BBC2 Tonight, 22 September: BoB from a "New perspective".

[Gainesy]

The blurb says that the programme will give new perspectives, including input from Luftwaffe pilots.

[Spartacan]

Potentially a very interesting programme because military history tends not to be written by the losing side!

King Harold's account of 1066?

[BEagle]

Herewith the blurb:

BBC - BBC Two Programmes - Battle of Britain: The Real Story (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00txmkk)

It's at 2000 on BBC2. If it's as good as Spitfire Women was the other night, it'll certainly be worth watching.

...military history tends not to be written by the losing side...

I don't know about that - there do seem to have been plenty of Spam movies about the Vietnam war.....

[forget]

:p In fine form this morning BEagle.

[Spartacan]

>>If it's as good as Spitfire Women was the other night, it'll certainly be worth watching.<<

Agreed. Stunning programme! I loved that 'checklist for all aircraft'. How many other pilots would have clocked 65 World War 2 aircraft?

So sad that most of them lost their opportunity to fly after the war ended.

[skippedonce]

James Holland's book on the Battle of Britain, released earlier this year, was certainly an interesting read, placing much more emphasis on the events in France than I had previously read. I look forward to hearing what he has to say tonight.

[Gainesy]

King Harold's account of 1066?

Always thought that being cleaved in twain brought on fairly terminal writer's block, but, there yer go.:)

[Agaricus bisporus]

Well, being cloven in twain is somewhat over dramatising events unless you are speaking from the perspective of My Lord Godwinson's eye, but nonetheless conducive to terminal writer's block, I grant you.

[Gainesy]

You need to go a few frames further on in the Arrow-Camera Tapestry, chap having trouble with his contact lens is some old RO who misread the invite to a Beach Do, bloke getting hacked in a 3 v 1 is Harold.

Don't forget--No Tapestry, No Kill.:)

[Lima Juliet]

I didn't see too much 'new perspective' tonight. The same old regurgitated blurb about the Royal Navy playing a bigger role than credited, 'which aircraft was better?' questions, RADAR saved the day and intelligence was poor on both sides.

Here's my 'new perspective' on the Battle of Britain for the not so expert 'subject matter expert' on tonight's program:

"British Airpower, in which I include RN FAA, Army AAA, Convoy Escort AAA, Barrage Balloons and the 'Air Defence of Great Britain' system won the Battle of Britain. However, by far the biggest contribution came from the RAF's Fighter Command, commonly acknowledged as 'The Few' (including foreign national and Commonwealth personnel)."

The BoB was all about denying the Nazis 'air superiority' without which they could not contemplate Op SEALION. Stories about naval supremacy do not feature in reality because the Nazis did not even get to that bit, which would have surely been the next big phase of the conflict in order to conduct a successful amphibious assault on the UK.

I thought tonight's program was a total let down.

LJ

[Chugalug2]

Agreed LJ. Yet another dollop of "At last! The defining account of what really happened", only to find that it was the account of what we thought happened anyway. As to the wider contribution of other Commands and Personnel, didn't WS cover that in a little talk he gave at the time? If it's not someone coming up with an entirely new angle; "BoB a Naval Victory!", it's someone else coming up with the blindingly obvious. Seems to me for all the re-enactments, visits to airfields and Ops Rooms, even the air to air stuff that we've somewhat over indulged in, the real high points in all these progs has been listening to the old boys (and girls) telling us how it was. It was that bit that was the salvation of this one as well.

[cargosales]

I missed the programme but generally find that the best insights into the Luftwaffe point of view are usually to be found in their pilots' autobiographies.

Such as the excellent Spitfire On My Tail by Ulrich Steinhilper, a Me109 BoB pilot. I can highly recommend it :ok:

CS

[Melchett01]

Overall, not a bad effort, and it certainly showed that there is far more to the BoB than the traditional views - which were even still being taught at Cranwell when I went through in the late 90s - that it was the Luftwaffe's move to targeting London that was the major / sole factor that lead to Germany losing the Bob.

However, it also covered pretty much the same material as Stephen Bungay's excellent work, Most Dangerous Enemy. So interesting, pretty well done, if not wholly original.

[Chugalug2]

I was once privileged to get a Luftwaffe Pilot's perspective on the BoB. We were doing a charter flight from Tegel to Palma and one by one the pax came up front to take the obligatory photo. The last one was a late middle aged chap, short and a bit portly. He seemed to be hanging back a bit so I asked him if there was anything else he wanted. He pointed to the instrument panel and said; " Your Gyro, no? Also there, your Kompass?" I said yes and was he a pilot? "Oh, not for many years" What did he fly? "The Emil" The Co and I looked blankly at each other. Picking up our confusion he made to explain; "Yah! I shoot down six Tommies!" Suddenly we realised when the "many years" was, what he did then and what he flew (The Me109E). Trying to look vaguely disapproving I said "I see". "Yah, but then it is my turn and they shoot me down". "Oh dear!", this time trying not to look too pleased! "Yah, I come down on my parachute and it is a beautiful day. I can see England and I can see France. From England to me I see coming a motor boat, but then from France also comes a motor boat". What happened? "Oh, that was such a bad day!" Because the English got there first and captured you? "No! The Germans! I have to go back to the war!"
All told with the timing and patter of Eric Morecambe! He said that after the "indefinite postponement" his Staffel along with most of the others went East for Barbarossa and he stayed on the Eastern Front for the rest of the war. He must have been no mean fighter pilot to have survived, presumably an ace and I am ashamed to say that I never asked him his name! Perhaps someone can identify him from my story?

[Dan Winterland]

Prior to a B of b cocktail party in the 90s, one of our Navs mentioned to the boss that his father in law was staying with them, had flown in the B of B and could he invite him to the cocktail paty. The boss mentioned it to the Station Commander who said, of course, he would be most welcome as the rarely got veterans to the event.

On the evening, the Staish sees an elderly and distinguished looking gentleman standing next to the Nav and goes up to him and says,

"You must be the chap who flew in the Battle of Britain".

"Ya, Guten Abend. Mein name is Otto. Pleased to meet you".

The Nav had failed to mention he had met his wife while stationed in Germany and that her father had been a He111 crew member. We got him right royally plastered while he recounted some ripping yarns. A real honour to meet the chap.

[pasir]

... From the many accounts published on the B of B it appears
generally agreed that the Luftwaffe had the greater advantage for armament in that most of their a/c were fitted with cannon - enabling them to open fire at a greater range - often able to sit back so to speak -
out of range as they engaged their enemy. In the few instances where the RAF were supplied with cannon - according to various accounts - RAF cannon were not so reliable and subject to frequent stoppages - leaving our
side at some disadvantage. Although fortunatly it didnt affect the final outcome of the battle.

...

[Hipper]

I'm not well read on the BoB, but I got a few things from last night's programme.

The change of use of the Me109E to escorting bombers instead of attacking our fighters was a critical factor. The impression was that the Me109E had the beating of our aircraft, albeit with only ten minutes worth of fuel in the operational area.

The German change from attacking our airfields to bombing towns was not a tactical decision so much as a retaliation ordered by Hitler for our bombing of Berlin.

It was also pointed out the Germans were not really making much progress in destroying RAF fighters, pilots and airfields and that they themselves were running out of pilots, aircraft and energy.

They would have been better off sticking to attacking our maritime activity using aircraft, submarines (and mines).

The Germans lost the BoB more than we won it.

Are these fair points?

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

Perhaps the strength of the programme was that it gave those men on the Clapham omnibus a wider perspective of the Battle and the various parallel elements than they are normally given.

Was it my imagination or did he really say that Fighter Command squadrons each fielded 24 A/C?

[Pontius Navigator]

The Germans lost the BoB more than we won it.

Defence is reactive. An attacker wins if he overcomes the defences. An attack may fail because it fails to overcome the defence.

In the sense that there is always a winner and a loser, we won.

A similar case was the Battle of the Atlantic; we defended and their attack was thwarted.

[pasir]

... Regarding the number of aircraft in each B of B RAF squadron-
the programme commentator stated along the lines that Lufwaffe estimates
were based on their own figures of 12 a/c per staffel - squadron or whatever the equivilant was - Whereas the RAF in fact would have up to 18 a/c per squadron - hence Luftwaffe underestimating RAF strength. However to add to confusion lower and higher figures quoting RAF squadron strength can also be found.

...

[Tankertrashnav]

The blurb says that the programme will give new perspectives,


Wonder if they'll mention the Blenheims, Beaufighters, Defiants etc etc.

Not holding my breath.

[BOAC]

Not holding my breath. - good job too:)

[Unixman]

The BoB prevented the Germans from even attempting Sealion; if they had attempted it it is probable that given the complete unpreparedness of the Germans for amphibious warfare the RN would have slaughtered them.

[proplover]

My take is that;
1) The Germans came up a well organised air defence system - unknown elsewhere at that time
2) The UK had very good short range combat aircraft although limited in numbers but fighting over home land
3) The change of German tatics from Sept 7th was crucial to the outcome.
4) The use of resouces by Park was crucial in so much that nearly all the incomming raids were met with some resistance which undermined moral as the Luftwaffe crews were constantly being given the impression that the RAF were a beaten force.

The German High Command seemed more concerened about weather conditions in the Channel for September than the British Navy especially as they didnt really have the best type of troop transport for a cross Channel expedition.

I think that if the surface ships of the Navy had sailed down the North Sea towards the Channel without RAF air cover the Luftwaffe and U boats may well of actually 'slaughtered' them. I seem to recall that certainly in the early part of the war the RN ships didnt do to well when up against a concentrated air attack.

It would of been imperative for the Germans to capture and hold a port and airfields to make the invasion work and then keep the troops supplied. I dont think that in 1940 they had that capability - they would of relied heavily on a British collapse similar to the French.

[angels]

Pontius - quite right. Quite a few people call the BoB a draw. Cobblers. The German aim was air superiority. They didn't get it. Ergo they lost.

The point unixman makes is a good one.

The barges in the Channel ports were just that - barges, crudely adapted to carry things they weren't made to (tanks etc).

They were made for canals, not the open sea. Any hint of a swell, waves, chop etc and they would have floundered without any help from the RN (who would have inflicted heavy damage anyway).

Also, look at the German plans for invasion -- even the scaled back ones. They would have been too thinly stretched and even our battered army would have inflicted sufficient casualties on the beaches to have probably stopped an invasion in its tracks. Parachutists would have made a difference, but in somewhere as large as SE England?

Thankfully all my conjecture is just thatl!!

[Gainesy]

Well, to damn it with faint praise, it wasn't as crap as I thought it would be.

High point for me was wondering how much Billy Drake wants for that fantastic house?

I think he should have made a programme about the bugged school where all the German PoWs were held, now that would have been new.

[Avitor]

During the time Sea Lion was on the table, Stalin's guard was somewhat relaxed!!!

[Wokkafans]

Many of you will be familiar with this but for those who aren't...

In 1974 an exercise was held at the Staff College, Sandhurst using a scenario based on the known plans of each side, plus previously unpublished Admiralty weather records for September 1940. The full text is in 'Sealion' by Richard Cox.

'Each side (played by British and German officers respectively) was based in a command room, and the actual moves plotted on a scale model of SE England constructed at the School of Infantry.

The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland, Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert. The main problems the Germans face are that: a) the Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy; b) the possible invasion dates are constrained by the weather and tides (for a high water attack) and c) it has taken until late September to assemble the necessary shipping.

22nd September - morning. The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches at dawn. Elements of 9 divisions landed between Folkestone and Rottingdean (near Brighton). In addition 7th FJ Div landed at Lympne to take the airfield. The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during the night crossing, but the RN had already lost one CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA and two DDs damaged, whilst sinking three German DDs. Within hours of the landings, which overwhelmed the beach defenders, reserve formations were despatched to Kent. Although there were 25 divisions in the UK, only 17 were fully equipped, and only three were based in Kent, however the defence plan relied on the use of mobile reserves and armoured and mechanised brigades were committed as soon as the main landings were identified. Meanwhile the air battle raged, the Luftwaffe flew 1200 fighter and 800 bomber sorties before 1200 hrs. The RAF even threw in training planes hastily armed with bombs, but the Luftwaffe were already having problems with their short ranged Me 109s despite cramming as many as possible into the Pas de Calais.

22nd - 23rd September. The Germans had still not captured a major port, although they started driving for Folkestone. Shipping unloading on the beaches suffered heavy losses from RAF bombing raids and then further losses at their ports in France. The U-Boats, Luftwaffe and few surface ships had lost contact with the RN, but then a cruiser squadron with supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows and had to run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats and 50 Stukas. Two CAs were sunk and one damaged. However a diversionary German naval sortie from Norway was completely destroyed and other sorties by MTBS and DDs inflicted losses on the shipping milling about in the Channel. German shipping losses on the first day amounted to over 25% of their invasion fleet, especially the barges, which proved desperately unseaworthy.

23rd Sept dawn - 1400 hrs. The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters and 70 bombers), and the navy had suffered enough losses such that it was keeping its BBs and CVs back, but large forces of DDs and CAs were massing. Air recon showed a German build up in Cherbourg and forces were diverted to the South West. The German Navy were despondant about their losses, especially as the loss of barges was seriously dislocating domestic industry. The Army and Airforce commanders were jubilant however, and preperations for the transfer of the next echelon continued along with the air transport of 22nd Div, despite Luftwaffe losses of 165 fighters and 168 bombers. Out of only 732 fighters and 724 bombers these were heavy losses. Both sides overestimated losses inflicted by 50%. The 22nd Div airlanded successfully at Lympne, although long range artillery fire directed by a stay-behind commando group interdicted the runways. The first British counterattacks by 42nd Div supported by an armoured brigade halted the German 34th Div in its drive on Hastings. 7th Panzer Div was having difficulty with extensive anti-tank obstacles and assault teams armed with stickybombs etc. Meanwhile an Australian Div had retaken Newhaven (the only German held port), however the New Zealand Div arrived at Folkestone only to be attacked in the rear by 22nd Airlanding Div. The division fell back on Dover having lost 35% casualties.

Sep 23rd 1400 - 1900 hrs. Throughout the day the Luftwaffe put up a maximum effort, with 1500 fighter and 460 bomber sorties, but the RAF persisted in attacks on shipping and airfields. Much of this effort was directed for ground support and air resupply, despite Adm Raeders request for more aircover over the Channel. The Home Fleet had pulled out of air range however, leaving the fight in the hands of 57 DDs and 17 CAs plus MTBs. The Germans could put very little surface strength against this. Waves of DDs and CAs entered the Channel, and although two were sunk by U-Boats, they sank one U-Boat in return and did not stop. The German flotilla at Le Havre put to sea (3 DD, 14 E-Boats) and at dusk intercepted the British, but were wiped out, losing all their DDs and 7 E-Boats. The Germans now had 10 divisions ashore, but in many cases these were incomplete and waiting for their second echelon to arrive that night. The weather was unsuitable for the barges however, and the decision to sail was referred up the chain of command.

23rd Sep 1900 - Sep 24th dawn. The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter inter-service rivalry - the Army wanted their second echelon sent, and the navy protesting that the weather was unsuitable, and the latest naval defeat rendered the Channel indefensible without air support. Goring countered this by saying it could only be done by stopping the terror bombing of London, which in turn Hitler vetoed. The fleet was ordered to stand by. The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only 440. The airfields of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and once more the threat of collapse, which had receded in early September, was looming. The Luftwaffe had lost another 71 fighters and 142 bombers. Again both sides overestimated losses inflicted, even after allowing for inflated figures. On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover and towards Canterbury, however they suffered reverses around Newhaven when the 45th Div and Australians attacked. At 2150 Hitler decided to launch the second wave, but only the short crossing from Calais and Dunkirk. By the time the order reached the ports, the second wave could not possibly arrive before dawn. The 6th and 8th divisions at Newhaven, supplied from Le Havre, would not be reinforced at all.

Sep 24th dawn - Sep 28th. The German fleet set sail, the weather calmed, and U-Boats, E-Boats and fighters covered them. However at daylight 5th destroyer flotilla found the barges still 10 miles off the coast and tore them to shreds. The Luftwaffe in turn committed all its remaining bombers, and the RAF responded with 19 squadrons of fighters. The Germans disabled two CAs and four DDs, but 65% of the barges were sunk. The faster steamers broke away and headed for Folkestone, but the port had been so badly damaged that they could only unload two at a time. The failure on the crossing meant that the German situation became desperate. The divisions had sufficient ammunition for 2 to 7 days more fighting, but without extra men and equipment could not extend the bridgehead. Hitler ordered the deployment on reserve units to Poland and the Germans began preparations for an evacuation as further British attacks hemmed them in tighter. Fast steamers and car ferries were assembled for evacuation via Rye and Folkestone. Of 90,000 troops who landed on 22nd september, only 15,400 returned to France, the rest were killed or captured.'

Dons tin hat.... :eek:

[airborne_artist]

Compare the numbers trained and the times they trained for, for D-Day, and then look at the Sealion training, equipment etc. There's a possible argument that if the BoB had been lost and Sealion had been launched that Germany would have been quite literally dead in the water in 1940, and the rest of the war might not have happened?

[Pontius Navigator]

A_A, in other words, like North Africa, the campaign could have been one of attrition on a larger scale than the BoB alone. Allow the landings, fall back and extend the German LOC and then chop off the head.

[airborne_artist]

Allow the landings, fall back and extend the German LOC and then chop off the head.

Or if the RN and what was left of the RAF had destroyed the Sealion initial forces as they landed and the phase two forces already in the Channel, would the German High Command then have turned in on Adolf?

[BEagle]

Wokafans, that would make a very good movie, in my opinion.

How lucky we were that der dicke Hermann was such an utter buffoon - and that Hitler was more concerned with revenge than strategy!

[Unixman]

proplover (http://www.pprune.org/members/67665-proplover)

Actually the British would have been very effective for the following reasons:


You mention U-Boats... They would have had to operate against fast warships in extremely shallow water and in a very confined space. It is probable that the RN would have initially used light forces from Harwich and Portmouth against which the U-Boats would have been far far less effective that you think. Once the light forces had got amongst the invasion traffic it would have been slaughter, especially given that the number of German escorts would have been very very low.
The Luftwaffe at that stage of the war were pretty ineffective against surface ships (yes there were some losses - 12 IIRC - at Dunkirk but that operation succeeded) and even later at Crete where the RN did sustain heavy losses from the air they still forced back the amphibious invasion fleet. Twice.
Anyway if SeaLion had been attempted Dowding had plans to withdraw all of the fighters to the South Midlands where the airfields would have initially at least been out of range of the Germans but we still could have covered the beaches.
The RN's night fighting capability had improved massively since WW1 where basically er er they didn't have any. If the RN had got amongst the traffic at night then both U-Boats and air power would have been negated.
The Germans couldn't bring heavy equipment across in anything like the amount needed. The plan was to land 10 infantry divisions and then somehow get the armour across... the dotty plans were to basically plonk a tank on a barge and take a flying leap at the shore .... and all of that against the RN. You light-blue jobs might well take the p*ss of the RN (in a friendly way :)) but I strongly suspect that if there was an invasion in the offing then they would uphold their "Engage the enemy more closely" traditions ....
Also the number of fully equipped British troops in the area was much higher than supposed. by September most of the losses incurred at Dunkirk had been made up and there also were 3 fully equipped Canadian divisions in the area.It would in all probability have been a mangle for the Germans

[Wokkafans]

For those that haven't read it the Richard Cox book makes for an interesting read. What it outlines is that the British strategy of defence in depth, i.e., the GHQ lines, probably would have been succesful in delaying the German advance for sufficient time to allow for reserve forces in the Midlands and North to join the fray. Unlike the allies in 1944, the German plan did not appear to take into account the significance of transport links, such as the railways, which would allow rapid British reinforcement en masse.

Undoubtably, the Southern counties would have taken a pasting and British military and civilian casualties would have been high. However, once the RN had reached the channel, with the support of RAF top cover, and combined with the German's lack of suitable seabourne transport, it does seem likely that any initial landing would be contained, starved of supplies, and eventually defeated.

BEAg's - agree, it would make a great movie - just make sure Spielberg isn't involved or it will be G.I's fighting off the massed German hordes. :ugh:

[Pontius Navigator]

the German plan did not appear to take into account the significance of transport links, such as the railways, which would allow rapid British reinforcement en masse.

Which is odd given the influence that the Russian railways had had on the decision to start WW1 and the subsequent use to maintain the western front.

[Wokkafans]

PN - I suspect that the Germans likely did reconise the importance of the rail network but at that time didn't have the resources to take it out to any significant degree, their efforts being focussed on the main cities, airfields, and industrial facilities.

I can't comment on the Russian railway system but could it also have been a factor that the UK rail system (pre Beeching) would allow rail traffic to divert around any areas that were taken out? (perhaps analogous to how the internet routes info around busy nodes).

[mmitch]

I have read a copy of the German intelligence survey for the invasion. They point out the complex railway system in the UK and how difficult it would be to disrupt it as the routes could be diverted.
mmitch.

[Gainesy]

The Luftwaffe was very effective against ships. After virtually wiping out the Dover-based 4th Destroyer Flotilla (nine ships plus two replacements, not all were sunk but all were put out of action), mainly by Stuka attacks, and sinking other warships in and around Portland (Foylebank, a brand-new AAA ship and the destroyer Delight), the Admiralty specifically forbad destroyer ops in the Channel in daylight.

This was weasel worded by the RN Historic Branch chap in the programme as:" the navy had good night fighting capability", or some such.:p

Also liked use of the "Euro Anthem" as background to Hitler and goose-stepping Nazis post France campaign.

[BEagle]

They point out the complex railway system in the UK and how difficult it would be to disrupt it....

A few low-flying Heinkels carrying bomb loads of wet leaves would do the trick these days...:rolleyes:

At least real choo-choos didn't seem to be concerned by 'leaves on the line', 'the wrong kind of snow' or 'engineering work' in those days.

[pasir]

...

Further to the points raised about the importance of the Luftwaffe smashing
our UK rail network in order to forstall the 'rushing of reinforcements' - One
may be excused for enquiring - What reinforcements ? - other then men.

The BEF had left all of their heavy equipment on the beaches of Dunkirk
-most of the 335,000 troops that returned to the UK were nearly all
minus even rifles. Had German troops estabished a foothold on
our beaches - other than the RAF I fear it would have been a walkover
for them.

Without wishing to belittle the Home Guard/ LDV a further indication of
just how desperate things were in those day being my fathers HG
platoon had One Rifle and 5 rounds to be shared between some dozen men
who would be called upon to defend the Croydon Airport area. The
remainder of the 'force' were each armed with pickaxe handles.


...

[air pig]

There was I believe in the event of an invasion force aproaching or landing for the use of chemical weapons including mustard gas from spray aircraft.

This has been quietly missed in most documentaries.

Air pig

[Wokkafans]

AP - check out Chapter 5 - appears you are right.

Wapedia - Wiki: British anti-invasion preparations of World War II (http://wapedia.mobi/en/British_anti-invasion_preparations_of_World_War_II)

[Willard Whyte]

At least real choo-choos didn't seem to be concerned by 'leaves on the line', 'the wrong kind of snow' or 'engineering work' in those days.

Well, not according to the Rev. W.V. Awdry anyway.

Apart from Gordon's little difficulties, that is.

[BEagle]

A shame that the Rev Awdry's books weren't published until May 1945 - a few spoof documents, left lying about for Nazi spies to find, detailing the defences of the Island of Sodor would have been fun!

[Modern Elmo]

etna
23rd Sept dawn - 1400 hrs. The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters and 70 bombers), and the navy had suffered enough losses such that it was keeping its BBs and CVs back

"Back" -- where US or UK aircraft carriers would be in a any future war with a first class power.

Got to keep the cap. ships fleet in being, don't you understand?

[Chugalug2]

ME:
Got to keep the cap. ships fleet in being, don't you understand?
No doubt what the Vichy French told themselves when they parked theirs at Oran. I would contend that the RN has shown somewhat more willingness to put theirs at risk than others. That policy has failed spectacularly at times it is true but long term has paid off. I rather suspect that they would have reverted to type in this scenario, though handing themselves on a plate to the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine would not accord with that tradition.

[air pig]

Would liked to known more about what Squadron Leader Felkin fand his team found out from evesdropping on the prisioners conversations. I do know Knickebein was discovered this way and a lot of thought by Air Ministry Scientific Intelligence ( There's a contradiction in terms) led by Dr R V Jones.

Regards

Air pig

[pasir]

... Some reports put down the discovery of Knickebein was through the intercepts of enemy coded radio xmissions - together with recovery of downed knickebein equiped a/c -
The tragedy of having advanced knowledge being that through
fear of disclosing that enemy codes had been compromised - no defences were put up - resulting in Coventry allowed to be bombed to destruction.

....

[air pig]

Hi Pasir

Also, an educated guess had to be made about the frequency modulation for the night of the Coventry raid. The first intimation came from evesdropping on Luftwaffe prisioners sent R V Jones and his scientific intellegence team on the track of the adapted Lorenz blind landing system which was turned into Knickebein. A feret flight by Wing Commander Bufton and Sgt McKie in an Anson found the Knickebein transmissions near Splading in Lincolnshire. The flight only happened on te direct orders of Winston Churchill, after a diagreement over radio wave propagation.

I don't know if the original hint came from the Oslo report, a document that came into the hands of British intellegence outlining German scientific advances.

Regards

Air pig

[pasir]

...Hi HP The points you nention all fit into the picture -Incidentally The evesdropping procedure was vividly portrayed in the 1957 film - 'The one that got away' -the true account of a Luftwaffe PoW who proved most industrious in escaping - giving the British considerable trouble - A film well worth watching when it comes around.

...

[Hipper]

The problem of using Intelligence without revealing its source also occured after the Bismarck sinking in 1941.

Enigma decrypts had revealed the locations of all six German supply ships that were to be used for this operation. Of course if you sink the lot the Germans will become suspicious, so it was decided to sink five of them and leave the other one alone. In addition it must appear that the ships were found in normal search operations, so usually an aircraft would be sent first. In this way when the supply ships were reporting they were being attacked they would mention they were discovered by a 'wheeled aircraft', for example. The selected five ships were duly sunk but as luck would have it the sixth ship was discovered in the normal course of events and dispatched.

Fortunately, despite much discussion, the Germans did not believe that Enigma was compromised and we could continue to read decrypts, and won the war!

[air pig]

The German Kreigsmarine were at the end of the war trying to develop a a ten rotor enigma machine, even when they increased their enigma machines to four rotors and used I think the Triton or Neptune codes. Bletchley for many months were unable to carck the code in a timely manner. Only when the Collossus computer was in service the decryption was speeded up. The way Enigma was cracked by a lot of hard work by some brilliant people and many others in the information chain from intercept radio operators to the people who worked in the huts at Bletchley, whose story has been told only in recent years.

Some Enigma codes were broken by people useing repeditive codes to set the rotors and using repeditive obsenities as the key start to test code before information transmission. This did apply to some SS units involved in murder operations on the eastern fronts, when reporting who many they had murdered that day.

The balance between knowledge of your enemies action by intercept cryptography and counter measures is a difficult problem even today and the use of Special LiasionUnits at main command levels helped to secure the secret. Dowding was a recipient of Enigma traffic analysis.

Regards.

Air pig.

[Unixman]

Hipper

You think that that was difficult! Look at the fun and games Blinker Hall had when attempting to hide the source of the Zimmerman Telegram (which I consider to be one of the greatest single intelligence coups of all time....)

[falcon22]

Apologies for the slight thread drift but the local news media in Kent have today been marking the anniversary of an interesting Battle of Britain story - The Battle of Graveney Marsh is said to be the last action involving a foreign invading force on British soil.
On 27th September 1940 a Junkers 88 was forced down and the crew used their weapons to try to stop the aircraft, and its new type of bombsight, being inspected before they could destroy it.
After surrendering they were taken to the nearby Sportsman Inn at Seasalter where a plaque commemorating the event has just been unveiled.
A George Medal was awarded to Captain Cantopher who disarmed the demolition charge set on the aircraft.

Battle of Graveney Marsh - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Graveney_Marsh)