Dannatt and Page [Archive]

Compressorstall

20th Sep 2010, 22:08

The MOD has been double ****ed because the figures quoted are spectacular at a time when the new Government is preaching fiscal responsibility and Afghanistan has meant people felt empowered to ask the questions that needed to be asked. How many people have sat on Squadrons looking at unfit for role kit whilst wishing that they had the stuff that they know works?
The problems are deep-seated. Firstly, how can you run a procurement system that is overseen by out-of-role professionals who are doing an amateur job of buying kit in their all-too-brief staff apointment. Secondly, as the prgramme kept referring to, Defence equipment is a business and the companies supplying the kit aren't going to make a loss.
If you put an ambitious staff officer in a procurement role, he/she only has 2 years to make and impact and get the reports required - how can they then follow through on a programme that will take many years to mature? The impact may only have short-term gains, but the drawbacks may linger for many years. What seems like a smart idea now, may come back and bite you in the years to come.
Sadly, the MOD isn't alone, but it's an easy target. It would be great if it was going to get better, but are these rapid cuts going to be like the quick impact good ideas?

Finningley Boy

21st Sep 2010, 06:29

It occurred to me that every time they wanted to make a point about waste and white elephants versus the dire need for helicopters (Blackhawks) the Typhoon was shown cavorting over Farnborough. No doubt many will have seen this and been given the impression of BAE Systems and all the Defence Procurement Ministers and Officers fiddling while Afghanistan burns.:mad:

FB

Snow Dog

21st Sep 2010, 06:54

At least the would be fiddling had they not saved money by reducing the number of strings on each instrument and cut the requirement for bows until sometime after they were in service.
Sorry, couldn't resist.
Reading the, admittedly, 'anecdotes' of Ministerial interference in the running of the 19th Century Navy as well as the number of Senior Officer come Businessmen could lead one to believe that nothing has changed; money making opportunities and the Defence Industry have always been close allies. Afterall, the military always want something a bit better, yet seem to do well with whatever they've got! Tongue in cheek

GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU

21st Sep 2010, 07:24

If you put an ambitious staff officer in a procurement role, he/she only has 2 years to make and impact and get the reports required - how can they then follow through on a programme that will take many years to mature?

Until recently, the Navy largely avoided that.

I had a few drinks last night with a munitions contracts wallah (Commercial Officer in new MoDspeak) thoroughly poxed off with senior "ops" chaps in brown suits making "promises" to Contractors that are contractually impossible.

The civvy project and logs staff do a pretty good job; if only they are allowed to do it.

Jabba_TG12

21st Sep 2010, 07:54

Pardon me for playing devils advocate here, but what is it about Lewis Page that gets you guys so riled?

Is what he reports completely factually incorrect, or only half the story, an incorrect perspective, or what?

Genuine question, not a wind up.

Roland Pulfrew

21st Sep 2010, 08:25

Jabba

The last two of your questions. I have read his book (didn't buy it - wouldn't give him the satisfaction; borrowed it from a library:E) and it is full of
half the story and an incorrect perspective

Obviously it is his perspective and he is entitled to it, but I would say it is often incorrect.:}

Tappers Dad

21st Sep 2010, 09:20

I think Haddon-Cave was spot on when he said in the Nimrod Review that there was 'an unsatisfactory relationship between the MOD and Industry'. When Portillo said the chairman of BAE Systems can walk into No 10 anytime and see the PM it speaks volumes about their cosy relationship. Hardly surprising then the reluctance I am getting from the authorities to persue those named in his report.Especially when they say they have spoken to the Home Office.

The Old Fat One

21st Sep 2010, 09:34

As I watched the programme one thought kept repeating.

Is this virtually an exact copy of the Panorama programme shown in the early eighties following the Nimrod AEW fiasco?

The faces change, the language of procurement changes, the story does not.

Another thought...

Anybody who thinks this is purely an MOD/Defence industry issue is either sadly under educated or on an anti military agenda.

I'll see your MRA4 project and raise you the Scottish Parliment. (MRA4, 4 X over budget, Scottish Parliment Building, 10 X over budget)

engineer(retard)

21st Sep 2010, 10:02

The programme was looking for the big impact, was too shallow and had too much knocking of the services eg "the RAFs largest procurement" with little understanding of the procurement process. Rattled on time again about delays and cost without mentioning treasury oversight or political interference. Talked about the shortage of helicopters without mentioning the often announced and always reduced amount of money for them.

This was the TV version of a Daily Mail article. Apart from that it was sound.

regards

retard

tucumseh

21st Sep 2010, 10:46

I fully agree with Eng(Retard).
I watched it a scribbled a few notes. In the order raised in the programme;

1. Minefield incident. Perfect opportunity to get into BOWMAN (the comms problems the BoI reported, tens of millions wasted on batteries that had to be recalled and destroyed, thus denying troops a Critical Enabling Technology etc).
2. Kiley stated MoD was not under resourced, rather what they get is wasted. This is largely true but the message was lost because, I think, he didn’t fully understand the subject.
3. Following on from that, there was the usual failure to differentiate between procurement and acquisition. The programme trashed procurement, but actually concentrated on the initial acquisition processes and Government policy.
4. Ian Godden spoke well on constant requirement change, but the ordinary punter (and 95% of the MoD) wouldn’t understand, because of 3. above. He made the point 75% of projects were on time and to budget, but this needed exploring. The question that needed asking was why MoD refuses to learn from these successes. (I’d be interested where the 75% figure came from. I’d say that means the situation is getting worse. They need to place these figures in context).
5. Mike Bell stated, correctly, that the Nimrod MR2 shouldn’t have been in the air at all, but then the programme linked this to late MRA4 when, in fact, the primary reason was systemic airworthiness failings. Also, the procurement officer (RAF?) said of the mainplane issue “by the time realisation set in...”, which indicates he wasn’t there at the beginning, when this risk was flagged on day 1, by both BAeS and MoD. (In fact, they were raised in the 80s on the Nimrod AEW programme). This meant the true issues were missed – that experience and corporate knowledge was ignored.
6. I’m always in 2 minds about Lewis Page, as he usually makes good headline points but never seems to back them up with any real knowledge. I think someone just feeds him lines and he recites them parrot fashion; but you know from subtle errors in the use of terminology he doesn’t truly understand. A lot like much of DE&S! He was spot on about much of our high-tech being US sourced, so making it difficult for us to sell abroad. But, again, the programme didn’t stop to offer examples. It just came across as willy waving between Band and Page, but both made reasonably valid points. (Although I thought Band sounded like an arrogant prat). This issue isn’t black and white.
7. Excellent visual explanation of the financial Bow Wave which most probably understood. Most procurers would have been shouting at the telly saying “Now, tell everyone this isn’t a procurement failure”, but they didn’t.

There was too much inconsequential “filler” when they could have used the time to explain a few finer points which would have got to the nub of the problem. The first 15 mins was playing to the crowd and lacked substance. Later, the procurement officer had a good stab by mentioning 2 year postings, lack of training, parachuting in grossly inexperienced staffs etc. But the bottom line is that most viewers will now think “procurement” is the only problem, when in fact it is the procurers who have to spend most of their time working round the problems caused in MB and political corridors.

Good attempt. 7/10.

melmothtw

21st Sep 2010, 10:58

I'll see your MRA4 project and raise you the Scottish Parliment. (MRA4, 4 X over budget, Scottish Parliment Building, 10 X over budget)

I'll see your Scottish Parliament and raise you a Portcullis House - at £235 million, the most expensive office block in Europe (more than £1 million for every MP that has an office there).

Biggus

21st Sep 2010, 11:19

What about the national NHS database, or whatever it was called - indeed just about any major government IT project!

Jimlad1

21st Sep 2010, 12:43

Lewis Page = Throbber.

Served as a diver, refused to do broadening appointments and threw teddies out of pram and left when being told he couldnt command an MCMV without doing PWO course.

Those who served with him allegedly have a very low opinion of him, both personally and professionally.

He knows a little about MCD work, he knows next to nothing about Defence, yet despite this natural handicap wrote the most puerile piece of ****e I've ever had the misfortune to read, namely Lions & Donkeys. Had he bothered to expand his career and go to staff college, he might have saved himself some embarrassing mistakes in print and on his website...

Media love him because he's a damn good self publicist, not because he knows anything. He's as qualified to comment on defence matters as I am to fly a Typhoon...

The Old Fat One

21st Sep 2010, 13:11

Also, the procurement officer (RAF?) said of the mainplane issue “by the time realisation set in...”, which indicates he wasn’t there at the beginning, when this risk was flagged on day 1, by both BAeS and MoD. (In fact, they were raised in the 80s on the Nimrod AEW programme). This meant the true issues were missed – that experience and corporate knowledge was ignored.

SRW was around at the time, as was I. I would conject that everybody was aware of the airframe limitations because many of us (me, but not in this instance SRW) were around for the Nimrod AEW fiasco.

You are completely correct that experience and knowledge was ignored - however, worse than that in my opinion, experienced operators were "ordered" to keep their opinions to themselves.

In fact one Kinloss Staish (you may work out who if you want) said..

"On my watch the entry into service of Nimrod 2000, will be smoother than the entry into service of the MR2, and I will not accept any contrary opinion."

And that is a pretty accurate quote, as others can verify if they wish.

JFZ90

21st Sep 2010, 17:38

I’m always in 2 minds about Lewis Page.....He was spot on about much of our high-tech being US sourced, so making it difficult for us to sell abroad. But, again, the programme didn’t stop to offer examples.

Band was clearly talking broadly about the importance of sov capability in the UK supplier base - i.e. not just from an export perspective, which is not the key driver for it anyway - the access it provides to technology is more relevant to quote just one benefit.

The programme was stitched together to show Lewis erroneously challenging the importance of a sov UK capability by ONLY talking about the potential export impact of US content in 'UK' products. He then quoted Typhoon as an example that can't be exported due to US content. Typhoon does have some US content, but as you say it is not black and white, and whilst it can make life complicated, it hasn't stopped its export so far. In this respect he was clearly talking total rubbish - he should have noticed that Typhoon has of course been exported, so not a great example to use!

He sits there all smug and criticising others - while not having a clue himself. Chiselling fun sponge!

tucumseh

21st Sep 2010, 18:56

JFZ90

Agreed.

When they were talking to Band and Page I thought the next obvious step was to mention the BAeS, sorry, Defence Industrial and Technology Strategies.

But there again, it would be just too embarrassing to admit that the DTS was, for example, mooting the development of various "future" technolgical solutions, when better solutions were already in service!

When this was pointed out on one example (in a FoI exchange) the MoD scientist charged with replying declined to pursue the matter and the following year (2009) an aircraft IPT at Wyton issued an Invitation to Tender to develop an RAF requirement that has been in service with the RN since 1997 and upgraded in 2000. The IPT actually formally chastised one bidder's MD when one of his staff told them they didn't need the R&D, the total procurement could be met for under £500k inside 3 months. I understand the 2 year R&D contract was let, valued at around £5M (according to the Contracts Bulletin). I spoke to the original designer and supplier and all they had to do for their money was dig out a 13 year old spec (owned, by the way, by MoD!). But they can't make the kit to that spec as the obsolete tooling has been destroyed.

In another example, a £3M contract was let by one IPT at ABW to develop, over 3 years, a solution that was already in service and being bought on a rolling basis, in huge quantities, by an Andover IPT. As the technology was already in service with just about every Army in the world, and half the households to boot, you'd think...... Again, a bidder was crucified for pointing out the R&D was unnecessary, as they could sell a better solution for £43 a pop, whereas the existing contracts (!) were paying over £400. (x 10,000 or so a year is a lot of money).

A few clues in there as to how to save a few Billion - each year - while actually enhancing Operational Effectiveness. Instead, here comes SDSR which will degrade OE. As I said, the suggestions were rejected by MoD.

Widger

21st Sep 2010, 22:14

£2000 for a plastic toilet seat, just to get a sticker on it proving that it is non ferrous.....it has been going on for years!

Ivan Rogov

21st Sep 2010, 23:55

Just watched it and thought there were some broad key points which should have been discussed more fully, i.e.:

- The defence budget is not there to provide UK jobs.
- Too many people in desk support roles, and many not suitably qualified or remaining in post long enough.
- The defence budget is large; the problem is it is just squandered.
- The procurement process is incestuous and doesn't provide VFM.

However very poor examples were used in most cases which meant that the key points were lost with sensationalised, tabloid facts.

- We should have Blackhawks because of a unique minefield incident. If the Chinook had been allowed to use its winch? A medium lift helo requirement needs broader justification, even if we agree.
- MRA4 in service would have prevented a crash, untrue as it was an issue with how we ran airworthiness.
- Buy the same kit the SF use for every one. Much of it is not suited to general use, in fact much is deliberately brought for niche roles.
- We should have F-16s in the mid 90's not Typhoon, no comparison. Now if he had said F-15s, but he didn't!
- BAE had the highest cost overruns and all those over £1 billion. He then points out that they handle the largest projects, so it is obvious these will incur the highest overruns.
- Wildcat is too small for the Army. It's not too small for what they say they want it for, again back to the medium lift justification.
- Tried the us and them tactic by pointing out how much senior officers wasted on houses etc. The figures were very small in relation to the issues, and reallocating one Sgt from the Generals house to the front line won't help.
- Waste on school fees because HM Forces move often. He didn't offer an alternative so our kids should move schools possibly every 2 or 3 years?
- And there were more.

Do we think if we brought "off the peg" we would get more of what we want? No we would just get a smaller budget, still be short of kit and get the very cheapest answer. The politicians have to take much of the blame and I trust none of them, they always want to cut out a little more. Anyone in the military knows a piece of kit they would like to use, but will never get as it will be deemed over spec. we are only allowed to buy kit to do the specified task with no flexibility to cover contingencies, hence the mass of UORs. I'm all for buying off the peg if it allows us to get more out of what we buy; VFM shouldn't just be the cheapest.

No doubt I have probably “Paged” this by quoting half truths and rumour!

tucumseh

22nd Sep 2010, 06:29

I think the Commercial off the Self / Off the Peg argument is too simplistic. What people actually mean when they say this is often Military off the Shelf (e.g. Blackhawk).
MoD do give thought to these things so I’ll summarise the formal advice on COTS (not MOTS) to the Secy of State (whom I’m quite sure hasn’t read it!).

Pros
· Cheap
· Readily available
· Small and Light
· The Potential for standard commercial interfaces

Cons
· Designed for a benign environment – seldom not below zero
· Capability may not match requirement
· Rapid Obsolescence – they are designed for a short life so of little consequence to normal user
· Not easily repairable – very often sealed units which are deemed disposable
· Changing specification very expensive
· Poor support – problems are usually addressed in the next generation, not by modification

In the RAF there is one long standing classic example of COTS use. I’m not allowed to discuss it here, but we have 3 of the aircraft and they are about to be replaced. We have a Spec Role Bay (or had) to “tweak” any of the boxes but by and large they are recognisable as the COTS devices and supported as such with very efficient contracts with suppliers which are not too different from the “collect at home” contracts you buy with your new PC. (For example, Hewlett Packard have an excellent scheme). This works a treat, but the average life of a system (often a dozen or so different boxes per system, and over 30 different systems per aircraft) is only expected to be 18 months or so; so there is funding available at any given time for total replacement, as opposed to repair. And replacement lead times are in days, not years. Some kit lasts longer as the requirement seldom changes, and you find this is the kit that is not COTS, but designed to a more robust Mil Spec. Overall, I’d say the cost is much the same as if it were Mil Spec, 20 year life kit. It is not the money that is the sole driver, but the operational flexibility and constantly optimised OE is given equal weight (which is how it should be, IMO).

So, there are indeed many applications for COTS, but the entire Procurement and Logistic Support philosophy would have to change, from an expected 20 year support plan to sealed, disposable units/systems that are completely replaced every couple of years. And, of course, you’d need to retain the existing infrastructure and policies for kit that can’t be COTS. We would need lots of “Special Role Bays” and expertise to integrate individuals COTS boxes into working systems – this expertise has been offloaded over the last 20 years, and with the demise of MoD 3rd Line workshops there is no longer an in-house recruitment ground. I’d say this does happen in isolated areas of MoD, but often a result not of policy, but individual initiative. One could argue what route a project takes in this respect is the mandated role of DEC when he develops the Requirement and the ILSM when he develops the proposed Maintenance Policy, before the contract is even let or funding firmed up. How many even consider this? Very few, because the rules are against you. Any such original thought hits the brick wall of red tape and the time wasted negates any COTS efficiency. He could spend his 2 year tour trying to get a COTS approval, and been seen as a failure at the end of it for trying to d a good job. In practice, the decision is left with procurers, who are castigated if they deviate from spec or mess with the funding profile (which is completely screwed up if you go COTS). In summary – it’s up to DEC to push for change if they want it.

Jabba_TG12

22nd Sep 2010, 06:29

Well, I guess that answers my Lewis Page question then... :}

Tuc, have you ever thought of writing a book yourself - cataloging the kind of horror stories that you've seen over the years that would be enough to drive anyone to the demon drink? :E Probably be enough for Lewis Page to look like Enid Blyton by comparison....

JFZ90

22nd Sep 2010, 21:56

I follow your logic Tuc, and...

...In the RAF there is one long standing classic example of COTS use. I’m not allowed to discuss it here....

...its pretty easy to work out what you're referring to, but I think you'd have to agree its a rather atypical case. You're not advocating that model could be applied to all platforms over the long term? Don't give the Lewis Page types false hope!

ShortFatOne

22nd Sep 2010, 22:12

"I'll see your MRA4 project and raise you the Scottish Parliment. (MRA4, 4 X over budget, Scottish Parliment Building, 10 X over budget)".

Not disputing the cost of the Scottish Parliament Building but intrigued to know where you get your MRA4 figures from?

Original budget was circa £2.7Bn, increased to £3.1Bn a few years back and has stayed the same since. That seems like a £400Mil/£2.7Bn sort of sum which appears to be approximately a 19% increase on the original budget.

The Old Fat One

22nd Sep 2010, 23:03

Original budget was circa £2.7Bn, increased to £3.1Bn a few years back and has stayed the same since. That seems like a £400Mil/£2.7Bn sort of sum which appears to be approximately a 19% increase on the original budget.

You seem to have missed a rather significant fact. Specifically, the original figure was for 21 aircraft and now it seems we will be getting a few less than that!

Figures I am working on are:

2.1 Billion for 21 aircraft when the contract was awarded in 1996.
3.8 billion for 12 (or is 9?) aircraft today

Originally 100 million each
Now circa 400 million each

= 4 X increase.

I freely admit this is back of the fag packet stuff, especially as I'm no longer sure if we are getting 9 or 12 aircraft. However, my figure tallies with that which is frequently being quoted as the increase in cost (X 4.80) so I don't think it is a million miles out.

19 percent on the other hand...in your dreams!

tucumseh

22nd Sep 2010, 23:48

JFZ90

No, not advocating that at all. The operators and maintainers loved it, but it was hassle to manage because of the red tape I mentioned and the attitudes of those few who were hostile to what you were trying to achieve - High Wycombe financiers especially. My point is that COTS is not the single solution some would have you think. My main concern is the tendency to buy COTS without thinking of systems integration, which is seldom understood; not helped by a long standing ruling that you can completely ignore it if it reduces cost or time. This ruling wasn't rescinded even when various Boards of Inquiry cited failure to integrate safety related systems as causal factors.

ShortFatOne

23rd Sep 2010, 22:53

I don't dispute that the unit cost has risen and indeed it may well be a budget of nearer £3.8Bn (not a figure I recognise but then what do I know) but unit cost and budget are 2 different things. To state that the aircraft are 4 x over budget is disingenuous at best. Pedantic I know but in these headline grabbing, sound-bite days, accuracy is important and the simple fact is that the MRA4 "budget" has not suddenly expanded to £12Bn (wish that it had!!!). More than happy to accept that unit cost has apparently increased. If that is what you meant then fine.

As an aside, knowing what I know now rather than 10 years ago when I fisrt joined the project, there was no way the RAF was going to get 21 MRA4's. See Tuc's many lucid and clear posts on why that was always a pipe-dream.

I will say that having flown the beast, the aircraft is already an impressive bit of kit and has huge potential (and I mean huge); it is, as always, up to the politicians to decide if we get to develop and exploit that potential, I'm just a driver airframes. :)

RumPunch

23rd Sep 2010, 23:53

The Panorama Programme at least clarified something that many people did not know , the Typhoon project was well over budget what the MRA4 project is at right now.

The Old Fat One

24th Sep 2010, 04:59

Unit cost/total budget...that's all a bit too smoke and mirrors for me.

However, since I want to see the beast in service ASAP, perhaps best not to dwell on the cost overun anymore.

MRA4 aside, it would be nice for the taxpayers point of view to see the MOD and its contractors held to account for whatever the multitude of reasons that budgets spiral out of control. Likewise for public sector projects outwith the military sphere.

For those that would simply accept that big public sector projects will always be subject to these manifestly flawed procurement processes, remember this...

The ultimate price will be paid in people's jobs, as we shall see in the coming months.

The Old Fat One

15th Oct 2010, 12:09

To state that the aircraft are 4 x over budget is disingenuous at best. Pedantic I know but in these headline grabbing, sound-bite days, accuracy is important and the simple fact is that the MRA4 "budget" has not suddenly expanded to £12Bn (wish that it had!!!). More than happy to accept that unit cost has apparently increased. If that is what you meant then fine.

NAO has reported today that the per aircraft cost has tripled. No need for smoke, mirrors, creative stats or pedants - all pretty clear. We the tax payer are paying three times the price that BAE sold the aircraft to us in 1996.

Will it see service? I absolutely hope so.

If it does get in, will it be great? Yes, the operators will make it so.

Could we have got something equally good, quicker and cheaper? Without doubt.

Will we learn a single thing from this (one of many) procurement cluster ****? Who knows? We appear to have learnt b*****r all from the last few hundred years all the way back to the locked up ammo boxes at Isandlwana.

QED

engineer(retard)

15th Oct 2010, 13:13

The smoke and mirrors are still there.

The non recurring element (NRE) for design development etc will remain the same regardless of build numbers For the sake of argument, if the NRE was 1 million and your recurring cost (production build) for 10 items was another million, your unit cost for the programme is £200k. If you half the build, the NRE does not go away and your unit cost is £300k. This of course ignores any economy of scale for bulk buying of material.

Neptunus Rex

15th Oct 2010, 16:49

Could we have got something equally good, quicker and cheaper? Without doubt.Name one; but it must have more than two engines.

minigundiplomat

15th Oct 2010, 16:52

Are we referring to 'Nimrod 2000'? (Remember that title?)

Never mind the 3 x cost, its 10 years late.

Biggus

15th Oct 2010, 18:27

TOFO,

We stopped having "lessons learnt" quite a few years ago. Now we only have "lessons identified".

It seems to me, with my schoolboy O-level (A grade though) English Language skills, that this means we are quite at liberty to repeat the same mistakes time after time, with no responsibilty, or accountability, to "learn" from previous events!

This is not simply a pedantic point, but rather a shift of mindset by the powers that be, and a classic avoidance of responsibility, culpability and accountability by those in the higher echlons..

Pongochap

16th Oct 2010, 14:03

It's certainly worth a watch:

http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/4od/player/3129790 (http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/4od/player/3129790)

Whilst Typhoon may be great at turning on a six pence and is no doubt a fantastic airplane, this is fairly irrelevant in modern aircombat (if it were ever to happen). I'm no jet bloke however surely:

· CAS capability = pod + bomb/gun.
· Air combat = radar and missile capability (with the performance required to get there to deliver said weapon).

One does wonder what the point is exactly.... Particularly liked the Farnborough shots with Typhoon wazzing around laden with bombs when it is very unlikely to be capable of deploying to AFG in the CAS role. Indeed, the most desired CAS platform in theatre - AC130. 5 please.

A grossly expensive and very late mess.

Thought it was also v interesting that he picked up on Wildcat. I do hope that the reason the AAC has not stuck itself with Wildcat is that it wasn't willing to take on the aircraft size/weight debate with the RAF over Blackhawk. Wildcat looks like a very effective Battlefield Recce Heli (BRH) platform. Great. But even in the unlikely event we were pitched into a conventional fight why on earth would we even need BRH when you've got Apache with a tank spotting radar.

What this SDSR sounds like it will lack is asking what you want from your heli fleet and then procuring it. One might even call such thinking a 'Strategic Review'. Col Tootal summed it up well I thought: heavy, medium and fires. So:

· Heavy: CH47. No debate there. Great trooping and CASEVAC aircraft flown well by RAF crews and bought off the shelf from Boeing.
· Fires: Apache - fires. No issues and maybe with joint crewing (as its already going). Bought off the shelf, and given to Westlands to charge a fortune to put new engines in and change the name on the manual.
· Medium: 'Blackhawk' (sized anyway). Everything else including ISTAR and limited fires. Ever seen a Blackhawk DAP! Crikey.... Could do either, buy off the shelf (hurrah), or Westlands could change the name on the manual (again) and charge £1m for each person who works there.

Does make you wonder where Merlin fits in. A huge, expensive aircraft that is only just more than ‘Medium’ capable but with no fires / ISTAR capability.

So, Wildcat. Err... Movement of 4 blokes. There's no decent weapons fitted to make it an effective fires platform (beyond crew served) and the EO is only suited for low level forward observation. So, even if it did arrive in time for AFG, you’ve got it, first UOR - an ISTAR camera.

Maybe Wildcat will get binned on Tue (along with Puma), leaving the door open for a switch to a medium heli. Would probably see this as either mixed or separate Army/RAF Sqns. Why not, it's worked in other areas... The Yanks have also very successfully fitted them with Mx cameras and weapons. Yet if that’s the game the AAC are playing I’d very surprised/impressed! Ultimately I care far less about who flies our aircraft than getting the best myriad of capabilities to support ground troops and deliver fires. If that means the AAC becomes an AH only fleet with RAF getting Blackhawk so be it. Although I would still argue (strongly) that the Army should be flying it.

Anyway, smart procurement in action... :ugh:

Biggus

16th Oct 2010, 14:30

Pongochap,

A couple of points. First of all, if manoeuverability is irrelevant in modern air combat, why is ever man and his dog, including the Russians and Chinese, developing manoeuverable aircraft, with cannards, thrust vectoring, etc... and are the Russians doing "cobra" manoeuvres at air displays.

As for UK helicopter procurement, and in particular the RAF Merlin and AAC Wildcat, blame the RN! The RN needed an ASW helicopter to replace the Sea King, which lead in turn to the ASW Merlin. Given the small numbers required by the RN, a transport version was acquired for the RAF, hence increasing the number of airframes purchased by the UK, providing better economys of scale etc, and making the cost per Merlin for the RN look slightly less horrendous.

Now fast forward a few years, until the RN needs a lynx replacement to go on the back of their few remaining frigates and destroyers. Once again the number of airframes required is tiny, and to try and help justify the expense...etc, etc, hence the AAC gets wildcat whether it wants it or not!

Melchett01

16th Oct 2010, 15:22

Pongochap,

Like you I'm no jetjockey, but frankly the Army's insistence that Typhoon is an expensive irrelevance does nothing but expose its corporate parochialism, whilst is persistence in pedalling this line over the years demonstrates a lack of understanding and unwillingness to learn the value and capabilities of air power.

The Typhoon was undeniably conceived in the Cold War, but that has more to do with the length of time taken to develop high tech bits of kit than any doctrinal reluctance to realise that the nature of warfare has changed. Based on the 'Cold War kit' argument, then the Blackhawk, Apache and AC-130, all of which are held in high esteem in theatre but with their roots in the Cold War are also irrelevant and have no place in 'our' inventory.

Now, what is the point of Typhoon and why do we need so many? Well, it's a swing role platform, not just AD as everyone including the PM seem to think. As such, it was intended that the Typhoon would replace multiple platform types - the F3 and the Jaguar. Based on the numbers we are getting against the numbers of F3s and Jags over the years, you'll find that it's by no means a 1-for-1 swap, and we are relying on the capability of the platform to make up for the drop in overall numbers. However, much to the apparent disgust of many outside of the RAF, we do actually still need a capable AD platform; one of, if not the primary role of the the RAF, aside from being a taxi / delivery service for everyone else, is defence of the UK and its interests. Defence of UK airspace is a key component of that. If the Army can come up with a suggestion for something cheaper, better, less manoeuvrable and less well armed that allows us to defend UK's airspace whilst retaining the key advantages of height, speed and reach, as well as being a capable deterrent against would-be aggressors then please let us know. We would be fascinated to hear where we have been going wrong all this time.

Now whilst there isn't much of an air threat in Afghanistan, that is not to say that at some point in the future that threat won't emerge. Either directly against the UK, or against UK forces deployed on operations. Just looking around the globe at many of the states that we would consider to be less than friendly will show that they have air forces made up largely of Russian kit -Fulcrums, Flankers and the like - precisely the sort of Soviet threat that is perceived as being irrelevant. So fast forward 30 years and we have cobbled together some sort of expeditionary capability to go and be a force for good somewhere.

We don't have much of an AD capability, because 30 years earlier argued it was irrelevant and we really needed Reapers and armoured vehicles, so that's where the money went. So as the helos land on the beach or the ramp comes down on the landing craft, all we will be able to do is watch as you are harassed on the beaches and HLZs by the Frogfoots or have your Chinooks shot down by a long range shot from a Flanker variant operating BVR ops. Later on you receive intelligence to suggest an HVT is going to be at a certain location at a certain time, but you can't do anything about it as you are essentially a slow moving ground based force with limited long range strike options. Equally, your troops become involved in a TiC; now most of your AH has been lost in the opening salvos, leaving you with a few armed Reapers and a couple of lightly armed Tucanos. Not a problem, other than they are operating at the otherside of the AO today, and by the time they get to your TiC it is all over. Wouldn't something fast and pointy with a long range strike option or the ability to provide rapid support multiple target sets thanks to a heavy swing role payload be a useful thing to have? Certainly not something you will get with a Super Tucano. Of course, it will probably be the RAF's fault that we couldn't secure the airspace to provide an umbrella for ground and ISTAR operations, and that ground forces are being picked off bit by bit by an enemy that over the years has understood the benefit of a decent air capability.

All very hypothetical I admit, but do you want to take the risk? Fifteen years ago, we were just coming out of the Cold War and talking about a revolution in military affairs where asymmetric, cyber warfare was the future. That theory must have lasted all of a few years before we went back to a primitive but effective enemy that wouldn't be out place in the Flintstones. The moral of the story, is for the Army to look over the parapet of its ivory towers and realise that they are not the only show in town, and without the broad spectrum of capabilities provided by its sister Services, it really won't take much for the foundations of that ivory tower to become rather unstable.

Occasional Aviator

16th Oct 2010, 16:35

Melchett01 :D:ok:

The Old Fat One

16th Oct 2010, 17:39

Melchy,

That is a rather good post. Go to the top of the class.

Martin the Martian

16th Oct 2010, 20:15

Melchett01: if I had a daughter, I'd want her to marry you.

You, sir, have summed up the argument far better than any expert or commentator could hope to do so.

Pongochap

16th Oct 2010, 22:59

Melchett

Actually, it is you who offers no more than petty single service parochialism. You’ll note, despite your lengthy diatribe, I was not disregarding the need for a AD capability, rather suggesting we could have done it differently and certainly cheaper than Typhoon. Furthermore Typhoon is not a swing role platform yet - and will not be in the foreseeable future.

Now whilst there isn't much of an air threat in Afghanistan, that is not to say that at some point in the future that threat won't emerge.

I agree however it is the worst of ‘Air’ single service gamesmanship to pretend that the Army is saying such things. They are not. Equally, no one sensible in the Army I know is suggesting we cut the Navy further or in particular ASW capability. These, as with AD, are important facets of British conventional capability. When was the last time RN anti-submarine capability was used in anger? I have no idea... probably the Falklands, however it is an important capability in a conventional conflict the UK must maintain. I hold less conviction regarding Trident but that has been done to death elsewhere.

What I find disappointing is how capability is so fundamentally misunderstood by those such as yourself. The ‘cold war’ label is irrelevant. It is capability and effect (related to cost in some degree) that are the key considerations and this is where Typhoon struggles. As stated earlier, in terms of A-G effect anything carrying a pod and laser or GPS guided bombs (including in some areas C130) is capable of providing an effective A-G capability. Again, whilst I’m no jet bloke, in A-A/AD terms, a radar plus a decent BVR missile sounds like a AD requirement. That to me sounds like an F16/F15/FA18/Grippen etc... However, getting lots of wazzy jets because, well, other people might get wazzy jets, is hardly a capability requirement.

The ‘cold war’ label also falls over in helis such as:
· Apache. Old airframe, heavily upgraded with MTADs and very effective weapons for convetional warfare also capable in COIN Ops.
· CH47. Old, excellent airframe but with engine and impending avionics upgrades.
· Lynx Mk9A. Old airframe with new engines replacing the GEMs built for Western Europe. Still too small with limited weapons.
· Blackhawk. Cold War designed, yet significantly updated with weapons and engines making it the most versatile and proven medium combat helicopter in the world.

The ‘Cold War’ label, despite repetition by the PM, is a red herring. In service, available or future equipments combining current COIN (AFG) and future conventional capabilities are exactly that. Capable aircraft that deliver current and future effect and capability. Some may not deliver current effect but are vital for AD. Ok. But let’s not further muddy the waters with ‘what if your helicopter was shot down by the Judean People's Front’ rubbish.

I await the we ‘must have Typhoon’ (despite delivering the same weapons as any other jet).... diatribe with significant indolence.

LowObservable

17th Oct 2010, 08:47

"As stated earlier, in terms of A-G effect anything carrying a pod and l@ser or GPS guided bombs (including in some areas C130) is capable of providing an effective A-G capability."

As long as you have an adversary who has elected to do nothing to stop you, and is willing to take the hits from air attack while counterattacking in other ways.

"Again, whilst I’m no jet bloke, in A-A/AD terms, a radar plus a decent BVR missile sounds like a AD requirement. That to me sounds like an F16/F15/FA18/Grippen etc."

Well, yes. And they can also do A-G even when the bad guys are not cooperating. Likewise ISR, after they fit a Cessna with a door gun and take out your Watchkeeper. And armed maritime surveillance, and EW, and... But except for Gripen they will all cost about as much as Typhoon.

So how about having the RAF spec out your next combat rifle?

Evalu8ter

17th Oct 2010, 09:12

Typhoon, as a project, is more important politically/industrially then capability - and always has been. The respective governments wished to prove their European credentials as well as preserving the skill set to design and manufacture advanced combat aircraft (with all of the associated technological spin-offs in other areas). So, Typhoon is an expensive option when stacked against multi-thousand production run F15/16/18 but a large % of the money spent returns to the respective govts in the form of tax so the true cost per jet to the public is probably lower than the fly-away sticker price would suggest. For these reasons Typhoon was ring-fenced in the 98 SDR. The Typhoon is a more capable platform than legacy F-series jets - however, if Typhoon had entered service on time it would have been seen as a step forward, but, alas, it has arrived already outdated by F22 and soon to be eclipsed (in most roles) by F35. Thus, it looks late & expensive.

Now, where it becomes controversial, is the increasingly shrill voices of seemingly FJ-centric officers who've now got their new toy (Typhoon) yet want to keep all of their old toys too and threatening doom if they don't. If we play "buggins turn" then it's the Navy's turn, so the carriers are ring fenced and survive. The RAF has raped other capability areas to put Typhoon on its pedestal and the RN are now offering to do the same with Amphib/DD/FF forces to get their CVFs.

It's not pretty, but the CVF programme is industrially and politically where Typhoon was in 1998 - the RAF need to get over it.

Melchett,
An eloquent proposal, however you could also re-write your future scenario thus:

In 30 years time a force of 10 Chinook Mk9s successfully inserted 40 Commando onto a target area inland after a classically executed STOM coup de main conducted during a no moon phase at night. Recce was provided by long range stealthy UAVs which provided streaming video of the target area and ELINT "take". Flanker varients attempted to interfere with the landing but E2 Hawkeyes from HMS PoW detected them early and vectored the CAP F35Cs to intercept. Using superior stealth, data links and BVR AAMs the Flankers were splashed by the F35s before they could interfere with the RW raid. Local protection to the assault was provided by CAS F35Cs and Apache gunships, whilst UCAVs interdicted supply routes and prevented the enemy from reinforcing the position. Diversionary strikes by F35 delivered Storm Shadows unhinged the enemy defences and organic/F35 jamming provided a screen of electronic protection. An escaping enemy commander, a HVT, was ID'd by one of the UAVs and successfully neutralized by a CAS CAP - configured Taranis variant. Post raid visual and electronic recce was conducted by a suitably configured F35s/UAVs.

If PoW/QE are Cat/Trap then the existing plans (with sensible embellishment) gets us to this outcome. Two CVF, 30-odd embarked F35s plus E2 and 20 ish RW operating off the other deck (CVF or LPH) with some shrewd use of long range UCAV and the job's done. Not to suggest that your scenario isn't plausible, just that others are equally valid - my assumption is based upon CVF/F35C with opportunities for sensible upgrades as finances improve.

Typhoon is still in the inventory, holding UK QRA in the Falklands and is available for deployed ops if HNS is available.

Occasional Aviator

17th Oct 2010, 09:20

As stated earlier, in terms of A-G effect anything carrying a pod and l@ser or GPS guided bombs (including in some areas C130) is capable of providing an effective A-G capability.\

Yes... once it gets there.

I am well aware that some of the most sought-after platforms are A-10 and AC-130, but to provide all your CAS this way would give you enormous problems.

Speed's important if you want a decent TIC response time without having to have many, many of these platforms. AC-130 travels about a third the speed of a Typhoon, so you'd need nine times as many airborne to give you the same cover (PM me if you don't get the maths!). You also need more/bigger bases (with FP, enablers etc), and you can't get as far to the tankers, so you need more tankers (more bases, etc).

Typhoon isn't the be-all and end-all by any means. But, it's the only jet we're going to be able to get to do the job we need to do - we're way past the point where we could say "oh, let's not bother with modern jets and just get some F-16s". And yes, it's not swing-role just yet but WILL be in the foreseeable future - don't know how far you're looking! Unfortunately we're now really only buying enough frames to do the AD job, which is why we need to keep hold of GR4 until something else comes along. And no, we couldn't do it with Harrier - the fleet's too small, tired and limited.

The B Word

17th Oct 2010, 11:18

How about the RAF spec out your next rifle?

Sounds like a grand plan to me; I'm pretty sure we wouldn't have selected the SA-80/L85 debacle!

Then again, our collectively (tri service) poor choice of the company that now owns the companies responsible for SA-80, Typhoon, Nimrod MRA4 and the ill fated Phoenix UAV is mostly to blame.

You know the company name - the other B word! BAe...now Systems.

The B Word

Lima Juliet

17th Oct 2010, 11:50

Yup, buying Dimaco C7s would have saved about £500 per SA-80 that we bought - that's a lot of money! I believe that over 300,000 were built so that is a £150Bn saving (uh oh, maths in public!).

LJ

Biggus

17th Oct 2010, 15:43

£150 million actually (which is peanuts in the grand scheme of things) ....don't give up the day job! ;)

(300,000 x 500 = 150,000,000)

Not_a_boffin

17th Oct 2010, 18:50

There's an ever so slight difference in the Buggins turn argument, because as far as I can work out, no one was suggesting that even if Typhoon was canned, it was never replaced with something else, ie end of "fast-jet" capability. In the case of CVF, it literally is that argument - no CVF, no more organic air - and that is why the RN has fought so hard for the ships. Think Joint Warrior, but with slightly expanded areas and then ask how many cabs from either Lossie or Leuchars are required on task just to provide air cover, never mind strike......

Lima Juliet

17th Oct 2010, 18:59

Biggus

Fair point mate and thanks for the correction. I guess it does illustrate, as a percentage, that procurement is as screwed up as my maths ( and trying to post using an iphone!).

LJ

Fire 'n' Forget

17th Oct 2010, 20:30

Evalu8ter

If PoW/QE are Cat/Trap then the existing plans (with sensible embellishment) gets us to this outcome. Two CVF, 30-odd embarked F35s plus E2 and 20 ish RW operating off the other deck (CVF or LPH) with some shrewd use of long range UCAV and the job's done. Not to suggest that your scenario isn't plausible, just that others are equally valid - my assumption is based upon CVF/F35C with opportunities for sensible upgrades as finances improve.

Exactly, each scenario can be played any way, so some PAK-FA launch a storm of BrahMos (supersonic anti ship missiles) from 500km away, how far out are your CAP's? Or they can just sub launch them. After all they are trying to sell them to half of the world at the moment. I would imagine betty and chuck would have to be pretty far off the coast as well if intel said that the land variant was in the AOR.

And then there is BrahMos II due in about 2013-15........well? :sad:

Evalu8ter

17th Oct 2010, 20:48

FnF
Your scenario is what one would hope the requirement set for T45/Sea Viper has in the KURs....and why the RN may be myopic in trading escorts for capital ships. Make no mistake, unless you do CVBG properly with a properly layered defence then you just create vulnerable totemic articles of national pride.

Of course, a HNS effort of deployed Typhoon is equally (if not more) vulnerable to a more accurate "son of scud" ballistic missile.

As you highlighted though, many scenarios play out in different ways. Equally certain is that we cannot fund all SAG scenarios to the extent we need to....

Pontius Navigator

17th Oct 2010, 21:36

Defence of UK airspace is a key component of that. If the Army can come up with a suggestion for something cheaper, better, less manoeuvrable and less well armed that allows us to defend UK's airspace whilst retaining the key advantages of height, speed

For a moment there I thought you were advocating retention of the F3, until you mentioned height.

The swing-role Tiffy offers something else besides an air defence platform or one that can transit across the AOA quickly. It can also exploit height in the CAS role. At the moment the ground threat is relatively low level. In early days it was relatively benign until the US supplied Stinger to the mujahadeen. If someone provided a SAM that could operate to 20-25k then many of the current CAS assets would be at risk.

Occasional Aviator

18th Oct 2010, 08:47

Evalu8ter,

I did like the little scenario you provided yesterday. A convincing argument for the utility of CV and amphib capability for small-scale interventions.

Clearly people can throw rocks at any scenario, and I'll resist any speculation on whether we'd be likely to get Hawkeyes, stealthy UAVs, carrier-borne UCAVs, suitable escorts etc.

The thing that bothers me is the cost to UK defence. Parocahilly for the RN, this scenario gives them almost everything they want... but what can the rest of the UK forces do? You pretty much say so yourself, in your closing point, when you say that Typhoon is still in the inventory, holding UK QRA in the Falklands and is available for deployed ops if HNS is available. Is this really what you'd want to see? UK air power reduced to a token air defence and a small AI/CAS capability provided solely from carriers (which is what a buy of 50 F-35C implies)?

I for one would like to see some CAS/AI capability that can deploy at faster than you can ride a bicycle from wherever it happens to be around the globe. And unless you can, it's a bit pointless having high-readiness forces like 16 AA Bde.

And, as a PS, the old chestnut "if HNS is available".... I do note that things like overflight rights are conveniently forgotten whenever anyone wants to make a point about how carrier air is in use in Afghanistan, or how you could use TLAM to provide deep strike.....