Mike Harland Inquest

[Alexus]

Mike Harland ex GR4 Nav (RAF Marham) who died on a BAe systems flight over Norfolk 2007.

Just to let you know, the coroner finally has a date for his inquest: 18th October in Norwich over 4 days - with a jury. I shall be covering it for BBC Look East. My reports will be available via BBCiPlayer.
I am really keen to talk to anyone who can give me off/on record thoughts on how these seats work, colleagues and friends who would be prepared to pay Wolfie a tribute.
Many thanks Alex Dunlop

[Lima Juliet]

Alexus

I will be interested in seeing the Coroner's findings as well - Mike was a top chap and I was very saddened to see him go in such a tragic accident. If anyone is culpable then I hope they recieve suitable sanction from the Coroner.

As a serving officer I would not be prepared to be interviewed either on or off the record.

Regards

LJ

[Sgt.Slabber]

Alexus

You have a PM

[peppermint_jam]

Alex.

Please post up links to your iplayer reports when they are released mate.

p_j

[Pontius Navigator]

Alex, the time table is pretty tight but you could try an FOI request on how the seat works; that would avoid Leon's answer.

You could also contact BAE and ask them. There PR man was a Mike Sweeney but he may have moved on.

There is nothing secret about an ejector seat and all you are asking for is a simple technical explanation and not a discourse on what may or may not have happened.

[The B Word]

Alexus

Take a look at:

MARTIN (http://www.ejectorseats.co.uk/martin%20baker%20sju5a.html)

This is all about the Mk 10 as fitted to Mike's Tornado. Also here is the official Martin Baker site:

Martin Baker - Mk. 10 (http://www.martin-baker.com/products/Ejection-Seats/Mk--10.aspx)

Good luck with your research

The B Word

[The B Word]

More stuff here:

German Airforce Sammlernet (http://www.gaf-sammler.de/html/jets/tornado-sitzmk10.htm)

Finally, the SJU-5/A is the US version of the Mk 10 seat and is very similar.

Regards

The B Word

[flipster]

Has there been any accident or BoI report released yet? (I doubt it but.....)

[jimgriff]

Thank you B WORD for bringing my website to wider recognition but I feel that I should point out that there are some quite fundemental differences between the Mk10 seat fitted to a Tornado and the SJU-5/A as it is shown on the pages from my site.
I wont go into those here but it is worth noting.

Jim

[RHINO]

Please excuse me as I have just come across this thread.

Is this the Mike Harland who started off Pilot training in 1982 at Cranwell?

If it is he, was known as 'snake' and not because he wasn't a nice guy:ok:

[Chugalug2]

jimgriff:
quite fundemental differences between the Mk10 seat fitted to a Tornado and the SJU-5/A as it is shown on the pages from my site.

How about the MB GRU-7? I only ask because of the comment posted at #45 here:

http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/302191-failed-ejections-3.html

on 1st December 2007.

[jimgriff]

Chugalug-
Of course- I couldn't possibly comment on how or why could I??:oh:
I was merely pointing out that there was a difference between the seats in case anyone took what was written about the SJU-5/A as gospel for the Mk10 and drew conclusions.

[Chris Kebab]

A lot of Wolfies old oppos are very, very interested to hear what the Coroner unravels on this one, let's just hope he gets to the bottom of it.

And no, apart from those who conducted the BoI and a few wheels at Marham I don't think anybody has seen anything official on the outcome of the inquiry.

Be very interesting to hear why it's taken so long and maybe how an RAF board investigates a civilian company flying our jets.

[Mick Strigg]

Please remember, that it is the Coroner's and Jury's task to establish:

Who died
When he died
Where he died
and under what circumstances did he die.

The Coroner and Jury DO NOT apportion any blame, so Leon, there will be no "If anyone is culpable then I hope they recieve suitable sanction from the Coroner" I'm afraid.

[downsizer]

Has the police investigation finished?

[tucumseh]

Be very interesting to hear why it's taken so long and maybe how an RAF board investigates a civilian company flying our jets.

My understanding is there was a bunfight between MoD and civilian police as to jurisdiction and responsibilities.

[Lima Juliet]

Mick Strigg

Maybe just my choice of words, but how do you explain this then?

Coroner blames RAF and MoD for Hercules crash that killed 10 - Home News, UK - The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/coroner-blames-raf-and-mod-for-hercules-crash-that-killed-10-969776.html)

:ooh:

[The B Word]

Mick

And there's more:

Coroner blames hospital for mother's caesarean death | Society | guardian.co.uk (http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2008/may/30/mother.dies)

Coroner blames Essex County Council for delaying inquests (From Chelmsford Weekly News) (http://www.chelmsfordweeklynews.co.uk/news/colchester/7985649.Coroner_blames_Essex_County_Council_for_delaying_inq uests/)

Coroner blames MoD again over troops' deaths - journalisted.com (http://journalisted.com/article/9y8l)

Coroner blames pilot for Puma crash - UK Wired News (http://www.ukwirednews.com/news.php/4141-Coroner-blames-pilot-for-Puma-crash)

...and my favourite...

Coroner blames cat in owner's death from E. coli : Worms and Germs Blog (http://www.wormsandgermsblog.com/2008/08/articles/animals/cats/coroner-blames-cat-in-owners-death-from-e-coli/)

Plenty of example of blame from Coroners - Google is (or isn't) your friend.

The B Word

[John Farley]

I fear even the most careful application by the Coroner of the rules spelt out in Mick Strigg's post will be written up/interpreted (and in headlines) by the press in terms of who was to blame.

Indeed even ordinary folk given the answers to those four points will say "XYZ was to blame" or it was "XYZ's fault"

[peppermint_jam]

Ministry of Defence | About Defence | Corporate Publications | Boards of Inquiry and Service Inquiries (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/BoardsOfInquiry/BoardsOfInquirybois.htm)

BOI report is at the top of the page.

[KING6024]

BBC Look East reported inquest started today and is expected to last 5 days.

[Alber Ratman]

I have been waiting a long time to read that document.

They did a very through job and got most of the recommendations right too IMHO.. no.. with what I know of the place I used to work in before I left the service..

Thats all I'll say on the matter.

[Alber Ratman]

The inquest returned a verdict of "Accidental Death". It was the only real verdict that fitted as the one item that could have proved beyond doubt what happen was not found.

This incident has so many human factors input, it would make a good Air Clues article especially from the "I learned .. about that" perspective.

Some things in the BOI are not as accurate to the workings of CMU as they put it.. Work in CMU is not done on MOD Form 700 series or LITS generated documentation.. It is signed off on DMS and then some poor sod has to verify it and ensure that LITS (via LITS 707s) is updated.
DMS is the way BAE fulfil their MAOS 145 commitment. It isn't a LITS type maintenance ssytem as it was designed for manufacturing. In fact the acryomn means Direct Manufacturing System. All the tradesmen did as for conventional LITS data transfers on the shop floor (opposed to Squadron use) was asset exchanges. The rest was up to the docs guy to print the equipment labels and raise fault cards on the LITS system to indicate status changes. It took a few aircraft through the place to realise that no IPT visible fault reporting for the majority of unscheduled maintenance was occuring at all!

Armourer SNCOs got away lighty with their work recording. It was awful.

[Rigga]

...Dedicated Manufacturing System

Doesn't even sound like a "maintenance" system?

[Alber Ratman]

It wasn't a patch on LITS Maintenance Manger for fault recording.. It was modified to track a maintenance schedule and a planner could add addition work to the schedule.. There was a faults (NRC) system in it as well (based on rework requirement originally I bet), but nothing was transferable electronically to the operator system (LITS) and if the workers didn't put the asset info on the DMS fault job number such as part numbers, transfering to the LITS fault database was impossible. The tracked items would be highlighted on DMS chits, so usually were not a problem.

A PART 145 MRO will use the operators scheduled taskcards and raise its own NRCs (that the operator will get copies of with all spares used). BAE Systems were allowed to draft their own schedule (true it was based on the relevent 5A1 and followed the logical trail), but visiblity of work was lost by its breakdown to the pulse system (No civvy MRO uses that!) and the paperless system of viewing what work was outstanding (again, no MRO works that way).

[downsizer]

Armourer SNCOs got away lighty with their work recording. It was awful.

Have you seen the actual documents?

[Alber Ratman]

Yes.. I certainly have.

[downsizer]

Yes.. I certainly have.


What was so awful about it?

And if they got off lightly, what would you have done with him/them?

[Alber Ratman]

The continued removal and fitting of seats using one main taskcard and with no fault documentation for the seats that were rejected.. All the LITS was done by the back door methods (were they should not have been). The BOI slates them (and the seat bay)for not doing things to the JAP. The BOI couldn't work out what work was done between the MMPs and LITS and they had a lot more time and resources than the poor sod in the docs cell who had to co-ordinate the thing. The MMPs were correctly signed for work content (bar that complete blocks were signed by one signature, that the BOI disargeed on as they believe individual sub blocks should be signed, but that is contentious for mps done by all trades). However the trimings (like completing each page to tie it to the work order etc and completion of the the front sheets) were not done, although at least the MMPs were co-ordinated by the people involved. The card returned contained about 20 MMPs and was almost the same size as all other LITS generated documentation for that maintenance.

As the BOI states in their recommendations, there were a few reviews required of the way CMU conducted their business in regards to CAMO reponsiblities for Tornado maintenance. They picked up faults with the F700 and short forecast. However it must be stated that the aircraft does not become LITS live untill the last DMS chit is checked and the DMS system is assured to have all work completed. It is only then that the last LITS MWO can be cleared and an accurate F721 can be printed. There was no F700 check done by an EngO, but RAF EngOs do not carry out that function in CMU anyway, a book audit is done by DQAFF staff. As stated, the short forecast was finally printed 4 minutes before the crew signed for the A/C. Why? because they were waiting in the office next to the desk where the book was finally being assembled! Things had gone wrong that morning when a nipped O ring seal was found on the A/F B/F. The whole post maintenance generation process was delayed, but BAE had to try and get that airtest carried out that day due to contractural arrangements with the MoD. The aircrew may not have been "presurising" but BAE managers were in the office, every half hour.

It was a horrible day.

[downsizer]

The continued removal and fitting of seats using one main taskcard and with no fault documentation for the seats that were rejected.. All the LITS was done by the back door methods (were they should not have been). The BOI slates them (and the seat bay)for not doing things to the JAP. The BOI couldn't work out what work was done between the MMPs and LITS and they had a lot more time and resources than the poor sod in the docs cell who had to co-ordinate the thing. The MMPs were correctly signed for work content (bar that complete blocks were signed by one signature, that the BOI disargeed on as they believe individual sub blocks should be signed, but that is contentious for mps done by all trades). However the trimings (like completing each page to tie it to the work order etc and completion of the the front sheets) were not done, although at least the MMPs were co-ordinated by the people involved. The card returned contained about 20 MMPs and was almost the same size as all other LITS generated documentation for that maintenance.

Exactely, they got a slating in the BOI, but you state they got off lightly. What are you driving at with that statement, do you think they should have been charged with manslaughter?

[Alber Ratman]

They were lucky that no service charges were raised for the paperwork issues. The seat remains held enough evidence to sugest what happen but training, proceedures and other factors (such as the TLP not being found) protected them from more serious charges (and rightly so).

[downsizer]

Just so I'm 100% sure before replying, you do not think more serious charges should have been brought against them?

[Alber Ratman]

As the corenor stated at the summing up, there was a conflict of evidence between what the sciencific evidence from the remains of the seat and the aircraft portion of the system (such as the inner cylinder of the ejection gun had witness marks consistant with the TLP locking device being dragged across its surface) and RAF technicians (stating that the TLP was servicable and that the spring possibly have failed). The MMPs were clear on checks but training did not include ensuring the two point TLP checks were mandatory. Spring failure could not be discounted (because the mechanism was never found) but the witness marks to the BOI seem to suggest that the plunger spring pressure marks on the tube were consistant with it being intact (and the BOI did trials on other seats to confirm that). However no MB seat has ever fallen out on a military aircraft before this incident (examples of civilian owned seats have, due to incorrect fitting of the latch plunger). Without the TLP, proving a manslaughter charge beyond any reasonable doubt is impossible (and rightly so). Hard copy documents illustrating a neligence of duties in regards to airworthiness is also dodgy ground due to DMS and the way CMU interacted with the MAE. I'm not surprised the Provo's didn't pursue things on that score, but I reckon it was a closer thing than the more serious charges.

[Alber Ratman]

And as the BOI stated, the lifting check was flawed. Trouble is a lot of armourers the world over took this to be the defining security check. Unfortunatley lifting the nose of the aircraft in this case was way below the actual forces that that seat was subjected to as the inverted manouver was applied with negative "G" thus doubling the actual weight of the seat/man combination.

The check has now been removed for all seat vital and indie proceedures, so I hear.

[RileyDove]

Just to clarify -a MB seat exited a civilian JP in the 1990s but that was due to having leg restraint lines stowed beneath the seat stopping correct engagement of the latch . I am not aware of any other incidents of MB seats coming out of civilian operated aircraft .

[Alexus]

Just to let you know my report on Mike H's inquest went on BBC Look East on Friday 22/10 ... tx at 1830 on BBC1.

A former GR1 navigator in Lancs who knew Mike from RAF days gave a great tribute, which sadly never made it into my film as the tape snapped in the play out machine.

Mike's widow and family showed immense courage and dignity at the inquest.

Piece can be seen at www.bbc.co/iplayer ... Search 'Look East' (only up until monday evening as next prog will be put on)

Thanks all for your background briefings and advice

Alex Dunlop
BBC East

[Alber Ratman]

That was the example I was thinking of.. As I said before no live MB seat had fallen out of any service AC before the 14th of November 2007.

[davejb]

Alexus -
link appears to be duff? ALso no hits on 'Look East' search on Iplayer site)

[Alexus]

Apologies link to BBC iplayer did not have ...uk on end (typo) but having checked it, it looks like BBC is now updating weekend programmes, which means each programme only stays online for 24 hours....
Can only suggest u email [email protected] and ask for item to be put onto Internet. Enough requests will result in BBC putting it on BBC Norfolk website

[Alber Ratman]

I lied about MB seats falling out of service aircraft. An incident occured to a USN A6 in 1991, pulling a neg G manouver.. Fortunately the seat failed to fully leave the aircraft and other circumstances saved the Nav in question. It wasn't the plunger that failed, but the latch window.

Linky (http://www.gallagher.com/ejection_seat/technical_aspects.htm)

[BOAC]

RAF Hunter way back too, seat rode up the rails. Memories are dim but I believe the drogue fired and extracted the chute but pilot stayed in cockpit (I don't think the harness release activated) and skilfully managed to land severely traumatised. Vague recollection of 'Fossie' as a name?

[c130jbloke]

Is there a link to the BoI report ? Have tried, but I keep getting sent to the Guardian's report :ugh:

Thanks in advance.

C130JB

[Wrathmonk]

jbloke - Is this what you are after? Click here (http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/C29E4E37-E1BA-4A2B-942A-9F035E7DF1D1/0/ZA554_boi_tornado_rpt.pdf).

[c130jbloke]

Wrath:

Thats it -thanks :ok:

[clunckdriver]

The RCAF had an interesting event on a Mark 5 CF100 on a test flight out of RCAF Station Bagotville in the early sixties. F/O Dave Saunders and back seater F/O Norm Grondin were conducting a post maint test flight, part of the test profile was to fly a negative G pushover to ensure boost pump feed, as they comenced the manouver there was a very load bang as Norm was ejected from the aircraft and Daves seat moved up the rails which in turn fired the drouge gun, thus starting the seat hanness release sequence, so Dave found himself sitting on a live seat, his chute in shreds and him not attached to the aircraft, all radios out , no canopy or nav aids, Dave managed to return to Bagotville and broke all records for getting out of a CF100!On examination yellow paint from Norms helmet was found on the horizontal stab so we all figured he had got the chop, however a short time later a Hydro Quebec Bell 47, flown by a Mr. Trembley touched down on the ramp with a grining Norm in the bubble, For those of you familiar with the bush around Bagotville you will understand the luck involved in a helicopter not only being within a few hundred miles but actually seeing Norm float out of the clouds under his somwhat tattered chute. The cause of this incident ? Maint failed to install the shear bolts under the seats. Norm went on to complete his RCAF years a re mustered pilot, Dave owns Aviadesign in the USA, a company engaged in aircraft modifications {He is an ex DH aprentice} A great tragedy this affair didnt end this way