides which, I've seen more than one reference (though as ever I can't remember where) that besides the Nenes RR also shipped a turboshaft (early Dart maybe?)

[Halton Brat]

They are all Gas Turbine engines, regardless of whether they produce a hat-removing blast of hot air, or turn a Leading Edge Cooling Fan (these devices will remove both head & hat).

Any further questions on the back of a 20GBP note please.

HB

[Fareastdriver]

wheezing piece of sidevalve junk blessed with 36 bhp

That engine could, with minimal maintenance, last for 10,000 miles before having to be disassembled for a decoke and valve grind, etc. That is equivalent to about 600 hrs. A Merlin had to rebuilt after 200hrs.

[Willard Whyte]

Britain's world-leading jet engine technology was also gifted to the USA during WW2, enabling General Electric to become the giant that it is today.

True enough, although Britain still seemed to have the edge in jet technology up until the late 50s.

[etsd0001]

I find it hard to believe that the hissing, wheezing piece of sidevalve junk blessed with 36 bhp when new, capable of propelling my 100E Anglebox from 0-60 in 29.7 seconds of frenzied mechanical stress, was ever in the same league regarding tolerances as a Rolls Royce Merlin

See the bottom of Pg 58 of the 2010 Airlife impression. To quote from Pg 59 -

"It took a or year so (to re-draw the 'prints), but it was enormous success, because, once the great Ford factory at Manchester started production, Merlins came out like shelling peas at a rate of 400 per week. And very good engines they were too, yet I have never seen mention of this massive contribution which the Ford Motor Company made to the building up of our airforces." - Sir Stanley Hooker.

Not Much Of An Engineer is well worth reading.

[lasernigel]

When you think that Atlantis will be the last shuttle mission, and the Americans will now have to pay the Russians a fee of £50M per astronaut.

Look back, a Brit invented HOTOL, this technology because of UK government lack of interest was sold to America. They aren't using it, we could have been charging them to get into space.

[jamesdevice]

Its been alluded to before, but one of the biggest mistakes was the inability to get management in British Industry (not just the aircraft industry) to plan properly and make sense of production
Take an example of my mother. During the war she riveted together the majority of the starboard-side inner wing boxes for Spitfires built at Westlands. Her bridesmaid assembled the port-side boxes. My mother went off ill for three weeks (an ulcer). When she got back she was faced with a pile of boxes to build. No-one else had been detailed to take her place. There was a three week backlog of part-assembled Spitfires awaiting starboard wings, despite the urgency.
THAT mindset, THAT lack of planning resource was one of the major failings in UK industry

[BossEyed]

HOTOL... was sold to America. They aren't using it...

Not even in Nevada? :E

[Willard Whyte]

Bubbling along in a shed somewhere...

Reaction Engines Ltd : Space Propulsion Systems (http://www.reactionengines.co.uk/index.html)

Skylon (spacecraft) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reaction_Engines_Skylon)

BBC News - UK Skylon spaceplane passes key review (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-13506289)

Reminds me (a bit) of the Avro 730. If nothing else it shows aerodynamics were quite well understood way back when.

http://prototypes.free.fr/tsr2/images/avro730_03.jpg

[Jetex_Jim]

biggest mistake?
Supplying those jet engines to Russia in 1948
Without those the Russian jet development would have been delayed by at least ten years. No Korean War. No Vietnam war. No Badgers. No Bears. No Berlin Wall. No Cold War
Well maybe. The British aircraft industry had little use for the Nene. I bet noone at RR was arguing against selling to the Russians.

However, sourcing a few engines is one thing, actually manufacturing the things is quite another. They managed to build ICBMs and manned launchers, do we attribute all that to the fact they scooped up a few Nazi V2s?

In fact, one might make the case that if the Russians had not been given a few of those 'agricultural' Nenes they'd have been forced to develop the axial compressor designs that they'd found in Germany. Which would have put them still further ahead.

[Jetex_Jim]

And just to show it's not just the post war British.
A prototype of the C919 jet that China’s state-owned aircraft maker hopes to begin delivering in 2016. G.E. has been chosen to supply the engines.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/business/global/18plane.html

As Lenin put it, 'The capitalists will sell us the rope we hang them with."

[Wander00]

Is this the one Ryanair are supposed to be interested in? No seats or loos then!

[henry crun]

Jetex_Jim: As I have read the history on the Nene sale, it was RR who received the initial request from the Russians.
They, RR, were keen to sell but they had to gain approval from the labour government before doing so.

[AGS Man]

I'm not sure of the aircraft type but the late great Neil Williams wrote on his test report "entry to the cockpit is difficult. It should be made impossible"!

[etsd0001]

it was RR who received the initial request from the Russians.
They, RR, were keen to sell but they had to gain approval from the labour government before doing so.

To quote again from 'Not Much Of An Engineer'

With Sir Stafford Cripps, at the Board of Trade, the left wing British Government appeared perfectly happy to sell out latest engine to the Russians, and in September 1946 clinched a deal for 25 Nenes & 30 Derwents, the first few of which the (the visiting Russian) team took back to the Soviet Union and copied exactly in double quick time.............

On my first visit to China in 1972 I was taken to the Peking Aeronautical Institute where they have a display of aero engines. Right in the fore front was a sectioned Nene engine of which, of course, the Chinese knew I was Chief Engineer. I inspected the engine carefully and said 'Yes, the Russians made a very good copy. They even copied the mistakes!'

[pr00ne]

Jetex_Jim


"As Lenin put it, 'The capitalists will sell us the rope we hang them with."


He was wrong, and so are you.

[Jetex_Jim]

"As Lenin put it, 'The capitalists will sell us the rope we hang them with."


He was wrong, and so are you.
And you justify this assertion exactly how?

The Soviet Union may be gone but, as my previous reference indicates, capitalism is still happy to exchange technology for short term profits.

[500N]

From the NYT article

"For the most part, Western aviation executives say the Chinese are simply too far behind in both civilian and military airplane technology to cause any real fears anytime soon"

Interesting to say the least.


How many of these "Western aviation executives" will be scrambling to catch up and competing with them in 5 years time ?


.

[BEagle]

"For the most part, Western aviation executives say the Chinese are simply too far behind in both civilian and military airplane technology to cause any real fears anytime soon"

I hear the words of Miss Mandy Rice-Davies*....:hmm:






*And no, I don't mean "Cor, Lord Astor, ain't you a naughty boy!"

[tornadoken]

Nene/Derwent to USSR: see my #166.

UK also bartered various aeroplanes, good and not so, for Peron-Fascist Argentina's beef. We were hungry and cold in 1946/47, so could not be picky about customers. Massey-Ferguson tractors, Morris Minors, Cossor/EKCO brown goods were not yet ready to burst on the world export scene. Great hopes were placed on Aero, especially turbines, to earn the $ we needed to survive. See the Brabazon Committee suite of civil Types.

For me, the 1946/47 turbine blunder was not this, but was Cabinet's 7/47 denial of a modest $ commitment to permit Bristol to licence-build L-849 Constellation, initially with Centaurus, then Theseus turboprop.

[Fareastdriver]

etsd0001On my first visit to China in 1972

You may be able to scotch a rumour knocking around China in the early 90s.
The Chinese were having trouble with the TBO of the Klimov copies so they asked Rolls Royce to send out a team to assist them. They brought out their original drawings of the Nene and put various things right.
Apparantly they stung the Chinese a packet for assisting them to fix illegal copies.

[etsd0001]

Hooker does mention that the Chinese had problems with their WP-7 military engine turbine blades. The fir-tree root was prone to cracking that led to the blade(s) departing the engine. They also had a problem with combustion chamber cracking due to the various thicknesses of metal used resulting in different rates of cooling when the power was reduced. The cracks would finally liberate chunks of material that would pass through the turbine.

RR sent them detailed drawings of the Spey turbine fir-tree root on the basis that they had lots of Speys in their Tridents so they already had the info if they cared to look. It would appear however that civilian aviation & military aviation were kept in separate 'boxes' and never were the twain to meet.

With regard to the combustion chamber problem, Hooker explained what the cause of the problem was and how it could be solved by the use of thicker material and keyhole slots cut in to the material. Once again he says they already had the answer if they had only bothered to look at the Russian copies of the the Nenes they had

[500N]

From etsd0001 post earlier
" They even copied the mistakes!'"

Reminds me of a story about the Spanish firearms trade who copied the Purdey Sidelock Shotgun, they had purchased a slightly used one which of course was slightly worn so the wear was also copied. I believe they eventually figured to buy a new one and copy that.

[Pontius Navigator]

'Yes, the Russians made a very good copy. They even copied the mistakes!'

According to the notorious Suvorov the same was true of the B29 that landed in Russia after bombing Japan. It was copied down even to the internal paint spec and a random holein one wing. When a second landed with a different paint spec and no hole and a 3rd with a mix of paint they continued to replicate the first as that was what Stalin had ordered.

Load of Bull really.

[AnglianAV8R]

"Load of Bull really"

Brilliant (intentional?) pun :D

[Graybeard]

Received this just the other day from an old friend, and thought it appropro.

The Blowfly: Gone But Not Forgotten.

It has been almost a half-century since the first Gormley-Bulsh Blowfly rolled out of a small, white frame factory in Aldershot, England. Built at the request of the Italian Army, it was intended for use as a defensive weapon against German observation balloon attacks.

The Gormly-Bulsh people were well known automobile manufacturers, but had no experience in the new-born aviation industry. This led to one of the most unusual features of the Blowfly--its fourspeed transmission (one speed in reverse). The company's chief engineer, Sir lan Hickey (later to become Mr. lan Hickey), had proceeded along familiar automotive design concepts; his inclusion of the transmission in the airframe design was not discovered until the prototype had already been completed. As the Italians were most anxious to combat the threat of the German balloons, Gormly-Bulsh decided to go ahead with Hickey's original design. These transmissions used straight-cut, nonsychromesh gears, necessitating additional flight instruction in double clutching.

Vee belts ran from the transmission pulley to the propeller assembly, mounted above the radiator, to provide the final drive. Another of Hickey's mechanical innovations was the use of burled walnut valves. These beautiful, hand-turned valves gave the Blowfly a distinctive and not unpleasant castanet-like chatter at idle. The presence of the transmission enabled the designers to employ the standard automotive cranking system in starting the engine. After the engine had been started, the clutch was engaged and the plane could be taxied in low gear, via a steerable tailwheel. Lubrication was by a rather primitive splash system which caused the engine to smoke badly whenever it was operated at any speed over 100 rpm.

When compared with other aircraft of the day, the Blowfly's performance was not spectacular. Its top speed of 87 mph (in top gear) was found to be inadequate, especially when coupled with the somewhat severe glide ratio of 3:1. The operational ceiling of 420 feet, however, provided to be of some defensive value: German antiaircraft gunners were reluctant to use explosive shells at this low altitude for fear of causing casualties on the ground.

The theoretical range of 200 miles was never reached under actual flight conditions as the valves tended to char well before this distance could be achieved. Armament consisted of two Savage single-shot .22 caliber rifles --- manually loaded and fired through the propeller. The engine turned about 120 rpm, eliminating the need for the pilot to worry about hitting his own prop. A three-pronged grappling iron was supplied but there is no recorded instance of its use.

Instrumentation consisted of a tachometer that was redlined at 200 rpm and a barometer/altimeter of the ever popular "Witch-and-Children-in-the-Cottage" model. Peak altitude was indicated when the witch came all the way out of the cottage. An oil temperature gauge was installed in the prototype but as the oil rarely remained in the engine long enough to become very hot, it was felt that this instrument served no real purpose; it was not included on the production model.

The three-cylinder, water-cooled, in-line engine was the same the company had been using in its fantastically unsuccessful two passenger drophead coupe, the Bolide. The engine was rated at 26 bhp, but again, this figure was never actually reached in the production engines because of various material limitations including the fact that the valves had a tendency to splinter at high revs. Many components of the Bolide automobile were used in the Blowfly; the muffler, radiator, windshield, horn, and hood ornament.

An interesting aside to the history of aircraft development was recorded on October 12, 1915, when a Blowfly was used in the first successful test of a phonograph in an airplane. The failure of the Royal Signal Corps to pursue this line of research further was instrumental in assuring radio's early domination of aircraft communications.

By the end of the war, a total of seven Blowflys had been built at the Aldershot plant, two of these actually being delivered to the Italians.
Only one of these planes was ever involved in actual combat. On November 9, 1917, Lt. Giuseppe Imbroglio, a member of the four man Dolce Far Niente squadron, was flying a patrol mission, his first in a Blowfly. He reported that while flying over the Tolmino-Caporetto Sector north of the Bainsizza Plateau at an altitude of 350 feet, he was attacked by a German observation balloon. What ensued was to be the longest recorded dogfight between a captive balloon and an airplane. After a number of furious onslaughts, the Blowfly was brought down when it was hit by a map case thrown by the German observer. Lieutenant Imbroglio was able by skillful downshifting to bring his ship to a relatively safe landing, but records captured during the latter stages of the war indicated that the German observer was badly shaken in the encounter and was sent back to Berlin for R&R.

Even though Imbroglio's was the only Blowfly involved in combat, the Germans claimed the destruction of 27 of the planes! It was later determined that this error was due to the plane's smoky lube system: What the Germans had seen was the same Blowfly 27 different times trailing a smoke cloud as it cruised toward its home base.

It is unfortunate that no Blowfly has survived. The last known example saw some use in 1923 after having been converted to a crop duster, but as the oil smoke tended to damage the crops it was shortly taken out of service. The engineering team responsible for the design and production of the Blowfly remained neutral during World War II at the urging of the British Government, so there was no chance for development there. The last Blowfly was seen in late 1956 filled with helium, being used to promote the opening of a supermarket in Grirnsby. An ironical use of a machine designed to be the scourge of the balloon! On this same occasion, a sudden squall caused the mooring lines to the floating Blowfly to part and the sole survivor of the breed was seen drifting out over the North Sea, where, presumably it finally fell.

One of my most cherished possessions is a polished mahogany gearshift knob embossed with the famous Gormly-Bulsh emblem. A silent memento of the gone but not forgotten Blowfly.

------
Sorry, couldn't help myself. Engaging thread.

GB

[Jetex_Jim]

How many of these "Western aviation executives" will be scrambling to catch up and competing with them in 5 years time ?
I expect those "Western aviation executives" will have taken their bonuses and moved on long before then.

[Halton Brat]

As the last surviving afficionado & custodian of the cherished memory of that paragon of British aircraft design, the Wiggins Aerodyne, I doff my virtual cap to a fellow traveller.

Had I not just spent a most enjoyable evening in a vineyard restaurant, I would feel better able to take you to task on several claims that you make regarding that infamous deathtrap, the Gormley-Bulsh Blowfly; the dreadful performance of this contraption is exemplified by the fact that it boasted not an Airspeed Indicator, but a calendar.

When this grape-induced mist has departed, I shall expand my case further; prepare yourself, Sir.

HB

[500N]

Further to my post above re ""For the most part, Western aviation executives say the Chinese are simply too far behind in both civilian and military airplane technology to cause any real fears anytime soon"

Thought this might be of interest to forum members with a fair emphasis on China and how fast they move. I liked this sentence "But the speed at which they have been developed".


Global race on to match U.S. drone capabilities - The Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/global-race-on-to-match-us-drone-capabilities/2011/06/30/gHQACWdmxH_story.html)

This is the Videolink from the article
YouTube - &#x202a;WJ-600 Combat UAV - CGI presentation at Zhuhai Airshow 2010&#x202c;&rlm;

Global race on to match U.S. drone capabilities - The Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/global-race-on-to-match-us-drone-capabilities/2011/06/30/gHQACWdmxH_story.html)

[pr00ne]

Jetex_Jim,


"And you justify this assertion exactly how?"


Well, you see, the very basis of Marxist-Leninist theory was that capitalism was a self destructive force and that eventually pressures of capital and consumerism, allied to inflation and taxation, would deliver the capitalist world into the communists arms. All they had to do was wait.

As history showed, the exact opposite occurred.

So, Lenin's claim that he would take the capitalists rope they sold him and hang them with it, was simply wrong.