F-35 Cancelled, then what ?

[ORAC]

Not that I'm cynical you understand, but compare the statements about the 2B software with the official report I linked to here (http://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/424953-f-35-cancelled-then-what-285.html#post8869696) on 17th Feb. And whats the performance loss with the interim fix?..... :hmm::hmm:

Late Software Not Expected To Jeopardize U.S. Marine Corps F-35 IOC (http://aviationweek.com/defense/late-software-not-expected-jeopardize-us-marine-corps-f-35-ioc)

The Joint Strike Fighter program now estimates a 4-5 month delay in delivering the aircraft’s fully functional software package and is working to recover that slippage after prioritizing work to support the U.S. Marine Corps initial operational capability (IOC) date of July 1.

The Marine Corps, the first Lockheed Martin F-35 customer slated to declare IOC, is using the 2B software package to stand up its first squadron of aircraft at MCAS Yuma, Arizona. Although the 2B is limited to employing three weapons—the 1,000-lb. GBU-32 Joint Direct Attack Munition, GBU-12 500-lb. Laser-Guided Bomb and Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile AIM-120 series—the F-35B will surpass the current capability of the AV-8B Harrier jump jet and F/A-18C twin-engine Hornets, the Marines say.

All of the software testing needed to enable close air support (CAS) operations for the Marines—a primary mission, as the F-35B will support the Marine Air-Ground Task Force—is complete, says Lorraine Martin, F-35 executive vice president for Lockheed Martin. The entire 2B software package was expected to wrap up testing in January, but she says “single-digit” numbers of tests requiring specific conditions have yet to be finished. Completion of those was slated for February.........

USAF Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, the Pentagon’s program executive officer, says the initial remedy is effective for a fault that caused a catastrophic fire in an F-35A’s Pratt & Whitney F135 engine last year, but the program is seeking to improve it. The fix—producing the polyimide engine lining with a “trench” for stators in the third-stage integrally bladed rotor roughly 1/8th of an inch deeper—has been approved for production aircraft, according to Chris Flynn, who served as Pratt’s F135 and F119 vice president during the engine fault investigation. The company aims to deliver the first set of “pre-trenched” stators in February, he says. By the first quarter of 2016, Pratt hopes to have added the fix to all engines in the fleet already fielded. “Hopefully, we don’t have to talk about this that much any more,” he says, acknowledging the engine fire and subsequent fleet grounding cost the program time............

[Hempy]

the F-35B will surpass the current capability of the AV-8B Harrier jump jet and F/A-18C twin-engine Hornets, the Marines say.

umm ooookay..in what decade?

http://www.voodoo-world.cz/hornet/u/armfa18.jpg

[Courtney Mil]

Good point, well made, Hempy.

[glad rag]

http://www.ausairpower.net/USN/000-Super-Bug-loadout.jpg

[rh200]

umm ooookay..in what decade?

Like all things, does it not depend upon how you define the metric?

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Really? Apples with apples here guys...

The AIM-7, Maverick, HARM, SLAM-ER, and Mk-82/83 slicks don't need to be integrated with F-35.

Shall we substitute these with AIM-120C/D, SDB II/Brimstone, AARGM (Block 4), JSM (Block 4A) and all the JDAM versions, and I'd argue the F-35 stacks up very well. Also, lets compare the F-35A's 18,500lb internal/external load with the Hornet's 12,500lb capacity.

Oh, and where is the F/A-18s's internal weapons bay? And do we want to compare internal fuel capacities?

[Maus92]

Yup, SH carries or will carry all those as well, and sooner in most cases and concurrently in others, excepting the Brimstone.

[glad rag]

Since when will a 35a fly off a carrier?

[LowObservable]

Glad rag - It might be possible once but it would be a short flight.

While we're all used to PowerPoint-vs.-real loadouts, it's quite difficult to get to the F-35's alleged 18,000 pounds. You have 11 stations, which looks impressive, but one is gunpod-only (maybe other non-droppable items later), four are single-purpose (2 x AIM-120, 2 X SRAAM), two are size-constrained and only two are wet.

[LowObservable]

This is interesting - see pp 14-15...

http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP02/20150226/102992/HHRG-114-AP02-Wstate-DunfordG-20150226.pdf

Today, there are a multitude of high risk regions where a crisis response operation would require large Joint strike packages to soften or blind the threat.... Such strike packages require coordination across services and combatant commands and take weeks and months to assemble.
This same kind of access can be attained with a single detachment of 4 to 8 F-35s.

It seems those aircraft would be pretty busy supporting CAP, doing ISR and generating strike packages - that's about the same number of SHARs that the Invincibles carried, just for hack-the-shad and a few other missions. Not to mention you still don't have AEW&C.

The sensors and communications equipment of our F-35s allow pilots and forward air controllers to see through the clouds to exchange high fidelity pictures in environments we would consider a no go today.

You what? Through the clouds = SAR/GMTI from a fighter radar. That doesn't sound like a source of "high-fidelity pictures" in a CAS context. And still no Rover yet.

Comments? GK121? Spaz? Anybody?

[MSOCS]

I think "high fidelity" is a "how long is a piece of string" question. Personally, if I can meet my ID criteria for a target with sufficient visual acuity that's good enough. In Gulf War 2 people were successfully doing it "in a CAS context" using gyro-stabilised binoculars from 20,000 feet. The SAR-map quality of modern radars is truly spectacular.

[LowObservable]

That's true to a point, but whether APG-81 can detect/track dismounts is a good question. 1-meter resolution is a nice map, but not really what JTACS are used to, and more importantly I can't keep that radar consistently on a ground target.

[MSOCS]

Yes LO, but these are being described correctly as "pictures", not video. Let's not muddy the waters. I don't for one second believe the article's quote was trying to compare the persistent field of view or resolution of a Lightning III or Sniper pod with that of a modern AESA SAR map. Given the choice I'd use the pod for CAS over SAR Map any day but the article makes a good point that, whereas in the past any ability to conduct CAS through cloud would be limited, the F-35 has a number of other strings to its bow. The same could be said for F-18 etc but they would undoubtedly be much more vulnerable in a "no go" area. As a pilot, I'd rather fly an F-35 on an opposed CAS mission in contested airspace over anything else.

[LowObservable]

As a pilot, I'd rather fly an F-35 on an opposed CAS mission in contested airspace over anything else.

If I was a JTAC, I'd have an arm-trembling death-grip on my lucky rabbit's foot if I had to give Mr MSOCS the old Cleared Hot on the basis of radar imagery.

[glad rag]

[QUOTE=MSOCS;8887731 As a pilot, I'd rather fly an F-35 on an opposed CAS mission in contested airspace over anything else.[/QUOTE]

Why? what is your reasoning behind that?

[uffington sb]

And if I were a grunt on the ground, I'd rather you and your several mates were flying A-10's, rather than a single, mustn't get shot down as it would look politically bad, F-35.
But what do I know, I'm neither a grunt or a pilot.

[MSOCS]

If I was a JTAC, I'd have an arm-trembling death-grip on my lucky rabbit's foot if I had to give Mr MSOCS the old Cleared Hot on the basis of radar imagery.

Thankfully Bill, you're a journo not a JTAC - however I would point out that there would be more than just a hunch and a Cleared Hot based on "radar imagery" in the scenario we're talking about. But you know that :=

Glad Rag - My reasoning is plentiful. In a contested, degraded, opposed battlespace, I'd rather be in an F-35 doing CAS than any other platform. It's no good being in an A-10 titanium cockpit if being shot down by a radar-guided SAM is an assured outcome. You're no good to the "grunt on the ground" if you can't get near where he/she needs you or you're a smoking pile of wreckage.

[Maus92]

CAS doctrine requires local air superiority. Anyway, I'm not so sure that using a SAR radar map would be wise with troops danger close on a fluid battlefield. Interdiction is another matter altogether, as well as selecting fixed targets away from contact.

LO: The Commandant is drunk on Kool Aid.

[MSOCS]

Yes Maus, it does but you know what? Air Superiority isn't guaranteed and sometimes you just have to get on with what you have and do the best you can for the guys and girls under fire.

My point is this; for many countries outside of the good 'ole USA, the F-35 offers the only tangible means of being self-sufficient in establishing that "local Air Superiority" and delivering success in a contested and complex environment without sustaining unpalatable aircraft losses. I sense you are taking the statement from the article too far. The challenging conditions of very poor weather, where the only means of establishing SA is to utilise a well-placed SAR map, is of low probability and duration. What the article clearly tries to state - and rather over-emphasises - is the utility of a 5th Generation platform, genuinely capable of conducting a number of roles in rather unique circumstances; it simply tries to accentuate the strengths under such circumstances and certainly doesn't mean that rationale applies to all scenarios and conditions.

Positive identification, either by direct ID or reference to features backed up by comm (voice or digital), is absolutely NOT akin to taking a SAR map and releasing a weapon, Danger Close, on a whim or hunch. Indeed, military CAS training involves a plethora of stressing scenarios to stretch the problem solving skills of both JTAC and aircrews to achieve the desired effects. Utilisation of a SAR map is one of many available "means" and not necessarily the "way".

[LowObservable]

I'll accept that SAR could be used in extremis (low cloud) as a CAS tool - a georegistered image on which the JTAC could place target coordinates; but two observations. First, it is not unique to the F-35 and second, that's not what anyone in Congress would have gathered from Dunford's remarks. "One meter" is not the everyday interpretation of high fidelity.

I'd be interested in comments on Dunford's win-the-war-with-eight-jets line. Does that not suggest that the QEs are three times bigger than they need to be? Because if I think back to my early CV briefs, the size started with sorties needed to win the war.

[MSOCS]

LO, I was very specific and careful to not say SAR is a unique capability to F-35 as I know fully well it isn't. The term unique refers to the ability of a 5th Gen platform such as the F-35 to operate "balls deep" in a battle space replete with varsity threat systems and conduct CAS, or any other mission within its design for that matter.

I also don't believe that you think for Congress so I challenge your opinion as to what those on the Hill "would have gathered" from Dunford's remarks. They are briefed to a much higher level than Aviation Week et al and smart enough to make their own minds up (cue typical politician cynicism).

You make an interesting point ref QE. Sadly I don't have the background.

[Turbine D]

Original quote by MSOCS: My point is this; for many countries outside of the good 'ole USA, the F-35 offers the only tangible means of being self-sufficient in establishing that "local Air Superiority" and delivering success in a contested and complex environment without sustaining unpalatable aircraft losses.
How can you possible know that? At the moment more doesn't work on the F-35 than works and that includes the engine that powers it. Save this kind of comment for sometime in the next decade. By then we will know whether it is the F-35 or the F-37 you are commenting on…

[Maus92]

F-35 advocates have the aircraft performing a wide array of tasks that other platforms traditionally perform: BMD to AWACS to ISR to EW (+ CAS) - in other words, and if one was to believe the hype - every mission sans logistics and troop transport. If the USN believed this, they would not be investing in E-2D, Growlers, and P-8s. They don't, and aren't doubling down on F-35.

[Maus92]

LO: why would one need a SAR map if the JTAC was passing you a coordinate? The JDAM doesn't need an image to hit its target. Maybe it would make the pilot feel more comfortable about attacking something he cannot see?

[LowObservable]

MSOCS - Dumb, smart or whatever. When you speak to Congress you speak to generalists, by definition. As you pick and choose what you say to them (and what you place on the record) you are shaping their awareness.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Careful MSOCS, don't mention the 'B' word or any publications, you'll likely receive a terse PM from LO or the mods!

[Basil]

From a trucky who wouldn't know an AMRAAM from an armchair; someone pointed me in the direction of this piece. His comments re the F-35 seem interesting.

How To Win In A Dogfight: Stories From A Pilot Who Flew F-16s And MiGs (http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/how-to-win-in-a-dogfight-stories-from-a-pilot-who-flew-1682723379)

Will the F-35's sensor fusion and low observability (stealth) allow it to overcome its lackluster maneuverability and kinetic performance against future enemies?

I can't answer this one. I can ask, "Why did they make it such a pig?"

If you had to fly any fighter into an air combat arena today, including an operational F-35A as an option, what would it be?

The F-22. It's a better jet than the F-35. It can carry at least as much, further and faster. If it was up to me I'd cancel the F-35 and start building more Raptors. A common counter to that is the cost to restart the F-22 assembly line. How much does one pig cost? Another is that the F-35 program is too far along. Yep, let's just keep paying for a poorly-managed, overly expensive fighter . .

Wiki says there isn't a carrier version of the F-22 and there's also an export ban.

[Lonewolf_50]

Wiki says there isn't a carrier version of the F-22 and there's also an export ban.
Indeed there is, which makes that fighter pilot's glib recommendation dead on arrival, no matter the cost of the pig. What I might suggest to that fighter jock is that ... the F-35 is your date to the dance, learn how to dance with her. :p

EDIT:
Weird letters appeared, now removed.

[busdriver02]

Basil, That's come up else where before. The short is that Spanky was commenting based on limited information and he admitted as much later. There is no doubt the F-35 is not the F-22 when it comes to kinematics, they were designed with different mindsets. Just looking at them parked next to each to other that much becomes obvious.

A lot of the hand wringing here seems to be about what it can currently do, which is to say not much. The thing is still in system design and development. From what I could find in 6-9 seconds on google we're about 5 years late to planned first IOC. Dudes I know in the program seem to think it will be an awesome jet in the next 5-10 years and is basically back on track if you ignore the 5 year setback.

The next question is if you look forward 5-10 years, what would the capability be of our legacy platforms in that threat environment? Third world ****-holes will probably still be just that, what we have now is fine. Near peer countries will still be nasty and the purvue of LO only platforms, legacy will be relegated to standoff munitions only, with their lengthy flight time. What about countries like Algeria (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_National_Army_%28Algeria%29#Air_Defense_Systems)? How many countries will be able to afford jumping from we're good to go to pretty scary? I don't think anyone knows for sure.

This whole thing is a lot more complicated than "the Air Force hates CAS, because the A-10 doesn't have a pointy nose and all they care about is the glory of shooting down planes" and other non-sense emotional arguments. I say all that as a slow ass helo pilot that would prefer the A-10 didn't go away anytime soon. But there is only so much money.

[Maus92]

The author of the piece posted a clarification on a well-known F-35 fan site - but not a retraction of his statements - basically saying the pilots will learn how the fight the F-35.

[busdriver02]

Fair enough, the F-35 is not an F-22. The F-35 is very similar to the F-16 when both are loaded for similar range and payload. The nature of LO means you have to carry everything internal, so your ability to jettison and bug out is reduced. It's just the nature of the beast.

By no means is the F-35 a BFM monster. But is it good enough? All the discussion of China and Russia all seem like WW3 discussions to me. I think the west will be challenged more by surface to air threats in the future as crappy little countries buy advanced SAMs. Let's face it, maintaining a credible air to air threat is stupid expensive, buying SAMs is way cheaper.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

The F-35 is very similar to the F-16 when both are loaded for similar range and payload.

errr....no!

An F-35A has a MTOW about 60% more than that of an F-16C, it also carries almost double the payload, has almost double the combat radius (on internal fuel alone), and has a several orders of magnitude lower RCS.

If you could load an F-35A to a similar fuel and loadout config as a maxxed out F-16C (which at about 45Klbs is probably impossible), it would eat the Viper for dinner and be back for cocktails and medals soon after!

Otherwise, nailed it!

[MSOCS]

The author of the piece posted a clarification on a well-known F-35 fan site - but not a retraction of his statements - basically saying the pilots will learn how the fight the F-35.

And Spanky elucidates what i've known for quite some time; that using "old-skool" trump card metrics as a basis to slate F-35 is not 100% valid; it isn't an apples-to-apples comparison.

I also know that, until the general public start reading about how the jet fares in live training and combat missions, the F-35 will continue to polarise peoples' views. So be it. Perhaps we can start calling the thread, "F-35 not cancelled, so what?"

For what it's worth, busdriver02 is on the money IMHO.

[Radix]

..........

[Lonewolf_50]

Perhaps we can start calling the thread, "F-35 not cancelled, so what?"
I vote yes on that one.
For what it's worth, busdriver02 is on the money IMHO.
Let's face it, maintaining a credible air to air threat is stupid expensive, buying SAMs is way cheaper. Indeed.

Also: Radix seems to be on the money, for the moment. ;)

The F-35 needs to be called by a nickname, just as the Fighting Falcon was called the Viper.
I say we use a NATO designation.

F-35 ... Foreplay. :E
(Why? CSN, that's why!)
It's been a long time coming

[MSOCS]

So then, how does the jet fare in live training missions? Any data yet?

Unfortunately, the performance and capability is (and will be) highly classified and you're really not going to hear a great deal in the public domain. Maybe a few throw-away lines; such as, "it's holding it's own against X,Y,Z" or, "in X missions we've seen great/average/poor success." It'll all be pithy i'm afraid.

I can say that those who are flying Operational Test and Evaluation will hold no punches in their assessments. Indeed, the feedback over the years at various OT EXCOMs from COMOPTEVFOR etc have swung from laudatory to scathing, depending on which area is being reported.

[LowObservable]

MSOCS - The high level of classification is part of the problem from both sides. The skeptics say that it prevents open discussion (and indeed prevents discussion at less-than-high class levels). The proponents complain that the skeptics are ill-informed (but insist that they be kept that way).

What we do all know is that the effectiveness of RCS reduction and LPI-LPD are parameters that have a colossal influence on force-on-force simulations. Turn those up to 11 and, yes, you'll be 400 or 600 per cent better in air-to-air than a Su-35 and eight times more effective than most things at ground attack.

Dial them back to 5 (for instance, assume some VHF detect/track and that you won't be able to achieve a high-Pk AMRAAM launch in conditions of total surprise) and the results will be different. If detection is mutual before weapon launch, then the old-skool metrics return to play.

With the same more modest assumptions, and dealing with an IADS (Busdriver), the comparison to a "legacy jet" (actually a modern aircraft using a combo of modest RCS reduction, high-end EW, SEAD/DEAD and standoff) is also different.

As for F-16 comparisons - it might be worth remembering that the F-16 IOC was around 40 years before the F-35 and the Hurricane was about 40 years before the F-16. So even if you get your numbers half right (which those cited above are not) the comparison has little validity,

[busdriver02]

Radix, snarky much? Cheers! Of course the answer is that it isn't doing much of **** yet. The five years of "progress hiatus" is more than a bit depressing.

LO, Foreplay doesn't really cover it, more like Tease.

The thing is, all that stuff is classified for a reason. Furthermore you can't expect the same advancement in aerodynamics from the Hurricane to the Block 10 Viper. Hell just look at the advancement from the B-29 to the B-52. There is a difference between development when something is completely new, to once a technology is mature.

I'm not sure which specs you're doubting. But you can do the math yourself as far as wing loading and acceleration times and compare to the F-16C/D, or you can go here: Not My Website (http://elementsofpower.********.com/) if you don't trust his math somewhere in there is a link to an F-16C/D performance charts. If your point of comparison is a clean block 52 with half internal fuel, gun and only 2x wingtip missiles, then no an F-35 can't hope to compete at BFM.

If you actually loaded them up and told a more reasonable story, they're very similar. Something more like full internal fuel (plus 2x wing tanks for the F-16) and 4x A-A missiles. At fight start the F-16 gets to drop it's tanks, but it's still full internal fuel since it's been feeding off the drops, the F-35 has burned off 5k pounds, the same fuel in 2x 370 gallon tanks. That results in 96lbs/sqft for the F-35 and 91lbs/sqft for the F-16, so pretty similar. If the mod to carry 6x AIM-120s ever happens that disparity shrinks. All that is Wikipedia numbers so take with a grain or two of salt.

As far as your IADS point, all of that high end EW and SEAD is much more effective with an LO platform. Standoff jammers can standoff a lot further if the jets going into the MEZ are LO and a big part of the problem being addressed is a MEZ that is much deeper than in the past.

I don't know how much you guys know about LO design but if you haven't read it, I recommend "The Radar Game (http://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/AFA/6379b747-7730-4f82-9b45-a1c80d6c8fdb/UploadedImages/Mitchell%20Publications/The%20Radar%20Game.pdf)" it's not all telling, but it does start to explain that "stealth" isn't about being invisible, but rather managing your signature in a predictable way.

There is no doubt that advanced electronic protection and RCS reduction measures that don't go all the way to internal carriage, would be better than legacy systems and wouldn't suffer the drag penalty of an LO platform the size of the F-35. I'm assuming you're referring to the Super Hornet here, which is somewhat amusing since that platform is notoriously draggy and bleeds energy with it's non-jettisonable pylons installed. And based on test reports the F-35 problems with drag are due to transonic wave drag not canted pylons and it actually accelerates very fast in the subsonic regime.

But at the end of the day all designs are compromises, in this case a decision was made to accept kinematics similar to legacy jets. In all fairness I'm guessing the F-35 is somewhere between an F-16 and F-18. In exchange it gets LO. At this point in the process, it's all the fancy avionics (software) that are really the test burden. After that it's a matter of integrating an insane number of weapons.

Is the F-35 perfect? No ******* way. But it's a far cry from the hand wringing, spittle flying, worst thing the military has ever bought abortion that APA would have people believe.

[Lonewolf_50]

But at the end of the day all designs are compromises, in this case a decision was made to accept kinematics similar to legacy jets. In all fairness I'm guessing the F-35 is somewhere between an F-16 and F-18. In exchange it gets LO. At this point in the process, it's all the fancy avionics (software) that are really the test burden.
The more serious kvetch about all that, to include all of that software, is how much it costs per unit.
After that it's a matter of integrating an insane number of weapons.
More cost. :cool:

[MSOCS]

The more serious kvetch about all that, to include all of that software, is how much it costs per unit.

This question is asked time and again on this forum. Today the cost is X and next year the cost is Y; a little later on when the production rate truly ramps up and the cost-curve starts to bottom out, the jet costs Z.

X>Y>Z. What are these figures? I don't care! I'm from the camp that says the value of anything is what you're prepared to pay for it.

If you view the F-35 through a cynical and hateful lens of doom then I understand your pain as you seemingly witness billions of tax dollars burn in front of your weeping eyes with nothing to show for it at this stage (other than jets coming off a production line and being tested....)

However, if you truly understand and appreciate the benefits F-35 will deliver, particularly if your country has a stake in its manufacture, you can rejoice in knowing that every tax dollar spent brings jobs, experience and an investment return for each aircraft made.

The exact cost isn't terribly easy to quote - that said, it is cheaper per unit than a B-2 or F-22 and I believe it to be comparable to Eurofighter.

[t43562]

Is the F-35 a "good deal" as a jobs and skills investment for any country other than the US? e.g. compared to the Eurofighter?

[melmothtw]

Is the F-35 a "good deal" as a jobs and skills investment for any country other than the US? e.g. compared to the Eurofighter?

If you believe the line put out by BAE Systems, as the only Tier 1 partner the UK is responsible for 15% of the JSF. From a UK perspective the USD1.5 trillion programme is expected to be worth about £30 billion to the national gross domestic product from 2009-36, and will account for over 24,500 UK jobs across a significant proportion of the country's aerospace industrial base.

[LowObservable]

Busdriver - Fanx. Helpful response.

The site you link to is the work of a perpetually cranky individual who has a tendency to mangle data. My own assessment (plus the odd bit of data along the way) is that the F-35A will accelerate quite quickly at subsonic speeds (and will outrun a lot of things if two 2K bombs are carried) but starts to run into the wall transonic and above, whether heavy or light. The culprit is a forebody that has to accommodate a regional jet engine standing on its end.

As for maneuver: I'm very wary of any calculations involving wing loading because the F-35A's ratio of net-to-gross wing area is off the charts. That's to say, the actual wings are much smaller than the 460 ft2 nominal (gross) area because the body is so wide. Nor is the front end particularly well shaped to develop lift efficiently.

This seems to have been a deliberate design trade: The F-35C has a much bigger wing to make its CV approach speed and isn't about to win drag races.

As far as your IADS point, all of that high end EW and SEAD is much more effective with an LO platform. Standoff jammers can standoff a lot further if the jets going into the MEZ are LO and a big part of the problem being addressed is a MEZ that is much deeper than in the past.

That's quite correct. But two points: The Radar Game, with which I am familiar, misses the relationship between RCS and burn-through range (where reflection = jamming power) which is nicely synergistic. When the F-22/35 LO technology got started, however, the US had a horrible history with automated EW and didn't remotely want to think about going that way. The Euros persisted and if you ask the French, moderate RCS reduction + jamming + standoff is a good balance.

The second point is that if you really want to exploit stealth and take the platform into the red zone, and you've already sacrificed much of the kinematics, maybe you should go all the way into all-aspect and wideband. The Radar Game doesn't mention this either, but this is the Neuron/Taranis/X-47 route.

If I was buying an AF I'd go for JAS 39Es and cruise missiles and use the spare cash for a few UCAVs. Because, pace MSOCS, the money spent on one thing cannot be spent on another.

[busdriver02]

LO, I don't think the lifting fan has as much of an impact on the non-B variants as you seem to imply. It certainly affects the B however. I think it has more to do with the requirement to internally carry a mk84 bomb body as well as an AIM-120 in the same bay. The bay ends up almost the same height as that big ass engine. But I think your first paragraph is generally on point.

I won't argue about that individual's crankiness, and he certainly misses the mark on why transonic acceleration is important but what part of his cocktail napkin math is off the mark in this case?

As far as the impact of body shaping and net vs gross wing area, I suspect that might have had a hand in the reduced sustained G spec. In other words, I suspect that it has a corner velocity commensurate with its "460ft^2" wing area and more modern airfoils, but that inefficient body lift shape (to paraphrase your words) means it'll bleed energy like a big dog. Ironically, in some respects that sounds a lot like the MIG-21 just with a 9g vs 7g limit and delta wing induced drag at fault vs inefficient body lift.

As to Radar Game: I really meant to introduce that for the masses. In as much as most people don't realize LO design isn't as simple as "make the RCS as small as possible." It's certainly simplistic, but does help those who still thing stealth is about being invisible.

As far as burn through and J/S ratios, my point was that a Growler could standoff much further and still provide support to an F-35 than it could from an F-16 for example. As far as self defense jamming, an LO platform will have a shorter burn through range than a non LO platform. As to EW advancement, the US all but abandoned EW with the push to LO. I think it's starting to come back to the table. We're starting to realize LO is not the panacea we thought it would be, and I hope EW

I don't think the F-35 has sacrificed "much of the kinematics" at least relative to what we currently have unless you toss the F-22 into the comparison. It's certainly not a clean F-16, but I think it's probably on par with a legacy fighter that has a bunch of missiles on the rail and dumped it's bombs and tanks but kept that rails.

The issue I have with standoff weapons is the time of flight. Short standoff is one thing, but longer range cruise missile are a different ballgame. If you're trying to hit a target that can pack up and move in 10 minutes, a 20 minute TOF is a problem; and yes I made up both of those numbers.

As far as the idea that reduced RCS+jamming+standoff weapons+UCAVs would an acceptable compromise versus the gold plated whole hog; well that probably goes to what the individual country desires as far as strategic objectives and what constitutes acceptable losses.

To end, LO I appreciate a level headed discussion that doesn't include hand wringing and foaming at the mouth about how much of a smelly pile of dung the F-35 may or may not be.

[glad rag]

bd02 smd2 quoted as [wait for it] max 40 min glide, open source........

"PULL" as they say in clay pigeon shooting circles.....:hmm:

[LowObservable]

By the way, what I really like about the combo of conventional fighter + cruise missile and UCAV is that it gives the defender three things to worry about: jamming, extreme low observables and extreme low altitude. Rather like the Aurora/Quartz combo but on a different scale.

The UCAV addresses the time-of-flight issue: Look at Neuron's sensors and planned test program and you can see where it's headed.

And before anyone complains about the cost of three systems: CMs have ICBM economics. You buy them and keep them in a bunker, fire one per year to see that it works and to validate S/W loads. UCAVs likewise fly minimally - put an appropriate pod on a Hawk for exercises.

[busdriver02]

I'd rather use two cruise missiles and stay hidden. I think the future will definitely be in ucavs of some sort. I just think it's further in the future than some think. The control link is still too vulnerable.

[NITRO104]

As far as your IADS point, all of that high end EW and SEAD is much more effective with an LO platform. Standoff jammers can standoff a lot further if the jets going into the MEZ are LO and a big part of the problem being addressed is a MEZ that is much deeper than in the past.
Consider this...North Korea (for example) can effectively close its airspace for any 'bomb slinging from stealth aircraft' action (including jamming), with only two AN/TPY-2 class radars, so you're back to cruise missiles anyway.
Sure, stealth provides some fighting comfort, but is it worth it in comparison to what the 'legacy' fleet can do with even fraction on money in terms of upgrades and procurement?

[busdriver02]

I don't agree with your assessment, but what makes you think the cruise missiles will fair any better?

I fail to see why you think 2 AWACs would somehow close the airspace over Korea. If that were the case, the whole DMZ problem would have been solved years ago. Detecting the pretense of an LO platform is a very different animal from being able to engage it.

[Radix]

.............

[orca]

I believe that once upon a deluded time they said that 'the bomber will always get through', which was of course nonsense, but cheered and scared in equal measure depending on whose bombers you were thinking about.

I have similar feelings about the 'cruise missile will always get through' school of thought. I don't buy it for a second. Some might, but to which locations? The heavily defended ones? Which tend (uncannily) to be where the baddies put their valuable stuff - I doubt it. Sure they did in previous conflicts and sure they will have a role to play in the future. But against high capability IADS I think that whilst they do have utility their day - of impervious attack of the high value list - might have been and gone.

Others will, naturally, disagree.

[t43562]

Is it possible to make stealthy cruise missiles?

[typerated]

Yes.
Very much so.

[Rhino power]

Is it possible to make stealthy cruise missiles?

AGM-129 and AGM-158 are both LO missiles, although AGM-129 was withdrawn in 2012...

-RP

[NITRO104]

I don't agree with your assessment, but what makes you think the cruise missiles will fair any better?
Because it's much cheaper to saturate the defense with cruise missiles than with the F35s.

I fail to see why you think 2 AWACs would somehow close the airspace over Korea. If that were the case, the whole DMZ problem would have been solved years ago. Detecting the pretense of an LO platform is a very different animal from being able to engage it.AN/TPY-2 isn't AWACS surveillance, but a mobile ground engagement installation with a range that pushes any bomb slinging out of the question.
N.Korea aside, if Chinese lay their hands on such a radar however (providing they haven't already) you're most likely back to square one, but with only half or less of the total TAC inventory compared to legacy fleet and since you'll probably end up shooting cruise missiles anyway, does the LO requirement justify the cost difference and what's the bottom line in comparable fleets' efficiency?

Don't get me wrong, I'm all about the progress.
It's just that I don't see it coming with F35 as it has been advertised.

[busdriver02]

I think having enough cruise missiles on hand to saturate a modern IADS is more expensive than you think. Regardless, even with LO aircraft, the future will still include cruise missiles. It's not really an either or thing; same deal for tailless UAVs. They'll come on line and get integrated into a bigger pie.

AN/TPY-2,
Touche, my brain automatically saw and typed apy vs tpy into google. The THAAD radar may be a really long range X band radar but that doesn't mean nothing gets in either.

[NITRO104]

I agree and LO has its uses.
I'm just not sure if on the scale of an entire fleet.
After all, one F35A buys you about 100 KEPD350 cruise missiles.

[Maus92]

I think having enough cruise missiles on hand to saturate a modern IADS is more expensive than you think.

Consider mixing decoys within the cruise missile attack.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

The site you link to is the work of a perpetually cranky individual who has a tendency to mangle data.

Oh LO, I think you've been in the US too long and your sense of irony has gradually depleted!

[orca]

Are these swarms of LO cruise missiles with embedded EW of some kind going to be air launched? If so then wouldn't it be best to strap them to LO aircraft which could be used on the other days of the war when those parts of the IADS that survived the opening salvo were still around?

Even if you dispute the need for LO aircraft one assumes most on this forum would support a Gen 4 delivery device - which would have to be kept in service alongside the LO CM stockpile. Sounds expensive.

I wonder what plan B would be in these situations?

'LO CMs haven't brought the diplomatic response we were hoping for Sir and whilst we have degraded the IADS we haven't rolled it back to the extent that Gen 4 can cope with.'
'In that case my boy, send in Gen 5!'
'We didn't buy any of those Sir, we thought a Gen 4, drone mix plus CMs would crack it'
'Awesome, let's go home.'

[LowObservable]

There's nothing quite as stealthy as a target that is on the other side of 50 million tons of rock. (Universally available and cheap terrain data, and computer processing/memory improvements, have done wonders for the flexibility of terrain/imagery referenced navigation.) And quite simple LO measures like a flat top and inlets concealed under the wings and body can give the best AEW&C a hard time, when target is deep into the terrain clutter.

There's not a lot of good, active defense. although the Russians and Chinese both use gun/missile Shorads to protect relocatables. The best bet is to rely less on fixed facilities, the counter to which is adding more smarts (even a datalink) to the missile.

On the other hand - if you're going in to stooge around in your 5genTM Wunderwaffe, looking for S-400s and TELs inside the red bubble, you need to make sure that your signature allows you to do that. X-band dominated bowtie may cut it. It may not. Don't want to find out which, the wrong way.

TPY-2 is a very powerful X-band radar that looks up in the sky for inbound ballistic missiles. over a fixed sector. Not a lot of good for air defense.

[Lonewolf_50]

@MC If you view the F-35 through a cynical and hateful lens of doom As I don't, the rest of your petulance is ignored.

It doesn't require cynicism to see what the JSF impact on acquisition was while I was still on active duty. It had impact on programs and projects I was directly involved with. I got to do some small amount of work on the Joint decisions regarding bases for initial f-35 training, but I'd rather not resurrect that painful period in my life. The program has lumbered along and the bird is up in the air ... progress is being made. What hasn't changed is how JSF acts as the 800 pound gorilla in the acquisition of weapons systems. Why? Because it costs a lot?
Is it worth it? We don't know, yet. (I hope it is, for a lot of reasons).

Similar impacts arose with, for example, F-18 E/F and some of the USn submarine programs. Bit ticket items do things to finite (even if quite large in absolute terms) defense budgets.

The F-18 has over time shown to be a good platform. It received a non-trivial amount of criticism during its development and its early years in IOC. It is no surprise to anyone who has been around a while to see JSF getting its share of criticism ... it comes with the badge and the winning of the award ... over a decade ago.

So, what do you get for your money in the F-35?
We don't know yet.

What we do know is that it is expensive.

[PhilipG]

Besides the F35 being as agreed expensive, as the IOC is so delayed, nations who bought into the cheap to purchase and cheap to operate 5th generation fighter / attack plane, are having to fund the continuing high costs of their long in the tooth 4th generation fleets.

A combination of the above and the recent financial uncertainty of most of the world would suggest that the resources are not necessarily there to purchase the planned number of planes. Or am I missing the plot?

[Lonewolf_50]

Phil, I think that major theme is directly linked to the first post in this thread. :ok:

[kbrockman]

Interesting DoT&E report ;
http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2014/pdf/dod/2014f35jsf.pdf

summary;
Not Ready for Prime Time (http://www.pogo.org/our-work/straus-military-reform-project/weapons/2015/not-ready-for-prime-time.html)

DOT&E Report: The F-35 Is Not Ready for IOC and Won't Be Any Time Soon

Cooking the Numbers
Testing Being Deferred, Not Completed
Significant Safety Risks Are Still Unresolved
Wing Drop Concerns
Engine Problems Continue to Hold the F-35 Program Back
Dangerous Helmet Failures
Initial Combat Capabilities for the Marien Corps Variant Will Be Even More Limited Than Planned
ALIS Software Failures
Software Snarls Jeopardize Combat Suitability
Hiding Today's Failings While Building a Huge Future Cost "Bow Wave"
A Maintenance Nightmare
Conclusion: Exquisitely Limited Capability

[LowObservable]

Nothing specifically new there - but a reminder of how far we have to go on an aircraft that is supposed to be "operational" this year.

[ORAC]

And in this I call massive bull****. This is a fundamental area of data integration in many layers of sensor integration; it's incredibly complex in even ground based supercomputer based systems. The fact they've called in outside experts, outside the base software team, shows they're panicking....


F-35 Software Challenge Won't Delay IOC (http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/03/24/f35-software-fusion-challenge-ioc-marine/70388664/)

WASHINGTON — The F-35B joint strike fighter remains on track to go operational for the Marine Corps this year, despite a recently discovered software fusion problem that manifests itself when multiple F-35 sensor suites attempt to communicate.

Lt. Gen. Chris Bogdan, the head of the F-35 Joint Program Office, said the problem with the targeting software is being worked by a team of experts from inside and outside the Pentagon, and expressed confidence the issue would be solved relatively shortly. He also notedthe Marines are aware of the issue and have decided it is not anything that should prevent them from reaching initial operating capability (IOC) with the 2B software package.

The software issue highlighted by Bogdan involves the sensor fusion that occurs between F-35 jets. The fighter is designed to gather information through its sensor suites and share it with other F-35s in the area, with up to four jets gathering situational awareness data and creating a joint operational picture for the pilots.

In most cases, Bogdan told reporters Tuesday, the software fusion worked well. But in the most extreme cases, with multiple air and ground threats affecting a set of four F-35s, "we found out that the fusion model sometimes, not all the time, sometimes creates an inaccurate picture for the pilot," he said. "If there is a single ground threat, a surface-to-air missile [battery] on the range, and I have four F-35s all with their sensors on and operating flying into that airspace to see that one threat, what we want to have happen is we want, no matter which airplane is picking up the threat, from whatever angles and sensors, to correctly identify that single threat and then pass that information [to] all four airplanes, so all four pilots are looking at the same threat in the same place at the same time," Bogdan explained.

But during testing, operators found the F-35 system had trouble identifying if the target was one target or multiple, something Bogdan said was a result of each plane looking at the target from a slightly different angle or using different sensors. In response, Bogdan's team has began work to fix the issue, including bringing in outside software fusion experts and having them consult with Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor on the F-35.

In the meantime, the Marines are able to operate the jet by changes in the concept of operations used in flights. Although Bogdan was unwilling to go into operational details, he noted one potential workaround could involve breaking up the four-ship F-35s in favor of two two-ship pairings.......

[rh200]

Interesting, sounds like a resolution problem in either, or both the spatial and time domain. Hence not able to determine their the same object by the time everyone gets around to talking each other and comparing cards.:p

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

an aircraft that is supposed to be "operational" this year.

Just keep redefining "Operational" till it meets what you have. Don't forget to tell the enemy that they have to downgrade their threat to be below the new definition - otherwise they are cheating!! :=

[PhilipG]

The reported fusion problems might have something to do with the Marines trying to achieve it on a bare bones hardware and 2B software. All other arms have decided to at least wait until the technical refresh of the systems, which I understand brings much greater processing power, might be helpful in the fusion area.

[ORAC]

http://www.community-credit.com/images/GuidanceSoftware.jpg

[Hempy]

Lt.Gen. Bogdan is starting to remind me of someone..

http://cdn.meme.am/instances/500x/54427137.jpg

[LowObservable]

Hempy, don't be mean.

Fox3 - That's been the idea for a while. Marine IOC is a joke. M=1.2/40000 feet, two AMRAAMs tops, no Rover and no gun. It can do an F-117-like fixed-target mission but that's totally not what Marine air does. And one squadron at most (aircraft built since 2013 can't run 2B). For the time being, too, it seems to be sucking down a lot of effort (aircraft mods and flight test - and presumably this latest S/W patch won't work on Block 3).

It's not that other aircraft have not had limited IOCs, but most were at least on a path that led directly to FOC or at least a robust interim capability.

Orca - Right, this does seem something rather basic to be working on at this stage. The question is where the problem occurs (also whether it is A-A or A-G or both). If the individual fusion engine on each aircraft is coming up with a fuzzy target location (after combining different sensors with different accuracy in az-el and range, and different scan rates) then sharing across four ships means everyone sees four targets. You could, I suppose, put in a S/W patch that plays eeny-meeny-miny-mo and picks one of them. Rather far from ideal, however.

Another issue (in A-A) is that the main sensors will be passive EW and radar. There's no IRST except a function in EOTS, which has a restricted look-up angle and is not the same thing as Pirate or Skyward-G. When fitted, IRST has a big contribution to fusion because of its az-el accuracy and speed.

[NITRO104]

Bulkheads, bulkheads...a kingdom for the bulkheads.
(http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/us-marines-stick-to-f-35b-dates-despite-new-problems-410518/)
Meanwhile, Bogdan also says he is worried about the integrity of the F-35B’s aluminium 496 bulkhead, which bears critical structural loads where the trailing edge of the wing attaches to the aft fuselage. In 2004, programme officials reduced the weight of the F-35B by about 1,360kg (3,000lb). Those changes included switching the bulkhead material from titanium to lighter-weight aluminium.

The lighter bulkhead has since proved susceptible to structural cracking, requiring a series of “patches” all over the 496 bulkhead. There are now so many patches that programme officials are concerned it may be necessary to redesign the bulkhead for production aircraft, Bogdan says.

[turtle12]

I've been away for a couple of months doing other things. If the attached has been shown before then please forgive me. My US mate thinks that it is probably kosher.

Not Ready for Prime Time (http://www.pogo.org/our-work/straus-military-reform-project/weapons/2015/not-ready-for-prime-time.html)

[Courtney Mil]

Thank you for the link, Turtle. The report confirms a lot of what we've been seeing for some time. My thought at the end was, "Which senior officer is going to have the balls to say it's not up to the task when told to declare a combat ready force?"

[Not_a_boffin]

The DOT&E report is one thing and there are undoubtedly still issues to resolve with the aircraft.

Not sure the POGO site could be described as entirely objective though........

[Courtney Mil]

Apart from some predictions, I had trouble working out which bits weren't true. I don't suppose the Project Office and Government press releases are exactly "on the nail". Maybe there is a world somewhere between the two.

I think the thing that makes it all seem a dubious is the fact that claims are being made about a project that is already being measured against such massively altered benchmarks. We've seen this done before, haven't we? I dislike the dishonesty of such politics.

Time for some better news. Where's Spaz to shine a lovely light and tell us all is well and that F-35 is nearly as good as the A-4?

[CoffmanStarter]

Where's Spaz ...

He's just been promoted to the post of F-35 Desk Officer at the MOD ;)

[Courtney Mil]

Now that is good, Coff!!! :ok::D

[Lima Juliet]

Since Block 2B is the first block to have any claimed combat capability, that IOC—if and when it is declared—will be lacking required 2B “operationally-relevant … performance” combat capabilities, according to the DOT&E report. Those capabilities and their flight tests are now deferred to later Blocks 3i and 3F, which introduce an all-new computer but will not have “Full Operational Capability” (FOC). The first FOC system will be Block 4, currently scheduled to be declared fully capable in 2022—assuming no further schedule slips in the intervening seven years.

Won't the QE Class be in mid life refit by then!!?

LJ:(

[Turbine D]

Where's Spaz to shine a lovely light and tell us all is well and that F-35 is nearly as good as the A-4?

I assumed he was called back to Lockheed Martin Headquarters to develop the strategy, telling the world, how good the LM Littoral Combat Ship is. It has been determined not to be survivable in combat situation… Spaz will sort that out…;):cool:

[LowObservable]

N-a-B - I would second the comment that POGO, overall, has been a better source of information over the years than LM or the program office.

The fusion issue remains a bit murky. Apparently the "patch" that allows four aircraft to share targets involves Link 16, which works but isn't very stealthy, to say the least.

The Marines are also falling back on the "it's much better than what we have now", which is not a huge deal, considering that they have AV-8Bs (1970s-80s with no core avionics upgrade that I can think of) and falling-to-bits F/A-18 Classics. They used the same line for decades comparing the V-22 with the CH-46.

One general observation: when the Marines and the AF talk up the wonders of the F-35's situational awareness and sensor fusion, consider that almost all their aircraft today (the F-22 is the exception) have early-80s, first-gen-glass cockpits. Aside from the F-22 the only U.S. type that has some degree of fusion is the Super Hornet, and guess which service is the least excited about the F-35...

[Lonewolf_50]

LO, the Marine Hornets are mostly C/D's. ;)

[Turbine D]

It appears that the US House of Representatives have come up with an overall spending budget for the first time in years. For the Defense sector, they are going to increase spending but are putting that increase in a special fund to cover costs of overseas military spending, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, etc. There appears to be no increase in spending for acquisition of new aircraft beyond that of the sequester spending. This budget will need to be reconciled with the US Senate budget.
Buried in the POGO article was a link to this from a guest respondent:

Submitted by Another Guest (from Australia) at: March 25, 2015
Col Michael W. Pietrucha, USAF, wrote a 24 page article in Air and Space Power Journal, "The Comanche and the Albatross: About Our Neck Was Hung". He has got a good point why the F-35 must be cancelled now. The F-35 is based on a belief that radar low observability will remain effective against future air defence threats. Although true for the F-117 against Iraq’s Kari system in 1991, stealthiness is unlikely to remain so against an adversary that has two decades to prepare for US stealth fighters, which have much higher infrared, visual, and emitter signatures than did the F-117. Outside China and Russia, no massive threat from an advanced integrated air defence system exists. Moreover, China is a poor example of a threat to cite if someone is trying to justify a short-ranged fighter with limited payload flown from island bases within range of overwhelming missile attack. Losses of US aircraft have mainly been helicopters since the Vietnam war and fixed wing losses were not shot down. Only Russia and China can pose the kind of anti-access, area denial (A2AD) environment that justifies a massive investment in stealth. These facts make the risk calculation involved with prioritising stealth over performance, range, and weapons loadout inherently suspect—and the F-35 might well be the first modern fighter to have substantially less performance than its predecessors. Col Michael W. Pietrucha's Proposal. • Maintain a limited number of F-35As (those already purchased) as a replacement for the capabilities lost upon retirement of the F-117; (To me the limited number of F-35As need to be sent to AMARC and to be recycled) • Create a modernised Tactical Air Force fleet consisting of a high-low mix of modernised F-15 and F-16 legacy fighters, light attack aircraft, and multi-purpose jet trainer / attack aircraft; • Recover some “sunk cost” of the F-35 program by using advanced systems to modernise older fighters, in effect fielding fifth-generation systems in fourth-generation airframes; • Restore the Air Force’s SEAD/EW (Suppression of Enemy Air. Defences - Electronic warfare) fighters and crews; • Expand the service’s global reach capabilities by providing deployable Tactical Air Force assets that can operate from short, rough airstrips on a logistical shoestring • Increase the number of absorbable cockpits to the point where the Air Force can augment the inventory of fighter/attack aviators to meet requirements; • Invest in affordable, exportable “light combat aircraft” derived from Air Education and Training Command’s T-X program; • Allow the Air Guard to maintain its position as the operational reserve and “relief valve” for experienced fighter/attack aviators while recapitalizing its portion of the CAF; and • Build a Tactical Air Force that can meet the nation’s demands for air-power capabilities even in the face of increasing fuel costs and decreasing budget.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Outbreak of common sense.

"Burn him, he's a witch!" ;)

p.s. My money (and the polls) is on the next Canadian Government being minority Liberal, in which case the Super Hornet is most likely to be selected as Canada's next fighter.

[Turbine D]

Fox,
I sincerely hope you win your bet and the Super Hornet is selected, keeping the Boeing production line open. The USN will need more E/Fs given the F-35 state of affairs. I was in the aerospace business starting in 1961, retiring in 2000, but then doing some consulting work. Other than the F-111 fiasco (McNamara's Folly), there has never been another military program botched as badly as this F-35 program, involving nearly every facet of airplane in total, doing so at unbelievable expense to taxpayers and other defense programs. I do like Col. Pietrucha's solutions. Then, there is that famous song with the line "Know When To Hold Em and Know When To Fold Em".;)

[NutLoose]

Late Friday afternoon, less than a week after Defense Secretary Leon Panetta issued dire warnings about the pending defense cuts, the Pentagon announced that it had grounded its next generation F-35 fighter because of engine problems. This was the second time in two months the plane has been taken out of service.

Friday afternoon is Washington’s preferred time to release bad news and hope reporters, already thinking about the weekends, will turn a blind eye. But after this latest failure, the problems with the F-35 are simply too numerous to ignore.

Equally impossible to ignore is the $1.5 trillion price tag for one of the biggest failures in Pentagon history. $1.5 trillion is the cost of operating the air craft for 55 years, an amount that has been consistently increased as the program drags on. It’s the most expensive weapons system the Pentagon has ever commissioned. And as problems mount, there are growing concerns that the F-35 will never fly a combat mission.

“This was a huge mistake. We were warned about it in the 1990s by some prescient people. Those people were ignored,” said Winslow Wheeler, a long-time Congressional staffer who now is the director of the Straus Military Reform Project. “We’re living the consequences of the bad, fundamental design of the airplane and bad, fundamental design of the acquisition plan.”

PROBLEMS FROM THE START
The Pentagon commissioned the F-35 during the Clinton presidency. Lockheed Martin was chosen as the manufacturer.

Right now, each branch of the military has their own planes, meaning that numerous contracts existed with different contractors. Lockheed was expected to lower the cost of air defense by creating redundancies between the branches. It was ordered to produce three different versions of the F-35: the Marine version could take off and land vertically; the Navy version would be designed to take off from air craft carriers; and the Air Force version would take off from traditional runways. The Pentagon ordered nearly 2,500 planes for $382 billion, or fifty percent more than the original cost.

As the price soared, the Pentagon in 2010 deemed the program “too big to fail.” Yet it continues to fall short. Recent engine troubles are just the latest in a series of mechanical failures. A pilot was killed when oxygen to the cabin was cut off. The aircraft are running too hot, limiting their ability to operate in warm environments.

The original delivery date was supposed to be 2010. Then it was delayed until 2012. Now, it’s not expected to be in service until 2019.

But when they are put into active use, they have multiple tactical problems. They don’t have a long range, so they need to be close to the field of battle. They lack the weapons systems to adequately support ground forces. And they’re at a disadvantage in a dogfight because of limited turning capability.

Even if the planes were perfectly functional, they were built for a different era. The United States has unsurpassed global air superiority. If the F-35 order is filled, DOD will have 15 times as many planes as China. The F-35 was designed to fight a war between large military powers, not ones against insurgents in Mali.

NO POLITICAL OVERSIGHT
As failures have mounted, numerous lawmakers have slammed the Pentagon and Lockheed for their failure to deliver. Sen. John McCain, R-Az., in 2011 said “We cannot afford aircraft that doubles or triples the estimated cost.” Claire McCaskill, the Democratic Senator from Missouri, told Pentagon leaders that she “need[s] to know whose fault this is.” Yet the program continues to be funded.

In response to lawmaker complaints, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates restructured the program and fired its manager. Current Secretary Leon Panetta has also called for improvements to the program, and has said the delays are unacceptable.

But according to Wheeler, lawmakers on Capitol Hill and officials at the Pentagon refuse to acknowledge that they might be throwing money at a program that has not, and might not ever, produce a usable aircraft.

“It’s certainly not too big to fail. It already has failed,” he said. “Cancelling this thing and proceeding with a properly conceived aircraft would be cheaper and better.”
David Francis


Read more at LiveLeak.com - The Pentagon?s Incredible $1.5 Trillion Mistake (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=1f6_1427769814#WkEGtlkws3XOLjE6.99)

[Archimedes]

NL - forgive me, but is that posted as a reminder of the article?

I only ask, since those new to the debate won't necessarily realise it appeared two years ago (NB reference to Panetta as SECDEF)... It first appeared here (http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/02/26/The-Pentagons-Incredible-1-5-Trillion-Mistake#page1), and the Liveleak page appears to have run it without any clues that the piece is old.

[NutLoose]

Forgive me Archimedes, I went on the date of the article at the bottom, unaware it was regurgitated info.

Added: 1 day ago Occurred On: Mar-30-2015

[MSOCS]

It seems old news is good news, especially if it's another dagger in the back.

Did someone really die in an F-35 due to Oxy issues? Really?! Or was it actually an F-22?! This regurgitated article has more holes than Swiss cheese.

[CoffmanStarter]

Interesting piece on the 'All Singing-n-Dancing' F-35 Bonedome ... makes the old Mk1a look positively prehistoric :eek:

Washington Post : F-35 360 View Bonedome (http://www.washingtonpost.com/posttv/national/a-fighter-pilot-helmet-with-360-degrees-of-sky/2015/04/01/30123c52-d267-11e4-8b1e-274d670aa9c9_video.html)

[RAFEngO74to09]

CoffmanStarter,

Fantastic helmet with an amazing capability - and so it should be for $400K !

[airsound]

Interesting piece by Guy Norris and Amy Butler in Aviation Week.
The F-35 (http://awin.aviationweek.com/ProgramProfileDetails.aspx?pgId=613&pgName=Lockheed+Martin+F-35+JSF) Joint Strike Fighter has been flown in air-to-air combat maneuvers against F-16s (http://awin.aviationweek.com/ProgramProfileDetails.aspx?pgId=611&pgName=Lockheed+Martin+F-16) for the first time and, based on the results of these and earlier flight-envelope evaluations, test pilots say the aircraft can be cleared for greater agility as a growth option. One thing it doesn't mention, however, is what the scores were!

F-35 Tested Against F-16 In Basic Fighter Maneuvers | Defense content from Aviation Week (http://aviationweek.com/defense/f-35-flies-against-f-16-basic-fighter-maneuvers?NL=AW-05&Issue=AW-05_20150403_AW-05_274&YM_RID=%27email%27&YM_MID=%27mmid%27&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_1)

airsound

[Rhino power]

test pilots say the aircraft can be cleared for greater agility as a growth option...

In other words, if you want it to perform better, it's gonna cost even more dollar! Surely the best performance it can achieve should be available straight off the bat, and not some (paid for) 'growth option'? Or am I missing something?

-RP

[ORAC]

test pilots say the aircraft can be cleared for greater agility as a growth option... = Its a dog - don't care what it costs, it's got to do better.....

[Martin the Martian]

Well, reading the article I can only come to the conclusion that the F-35 came off second best, cos' if it had won the DoD and LM would be shouting it from the rooftops. This 'greater agility as a growth option' has spin doctor written all over it, unfortunately.

[ORAC]

LjLFKmRk16E

[LowObservable]

Interesting story indeed...

Back in the Stone Age, a senior guy from an airplane company not a million miles from Foat Wuff told me how they were breaking "agility" down into two components: Maneuverability, measured by the established Boydian things like Ps, wing loading and T/W, and controllability, which meant removing envelope limits, being able to roll at high alpha (which was a limitation on his main product at the time), and generally being able to change energy states quickly and in a way of your own choosing.

FW's always been good at flight controls, so it is hardly surprising that a postively-to-neutrally stable airplane with big aft H-tails has a big controllable envelope.

But apparently the program doesn't want to talk about the classic Boydian measures, or about how quickly you can get out of a high-alpha low-airspeed position (that is, you don't want to be a grape). However, they do seem to be scrabbling around for marginal improvements by tinkering with control laws, which tells its own story, does it not?

Note that the FW conversation cited above was around the time that MiGs were doing tailslides and Sus were doing cobras, and the rip against those was in terms of controllability - you could do it but everyone knew where you were going next. The Su-35 shows how that has been fixed with 3-axis vectoring and integrated thrust/vector/aero control.

[tubby linton]

The aircraft is going to be a bargain if you believe this article:
https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-f-35-will-cost-significantly-less-than-you-think/

[airsound]

I'm inclined to agree with you Martin, when you say
Well, reading the article I can only come to the conclusion that the F-35 came off second best, cos' if it had won the DoD and LM would be shouting it from the rooftops. This 'greater agility as a growth option' has spin doctor written all over it, unfortunately.But I'm a bit surprised that AvWeek didn't include a bit of OpEd indicating what they thought was the strength of their story. The comments under the online version do pick all the expected holes.

airsound

[LowObservable]

Right, TL - A perfect example of how spin works. UK Defence Journal (which appears to be a one-man op) even cites the original DoD release, which makes it perfectly clear that the "cost reductions" are based on general economic projections and have ****-all to do with whether the jet takes fewer manhours to build, breaks less often or takes less time to fix.

[Turbine D]

LO,
the "cost reductions" are based on general economic projections
The latest economic "spin projection" to come up for the F-35 is reduced operational costs resulting from current cheap oil. Cheaper oil leads to cheaper jet fuel, therefore, the F-35 benefits and the US DoD is taking advantage of this in their forward looking operational cost projections. No mention of revised future projections should the cost of oil rise…

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

When they want balanced and informative articles written about the F-35, AvWeek sends Guy & Amy. When they don't, well...we know who they send!

[orca]

I personally found the story of test pilots engaged in air-to-air work brilliant. Haven't laughed so much in weeks. Test pilots! In combat training! Fabulous. I thought wind ups were a thing of the past, and they even got it into the press. Well done to all concerned!;)

[glad rag]

Nice one orca but perhaps slightly too intellectual for those blinded by the lightning...

[ORAC]

Interesting post by MandS in the article comments section yesterday.....

[LowObservable]

MandS aka Kurt Plummer aka Lop Eared Galoot (LEG) is always interesting. But so far out, sometimes, that it's hard to tell whether his stream-of-consciousness databursts can be relied on.

[TLB]

I personally found the story of test pilots engaged in air-to-air work brilliant. Haven't laughed so much in weeks. Test pilots! In combat training! Fabulous. I thought wind ups were a thing of the past, and they even got it into the press. Well done to all concerned!Prior to becoming test pilot for the Eurofighter; then the F-16; and now the F-35, Canadian Billie Flynn spent 20 plus years as a CF-18 fighter pilot in the Canadian Air Force. His final flying tour was as Commanding Officer of 441 Tac Ftr Sqn where he lead his squadron into combat during the Kosovo Air Campaign from Aviano.

I think he knows a thing or two about combat training !

[orca]

And possibly an iota or more about banter?;)

[Bevo]

I personally found the story of test pilots engaged in air-to-air work brilliant. Haven't laughed so much in weeks. Test pilots! In combat training! Fabulous. I thought wind ups were a thing of the past, and they even got it into the press. Well done to all concerned!;)

orca,

As a member of SETP I have to respond. With 187 combat missions in the F-4 in SEA and and three year operational tour RAF Lakenheath, I was selected to attend the USAF Test Pilot School. After flying system and weapons testing in the F-15 at Eglin AFB, I was selected to join the Navy Operational Test squadron, VX-4, at NAS Point Mugu, where I did operational testing on the F-14 and F/A-18 including tactics development for mixed F-14-F/A-18 formations.

Sooo it is quite possible that the Operational Test Pilots who flew these missions where capable of making some kind of judgement on the capability of the F-35; meager as that might be. :)

[orca]

And, having made that judgement, they can scratch their unworldly grey matter and arrive at a considered opinion as to whether I was serious or not.;)

[glad rag]

Touchy ain't they.......:hmm:

[Bevo]

Hey -We have big watches and big egos to protect. :p

[rh200]

big watches and big egos

Obviously a compensation measure:E

[david parry]

F135 Fix Nears Completion As Production Ramps Up | Defense content from Aviation Week (http://aviationweek.com/defense/f135-fix-nears-completion-production-ramps?NL=AW-05&Issue=AW-05_20150407_AW-05_427&YM_RID='email'&YM_MID='mmid'&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_1)

[ORAC]

The fix that isn't a fix......

[glad rag]

Well it does seem to be an awfully long drawn out remedial process( that in fact is not the final solution) that we were led to believe would be ready last December..
The comments in the article seem completely fair and well worth taking on board.

The projects big problem, as I can see it, is any technical superiority the airframe had to start with has been completely eroded by both the failure of the prime contractors to deliver on time (we won't go near budget) and the quality of the opposition to develop counters to the airframe technology...

[LowObservable]

Much the same as transonic roll-off, where the "fix" is presumably to stay out of the zone where it happens.

"Doctor, my back goes into spasm when I bend over to tie my shoes."

"Here's a prescription for a pair of loafers. Next patient, nurse!"

The question is whether and how it is being demonstrated that the excess flex is not going to cause other problems over the engine's projected lifetime.

[Hempy]

The engine maker also aims to define a long-term solution by the middle of this summer

It's obviously not a fix if they still don't know how to fix it..

I'm offering 20/1 that their 'definition' (by July/August...lol) is nowhere near definitive. Any takers?

[Turbine D]

The engine maker also aims to define a long-term solution by the middle of this summer
It's obviously not a fix if they still don't know how to fix it..

They know how to fix it with some help, concession from the customers.
The concession is adding more weight. So without the weight concession, I can't imagine what the fix might be.

The basic F135 engine design for the F-35 came from the F119 engine for the F-22 fighter. Both engines have about the same diameter, the F135 is 17 inches longer than the F119, mainly to accommodate one more LPT stage than the F119 has. The dry weight of the F135 is 150 pounds more than the F119, but with the aerodynamic changes to the fan and additional LPT stage, it produces 8,000 pounds of additional thrust in afterburner than does the F119.

However, that additional thrust is really needed to power the overweight F-35 aircraft. Adding engine weight to stiffen the engine backbone to stop flexing diminishes engine thrust to weigh ratio. Thrust to weight ratio can usually be improved upon by increasing turbine temperatures, but the turbines are already running at max or too hot which decreases turbine component life. So you see the probable dilemma.:(

[ORAC]

Pity they don't have an alternate engine. Ohh, wait......... :hmm:

[Courtney Mil]

If the "fix" is so good, as they claim in the article, why is it only interim?

Why do I feel that my tax Euros are not earning me a completely honest picture?

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Because not a single cent of your Tax Euros is honestly spent? Which is why the EU's auditors haven't signed off the accounts for the last 19 years. ;)

[O-P]

I've just been looking at the spec for the T-X (T-38) replacement, and it has F-16D written all over it. I suspect, again my cynical side, that once the T-X (New model F-16) wins then the F-35 buy will plummet.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

And yet no one, not even Lockheed, is proposing an F-16 for T-X...

[david parry]

U.S. Marines Prep for F-35B Ops Trials on USS Wasp | Defense content from Aviation Week (http://aviationweek.com/defense/us-marines-prep-f-35b-ops-trials-uss-wasp?NL=AW-05&Issue=AW-05_20150409_AW-05_781&YM_RID='email'&YM_MID='mmid'&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_1_b)

[Hempy]

Operators will assess the ability of the fighter to function not only on takeoff and landing, but also in navigating around the deck and in the belly of the ship, where maintenance operations take place.

“This exercise will evaluate the full spectrum of F-35B measures of suitability and effectiveness to the maximum extent possible,”

Hard hitting stuff....

[LowObservable]

“This exercise will evaluate the full spectrum of F-35B measures of suitability and effectiveness to the maximum extent possible."

This sentence appears to be internally contradictory, at once saying the exercise "will evaluate the full spectrum" but then qualifying "full" with "to the maximum extent possible".

This is like telling you that you can drive off with any car in the Porsche showroom as long as it doesn't cost more than $5,000.

I predict that the test will fully accomplish its goal, which will be to generate >3 concurrent sorties on one day for an audience of media and Congressional people. This should be doable with a half-dozen jets picked from a designated group of cherry-picked, fresh-off-the-mod-line aircraft.

[Snafu351]

"Because not a single cent of your Tax Euros is honestly spent? Which is why
the EU's auditors haven't signed off the accounts for the last 19 years. ;)"
Somebodies been reading too much torygraph or daily fail... https://fullfact.org/factchecks/has_eu_budget_rejected_auditors_18_years-28593
Auditing the EU accounts | Second reading (http://commonslibraryblog.com/2014/06/24/auditing-the-eu-accounts/)
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ECA-13-36_en.htm (http://commonslibraryblog.com/2014/06/24/auditing-the-eu-accounts/)
Apologies for the off topic but there's too many lies easily thrown around on this subject and some balance is required. The accounts lie being one of the biggest.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Well, your own references quote the UK, Netherlands and Swedish Governments as saying the ECA has not given an unqualified statement of Assurance for the last 19 years. Current (2012) "error" equates to 6.2 billion euros per year.

[John Farley]

LO

I think there is a good chance he meant:

“This exercise will evaluate the full spectrum of F-35B measures of suitability and effectiveness to the maximum extent possible from this particular ship"

[Snafu351]

Which is very far from saying the accounts have not been signed off. Stating they have not been signed off is in fact a lie. European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press release - EU accounts signed off, but errors persist in all main spending areas, say EU Auditors (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ECA-13-36_en.htm)
6.2 billion equates to around 4% of the budget.
In addition most, if not all of the "error rate" as the auditor puts it, is down to national governments and / or the organisations that receive the funding, not the EU itself.

[Obba]

Not sure if this has been posted....


https://medium.com/war-is-boring/russia-s-stealth-fighter-is-in-serious-trouble-24ac3ef85227

[ORAC]

The software reminds me of the saga of Windows 3.0.... :hmm::hmm:

http://assets.amuniversal.com/d0117c406cbb01301d46001dd8b71c47

Problems plaguing F-35's next-gen maintenance system (http://www.defensenews.com/story/military/2015/04/15/problems-facing-f35-maintainers-automated-system/25781075/)

The F-35's highly touted, next-generation software system designed to detail maintenance issues on the jet is plagued with problems that could lead to more delays with the jet's development. The F-35's Autonomic Logistics Information System is a program that a maintainer plugs into the jet, and it is expected to outline what is wrong and what is working, and to streamline the process of identifying replacement parts. It has been a touted as a game-changing technology to simplify the maintenance process for the new jet.

But members of the House Armed Services tactical air and land subcommittee who spoke with maintainers last month at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, heard a different story. Maintainers there said 80 percent of issues identified by ALIS are "false positives." Additionally, the program is sluggish, slowing down maintenance instead of streamlining it, subcommittee chairman Rep. Mike Turner, R-Ohio, said during a hearing Tuesday..........

The system is not meeting requirements for service members operating the jets, said Sean Stackley, the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition. "The issue of false positives is very real," Stackley said. "The concerns with regards to the reliability, responsiveness, the timeliness of ALIS informing the war fighter is at the top of our priority list." The solution going forward will not be one simple upgrade, he said. The program is testing software upgrades to capture the known deficiency, but it won't be immediate. "The program is improving, but it is not where it needs to be," Stackley said.

The ALIS system is currently computer racks totaling about 1,000 pounds, and was too big to be used during carrier testing. The program is developing a deployable, two-man portable version of the system that will be ready in July. The version, currently a software suite called 1.0.3, will be incrementally upgraded, with the Marine Corps going to its initial operating capability with a 2.0.1 version later this year and the Air Force getting another upgraded version, 2.0.2, for initial operating capability next summer. The Navy is expected to have initial operating capability in 2018.

[Wander00]

Sounds like the system in my car - does not work that well there either!

[dervish]

incrementally upgraded,


My suspicious mind tells me this often involves too many blank cheques.

[airpolice]

Let's hope that things do get better, and soon. Otherwise the US will run out of money before they have a replacement for the A10.

Marine Corps pilots of the first F-35 joint strike fighters scheduled to begin flying this summer will not be able to use night vision technology or carry more than four bombs and missiles, Defense Department officials testified in the House on Tuesday.

Overall, the first variant aircraft will have a range of lingering shortcomings when it goes into operation and will not be able to best the capabilities of the 1970’s era A-10 Thunderbolts it was designed to replace, according to Michael Gilmore, director of operational test and evaluation at the Defense Department.

The F-35 program began in 2001 and has since racked up nearly $400 billion in costs — one of the most expensive and troubled Defense Department acquisition programs. It has also led to a controversial plan to retire the A-10, a close air support stalwart that many believe provides crucial cover for troops on the ground.

[Hempy]

Let's hope that things do get better, and soon. Otherwise the US will run out of money before they have a replacement for the A10
worth a watch

xrZoU9SR7II

[Lonewolf_50]

worth a watch

xrZoU9SR7II It is worth noting that said rep was an A-10 pilot her own self. :cool: Objectivity may be in doubt. In her defense, I think we have a thread running here at PPRuNe Mil Forum wherein the premise that NOTHING can replace the Warthog is well enough supported.

[Turbine D]

Originally posted by Lone_Wolf:
It is worth noting that said rep was an A-10 pilot her own self. Objectivity may be in doubt.
Objectivity isn't in doubt, but the BS that has been emanating from the DoD leaders as to the F-35's capability/survivability is in doubt. I didn't quite hear Mr. Gilmore mention this:
Other live-fire test shots into the propulsion system revealed that “sustained fires were created in the shot into the variable area vane box nozzle due to leakage in the actuating hydraulics, and the shot into the roll duct nozzle door due to damage to the adjacent fuel tank. These fires would ultimately have led to cascading structural damage.”

Just let a knowledgable person such as Martha McSally ask the right questions.:ok:

We have spent and continue to spend an ungodly amount of money on the Marine version of the F-35 which doesn't have the CAS or survival capability of the A-10. So what role does it really have? What role will it have? The DoD now has an unlimited credit card, having run out of blank checks…

[Lonewolf_50]

We have spent and continue to spend an ungodly amount of money on the Marine version of the F-35 which doesn't have the CAS or survival capability of the A-10. So what role does it really have? What role will it have?
Let's not mix apples and oranges.
When it was first procured, the F-35, aka Joint Strike Fighter, was not "this is the plane to replace the A-10" was it?
No, it wasn't.
The B is to replace the Harrier.
The A the F-16.
The C the F-18.
(Whether or not this is all in all a good idea is another matter, long argued from program inception to this morning, and beyond)

None of those previous models were a replacement for the A-10 either.
Right? ;) The A-10 fitted a unique niche, but if you look in the other direction, it can't replace the Viper, the Hornet, nor the Harrier in their multiple missions.

Doctrinally, Strike and CAS are distinct missions, though perhaps the authors of doctrine make distinctions that eventually blur in combat. You'll note that the competition was not for a Joint CAS Fighter.

I'll stand by the point already made in the other thread: nothing can replace the A-10. And nothing will, by itself. If you bother to roll up an echelon, the joint fires necessary to support the close fight will need to be provided by a mix of direct, indirect, and airborne fires (like Apache/Cobra attack helicopters) even though they are not an exact match for that lovely Warthog gun. A piece of it will come from strike aircraft like the
Harrier
Viper
Hornet
Strike Eagle
Lightning II

With the increasing use of "smart munitions" "brilliant munitions" and various flavors of guided sub-munitions, the menu of fires in support of the close fight is pretty well set up, with columns A and B, like a good Chinese menu.

The complaint that F-35 has not yet demonstrated strike and CAS in finished form (yet) I won't argue: I'd say it hasn't yet.

[MSOCS]

Lonewolf, spot on chap.

Will the F-35 be a capable CAS platform? Yes, I have no personal doubt that it will! It is already performing well in the CAS environment, even with its limited number of cleared weapons. How can it move forward further? Well, expansion of weapon carriage types will eventually bestow a larger mixed-load capability that is the very essence of flexibility in most CAS regimes - think low collateral-to-big kaboom (scalable); cockpit-selectable effects; multi-spectral sensors, etc. That mixed load capability won't come early - most likely to be Blocks 4 and 5 so 2020-30. Wish it could be sooner but that's programmatics folks. You won't do it all stealthily of course. The weapon bays are fixed sizes and yes, the B variant has the smaller bay. The counter to that is that F-35 doesn't need to be the CAS master. She has a large array of other missions to fulfil. Most within the same sortie and all against threats that would make an A-10 pilot poop into his/her nice titanium bathtub. You talk survivability against direct hits. I challenge you that the A-10 is designed to take some direct hits because it is MUCH more likely to take one given its operating regime - i.e. in your face. So, the "spin" i'm reading above is apples-to-oranges, like so many other points made.

The A-10 doesn't kick the proverbial door down (access) and clean up the AOR for itself (airspace dominance). It waits for a massive package to do that job for it. 5th Gen platforms do (and will continue to) in relatively much smaller packages which is why we're investing in that future.

(yes, I wrote massive package.....)

[Ian Corrigible]

When it was first procured, the F-35, aka Joint Strike Fighter, was not "this is the plane to replace the A-10" was it?
No, it wasn't.
The B is to replace the Harrier.
The A the F-16.
Lone,

From the earliest days, the JSF was always described as replacing both the F-16 and the A-10. Examples from 1996 (http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=999) (DoD TACAIR speech) and 1997 (http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/logistics_material_readiness/acq_bud_fin/09-F-1079_JSF_SARS_1996_Present.pdf#page=19) (JSF SAR).

I/C

[Lonewolf_50]

Lone,

From the earliest days, the JSF was always described as replacing both the F-16 and the A-10. Examples from 1996 (http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=999) (DoD TACAIR speech) and 1997 (http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/logistics_material_readiness/acq_bud_fin/09-F-1079_JSF_SARS_1996_Present.pdf#page=19) (JSF SAR). I/C
Given that the USAF has been trying to dump the A-10 since before Desert Storm, anything they fly has to fulfill that CAS role if the USAF still wants to do CAS. What I stated is not incorrect: the JSF wasn't built as a pure CAS platform, unlike the A-10.
We have spent and continue to spend an ungodly amount of money on the Marine version of the F-35 which doesn't have the CAS or survival capability of the A-10. Apples and oranges again. Uh, the A-10 isn't/wasn't a USMC airframe, the Harrier is/was. Harrier is what B is to replace. (There is another ages long debate on the Harrier that I won't resurrect here).

Here's how I see it: part of the CAS need/requirement will be fulfilled by the UH-1Z, in terms of how the USMC combined arms fighting doctrine applies airborne fires. I may be wrong, having been out of that side of the business for a few years. I do recall that the Marines surely appreciated A-10's overhead when they could get them, as part of the joint force.

As above: nothing replaces the A-10, for better and worse, and that seems to be how the USAF wants it in the future, and has wanted for over a quarter of a century. The push back from the Army, whose requirement it met in the original sense (60's - 70's era requirements formulation) is part of the never ending inter-service bickering. We could also return to the rage from the USMC about the loss of the 8" gun, the 8" gun cruisers (for Naval Gunfire Support) and the second retirement of the Battleships and their NGFS. Nothing can or has replaced the BB, Iowa Class, but somehow the Marines have managed to figure out how to fight without them.

[LowObservable]

Quite correct, Ian C - the "spin" in this case is to state that "the JSF was never designed to replace the A-10", which is flat-out false: the USAF did not say it would abandon CAS or develop a separate A-10 replacement. And of course CAS remains a primary reason for the Navy's army having its own air force.

That said, the F-35 will do CAS in the same general way as other FJs - primarily with guided weapons, the targeting pod and digital comms with the ground and other assets (like UAVs). However, there is no Rover yet and the limitations of the EOTS (no HDTV, limited field of regard) have been discussed here.

MSOCS is right, however, to say that it's not a driving requirement and that JSF is designed to do things that the A-10 can't (we all knew that). However, that underscores another point: the USAF could afford to run an A-10 force alongside F-16s and F-15s. The F-35 business case involves eliminating every other tactical aircraft except the F-22.

[Lonewolf_50]

MSOCS is right, however, to say that it's not a driving requirement and that JSF is designed to do things that the A-10 can't (we all knew that). However, that underscores another point: the USAF could afford to run an A-10 force alongside F-16s and F-15s. The F-35 business case involves eliminating every other tactical aircraft except the F-22. Your last two sentences are the core problem: eggs and baskets. Contra Turbine D's assertion, no, there isn't an unlimited credit card account, part of why A-10 (and all of the manpower slots attending) is going the way of the Kiowa Warrior for the Army. It's where the 600-ship Navy John Lehman dreamed of went as well: an unfundable aim.

[Turbine D]

Originally posted by Low Observable:
The F-35 business case involves eliminating every other tactical aircraft except the F-22.
Exactly correct. In the business world there is such a thing as "Truth in Packaging". The essence of any investigation is to get to the "truth" of that packaging matter. That is what has been lacking throughout the entire F-35 program. Ask the right questions as Martha McSally did takes the wraps off a faulty packaging claim by the DoD.

Originally posted by Lone_Wolf: Contra Turbine D's assertion, no, there isn't an unlimited credit card account
Wrong. There are Senators and Representative from 47 of the 50 States who's industries contribute, in some form or another, to the F-35 program. These folks including the Texas contingency where it is assembled will assure all the money, whatever amount it takes, to build the F-35 no matter its lack of capability. Simply put, it is a political aircraft with an open ended budget. Forget the apple & oranges scenario, just think of your tax money being flushed down the toilet.

Originally posted by MSOCS:
Will the F-35 be a capable CAS platform? Yes, I have no personal doubt that it will! It is already performing well in the CAS environment, even with its limited number of cleared weapons.
The F-111 was advertised as the phenomenal complete package as well. Was it? I didn't realize the F-35 had been deployed to a war zone, demonstrating real time CAS. When did that happen? IOC is scheduled for late summer, this year or next.:}

[glad rag]

said stuff..

I find your post somewhat disingenuous with the known facts about this project, I'm afraid.

[MSOCS]

I'm not being "disingenuous" Glad Rag but it's your opinion, which you're entitled to.

I think I've been quite honest as to what the limitations are in the CAS mission at the moment as well as being clear when I think it's likely to see improvement (Block 4/5) with increased weapon clearances across the US Services and International partners.

Please be specific in calling me out and I'll be only too glad to explain my reasoning to you if appropriate.

[Lonewolf_50]

Turbine D:
The JSF was a political beast from its inception, thanks to Goldwater-Nichols and "one size fits all" attitudes among the politicos. We agree on that. Also on the strategic acquisition decision to spread the vendor base across many constituencies.

If we go back 30 years or so to F-18 acquisition (*and Tip O'Neil's support of a controversial program ... local vendor driven) the Hornet program had its share of detractors and bile when it came out, eh? (Don't we all remember the infamous cracks in the tail?)
A pretty popular book called "Pentagon Paradox" was made possible by the donnybrook the Hornet caused. Here we are three decades later, and the Hornet is a workhorse. It didn't turn out to be the F-111, but it did not get through acquisition unscathed.

But no, we cannot seem to agree on the facts: there is not unlimited money in the DoD budget. I suggest you take a gander at "sequester" from the past year or so and recalibrate your rangefinder. ;) Not sure if you are still linked to/involved in things that are DoD contracts.

It may be the case now (as it was when I was last on active duty) that with the limited dollars the priority spending leans in a particular direction. (Hey, V-22 thread over on rotary forum, go have a look at the both of them! :ok: ) A decade ago JSF ate amazing piles of dough, and the current choice was just getting selected and basing was being ironed out. (Environmental Impact Statements, how I hate thee!) It still eats piles of money but it doesn't have unlimited money.
Nothing in DoD does. That's reality, not hyperbole.

Does it get "more than its fair share" is a valid question. Given my own bias, I'd say the answer is yes. I am not an objective observer given the various programs (that I cared about while still serving) getting pushed about by its programming bow wave.

[Bevo]

There isn't unlimited money, however, the DoD will have to reduce/scrap other, possibly critical, programs to support the F-35. In addition, the international portion of the program make it "to big to fail".
Congress is now weighing the purchase of more F-35 Lightning II aircraft as part of the 2016 defense budget. The Government Accountability Office warned Tuesday that it may be a risky move due to the large amount of testing still needed to be completed to field future variants. Many lawmakers are frustrated with the delays, cost overruns and technical problems but believe the 5th generation fighter jet is needed to retain American air superiority in the coming decades.

Rep. Loretta Sanchez, D-Calif., said some critics have called for the costly development project to be scrapped. "However, we are past that decision point. We just need to make this program work," she said.
http://www.military.com (http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/04/15/first-version-of-f35s-wont-outdo-a10-in-battlefield-capabilities.html?ESRC=airforce-a.nl)

[Lonewolf_50]

Many lawmakers are frustrated with the delays, cost overruns and technical problems but believe the 5th generation fighter jet is needed to retain American air superiority in the coming decades. If they'd wanted that, then Congress shouldn't have cut the F-22 buy short. (At this point, my lengthy stream of profanity has been censored).
The placing of nearly all eggs in one basket ... more :mad:

[Courtney Mil]

Hear, hear, Lonewolf. :ok:

[Bevo]

:ok::ok::ok:

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

In addition, the international portion of the program make it "to big to fail".

Hopefully Canada will do its bit to fix that, and cancel F-35 in favour of Super Hornet/Whatever.

[glad rag]

I'm not being "disingenuous" Glad Rag but it's your opinion, which you're entitled to.

I think I've been quite honest as to what the limitations are in the CAS mission at the moment as well as being clear when I think it's likely to see improvement (Block 4/5) with increased weapon clearances across the US Services and International partners.

Please be specific in calling me out and I'll be only too glad to explain my reasoning to you if appropriate.

It's small g and small r for starters.

Attention to the details must be maintained despite a natural, but overwhelming, belief in what the mind thinks despite the evidence that is right in front of you.

Ask any FJ pilot/nav if you don't believe me. :suspect:

best rgds

gr

[glad rag]

If they'd wanted that, then Congress shouldn't have cut the F-22 buy short. (At this point, my lengthy stream of profanity has been censored).
The placing of nearly all eggs in one basket ... more :mad:

You got that spot on pal :D

[ORAC]

http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/03270/potd-plane_3270388k.jpg

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

another engine fire? :E

[ORAC]

Tis an F-22, good thing you flew a 2 seater with another set of eyes.... :p:p

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

F-22 - after my time. I'll take the hit though :ouch:

[MSOCS]

Careful F3WMB,

You'll have glad rag accusing you too of not being aircrew, through lack of "attention to detail."

[LowObservable]

LW 50 -

It was not Congress that cut short the F-22 buy. It was SecDef Gates.

[Bevo]

The Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force were fired by Gates, in part, because the kept asking of more F-22s. Gates wanted lower tech items for the war in Afganistan. In his far sighted view he saw no need for more F-22s. :rolleyes:

Gates has been critical of Air Force officials' calls to build more F-22 fighter jets, an advanced but expensive plane. He also has been frustrated over what he sees as insufficient deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles over Iraq and Afghanistan.

Loren Thompson, a defense policy analyst at the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Va., said although the "formal reason" for Moseley's and Wynne's departure was the Taiwan shipment, the forced resignations were actually the result of a growing "accumulation of grievances."

"In the end, what it came down to is the feeling of the secretary of the Defense that the Air Force just wasn't on the policy page he was on, that it was pursuing its own policies," said Thompson, who is close to Air Force officials.The official also pointed to statements of a top Air Force general that directly contradicted what Secretary Gates has said about spending on Air Force F-22s.Air Force's top leaders are ousted - latimes (http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/06/nation/na-airforce6)
Top Air Force Officials Fired - ABC News (http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=5006916)

[Courtney Mil]

I guess you need more than just fourteen One Irons in your bag.

[Hempy]

And "Not even God can hit a one iron" - Lee Trevino

Ah well, how about 4 one irons and 10 putters?

[david parry]

Despite IOC, Questions Remain For F-35B Integration | Defense content from Aviation Week (http://aviationweek.com/defense/despite-ioc-questions-remain-f-35b-integration?NL=AW-05&Issue=AW-05_20150420_AW-05_724&YM_RID='email'&YM_MID='mmid'&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_1)

[Hempy]

“In the America, the very time-consuming piece is going inside the ship and dropping lighting and ventilation and piping wiring and everything down far enough so you can install new material and weld it in place and then restore all that stuff,” Rear Adm. David Gale, program executive officer for ships, said during the roundtable.

About a dozen modifications are needed for the ships to house the -F-35Bs, he says.

10 to 1 says the cost of these mods don't appear in any announced budgetary figures. A little bit more here, a little bit more there...

[LowObservable]

So the force will be declared "operational" without ever having practiced any kind of combat-type operations from a ship?

[Lonewolf_50]

So the force will be declared "operational" without ever having practiced any kind of combat-type operations from a ship?

No, I don't think you can arrive at that conclusion.

[Turbine D]

Originally posted by Lone_Wolf:
No, I don't think you can arrive at that conclusion.
Odds are you will be able to. By the time summer rolls around there will be a customized definition of IOC designed to fit wherever the F-35B situation might be. It is known as moving the goal posts. Gen. Bogdan has already accomplished this once on expected F-35 combat capabilities. Stay tuned…

[LowObservable]

TD - It appears that the only shipboard exercise planned pre-IOC is focused on the basics of sustaining multiple aircraft on the ship.

[Lonewolf_50]

Odds are you will be able to. By the time summer rolls around there will be a customized definition of IOC designed to fit wherever the F-35B situation might be. It is known as moving the goal posts. Gen. Bogdan has already accomplished this once on expected F-35 combat capabilities. Stay tuned… We'll see.
IIRC the first "deployed" squadron will be in Iwakuni Japan (forward deployed is a term of art in the USN for forces based out of the US) and their acid test will of course be: when will your det embark on an amphib and hit the mil exercise and collective training circuit?
Seventh Fleet is dying to know, I suspect.

[Turbine D]

Originally posted by Lone_Wolf:
IIRC the first "deployed" squadron will be in Iwakuni Japan (forward deployed is a term of art in the USN for forces based out of the US) and their acid test will of course be: when will your det embark on an amphib and hit the mil exercise and collective training circuit?

These are the requirements to be met and completion dates which have been provided to the United States Congress regarding IOC for the F-35B. I believe this information is legally required to be submitted to Congress by the DoD. Do you think IOC will be declared in July by the DoD and the Navy Secretary in July as they have been advertising?

United States Marine Corps F-35B IOC Date and Capabilities:

Marine Corps F-35B IOC shall be declared when the first operational squadron is trained, manned, and equipped to conduct CAS, Offensive and Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, Assault Support Escort, and Armed Reconnaissance in concert with Marine Air Ground Task Force resources and capabilities. The F-35B shall have the ability to conduct operational missions utilizing SDD program of record weapons and mission systems. The aircraft will be in a Block 2B configuration with the requisite SDD performance envelope and weapon clearances. The first Marine Corps F-35B operational squadron shall have 10-16 primary aircraft and shall be capable of deploying and performing its assigned mission(s). Support and sustainment elements shall include spares, support equipment, tools, technical publications, training programs and devices, and Autonomic Logistic Information System V2.

Marine Corps IOC is capability based and will be declared when the above conditions are met. If the F-35 IMS Version 7 executes according to plan, Marine Corps F-35B IOC criteria could be met between July 2015 (Objective) and December 2015 (Threshold). Should capability delivery experience additional changes, this estimate will be revised appropriately.

The criteria stated above will provide sufficient initial combat capability for the threat postulated in 2015. However, in order to meet the full spectrum of Joint warfighter requirements in future years, the Marine Corps will require enhanced lethality and survivability inherent in Blocks 3F and beyond.

[LowObservable]

The question at that point is whether anyone in Congress will ask pertinent questions such as "How do you do CAS with no Rover, no gun, no HD sensor and the fuel fraction of a clean F-16?" or "How do you do OCA/DCA with two AMRAAMs?" or "How do you do reconnaissance with one MWIR camera and nothing better than L16 to send data to anything except another F-35?"

[Lonewolf_50]

These are the requirements to be met and completion dates which have been provided to the United States Congress regarding IOC for the F-35B. I believe this information is legally required to be submitted to Congress by the DoD. Do you think IOC will be declared in July by the DoD and the Navy Secretary in July as they have been advertising?I don't know.
This program slides farther right (as a habit) than a figure skater at the end of a routine. :p

[rh200]

Redefining you metrics for the reality of the new operational paradigm comes to mind:E

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

"House!"

Bull**** Bingo [Random!] (http://www.bull****bingo.net/cards/bull****/)

[Turbine D]

Latest US Government GAO Report on The F135 Engine released yesterday::sad:

http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2015-111.pdf

I thought the rebuttal comment from Pratt & Whitney, reported in various publications, was interesting:

"But, the engine performed well for the Navy's takeoff and landing exercises.":cool:

To which one could comment, "It's elementary my dear Watson.":=

[Lonewolf_50]

I thought the rebuttal comment from Pratt & Whitney, reported in various publications, was interesting:

"But, the engine performed well for the Navy's takeoff and landing exercises.":cool:
I would hope so. :rolleyes: The performance bar was sent a bit higher than that for the money spent.

Turbine: thanks for the link, that's going to take a bit of time to digest over a cuppa Joe. Hmm, given all of the gov'mint speak in the text, it may take something stronger. :p

[Hempy]

Objective

We inspected the F-35 engine (F135) program’s quality management system for conformity to contractually required AS9100C, “Quality Management System,” statutory and regulatory requirements, DoD policies, and internal quality processes and procedures. F135 engines are procured by the Department of Defense from Pratt & Whitney for the F-35 Lightening II program.

Findings

A. Additional program management oversight is required by the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), as evidenced by the 61 nonconformities (violations of AS9100C, regulatory requirements and DoD policies) that we documented during our inspection.

B. The F-35 critical safety item (CSI) program did not meet DoD CSI requirements, including requirements for parts identification, critical characteristic identification, part determination methodology, and supplier identification.

C. (FUOU) The F-35 JPO did not establish F135 program quality goals and objectives that were mutually agreed upon by Pratt & Whitney for current contracts. Additionally, Pratt & Whitney metrics did not show improvement in quality assurance, process capability, and [REDACTED]

D. The F-35 JPO did not ensure that Pratt & Whitney proactively identified, elevated, tracked, and managed F135 program risks, in accordance with the F135 risk management plan.

E. The F-35 JPO did not ensure that Pratt & Whitney’s supplier selection criteria and management of underperforming suppliers were sufficient.

F. The F-35 JPO did not ensure that Pratt & Whitney demonstrated adequate software quality management practices. Pratt & Whitney had an outdated software development plan, requirements traceability issues, and a software quality assurance organization that did not perform required functions.

ouch :ouch: All going well then. Just ask Gen. Bogdan, he'll tell you.

Can someone say 'General Electric'?

[Wander00]

Does not tis get nearer and nearer not to "if" but to "when". Hat.......coat..........

[Courtney Mil]

Not even Spaz could have put a good spin on that report. Probably just discredit the Inspector General.

It really has surprised me just how bad things are.

And, yes, the program will go on. And, yes, IOC will be achieved - with certain adjustments - because many, big careers and lots of money are rising on it. And, no, no one is going to stick their head above the parapet.

Reminds me of "Yes, we'll accept the F2 into service with concrete in its nose. Only much, much bigger.

[longer ron]

As I have always said - its a Turkey ! I just pity the poor groundcrew who have to maintain the bloody thing :(

[ORAC]

GAO Report April 2015: F-35 JSF - Assessment Needed to Address Affordability Challenges (http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669619.pdf)

[Hempy]

http://i87.photobucket.com/albums/k144/h3mpy/37083AF0-D979-40DA-810F-CC5F36A61715.png_zps19gif2px.jpeg

Ouch :ouch:

http://i87.photobucket.com/albums/k144/h3mpy/E62CE40F-DD85-460B-90E7-D042F0FA9A83.png_zpsw5yi21xi.jpeg

2015??

http://i87.photobucket.com/albums/k144/h3mpy/48253AEF-D132-4F7D-93A8-BA941F0C5B54.png_zpsjwcxidmz.jpeg

"significantly increase procurement funding...." :ugh:

[ORAC]

Hmmm. Remind me, just about when was the F136 engine cancelled?

[Hempy]

Nah, it'll be fine. We'll just repace the engines when they hit 40 hours...they only cost $16,000,000 each :rolleyes:

[Lonewolf_50]

And, yes, IOC will be achieved - with certain adjustments - because many, big careers and lots of money are rising on it. And, no, no one is going to stick their head above the parapet. The decision was made at high levels in government, secretarial level, to put all eggs in one basket. Over a decade ago. That is part of why the inertia will not be overcome, as there isn't another option. Stuck with it, at least in the US. Other nations may have more flex in making a choice to opt out.

[Hempy]

Not even Spaz could have put a good spin on that report.

Strangely enough, Spaz, Engines, JSFan et al have been noticeably quiet of late :rolleyes:

[Turbine D]

Original quote by Lonewolf_50:
The decision was made at high levels in government, secretarial level, to put all eggs in one basket. Over a decade ago.

Original quote by ORAC:
Hmmm. Remind me, just about when was the F136 engine cancelled?

The decision was made decade ago by the UTC/PWA lobby in Washington to eliminate the competition as the Pratt engine was far superior compared to the GE/Rolls Royce engine, and the Connecticut Congressional delegation agreed, they didn't want to lose another engine war. Actual funding continued through part of 2011 and then GE/RR self funded to the end of 2011. Somewhere there are six engines encased in bubble wrap, preserved as a reminder to dimwits in Washington that they are still dimwits.

December 2, 2011

Joint Statement From GE and Rolls-Royce

The GE Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team (FET) has reached the decision to discontinue self-funded development of the F136 engine for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) beyond 2011.

The decision, reached jointly by GE and Rolls-Royce leadership, recognizes the continued uncertainty in the development and production schedules for the JSF Program.

"GE and Rolls-Royce are proud of our technology advancements and accomplishments on the F136," said Dan McCormick, President of the FET. "However, difficult circumstances are converging that impact the potential benefit of a self-funded development effort."

With the F136 engine development almost 80 percent complete, the Department of Defense terminated the program in April of this year. Following termination, the GE Rolls-Royce FET had offered to self-fund F136 development through fiscal year 2012, but will now end its development work. The FET will continue to fulfill its termination responsibilities with the federal government.

For 15 years, the FET has developed a competitive fighter engine for JSF with the world's most advanced propulsion technologies, including numerous patented technologies from both companies.

Before the program was terminated, six F136 development engines had accumulated more than 1,200 hours of testing since early 2009. The FET consistently delivered on cost and on schedule, and was rewarded with high marks by the Department of Defense in a successful joint venture between GE and Rolls-Royce.

Throughout the F136 program, GE and Rolls-Royce have been leading advocates of defense acquisition reform - offering unique and aggressive fixed-price proposals for F136 production engines for the JSF program.

"GE and Rolls-Royce are deeply grateful to our many Congressional supporters on both sides of the aisle over these many years as well as the military experts who have supported competing engines for JSF," said McCormick. "We do not waver in our belief that competition is central to meaningful defense acquisition reform."

Source: Rolls-Royce, GE

Original quote by Lonewolf_50:
Other nations may have more flex in making a choice to opt out.

Canada will have the first opportunity to do so by selecting the FA-18 E/Fs. I would suspect others to follow if the program keeps aging and more costly with far less capability than was originally promised.

Original quote by Hempy:
Strangely enough, Spaz, Engines, JSFan et al have been noticeably quiet of late
Tis what happens when all the photo ops and the manufacture's propaganda dries up while good news fades into a distant memory…:uhoh:

Much of the GE owned technology developed for the F136 will be apparent in the new commercial engines, soon to become a reality…

[Lonewolf_50]

The decision was made decade ago by the UTC/PWA lobby in Washington to eliminate the competition as the Pratt engine was far superior compared to the GE/Rolls Royce engine, and the Connecticut Congressional delegation agreed, they didn't want to lose another engine war. Actual funding continued through part of 2011 and then GE/RR self funded to the end of 2011. Somewhere there are six engines encased in bubble wrap, preserved as a reminder to dimwits in Washington that they are still dimwits. Turbine, I was referring to the weapons system, F-35, not just the engines. Thanks for the details in any case. :ok:
Much of the GE owned technology developed for the F136 will be apparent in the new commercial engines, soon to become a reality
Is that the same brand of "soon" as the "F-35 will IOC soon" or is it another brand? :E

[ORAC]

I was alluding to the previous diagram and the dramatic decline in engine life.

If one was cynical one could suppose that the manufacturer had been spending waaaay over revealed costs to produce early engines above spec to match/best the opposition and that; once it was cancelled; they went back to contract spec and time.

Gee, you want it better? Meet my lawyers and engineers.........

[glad rag]

Hmmm. Remind me, just about when was the F136 engine cancelled?

:confused: Was it the same time as the manufacturer promised "The Turkey" would out perform the current service aircraft :ouch:




Anyone have details on just what are the procedures and processes for F35B ECU replacement?

[I could do with a laugh]

[Turbine D]

Original quote by Lonewolf_50:
Is that the same brand of "soon" as the "F-35 will IOC soon" or is it another brand?
I was thinking of the new CFM LEAP engine:
The CFM LEAP family represents the engines of choice for the next-generation single-aisle aircraft. The LEAP-1A is an option on the Airbus A320neo; the LEAP-1B is the exclusive power plant for the Boeing 737 MAX; and the LEAP-1C is the sole Western powerplant for the COMAC C919. Two engine families have contributed significantly to the design of the LEAP engine, the CFM56 and the GE90/GEnx series of engines. The GE90/GEnx contributed the high-efficiency core architecture to minimize fuel consumption, while the CFM56 legacy drove reliability and maintenance cost design practices.

Airbus just rolled out the first A320neo LEAP powered aircraft and it will start ground testing and flight certification testing this year. I believe over 5,000 LEAP engines have been sold at this point in time. Revenue service will start in 2016.

FYI, the CFM56 core came from the F101 engine designed for the B-1A/B bomber. There have been over 25,000 CFM56 engines produced for Boeing and Airbus. The GE90/GEnx core evolved out of the GE engine offered for what is now the F-22 fighter.

I suspect the promised dates will be met as advertised along with up to a 15% improvement in fuel efficiency verses the best of the current CFM56 engines, further reduced maintenance costs, and a 1000 pound weight reduction contribution for each A320neo aircraft verses current A320 aircraft.

[Lonewolf_50]

I was thinking of the new CFM LEAP engine:
The CFM LEAP family represents the engines of choice for the next-generation single-aisle aircraft. ... snip the rest>>> Neat. I love technology. CFM56 relation to B-1 was an interesting tidbit, thanks again! :ok::ok:

[Hempy]

nice recovery..

[JFZ90]

P&W fights US government criticisms of F-35 engine reliability - 4/30/2015 - Flight Global (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/pampw-fights-us-government-criticisms-of-f-35-engine-411748/)

Interesting to see the VTOL engine is almost twice as reliable as the CTOL engine. Counter intuitive. I wonder why that is.

The drop off after F136 cancellation is interesting. I assume there is more to this though, were there also cost/weight/production changes that explain the drop off? I suspect "Engines" would know.

[Turbine D]

From Flightglobal
“The engine is reliable, and we’ll continue trying to make it more reliable,” Bennett Croswell, president of P&W’s military engines business, told reporters on 27 April. Croswell acknowledges the accuracy of the GAO’s numbers, but says that report does not reflect the overall picture of the F135’s reliability record.
That is exactly what P&W said about the PW F100-PW-200 engine that powered the F-16A/B. What happened subsequently is history. The one thing about history is we learn we don't learn. Mr. Croswell apparently never studied the history of the F-16 Fighter and its initial single sourced engine.

The other business history lesson is that you never publicly criticize your customer whether you are President or not, especially when you say your deficient management systems don't represent the end product.:=

[glad rag]

P&W fights US government criticisms of F-35 engine reliability - 4/30/2015 - Flight Global (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/pampw-fights-us-government-criticisms-of-f-35-engine-411748/)

Interesting to see the VTOL engine is almost twice as reliable as the CTOL engine. Counter intuitive. I wonder why that is.



Statistics. Ratio of one airframe type to the other.

[glad rag]

That is exactly what P&W said about the PW F100-PW-200 engine that powered the F-16A/B. What happened subsequently is history. The one thing about history is we learn we don't learn. Mr. Croswell apparently never studied the history of the F-16 Fighter and its initial single sourced engine.

The other business history lesson is that you never publicly criticize your customer whether you are President or not, especially when you say your deficient management systems don't represent the end product.:=

We call it taking the :mad: :mad:

[Turbine D]

Original quote by glad rag:
Anyone have details on just what are the procedures and processes for F35B ECU replacement?

Just a few thing to do before they get to the ECU, but it is on the to do list.;)

TI Number Mod CR Title
TI-0000-1089 CR-021694 LRIP 3 Aux Air Inlet (AAI) Door Install
TI-0000-1324 CR-022656 Structural Cracking of Aft MLG Door Drive Link U-Joint
TI-0000-0116 CR-011738B Full Qualified Clutch Cooling Fan
TI-0000-0367 CR-014114C Engine Trailer Adapter Kit - FS556 Interface, J27006/J27007
TI-0000-0121 CR-014289B Lift Fan Exhaust/Inboard Weapon Bay Door Interference
TI-0000-0396 CR-014289C WBDD Limit Life, ECU
TI-0000-0655 CR-014819D EO DAS Center Fuselage Vibration Testing
TI-0000-0373 CR-015026B Aux Air Inlet Lock Actuation Mechanism
TI-0000-0423 CR-016270C Bleed Air System Ducting Design
TI-0000-0099 CR-017502 J75503 Wrap Around Adapter Set
TI-0000-0683 CR-017534&B Rev-HT Bearing Issues
TI-0000-0463 CR-017913B Support-Fairing, Mid, LH/RH
TI-0000-0058 CR-018274 Back-Up Radio Tray Clearance
TI-0000-0968 CR-018524 Material Removal Allowance for IPP Blocker and Screen
TI-0000-0027 CR-018524A IPP Exhaust (STOVL)
TI-0000-0138 CR-018564B Wingtip Light Improvement For FAA Compliance
TI-0000-0825 CR-022768D LEF Improvements
TI-0000-0031 CR-018835 Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) Motor
TI-0000-0015 CR-018836 Stress Failure of Hydraulic Tube Support Bracket
TI-0000-0063 CR-018838A Bootstrap Accumulator Redesign
TI-0000-0045 CR-019003 CTOL/STOVL MLG SDD & LRIP Part Number Rolls
TI-0000-0056 CR-019004B IPP Controller Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0057 CR-019005 STOVL GO3 Control Valve Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0117 CR-019107 CTOL Trestle Inst Cotter Pin
TI-0000-0165 CR-019135B R3 Float Valve with Mechanical Thread Locking
TI-0000-0231 CR-019340B PTMS EHA Cooling Orifices - CTOL & STOVL
TI-0000-0101 CR-023102A Lift Fan Inlet Door Full Qualification Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0245 CR-019469C Antenna Switch Unit
TI-0000-0264 CR-019516A PTMS Controller
TI-0000-0124 CR-019533 Controller, Motor Pump Qual Failure (GMMP)
TI-0000-0561 CR-019683E STOVL FS 496 Bulkhead Trunnion
TI-0000-0280 CR-019841 Cockpit Panels Pushbutton Switch Simultaneity
TI-0000-0398 CR-019930C Arresting Hook Aft Door Spring Damper Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0375 CR-019979 STOVL IRCM Doors Bushing to Lug Interference
TI-0000-0208 CR-020003A CTOL Arresting Gear Push Rods
TI-0000-0424 CR-020066A Firewall Shutoff Valve Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0477 CR-020097A CTOL EHAS Panels
TI-0000-0875 CR-020189 CV Main Landing Gear Retract Actuator
TI-0000-0130 CR-020289 Emergency Control Valve Qual Failure
TI-0000-0575 CR-020289A ULF & 3BSD Emergency Control Valve
TI-0000-0608 CR-020396D Fwd Upper Engine Mount (CTOL)
TI-0000-0456 CR-020396D Bulkhead - FS 450
TI-0000-0457 CR-020396D Bulkhead - FS 472
TI-0000-0458 CR-020396D Bulkhead - FS 518 (Upper)
TI-0000-0460 CR-020396D Bulkhead - FS 556
TI-0000-0432 CR-020397A Short Life - CTOL Wing Forward Root Rib
TI-0000-0602 CR-020398A Brake Control Unit (BCU)
TI-0000-0538 CR-020593 EHA Flaperon Support Equipment Locations
TI-0000-0363 CR-020636A TRS Component Changes from Qual Test Failures
TI-0000-0412 CR-020680B Wing Lighting Controller Salt Fog Failure
TI-0000-0331 CR-020725 WBDDS RGAs Limited Life - Change Request Approval
TI-0000-0654 CR-020726A IDMS Connector Ref Des Swap
TI-0000-0673 CR-020743B Ordnance Quick Latch System (OQLS) Clip Lock
TI-0000-0137 CR-020793 Pump, Motor GND Maint Qual Failure
TI-0000-0132 CR-020907B Valve, Mechanical Sequence - T Qual Failure
TI-0000-0811 CR-021167A 2WSH54239: CV Rear Spar
TI-0000-0810 CR-021168 2WSH64241: CV Frame
TI-0000-0817 CR-021170 2WSH44162: CV RH Tail Hook Longeron
TI-0000-0631 CR-021180 Countermeasures Doors & NNMSB/WSESRB Concerns
TI-0000-0263 CR-021181 Power Panel 1, 2, 3
TI-0000-0544 CR-021194 Limited Life STOVL Mid Fairing Longeron
TI-0000-0558 CR-021194 Short Life Parts: Keel Beam RH
TI-0000-0559 CR-021194 Short Life Parts: NLG Drag Brace Ftg
TI-0000-0566 CR-021194 Short Life Parts: Support, Otbd, FS 502.65 LH/RH
TI-0000-0617 CR-021194 Limited Life STOVL STA 3/9 Aft Rib
TI-0000-0545 CR-021217 Limited Life STOVL Nacelle Vent Inlet
TI-0000-0564 CR-021217 STOVL Forward Root Rib (L6/U6)
TI-0000-0808 CR-021259 Weapons Bay Door Uplock Sealing
TI-0000-0098 CR-022768D CTOL Nose Landing Gear
TI-0000-0910 CR-021395A PCD EU Cooling Rework
TI-0000-0607 CR-021434 Limited Life CTOL STA 3/9 Aft Rib
TI-0000-0135 CR-021459B Engine Driven Pump Life Limit
TI-0000-0895 CR-021557A Arm Disable Current Leakage Path Correction
TI-0000-0848 CR-021621 2CSH20930 Splice, Fuel Floor/Root Rib, FS 402, RHS/LHS
TI-0000-0377 CR-021694 Aux Air Inlet Door Redesign
TI-0000-0845 CR-021891 CV VT Aft Moment Fitting Life Limited Structures Part
TI-0000-0626 CR-021905A SMSFRIU SDD/LRIP Arm Disable Input
TI-0000-0998 CR-021915B CTOL and CV Refuel System Mod
TI-0000-0897 CR-022058 Roll Control Nozzle Door Redesign
TI-0000-0495 CR-022105F OBIGGS & Pressure/Vent Changes for Lightning Protection
TI-0000-0133 CR-022196A Filter Module, Pressure Qual Failure
TI-0000-1011 CR-022226A L-Band Pre-Selector (LBPS) Calibration for Mode 5
TI-0000-0802 CR-022695 CTOL Main Landing Gear
TI-0000-0703 CR-022515A Roll Post Door Actuator Life Limitation
TI-0000-1101 CR-022647A GMMP Controller EEE outage
TI-0000-1092 CR-022666 Landing Taxi Light Redesign
TI-0000-0119 CR-022736 MWARS Replacement
TI-0000-0866 TBD Production Ejection Seat (-0023)
TI-0000-1099 CR-022841B ATQA Mounting Bolt Interface
TI-0000-0064 CR-022872 Counter Measures Door Control Valve on AF:6
TI-0000-0158 CR-022877 WBDD Flexible Cable Re-design
TI-0000-0191 CR-024623 270V BCCU
TI-0000-0574 CR-023121B/D Electronics Units Modifications
TI-0000-1485 CR-023282CA F1 Feed Tank Gasket
TI-0000-1540 CR-023332A CV Rudder Hinge 2
TI-0000-1372 CR-023355D EW Block-2 DRFM Module Firmware Issue
TI-0000-1652 CR-023599 Rudder Slider Hinge Wear
TI-0000-1654 CR-023712 CV Right Hand (RH) Center Fuselage Avionics Bay Floor
TI-0000-2548 CR-023712 CV Center Fuselage FS 402 Outboard Joint Limited Life
TI-0000-2551 CR-024031 L-Band Power Amplifier (LBPA) Update for LINK-16
TI-0000-1709 CR-024114 Carrier Variant Marker Beacon Antenna
TI-0000-2513 CR-024153 CV IPP Shear Web Limited Life
TI-0000-1207 CR-024162 Vehicle Management Computer (VMC) Electrical Connection Issue
TI-0000-0441 CR-20773A CTOL FS 594 Centre Arch Low Life
TI-0000-1549 CR-023540A Firmware Update for AMS Cartridge Reset SPAR
TI-0000-0405 CR-23769 EDU Random Vibration Failures
TI-0000-0702 CR-24090 CV Fwd Arresting Gear Door Actuator Life Limitation
TI-0000-2554 CR-24872 J84001 Fiber Optic Inspection Set Extension Handle DR?s
TI-0000-0122 TBD 28V Battery and Charger Changes
TI-0000-0129 TBD MLG Control Valve Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0709 CR-022768D HT EHA Block Change for LRIP 4
TI-0000-0282 TBD Update to Audio Control Electronics (ACE) Unit
TI-0000-0469 TBD Composite BOS 2ZCH42000-0002 Assemblies
TI-0000-0583 TBD CTOL/STOVL Rudder EHA Design Change
TI-0000-0906 TBD NLG Lug Inspection and Support Stiffener
TI-0000-1097 CR-022972 Ball Joint Salt Fog Failure
TI-0000-0913 TBD LEFAS PDU Resolver and Rotor Shaft Seal Life
TI-0000-1113 CR-024000 AESG Power Connector Rating (Generator)
TI-0000-1256 TBD CV Nose Landing Gear Drag Brace Door Cracking
TI-0000-1396 TBD HTCA with End Gland Material Issue
TI-0000-0336 CR-024982 Panoramic Cockpit Display (PCD) Major Variances - DU
TI-0000-0343 CR-024982 Panoramic Cockpit Display (PCD) Major Variances - EU
TI-0000-0480 CR-025000 ICC Qual Issues
TI-0000-2784 TBD CNI 3A & 3B Integrated Backplane Assembly (IBA) Upgrades
TI-0000-0221 TBD DAS Refuel Lights Lenses
TI-0000-0406 CR-025271 Ordnance Hoist System (OHS) Hoist
TI-0000-1102 CR-022481B BH-1 Weapons Bay Doors
TI-0000-1472 TBD Gun Port Door Threads in Bearing Issue
TI-0000-0329 CR-021982 Refueling Bay and Nozzle Clash LRIP 1-3 Modification
TI-0000-0781 CR-023432 3BSM NBD - Assembly Changes
TI-0000-1446 TBD CV Fuel Dump
TI-0000-0908 CR-023802 STOVL Fuel Dump (CCDD LRIP2-051)
TI-0000-1000 CR-022481 Inboard Weapon Bay Door Flipper Door Design Change
TI-0000-1060 CR-022121 Final Finishes
TI-0000-1078 CR-025006 AF1 Nacelle Insulation
TI-0000-0180 TBD CTOL Fuel Floor Tooling Holes - Bay 207 to Gun Bay
TI-0000-0787 CR-024068 HMDS Path Forward
TI-0000-1048 CR-023982 Panoramic Cockpit Display-Electronic Unit (PCD-EU)
TI-0000-1062 TBD CV Main Landing Gear
TI-0000-1063 TBD CV Nose Landing Gear
TI-0000-0284 TBD STOVL Canopy frame
TI-0000-0316 TBD CTOL FS 496 Bulkhead Trunnion
TI-0000-0321 TBD Lift Fan Exhaust Door Aft Uplock Hook Failure
TI-0000-0467 TBD Fuel Floor - FS496-556, LH
TI-0000-0468 TBD Fuel Floor - FS496-556, RH
TI-0000-0486 TBD Short Life - STOVL Inner Wing FS518 Lower Bulkhead
TI-0000-0543 TBD Path Forward for Outboard Rib at Station 2 and 10
TI-0000-0556 TBD STOVL Short Life Parts: Aft Mid Keel
TI-0000-0638 TBD STOVL BL 0.0 Web Fwd Upper Engine Mount Support
TI-0000-0813 TBD CV Life Limited Structures Part - LH/RH Pylon Sta 3 Aft Rib
TI-0000-0815 TBD 2WSH24212 CV FWD Upper Engine Mount
TI-0000-0816 TBD 2WSH34496 - CV FS 496 Blkhd Station 6
TI-0000-1440 TBD STOVL Thrust Mount Shear Webs
TI-0000-0723 TBD EOTS PBS Startup Timeline
TI-0000-0055 CR-019070 IPP Bay Vent Fan Electrical Bond
TI-0000-0281 CR-020226 Hoist Point Cover FIP Proposal
TI-0000-1023 CR-022936 Roll Nozzle and Duct Bay - BALD Sensors redesign
TI-0000-0193 CR-021921B EW Gain State Control Logic Error
TI-0000-1365 CR-022721A Cat Launch Shock Exceeds INS PBS
TI-0000-0448 TBD Add -0007 ASSCA/-0006 ATQA To Aircraft TVE
TI-0000-0842 TBD 2ESH10095 CV HT Rib 5 Life Limited Structures Part
TI-0000-0976 TBD BF6 and BF8 RCS ATP
TI-0000-0819 TBD Liquid Cooling System Cart - Facility AC Power Interface
TI-0000-1134 TBD Cabin Pressure Tester
TI-0000-1198 TBD HT Heating
TI-0000-0361 CR-023382 Vertical Tail 575 Fitting
TI-0000-0386 CR-025191 Fuel System Major Variance for LRIP 1-Signal Amplifier
TI-0000-0516 CR-022972 AAR Probe Weak Link Adaptor Re-design
TI-0000-0576 CR-020289A Refuel Probe/Tailhook Emergency Control Valve
TI-0000-0578 CR-020289A Aux Inlet Door Emergency Control Valve
TI-0000-1082 TBD Power Panel 1 & 2 Random Vibration Failures
TI-0000-1203 CR-021217 Life Limited 402 Frame
TI-0000-1289 CR022737 US16E Ejection Seat/MWARS Retrofit Configuration Proposal
TI-0000-1421 TBD STOVL Main Landing Gear
TI-0000-1422 CR-021388A STOVL Nose Landing Gear
TI-0000-1483 TBD Power Panel 3 Random Vibration Failures - Second Failure
TI-0000-1486 CR-023838 STOVL FS 503 Frame/IPP Shear Web Durability Test Failure
TI-0000-1515 CR-024000 ESG Service Life (Generator) -0003
TI-0000-1551 TBD 28V Battery Full Qualification
TI-0000-1589 CR-023300 Hydraulic System Single Point Failure
TI-0000-1786 CR-023729 FS-402 Frame (TIN-075)
TI-0000-1857 TBD 2GHH42033 Time Delay Valve - Fully Qualified Part
TI-0000-2467 CR-025204 CTOL FS 503 Frame Limited Life
TI-0000-2468 CR-025204 CTOL IPP Shear Web Limited Life Discovery
TI-0000-2641 CR-024341 STOVL - Short Shank Condition, Engine Access Panel
TI-0000-2674 CR-24794 Cracking of Bifurcation Seam Treatment
TI-0000-2892 CR-025079 BF5 IRCM Hinge to Drive Link Clash
TI-0000-1552 TBD 28V BCCU Lightning Compliance
TI-0000-2682 TBD AR Probe Light
TI-0000-0884 CR-024000 AESG - Material & Workmanship
TI-0000-1142 TBD Missionized Gun System Jumper Panel Hoses and Drain Seal
TI-0000-1796 CR-025271 Ordnance Hoist System (OHS) Motor
TI-0000-2506 TBD Gun Port Blast Mislocation
TI-0000-2546 TBD Weapon bay light departing aircraft during flight
TI-0000-2833 TBD Gun System Muzzle and Purge Door Time Out
TI-0000-0387 CR-016910 Fuel System Major Variance for LRIP 1 - Dive Rate Performance
TI-0000-1161 CR-22656 STOVL Aft MLG Door Cracking
TI-0000-1518 CR-024193 PAO Cooling Orifices In Center Fuselage Cold Liquid Loop
TI-0000-1783 TBD Canopy Boot Cracking
TI-0000-2633 CR-024265 Flaperon Blade Seal Buckling
TI-0000-2672 TBD Radome Shroud Gapping/Trimming
TI-0000-2909 CR-025167 IPP Bay High Flow Air Duct Separation
TI-0000-2931 TBD CV NLG Drag Brace Cylinder and Steering Motor
TI-0000-0236 CR-019412 FPS Fire and Bleed Leak Controller (FBLC) Redesign
TI-0000-0260 CR-016633C Canopy Actuation System
TI-0000-0738 CR-025142 Modified Fuel Dump Valve (T28a)
TI-0000-0772 TBD PTMS Turbomachine/ACCM Cable Interface Changes
TI-0000-0327 TBD STOVL High Sea State Fuel Stowage - Rev B to CR-016712A
TI-0000-0737 TBD IPP Purge Issue Due to Low Fuel Shutdown
TI-0000-1650 CR-022737 MWARS for Production Seat
TI-0000-1653 CR-23490 Ground Maintainance Valve Deletion to Prevent PAO in Cockpit
TI-0000-2416 TBD CV Drag Strut - Alt Gear Extension
TI-0000-2450 CR-023901 Bleed Air Sensor Fitting Galling
TI-0000-2635 TBD CV NLG Interference Problems - OBOGs routing
TI-0000-2725 CR-024162 Vehicle Management Computer (VMC)
TI-0000-2834 CR-024904 Boarding Ladder Cracks
TI-0000-2889 TBD WBDDS Supplier Disclosure on Lower Breakaway Torque
TI-0000-0771 CR-16464B Install Battery into CNI Rack 3A and 3B
TI-0000-0945 TBD CTOL Audio Control Electronics (ACE) In-Flight Refueling
TI-0000-1056 CR-016660C RADAR 1A & 1B Racks -0002 Cut-in
TI-0000-2818 CR-025046 EOTS LoS Pointing Angle
TI-0000-1093 CR-023616 CV Arresting Gear
TI-0000-0358 TBD Production Ejection Seat (-0021)
TI-0000-0514 TBD Lift Fan Inlet Maintenance Fix
TI-0000-0579 TBD Auto Pilot
TI-0000-1520 TBD CV Nose Landing Gear Aircraft Integration
TI-0000-1761 TBD HT EHA Solenoid Valve (SOV) Qual Test Failure
TI-9999-0655 TBD EO DAS Center Fuselage Vibration Testing
TI-0000-0730 TBD CV Rudder EHA
TI-0000-0833 CR-021053 Short Shank Condition on Engine Inspection Panels
TI-0000-1122 TBD LEFAS Foldbox Lug Cracking
TI-0000-1192 TBD CTOL Thrust Mount Shear Web
TI-0000-1494 TBD PTMS Turbomachine Configuration to Correct Qualification Failures
TI-0000-1499 TBD FS 472 Bulkhead Crack BH-1
TI-0000-1541 TBD CV HT LOWER SKIN BOLTS SD-2013-010
TI-0000-1649 TBD CV LEFAS Asymmetry Brake Lug Cracking
TI-0000-1655 CR-024025 STOVL RH and LH Rear Spar Lower Flange Fatigue Cracks
TI-0000-2423 TBD CV Lower FS 518 Design Change
TI-0000-2448 CR-023966A CV Thrust Mount Shear Web - Service Life
TI-0000-2670 TBD Durability Findings 2013 - Bulkhead FS 496
TI-0000-2813 TBD Durability Findings - FS 450, 472, 556, 518 Lower and IRCM Fitting
TI-0000-2814 TBD Durability Findings 2013 - FS 575 Center Arch Frame
TI-0000-1104 TBD CTOL Ventilation Leakage from Bay 207L
TI-0000-0992 CR-013553 Outboard Vertical Tail Seal Redesign
TI-0000-0904 CR-021759 Backup Radio Guide Pin Misalignment
TI-0000-1053 CR-022138 Fire Suppression Bottle Low Clearance
TI-0000-2675 TBD Roll Nozzle Bay - BALD Sensors - Supplier Disclosure
TI-0000-2921 CR-025116 Gun Vent Door Unpainted Brackets
TI-0000-0485 TBD J12003 Ejection Seat Stand Design Issues
TI-0000-0660 TBD J26007 LF Driveshaft
TI-0000-0799 TBD Canopy Sling
TI-0000-1337 TBD DR 1-2076141 Tool Boxes not within weight standards
TI-0000-1338 TBD DR 1-2565051 Tool Set Shipboard FOD Hazard
TI-0000-1629 TBD Deployable Mission Rehearsal Trainer #1
TI-0000-1658 TBD Changes to Support Turning on AMC’s Algorithms in ALIS
TI-0000-2440 TBD J26035 Adapter, Drive Shaft Compression Galling issue
TI-0000-2699 CR-023093C Fibre Channel Switch Design Issues -0005
TI-0000-2797 TBD SE Weight Label and Forklift Provisions
TI-0000-2954 TBD STOVL NLG EEE Failure
TI-0000-1408 TBD AEL, Aft Sector
TI-0000-2865 TBD TR2 - SP-SPIO Issue
TI-7777-0004 CR-013644D MLG Strut Redesign
TI-7777-0007 CR-015718A OBOGS Plenum HEPA Filter Provisioning
TI-7777-0010 CR-016660B Radar Harness Redesign
TI-7777-0024 CR-018697 Gun Gas Purge & Gun Port Door Actuators
TI-7777-0031 CR-018544 Brake Control Electronic Unit Update
TI-7777-0042 CR-018487A Return Fuel Cooler HX Coating
TI-7777-0057 CR-018378 Nacelle Fan - Full Qualified Configuration
TI-7777-0077 CR-009382B Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) Rack Strut
TI-7777-0081 CR-014768E 270V BCCU Change
TI-7777-0083 TBD EHAS/LEFAS -0011 EU & Rack Config Update
TI-7777-0084 CR-016708A ACCM Filter Pin
TI-7777-0085 CR-016758A Replacement of Door Actuator Lock Assemblies
TI-7777-0087 CR-016909A Flaperon EHA Pump Design Change
TI-7777-0089 CR-017095 Avionics Bay Environmental Seal Change
TI-7777-0093 CR-017505 Flow Sensor EMI/Vibration
TI-7777-0095 CR-017773 Manual Drive Unit
TI-7777-0097 CR-017937A IEU Lightning Compliance
TI-7777-0098 TBD CTOL Structure Redesign for Updated Gun Loads
TI-7777-0101 CR-15956A NLG Down Lock Actuator
TI-7777-0102 CR-016633C Canopy Actuation System
TI-7777-0106 CR-016912 WBD Fwd Uplock Roller Bracket

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Remember Apollo 13?

Gene Kranz: Let's look at this thing from a... um, from a standpoint of status. What do we got on the craft that's good?
[pause]
Sy Liebergot: I'll get back to you, Gene.

[NutLoose]

Here's the most expensive weapons system ever and all of its ammunition in one photo (http://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/other/heres-the-most-expensive-weapons-system-ever-and-all-of-its-ammunition-in-one-photo/ar-BBiPENU?ocid=msnclassic)


Says it all really, and this being a supposedly cheaper alternative to the F22.

[O-P]

I noticed the baggage pod is classed as an 'armament', yet the Meteor doesn't make the list.

[Hempy]

http://img.s-msn.com/tenant/amp/entityid/BBiPOOW.img?h=194&w=300&m=6&q=60&o=f&l=f

"It'll never fly, Orville...."

[Lonewolf_50]

Designed and manufactured at Lockheed Martin's massive production facility in Fort Worth, Texas, the F-35 Lightning II can carry
an impressive 18,000 pounds of lethal ammunition. Wait, how much non-lethal ammo can it carry? :eek: :confused:

The business insider puff piece caters to ... whom?
Commence nitpicking.
How cost was presented. The article called it the most expensive, at $103 million per copy. The single most expensive weapons carrying vehicle that I am familiar with is a Seawolf submarine: something over 3 billion. The next most pricy aircraft is the B-2, at something close to a billion a copy. On the other hand, the volume of these probably tips the program cost into the highest ever category ... the mini article noted the notional size of the buy, but didn't do the arithmetic to show why it's the most expensive program
End nitpicking

[PhilipG]

Just to split hairs, is this saying that with a 426 gallon wing tank or two and a baggage pod, that a further 18,000 lbs can be carried, or are these classed as ammo?
Or is this just sadly poor PR?

[Turbine D]

Original quote by Lonewolf_50:
The article called it the most expensive, at $103 million per copy.

Lockheed says that each F-35A jet, also referred to as the Conventional Takeoff and Landing ( CTOL ), costs $103 million (not including engine) and is the most requested of the three aircrafts.

Neat how they have separated out the engine from the aircraft when it comes to cost divulgence. Add in the engine and total package cost is closer to $120 million. Hopefully the automobile folks won't pickup on this pricing technique.:(

BTW, Bennett Croswell, President of Pratt's Military operation, told the Flightglobal folks "The company stands by a commercially-derived programme that it has adapted for the F135."
Don't know what is meant by "commercially-derived" but hopefully that isn't what they do on their commercial product offerings.:confused:

[Lonewolf_50]

Neat how they have separated out the engine from the aircraft when it comes to cost divulgence. Add in the engine and total package cost is closer to $120 million. Hopefully the automobile folks won't pickup on this pricing technique.:(
Aye. The separation of the engine seems to be a systemic thing that goes back a few decades. Might be due to the modularity of systems, not sure.
I do know that during a mishap investigation in the 80's we were dealing with an engine replacement (in flight fire) that cost of the engine wasn't figured into the "Is it a class A, B, or C" mishap, only the cost of repairing the skin/airframe components. The engine was treated as a separate entity.

I am with you on the "they are playing games with this" angle.
The cost to get the weapons system as whole has to include the engine, since without it the thing won't fly. :E

[Danny42C]

In the "dear dead days beyond recall" , we used to demand/return airframe and engine as separate items from/to RAF Stores.

As if that wasn't inviting enough trouble, (2xNumber of Pots) spark plugs were on Inventory as separate entities, too.

Keeping the Squadron Inventory up to date was great fun (so long as you weren't the Holder).

D.

[peter we]

Interesting to see the VTOL engine is almost twice as reliable as the CTOL engine. Counter intuitive. I wonder why that is.

Statistics. Ratio of one airframe type to the other.

Nope; of the first 100 F-35's delivered by 2013, 44 were the A and 42 the B.

Besides that, if it was a down to a small sample size the noise would be like the start of the program, up and down.

The B engine really must be much more reliable than the A model.

[Just This Once...]

The flight regime of B is less extreme than the A.

[54Phan]

I may be mistaken, but aren't engines classified as GFE (Government Furnished Equipment) at least in American military procurement programs?

[Engines]

Turbine, JF, Glad, Others,

Firstly, my apologies for the gap in posting - I've been on foreign travel, catching up on all the holidays I never got to do when I was working. The other reason is that I've been reading the two reports (DODIG and GAO) that have sparked off the recent thread activity.

Usual disclaimer - I've been off the F-35 programme for some time, and I have no special access, so this reply is based on 'best guess' and informed opinion'.

A common thread across the two reports is the engine, so I'll address those issues.

DODIG Report:

In the early days of the JSF project, the aim was to go for a more streamlined and less intrusive way of procuring military kit in the USA. The old compliance systems tied up literally thousands of staff reading papers, checking lists, writing specs that couldn't be complied with, and getting contractors to spend millions on mountains of paper trying to comply with a huge list of requirements.

The idea was to try to put the onus on the contractors to do the job as best they saw fit, while keeping the key requirements of performance, safety and cost in place. (I was told this lot by a fairly senior JPO type some years back).

This report reads to me as if the JPO have fallen squarely between two stools, and by trying this 'lighter' approach have not held P&W down to the letter of the contract, or in some cases, haven't reflected the full extent of DoD regulations into the contract. Some of the omissions the report picks up are frankly surprising, especially the lack of a dedicated Quality Plan for the F135 engine. That's a basic building block of any contact I was involved in, but I have seen recent MOD DE&S contracts with US companies opt for the 'generic' type of plan that is reported here.

I do note that this report is not about the engine's quality 'per se', but about the systems being used to control and manage the quality and any risks in achieving the required quality. The only 'effect' I could find in the report was the failure by P&W workers to wear goggles.

But I don't want to even try to sugar coat this. The findings, including of out of calibration test kit and FOD in the final assembly area are bad news. These are basic issues that have to be put right. This isn't a good report, and I'd expect some JPO staff to carry the can for it.

GAO Report:

The GAO has, for some time, majored on two key issues' with the JSF/F-35 programme. The first was insufficient technical maturity (or excessive technical risk) at the start of the programme. The second was excessive 'concurrency' (overlap) between the development phase and the production phase.

My view is that GAO have good points here - LM certainly underestimated the technical risk associated with designing a powered lift aircraft, especially the risks associated with designing a low weight but rugged airframe with lots of big holes in it. They also underestimated the risks involved in stuffing an LO aircraft with a huge number of mission critical systems. That said, I would offer the thought that designers have to take risks to achieve the improvements in performance demanded by customers.

On concurrency, GAO have a valid point, but a degree of concurrency is inevitable in any real combat aircraft programme to meet real world schedules. LM's problem (and the JPO's) was that they thought that the X-35 programme had delivered a design that could be easily translated into a production aircraft. It hadn't, and that mistake led LM to assume very optimistic dates for 'design freeze'. They missed those dates by a mile, and ended up with a massive list of changes to incorporate into LRIP aircraft.

Turbine's list is interesting - it looks quite old, some items on there date from around 2003. The thing I would offer is that downstream change is inevitable on any aircraft project, and lots of it. It's engineer s**t, and needs to be handled in an organised and methodical (i.e. boring) way. LM didn't do that, and ended up playing 'catch up' late in the game. As I've often posted, life isn't perfect, designs aren't perfect, and stuff happens. What matters is how well you handle the stuff.

Engine Issues:

The headline is the 'poor reliability' of the F135. Again, here I feel that the F-35 are being held hostage to over optimistic promises. The reliability figures are certainly well below the forecast curve, but quite honestly I've seen far worse figures for far less advanced engines at a similar state of entry to service. (RR gem and RB199 spring easily to mind).

That doesn't make the F135 any better, but i do think it puts it in some context. These engines are fiendishly hard to design and make. They are at the very cutting edge of technology, and being worked hard. Again, stuff will happen. On the F135, stuff is happening. My guess is that they will work the issues and get the figures into line. But it will be hard. (By the way, I have NO idea why the STOVL engine is performing better than the CTOL).

Having looked again at the graph in the GAO report, and done some searching on the Net, I'm not sure that there is a strong link between declared F135 reliability and the cancellation of the F136. The F136 was effectively stopped in July 2011, and fully stopped in Dec 11. The GAO graph shows a jump in reliability in early 12, followed by a major fall in late 12.

Second engine cancellation - my own views, informed by some first hand knowledge while in DC. The F136 was under strong attack from 2005 onwards, mainly by Congress, who were looking for cost savings. The DoD were divided on the issue - the technocrats who ran engine tech programmes reckoned the F135 was great, while USAF and USN programme managers who were scarred by the 1970s PW100 saga wanted the second engine.

The Uk Govt and MoD were, in my view, sadly deficient in not pushing for the F136 to continue. The US Government expected them to push, and were amazed when they didn't. Again my view - F136 would have given business to RR, helped export more F-35s, and provide an engine with more thrust and a much better compressor.

Result was an open target for Congress, no push from DoD or JPO, and help from the other nation involved, UK, arrived far too late to make a difference. The rest is history.

Hope this lot helps a little, best regards as ever to those running the numbers again, and again , and again, and again, and again, and.....

Engines

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Outstanding insight as always Engines.


And yes, the F135 is Govt Furnished Equipment, and therefore cannot be factored into the aircraft's unit cost ex-LM.


Shoulda stuck with the F136 which showed considerably more (bench) power and growth potential.

[ORAC]

Having looked again at the graph in the GAO report, and done some searching on the Net, I'm not sure that there is a strong link between declared F135 reliability and the cancellation of the F136. The F136 was effectively stopped in July 2011, and fully stopped in Dec 11. The GAO graph shows a jump in reliability in early 12, followed by a major fall in late 12. Lag between production and in service use. The spike would have been with the last engines produced in the final push to get the F136 cancelled. The stats thereafter with engines manufactured after the cut off.....

[Engines]

ORAC,

Honestly, and with respect, i really do think you might be lining events up and seeing patterns that aren't there.

The JPO were, by around 2008/9, ready to can the second engine. The full costs of the redesign in 2004/5 were coming in, as were the real software development costs, and Congress had already tried to get the second engine canned. On the political side, both P&W and GE had well organised and very effective teams lobbying Congress. Steady production of F135 engines wasn't, as far as I saw, a factor in canning the F136. it was a pure budget drill, and in the end driven more by the DoD and the politicians than by P&W.

I don't know the details behind the reliability graphs, and I honestly can't explain the large 'spike' improvement in 2012, or the subsequent drop. I'd be interested to see what the graphs looked like before 2012 - I know that these figures were being closely watched by the JPO as well as the rest of the DoD.

Like I said, I won't even try to sugar coat these reports - the figures are poor and will need to be improved. That said, I've seen at least two, possibly three, UK aircraft programmes that showed similar trends.

Best regards as ever to those tendin' the engine'

Engines

[ORAC]

IIRC it took the Saudi order and cash to sort out the RB199.

Aimed at the JPO, not Engines!!!!

http://l2.yimg.com/bt/api/res/1.2/.8ASaWM0.SqfT5SU_a5ckw--/YXBwaWQ9eW5ld3M7Zmk9ZmlsbDtoPTE4NztweW9mZj0wO3E9NzU7dz02MDA-/http://media.zenfs.com/en_us/News/ucomics.com/dt150502.gif

[Engines]

ORAC,

True on the impact of the Saudi order - RB199 was a very sick puppy for a long time. I remember being ordered in 1994 to remove 25% of RN funds from Sea Harrier Pegasus engine support (already very very taut) to divert funds to RB199. We were promised a repayment the following year from RAF funds. (Just to set the record straight, we weren't being singled out - as I remember, similar demands were made on just about every aircraft engine support budget at the time).

Still waiting....

Great cartoon - made me larf. But I'd ask PPruners not to be too hard on the JPO al the time - they have got a lot of things right, and have been subject to a level of political and public oversight that would have crushed any DE&S PT by now. My dealings with them at Fort Worth were generally marked by mutual respect and lots of intelligent hard work from DC.

Best regards as ever to all those making a difference

Engines

[Hempy]

I'd ask PPruners not to be too hard on the JPO al the time - they...have been subject to a level of political and public oversight that would have crushed any DE&S PT by now

With all due respect, how do you think JPO would be traveling right now without the oversight? It seems to me that it's the only thing stopping the whole project going completely off the rails.

I imagine that people immersed in projects like this tend to forget who is actually paying the bills sometimes..

[glad rag]

Thanks Engines, that was a succinct write up.

Having worked on "final assembly" lines I can understand the alarm over the FOD issues but the process itself WILL generate FOD. It's the need for it to be addressed immediately during the process along with the time and resources made available that so many "managers" just don't get IMHO....

[Engines]

Glad,

Thank you. You are bang on the money there. FOD is certainly generated on traditional airframe final assembly lines, but having seen and worked around a number of US and UK examples, I'd say that overall US lines tended to be cleaner and more FOD free. There were also big variations between UK companies.

One measure that I know helped was having assembly jigs and fixtures equipped with built in vacuum cleaners and FOD bins so that locking wire cut off and swarf could be safely removed as it was generated. I once tried to get this idea installed on a UK assembly line, only to be told that it would cause a strike as only union approved cleaners could operate vacuum cleaners.

Engine final assembly lines should, in my view, be absolutely FOD free. Unless locking wire is being used (rare these days) there should be NO material left over from assembly, and the place should be surgically clean. I was appalled to see that a UK engine assembly line (RR East Kilbride) had open bins of nuts and bolts next to the Pegasus assembly line, with no control over how many were used. Plus scarf and locking wire scrunching under our feet. Both RAF and RN assembly lines used 'kit control', where the right number of nuts and bolts were issued to build teams when required, and no additional items were issued without a very good explanation.

When challenged, RR's explanation as that FOD control 'wasn't as important', as they had a just had the MoD pay for a new stand to turn the engines over and listen for FOD. Gawd.

Hempy, I can absolutely assure you that the JPO know who is paying the bills. This is a massive and highly complex project, not helped by the fact that it has to serve two customers (USAF and USN/USMC) who have very different views on how this aircraft is to enter service and be supported. Add in three variants, a good few export customers, and you should get an idea of the challenges they face.

Yes, I know that this is what they are supposed to be doing, and it's what they planned - but as I've often posted, unexpected stuff happens, and mistakes get made. The JPO has had excellent leaders, and some less than excellent - for what it's worth. I think Bogdan's doing a good job.

The really onerous oversight they are subjected to is that from Congress and organisations like the GAO. I'd be more than happy to see a similar level of attention paid to UK defence projects, plus a similarly informed defence press. It might help stop some of the really epic fails the UK Armed Forces have had to put up with. Sadly, most defence reporting in this country doesn't get much past the 'Beano' level.

Best regards as ever to those actually cleaning up the FOD

Engines

[Bevo]

Engines -- LM certainly underestimated the technical risk associated with designing a powered lift aircraft, especially the risks associated with designing a low weight but rugged airframe with lots of big holes in it. They also underestimated the risks involved in stuffing an LO aircraft with a huge number of mission critical systems. That said, I would offer the thought that designers have to take risks to achieve the improvements in performance demanded by customers. I believe therein lies the issue with many new, technically challenging, military programs. The big issue is the government’s ability to properly evaluate the technical proposals presented by the contractors.

For a short time I was one of the competing programs and had a chance to see the some of the interaction between the government technical folks and the contractor’s engineers. One of the issues was the relationship between the Air Forces technology development arm and the proposal evaluation. For example, at the time of the JSF selection process, the engineers from Wright-Patterson were heavily into developing hydro-electric actuators. Our design engineers thought that the maturity of the design for those actuators were too high of a risk, however, come proposal time, some of the same engineers from the Air Force technology development side were part of the proposal evaluation. They had a vested interest in seeing hydro-electric actuators on this aircraft and took issue with our risk evaluation.

As with many programs, the seeds of future problems can be traced to the technical proposal evaluations.

[Engines]

Bevo,

Thanks for coming back, and with an excellent input.

Yes, the USAF were very heavily involved with hydro-electric actuators (or electro-hydrostatic actuators (EHAs)) via the F-16 'AFTE' trials, and certainly had a vested interest in getting 'their' technology on to the F-35.

The sums seemed to show very good through life advantages, but as the F-35 programme developed some of the integration drawbacks manifested themselves. Heat dissipation was a big issue - on conventional hydraulic actuators, most of the heat generated is carried away down the return lines and dumped in the fluid reservoirs. Not so with 270V DC. The aircraft also had to carry a big 270V DC battery in case of a total elec failure, although this was partially offset by the ability to do away with lots of hydraulic system components. The EHA guys also claimed that volume and weight would be saved by eliminating hydraulic lines, but the 270V DC lines weren't exactly slender.

The actuators themselves got very big, but I'm not sure that conventional ones would have been a lot smaller. When the weight reduction plan was under way, there was a proposal to look at reverting to conventional hydraulics, but it was (in my view correctly) judged to be a step too far. Interesting to note that the outboard ailerons on the F-35C are hydraulically powered, not electrically.

This does highlight another area where F-35 is breaking new ground - it is a far more 'electric' jet than anything fielded so far.

You make an excellent point about the ability of the customer to independently and knowledgable verify a technical proposal - sadly, in the UK most of the MoD's ability to do this has been discarded over the past 10 years or so. Not good.

Best regards as ever to those racking and stacking the figures

Engines

[Turbine D]

Engines,

Thanks for all your thoughts they are interesting observations. I do have some observations that differ from yours as you might expect. It seems to me, no matter how you cut it, the JPO is totally responsible for the management of a program, complex or not. It is their job to assure that the program is carried out in such a way that the key parameters are met, which among other things includes program timing and milestones, program costs, reliability and risk analysis/risk abatement, just to name a few.

The idea was to try to put the onus on the contractors to do the job as best they saw fit, while keeping the key requirements of performance, safety and cost in place. (I was told this lot by a fairly senior JPO type some years back).

So, just looking at this from an engine perspective, that idea is awful. The key component of any new project, once identified, is the question: "What can possibly go wrong?" So if you are depending on your sole source supplier to provide you with a risk analysis/risk abatement program, you have hired the Fox. Do you think for a moment UTC/P&W would share real risk data when they advertised low risk in the first place?
This is where I blame the US DoD leadership all the way to the SoD. IMO, this is why the engine program as well as the entire program is in such disarray, decisions as you point out here. It has been my understanding that the SoD, at the time, promoted these changes to save money and that included the elimination of funding for the F136 engine even although directed by Congress to continue on. There is history that defines how stupid this decision was:

From Congressional Research Service
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Historians trace the Air Force’s interest in pursuing an alternate engine for the F-16 to Air Force frustrations in the 1970s with Pratt and Whitney’s management of the effort to develop the F100, and to Air Force concerns about using a single type of sole-sourced engine to power its entire fighter fleet of F-15s and F-16s. The use of annual competitions for procuring engines for an aircraft procurement program was unprecedented and controversial. Proponents believe it produced better engines, on better terms, for less money than would purchasing from a single company facing no competition. Other observers believed it “unjustifiably jeopardized combat effectiveness and pilot survivability.” Most of the studies have concluded that contractor responsiveness—not dollar savings—was the primary benefit of the competition. Testimony presented at a 1984 hearing suggested that requiring General Electric and Pratt and Whitney to compete for annual production and O&S work generated benefits for DOD in areas such as better contract terms and conditions, better warranties to ensure engine quality, consistency, and long-term stability of support.160 A 1987 assessment stated that after competition was introduced, the incumbent (Pratt and Whitney) offered “engine improvements to the Air Force earlier than the Air Force had been led to expect without the competition.”
So lets move to today's situation. When General Bogdan took over the F-35 program he was very loud and clear with both LM and P&W as to the lousy job they were both doing and that he expected more for both. He also identified, for the first time, the shortcomings of the aircraft and engine and lowered expectations. Then came the engine failure and fire that basically destroyed one aircraft. Bogdan was emphatic that P&W would get at the root cause of this failure and P&W would cover whatever cost incurred required to fix the problem. In other words, not at taxpayer expense. So here are the results of that:
From Defense News:

Pentagon, Pratt Cut Deal for F-35 Engines, Modifications

The newly identified root cause? “Prolonged rubbing into the material in the stator,” the JPO said in a statement. That “decomposed and superheated the titanium rotor, leading to excessive heating which started very small cracks in a titanium seal and then led to failure of the 3rd stage fan rotor.”

The office is working with Pratt to implement a plan to modify the fielded engines while also putting through a long term solution for newer copies of its F135 engine.

The cost of the modifications are included in the contract for LRIP 7, which was also awarded Tuesday. That award was for $592 million. When added to a previously awarded sustainment contract from last December, the total cost for LRIP 7 comes in at $943 million in funding for Pratt.

The lot covers 36 engines, as well as associated management and support. Pratt submitted its initial offering for LRIP 7 and 8 together; the announcement notes a contract for LRIP 8 is expected in the “near future.”

So my take on General Bogdan is that he has talked the walk very well, but walked the talk very poorly.

BTW, the Congressional delegation from Connecticut says:
(Source: John B Larson) Blumenthal, Murphy, Larson, Courtney, DeLauro, Esty Issue Joint Statement on $592 Million Pratt & Whitney Contract for F135 Engines HARTFORD -U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), U.S. Senator Chris Murphy...

"We applaud Pratt & Whitney for its continued commitment to driving down the cost of the F135 engine,"

Now if you are an engine person, you and I both know that rubbing of a titanium blisk seal is not the root cause of the F135 engine problem but a symptom of a more significant problem which must be resolved if the flight envelope is to be maintained. We will see how long, how many ($$$s) it will take and what the performance hit will be. It won't be pretty…

TD

[LowObservable]

AFTI was definitely an area where someone managed to get their pet rock accepted as part of the technology baseline. More-electric and 270VDC was part of that, as was the integrated powerpack.

Part of this may have been the belief that electric was the way of the future, and that developments like electric cars would drive better battery, power management and motor technology. This was certainly the view of Boeing on the 7E7/787.

I must say that I was boggled when I saw the JSF actuators on the Parker stand at Farnborough. They reminded me of the engine on my garden tractor, rather than something you'd put in the wing of a high-performance jet. Maybe the promised cost advantages will happen, but there's little sign of that so far.

The engine reliability issues will be a challenge - and sorry, but "better than 1970s British products" is not exactly a supercalifragilisticexpialadocious endorsement - and a repeat of the SBSDD "the GAO report is based on old data" is unreassuring.

[Engines]

Turbine,

Thank you for taking the time to respond.

I can't argue with the points you make - happy to differ in conclusions, but that's the point of an open forum - long may it continue.

Ownership of risk, identification of risk and management of risk are always contentious issues. What I was trying (badly) to get across was that by the 1990s the DoD had realised that the previous (largely humungously bureaucratic paper based processes) had not delivered the improvements in performance that were required.

The JPO were trying to move towards a more streamlined requirement process, and putting more onus on the contractor to perform, rather than spend millions of dollars getting the contractor to produce paper trails proving it.

The clip you showed on the background to the F135/136 decision is very familiar - it was shown to a DoD panel we supported in 1998 to review the F136 programme, and represented the views of the DoD engine programme managers who desperately wanted it to continue. The panel concluded that it should, and strongly recommended that to the DoD.

Just a few years later, it was canned, and I fully agree that it was a dumb decision. I don't know enough of the technical detail to judge P&W against GE, but I really do agree that competition is the best way to ensure best performance - if you can afford it. The US decided that they couldn't.

Best regards as ever to those making the tough calls,

Engines

[peter we]

The engine reliability issues will be a challenge - and sorry, but "better than 1970s British products" is not exactly a supercalifragilisticexpialadocious endorsement

You are no Engineer.

[LowObservable]

Engines - It was a tough call, but made much harder by the tone of P&W's propaganda. The company and its shills repeatedly and quite falsely claimed that the F135 had won multiple competitions against GE, and it's an interesting exercise to search P&W's F135 sites for the word "mature".

[rh200]

but made much harder by the tone of P&W's propaganda. The company and its shills repeatedly and quite falsely claimed that the F135 had won multiple competitions against GE, and it's an interesting exercise to search P&W's F135 sites for the word "mature".

Standard marketing bullsh!t, unless there are actually deliberate lies, it is to be expected. P&W focus at that level is its shareholders and to destroy the competition, standard stuff.

The people making the decisions on the evaluation side should in theory be smart enough to cut though it.

[LowObservable]

The program people could have done, but were actually determined to cut the F136 to save short-term money. (Not much of it, compared to the size of the program.) Many people in Congress swallowed the propaganda whole and this killed the debate.

[Turbine D]

Engines,

Thanks for your response once again. Relative to this:
The US decided that they couldn't.
Actually, the F135 selection was a follow on to what would be the F119/F120 engine contest for the F-22 fighter. Pratt made it known it would shut down their military engine operations outside of West Palm Beach, Florida if they were not selected as the engine of choice, i.e., the F119. During the early evaluations of both engines, I happened to be on a night flight to West Palm Beach for the purpose of playing golf for a week. The plane was dark and the person next to me had the laptop out reading mail. The person worked for P&W, it was obvious. It is hard not to look at a laptop screen lighting up the surrounding neighborhood at night. One email received listed all the problems being experienced on the F119 engine and if there were solutions identified or TBD. There were quite a few, more TBD than identified, several pages matter of fact. It didn't matter, Pratt won the contest. The alarm bells rang loud and clear at the Pentagon, an important supplier was leaving the business unless…

When the F-22 got cancelled with few being built verses what suppliers were counting on, the Pentagon "What will we do without two viable engine suppliers?" exercise went through the rigors one more time to assure Pratt remained in business.

If you want to know, the GE F136 engine had some features the Pratt engine didn't that added very modest additional weight and complexity, but provided better fuel efficiency, better high altitude performance, thrust growth potential beyond what the F135 is capable of, as we now know, while paving the way for the next generation engine. In fact this technology is now being fully developed for the next generation engine through the ADVENT program. The DoD reasoned, with the external message being, they wanted a simple proven derivative engine that performed without problems and the F135 was that engine, internally the message was, they wanted two engine suppliers.

So when it came to the F-35 Program, it wasn't that the US couldn't afford it, e.g. two competing engines, it was they couldn't afford losing Pratt as a supplier of military engines, simple as that…

TD

[tdracer]

Apologies for being a bit behind - I've been traveling and pretty much off line for the last week+ - but I want to add my observations (and I invite Turbine D and Engines to disagree or pile on as they see fit).
First off, over my career in turbine engines I've spent time working with all three - Pratt, GE, and Rolls. As good friend of mine put it before he retired "The worst engine company in the world is the one you're dealing with today".
Due to the relative market share, I've spent the majority of my time the last decade working GE (although I've still spent significant time and effort dealing with Pratt and Rolls). I think the genesis of the problems with the F135 started 25 years ago - when the development began for the 777 EIS engines. At that time, Pratt was already betting heavily on the geared fan concept - as a result the PW4000/112" engine for the 777 was a realtively minor development of the PW4000/94" (767 and 747-400). Meanwhile, GE committed hugely to a totally new engine - the GE90. Since that time, Pratt has continued to pursue their geared fan committment, while paying relatively little attention to the rest of the engine, while GE has continued to incrementally improve all aspects - the fan, compressor, and turbine - and done that to great effect.
GE personnel have told me, pretty much in so many words, that there is little new in the CFM LEAP - they've basically just taken everything that went into the GEnx (and GE90) and scaled it down to CFM size. GE also discovered - rather painfully - during the GEnx program that some of their aero development tools needed some refinement - refinement that has been successfully demonstrated in the GEnx PIP programs.
In short, GE has continued to successfully refine the entire engine technology, while Pratt has let their compressor and turbine technology stagnate while they chased the geared fan holy grail. Something that is all too apparent in their commercial market share where GE/CFM has well over half the market and Pratt is small single digits :=
Or to put it a bit differently - GE has been able to spread their incremental development costs over a mix of military and commerical engines, while Pratt no longer has a meaningful commerical base
Combined with Pratt's long standing issues with providing a geometrically stable compressor case (something I posted about many pages back), I believe the F135 problems were not just predictable, they were inevitable.:mad:

[MSOCS]

tdracer,

Thank you for some insightful and, frankly, welcome analysis there. It's a rare thing and has certainly examined a few perspectives on the -135 saga.

[Turbine D]

tdracer,
but I want to add my observations (and I invite Turbine D and Engines to disagree or pile on as they see fit).
I certainly don't want to pile on because you really wrote a good perspective of the engine businesses of GE and P&W. But there are some details of interest I can provide. GE used a building block philosophy in its engine designs. By that they had demonstrator engines to examine new technologies to see if they worked as imagined by the inventors and designers. Some of the technologies that successfully emerged from the demonstrators were put into the F101, F404 and F110 engines. Then, in the mid 1970's, a NASA program was proposed named the Energy Efficient Engine or E3. The idea was to design a new fuel efficient commercial high bypass turbofan as political problems in the Middle East were driving fuel costs up. GE approached this as an overall opportunity, a commercial building block engine, so to speak. GE decided to improve fan, compressor and combustor efficiencies believing they had really good turbine and turbine cooling technologies. It turned out to be a good program for GE. I think P&W concentrated more on turbine technology, particularly on air cooling, DS and SC materials technologies. Brian Rowe was the Leader of GE Aircraft Engines at that time and he hell-bent on overtaking Pratt on both the commercial and military engine fronts. His plan was 4 pronged, emphasizing technology advancements, modernized facilities, providing excellent customer service and establishing international operations.
Things on GE's commercial side of the business were going good, the CF6-6 morphed into the CF6-50 which morphed into the CF6-80A/C. GE's large engine commercial market share rose. One of the real boosts came as a result of a disaster. The TRW airfoil machining plant in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania burned to the ground and as a result, airfoil machining capacity reduced significantly. At that time, JAL was deciding on an engine for a very large B-747 order. As soon as the rubble from the fire was cool, GE went in retrieved their machining tooling cleaned them all up, replaced whatever parts was damaged and placed the tooling with new machining sources. GE never missed a beat on engine deliveries and spare part requirements. However Pratt was slow to respond to the point JAL had 747's grounded waiting for spares. GE won the JAL order and that firmly put GE in the large commercial engine business.
On the CFM56 engine side of the business, the V2500 came into being as a challenge to GE and SNECMA. So GE decided to build a unducted fan, highly fuel efficient engine demonstrator using the core of the F404 engine. It was the GE37 engine and it demonstrated two important features, big fans produced better efficiencies and composite material blades could enable large fans to be produced without taking a significant weight penalty but the GE37 never made it into the commercial marketplace. So, with Boeing's announced plan to build a long haul two engine aircraft (B-777), GE took the compressor, combustor and fan technology of the E3 and coupled it with the composite material for fan blades, defining what is now the GE90 engine.
If you look at the GE/SNECMA LEAP engines they do contain all the best technologies of the GEnx and GE90 engines with new innovative manufacturing methods used to produce parts.
One of the seemingly most difficult thing to do in engine design is matching the modules to yield the efficiencies both design and computer analysis programs say one should have. For example, you can design a good fan, fan booster and LP turbine, but when they are put together, they don't deliver the advertised performance. And that is true with all of the modules.

[John Farley]

The basic problem?

When one is a customer, from private individual to Government, and in the market for the very latest high tech product (F135 in this thread but the arguement applies in many circumstances) then I don’t see how the customer can know as much about the product as those developing and building it. So how can the customer tell if the supplier is telling the whole truth or even make a valid risk assessment themselves?

If the customer must have the product, then in my simplistic and perhaps naive view, the only real protection a customer can have is two suppliers in competition.

[Lonewolf_50]

If the customer must have the product, then in my simplistic and perhaps naive view, the only real protection a customer can have is two suppliers in competition. As noted above, both services (USN/USAF), the real customers, were advocating the F136 as well, but our Congress seems to have missed your very well crafted point.

Not for the first time. :mad:

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

To be really naive, you would only need one supplier (post development competition) if that supplier were doing their honest best for the Nation (plus allies) as well as making a reasonable profit.

But then you'd also need as the customer an honest Government doing its best for the Nation too. ;)

[Hempy]

The supplier is solely intent on doing what's best for its shareholders by attempting to make massive profits. End of story.

This is capitalism 2015.

[NITRO104]

To be really naive, you would only need one supplier (post development competition) if that supplier were doing their honest best for the Nation (plus allies) as well as making a reasonable profit.
Communist countries were 'doing' that for years...we all know what that produced and how it ended.

[Courtney Mil]

TurbineD, Engines and tdracer in particular, thank you for you considered and valued posts. Much appreciated.

[John Farley]

Hear hear to Courtney's post.

[LowObservable]

Nitro - The Pentagon economy resembles socialism much more than it resembles free-market capitalism.

[Engines]

LO,

Spot on. To some large extent, the DoD operates on a 'command and control' system, where defence companies pretty much do as they are told, and 'build to print' once their designs are approved.

DoD has been trying to change away from this, basically because even the US cannot afford the massive costs of the bureaucracy involved in doing all that commanding and controlling. This has led to many 'defence acquisition transformations) that have had varying degrees of success.

In some ways, F-35 is just another of the attempts. As I've posted earlier, some of the ideas have worked, some haven't.

Bit it does mean that when countries like the UK buy a US sourced piece of kit, US companies are unused, ill equipped and usually plain unwilling to provide the level of 'performance underwriting' that UK companies are used to. Plus the ever present issue of US ITAR regulations being used to preserve the US technological lead.

These issues can, and do, lead to problems when buying from the US. Rivet Joint's a decent example. Unfortunately, very few Uk MoD acquisition personnel are fully aware of the risks involved. I hope that those people currently advocating a direct Apache buy from Boeing have got all those issues fully 'risk costed'.

But I bet they haven't.

Best regards as ever to those having to deal with Uncle Sam,

Engines

[NITRO104]

Nitro - The Pentagon economy resembles socialism much more than it resembles free-market capitalism.
Indeed it does and that can't end up well in any conceivable way.

[ORAC]

http://l3.yimg.com/bt/api/res/1.2/Yy7VdGF8Cvkn.H1QOZPXog--/YXBwaWQ9eW5ld3M7Zmk9ZmlsbDtoPTE4NztweW9mZj0wO3E9NzU7dz02MDA-/http://media.zenfs.com/en_us/News/ucomics.com/dt150509.gif

[rh200]

The supplier is solely intent on doing what's best for its shareholders by attempting to make massive profits. End of story.

This is capitalism 2015.

Ummm, well that is capitalism, I was under the understanding thats how it was supposed to work.

Blame the people who stuff up the contracts and decision makers etc. Not the people doing their job.

What are we saying here, large companies should go, "Oh sh!t, there DOD are incompetent, we'll make a loss and wipe their @rse for them".

We know what the nature of the beast is, deal with it.

Nitro - The Pentagon economy resembles socialism much more than it resembles free-market capitalism.

Like no sh!t, its the military.:ugh:

We as a society have to find incremental improvements as things go forward, supposedly more bang for buck, all whilst under the constraints of changing societal expectations.

The whole F35 thing appears to be nothing more than a swiss cheese incident. Or a perfect Storm.

Like many things we have tried too many things in one go. Technology integration, try and average out its capabilities for every task, and then change the way we approached the project sourcing and procurement system. Combine all that with our usual bureaucratic bungling and this what you get.

The change in procurement and sourcing/project system, was probably going to be a elephant in the room anyway, so doing it on the F35 project appears to be insanity.

[John Farley]

Perhaps the only advantage of getting old is that one has more experience to draw on.

During the mid 1940s a Spitfire cost £5000. Less than 10 years later the Hunter cost £250,000. Plus when you fired the guns the Hunter’s engine stopped. You can imagine what some people thought about this at the time.

I have taken an interest in military aircraft procurement from then to the present and watched (not just in the UK) throughout this period the trend of unexpected costs, issues of introducing immature technology and contract problems. The only exception to this generalisation that I have noticed was the RAF Hawk – and there were special reasons why this did not follow some aspects of the trend.

Forgive me if I can’t share some people’s excitement at the F-35 events of today.