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Jetex_Jim
21st Sep 2010, 11:30
In his book, Reflections on Intelligence, R.V.Jones recounts that in February 1944 Lord Cherwell told Churchill that six Lancasters carrying anthrax bombs could kill everyone in a square mile . As Jones puts it, ‘hardly less devastating than an atomic bomb’. He goes on to say that half a million anthrax bombs were ordered to be made in America. These to be held in reserve in case Germany came up with something similar.

Jones also mentions his response to a question from Churchill regarding why Hitler never deployed his, ‘Weapons of Despair’, the nerve weapons that Germany had developed. He claims the reason was revealed in a decrypted communication with the Japanese indicating that Germany believed Britain had developed nerve weapons of its own.

The question being why, with Bomber Command fully engaged, on an almost nightly basis in pounding Germany as hard as possible, they resorted to less than the most powerful weapons available? Of course, what Jones doesn’t touch on is what the USA might have ruled on the subject, and if they, rather than Churchill and his cabinet, set the limits.

However, that does still leave the question, why, at the end, with the Red Army banging on the door, did Hitler feel restrained?

Henry09
21st Sep 2010, 12:16
Maybe he was worried about a war crimes tribunal ;)


Seriously it sounds a fascinating book. Must read thanks.

Pontius Navigator
21st Sep 2010, 12:56
There is a relevant thread here:

Why did Hitler never use biological or chemical warfare? - World War II Forums (http://ww2f.com/wwii-general/41079-why-did-hitler-never-use-biological-chemical-warfare.html)

That Hitler did not use Tabun and Sarin against his non-Geneva Convention opponents, the Russians at the end was, IMHO, due to the lack of means of delivery and a possible lack of access as Germany was squeezed on two fronts.

Roosevelt would seem to have been the controlling factor on the allied side holding the chemical weapons as a retailiatory weapon. Of course his decision of first use of atomic weapons is counter to that. Maybe he had experience of chemical weapons but only theoretical knowledge of atomic ones and no concept to the actual effects.

racedo
21st Sep 2010, 13:14
The lack of use of Anthrax was possibly down to the understanding that once you have used it the area around is unihabitable for a generation or two, possibly even longer.

BBC News | SCOTLAND | Britain's 'Anthrax Island' (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/1457035.stm)

ExAscoteer
21st Sep 2010, 16:41
The question is discussed quite well in Robert Harris' excellent book 'A Higher Form Of Killing - The Secret History of Chemical and Biological Warfare' which was first published in the mid '80s and republished in 2002.

With regards to the Western Allies, while we had biological weapons such as Bacillus Anthracis, it was known that BW were historically less than controllable (which remains the case to this day even with Genetically Engineered bacterial and viral strains); while we had some chemical weapons (Nitrogen and Sulphur Mustards, Phosgene, Cyanides) it was rather a shock to learn about the Nazi nerve agents (Tabun, Soman, Sarin).

Indeed a British chemist (I forget who) had stated just prior to the war that such agents couldn't be produced!

The reason that Hitler didn't use these agents against us is (IMO) that he fervently believed that we did have our own and would retaliate (since there had been a CW 'tit for tat' during WW1). This was because the Germans had become aware of the USA discovering the insecticidal properties of dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) and synthesising it in large quantities. The initial chemical pathways to DDT are the same as those to nerve agents.

As to why he didn't use them against the Russians is, presumably, the belief that, given the nature of the Alliance, the Americans would retaliate.

tornadoken
22nd Sep 2010, 09:19
“PM had reason to believe (Hitler) will use gas on the Russian Front. (en clair BBC broadcast) No.10 will issue an immediate warning of retaliation” UK War Cabinet Minutes W.M(43)57,21/4/43. Hitler was deterred, accepting UK would hazard London in support of the Ally.

711,000 mustard gas bombs were at Bowes Moor, Yorks, Mkt. Rasen/Norton Disney,Lincs, Lord’s Bridge,Cambs for D-Day for a Light Bomber Wing (88 Sqdn./Boston,107 Sqdn./Mosquito, 226 Sqdn/Mitchell, Swanton Morley) and 15 Sqdn/Mildenhall,Lancaster, 148 Sqdn/Methwold, 214 Sqdn/Chedburgh,Stirling. 10,000 were held till 1956. B.B.Halpenny,Action Stns 2,PSL,83. G.Carter/B.Balmer,P300, R.Bud/P.Gummett,Cold War Hot Science,Harwood,1999. J.Lewis,Changing Direction, Cass,2003 denies suggestions of UK policy of 1st. (not retaliatory, 2nd.strike) use of its 500,000 anthrax bombs v.Germany; he states Staff judged BW as physically unuseable.

Churchill determined Allied policy on all this, not FDR: UK, not DC, would have been the target of retaliation.

chevvron
22nd Sep 2010, 14:09
Pontious: I thought Roosevelt died before the atom bombs were deployed and Truman made the decision.

ColinB
22nd Sep 2010, 19:09
In the pre-war years we thought the Germans would use Mustard Gas as they had so successfully in WWI. In 1939 we began production at Sutton Oak, Randle, and began the erection of factories at Valley and Springfields.
The AASF in France was armed with CW and it was removed at Dunkirk but we left behind our armour and tanks.
In 1940 the only means we had to “fight them on the beaches” was by using mustard gas to contaminate the Kent beaches. We had only three days supply.
By 1941 increased production allowed us to plan saturating the beaches by the use of hundreds of aircraft and dozens of squadrons. We would have breached the Geneva Convention by doing this, but we were determined German would not gain a foothold here.
Although many varied CW munitions were manufactured they were not used for various reasons.
In the preamble to D-Day we manufactured and shipped 4,500 tons of mustard to five Forward Filling Depots which were located in the heart of the bomber groups to allow us to respond in a timely fashion if the Germans decided to use CW on the invasion beaches.
In 1945 we ceased production of mustard and decanted the lesser grades from weapons and tanks and shipped it by rail to Valley. The sub-standard product was loaded into 25,000 52 gallon drums and shipped to Barry docks before dumping in the Hurd Deep North of the Channel Isles.
This left in 1946 9,500 tons of bulk mustard, 4,500 tons from the FFDS was made up into other weapons in 1952/3 in Operations Spring Onion and Pepperpot. The remaining 5,000 tons stayed in the Valley tunnels until 1958-1960 when the debonair Major Toler burnt the lot in the AOS system at Randle.
In 1945 we found that the Germans had over 71,000 Sarin (nerve gas)250Kg bombs at Raubkammer near Munsterlager. These were all individually packaged in bespoke wooden boxes. We shipped these to RAF Llandwrog where we stored them until 1955-1957 when we shipped them to Cairnryan, loaded them in hulks and scuttled the hulks in the Beaufort Deep.
The only CW we held at this time was a 20 ton “museum sample” of mustard gas.

ColinB
23rd Sep 2010, 07:34
The reason that Hitler didn't use these agents against us is (IMO) that he fervently believed that we did have our own and would retaliate (since there had been a CW 'tit for tat' during WW1). This was because the Germans had become aware of the USA discovering the insecticidal properties of dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) and synthesising it in large quantities. The initial chemical pathways to DDT are the same as those to nerve agents.
It appears that both sides monitored each others scientific journals and the basic research on DDT was taken as proof that we probably had nerve gases

411A
23rd Sep 2010, 11:24
Lord Cherwell told Churchill that six Lancasters carrying anthrax bombs could kill everyone in a square mile . As Jones puts it, ‘hardly less devastating than an atomic bomb’.

All very interesting, however...the aerial delivery of these types of weapons is highly variable, and many times produces undesirable results...whereas, the use of atomic weapons is much more predictable.

In addition the following is incorrect...

Roosevelt would seem to have been the controlling factor on the allied side holding the chemical weapons as a retailiatory weapon. Of course his decision of first use of atomic weapons is counter to that.

Harry S. Truman, then the POTUS, decided, not Roosevelt.

However, the first part of the referenced quote is certainly correct, IE:
Roosevelt would seem to have been the controlling factor on the allied side holding the chemical weapons as a retailiatory weapon.

No question about that.

Jetex_Jim
23rd Sep 2010, 22:37
It appears that both sides monitored each others scientific journals and the basic research on DDT was taken as proof that we probably had nerve gases

It's been suggested that, pre-war, IG Farben shared technical information between companies in the USA and UK. (Dupont and ICI)

... let’s not forget that tabun was isolated when I.G. Farben still had close ties and were sharing data with DuPont here in America. From the site referenced by PN in post two.


The immediate pre-war connections between IG Farben USA and its own famous parent might also be of interest.
I.G. Farben in America: The Technologies of General Aniline and Film (http://www.colorantshistory.org/IGFarbenAmerica.html)

Agaricus bisporus
24th Sep 2010, 14:23
All in all, it's a pretty convincing demonstration of working deterrence from mutual ownership (real or imagined) of massively destructive weapons.

ColinB
24th Sep 2010, 18:10
I think that there was mutual deterrence when the use of chemical and biological weapons was considered, no matter how accurate the intelligence.
One can appreciate that after the losses at Okinawa, the USA would utilise the atomic force they had to bring the war to an end before the invasion of the Japanese mainland but it is doubtful if they would have used it if Japan had such weapons.
So I suppose the case is made for mutual deterrence.
When the US troops were taking such horrendous and unrelenting casualties at Iowa Jima, Guadalcanal, Peleliu and Okinawa, mostly in trench warfare, it would have been an easy decision to utilise the vast amounts of chemical weapons to ease their problems. I believe they showed great restraint in not doing so.
The result of not using them was a painful and horrific price paid by the US Forces, resulting in uncommon valour being a common virtue