Why no helo transport? Are we condemning our diggers to an easy victimology?

[TheShadow]

In the big scheme of things, losing 20 diggers in Afghanistan isn't earth shattering across the termly spectrum of a limited regional war. However speaking as an ex-Vietnam conflict helo pilot, I cannot help but wonder why we are playing into Taliban hands by committing our ground-pounders to foot-patrol forays from their bases along well-known and oft-plied routes. The Taliban doesn't need intell to interdict those routes. They simply set up the IED's and rely upon their teenagers to give them 20 minutes notice of a patrol tracking towards.

I'm not sure whether all of these IED's are being command detonated by cell phone or walkie-talkie, but I'd suggest that a vast majority are. If so, are the patrols carrying jammers?

Enough said on that subject, however there's another aspect that requires explanation. Instead of foot-tracking towards regional population centers or suspected arms caches, why not utilize the tried and tested methodology of choppering in to somewhere else and foot-tracking in on an unexpected axis? Obviously I'd not be well versed in modern tactics as my experience dates back 40 years, however I do hope that we are NOT putting our forces in harm's way through being afraid of the MANPADS versus helo threat.

Helo's at low-level are sufficiently safe if escorted by gunships. Whenever we did people-sniffers in Vietnam at ultra low-level we had gunships in 2 click trail and all it took was a smoke-pop and an R/T call to deter the gooks from taking potshots or engaging you with LAW's or RPG's. They eventually found it wiser to keep their heads down. Escorted helos at low-level using terrain-hugging and nap-of-the-earth masking techniques have the distinct advantage of their tracking and destination being indeterminate and time precious - as far as the opposition is concerned. Courtesy of modern NVG'ss you can do it night and day. Contrast that tactic to a foot-slogger patrol heading fortress outbound in daylight on a known tracking with an obvious objective. Chalk and cheese.

Even if MANPADS come into the equation, very few of these are effective against low-level helos and they'd be easily engaged by follow-up supportive gunships. Contrast this effective quid pro quo against the current nil cost to the insurgents of simply detonating an IED from a safe hidey-hole..

So I guess my question is quite simply: "Would a company/squadron of slicks with a heavy hog team of three gunships help drop this IED toll?" If the answer is yes or even just maybe, I'd be prepared as a taxpayer to stump up $500 to help fund this change of strategy. If the shared bill was $1500 I could also manage that. There's no great difference between rugged terrain and jungle as far as a helo squadron is concerned. If you put this solution to the people I'd suggest that about 30% would be prepared to send the Def Dept $500, even if they had to add it to their credit card bills.

Gaining the upper hand and minimizing casualties might be as simple as using proven tactics to defeat a very unsophisticated enemy.

If this is a viable proposition and it isn't being addressed by my old Sqn mate CDF Angoose Houston, then colour me confused. It takes more than crocodile tears and heartfelt pronouncements to turn a situation around each time a digger is killed in action. I'd like to see some Israeli style strategic change of direction, even if it costs a few quid. Sometimes the solutions are obvious and sometimes they are obscurely elusive. This one is fairly plain to me.

.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Helo's at low-level are sufficiently safe if escorted by gunships. Whenever we did people-sniffers in Vietnam at ultra low-level we had gunships in 2 click trail and all it took was a smoke-pop and an R/T call to deter the gooks from taking potshots or engaging you with LAW's or RPG's. They eventually found it wiser to keep their heads down. Escorted helos at low-level using terrain-hugging and nap-of-the-earth masking techniques have the distinct advantage of their tracking and destination being indeterminate and time precious - as far as the opposition is concerned. Courtesy of modern NVG'ss you can do it night and day. Contrast that tactic to a foot-slogger patrol heading fortress outbound in daylight on a known tracking with an obvious objective. Chalk and cheese.
.

The Taliban are not gooks and don't care about dying. I am not sure how you conclude that helos are safe at low-level.....

Even if MANPADS come into the equation, very few of these are effective against low-level helos and they'd be easily engaged by follow-up supportive gunships. Contrast this effective quid pro quo against the current nil cost to the insurgents of simply detonating an IED from a safe hidey-hole.

You are very wide of the mark........too late for gunships when the Stinger RMP has taken the side off the aircraft.

Things have moved in........

HPT

[UNCTUOUS]

The big boogey-man on the block in Afghanistan may be the legendary Stinger but if they are indeed present (and not just a spectral and imagined threat), in that largish country they'd be very few and far between. How to defeat their highly localized limitation?

Just truck the patrols to an LZ pickup nearby and have the choppers fly in to emplane them. We're not talking Vietnam style combat assaults here, just a two-ship slick flight with one or two gunships in support. With some coordination, their destinations could even be distant and in support of an adjacent province.You'd need to be Nostradamus to position the limited supply of MANPADS to be conveniently located for a chopper kill. And the Shadow is not talking about combat assaulting a target, just giving the patrols a non-evident axis of advance towards an objective and thus avoiding a well-trammeled path towards their local and traditional areas and objectives of interest. Their exit route could similarly be a non-evident exfiltration towards an obscure pickup LZ.

Like the Shadow, I see little evidence of any lateral thinking and plenty of evidence for us continuing to play foolishly by the taliban's own ground rules.
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[HEDP]

What makes you think that in the last forty years no-one else has thought about this?

What makes you think that what you suggest is not being done?

What makes you think that there are no helo's on task?

What makes you think that you can demonstrate security when it isn't secure enough to go in and out your own front door?

How do you interact with the population if you helo everywhere?

There are many more tasks that have to be carried out by these helos in addition to what you suggest. Convoys will still be required to deliver stores in sufficient quantities as are required.

This is not a north/south gooks all out war, this is an insurgency amongst local populations that may or may not be sympathetic in either direction!

There are very many tried and tested tactics and techniques being employed but it doesnt change the fact that the lads on the ground have to demonstrate a presence in order to establish a secure environment.

Your offer of cash for helos is comendable but if I had $500 spare then I might think that as good a use might be in making some of our brave lads whom have been injured a little bit more comfortable.

IMHO HEDP

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Shadow/Unctuous-have you been to Afghanistan?

I have, I know the country, the threat, the reality......it isn't Vietnam, Northern Ireland etc....

Yes, SAMs are rare, but when they are unleashed they are effective. The biggest threat to helos is still old codgers that think that low-level tactics are safe.....

HPT

[Two's in]

Gaining the upper hand and minimizing casualties might be as simple as using proven tactics to defeat a very unsophisticated enemy.

Winning hearts and minds 30mm at a time...

[Pelikanpete]

It's slightly naive of the original poster to image that today's military are so wet behind the ears that they are not aware of the basics. Helicopters are essential but a continuous ground presence in every town and village and the ability to support them, particularly the smaller, remote bases is the capability that is most required. That means as many well trained troops (preferably Afghans), on foot, as is possible - the raw material for a successful counterinsurgency.

[airborne_artist]

Vietnam was a) 40 years ago and b) not a great success for the US, so what worked there may be pretty irrelevant.

At some point you have to put, and keep, boots on the ground. Those boots will always be vulnerable to all sorts of irregular threats, whether that's suicide bombers, IEDs or as we've seen several times, rogue Afghan soldiers/police turning their weapons on their mentors.

[Tibbsy]

as my experience dates back 40 years


If this is a viable proposition and it isn't being addressed by my old Sqn mate CDF Angoose Houston

hmmm :hmm: You're not Bushranger 71 using another handle are you....?

[barnstormer1968]

I possibly understand where Shadow is coming from, and broadly agree with some of his sentiment too.

The bit where he lets himself down is suggesting the enemy here are unsophisticated. IMHO they are doing pretty well, bearing in mind they have no CAS, no AT, no helos, no artillery, no secure (modern) radio net, no full coverage AD systems, plus they often have very old equipment too.

Even given all of the above, they regularly take us on and do fairly well from it!

Yes we do need to keep boots on the ground, that is true, but I think Shadow was suggesting we fly troops from one village to another (the downside being that troops will already have to be in each village to assure its LZ), so that boots can be on the ground, but only where the populous are.

That is how I read it.

I also know a convoy is easier in some ways to attack than a foot patrol, but then it is easier for them to have grenade launchers, or HMG's to retaliate with, as well as their own organic IED sensors.

I do actually think they are many very sound lessons to be learned from Vietnam, and many of the tactics used there are still effective today (surprisingly effective too). Some are obvious to an armchair general like me, but I do wonder just how many active generals are picking up on mistakes made, and the use they can be to the enemy.

Oh, I am talking of lessons learned (and used) by the VC, not the Americans BTW.

[MTOW]

Hydraulic Palm Tree and others... when you cut Shadow's message down to its core, he's proposing more helicopter support be available for the guys (you!) in Afghanistan.

Are you saying you don't need or want it?

I think we all need to be a lot more aware than some seem to be that it's a natural human trait, if you're part of The System, to defend the status quo.

No one's accusing the current military of being wet behind the years. (I have to say that I was very, very favourably impressed by the baggy-arsed grunts [affectionate description] who I saw in the recent 4 Corners program on the ABC.) I think he was saying, (and as another armchair general whose only wartime experience dates from 40 years ago, I must say I agree with him), that a viable ADF helicopter support element would give those men wearing the boots that must be on the ground an opportunity to get those boots where they're needed without necessarily having to walk through otherwise unavoidable and easily-identified killing zones.

Surely any asset that gives the grunts-on-the-ground more flexibility in the way they project their force is a good thing?

(And I don't think Shadow is Bushranger 71. If he knows Angus as Angoose, I'd be guessing he's a few years younger than BD.)

[TheShadow]

...and yes, both Unctuous and I were there in theatre in Brian's time (pre and post gunship). Only difference is that I've got two vastly different campaign medals and a different Cross to the one Brian wears - and only gave up on flying around 10 months ago. I think that any 9 Sqn type who saw the transition from the American gunship support to our own Bushranger inhouse on-scene fire support would have to say, once again, chalk and cheese. It's best stylized as teamwork. We didn't really have that with the US Army gunships and often they got diverted on more important tasking - or just failed to turn up (and misunderstandings were rife).

MTOW has encapsulated my argument for organic airlift (and fire-) support well. You don't need to secure the LZ's for insertion, because they're easily reconnoiterable and (being sans jungle) multiple choice. Unlike Vietnam you also don't need B52, F/GA, arty or gunship LZ prep -or even door-gun suppression - you just pitch-up unexpected like. If conversely however, you do an A to B via C ground-pound in to any taliban hive of activity, the bad guys can easily cover the likely access routes and ex-base exit routes to those tracks/trails with mines or IED's..... and they have 20 to 30 minutes to get organized. The noise of helos outbound or enroute doesn't give you any useful intell (until it's too late) on where they are going to deposit their troops - or even if there are any diggers onboard (i.e. maybe it's just logistic support).

If you change the game so that insertion to the proximity of the Tactical area of interest is via chopper, then the axis of likely advance to the objective becomes 360 degrees and impossible to cover. Not trying to tell people how to suck eggs but that's as plain as the nose on your face.

I don't see the Bushmaster vehicle as making anybody as impervious to the IED threat as the ubiquitous helo with its pop-up capability and organic light fire-team's firepower. I may be an old codger but I've still got all my marbles. IMHO so does everybody participating in this regional stoush. I just wish they'd start playing sensibly with theirs. It could be a game-changer.

.

[Mr C Hinecap]

Very different situation on the ground with very different tactics, requirements and intended outcomes. Just by saying 'it is enough like Vietnam for this to work, but no trees so a bit easier on that front' doesn't even come close. Suffice to say there are some very clever people working out there (and back here). Whilst more cabs are always a good thing, the tactics on the ground require a very different use than suggested, at this time.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Shadow/MTOW

Of course we need more choppers. A Huey with an M60 is not going to achieve anything. A number of the choppers in theatre have M134 and even the prospect of a one KM chainsaw doesn't put the TB off. Many of the missions are supported by AH/CAS and the sight of an Apache or Tiger cuts nothing with the enemy.

You say the unpredictability of 360 degree approach is impossible to cover. Well if you are approaching Sangin just how different can the last 60 seconds of flight be when you are flying an aircraft at 50,000Ibs at the edge of power limitations - a gentle straight in approach is required, particularly with a slung load. RPGs and HMG can very easily be brought to bear.......as has bee proven.

The TB have spotters everywhere and pass direction, heights etc by radio...so they know where and when an aircraft is going to arrive overhead. These guys dig IN under tarps and are not visible.

It really isn't as easy as you might think!

HPT

[TheShadow]

There is no suggestion of flying INTO a provincial centre or area of interest. A flight of helos would simply deposit the patrol at a distance from the objective, allowing the foot-sloggers to foot-slog in on an unpredictable axis - anything up to 10 or 12 clicks.

A variation on the well-proven aural deception theme of having the heavy hog team overfly the LZ in trail as two hovering slicks deposited their SAS boys in a jungle LZ might be as follows. 180 flare/hover in a number of locations raising dust - and in one of those locations deplanement occurs. Unless you're under close visual observation, the patrol's infiltration is likely to be unconfirmed/undetected. In the big scheme of things, intentionally generated uncertainty is worth ten times the best camouflage. Drop a few coloured smokes here and there along the way to generate Taliban confusion and R/T indiscipline.

The present practice of foot-sloggers departing the friendlies base towards an evident objective is to give the Taliban adequate time for preparing and manning their IED traps.... and over a very limited number of access routes. We're making it so easy for them to ambush our patrols.

Can't see where slung loads come into this argument. But operating fully loaded helos into minimal pads that have been prepped, are on fire and full of rising ash, while your door gunners are suppressing on twin M60's is just a typical slick pilot's distraction. The really complicating factor in SVN was that frequently these pads would have been blasted out by B52 strikes and be unlandable - as well as being surrounded by 100 ft tall trees of a triple canopied jungle. When you sank beneath the canopy you lost your vital headwind and got the RPM warning beeping - just to add to your angst. The Sqn boggy was always no 13 into a 12 acft pad. Overpitching and hitting like a bag of ****e was always on the cards. Avoiding collision, obstacles beneath and retaining the ability to fly out again was the important part. The difficulties in Afghanistan are only a variation on a well-worn theme.

Surprise and deception remain fundamental principles of war. We should consider using them.

[7x7]

TheShadow, the overriding sentiment from today's rotary wing flyers seems to be "What would you know, you silly old fart. This isn't 40 years ago."

Perhaps I should amend that to read: "What would you know, you silly old RAAF fart."

I can't help but feel that there are more than a few among the current generation of Army flyers who have swallowed the extremely skewed views of a few now senior Army people who oversold their case to get their hands on the helicopters with the line that the RAAF worked only from 1100 to 1430 hours Monday to Friday and only ever slept in five star hotels - and that however the RAAF did it, the Army would do it differently.

Tin hat (I'm too old to own a kevlar) on and chinstrap secure as I await the inevitable incoming. But after you've calmed down a bit, guys, I think most of you will admit that there's more than a little of that sentiment out there. Take a look at some of the utter rubbish posted on the AAAA's site (and their refusal to allow any contrary views to be posted) before you say there isn't.

[Hedgeporker]

I don't see how a lack of helos suddenly makes it easy for diggers to study the subject of the relationship between victims, offenders, and the criminal justice system - and you're making that sound like a bad thing. :8

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

There is no suggestion of flying INTO a provincial centre or area of interest. A flight of helos would simply deposit the patrol at a distance from the objective, allowing the foot-sloggers to foot-slog in on an unpredictable axis - anything up to 10 or 12 clicks.

Have you seen the terrain in AFG.....it somewhat limits approach directions and exposes the pongos to 10 or 12 clicks worth of ambush...snipers and IEDS.

A variation on the well-proven aural deception theme of having the heavy hog team overfly the LZ in trail as two hovering slicks deposited their SAS boys in a jungle LZ might be as follows. 180 flare/hover in a number of locations raising dust - and in one of those locations deplanement occurs. Unless you're under close visual observation, the patrol's infiltration is likely to be unconfirmed/undetected. In the big scheme of things, intentionally generated uncertainty is worth ten times the best camouflage. Drop a few coloured smokes here and there along the way to generate Taliban confusion and R/T indiscipline.]

Yes we are familiar that tactic, and it would be nice to have the additional assets to play at that game....the TB watch everything and report very coherently as to what has been dropped and don't for one second think that they don't have NVDs.


as well as being surrounded by 100 ft tall trees of a triple canopied jungle. When you sank beneath the canopy you lost your vital headwind and got the RPM warning beeping - just to add to your angst. The Sqn boggy was always no 13 into a 12 acft pad. Overpitching and hitting like a bag of ****e was always on the cards.

I'm afraid that exposing the aircraft to undue risk due to poor airmanship through a lack of performance planning is not appropriate in the 'new age' and probably never will be again. Losing a CH47, Tiger or MRH ain't quite the same as losing a Huey, politically or financially.

The difficulties in Afghanistan are only a variation on a well-worn theme.

When were you last there?

And 7x7, I have 20 years of RAF behind me, so don't tar me with the AAAvn brush....

HPT

[UNCTUOUS]

as well as being surrounded by 100 ft tall trees of a triple canopied jungle. When you sank beneath the canopy you lost your vital headwind and got the RPM warning beeping - just to add to your angst. The Sqn boggy was always no 13 into a 12 acft pad. Overpitching and hitting like a bag of ****e was always on the cards.
I'm afraid that exposing the aircraft to undue risk due to poor airmanship through a lack of performance planning is not appropriate in the 'new age' and probably never will be again. Losing a CH47, Tiger or MRH ain't quite the same as losing a Huey, politically or financially.
.
Unfortunately the L13 engine in the Huey was prone to a very variable performance. No two aircraft would have a definable or consistent performance for a reason I'll explain below - so unlike ops in PNG or OZ, a TOLD card was pretty much a useless predictor of nothing useful - performance-wise.

The problem in SVN was always that ops into burnt pads gave aircraft a sticky ash compressor coating that degraded performance non-linearly. At the end of the average day, for the high mission numbers, you'd be finding it very difficult not to overpitch and bleed RPM, having lost up to 15Tq. After each day's flying, most aircraft were automatically scheduled for a large drink of walnut shells down the inlet that evening. Next day it was the same power-erosive process of performance degradation. That doesn't happen so much in sandy desert environments. Sand tends to burnish compressor blades.

We never had the option of saying "sorry" - that we'd "only be able to take 7 troops because of full fuel" on the first lift. Nothing gung-ho about it, just that the battalion commanders were calling the shots to the CP and they were issuing the tasking. But admittedly, we were a "can-do" outfit.

Notwithstanding all that, in over 1000hrs in country I never broke any airplanes. In fact few were broken in the time I was there (if you discount a few engine failures - Kiwi Ken Wells, Tony Casadio, Ken Vidal, Rowley Waddlewood etc)
.

.

[Trojan1981]

I have to agree with nearly everything you say, Hydraulic Palm-tree.

The Shadow, I respect your experience and have nothing to say about Vietnam or its relevence. HPT has some good points however, I wont repeat them, but everything he has said so far about operating helos in the 'ghan is true. The Bushmaster is an excellent peice of equipment. It pains me to say that because I hate riding in armour, it feels like a coffin and the idea of being in one when an IED goes off nearby scares the crap out of me. That said, they work well. Most of the Aussie casualties were outside the vehicle when the device activated, while those inside have survived.

Remember, it is a basic premise of warfare that a force most occupy and hold ground. This has never been more important than in Afghanistan. The TB are not an enemy who are intimidated easily and airbourne direct fire support can only achieve so much. One stray bullet can make enemies of an entire village.
Food for thought, the Russians killed more than 2 million Afghans and still lost.

[TBM-Legend]

...another one of Australia's finest KIA yesterday. RIP

[OVERTALK]

Most of the Aussie casualties were outside the vehicle when the device activated, while those inside have survived.
I'm sure that it cheers the Taliban no end when they see such disruptive events and their consequences, but perhaps a primary objective should be to deny them their minor exhilarating victories by changing tactics to keep them on the hop, on the defensive and taking hits. Regularly reinvigorating the enemy's morale is somewhat self-defeating.

I'm not sure whether or not the SAS is presently operating in Afghanistan but one of the limitations on the perspective of our troops in this nasty war might be unfamiliarity with the successes of the SAS in covert helo insertion and safe extraction - during (once again) the lengthy Vietnam conflict.

Apart from the SAS and their corporate memory, few Aust Army wallahs would be familiar with the techniques employed by the SAS and 9 Sqn in Vietnam. That they were highly successful is indisputable but equally true (as 7x7 alluded) is the fact that an Aust Army Aviation instinctive reflex is to automatically reject the RAAF experience as irrelevant. I don't think it is.

Angus and our political masters might be determined to stay the course but remaining lockstep with failure is not an option. I'm with those who see provision of air mobility to the diggers as being an essential part of the solution. Trudging out of bases along well-defined (but sometimes varied) routes is simply to invite getting your butt blown off.... via overt ambush (contact) or ambuscade (mining). We seem to be proving that point quite regularly now. A different approach to forays into contested areas is called for - and quite warranted by recent events. Dare I say "wake up and smell the coffee"?

A successful counter-insurgency campaign is all about wrenching the initiative from the desperadoes and making them acutely aware of their low-tech vulnerability. Right now the obverse is true and has been for quite some time. Choppers aren't just for medevac.

They're for seizing the initiative. But having a medevac helo on station is also a top life-saver - versus calling it in and waiting your turn. A slick is also a medevac machine.

Unpredictability and mobility isn't apparent in our troops' recent casualty figures. I cannot fathom why the Aust Army is turning its back on Air Mobility. Perhaps some ex armoured Cav gecko is in the ascendancy and calling the shots. Maybe he's convinced all and sundry that the Bushmaster's armour-plate is some kind of answer? Who knows? It's all top secret. Death isn't however. It's all over the terrorist web-pages and our evening TV news. It demoralizes our citizens and encourages our opponents. 40 years after Vietnam we seem to have surrendered our technological edge. The question must be "why?" Haven't seen a valid answer in this thread, thus far.
.

[0497]

Not sure if you can access this from England but well worth a look. Foot patrols, IEDs etc.

Four Corners - 05/07/2010: A Careful War - Part 1 (http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2010/s2943068.htm)

BQ9BWPXqoT4

[Mr C Hinecap]

40 years after Vietnam we seem to have surrendered our technological edge. The question must be "why?" Haven't seen a valid answer in this thread, thus far.

Either you don't get it or you don't want to get it. Have you any idea of the technology currently deployed in Afghanistan? Evidently not. Far more than you could evidently imagine. You'll not see detail in this thread because, shock news, this is open and current operations, equipment and tactics won't be discussed - especially by those who really know what is happening. They know that lives depend upon it. I find it hard to believe that you seem to think we've not done anything new or looked critically at how warfare is fought (inc helicopters in all their roles) since Vietnam. Do you really think so little of all those who followed you and served since?

[Wiley]

Most will have heard the shock horror reports in the Australian news over the last 24 hours of the Kalgoorlie/Boulder high school teacher who set his (her?) students the project of designing a terror attack with a view to killing as many innocent Australians as possible. The Oz public have reacted as you might expect them to when drummed up by the tabloid media.

Along similar lines - think Spain and Madrid trains immediately before a national election - I'd be guessing that some very clever people in northern Pakistan (even if they're getting their feet a bit wet at the moment) have come to the (in my mind, the very logical) conclusion that killing one, or ten, or preferably more than ten Australian soldiers is almost guaranteed to have far more political fallout than killing an even larger number of Americans, so they've stepped up ops in the Australian area of operations to bring that about.

Seeing that the Mr Faulkner, the Australian Defence Minister, has announced a parliamentary debate on the Australian commitment to Afghanistan, it would seem that those clever people in Pakistan have already succeeded to some degree.

Hydraulic Palm Tree and others, accepting that this is an open forum, I've read David Kilcullen's (very sensible, I think) book on ops in Afghanistan stressing population-centric operations, and I accept that I don't know one tenth of one percent of what you guys get up to with the modern day kit you have available to you, but I repeat what I think is a well-founded perception as mentioned by Overtalk (= Overtorque. Clever - I get it) - the Army has to accept that there might be a few things that could be learned about helicopter operations from the way the RAAF did things before the takeover. I (and many others) can attest that damn near everyone on the Army side went out of their way to shelve and ignore any such experience as quickly as they could.

The casualties that are occurring now give the perception – and this is one war where perception is almost as important as any other facet of the war (something the enemy, with their very professional use of propaganda, certainly understands) – that the Australian Army is reacting rather than forcing the enemy to react to what they, the Australian Army, force upon them. Continuing the tactics of foot patrols, while fitting exactly within the ‘population-centric’ tactic espoused by Kilcullen, must surely be leavened with a few other tactics – like helo insertion.

But I suppose that might be an easier option if we had our own helicopters that we could put into the theatre - that worked.

[TheShadow]

I realise that war correspondents are usually only respected after they're dead, but this particular one (see below) has been in quite a few conflict zones and has the unique ability to see through in-theatre BS. Anyway, for what it's worth, I personally respect his work and I've known him (and followed him) since 98.
-----Original Message-----
From: C
Sent: Monday, August 23, 2010 10:24 AM
To:
Subject: Afghanistan
Gidday TS,
Long time no speak. I am working on XXXXXXX now doing the odd investigative yarn for them and I noticed you'd posted re the helos issue in Afghanistan. I've been over there myself a few weeks back - with the US xxxxxxxx/xx, not the Aussies - and I asked the same questions you asked.
The short answer is that the much vaunted counter-insurgency strategy pushed by Aussie David Kilcullen with General Petraeus is that to win the hearts and minds of the locals you need to engage at a local level and that requires troops on the ground, mixing with the locals and being seen to be patrolling the area. Helos don't cut it.

I have to admit that, after going on numerous patrols with US soldiers, both on foot and in the big MRAVs, to my humble amateur expert eyes, it looks like a forlorn hope that the western alliance nations will ever be able to achieve any kind of turn-around in Afghanistan - certainly not within the short term election cycles and burgeoning deficit priorities of the American and British Governments. Of the several hundred US soldiers we started filming with in May, five are now dead and 31 are now seriously wounded. The attrition levels are shocking. They'd also be far worse were it not for the absolutely miraculous surgical hospitals at Khandahar and Bagram, within a short flight of most conflict areas. Nothing I say detracts from the humbling heroism and moral fibre and raw courage of the soldiers I had the privilege of spending time with.

Perhaps the best test of how safe it is to travel in Khandahar province was that, for us to move from Khandahar airfield out to our embed eleven kms out of town, it was only regarded as viable to travel safely by helicopter.
Even then, the Chinooks have to be escorted by two Blackhawks at all times because of the (until recently) undisclosed risk of shoot-downs by Taliban Surface to air missiles we're not meant to talk about. The roads are too dangerous for US patrols during the day.

Particularly so now that the Taliban blew the main bridge from the airport into town and so every patrol currently has to go across the river bed next to the wrecked bridge. When the winter rains come and the river floods, then it will require the big MRAVs to travel on the roads and before it gets really cold I am sure the Taliban will have even more fun. I saw what a standard ammonium nitrate bomb does to an MRAV and it ain't pretty.
The fundamental problem I have mate with this Afghanistan conflict is the mission creep. We went there to kill the people who did 911, after a big diversion in Iraq. But, as you know, they aren't there. The Taliban, however brutal and medieval, is fighting a classic insurgency - with increasing popular support from Pashtun tribespeople - because we invaded a country over which - rightly or wrongly - they had de facto possession and control. Their de jure sovereignty wasn't an issue to host nations like Pakistan either, who keep on cosying up to them through ISI even now.

So why are we killing the Taliban and trying to hold southern Afghanistan? Sure Hekmatyar Gulbuddin and a few other Taliban commanders have crossed over to Al Qaeda, but the awful reality is that we're trying to prop up a totally illegitimate and outrageously corrupt Karzai Government to avoid the return of a theocratic regime that used to support Al Qaeda. IE: We're supporting one bunch of thugs to stop another bunch of thugs from taking over. It's morally bankrupt. It is starting to look to a lot of muslims that we're there to defeat an Islamic regime because it's an islamic regime.
Meanwhile, the real bad guy sit in Quetta directing operations with the sanction and support of the Pakistan military - whom the Pakistani President is too weak to rein in.

That's pretty much what most senior American officers said to me during the long nights. They're wondering why the hell they're there too.
Hope you're well mate.
C
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----- Original Message -----
From:
To:
Sent: Wed Aug 25 02:44:16 2010
Subject: RE: Afghanistan

Mate
Thought you'd stopped sneaking around war zones checking ID's and gathering footage. But I guess "embedded" is as good as free room and board, even though you're a little limited in your freedoms and reportage.

I think that one of our grand (and most pretentious) pretences for being in SVN was to "win the hearts and minds". But as usual, when it comes down to achieving military objectives, you have to grab them by the balls with the assurance that their hearts and minds will follow. Do anything less and you are rightly perceived as weak. What the tribals do respect is military might and being deftly out-manoeuvred. I've read the Wikipedia entry on Kilcullen and admit that he has impressive credentials in counter-insurgency. But in an operational "boots on the ground" sense, it may be a case of not seeing the forest for the trees. His philosophies are strategic. Concerns about localized vulnerabilities are tactical. Kilcullen may not have his mind actually wrapped around the elusive precepts and concepts involved.... in comparison with the measures for achieving stated political aims. Theorists tend to be dismissive of casualties as being a military "cost" and problem.
In my own long-term dealings with the Middle East mindset, I often found that a smiling dig-in of the heels regularly achieved the desired result - more often than not. Cave in and capitulate and you'd end up catching the fall-out later on. Mission creep is better described as losing sight of the big picture against the backdrop of humanitarian concerns, rapidly mounting friendly casualties, personal involvement, civilian deaths and local internecine strife. Every politician of any persuasion claims that we're justifiably there and there for the long-haul, whilst at the same time clamouring for their military leaders to stipulate an end time for this pain-game. Conquerors never have that "backing out gracefully" problem; peace-seekers always do.
My personal views have varied between bombing them back to the stone age and just hemming them in (Clinton style). His solution was to use Al Qaeda camps as proving grounds for Cruise missiles. I wouldn't disagree with that approach. You can surveil the country and interdict at will and otherwise allow the peoples' hearts and minds to interact with each other in a traditional sense. Who cares if local warlords are at each other's throats - or if the tribes slaughter each other over local issues? Kabul can remain epicentric and isolated and fortress-like and happily ensconced in the seventeenth century. The clan in Kabul may seem corrupt, but that's only by our Western standards (i.e not to exploit an opportunity afforded them by the war would make them appear weak and un-Afghani. They're only doing what's expected of them by their like-minded peers and I'm sure they feel no guilt or shame about that). We have to stop measuring local whacko's by inappropriate yardsticks. Nothing much has changed at the top in Afghanistan since British Imperial or Soviet era epochs (see Soviet war in Afghanistan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://tinyurl.com/38p4pr)).
The culture of opportunistic villainy is also embedded.

The country has some extensive mineral wealth but it's not worth the cost of recovery. Yet, notwithstanding corruption, connivance and local conniptions and irregardless of geo-political, military and strategic considerations, while we have troops stationed there with a defined task, we owe it to them to give them the very best chance of survival against the lethal threats. By a factor of 10 to one that's primarily the IED.
Troops on the ground tracking to and from their secure cantonments are very vulnerable to being interdicted by the simplest of explosive devices. The IED is a lazy man's/poor man's minefield. Courtesy of cell-phone technology or a length of phone-cable, you just have to lay it and await local intell on patrols outbound (or if you've no poppy fields to tend, lay in wait). Not sure if the patrolling troops are jamming cell-phone signals, but there are very few effective counters to this undetectable threat except for helo mobility allowing you to become quite unpredictable in your movements and timings. Maybe you could re-read the Pprune thread at this link (tinyurl.com/2amwh8b) for a few contrasting views. See whether there's any coherent argument for or against.

"troops on the ground, mixing with the locals" can still be achieved, but without the very predictable traipsing to and fro from the secure base area.
I'm betting that this traipse is where 95% of our casualties have occurred..... i.e. hub outbound/inbound is quite easy to cover with IED's.
As you say below: " Perhaps the best test of how safe it is to travel in Khandahar province was that, for us to move from Khandahar airfield out to our embed eleven kms out of town, it was only regarded as viable to travel safely by helicopter."

If, as you say, the roads are too dangerous for mounted US troops, surely that goes double for the foot-trails into and out of Aussie base-camps? Did you have this precise conversation with Kilcullen and if so, what did he have against chopper support for the reasons given in the Pprune link? (i.e. the points made in TheShadow's and UNCTUOUS posts)? My concern is more for what's happening in the Australian area of interest (Oruzgan, Helmand). The overall problem on a national level (see attached email from Winslow Wheeler, the Director Straus Military Reform Project Center for Defense Information) is quite mind-boggling.

Regards
TS
PS If you've no objection, I'd like to cite all or part of your email in a Pprune post.
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Hi mate. Can you please not use my name or the ID of the US unit in what you post? I am going back there to reprise what we shot and it might ostracise the increasingly defensive US officers we deal with if they see just how bleak we are about the war. Embedding is not something I would ever do again. No matter what the US claims, the freedom of movement is constrained by the American military's increasing sensitivity to the apparent failure of their mission.
Cheers mate
C

[MTOW]

David Petraeus' (perhaps poorly named) 'surge' in Iraq, which was to a large degree designed by David Kilcullen, worked well (as much as anything is going to work in the Middle East - it could well unravel before our eyes now that the Iraqi Army and police have taken over from the Americans).

However, why it worked so well is the nub: it worked because the local Iraqi Sunni tribes had become, to a very large degree, disaffected with the Al Qaeda fighters, (many of whom were almost as foreign to them as the Americans). Kilcullen says that what tipped the balance was something prosaic - the locals objected to the foreign Al Qaeda fighters wanting - demanding, in fact - to marry local women. (Marrying into the local communities is a long standing Al Qaeda tactic, but it didn't fit comfortably with the relatively sophisticated Iraqis, who saw it for what it is in many cases - not much more than Muslim 'nice talk' for taking a concubine, who'll be discarded with three claps of the hands when Al Qaeda decide it's time to move on.)

i.e., the 'surge' worked because the Coalition was able to harness this disaffection and the vitally important fact, (exactly the same as with the population of Northern Ireland after 25 years of 'the Troubles'), that the local population was throughly sick of the blood-letting and wanted to avoid the state of almost total anarchy that Iraq was plunging into.

The situation in Afghanistan is utterly different. Most importantly, the local tribesmen aren't yet sick of the war. (Given their history, I doubt they ever will be - see Kilcullen's explanation for how he came to name his book 'The Accidental Guerrilla'.) There's little to no disaffection with the Taliban because the Taliban are largely local or from allied tribes across the Pakistani border that exists only in the minds of Westeners.

Trying to use Kilcullen's 'population-centric' tactics on a population that has fought off outsiders - successfully (a small but important point) - from the days of Alexander the Great who will always see Afghans from Kabul as foreigners (and Westerners as someone who might as well be from another planet) simply isn't ever going to work. They don't want a central government. They want to be left alone - even by any 'outsiders' (i.e., even from the next valley) among the Taliban, but while they have a greater threat to fight, they'll ally themselves with the Taliban against the common foe, and despite how many roads are built into remote valleys (Kilcullen's success story about ops in Afghanistan), I don't believe it will ever change until the local people reach that same place in their heads that the Irish and the Iraqi Sunni tribes reached - i.e., not until their suffering has passed some indefinable point that any student of history will tell you would seem to be still a very long way off for the Afghans.

I hate to say the incredible efforts of our troops in Afghanistan are wasted, but I fear they will be, for the casualty rates (which over nine years, have only just passed what the same Australian Army suffered in one day in Vietnam - Aug 18th 1966, at Long Tan) already seem to be turning the public into questioning why we're there - and as has already been mentioned, this war will be lost in exactly the same way as Vietnam was lost - on the home front and in loss of public support.

Our troops' efforts have not been in vain - they've brought us time. The only real question we should be asking in the forthcoming parliamentary debate is whether their continuing sacrifice is worth the price of buying us more time and whether we, the taxpayers, are willing to pay the very high price in treasure and lives to keep buying more time.

Kilcullen touches on that very point at some length in his book (which I'd highly recommend to anyone who hasn't read it) and recommends that we resist military involvement unless it is absolutely unavoidable.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Wiley - I'm ex RAF so explain to me how I am AAAVn short sighted......

HPT

[Belgique]

Key Karzai Aide in Graft Inquiry Is Linked to C.I.A.

The aide to President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan at the
center of a politically sensitive corruption investigation is
being paid by the Central Intelligence Agency, according to
Afghan and American officials.

Mohammed Zia Salehi, the chief of administration for the
National Security Council, appears to have been on the
payroll for many years, according to officials in Kabul and
Washington. It is unclear exactly what Mr. Salehi does in
exchange for his money.

Mr. Salehi's relationship with the C.I.A. underscores deep
contradictions at the heart of the Obama administration's
policy in Afghanistan, with American officials simultaneously
demanding that Mr. Karzai root out the corruption that
pervades his government while sometimes subsidizing the very
people suspected of perpetrating it.

Read More:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/world/asia/26kabul.html\?emc=na

[Bushranger 71]

Hello All,

A very good friend alerted me to this thread, so herewith some interim response as we are presently in the far north of our land spending some time with my closest friend of 50 plus years, Rex Budd, DFC, who is terminally ill with a short life expectancy horizon. Rex and I served together on Sabres and had a longer association on Iroquois. He did perhaps all of the acceptance flight testing of 16 Hotel model Iroquois purchased via the US Army during Vietnam operations. He later helped me train the initial lot of Bushranger gunship aircrew and on a second tour became 1 of 5 gunship flight commanders.

Tibsy; re your post #9. I either identify myself or use a sole screen name ‘Bushranger 71’ when indulging in forums and only contribute if I feel I can make useful input to dialogue. Herewith some brief feedback to discussion this thread.

For the record, 9SQN RAAF worked in harmony with US Army gunship elements during Vietnam operations and they generally provided good support. The problem was availability due to an inefficient US Army gunship tasking philosophy which is why the Bushranger development project emerged.

Helo combat survivability has proven statistically to be far better than imagined by most, if operated prudently, and escort of utility or MLH platforms is largely unnecessary and wasteful of resources in my view, except of course for some special roles. Like others, I ponder why there has not been much broader use of helos in Afghanistan to negate the IED threat, which by the way were often encountered during Vietnam War operations.

MANPADs and all other forms of missilery have significant logistic/maintenance penalties and particularly power packs for the assortment of such weaponry that was reputedly splashed around Afghanistan over years. Some aircraft losses prove that the threat exists, but whether it should be viewed as a substantial deterrent to helo ops is debatable.

Thinking strategically; western nations largely fail to absorb the lessons of diplomacy and war-fighting and have historically trampled centuries old systems of government and cultures. Marching into countries as occupiers alienates the majority of the population and of course fosters insurgency which is almost impossible to counter militarily. Securing and holding territory requires massive military resources and would mostly be economically unsustainable. As for patrolling from garrisons; that strategy allows the enemy the initiative. Civil aid projects to win hearts and minds might give politicians and some in the military warm fuzzy feelings but cannot be done on a scale sufficient to bring a population onside, as has been proven in multiple conflicts.

So; I see Afghanistan as yet another imprudent military intervention by western powers and happenings in that part of the world are more relevant to Russia and China than NATO and other ISAF participants. So-called terrorist training can be conducted anywhere in the world and denting the Taliban infrastructure will be meaningless in that regard. Better to get out of there and rehabilitate military forces which have become degraded through sustained involvement and will inevitably become further diminished due to worldwide economic considerations.

We have about 2,500 kilometres of driving ahead to wobble our way back home via numerous watering holes which will take another week and I will then make some more detailed responses.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

MANPADs and all other forms of missilery have significant logistic/maintenance penalties and particularly power packs for the assortment of such weaponry that was reputedly splashed around Afghanistan over years. .

Might be the case with SAM 7s and early Stinger, but what if Iranian and Chinese weapons were getting across the rather porous border? battery technology has come on a little since the early seventies.......

I recall being told in Northern Ireland that the IRA would not bé able to get a SAM7 launch because of battery problems, then a 2-ship was engaged in Fermanagh.

Some aircraft losses prove that the threat exists, but whether it should be viewed as a substantial deterrent to helo ops is debatable

You may be correct, but the political/strategic fallout of a Australian helo being shot down is unacceptable, whatever might have caused it. For that reason, leave the tactics to the in theatre crews who are privy to the intelligence and knowledge of their individual platforms systems......if you want to be an armchair pundit, perhaps stick to AFL or footy!

HPT

[Bushranger 71]

Hello HPT; re your post #31.
I recall being told in Northern Ireland that the IRA would not bé able to get a SAM7 launch because of battery problems, then a 2-ship was engaged in Fermanagh.So somebody got shot at! That’s what happens in war-fighting.You may be correct, but the political/strategic fallout of a Australian helo being shot down is unacceptable, whatever might have caused it.I hope you are not saying that it is acceptable to lose ground-pounders in combat but not an Army Aviation aircraft and aircrew! Warrior spirit was once the fundamental core of the Profession-of-Arms and if you want to do the job of supporting the guys on the ground effectively, then you have to be prepared to be directly involved in the fighting, which of course involves risks and some possible loss of aircraft and personnel.

Considering the theme of this thread, should we blame our politicians and military chiefs, due to their implied fear of aviation casualties, for the absence of adequate integral helo support for Australian elements in Afghanistan; or does the capability not exist within Army Aviation to provide the resources?
For that reason, leave the tactics to the in theatre crews who are privy to the intelligence and knowledge of their individual platforms systems......if you want to be an armchair pundit, perhaps stick to AFL or footy!
Derogatory comment does you no credit. Operating techniques and tactics are of course the province of commanders in the field; but they should all be cognizant of lessons learned from previous conflicts to minimize hardware losses and casualties. Military history is replete with failures to heed past lessons of war-fighting.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

So somebody got shot at! That’s what happens in war-fighting.

Thanks, I've been in more a than a few so I really have quite a good grasp of that. Merely responding to your comment about the difficulty of getting the batteries to work on SAMs....it has been proved it isn't difficult, especially if they are new of of China, hypothetically speaking!

I hope you are not saying that it is acceptable to lose ground-pounders in combat but not an Army Aviation aircraft and aircrew!

Yes, that is exactly what I am saying. Death after death of ''ground-pounders'' has been overshadowed in the UK by the loss of military aircraft. The political fallout of these occurrences has been overwhelming. Trust me, I was intimately involved in the fallout out of a number of them. Unfortunately, the loss of multiple lives and an expensive aircraft is of more interest (read potential embarrassment) to the pollies.

Considering the theme of this thread, should we blame our politicians and military chiefs, due to their implied fear of aviation casualties, for the absence of adequate integral helo support for Australian elements in Afghanistan; or does the capability not exist within Army Aviation to provide the resources?

A bit of both, but mainly the latter.

Operating techniques and tactics are of course the province of commanders in the field; but they should all be cognizant of lessons learned from previous conflicts to minimize hardware losses and casualties. Military history is replete with failures to heed past lessons of war-fighting.

Yes and that's why the ADF employs warfighters from a number of other nations including the UK, USA, Netherlands, South Africa in order that they can reap the benfit of others' experiences. Taxctics are drawn to together from past conflicts and revisited cosntantly to ensure that they they are appropriate to the environment. You sir, have no idea if the COIN style tactics employed 40 years ago have a place in the modern battlespace....the current aviators on the other hand do.

HPT

[Peter-RB]

I have been told the HGV of the sky Wocka is solely on Medivac now, why?
it seems strange when we here in the UK dont hear that from official noise's

PeterR-B

[Dragon79]

Army - The Soldiers Newspaper : September 2nd 2010, Page 1 - Defence Newspapers | The Soldiers Army (http://digital.realviewtechnologies.com/default.aspx?xml=defencenews_army.xml)

Page 24 at the top, training for anything in particular?

[Aynayda Pizaqvick]

Thats because its not official and whoever told you that lied. Medivac is just one of the many roles that Chinook does very well on Ops.
Ive been following this thread for days now and as a military helo pilot am insulted that people on here genuinely believe that we do our rather dangerous jobs day in, day out with little or no regards for how it was done in the past.
Our tactics are robust and well suited to the very complicated intelligence picture that we deal with daily and (for obvious reasons) you are not privy to - this why you don't see multiple casualty helo incidents on the TV every week.
As has been said before, best leave the tactics (note tactics, not strategy) to the guys on the coal face who have been doing this for a number of years now.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi D79; re your post #35.

This seems like a long overdue very good step forward. A few decades back, RAAF helo aircrew conducted frequent training for high DA ops in PNG and in NZ which was invaluable for appreciating the performance limitations of platforms.

It will be very interesting to see how MRH90 and Tiger shape up in this regard. Anecdotal aviation media suggests Tiger is limited to about 250 rounds of cannon ammunition and 18 x 70mm rockets when operating around 6,000 feet altitude in Afghanistan.

[thewhiterabbit]

Its not a step anywhere. AAAvn aircrew have been conducting annual training in PNG since we were operating the Souix. HDA training is a key competancy.

As for MRH-90 and ARH performance at altitude I'll leave to the uninformed to comment on.

[Frazzled]

Seen flying around Kabaul may/june this year - a Tiger:eek:. French i think as it was escorting what looked like a super puma? Just not sure whether our guys a ready yet to deploy, in time perhaps....

[GreenKnight121]

DARPA Works to Develop A Flying Humvee For U.S. Troops (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4783521&c=AME&s=LAN)

http://www.defensenews.com/pgf/stories21/091910_defense_flyhumvee_315.JPG

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is working to develop a "flying Humvee" that could be piloted by troops with about the same amount of training it takes to drive an armored truck.
Full Story (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4783521&c=AME&s=LAN)

Cheap... yep

Door gunner... yep

Down low so you can smell the enemy... yep.

Checks all BR71's boxes... the Aussie Army ought to buy 100 or so.

[Doors Off]

There were some very good articles by MAJGEN Molan in this weekends "The Australian" at least there is one influential high level mil man with cudos, supporting the oz digger. Search the Australian for Molan and you will find them

[Belgique]

Dead digger's mate: The army let us down
21 Sep
Dead digger's mate: The army let us down - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) (http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/09/21/3017276.htm)

'The army let us down': Lance Corporal Jared MacKinney poses in his combat fatigues in Afghanistan (Defence Department)

Video: Email claims army let digger down (ABC News)
Video: Lance Corporal MacKinney farewelled in Brisbane (7pm TV News NSW)
Video: Australian troops exposed to unnecessary risk: soldier (ABC News Breakfast)
Related Story: Houston denies diggers left short of firepower
Related Story: Soldier's widow gives birth hours after funeral
The Australia Defence Association (ADA) says an email from a soldier who fought alongside a digger killed in Afghanistan raises substantial concerns about the level of support for Australian troops.
A version of the email, edited by the ADA and given to the ABC, claims the death of Lance Corporal Jared MacKinney, during a battle near Tarin Kowt last month, could have been avoided if the Australians had more artillery and aerial support.
The soldier writes to a friend: "Everyone is too scared about collateral damage. That contact would have been over before Jared died if they had mortars."
And he adds: "The army has let us down mate and I am disgusted."
"It is bull**** how this is being reported on, not just here at home. Can you please inform some people in the media that the guys that are over here that were involved are very pissed off at the reports they got ambushed!"
The author of the email said the Australians had also been let down by poor intelligence about the size of the enemy force.
"Air took time, f*** knows why and then when it finally turned up it flew around for about 25 minutes," the soldier writes.
"Realistically we should have lost at least five or six blokes and 15 - 20 enemy were killed that we know."
The association's Neil James says the email has been sent to the Defence Force hierarchy.
"Certainly a number of the issues raised are of some concern to us and I should add they've been of concern to us even before we've seen this email," he said.
"We have long argued that the force in Afghanistan is inadequately sized for the task."
"But the underlying problem here is simply that units of the mentoring taskforce are possibly being committed in too small numbers considering the size of the enemy forces they're facing, and that in turn relates to, basically, an inadequate size of the force overall."
Lance Corporal MacKinney was killed during a three-hour battle against insurgents near Tarin Kowt last month.
Shortly after the soldier's death, the former chief of operations in Iraq, retired Major General Jim Molan, questioned why the battle lasted so long and why there appeared to be no rapid-response (i.e. heliborne) reserves available to come to the aid of the Australian patrol.

[MTOW]

ABC news today had an audio clip of the OC of a Darwin-based Army unit deploying to Afghanistan sprouting the company line that his troops have the best equipment and support of any of the coalition forces deployed there, (this, in answer to a news story about a soldier who had spent $5,000 of his own money to get personal equipment he considered suitable/adequate).

Am I the only one out there who is quite amazed to see that we have fielded 1500 troops to a war zone without integrated helicopter support (sorry guys, but two Chinooks doesn't cut it!) - and that the commanders of that force are telling the taxpayer - and the parents/wives of their troops that they consider their soldiers have all the support they need without that helicopter support?

I'm trying to avoid the "who did/does it better, the RAAF or the Army?" argument, (22 years after the event, it's a total non-argument, so let's not go there). However, I still find it incredible that the ADF have mothballed their gunships - 6 *** years ago!!! - and thanks to (what shall we call it? - fanciful?) decisions on buying an incredibly expensive and as yet unproven replacement, still don't have an operational replacement. AND, that same ADF is unable/unwilling to field a viable integrated rotary wing troop lift/medevac capability to accompany its deployed troops.

The Leader of the Opposition, Tony Abbott, playing the spoiler role so beloved of Leaders of the Opposition, all but said today that he has no confidence in the Australian CDF. Angus, I know you have many, many balls to juggle in trying to squeeze a quart of capability out of the proverbial pint pot along with keeping so many disparate parties happy, but in allowing the ADF helicopter force to sink to its current state, I think Abbott has a point.

[500N]

Question re the helo support.

How many Helo's of any sort went to Timor ?

Always seemed to be a lot in the video clips.

I think the ADF is afraid of losing a Helo in combat,
especially the new one's.

[7x7]

500N, see post # 31 in this thread. To save to looking, here's the relevant quote. (My bold face.)

You may be correct, but the political/strategic fallout of a Australian helo being shot down is unacceptable, whatever might have caused it. For that reason, leave the tactics to the in theatre crews who are privy to the intelligence and knowledge of their individual platforms systems......if you want to be an armchair pundit, perhaps stick to AFL or footy!

[TBM-Legend]

'twas at Oakey Army Air Base today. Talk is NO helos beyond the two CH-47's for lift etc. A remote possibility of a few Tigers in a year or so. "the boys have all the air support they need from other coalition partners" it was said. A few more grunts and other thingies might be deployed...

[MTOW]

"the boys have all the air support they need from other coalition partners" it was said.

From Post # 42:
"Air took time, f*** knows why and then when it finally turned up it flew around for about 25 minutes," the soldier writes.
"Realistically we should have lost at least five or six blokes and 15 - 20 enemy were killed that we know."The ghosts of 9 Sqn should be disturbing a few very senior people's sleep.

[cj0203]

Sighted leaving Amberley today- an MRH-90 cruising at about 30knots, on the back of a truck!! Obviously too broke to fly the short journey back to Brisbane. And talking to some pilots at Oakey yesterday, none yet operational and they laughed when the question arose when this may happen. :D

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

According to Win News tonight the MRH is operationally ready, and as for the Tiger, since the Coalition are asking it to deploy, it must be ready....they must know best as the are our Lords and Masters......:}

PS. Apparently the Black hawk is operational too.....only against viscously sharp slices of mango though!

LMCO

HPT

[L J R]

And when are you guys getting an armed UAV?

[TheShadow]

.... but he's a bit short of real defence acumen in his shadow cabinet to exploit it and score a really useful march on a demonstrable government vulnerability.

I've had a few off-line inputs on the points made in this thread and I do think it would be in our troops' interests for knowledgeable people to debate the concerns and inabilities further on here.

Quite a few interested potentates are following this thread. They need to be better informed.

TS

[7x7]

I can't believe that the whole media pack have let Jools get off scot free with her blithe announcement that the Americans will be supplying helicopter support to the Australians in Afghanistan.

40 years ago, we could do it for ourselves.

I suppose that's progress of sorts... 'progress' to a non-effective defence force that will offend no one to our north - which is what some of the huggy fluffs and latte drinkers in Canberra aspire to.

[Saltie]

I can't decide whether it shows the total ineptness of the Liberal/Nationals Opposition or the sure-footed cunning of the Labor Party back room boys the way that talk of the lack of tanks in the Australian commitment to Afghanistan has dominated the news over the last few days rather than the ADF's inability to put more than two Chinnoks into operational service in Afghanistan.

Surely to God there's someone out there in the Australian media willing to ask why the ADF isn't supplying (at the very least) its own rotary wing medevac capability?

Julia Gillard and "We will use American helicopters to support our troops..." without a single, solitary "WTF?" from the Australian media speaks volumes about the total ignorance (or more likely, almost total lack of intrest) of the lot of 'em, especially when the email from the front line soldier decrying the (he says, and who are we to doubt him) unnecessary death of his comrade specifically mentions the late arrival and ineffectiveness of the (American?) air support they called for.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Saltie, with only 6 Chinook in the fleet, more than 2 of that type in AFG for more than 6 months of the year is unsustainable when you factor in maintenance and crew training requirements.

What's wrong with using US/NL/FR/SP/IT and UK air support? Do you think we can do it better than our allies?

We can't do it all.....

HPT

[500N]

"We can't do it all....."

Maybe, but I think most people in the ADF think we should be able to do a lot more than what we are currently doing.

Re Helo Medivac, the US seem to have a superb, well oiled set up and I can understand leaving that task to them but other helo support via Chinook or other I would have expected that the ADF would be able to provide more insertion / extraction capabilities.

And in view of the fact that we are supposed to have attack Helo's,
why have them if we aren't going to use them in the perfect environment.
And after bringing over 2 Ex British pilots ???

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

500N

The reality is AAAvn isn't resourced to support more than a single medium scale warfighting op on an enduring basis.

As for AH pilots that have been brought over. There are a few more than 2 ex UK AH pilots that have been recruited. Perhaps ask them and the NL and US pilots how much they have been listened to. As the the ARH......not deployable yet.....maybe soon.....maybe not.

HPT

[MTOW]

Perhaps ask them and the NL and US pilots how much they have been listened toShades of 1988 and the ex-RAAFies who transferred to the khaki, eh?

I suppose you could say that AAVN is consistent.

Arf!

[500N]

Hydraulic Palm Tree

PM sent.

Re "The reality is AAAvn isn't resourced to support more than a single medium scale warfighting op on an enduring basis."


What other "warfighting op" are they currently supporting on an enduring basis ?

Iraq ?
Timor ?

Wouldn't Afghan be high up the list over any others (except for the fact that the Gov't is scared of losing one in Combat ?).

Why have them if when the war comes we don't use them ?

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Maybe why the first 2 Brits (contractors) packed up and went home............?

[budgiep]

It would appear that Sweden is also getting frustrated with delays in their NH-90 TTH program and feeling the public pressure to better to support their troops in Afghanistan. Accordingly they have chosen to take a radical (wrt cost and hence not an option for Oz) solution to the problem by looking at purchasing fifteen (15) UH-60M's to address an urgent shortfall in Combat Search and Rescue and Medical Evacuation transport capability in Afghanistan. :eek: See the press release below:

http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2010/Sweden_10-63.pdf

Didn't the MIKE loose out to the MRH-90 for AIR 9000 Phase 2? The MIKE has been performing well in both Iraq and Afghanistan for a while now. I wonder how the AAvn guys at the frontline feel?:ugh:

[Barry Bernoulli]

In July 1964, three of the newly aquired RAAF Caribous were diverted on their delivery ferry from Canada to Australia, to Malaysia. They then continued to Vung Tau and formed the RAAF Transport Flight Vietnam. They were later joined by an additional four aircraft and redesignated 35SQN; operating in support of the AATTV and the US forces, and later 1ATF.

RAAF aquired the UH1B in late 1962. In 1964, 5SQN deployed four of the aircraft to Malaysia to support the Indonesian Confrontation. From 1966, 9SQN RAAF was deployed to Vietnam. Originally operating the UH1B, they re-equipped with the UH1H in 1968, those sixteen airframes being delivered directly to Vung Tau by the US Army.

How do the two scenarios (Vietnam and Afghanistan) compare?

[Frazzled]

We have 2 chooks ove there because it the best we can do at the moment. Our blackhawks are old and tired, don't have the EWSP and would really need a serious upgrade in the engine department to handle hot and high environment. MRH90 doesn't sound any where near ready for anything and the tiger project is late and I doubt ready - and even if they were ready to deploy then you need the government with the will to get them over there.

Unfortunately, recently the ADF seem to be purchasing the newest most shiniest toys they can get their hands on. Tiger versus apache, mrh90 versus mike model blackhawks, wedgetail, A330 tankers (or VIP watch this space), JSF. Going for the porche when a commodore would do??

In the end we deal with what our masters buy us and try to make do but at the end of the day 2 chinooks is about the best it is going to get in the future.:hmm:

[Barry Bernoulli]

It begs the question as to where the ADF has come with RW support to the troops in the 40 years since Vietnam. Much water, bitter water, has passed under the bridge, in an effort to provide empathetic support to the chaps on the line.

In 1989, 9SQN became A SQN of the 5th Aviation Regt and 35SQN became B SQN of the 5th. Moving RW from RAAF to Army was supposed to markedly improve the level of support.

Army now operates 35 Blackhawks, 6 Chinooks, plus MRH90 plus Tiger, plus ancilliaries. From that fleet, they field two CH47 in Afghanistan.

My observation is that 40 years of lessons learned, including the 20 years of integrated Army RW doesn't seem to have done much for the level of fielded air mobility support for the troops.

[Frazzled]

Barry you're probably right. I've seen both systems from the inside and still as army rw you still found yourself explaining crew duty and other aviation restrictions to the grunts - so they probably haven't seen a great change in the level of service they have received. Grunts just don't understand aviation no matter who is providing teh service.

Though the raaf proably faring no better - a new boggie in the squadron is waiting for conversion in jun 2012. A two year wait due to delay in airframes. You could argue that the fighters are not getting any tanking since the 707's retired and corporate knowledge is being lost.

The problems i think is bigger than army versus raaf but more in the delays to projects having a flow on effect to the operational world. Don't see any solutions downtrack.

[OVERTALK]

08 Oct 2010
An Australian soldier is recovering in Afghanistan after he was wounded by an exploding roadside bomb, the Australian Defence Force (ADF)says.

The soldier from the Special Operations Task Group was wounded when the vehicle he was traveling in struck an improvised explosive device (IED) in northern Kandahar six days ago, a statement from the ADF said on Saturday.

The wounded soldier was flown to a medical facility at Kandahar Airfield, but later released after an assessment confirmed he had not been seriously injured.

Commodore Roger Boyce said the wounded soldier would spend some time recovering before returning to combat operations.
The incident occurred during a joint operation between Australian and Afghan troops to improve security in and around Kandahar city.

[ORAC]

Evening Standard: David Cameron ‘rules out slash and burn defence cuts’ (http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23886028-david-cameron-rules-out-slash-and-burn-defence-cuts.do)

..........However, the helicopter budget is expected to be reduced by as much as £1 billion. Ministers are expected to insist that this will not affect operations in Afghanistan......

[7x7]

I see the GAF helicopter thread has "taken wing"... too much input from der Auslanders?

Frazzled, I think the senior Army officers who orchestrated the campaign to have the helicopters transferred to the Army honestly believed that by doing so, they could sweep aside all those annoying problems they had with junior RAAF pilots refusing to do their every bidding and citing all those bothersome things like performance limitations, crew duty time etc.

[500N]

Since the other thread was deleted.

Article in The Age newspaper today.
Tiger helicopters ready to fly: maker

Dan Oakes, Marseille

October 16, 2010

AUSTRALIAN attack helicopters are unable to operate in Afghanistan because Defence has insisted on ultra-strict night flying specifications, according to an aircraft manufacturer.
Head of Eurocopter's government programs Dominique Maudet told The Age yesterday that Defence wanted a standard of external lighting above and beyond that used on similar Tiger helicopters the French military had flown successfully in Afghanistan in the past year.
The disclosure came a day after the Australian Defence Force urged the Dutch government to keep its Apache attack helicopters in Oruzgan province, while simultaneously claiming the Tigers were not needed in the restive southern province.
Advertisement: Story continues below
''The French have flown more than 1300 hours in Afghanistan with the current lighting system,'' Mr Maudet said. ''The specificity of the Australian request will be met by this modification, but [the existing system] does not prevent at all the Tiger to fly at night.''
Mr Maudet believes the request stems from incidents in the past involving other makes of helicopter.
In 1996, 18 soldiers were killed when two Blackhawk helicopters crashed during a training exercise near Townsville. There were claims, later disproved, that the crash was due to defective night-vision goggles.
''Australia has very, very high sensitivity about this issue in the past, which led the Commonwealth of Australia to very specific demands compared to the French,'' Mr Maudet said.
The Coalition recently called for six Tiger attack helicopters, additional troops and other military hardware to be sent to Afghanistan.
Australian troops make up 1500 of the 1800-strong coalition contingent in Oruzgan, but they rely on logistical support from other nations in the combined force.
Defence has said it could be two years before Australia's Tiger helicopters are ready for deployment in Afghanistan Mr Maudet said 13 of 22 Tigers ordered had been delivered.
Dan Oakes travelled to Marseille on a tour sponsored by Eurocopter.

[7x7]

Mr Maudet said 13 of 22 Tigers ordered had been delivered.True. But what he doesn't say is that all 22 were supposed to be delivered five years ago.

[TBM-Legend]

Here we go again, Australia believing that we lead the world. We buy a miserable 22 aircraft and demand a standard above the main users. I was at Oakey Army Airfield the other day and the precious heaps called the MRH-90 don't even have a door gun system!

I was told it was not part of our doctrine??? If we need one, the Italian mini gun system would be it. Imagine buying a "combat" helicopter without a gun! If we do buy the system it will take 5 years to qualify it for flight in the Southern Hemisphere.....:yuk:

[Frazzled]

7 X 7 you are probably right but aviation is aviation and you can't get away from crew duty and other issues.

MRH90 can fit a door gun - or people can enter and exit the door but can they do both at the same time. And exactly where does the loadmaster sit?? Does he has his own seat and have a hareness like a blackhawk or does he sit on the floor??

[TBM-Legend]

Frazzled you are right. I was told that we don't need door gunners. The crewman/loadie has his own 'station'. I guess we shall rename them Army Flight Attendants!

I went in and out of the ramp and at my miniature 5'10" height without any gear and guns had to crouch down. The answer was "well that's how we do it in a Chinook"....

[Bushranger 71]

Am re-engaging here hoping that there will be less inter-service sledging and no more '...inappropriate libelous, defamatory or otherwise tortious language...', as encountered on some threads (see Site Terms & Conditions).

The present parlous situation for the ADF has arisen because Australia has a defence industry policy in lieu of a military preparedness policy with the major arms peddlers now parenting most of defence-related industry in country. Progressive optimization of proven hardware in service (where cost-effective) to maintain continuous and credible military capabilities has been virtually spurned since the Vietnam War. DMO/DSTO now conspire with the big arms corporations to generate expensive projects for industry regardless of whether these are prudent hardware options and they have mostly resulted in big delays, cost overruns and very serious capability gaps. Had Seahawk been fitted with a modular dipping sonar (as available in USN), Blackhawk upgraded including EWSP, Iroquois enhanced to Huey II, the ADF would now have a more credible helo force.

Decommissioning the Iroquois gunship role mid-2003 has left an inexcusable fire support capability gap until maybe mid-2012. Upgradable to Huey II for peanuts (about $2million), an enhanced Bushranger gunship could carry 500 rounds of 20mm HE for podded low recoil cannon (in lieu of 70mm rocket launchers), 12,000 rounds of 7.62mm for miniguns and doorguns, hover in ground effect at around 12,000 feet at max operating weight (10,500 pounds) in ISA+20 conditions and also have some nice systems incorporated. Alas, nobody is held accountable for this 9 year gap in fire support capability or waste of invaluable assets in Iroquois disposal.

Undermanning of some supposed ADF operational units is equally serious. If units cannot be manned with medically fit bods (not obese) to within say 5 percent of their operational personnel establishment; then how can they be considered combat ready in the Order of Battle? But I was always told by highers over the years that the number of units in the Order of Battle was sacrosanct and one must never admit to being inadequately manned! The expansionary visions for the ADF envisaged in Defence White Paper 2009 toward a somewhat mythical Force 2030 structure are thus quite unrealistic in my view.

What might be done regarding helo force capacity? Consider these operating costs per flying hour for 2006/07 provided by Defence (in 2008 dollars): Seahawk - $45,317; Sea King - $23,616; Squirrel - $5,208; Blackhawk - $20,659; Kiowa - $2,865. The operating cost of a Huey II according to Bell Helicopter is below $5,000 per hour. Just guessing, but figures for Tiger and MRH90 will likely exceed Sea King and Blackhawk.

This wisdom is from a comprehensive US Army analysis of Vietnam War operations:

‘The (US) Army's decision to standardize on a utility tactical transport helicopter has far-reaching implications on every operation from its planning to its execution. Literally hundreds of our key battles could not have been fought without a light, agile machine that could go into improbable landing zones at a critical time. Had the Army chosen to build its airmobile tactics around a ‘platoon carrier’, different and less flexible tactics would have been forced on our commanders. As we move to replace the Huey fleet, we must never lose sight of the essential characteristics that made the Huey invaluable to the Infantry commander. Technology offers so many tempting alternatives that one can easily forget the basic problems of squad tactics. The vital lessons which we learned in the ‘sizing’ of our helicopter fleet dare not be forgotten.’ – Lieutenant General John J. Tolson

Discarding the Iroquois leaves the ADF without the most valuable of battlefield support helos, a light inexpensive utility aircraft capable of widely varied roles that can be operated very cost-effectively with some affordable losses in combat.

The MRH90 is clearly too big, heavy, complex, expensive, costly to operate and unsuited in multiple respects for general battlefield utility roles. The most cost-effective solution would be to acquire 50 or more Huey II which have great multi-role flexibility/versatility, including for naval support functions, and it might be more economical to just leave Tiger and MRH90 in hangars! But what types to shed and who might operate whichever is not being argued now.

There would of course need to be offsets to persuade the politicians to go down that track. At risk of being ostracized by my fighter associates, methinks shedding a couple of fighter squadrons and extending the F/A-18 a bit longer would be advantageous. Why? Because the Wedgetail/MRTT/JSF saga has disaster writ all over and the JSF might yet founder as a US project. Making some RAAF manpower available could help substantially in rebuilding a utility helicopter component. There also remains a small window of opportunity when many willing retirees (others) could be co-opted to assist in re-establishing Huey capabilities. CDF Angus may of course shudder at these thoughts, but it is arguably an achievable and affordable proposition if people are prepared to think outside the square in terms of improving ADF military capabilities.

Advisory info re Rex Budd. Now hospitalised in Cairns. Still mentally with it but declining physically.

[7x7]

If the story I heard some years ago about the ADF's acquisition of the Steyr rifle is to be believed, Bushranger71 has a point in his second paragraph.

My source (who was in a position to know) said that manufacturing the rifle in Australia was four times as expensive as buying the rifles directly from Steyr, and the jobs (in Australia) it created were almost all short-lived, (but, of course, most importantly, it allowed a senior politician to have his moment in front of a bank of cameras telling the electorate about all the jobs he'd created).

He said if they'd bought the rifles from Steyr and bargained (as part of the offsets in making the purchase) for a maintenance facility to be established in Australia, (to do maintenance on Steyr equipment from other areas as well as Australia), it would have meant fewer jobs, but they'd have all been long term ones, and saved the Australian taxpayer millions.

[MTOW]

The Steyr story, almost exactly as detailed above, appeared in a newspaper article, (I think 'The Australian', but am not sure), a couple of years ago.

[TBM-Legend]

according to a good friend the same is happening with the new air warfare destroyers.

US Arleigh Burke DDG modded for fewer crews + Aegis = no risk. [standard US ship with some more automation]

Spanish F100 heavily modded with US/Swedish etc equipment + Aegis + big risk and huge cost overruns. [special design for Oz only]

[Andu]

TBM-Legend, if what a Navy friend has told me is true, there's much more to be uncovered about the Spanish Air Warfare Destroyer than just what you have mentioned. Much, much more. And it's going to cost many, many millions to fix (if indeed it's fixable).

The way he tells it, it's a classic example of the people doing the purchasing never having once stepped aboard a warship in their lives and if the Navy could get away with doing day cruises, and put the crew to beddybyes ashore every night - or crew it with pygmies who are happy to bunk up in racks four bunks high, they might be able to get it up and running - one day. However, most agree that that isn't a very practical option for a country with a 12,000 NM coastline.

[Bushranger 71]

Sadly; the AWD is another example of how Australia has been contemptuous of our highly valued US alliance by acquiring European hardware including MRTT, Tiger, MRH90, LPDs. Shameful hypocrisy!

Although beaut German submarines would be a good choice as America no longer manufactures diesel boats.

[TBM-Legend]

so will it be the tried and proven MH-60R or the flakey NH-90[NFH] for the Oz Navy????

[7x7]

TBM, our Defence acquisition process is factored around our being "Down Under", where everything's upside down. So, take the logical conclusion - and invert it.

And there's your answer.

[TBM-Legend]

stay tuned for the new sub debacle followed by the frigate replacement one with a few billion lost on "minor" projects....:D

[Frazzled]

..........................wedgetail, tanker, JSF, P3C upgrade.......................:ugh:

[TBM-Legend]

rust buckets Kanimbla and Manoora...:{.

[7x7]

How long before Australia faces similar Defence cuts to the ones now being faced by the Brits? (See the many threads running on this same board since David Cameron's announcement.)

For those who think it'll never happen, let me mention one name... "Bob Brown". (And if there's anyone out there who thinks Defence will survive at the expense of Social Welfare and Environmental Protection projects, I have a bridge you might like buy...)

And after the spending cuts are in, I ask the AAAvn people out there what they'd rather be operating? Equipment that costs $5,000 an hour to operate or equipment that costs $35,000 an hour to operate?

I see Angus saying yesterday that "no expense will be spared" in defending the three SF soldiers charged over the civilian deaths last February. Myself, I could think up a way to save much of those expenses -

(1) Australia withdraws from the treaty (thank you, Mr Howard) that puts our soldiers at risk of being charged by the ICC for any 'offence' the ICC deems that they may be charged over.

(2) Drop the independent military tribunal (again, thank you, Mr Howard) that sees soldiers being tried by lawyers who've never been closer to a battlefield than the O's Mess in Kandahar rather than by other soldiers who know what going in to a defended cantonment at night actually means.

[Bushranger 71]

See this link: The war debate we haven't had | The Australian (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/the-war-debate-we-havent-had/story-e6frg6zo-1225941396300)

By a journalist whom I normally do not give much credit but he is on the right track re military helicopters.

[500N]

7x7
" How long before Australia faces similar Defence cuts to the ones now being faced by the Brits? (See the many threads running on this same board since David Cameron's announcement.)

For those who think it'll never happen, let me mention one name... "Bob Brown". (And if there's anyone out there who thinks Defence will survive at the expense of Social Welfare and Environmental Protection projects, I have a bridge you might like buy...)

And after the spending cuts are in, I ask the AAAvn people out there what they'd rather be operating? Equipment that costs $5,000 an hour to operate or equipment that costs $35,000 an hour to operate?"


What makes you say the above ?

It's not like Australia is short of money - at least while the commodities boom continues. If that ends, then it will be a different story.

I can understand Bob Brown using his political leverage to get more money for his Latte sipping agenda and defence just might have to fight a bit harder to get money for projects, although I feel jobs in local areas will determine more than a few decisions along that track.


Bushranger
Interesting point Greg made re the helicopters. I wonder how much effort is being made by the Senior people in the ADF to supress that type of link between assets on hand and deployability ?

[Bushranger 71]

Hi 500N,

Have to disagree with you regarding Australia's financial integrity. A substantial national debt now exists with huge downstream outlays necessary concerning infrastructure, health, an aging population, etcetera. GFC2 seems imminent and the China driven resources boom will unlikely continue at present pace. Federal government revenue dropped substantially in 2009/10 and the Treasurer commented recently that there will likely be some more negative effects on revenue from some happenings beyond Australia's control.

Both major political parties have endorsed compounding growth of defence spending out to 2030 which is unachievable realistically and ADF expansion envisaged in Rudd's rushed White Paper 2009 is just not feasible. There will probably be some squirming going on within the DoD regarding their ambitious 10 year Defence Capability Plan as some pruning of defence expenditure seems inevitable.

Digressing a bit; I am told that 9SQN Association collected Iroquois UH-1H A2-771 last Monday and it is now hangared at RAAF Base Amberley where it will be restored to original Bushranger gunship configuration (in Air Force livery) over the next year for historical purposes - A2-773, the prototype and thus original Bushranger, has been assigned elsewhere. The Afghanistan helo and fire support issue need not have arisen had these 20 or so aircraft been kept in service and upgraded to Huey II.

I keep informing multiple politicians of both major political parties regarding the decline in ADF deployability capabilities and a few journalists also seem to be probing defence issues which might be making some senior people a bit nervous. No doubt 'big brother' is also monitoring this and other forums, although I have not as yet had any visits from 'men in dark glasses'!

[TBM-Legend]

how would you like a purpose built building in the area for display of the bird.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi TBM-Legend,

A very kind offer, but I am not involved with that project and it seems there is now a hangar dedicated at Amberley for historical purposes with some additional official organizational bits created around the country to preserve significant history. Long overdue of course.

[Andu]

Given that we have troops committed to a war at the moment, wouldn't it be nice if we had operational helicopters in our military inventory to replace the ones we're putting into museums?

- Before we put them into museums?

Only in Australia...

[Ned Parsnip]

THE special forces patrol drove headlong into a massive ambush. The intelligence was strong, but what it didn't say was that 150 heavily armed insurgents would stage a rolling ambush in a bold bid to wipe out the Australian, US and Afghan "hunter killer" patrol.
Soon after, as they fought the fight of their lives and as the first casualties began to fall, the Diggers spotted two Dutch Apache helicopters escorting a Chinook chopper to a nearby forward operating base.
"Salvation" they thought as the joint terminal air controller (JTAC) responsible for guiding air support radioed the pilots asking them to bring their Hellfire laser-guided missiles and 30mm cannons to the fight near the village of Khaz Oruzgan. As the call went out the soldiers on the ground endured withering enemy mortar, small arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire. The casualties grew.
"We're in an absolute doozy of a **** fight. We need your assistance as we're taking casualties," the JTAC - known only by his initials of SG - told the Dutch pilots.
He gave the Dutch target indicators but the chopper pilots refused to drop under their "safe" height of 5000m. Below that level aircraft are vulnerable to small arms fire, but the armour-plated Apaches are designed to operate under heavy fire at very low altitudes.
..................former SAS soldier and ex-Royal Marine Rob Maylor, who sustained serious shrapnel wounds during the battle, reveals intricate details of the ambush and the lack of Dutch help.
"They wouldn't open up on the Taliban for fear they might draw some fire themselves," Maylor said of the September 2008 battle that cost the life of one US soldier and left seven SAS soldiers and two sappers badly wounded.
"I honestly thought that we wouldn't get out of there alive. If the bad guys had got any closer it would have been all over for us," he said.
As the Special Forces patrol was being pounded from all sides, another SAS soldier marked targets for the choppers using a .50 calibre heavy machinegun to kick up dust clouds close to enemy positions.
"They still wouldn't engage. SG had had enough so he told them, 'If you're not going to engage then you might as well f. .k off' and they did. Cheers boys," Maylor wrote.
The revelations add weight to the views of Australian soldiers on the frontline, including one whose email appeal for greater fire support was published by The Daily Telegraph, that they need more firepower.
Allies abandoned our Diggers (http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/indepth/allies-abandoned-our-diggers/story-e6frewp9-1225941955873)

Ian McPhedran
From: The Daily Telegraph (http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/)
October 22, 2010

Top brass and politicians have stepped up their campaign to discredit troops and others calling for more help, with Defence Minister Stephen Smith repeating the mantra of Lieutenant-General Mark Evans that such claims were "inaccurate and ill-informed".
"Capabilities such as artillery, mortars and attack helicopters are available through our partners," Mr Smith told Parliament.
One of the specific complaints in the email concerned a lack of helicopter support during another deadly battle that claimed the life of Private Jared Mackinney.

[Bushranger 71]

CONCEPTUAL HUEY II GUNSHIP

http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/HueyIIGunship.jpg

PERFORMANCE

http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/HotelHueyIIPerformance.jpg

BUSHRANGER AND HUEY II WEAPONRY

http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/HotelHueyIIWeaponry1.jpg

[MTOW]

Is there someone out there who is able (willing? - I don't think Official Secrets/security should be involved) to give us outsiders some idea of what would be required to the Oz Blackhawks up to specs to make them usable in Afghanistan? I know the original idea was that it wouldn't be necessary, as they' soon be replaced by the MRH-90s, but for some time now, 'soon' is looking like not being anytime... err... soon.

[OVERTALK]

Some interesting comments on Ned Parsnip's snippet above can be found at

tinyurl.com/33zncyt

.

[Trojan1981]

The Blackhawk would never make a good CAS platform, it is far too vulnerable to ground fire, not particularly manouverable or high performing, and would require quite a lot of modification to re-role.

Bushranger, the Huey II idea probably should have happened a long time ago, but it is getting out of date now. I respect that the fact that you have a lot of experience and knowledge in this field.

A good CAS platform for the ADF would be one with long loiter time, presicion guided weapons and real-time datalink capability. An aircraft that can remain clear of most gound fire and also provide battlefield surveillance and comms relay, in addition to targeting; essential for effective networked operations. IMHO this means a UAV, as much as I hate to say it. Probably the most effective CAS platform in the ADFs current inventory would be an F/A-18. Helicopters are very vulnerable to ground fire and have not fared well in the 'Ghan or Iraq. They are still essential for many roles within the ADF (Knucks may argue!) but IMHO CAS is not one of them.

[Evalu8ter]

"Helicopters are very vulnerable to ground fire"

What a load of rubbish! How many F18s would have sucked up an RPG and 25+ MG/HMG rounds like the RAF Chinook did in the 'Stan last year? The issue with RW is that we fly constantly in the threat band and have to to do our job. We don't have the luxury of mincing around at FL250 dropping PGMs. Therefore our exposure increases our liklihood of being hit, but Vietnam and subsequent wars have proven that RW are actually surprisingly robust. As for CAS, I'd take an Apache/Cobra over FW almost every time - more responsive and understanding of our needs. The majority of RW losses in Theatre are as a result of accidents, mainly due to the high ambient temperatures and brown-out issues - not to enemy fire.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

The Blackhawk would never make a good CAS platform, it is far too vulnerable to ground fire, not particularly manouverable or high performing, and would require quite a lot of modification to re-role.

Errr, tell JSOC that the Blackhawk doesn't make a good CAS platform

MH-60L DAP (http://www.guncopter.com/mh-60-dap/)

HPT

[9BIT]

HPT,

Whilst the DAP is good it is not a bespoke CCA platform and not something the ADF could field any time soon (if it wanted to). We already have a capable CCA platform combined with an impressive ISR capability. The ARH would be more than capable of providing the fires our boys require (hellfire, rockets and 30mm). It could go now I am told if there was the political will to make it happen. On the one hand we are being told it is ready and the most capable thing AAAvn has ever fielded and impressing all - yet it is not where it is needed most? This latest revelation about the inability of the Dutch AH-64 to provide what was required in a TiC in late 08 must surely increase the pressure to send our own organic CCA.

:ugh:

[Frazzled]

MTOW,

I'll give it a shot and start the ball rolling and everyone else can yell me down...

Our blackhawks are unique and a little on the old side. They are also designated S70-A so are different from the basic US blackhawk. You know we can't buy off the shelf.....

I think our engines are probably originals - they don't have FADEC's and low on power compared to the new mike models. therefore when operating hot and high (TK about 5500ft above sea level) then they can't carry many people and don't handle very well at that altitude. So new engines would be in order. Having fadecs would stop the lag as well and therefore rotor droop.

Which may also mean upgrading transmission to take the new power and maybe new wiring for engine managment systems.

Avionics - steam driven, GPS's drop out with large angles of bank, no moving map display (but chinoks use a different system i think).

Self protection - EWSP suite has not been updated since purchase - maybe ok against SA7 - wouldn't be too keen to see it go against SA16, SA18 or chinese/iranian copies etc.:eek:

Overall, nothing money can't fix.......however probably not going to get it in these troubled times, need money for boat arrivals, NBN, water buy backs doubt that's going to happen.

OR maybe do a C-17/super honret and buy/lease some off the shelf that are compatible with the US aircraft.

Comments

Frazzled:ugh::ugh:

[500N]

Any fire support from above, even an M60 out of a door would
be welcome by troops on the ground, even if only to give enough
time to do a clean break contact.

I fail to understand why Australia / the ADF has to come up with weird and wonderful capabilities that stops us buying off the shelf items and slightly
modifying them, instead of reworking everything.

Especially since we seem to operate with the US a lot, why we can't dovetail onto what they do at the same time - or get the model 2's after the bugs have been ironed out.

Also, are the Tiger's ready or not ? Seem to be conflicting reports.
And if not, why is it taking so long to get them operational ?

Isn't Afghan the perfect place to use them, especially when our troops are needing them most ?


On the subject of the Dutch, I noticed a media release saying the Dutch have been asked to look into the claims. It has obviously struck a cord in the Gov't for such a quick media response. I just hope it has some positive effect.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi Trojan 1981; re your post #95.

Sorry; but I have to disagree with you re supposed helicopter vulnerability/survivability in combat. This bit from a comprehensive US Army study of Vietnam operations:

‘Statistics on relative vulnerability (of helicopters) reveal that out of 1,147 sorties, one aircraft would be hit by enemy fire, one aircraft was shot down per 13,461 sorties, and only one aircraft was shot down and lost per 21,194 sorties. Used properly, the helicopter was not the fragile target some doom-forecasters had predicted.’

9SQN RAAF flew 237,806 sorties for 58,768 hours during 5.5 years (2,000 days) of Vietnam War operations. Only 1 aircraft was directly lost to ground-fire and 3 aircraft were forced to land. 23 overall received mostly minor battle damage. These were lower probabilities than for the US Army with operating practices significant. There have of course been a few losses to MANPADS in Afghanistan but risk from 7.62mm and 12.7mm weaponry would be no greater and arguably less intense than during Vietnam operations. The apparent apprehension among some operators regarding risk of ground-fire in Afghanistan is a bit puzzling although there are doubtless political overtones due to the worldwide unpopularity of involvement.

The Huey II is not dated; it is a virtually as new factory upgraded light weight battlefield support platform with lots of certified enhancement options, long supportability envisaged due to commonality of components with civil versions and orders approaching 200. If Chinook, Blackhawk, Kiowa all have parallel upgrade programs, how can a Huey be considered obsolescent? It betters the Blackhawk in some respects like cabin layout, weight, technical simplicity, operating costs and probably hot and high performance, although latter data for UH-60L or M not known.

A 'new' Huey II costs $2million and a Blackhawk UH-60M upgrade about $14million (2008 dollars). Assuming the dismal decision to waste 20 plus Hotel model Iroquois for historical purposes will not be rescinded, it would seem more cost-effective to buy maybe 50 or more Huey II from Bell Helicopter than put ADF Blackhawks, which are about 4 times as expensive to operate, through an upgrade program. If no action in this direction, then crucial battlefield utility helo capability will be forfeited as the MRH90 will clearly be quite unsuited for that function. A good CAS platform for the ADF would be one with long loiter time, precision guided weapons and real-time datalink capability. An aircraft that can remain clear of most gound fire and also provide battlefield surveillance and comms relay, in addition to targeting; essential for effective networked operations. Why not an AC-130 capability? An invaluable asset in all theatres from Vietnam onwards and likely to remain in the USAF inventory for some time - the US Marine Corps is also adapting some of their C-130. Converting some RAAF C-130H for special operations roles and acquiring more C-130J would really enhance flexibility and versatility for regional operations. Apart from money of course, the problem is AC-130 may be a bit too warlike for our politicians, many of whom now seem to see the ADF becoming a virtual 'peace corps'.

[MTOW]

A good CAS platform for the ADF would be one with long loiter time, presicion guided weapons and real-time datalink capability. An aircraft that can remain clear of most gound fire and also provide battlefield surveillance and comms relay, in addition to targetingTrojan, you're falling neatly into the hole Bushranger 71 and the rest of us have been saying for ages now that the ADF should be avoiding - dreaming of a '(seriously expensive and unproven) built-for-task-Rolls-Royce-or-Ferrari-with-all-possible-bells-and-whistles' that has two serious shortcomings (the very same shortcomings that have put the ADF's rotary wing close air support/troop lift force into its present state of not being able to provide that support to our troops) -

(1) lead time. We simply can't afford the lead time. The ADF needs something that can be fielded - and that will work - in absolute minimum time, and

(2) cost. Australia simply can't afford yet another hugely expensive super high tech military buy that might not deliver everything it promises. All too many of the recent very expensive buys have two things in common - (a) they are one off systems, unlike anything operated by any other military force in the world, and (b) have not resulted in the ADF gaining a platform or a system that has delivered anywhere near the promised results, if they have delivered anything at all.

Look how successful - and cost-effective - the one exception has been, where we bought off the shelf - the C17.

Besides, as Bushranger 71 says, the ADF already operates the perfect airframe for the job you dream of, and have been since 1957 or so - the Hercules. Three or four of our H models just need to be fitted with the standard (note that incredibly important word) US kit to turn them into AC130s.

If our political and military leadership in Canberra had the will, I daresay we could have them in the field and operational in Afghanistan, crewed by our own people, within six months of the decision being made.

[UNCTUOUS]

....let alone the true facts?
but we're open to Suggestions:

a. Crews weren't up-to-date on their cat checks

b. Weapons tight clearances hadn't been lifted by the Dutch ambassador to Afghanistan

c. Dutch Commander was on leave in Lahore and couldn't be contacted on his cell-phone.

d. Crews had forgotten to remove the armament safety pins.

e. Crews were FIGMO and had promised each other not to allow each other to get the other into trouble (sorta like "Dutch Treat")

f. Squadron SOP's dictated that crews remain at medium altitudes for best fuel consumption, best line of sight comms, optimalized battlefield overview and least shrapnel damage.

g. ISAF ROE's were still being translated from Dutch to English.

h. There was some doubt that the insurgents firing upon the Aussies were Taliban and not just local angry peasant farmers.

i. Aircraft were just out of manufacturer's warranty and overdue their 20,000 mile servicings.

j. Weapons were highly classified and Dutch officers were anxious not to allow them to fall into the hands of a sophisticated enemy.

k. Embedded Dutch journos had warned the pilots of adverse publicity about atrocities, should they be involved in any senseless killing of nationals.

l. Crews included Afghans under instruction and they refused to fire upon their fellow countrymen.

m. There were rumours of IED's, MANPADS, RPG's and other nasties possibly being in the area.

Dutch to review SAS claims
October 22, 2010 - 8:19PM

Breaking Internet News

AAP

The Dutch defence force will review claims that its personnel refused to help Australian special forces soldiers ambushed by the Taliban in Afghanistan, Defence Minister Stephen Smith says.

The claims were made in a new book by ex-SAS soldier Rob Maylor, extracts of which were published by News Ltd on Friday.

The book refers to an incident on September 2, 2008, in which an Australian special forces unit came under heavy fire from Taliban insurgents.

Mr Maylor claims two Dutch Apache helicopters refused to descend and help by returning fire.

Mr Smith on Friday said the Australian Defence Force (ADF) had contacted its Dutch equivalent, which indicated its intention to review the claims.

He confirmed two Dutch attack helicopters were present during the incident but said Australian troops had fire support from US and UK helicopters as well as US F-18 jets.

"The ADF has contacted their Dutch counterparts who have indicated their intention to review the claims," Mr Smith said in a statement on Friday.

"The incident, as it has been reported, goes to the detail of operational procedures and rules of engagement.

"As is the case in such matters, I take the professional operational advice of the CDF (Chief of the Defence Force).

"It remains my view that the Dutch have made a very important contribution in Oruzgan," Mr Smith said.

"Australia greatly appreciates the efforts of the Dutch forces in Oruzgan and the close relationship that we developed with them."

Mr Smith said ensuring sufficient helicopter support for troops was crucial and that Prime Minister Julia Gillard had raised the issue with senior military commanders during her recent visit to Afghanistan.

.

UNC
Down in the delta and Chook'd out (it's always so lonely seeing your helo disappear , dangling in the distance - and you're still there on the ground, wondering about the next likely development - as the sun disappears below the horizon).

[7x7]

I have to agree with others who've commented that Australian Defence spending will come under enormous pressure as the Gillard government attempts to fulfill its promise to come up with a balanced budget by 2013. (Another promise I don't think they'll achieve, but that's another matter and the pprune moderators won't allow discussion on that.)

Defence has always been more or less 'the caged canary in the mine' in economic hard times - i.e., the first area any government looks to to save some money, (and at the same time, [always a high priority for any government], offend a minimum number of voters), when times are tough.

Looking at what's currently happening in the UK should cause anyone in the ADF to pause and consider what effect cuts not even half as deep as the ones the Brits have just announced would have on all the grandiose plans Kevin Rudd announced just a few short years ago.

Simply put: they ain't gunna happen, or quite a few of them aren't, and if they do, they'll be greatly reduced in scope, and hourly operating costs of the surviving ones will play a huge part in how much use the ADF can make of them. (Tell me, what do the ~50 Tiger pilots the Army currently has actually do?)

Drifting off thread for one moment, but can anyone tell me why the Brits, after cutting into almost every Government Department to a truly punishing degree, exclude from their cuts what always seems to be 'the' most sacred of sacred cows - foreign aid? What is it about foreign aid that keeps it excluded from any cuts?

Oh, and UNCTIOUS:- superb post. Why don't you send that in to 'The Australian', if only to their online edition. They might actually print it.

[Trojan1981]

Frazzled - you are spot on regarding our Blackhawks.

MTOW, Bushranger, I agree with most of what you are saying. Bushranger, with regard to Helos, they are more vulnerable than a higher flying UAV or manned aircraft and, as I believe you are suggesting, the loss of one or several would have political consequences. In high intensity conflict, where there is effective red-air, helicopters would also face substantial air-air threat (I have been told by fighter pilots that rotor discs stand out like the dogs proverbial on radar and, I assume, also the heat sig on IRST).

IMHO a good off the shelf solution would be the AC-130U. The problem is we currently don't even have enough C-130s (or Crew) to meet our current airlift requirements. Also, a new AC-130U is approx $190 mil. An AC-130 can spend long periods on station and provide substantial direct fire support. Another cheaper and safer, but less effective, option would be the MQ-9 or equivilent.

[Frazzled]

How about one from left field - add this to the wish list..:)

Us are rumoured to be developing a gunship lite based on the C27J platform to increase their numbers of gunships....Hmmmmm

Despite what navs might tell you our C130H's have just about had it - too much time spent low level and airframes are just about cactus.

We don't have enough J's at the moment let alone crew. Training seems to be the problem - can not train enough crews fast enough both fron and back end.

One day when I am king we will buy off teh shelf US products as we seem to follow them into everythig these days and they at least keep spares on teh shelf.

F:ugh:

[Mike7777777]

If there is a comparison to made with the war in Vietnam, the most effective support for ground troops was provided by artillery shooting from fire support bases, frequently flown in by helicopter. The much-reported 30 minute response time for fixed wing air support in Afghanistan is a nonsense against lightly armed, mobile, irregular opposition with extensive local knowledge. 5 minutes max should be the objective.

But is there a comparison to be made with Vietnam?

[Bushranger 71]

Hi MikeSevens,

Yes; arty support in Vietnam was very good and particularly where Fire Support Patrol Bases had overlapping gun ranges. But that concept of operations is pretty predictable and patrolling from garrisons somewhat advantages the enemy who can generally move freely beyond artillery range. Same lessons learned by the French in Vietnam apply in Afghanistan today.

Some contend 1 Australian Task Force dominated their TAOR by frequently establishing FSPBs to support patrolling, but debatable. The local Viet Cong infrastructure was severely dented but the North Vietnamese Army still roamed into the area when it suited their strategies.

Many ex-military worldwide question why there has not been broader use of air mobility in Afghanistan to minimize the IED threat, but that appears to be a resources issue with some political constraints. What seems lacking for the Australian ISAF component (apart from own utility helicopters) is more suitable integral armoured cavalry support to enable mobile immediate fire support response.

The M113 light armoured cavalry vehicle, as operated in Vietnam by Australian forces, allowed greater operational flexibility. Fitted with a 76mm gun turret and mortar, it could provide immediate fire support response out to about 10k. But, the heavy weapon capability has been excluded in an ongoing (botched) enhancement program for 431 M113 vehicles, although some will be adapted for mortar carriage (120mm?). Too many negatives in employing cumbersome behemoth tanks.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi again Trojan 1981; re your post #105.

Post-Vietnam War, the RAAF Iroquois and fighter squadrons were tasked to develop helicopter versus fighter tactics which is why the Air Force Huey camouflage scheme emerged (designed by my creative daughters). Both 5 and 9 Squadrons were ultimately involved in trials and it was great fun. A few of us having flown fighters was beneficial because we understood how to make target acquisition and tracking more difficult for the higher speed birds (then Macchis and Mirages).

http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/HueyCam4.jpg


The outcomes were more favourable for helos than most would imagine provided appropriate tactics are employed relative to the operating environment (terrain, vegetation, visibility, etcetera). Having said that, a few Hueys got 'splashed' although we did not then have our doorguns loaded with 100 percent tracer to discourage our opponent friends a little! As you suggest, more modern technology should advantage the fighters but the question really begged is whether ADF air components would be deployed in less permissive air environments?

What might be done to provide funding and manpower for say AC-130 and utility helo capabilities, if Defence can be convinced of these deficiencies? Some possibilities: retrench 10,000 of the public service component of Defence (they would not be missed!); mothball 2 fighter squadrons to extend the life of the F/A-18 and opt out of the JSF project; curtail the MRH90 project by at least half the number of aircraft; recover the Iroquois being discarded and feed them through the Bell Helicopter Huey II factory upgrade program (below $100million for upgrade plus ongoing support costs).

Something has to happen to regain adequate combat readiness and military credibility therefore some rationalising of force structures seems necessary. It would of course all depend on Service Chiefs admitting their respective force shortcomings and MPs having the political will for corrective action.

[500N]

Interesting that our Chinook's have just returned home and won't be going back until the new year.

[Like This - Do That]

The M113 light armoured cavalry vehicle, as operated in Vietnam by Australian forces, allowed greater operational flexibility. Fitted with a 76mm gun turret and mortar, it could provide immediate fire support response out to about 10k. But, the heavy weapon capability has been excluded in an ongoing (botched) enhancement program for 431 M113 vehicles, although some will be adapted for mortar carriage (120mm?). Too many negatives in employing cumbersome behemoth tanks.

BR71 I'm not sure if the Saladin turret FSV made it to Vietnam ... did it? Certainly the Scorpion turret MRV didn't - it didn't enter service until the late 1970s. Indirect fire from the mortar has a planning range of about 5000m (81mm), and the 76mm gave direct fire out to a couple of thousand metres.

The MRV 'beasts' had all been retired before the ASLAV was trialled. The 25mm on the ASLAV gives direct fire out to the same range as the 76mm, far more accurately.

Your description of Land 106 as being 'botched' ... well, I can't disagree. Half a billion beer tickets blown on vehicles that just won't be deployed. It would have cost more to buy a contemporary IFV to equip 1 BDE, but that will have to happen under Land 400 anyway, and the result would have been a useful asset.

Given the grief it has caused 2 Div RAAC Regiments, (who have had half a decade in the wilderness after 'donating' their buckets to be fed into the M113 upgrade program), and the resultant lack of a battlefield-employable car - - - :ugh::mad::{

'Cumbersome behemoth tanks'? You mean the mobile, protected, network-enabled, sensor-equipped intimate direct fire support system? The 'negatives' to which you refer must be the political fall out. For this we can thank the Army for not explaining why we need tanks; and the ignorance of pollies and the self-appointed authorities on all things strategic. For some reason tanks push cranky buttons in the likes of Mike Carlton (SMH) like nothing else :confused:

When push comes to shove Australian tanks save Australian soldiers' lives. Australian soldiers will die on some operation in the future because the ignorance of the tank haters will have removed the capability from the inventory. You get fired up about RW battlefield lift (and related); I get fired up about the undeserved and unjustified position that armour in general, and tanks in particular, have in the ADF's and the Gummint's view of the world.

Sorry for the thread hijack folks.

[Bushranger 71]

Hello LT-DT; re your post #111.

We are off the thread theme although complaints from Afghanistan were re lack of integral utility helos and mortars which led to calls for deployment of Abrams tanks. Also; some poor grammar on my part best clarified.

I was thinking max range of 120mm mortar at about 10k (see: Modern Mobile Mortars (http://defense-update.com/features/du-1-04/feature-mortars.htm)) and cannot locate some Vietnam imagery to verify introduction of the Saladin 76mm turret (it may have been later). But I do recall argument in favour being the ability to fire canister rounds, like the Centurions. Cannon is great, as fitted to ASLAV, but why not also to mortar carrier M113s?

The Centurion 'tankies' were the most disciplined of the fighting arms in Vietnam and great to work with, but the APC equipped cavalry units were more flexible. 70 tonne Abram tanks have significant deployability constraints (transportation, wharves, cranes, roads, bridges, etcetera) and field support penalties including large tank recovery and transporter vehicles. Australia needs to be able to quickly deploy light armour into rudimentary airfields around the region by C-130 and maybe C-17, hence the appeal of a versatile M113 FSV.

Methinks enough said re armour and I am too old to get 'fired up' concerning issues which I see as just interesting forum debate.

[Trojan1981]

Bushranger, I know little about Armour, but I have worked with Cav units deploying APCs and later combinations of ASLAVs and Bushmasters. My understanding is that they are very happy with the current equipment and believe that many lives have been saved using bushmasters for battlefield mobility and patrolling with escort LAVs to provide direct fire support as required. Indeed the LAVs have been very effective in this role. The Cav blokes told me they feel the current equipment is more than adequate. Frankly, my experience in Bushmasters (cramped, hot, dangerous) scared the crap out of me and I will be happy if I never see another one again!

Regarding your post 109; I was referring to BVR engagements of Helos using either Radar or passive IR (still BVR) detection, as I am informed is possible with current and upcoming equipment. But I am no expert on this, I am only going on what I have been told by fighter pilots.

Obviously a UAV would face the same air-air threat, but the consequences would be much lessened. Also the loiter time would be such that even a small fleet could provide constant availlability to the task group - no wait time.
I don't know, but the attitude of the Army hierarchy may bear some respnsibility for the lack of direct fire support in place. For large pre-planned operations like the one at Derapat why was there not an ATO for CAS before the operation began?

[TBM-Legend]

B71, I don't think the issue for any M-1 Abrams deployment to A/stan is logistics. As you can see they can be flown in to an airhead. Ports/wharves etc are restrictions from another age - prior to the C-17!


QUOTE:
The C-17's ability to fly long distances and land in remote airfields in rough, land-locked regions make it a premier transporter for military, humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. It can:
Take off from a 7,600-ft. airfield, carry a payload of 160,000 pounds, fly 2,400 nautical miles, refuel while in flight and land in 3,000 ft. or less on a small unpaved or paved airfield in day or night.
Carry a cargo of wheeled U.S. Army vehicles in two side-by-side rows, including the U.S. Army's main battle tank, the M-1. Three Bradley infantry-fighting vehicles comprise one load.
Drop a single 60,000-lb. payload, with sequential load drops of 110,000 lb.
Back up a two-percent slope.
Seat 54 on the sidewall and 48 in the centerline.

[Barry Bernoulli]

TBM-Legend:

How many tanks would you need to deploy?

How many can the C17 carry at once?

How long would that take?

How much would that cost?

[Trojan1981]

The ADF does not even have the airlift capability to sustain the current deployment, let alone adding tanks. Thats why contractors are often used. One subject I do know is ADF logistics. The sheer amount of man-hours and parts required to support armoured vehicles (particularly tanks) in the field is astounding. I am not saying we can't do it, but it would take a lot more logistical support to sustain them. It is not just a matter of moving the vehicles.

[Frazzled]

wouldn't have thought tanks were the answer - but as an aviator i know nothing about armour, glad to leave that to the army. Though I hear IED and flat bottom hulls don't mix well.

However, having carried the odd injured army dude out of theatre after being in a bushmaster I can only imagine that other defence forces are envious of the ADF.

They need quick response support WHEN they need it. Would be nice if we had our own dedicated air support but are they ready and the chinooks got sucked up into the US system whats stopping the ARH being sucked up into the same system.

Also, if we were deployed ARH would we have enough crews/spares for year round deployment or only "seasonal" like the chooks, and if seasonal then what will they use in the off season?

Handing over.....:ugh:

[MTOW]

Frazzled, until the ADF 'progressed' to its current sorry RW situation - at the insistence of a few people now long retired, but still very keen to protect their 'legacy' - the ADF had a unit that could have provided everything you ask for. It was called 9 Squadron.

[TBM-Legend]

Sorry, not exactly aviation but....:hmm::hmm::hmm::hmm:

QUOTE: The Australian , 25th Oct 2010

AUSTRALIA'S largest defence project, the $8 billion plan to build the navy's new air warfare destroyers, has had its first serious setback.

A Melbourne shipyard has botched the construction of the central keel block of the first warship.

The multi-million-dollar bungle could delay the project by up to six months and is believed to have triggered a rift between the Williamstown shipyards, where the hull block was built, and the warship's Spanish designer.

The setback has alarmed the Defence Materiel Organisation, which sees the AWDs as its flagship project and a key test of whether Australia can sustain a viable naval shipbuilding industry.

The three new 6500-tonne destroyers, based on the Spanish F100 boats, will be the most capable warships in the nation's history when they enter service from 2014.

The Australian understands that the central keel block of the first AWD warship, HMAS Hobart, was built to inaccurate dimensions as a result of faulty welding and inadequate quality control at the Williamstown shipyards, operated by an AWD subcontractor, BAE Systems Australia.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi TBM-L; re your post #114.

Methinks we can have a worthwhile debate re ADF armour deployability capabilities so I am working on a starter for a new thread, something like: 'ADF deployability of armoured elements'.

Cheers Mate.

[7x7]

TBM-Legend, the AWD keel disaster wasn't foreseen. If what I've heard is even halfway true, there are a lot more big dollar disasters to come with that particular project that have been.

[Bushranger 71]

Hello all; new thread up now on the armour bit.

[TheShadow]

Senator Fielding's impassioned plea in the Upper House yesterday for helicopter support for our troops in Afghanistan (point 2 of 3 points that he made - stemming from his visit there and discussions with troops and their commanders) HAS BEEN TOTALLY IGNORED by press coverage of the debate.
For an example, see this article from the Australian:

tinyurl.com/27588fo

[7x7]

Two links for those who, earlier in the thread, dismissed concerns expressed by Bushranger 71 and others about the high prices and high operating costs of the rotary wing (non)assets the ADFs is(n't) currently employing.

Defence outlines worries over dwindling budget at a time forces are in demand | The Australian (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence-outlines-worries-over-dwindling-budget-at-a-time-forces-are-in-demand/story-fn59niix-1225944420616)

The department, set a long-term capped budget, remains concerned the government will look for further savings. "Defence consumes approximately 9 per cent of government outlays and is typically seen either as largely discretionary spending or at least more capable of being financially reshaped than other government agencies," the briefs state.

"Indeed, there still exists a view that . . . there is still 'plenty of fat' within Defence. These views, although ill-conceived, render Defence an obvious target for any major budget reshaping."


Diggers exposed as costs blow out | The Australian (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/diggers-exposed-as-costs-blow-out/story-fn59niix-1225944434028)

ALMOST a third of the weaponry, armour, system and support upgrades promised to Australian troops in Afghanistan have encountered problems.
The Gillard government has been warned that these issues could result in delays or cost blowouts.

As parliament continues to debate Australia's role in Afghanistan, amid expectations of a greater number of casualties, it appears those on the front line remain dangerously over-exposed. In the middle of last year, after visiting Afghanistan for the first time, then defence minister John Faulkner ordered a force protection review, which was completed later last year and led to a $1.1 billion package of budget initiatives.Did anyone else read the Defence Supplement in 'The Australian' a few days ago? ('The Weekend Australian', I think it was.) Lazy journalism at its worst, and the journalists at 'The Australian' should be ashamed of themselves - the so-called 'articles' on the current state of our defence forces were nothing but a series of press releases taken directly from defence industry handouts. Everything is 'on track' and hunky dory, with ships and helicopters all to be on line and working wonderfully well 'soon'.

[500N]

7x7

I agree with you re the newspapers getting lazy. The first thing I do is look at the defence web site to see if they have released a press release. Soon shows if the newspapers have just copy and pasted it.

Re "hunky dory" - which as shown it is obviously not, lucky the ADF and other PS components are not a private company as heads would roll - like BHP's building cock ups in the last 15 years.

Although in some ways maybe it needs to run along the lines of a company.

[Bushranger 71]

See the link at post #85 this thread for some reasonable commentary re helicopters.

There are a few journalists who have the scent that defence is a mess; but just as business heads have publicly stated they were threatened by some federal government ministers over the past year, so it seems that some newspaper editors also come under such pressure and their staff might be a bit restricted in what they can ferret.

What is needed now is a storm of letters to MinDef Stephen Smith highlighting how a flawed defence policy is withering ADF capabilities. We must maintain continuous adequate and credible combat readiness by optimizing in-service hardware, where cost-effective, and should not be religiously pursuing some conceptual capabilities plan toward a Force 2030 structure which might not be appropriate 2 decades hence.

The whole plot has been orchestrated to channel taxpayer funding into the major arms corporations who now largely parent defence industry in Australia. The dots are easily connected between some former high profile politicians and military leaders now connected with the arms industry. This is the murky aspect that the media probably would not be brave enough to tackle.

[500N]

Article from today's WA Newspaper.Buying high-tech defence kit always risky Max Blenkin

November 1, 2010 - 11:59AM
AAP
Buying high-tech defence equipment is always risky, and attempts to eliminate that risk could result in Australian forces going to war with obsolete weapons, a new study says.
The study says despite many inquiries defence procurement projects continue to experience cost overruns, delays and shortfalls in performance, such as the plan to acquire Seasprite helicopters, which was dumped at vast cost.
In the paper, published in the latest edition of the Kokoda Foundation journal Security Challenges, former senior defence official Fred Bennett said there was always some risk, particularly in acquiring advanced high-tech equipment.
Advertisement: Story continues below
"Problematic as it is, experimental risk cannot be avoided," Mr Bennett said.
"Attempting to do so involves a greater risk - that of going into battle with obsolete weapons systems."
Australia's succession of high-profile defence headaches has included projects to acquire the Seasprites, Collins submarines and Wedgetail early warning aircraft.
To avoid problems, countries can buy proven equipment already in service with other nations, a practice known as military off-the-shelf (MOTS).
Mr Bennett said such strategies created only an illusion of lower risk.
"But by precluding innovation or changes to meet Australia's unique needs and circumstances, those strategies expose future military operations to higher risk," he said.
Australia's relatively small defence force depended on the highest quality of personnel and the best and most suitable equipment.
"But a MOTS-based procurement strategy risks sending our forces into battle with yesterday's weapons designed to meet the needs of a different defence force in a different theatre of operations and unsupported by in-country capability for repair or adaptation to changing operational conditions," he said.
Mr Bennett said the first step was to openly acknowledge that advanced, technologically complex defence equipment projects featured high levels of uncertainty.
It could then be accepted that the schedule and cost of such projects could not be forecast in any meaningful way in the early stages.
"Perhaps the key to successful defence project outcomes is higher quality, better educated and more experienced project managers," he said.

[Belgique]

As you would be aware, Parliament has recently been debating Australia’s commitment to Afghanistan.

You may be interested in the speech I recently delivered on this issue.

Regards

Steve F.

Wednesday, 27 October 2010

Speech by Senator Steve FIELDING

Leader of Family First

Afghanistan

Firstly, I support our troops in Afghanistan because I believe it is still possible to ensure Afghanistan does not once again become a safe haven for terrorists. I believe that to pull our troops out of Afghanistan now would be an act of great betrayal. It would betray the lives of the 21 soldiers who have been killed in action. It would betray all those diggers who have been injured in action. It would betray the families and friends of those 21 soldiers who have been killed in action. It would betray the people of Afghanistan, who we have made a commitment to—to help them govern their country on their own. It would betray our close ally the United States, who we have committed to stand beside.

Does this mean that we can never withdraw our troops from Afghanistan? No. What is does mean is that we should be very careful about what we promise and about the scope of our commitment.
Currently, we have committed to help the people in Afghanistan by strengthening their security and defence forces in Oruzgan province so eventually the Afghans can look after themselves. Yes, I know there are other commitments but that is the one that I will focus on.

Obviously, we cannot stay in Afghanistan forever, but to walk out now while the job is half done would be crazy. It would be an act of great betrayal. But obviously all Australians are concerned about the casualties arising from this war. Losing one Australian soldier is horrific and hard to take, and as the death toll rises, more and more Australians are becoming uneasy about our involvement in Afghanistan.
In fact, as the death toll of Australian soldiers rises, along with the government stating it is only going to get worse, more and more Australians continue to question: ‘Why don’t we just pull out?’
especially when there is also a growing feeling we just cannot win this war.

I admit that I too had started to grow more and more uneasy with our involvement in Afghanistan. That was when I decided it was time to do what I have always done before reaching a conclusion on a significant
issue: get out of my office and go to the coalface and find out firsthand what is going on. So I requested a trip to Afghanistan. Even though I was very unhappy about how long it took the government to arrange for me to visit Afghanistan, I am thankful to the government for finally arranging a visit for me three months ago.

My objective for the visit was to see firsthand the conditions and hear from soldiers and their commanders their views on two big questions. The first question was: is it realistic to expect that once Australia completes its training and mentoring role that the Afghan army and security forces will be capable of operating effectively on their own? The second big question is: are we supporting our soldiers enough and ensuring we are not putting their lives at risk unnecessarily?

With regard to the first question, after talking with our soldiers, the Australian command, the US command, the Dutch command and the Afghan command, I do believe it is still realistic to conclude that our efforts in the training and mentoring of the Afghan army and security forces will allow the Afghan army and security forces eventually to operate effectively on their own. But I also acknowledge that the next two years is critical in determining whether Afghan army and security forces will eventually be able to operate effectively on their own. I believe they will, but the next two years is absolutely critical, and to pull out now would be crazy and a gross act of betrayal.

The second question, about support for our soldiers, is very tough because I was only with our troops in Afghanistan for a few days, but I do believe we can and should do more to support our soldiers and I will outline some specific recommendations that I hope the government will action with some priority. I am mindful that some may say it is inappropriate for me to make recommendations as I am not a defence expert and I have never served in the defence forces. I can understand those views. However, I make these recommendations based on personal observations, along with discussions with our soldiers and others.
Before moving onto my recommendations, I would like to emphasise how impressed I was with the professionalism and commitment our soldiers have towards their task—especially given the extremely tough environment and the life-threatening intensity of operations.

My first recommendation is that the government should implement a comprehensive, ongoing plan that engages and informs the general public on why Australia needs to be involved in Afghanistan. I will say that again: the government should implement a comprehensive, ongoing plan that engages and informs the general public on why Australia needs to be involved in Afghanistan. The rationale for this recommendation is that our soldiers on the front line are burdened by the growing sentiment from the public that they should not be in Afghanistan. I feel the government could do more to keep the public more supportive of our involvement in Afghanistan. It is heart wrenching to think what it would be like to be on that front line. I know we pay them, but it causes them heartache to know that back in Australia there is growing public sentiment that does not support what they are doing there.

Even back in July this year the government conceded they did need to do more when they stated:

… 55 per cent of Australians were “not confident Australia has clear aims in Afghanistan”.

How can the Australian public be supportive of what our troops are doing if 55 per cent of Australians are not confident Australia has clear aims in Afghanistan? How could it be that 90 per cent of politicians are out of step with the community? Because what I have heard throughout this debate is, I would estimate, 90 per cent of MPs saying, without a doubt, ‘We’re doing the right thing,’ but in the community we have allowed it to prevail that 55 per cent of Australians are not confident Australia has clear aims in Afghanistan.
That clearly is a responsibility of the government and it is very important. I know the government is doing a lot, but I make this first recommendation because I am burdened from what I saw over there talking to some of our soldiers.

Recommendation 2 is that the government should secure additional rotary wing capacity to adequately support our troops in Oruzgan province. The rationale for this recommendation is that we are placing our soldiers’ lives at an unnecessarily greater risk because tasks that should be performed by rotary wing support are being carried out by road or delayed because of lack of rotary wing support.

My final recommendation, recommendation 3, is that the government should implement a 12-month trial appointment of an independent soldiers advocate that has the responsibility to make direct recommendations to the regional commander of the operations. The rationale for this recommendation is that I detected that some soldiers felt that their concerns were not taken seriously or actioned adequately or in a timely manner. The soldiers advocate would ensure confidentiality for soldiers at all times as they work with the command on resolutions. I am not saying that the command has to do what is recommended by the soldiers advocate, but it would at least assure our soldiers on the front line that the top level has heard directly from them about significant issues. I think it is worth a pilot. I detected quite seriously that some soldiers felt their concerns were not taken seriously enough, and that burdens me greatly.

So where to from here? This Afghanistan debate is important, but its value will be short-lived unless the government is prepared to take action on these and other worthy recommendations. It is worth stressing that again: this Afghanistan debate is important, but its value will be short-lived unless the government is prepared to take action on these and other worthy recommendations from this debate.

I conclude by sharing how much admiration I have for our soldiers, especially those who work outside the wire. We have seen the pictures, we have seen the conditions and we know what it is like to have a 40-plus degree day, but I did not realise how harsh the conditions are in Afghanistan. Your body has to operate in stinking hot temperatures of 40-plus degrees and a dusty environment not just for a few days but for months. Your life is at risk not just for a few days but for 24 hours a day, seven days a week for months. You are always on the edge and alert, not just while you are awake but also while you sleep. You are subconsciously aware that it is not safe and your life is still at risk.

Your emotions are numb. Death and injury are all around you, no matter where you look. You hear that another one of your fellow diggers has lost their life or been injured. This tugs at every human’s heart, and I cannot say how humbling it was to talk to our soldiers on the front line. I thank them for allowing me into their world. I remember standing on the training ground where the combat engineers train the troops in the finding of improvised explosive devices, and I was nearly in tears—one step and you are gone.

People in this Senate know me. I have not made these recommendations lightly, and I urge the government to think about whether we can support our troops more. I believe that we can, and I have made these three recommendations because my heart was torn. We need to do more and we should do more. I do not want to take anything away from the support that the government gives our defence forces, but there are questions that have to be answered, and the implementation of the three recommendations I have made would go a long way with our defence forces.

There is one other issue that I will raise. When you come back to civilian life after months outside the wire, it must be nearly impossible to feel like a human being again. From what I understand from talking to people, some soldiers would probably use some of the services that we offer a lot more, but they are worried about what would go on their record if they used some of those services. I do not know how to solve that one, and that is why I have not put a recommendation down, but it is something that I think the government also needs to look at. I thank the Senate.

Question agreed to.

[Wiley]

For those who’ve taken apparent glee on this and earlier threads in shooting down Bushranger 71 and others who’ve decried the massive waste and lack of a timely operational product in the succession of gold-plated ‘Ferrari/Rolls Royce’ buys the ADF has made over the last few decades, here’s a book you really should take the time to read: ‘Boyd: the Fighter Pilot who Changed the Art of War”. ( boyd. the fighter pilot who changed the art of war - AbeBooks (http://www.abebooks.com/servlet/SearchResults?sts=t&tn=boyd.+the+fighter+pilot+who+changed+the+art+of+war&x=35&y=16) )

This book should be a must read for any officer and NCO in any of the three services, particularly those with aspirations of making a career in the service – and perhaps, in particular, every one of the currently under-employed AAVn Tiger and MRH-90 pilots sitting around their crewrooms waiting for their shiny super steeds to come on line.

For those non-fighter jocks among you who might, (as I was), be initially dismissive of the seemingly typical fighter pilot hyperbole contained in the title of the book, don’t be. This was the man responsible - against massive resistance from his superiors - for the F15, the F18, and most importantly, the F16, and who, through one of his ‘acolytes’, (see the Wikipedia link), had much to do with the creation and introduction to service of the A10 despite the USAF hierarchy doing everything in their power to kill the project.

However, the fighter stuff is only part of the story. Boyd’s real influence didn’t come to bear until after he quit flying, where he developed the concept of ‘manoeuvre warfare’, a (for the US military, at least), radically novel concept of warfare that changed the way of fighting a modern war – at least by the US Marines.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Boyd_(military_strategist)

John R. Boyd, Colonel, United States Air Force (http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jrboyd.htm)

John Boyd - USAF, The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of Air Warfare (http://www.aviation-history.com/airmen/boyd.htm)

There should be a copy of this book in every crewroom – and every politician even likely to become Minister for Defence should be locked in a room and not allowed out until he’s read it from cover to cover.

[Like This - Do That]

Wiley, you can rest assurred that Boyd and decision making cycles are taught at RMC and the University Regiments. However I think in the last couple of years the ASDA model has replaced Boyd's OODA loop, but that's by-the-by.

Maneouvre theory ditto, it's taught extensively.

Can't speak for Sandbags or West Point or RMC in Canada, but I would be surprised if those establishments were all that different in this regard.

[MTOW]

LT-DT, they might be be teaching Boyd's theories at RMC, but judging by the overly expensive 'gold-plated' (to borrow Boyd's own phrase) equipment purchases made for the ADF over the last few decades, those theories haven't permeated into the upper ranks, both military and civilian, at Russell Hill (very much like they didn't in the Pentagon, with the notable exception of the USMC, or parts of it).

I loved his comment to the Joint Chiefs about the F-111 (then the Pentagon's absolute top pet project) when he was asked about its performance when pitted against the then current Soviet fighters (which was absolutely woeful in all aspects). Something along the lines of "paint it yellow, put seats in the bomb bay and turn it into a high speed base taxi. That's about all it's good for." (Tact and diplomacy were definitely not among Boyd's strong suites.)

The USAF to this day goes out of its way to ignore Boyd, to the point of not giving him credit when they do use his briefings, but the USMC has his portrait hanging on the wall at Quantico among their Leatherneck luminaries. For those not aware of the very wide gulf that exists between the USMC and the USAF, that's about on a par with Australian AAvn acknowledging that the RAAF might have actually known what they were doing when they operated choppers pre-1988.

[500N]

In today's paper. Seems to be a few like this lately in The Australian and The Age.
Minister attacks defence

Dan Oakes

November 27, 2010

DEFENCE Minister Stephen Smith has demanded better communication and accountability from defence bureaucrats.
In an unusually frank and hard-hitting speech to senior defence officials, Mr Smith said major projects were being poorly handled and that government was being deprived of vital information by the sprawling organisation.
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Since he began in the role 10 weeks ago, Mr Smith has made defence accountability a strong theme. It has been reported that he has directed senior defence personnel to show advance copies of any speeches to him or his aides.
Mr Smith also announced that the $355 million Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile, which is fitted to fighter planes, is the latest project to be added to the notorious ''projects of concern'' list. ''This listing is not primarily because of industry delays or cost increases. It is because of our poor management, our failure to keep government properly and fully informed about the project and its difficulties,'' he said.
The Defence Materiel Organisation, which procures everything from socks to fighter planes, has become synonymous with cost blowouts and schedule overruns, and now faces a ruthless cost-cutting program. The organisation's annual report, released this week, shows that of the top 30 projects on its books, only eight are on time.
The most troubled project is the navy's $4 billion multi-role helicopter, which has been dogged by engine problems. Mr Smith said there was a lack of communication between various areas of defence, meaning he received information from individual ''silos'' rather than from defence as a whole.

[emergov]

I'm not sure how Dan Oakes has managed to identify AIR 9000 as the 'most troubled project'. It isn't even on the list published by the minister on 26 Nov:

26 Nov 2010

Stephen Smith MP
Minister for Defence

MIN36/10
Projects of concern - Update

Minister for Defence Stephen Smith and Minister for Defence Materiel Jason Clare today released an update to the Projects of Concern list.

Project AIR 5418 Phase 1 – the acquisition of Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM) – has been added to this list.

This project, approved in 2004, is acquiring JASSM for deployment on F/A-18A/B aircraft to improve aircraft survivability and weapon effectiveness.

The project is running late and risks to capability remain.

In a speech today to the Department of Defence Senior Leadership Group, Mr Smith drew attention to concerns around AIR 5418 project management.

“Government has not been kept properly and fully informed as to the progress with respect to this major project” Mr Smith said.

Mr Smith said “It is essential for Government to be appropriately informed about the delivery of complex and important capabilities so that appropriate steps can be taken to manage issues that emerge in relation to cost, capability or schedule.”

The next major stage in this project is a live firing from an Australian F/A-18A/B in the United States in late 2010 or early 2011. Defence will provide the Government with a full report on the effectiveness of this test to inform the Government’s consideration on the way forward with respect to this project.

Mr Smith said “Defence will ensure that this project now receives additional scrutiny and senior officer oversight in the lead up to the test firing and in the development of subsequent advice to Government.”

This brings the total number of projects placed on the list since 2008 to 18, with six removed – five due to remediation and one due to cancellation.

The Projects of Concern list was established by the Government in 2008 to focus the attention of Defence and industry senior management on remediating listed projects.

This process has been successful in remediating a number of key complex and challenging projects.

Projects are put on the list when, for example, there are significant challenges with scheduling, cost, capability delivery or project management.

The current complete list of projects is below.

CN10: Collins Class Submarine Sustainment and Projects
AIR 5077 Phase 3: ‘Wedgetail’ Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft
SEA 1448 Phase 2B: Anti-Ship Missile Defence radar upgrades for ANZAC Class Frigates
JOINT 2043 Phase 3A: High Frequency Modernisation (HFMOD) – communications and data exchange capability for sea, air and land forces
AIR 5333: ‘Vigilare’ – Aerospace surveillance and command and control system
JOINT 129 Phase 2: Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – airborne surveillance for land forces
LAND 121 Phase 3: ‘Overlander’ replacement field vehicles, trailers and modules for land forces (‘Medium Heavy’ class of vehicles only)
JOINT 2070: Lightweight torpedo replacement for ANZAC and ADELAIDE Class Frigates
AIR 5402: Multi-Role Tanker Transport aircraft – Air to Air Refuelling Capability
JOINT 2048 Phase 1A: LCM2000 Watercraft for Landing Platform Amphibious ships
AIR 5276 Phase 8B: Electronic Support Measures upgrade for AP-3C Orion aircraft
AIR 5418 Phase 1: Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missiles

[Wiley]

emergov, you’ll see that in my post #129, I recommended a book that I thought was pertinent to this debate. Below are two extracts from that book. The first cites the situation in the US military in 1978 and the second, in 1982.

The question that comes to mind after reading them is: “Does this sound like anywhere you know of in 2010?”

There is nothing in the past to compare with the Spinney Report. For that reason alone, it is arguably one of the most important documents ever to come out of the Pentagon.

Spinney's basic point was that the unnecessary complexity of major weapons systems was wrecking the military budget. He made public what only a few people in the Air Force knew: throughout the 1970s much of the Air Force budget went toward procuring tactical air fighters and weapons while nearly all other areas suffered. So much money was being spent on overly complex weapons such as the F-15 and the F-111D that there was little money to operate and maintain the aircraft. Training flights for pilots were being replaced by simulators. Maintenance skills required to keep the F-15 flying were so high that civilian contractors had to be hired. Electronics systems failed far more often and took far longer to repair than predicted. Spinney showed that supporting the F-15 was more expensive than supporting the ancient B-52. He showed that readiness was at an all-time low; in a full-scale war, supplies of the Air Force's favorite munitions would last only a few days.

But the most significant part of the Spinney Report was that readiness problems were not caused by lack of funds; they were caused by Air Force leaders who deliberately bought such expensive and overly complex weapons that fewer and fewer of each model could be purchased. The leaders' incentive was to force increases in their budget and to funnel more money to defense contractors, and they said whatever they needed to achieve that goal. Spinney proved that virtually everything the Air Force had promised the American people about the F-I5 and the F-I I ID was false.
In this following extract, you could be forgiven for asking if you couldn’t delete ‘Pentagon’ and insert ‘Russell Hill’ and likewise replace ‘America’ with ‘Australia’.Civilians unacquainted with the ways of the Building have only vague ideas about what it is the Pentagon does. They think the real business of the Pentagon has something to do with defending America. But it does not. The real business of the Pentagon is buying weapons. And the military has a pathological aversion to rigorous testing procedures because in almost every instance the performance of the weapon or weapons system is far below what it is advertised to be and, thus, far below the performance used to sell Congress on the idea in the first place. Weapons development is inherently risky and the costs can be difficult to predict. But the big problem is what Spinney calls "front-loading," the practice of deliberately underestimating the costs in order for Congress to fund the program. The weapons-buying business has few checks and balances; from beginning to end it is an advocacy proceeding. Not only do military rewards and promotions go to the officer in charge of a major program but he almost always finds a high-level job in the defense industry upon retirement, often with the company whose project he ushered through the Pentagon. This is the true nature of the Building. And this is why Air Force generals did not want an unbending and rectitudinous man such as Jim Burton in charge of testing weapons.

Burton arrived at the OSD testing office in June 1982. From the time he walked in the door, Pierre Sprey besieged him to conduct tests showing how vulnerable American aircraft and armored vehicles were to Soviet weapons. Sprey was one of the most vocal critics of the Army's new Abrams Tank, and especially of how the vulnerability testing of tanks and armored vehicles was done largely by computer modeling. And the models were never verified by field tests. Thus, to Sprey, the model-based tests had no validity. Subject our tanks and our infantry carriers to realistic battlefield tests, he said. The lives of American soldiers are at stake.

Burton, with Sprey in the background, came up with the idea for a live-fire test program — that is, actually shoot live Soviet rockets and cannons at U.S. tanks to test their vulnerability. Such a program seems to be common sense, but in fact it was a radical departure from current practice. Boyd predicted that the Army would rise up in opposition.

For a year Burton briefed his ideas on live-fire testing to low-level Pentagon staffers and junior officers. After laying the groundwork and receiving the unanimous support of all branches of the services, Burton chose the first weapon he wanted to test: the Army's Bradley Fighting Vehicle. He could not have picked a weapon closer to the heart of the Army. The Bradley was supposed to be an advance over the traditional armored personnel carrier, which is just an armored box used to transport troops safely. The Bradley added a light turret to the armored box to allow it, in theory, to both carry troops and "fight." But the Bradley was too lightly armored to fight tanks: what it was supposed to fight had never been precisely detailed by the Army.

The Bradley was of crucial importance. First, it was the weapon whose safety affected the greatest number of soldiers; if America went to war, as many as seventy thousand soldiers might ride this vehicle into combat. Second, the Bradley program was in early production. This meant any problems could be corrected before thousands of the vehicles were sent to troops in the field. And third, the Bradley had never been tested for vulnerability to enemy weapons.

The Bradley was a tragedy waiting to happen. It was packed with ammunition, fuel, and people. The thinnest of aluminum armor surrounded it. So Burton sent the Army's ballistic research laboratory $500,000 to test the Bradley, and he insisted the testing use real Soviet weapons.

The Army agreed. But the first of the "realistic" tests consisted of firing Rumanian-made rockets at the Bradley rather than Soviet- made ones. The Army buried the fact that the Rumanian weapons had warheads far smaller than those used by the Soviets. To further insure that the Bradley appeared impregnable, the Army filled the internal fuel tanks with water rather than with diesel fuel. This guaranteed that even if the underpowered Rumanian warheads penetrated the Bradley's protective armor, no explosion would result.

[Bushranger 71]

Periodic reports by DMO detailing 'Projects of Concern' are quite worthless unless positive leadership is shown by politicians in holding to account high-ranking Defence bureaucrats and military officers who have been complicit in the origination and management of flawed hardware acquisition strategies.

The question 'Why no helo transport?' relates directly to support of defence industry being the central plank of Australian defence policy in lieu of adequate and credible combat readiness being continuously maintained. Had combat-proven in-service helicopter types been progressively optimized through manufacturer programs instead of hugely costly projects (Seasprite, Tiger, MRH90) being generated to materially benefit the major international arms peddlers who now largely parent Australian defence industry, the ADF would now have more cost-effective operational capacity.

Perhaps $5billion has hitherto been squandered on flawed helo projects but the architects are not being held accountable, whether they be the Defence executives who generated the acquisition strategies (like Projects Air 87 and Air 9000) and/or those within the Helicopter Systems Division of DMO responsible for project co-ordination and management.

Digressing a tad, the goal of creating 'a hardened and networked Army' as the central core of a mythical ADF Force 2030 structure is also questionable as who can predict how military engagements might be conducted 2 decades hence? Do our defence planners envisage the ADF playing Rommel across northern Australia or in other arid areas of the world rather than being more adequately equipped for operations in our regional wet tropics archipelago?

[500N]

Bushranger

Re "the ADF would now have more cost-effective operational capacity." relating to " (Seasprite, Tiger, MRH90)".

What about ANY operational capacity ?

Are any of the above are at "operational capacity" ?

[7x7]

The latest Wikileak leak has the Americans worrying about how Australia is going to pay for all the top shelf military kit it has ordered.

They're not alone in this...

It would be even nicer if it worked.

[500N]

I liked this from the same article which is what everyone has been saying.

"The cable, sent in August last year, also reveals US diplomats believe Australia should stop awarding contracts to domestic defence companies - an act that may lead to their collapse and big job losses - and procure more equipment from American companies to achieve greater value for money."

and

"However, US diplomats reported to Washington their belief that the Australian military is beset with ''ingrained problems'' involving ''poor budgeting, cost overruns and delays in delivering new equipment exacerbated by efforts to prop up local defence industries''

''While the defence white paper presents a bold force upgrade, funding is uncertain … if Defence can find the political will to reform inefficient budgeting and programming, particularly by procuring from the US rather than domestically, it will be able to achieve the needed savings to pursue its ambitious plans.'' The cable quoted a unnamed senior Treasury official saying the Defence's ''budgeting and execution is the worst in the federal government''."

[Wiley]

Whilst the American diplomat's comments may be seen as self-serving for American interests, it makes what he says no less accurate. Bushranger 71's earlier comment that we don't have a defence policy, but more a defence industry policy, is sadly true - which would be a very good thing for all concerned if such a policy was able to deliver viable, operational products on time and as cheaply as buying off the shelf from elsewhere.

Unfortunately, it doesn't, and is proving to be very, very expensive not just in monetary cost - some would say, (me among them), most unfortunately in that most precious currency of all, our soldiers' lives.

[Belgique]

Bugs hamper patrol vehicle's combat role
December 29, 2010 - 12:34AM

AAP

New British-built army patrol vehicles for Australian special forces troops are plagued with problems and have not been deployed in Afghanistan two years after they were purchased.

The federal government bought 31 of the Nary patrol vehicles for almost $50 million in August 2008 under former defence minister Joel Fitzgibbon.

They were bought without going to tender because of "operational urgency".

But Fairfax newspapers say the vehicles, named Nary after SAS Warrant Officer David Nary, who died in 2005, have electronics problems and are too heavy to be carried on cargo helicopters.

They were set to replace armoured Land Rover and Bushmaster vehicles at the beginning of 2009.

Hundreds of the same vehicles are operational in Afghanistan with the British Army.

Australia's Defence Department said the Nary's introduction was set for the second half of 2011.

But a Defence source with knowledge of the project said: "One would like to think that this is a capability that should have been (in Afghanistan) by now".

Industry sources say the Defence Materiel (Materiel) Organisation has failed to merge the British vehicles with US-designed electronics and communications used by the Australian Army.

This may affect systems for secret communications designed to prevent the enemy from listening in.

from link (http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/bugs-hamper-patrol-vehicles-combat-role-20101229-199fl.html)

[TheShadow]

Click here to find out more!
Top brass bombarded with treats
Linton Besser
December 30, 2010

EXCLUSIVE

SOME of the world's biggest weapons manufacturers and arms dealers are among companies to have wined and dined Defence executives and military officers, internal government records show.

The records shine a light on the relationship between the Defence industry's big hitters and the military, with more than 110 free dinners, lunches, theatre and football tickets given to the Defence Department's three-star personnel from a range of companies in the past three years.
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The recently retired head of the Chief Capability Development Group, Vice-Admiral Matt Tripovich, enjoyed more hospitality than any other senior official - accepting almost one-quarter of all such events taken up by senior levels of the Australian defence establishment.

Admiral Tripovich, responsible for securing cabinet approval to buy new multimillion-dollar weapon systems, benefited from 28 invitations to dinners, concerts, the theatre and rugby Tests.

And the federal government's second-most senior arms buyer, Warren King, is another prolific luncher, accepting 25 invitations from companies seeking defence contracts.

These ranged from a private dinner in July with Jim McDowell, the chief executive of BAE Systems, the world's wealthiest arms dealer, to a cocktail function hosted by the electronics group Thales at the Australian War Memorial in December 2007.

Mr King is the deputy chief executive of the Defence Materiel Organisation, and a former senior executive at Raytheon, another major arms supplier that has provided hospitality to senior Australian Defence officials.

The Vice-Chief of the Defence Force, Lieutenant-General David Hurley, accepted 24 hospitality invitations, including a ticket to a US football game given to him by the defence firm General Dynamics, two tickets to King Lear from Australian Aerospace and two tickets to My Fair Lady from Optus, which is mostly owned by the Singapore government.

This year, the Herald revealed Defence had spent more than $48 billion in the four years between 2006 and 2009, in 83,000 contracts.

In that period, Australian Aerospace, the local subsidiary of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company, BAE, Thales, Boeing and Raytheon collected a combined $7.2 billion from Australian taxpayers.

Between 2006 and 2009, Defence published more than 2000 contracts with BAE Systems, 789 with Boeing, 329 with Australian Aerospace and 106 contracts with Optus worth a combined $121 million.

Qantas provided more hospitality and gifts to senior Defence officials than any other company, including free membership to its Chairman's Lounges at major airports.

Other companies gave officials tickets to art exhibitions, meals at exclusive restaurants such as Quay in the Overseas Passenger Terminal, and a variety of cocktail parties.

The Chief of the Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, was restrained by contrast to his colleagues, accepting only a handful of invitations from the industry.

These included an invitation to the Masterpieces from Paris exhibition put on by Qantas, a BAE Systems dinner and a Boeing cocktail function at the Canberra restaurant the Boathouse by the Lake.

The hospitality declarations, released under freedom of information laws, show Admiral Tripovich is an avid sports fan. He attended 11 sporting fixtures at others' expense, including nine Brumbies rugby matches, between October 2007 and May this year, where dinner and drinks were provided by his hosts, Defence has confirmed.

He accepted six invitations from BAE Systems for dinners and concerts, 10 from Optus for dinners and theatre tickets and four lots of Brumbies tickets from LOPAC, a defence consultancy.

Raytheon, Thales, Ericsson, and Noetic are other companies to have entertained him.

The Herald does not suggest these gifts were in any way solicited. A spokeswoman said Defence maintained a strict regime to prevent conflicts of interest. When an official accepted a gift or hospitality which may be perceived as improper, this ''would be investigated and appropriate action undertaken''. Officials were not allowed to accept gifts during a tendering process or contract negotiation.

Do you know more? [email protected]

from this link (http://www.smh.com.au/national/top-brass-bombarded-with-treats-20101229-19a9m.html)

[Wiley]

Policeman co-ordinates state, federal forces
Jacqueline Maley and Dan Oakes
January 12, 2011

Deadly floods hit Queensland
Queensland's flood crisis intensifies with severe flash flooding. The Premier Anna Blight says many residents are in a 'very desperate and grim situation.'

THE Queensland Police Service, led by the Deputy Commissioner, Ian Stewart, is co-ordinating the enormous and logistically complex flood relief effort that encompasses several government agencies, the defence forces and thousands of volunteers.

Each day of the relief effort, which comes under the auspices of the government agency Emergency Management Queensland, Mr Stewart convenes several meetings of the State Management Disaster Group, to update staff and agencies of the unfolding situation.

State government departments such as health, housing, treasury and community services sit in on the meetings. At a local level, every town has a disaster management team that includes the police, emergency services and any defence force assistance. There are also about 3000 State Emergency Service volunteers working across the flood-hit areas.

The Defence Department has formed a joint taskforce, commanded by Colonel Luke Foster, to deal with the state and federal government response.

The taskforce is deploying teams from the Gallipoli Barracks at Enoggera, in Brisbane, and includes personnel from all three services, as well as reservists. The Australian Defence Force has sent extra helicopters to Queensland to aid the search and rescue effort in the area around Toowoomba.

With dozens of people still unaccounted for after the devastating flash floods, the Defence Minister, Stephen Smith, said six extra helicopters would arrive in Queensland this morning, taking the Defence contribution to 15 aircraft and almost 200 personnel.

Both Mr Smith and the Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, said yesterday that the resources of the Defence Force were at the disposal of the Queensland Premier, Anna Bligh.

''I have made it very clear to Premier Anna Bligh that any resource she needs from the Australian Defence Force will be made available to the people of Queensland to assist them during this very difficult period,'' Ms Gillard said.

The decision to send the extra helicopters was made yesterday following discussions between Mr Smith and the Chief of Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston. Already three army Black Hawk helicopters, two navy Sea King helicopters, an army Chinook helicopter, two RAAF B350 King Air planes and a RAAF C-130 Hercules are involved.

Mr Smith said two additional Black Hawks had been assigned to the operation and would be based at Amberley, as would four Kiowa light helicopters, which Mr Smith said were ''particularly well-suited for the operation and search and rescue''.(My boldface.)

One is tempted to add "...just as they are particularly well-suited - far moreso than the high tech, high cost rotary wing assets the ADF is buying - to 90% of operational Army support missions."

[Bushranger 71]

Year 2007 ADF helo operating costs per flying hour provided to ASPI by Defence were: Sea King-$23,616; Blackhawk-$20,659; Iroquois-$7,738 (due to reduced flying rate while being withdrawn from service); Kiowa-$2,865. A Hotel model Iroquois upgraded to Huey II costs about $5,000 per flying hour to operate.

Perhaps Minister for Defence Stephen Smith might now ask CDF why the Iroquois were shed when they could have been very cost-effectively upgraded to Huey II for around $2million or less per aircraft! Their track record in rescue work and aid to civil powers in Australia and offshore during 26 years of RAAF service was illustrious and they were often speedily deployed into remote areas by C-130. This invaluable capability has been foolishly forfeited by Australian defence planners.

[TBM-Legend]

might ask why the Blackhawks don't have rescue winches fitted would be a better question.

The soon to be retired Sea Kings are doing a great job. Right size for multi roles and transport of all sorts of things...

[Bushranger 71]

So why not fit the RAN Sea Kings with the proven demountable L3 AQS-18(v)-3D dipping sonar (L-3 Communications -> Products & Services -> AQS-18(V)-3 (http://www.l-3com.com/products-services/productservice.aspx?type=ps&id=736)) and make that aircraft do what it was supposed to be for initially? This sonar kit is in service worldwide on various helo types including SH-3 Sea King. Just put the compact gear down the back with the Observer/TacO (or whatever they are called these days) and a simple repeater monitor screen up front for the pilots (zero R&D necessary). Sea King should be pretty supportable for a while yet considering the numbers in service around the globe and the operating costs are about half of Seahawk ($45,317 per hour at 2007).

The next dubious merit megabuck spend will conceivably be the MH-60R/S (upwards of $2billion project cost) with operating costs perhaps higher than Seahawk and it is so stuffed full of systems and heavy that it will be virtually useless for boarding party roles. Better to consider what resources might be available from the scaling down of the British military and go for more Sea King to save the nation a lot of money.

The disastrous ADF helicopter rationalisation strategy emerged when Army Aviation headed the Helicopter Systems Division of the Defence Material Organisation. Navy now leads that outfit and has opportunity to correct some of the inferior planning and get back in the helo ASW game pretty quickly plus enhance multi-role capabilities with Sea King.

[piggybank]

Quote.

"Year 2007 ADF helo operating costs per flying hour provided to ASPI by Defence were: Sea King-$23,616; Blackhawk-$20,659; Iroquois-$7,738 (due to reduced flying rate while being withdrawn from service); Kiowa-$2,865. A Hotel model Iroquois upgraded to Huey II costs about $5,000 per flying hour to operate."

These figures look very high to me, specifically the Iroquois and Kiowa. Anyone with different figures to this. I am on a oil company network and limited time to research.

I would have thought Iroquois at thirty percent of the figure quoted, and Kiowa at 20% of the figure quoted.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi piggybank; agree the referenced operating costs seem high. They derive from the ASPI Special Report 21 (Australian Strategic Policy Institute (http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=200&pubtype=10)) which embraces some explanation of factors included by DoD Australia. Note therein a figure of $5,755 for a twin-engine Bell 412 provided by a civilian operator. The Huey II figure of $5,000 per flying hour was provided by Bell Helicopter.

Hitherto, Australian defence planners have been seemingly dismissive of aircraft operating costs, no doubt brainwashed by the reckless projected hardware acquisition expenditure endorsed by both main political parties. Comparing operating costs based on common data, multi-role capabilities, hot and high performance of various types; it becomes pretty clear which helos are the best value for money.

[piggybank]

Bushranger 71

Thanks for the clarification.

The company I work for in PNG would murder to earn money like that on helicopters. Without looking at your reference, I think my figures are closer to reality and still turn a profit.

[Andu]

Those who've pooh-hooed Bushranger 71's repeated warnings about the overly expensive purchase and hourly operating costs of the ADF's current and future helicopter fleet might be interested in this comment on the currently hot running thread about the RAF's huge cuts in aircrew and aircrew trainees.

More fundamentally though, the constant whining about accountants and bean-counters shows why we in the Services are babes in the wood in the modern world. It IS all about the money AND IT ALWAYS HAS BEEN! It is specifically because our 4-stars have failed over the last 10 years to grasp the nettle of the unaffordability of our plans that we have ended up in this crisis.Don't for one moment think it can't, or won't happen here. And is there anyone who thinks our 4 stars are any different to their Brit equivalents?

[Bushranger 71]

Hello boys and girls. Somewhat sadly, I will go a bit further than Andu; but first, have a read of this great article by Professor Henry Ergas in 'The Australian', 18Feb11: Captain Kafka running defence | The Australian (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/captain-kafka-running-defence/story-e6frg6zo-1226007806428)

In 2008/09, defence expenditure approximated around $22.4billion or 7.6 percent of federal government revenue, which was then about $295billion – forget relativity to GDP as that is just smoke and mirrors stuff.

Assuming current defence expenditure is $26.8billion, grab a calculator and project the intended compounding increases in defence expenditure at 3 percent per annum out to 2018 and then 2.2 percent to 2030. Figure just how much federal government revenue would have to increase for defence spending to represent 7.6 percent downstream, or whatever figure you prefer. The question arises whether that will be affordable without the nation being taxed into poverty.

The starry-eyed lot at the top of the defence realm have indeed evaded their responsibilities to undertake cost-effective force structures planning and military leaders will likely escape culpability due to wholesale changes in top level appointments due mid-2011. The unrealistic spendathon is of course promoted by multiple retired politicians and senior military officers now employed by the powerful multi-national arms conglomerates – just follow the people and projects trail and this aspect becomes clear.

Why do we need 46 medium lift MRH90 when 12 Chinooks would have been better or 100 JSF or 8 infantry battalions? And we certainly do not need the superfluous Ministries of Defence Material and Science & Personnel. Lots of scope for force structures rationalisation and running a lean and more efficient organisation and we can only hope that the politicians see the need for much improved oversight of defence affairs.

It seems inevitable to me that some defence cutbacks are in the offing, as has been happening elsewhere in the world. That is just economic reality.

[Like This - Do That]

BR

The $20B in efficiencies being demanded are reality enough! Lots of low hanging fruit being picked, which only succeeds in p1ssing off the operators at the coal face. Some of the things being driven in the name of cost savings make one shake one's head in disgust.

But the big c0ck ups? Has anyone been hanged for Sea Sprite? Has CA sacked anyone for the pointless WOFTAM of mid point DPCU, redundant and replaced before being issued? LCM 2000? Does the Minister do anything more than say "tut tut" and wag his finger when the Pussers can't put as much as a kayak in the oggin during one of the worst disasters in living history? Not much action when it comes to the big debacles :mad: oh no, but quietly cut ball ammo allocation, reduce access to ranges, issue fewer uniforms to recruits, reduce course panel sizes ... no worries!

[Bushranger 71]

Hi LTDT. I do feel for those serving in present economic circumstances as many military retirees have served through similar penny-pinching political cost-cutting exercises wherein the politicians and military leaders did not have the testicular fortitude to cut over-expenditure by jettisoning some flawed projects. The civvy component of Defence is now around 22,000 strong with DMO over one third of that number and recruiting prodigiously, but no freeze or cuts being heralded in that direction!

But I do not agree that $20billion in cost savings over time will be sufficient. In my view, we could have a pretty capable ADF if an affordable 7.5 percent of federal government revenue was better spent.

As TBM-Legend said earlier, 'there should be some heads on pikes'; but alas, Australia has become a land of non-accountability no matter the magnitude of cock-ups that hugely wound taxpayers. Needed at the top are 'men of steel', not political animals be they politicians, senior public servants, military chiefs who continually defend flawed judgements. They would get a whole lot more respect from the public, serving and retired military if they would just publicly admit to inappropriate decisions and propose corrective actions, even if that means cost penalties for bugging out of foundering projects.

Sadly, very glaring shortcomings in leadership.

[Andu]

From today's SMH 'Column 8', humour with a disturbingly serious message in its content.

"Australia gets Spain to build our new Armada," notes Harald Ehrlich, of shipyards unknown, “and our own Nelson is there to help with the launch. Let’s hope he is not quite as successful at sinking the fleet as his English namesake.”Earlier in this thread, the Army’s unwillingness to put their overly expensive new helicopters into high risk situations had been discussed. (Somebody commented that it would be "politically unacceptable for the ADF to lose a helicopter".)

On a far larger scale, one might ask whether the Navy will ever be willing to place such a large asset – the classic ‘all your eggs in one basket’ – as one of their new aircraft carriers/cruisers (call them what you will) into any situation where it might be at risk of being sunk.

In peacetime, for disaster relief or civil aid, once one of the new carriers gets there, (wherever ‘there’ might be), having such a large platform with state of the art comms., helicopters, landing craft and everything else on board will surely be a fantastic asset. But you don’t need to be Von Clausewitz or Sun Tsu to see that if we ever find ourselves in an even mildly shooting war, Australia would have to be extremely careful in risking all those eggs to one incoming missile, torpedo, mine, bomb or even suicide speedboat.

Just as with the helicopters, surely to God we’d have been better off with a large number of smaller, cheaper craft that could both spread the wealth and led to a less profound effect upon the whole national defence should just one of them be lost? (I'm reminded of the Argentineans keeping their lone carrier squarely in port for the whole duration of the Flaklands conflict because of the threat presented by one lone RN submarine.)

Along similar lines, do we have the fleet support vessels (and the manpower) to provide adequate protection for just one of these (in Australian terms) behemoths?

[Bushranger 71]

See this link: Type 071 Yuzhao LPD (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/yuzhao.htm)

Other sources suggest displacement tonnage (light?) between 12,000 and 14,000 tonnes with capacity for 4 'heavy lift' helos and deck/hangar manoevring systems like RAST. Maybe 4 vessels of similar design would have been more appropriate for ADF regional operations!

The Spanish/Australian LPDs have ramps and are advertised as having capacity for a 30 aircraft air wing.

Has the Canberra class been built to double hull warship specs? Just curious.

[MTOW]

ARH Tiger, I can see why you might think Andu and Bushranger are reading from the same page, (I'll put my hand up and freely admit that I am as well), but where in the world did "you must be a member of the Labor Party" come from?

Along with Bushranger 71, I think it's absolute madness for a navy of the RAN's size to commit such huge resources to one hull. One cruise missile and the RAN - and Australia - is virtually out of the whole damn shootin' match, not just the local engagement. And for that reason, I can't see the Navy or any politician in future risking Canberra or her sister ships (and all the non navy personnel and equipment they'd be carrying) to even a medium risk.

What's the naval equivalent of hangar queen?

[TBM-Legend]

MTOW - Old argument re capital ships. "the carrier can be taken out by a single missile or torpedo".....

That is not an argument not to have them. Yours is an all-out war possibility. When was the last carrier sunk enemy action? Around 65 years ago.....

Remember the Falklands would have been lost without Invincible. It operated of with sub/air/surface opposition threats.

Assymetric military engagements have been the hallmark of combat operations since Korea.

[Bushranger 71]

HMAS Melbourne and Sydney both did some good work in their day with less sophisticated fixed wing aircraft embarked. But I think the big question re the Canberra class LPDs is what would be the fixed wing air structure if operated in aircraft carrier mode?

The Harriers certainly did a good job in the Falklands War, but they soon seem destined for scrap metal, including in the USMC. The F-35B version of the JSF looks pretty wobbly at this stage, if this is what Australia's defence planners had in mind when committing to the Canberra class. And the big heavy (and slow) Super Hornet may not be compatible. UCAVs maybe, but pretty futuristic at this stage.

The logical regional need for Australia is more toward several 'multi-role support ships' for logistic style purposes and the Chinese Type 071 LPD seems to be of appropriate size with suitable characteristics. According to some sources, they can produce these ships at about one third the cost of say the larger US San Antonio class. Malaysia may soon order 2 Type 071s.

The US and European arms conglomerates are now being challenged like never before.

(Apologies for the thread drift but one thing leads to another)

[Wiley]

Interesting point about the size and carrying-capability of HMAS Canberra and her sister ships. Future planners will be left with a bit of a dilemma - load 'em up and (as has been said before), put an awful lot of eggs [and we don't have a awful lot of eggs in the first place] into one basket, or send them out half empty with a lot less on board than they can fit so as to spread the risk of losing too much capability (forget enemy action; even to one single major unservicemability).

What are the chances that one or more of them will be mothballed or significantly delayed (a delayed project in the Australian defence system; now there's a novel concept) to an effort to balance the budget?

I must say that anyone who thinks we're immune from the kind of cutbacks we're currenty seeing in the UK isn't a student of history. Even if any such cutbacks are (hopefully) unlikely to be quite so deep, I really don't see how we're to avoid them with the huge and unexpected expenses acssociated with the recent rash of natural disasters to be paid for, and Defence has always been the first place the pollies look to to save a buck. The two areas that appear to be sacrosanct and don't get the knife - or at least not much of the knife - are always the same - welfare and foreign aid.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi ARH Tiger. I have to first challenge your political inference in post #154.

I voted conservatively for most of my life and was a member of the Queensland National Party for a few years, until I got some insights into what old Joh was up to (I even bought an aircraft off the old bugger). I began voting informal from 1996 onwards because of dissatisfaction re John Howard's intentions regarding defence matters and middle class welfare; and now, I am more or less apolitical because there are few in the political realm these days who can be respected.

Majority of the flawed military hardware acquisitions were generated during Howard's reign and his former Minister for Defence who jumped ship to ride the 'defence gravy train' drove the Tiger, MRH90, LPD procurements; the latter 2 being announced just a couple of days prior to calling of Election 2007. Just follow the people trail and you will find a former Army CDF also involved.

Had Army and Navy air arms been wise enough just to push for factory upgrades of Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk, Chinook, Sea King, Seahawk; both force components would be in much better shape today. Instead, the disastrous ADF helicopter rationalisation strategy, which absurdly aims for only 4 types in service, has generated huge capability gaps and wasted billions of taxpayer dollars.

'Tis rather interesting that some ASPI staffers who were complicit in drafting Rudd's Defence White Paper 2009 are now saying that the futuristic military expansion agenda therein was never going to be economically achievable. But both of the major political parties are now stalemated because they said 'me too' regarding unrealistic unaffordable defence expenditure projections out to 2030.

In typical Canberra fashion, they will defend their flawed postures until economic necessities compel some remedial action. More unscheduled acquisitions to offset capabilities gaps, like acquiring a UK Bay class LSD, may trigger a bipartisan political deal to diminish intended defence spending downstream so both parties can save some face. If that eventuates, then there will obviously have to be some massaging of military acquisition projects in train. The nation simply cannot afford continuation of reckless defence expenditure.

[MTOW]

ARH Tiger, yours would be a sound argument if the new mounts could actually line up for the race with a jockey that they were designed to carry on their backs.

The sad fact is, neither the grossly overpriced troop carrier nor the attack helicopter (that, judging by your user name, you seem to be overly enamoured with) can't - and don't look like being able to for some time to come.

The old faithful mounts that are now prematurely at the glue factory once could, and still could today, and a damn sight better than their replacements have demonstrated to date.

[TBM-Legend]

ADF helos.

Follow Uncle Sam

More Chinooks, Mike model Blackhawks, MH-60R and some S's for Navy.

Whoopee a proven model on time on budget.....

[Doors Off]

MTOW,
are you certain that a B206B-1 Kiowa and UH1H Gunship (with any weapons load and SLB in the back) could fly out of Kandahar (6500ft AMSL) at 40deg celsius?:confused: I am yet to read/see the glossy brochures on those figures for the trusty/rusty old steeds.

As for the Tiger I have only read Shephard press Rotorhub, Janes Defence Weekly, AirForces Monthly and a few newspaper articles. It is reported that the Tiger the ADF purchased is more capable than the French and German Tigers (it fires Hellfire Missiles 8km range :ooh:- don't see that weapon system integrated on any Hueys (classic or upgraded):(

French have been flying/fighting their Tigers out of Kandahar (6500ft AMSL) carrying a fighting fuel/weapons load for about 18 months now. There is a video on YouTube (search "French Tigers smashing Taliban") of a French Tiger firing at and killing Taliban fighters from 2150m utilising an Off Axis 30mm Cannon (don't see those on any of the old steeds either):ooh:it uses approx 30rds to kill multiple fighters in the engagement. I would suggest that it would take a lot more "pea shooter" 7.62mm rounds and firing from "I can smell their breath, oh **** their weapon range matches mine":eek: very close ranges to achieve one kill in that horrid stoney country.

I do not know about the intimacies of either the MRH (yet to be flown in an operational environment) or the Tiger. However it would appear from those reputable publications that I mentioned, that the Tiger is carrying it's jockeys into battle and doing a very fine job (they did crash one on 4/5 Feb which the internet says hit the ground at 70kts and both crew walked away, can't see a Jetranger or Huey crew surviving those kinds of impacts.:uhoh: Google "French Tiger Crash Afghanistan").

This brings us back to the thread title - are we condemning our diggers to an easy victomology? Big questions should be asked as to why the French are operating their (less capable Tigers according to the latest AirForces Monthly) Tigers in Afghanistan but Australia is not. Is it that the Australian Government is too risk averse? It is likely that a number of patrols in Afghanistan would have been less likely to be engaged if they had Tigers overhead? I know that Senator Johnson raised the need for Attack Helicopters (Tigers) and Tanks (Abrams) to be deployed to Afghanistan and was yelled down by both senior military "commanders" and the PM. Yet, the USMC deployed Abrams tanks into Helmand Province in Dec and the latest Janes Defence Weekly states that they are bringing a phenomenal success to the battlefield. Maybe Sen Johnson was correct?

I am happy to be directed to facts/figures capabilities (not glossy brochures unproven) of past systems and their flight performance capabilities, yet that would still leave the question of large Calibre Off Axis Cannon and Hellfire Missiles that they were not/are not fitted with.

I think we need to accept that the past is the past, build a bridge and get over it about Huey etc. Like a fart it is gone, at the time it had a lethal effect on those in close proximity, but now it is gone. Questioning the efficiency of the ADF/DMO whatever the Public Servants are called is without doubt a worthy cause. :ok:But the ships are being built, the Helicopters are here and it appears that the "Slow" SuperHornets are battle worthy. (I know I would rather be in a Superhornet at Mach 1.5? than a Starfighter / Mirage (lovely aircraft) at Mach 2.5-3.

Doors Off

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Doors Off... :ok:

[Bushranger 71]

Hello Doors Off. I am not with your SLB jargon and there is more emotive stuff than fact in your post #164.

There is abundant video footage of Kiowa versions being operated successfully in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A Huey II Bushranger version could hover in ground effect at maximum operating gross weight (10,500 pounds internal load) at about 12,000 feet in ISA +20C conditions. That is published performance data direct from Bell Helicopter and not from 'glossy brochures'. If you wish to compare performance of other types for IGE hover at MOGW, then you need to get their manufacturer figures for the same ISA conditions.

USMC UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey) are operating in Afghanistan and Hellfire is an optional fit, also easily adapted to Huey II; but really only justifiable for high value targets, not knocking over a few doped-up Taliban. I believe each Hellfire round costs upwards of $75,000!

The French Tigers operating out of Kandahar (6,500 feet AMSL) are restricted to 18 rockets and about 250 rounds of 30mm HE, but nothing seen publicly whether they have also had to reduce fuel loading. A Huey II Bushranger with full fuel would carry 9,000 rounds for 2 miniguns, 500 rounds of 20mm HE for 2 cannons, 3,000 rounds of 7.62mm for 4 doorguns, with refuel/rearm turnaround of 15 minutes.

Off-boresight shooting is not on for intimate close air support; just too dangerous in close quarters engagements like when the guys on the ground are brawling within cricket pitch proximity. That scenario might sometimes require a utility helo hovering over friendlies gun muzzles when they are pinned down and cannot move so you can drop ammunition right where they need it and then winch out their casualties (while the ongoing din of battle I assure you is very noisy). Gunship suppression with HE cannon is unsuited to such situations due to HE fragmentation safety distances, but accurate high density minigun suppression from fixed forward firing weaponry does the very close quarters job best, including in jungle.

Bushranger operations during the Vietnam War were conducted in a mix of jungle, swamp, wide-open rice padi, urban areas and rocky mountains; not too unlike what might be encountered in our neighbouring regional tropical archipelago. Iroquois ground-fire hit statistics were US Army 1 in 1,147 and RAAF 1 in 9,512 sorties and shoot down statistics were US Army 1 in 13,461 and RAAF 1 in 79,270 sorties (more prudent operating practices). Adequately supporting the guys on the ground in those environs meant being prepared to get eyeball to eyeball with the opposition at firing ranges from about 700 metres down to maybe 100 metres (in pressing situations) before breakaway, as the essential accuracy is not achievable with longer range shooting. Maybe those who feel a bit timid regarding close quarters gunship operations should perhaps think about another job.

You are way off track DO regarding Iroquois prang survivability. The semi-monocoque fuselage construction is strong and contains the crew pretty well when other bits might be shed. The crew sustained only minor injuries in this operational accident.

http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/37a-SASRopexPrang.jpg


But reality is, best usage will have to be figured out for Tiger, MRH90, LPD as the politicians are unlikely to flog them off to offset hugely reckless defence spending.

Project Air 87 acquired the Tiger '... to replace the capability currently represented by the Bell 206B-1 (Kiowa) and UH1-H (Iroquois) gunship helicopters with a new reconnaissance and fire support capability for the land force early in the next century.' Tiger will of course have some different attributes, but it clearly will not adequately replace either of the mentioned capabilities.

A retiring engineer/pilot colleague from fighter days has managed airworthiness oversight of the Tiger and mentions some good and deficient features. The manufacturer has apparently taken weight-saving shortcuts in airframe design leading to some weaknesses (also evident in MRH90) which will likely show up downstream.

It seems improved engines are in mind for Tiger, but whether the taxpayer gets slugged again remains to be seen. The high recoil 30mm cannon, which will pound the airframe and also has a restrictive cooling cycle, was rejected by the Germans pending development of their own low recoil weapon. I would substitute a low recoil 20mm weapon (as in the NC621 pod), also fit NC621 20mm pods and/or minigun pods (as appropriate) in lieu of rockets. The aircraft would then have more suitable firepower and essential gun redundancy, going some way toward substituting for the forfeited Bushranger gunship capability; but still not comparable with a Huey II Bushranger version for effective intimate close air support.

[MTOW]

Doors Off, where your argument fails is along the same fault line as ARH Tiger's - you talk about French Tigers doing a good job in Afghanistan.

The question to ask is why we can't get ours up and running to provide indigenous air support to our soldiers in Afghanistan. (I don't care what the US and Australian Army PR people say to Tony Abbott - saying that the US assets will always be there every time they're needed, and more importantly, when they're needed, has a rather hollow sound to it to me.)

Why does the French version work, but our "better, more capable" version of the same product doesn't? Could we look back into very recent history and ask why the New Zealand Navy's almost off the shelf Seasprites are working fine, but our "better, more capable" version, modified at our request to be a total one off and like no other Seasprite anywhere in the world, was a horribly expensive disaster that delivered NOTHING but a huge bill to the taxpayer?

[BBadanov]

The Tiger was the wrong choice.

Although AIR 87 wasn't the worse conceived and run project - "Super" Seasprite takes that prize - it continually changed scope, and ended up being for an armed recce helo. (The project had at various times also included wide area surveillance by SAR and as well as a UGS surveillance component!)

There were ample warnings that Tiger had underperforming engine problems - alarm bells should have rung that "high and hot" performance was not going to cut it. Alas, still no IOC with AAAv.

While orphans like Rooivalk and Mangusta would also have been problematic, we maybe should have overcooked it and gone for AH-64D in the name of Coalition interoperability. Failing that, a mix of AH-1Z and UH-1Y would have been better than the problems that have been foisted upon the ADF.

French Tiger ops in Afghanistan? Yes they are there, probably as a martketing ploy by the tricky Frogs. What they are tasked with, the availability, and ability to achieve the mission is a different matter.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi BBadanov; and I would add supportability in the field.

Reading 'APACHE' and other tomes, it seems there is a pretty big technical and logistic support tail for a Brit deployment of about 8 of that aircraft type in Afghanistan. US and Dutch forces would of course have parallel experience.

Presumably, Tiger would have similar overheads and considering the ADF system of outsourced maintenance, questions begged are does the contractor own all of the support gear and will their civilian employees have to be deployed to keep the birds on line?

Maybe the Tiger people can inform us re the envisaged structure of, say, a 4 aircraft detachment deployed to a remote area.

[Bushranger 71]

Some very interesting discussion on the title thread following post #6 by SASless.

It seems realization is now emerging re the differing capabilities of versatile helo gunships versus AAH. Need for lots of ammunition and multiple gun redundancy to assure staying in the fight for as long as possible.

The Australian Army religiously pursued the Hueycobra whereas the Air Force advised retaining the versatile Huey Bushranger gunship capability, which if upgraded to Huey II could have substituted 2 x NC621 20mm low recoil cannon pods with 500 rounds total of HE for 14 x 17 pound warhead rockets (see my post #164)

Roughly another 600 pounds would have been available for fire control features/defensive suites. Given outstanding hot and high performance, a Huey II Bushranger would have out-performed all other RW firepower for close air support available in Afghanistan.

Alas; AAAvn shot itself in the foot via Tony Fraser's ridiculous ADF helicopter fleet rationalization plan which sheds proven valuable capabilities.

But how can the problem be fixed to provide adequate integral utility helo and fire support for ADF elements in Afghanistan? Pretty easy really; just recover the UH-1H Iroquois not yet shed and put them through the US Huey II upgrade program, plus buy a few more if necessary via Bell from stored reserves. Funding? Less than $100million would be required for 50 aircraft which could probably be shaved from other very costly programs.

The question begged is of course would Australian political and military leaders have the fortitude to admit capabilities planning failings?

[SASless]

"However, US diplomats reported to Washington their belief that the Australian military is beset with ''ingrained problems'' involving ''poor budgeting, cost overruns and delays in delivering new equipment exacerbated by efforts to prop up local defence industries''

Now don't take offense....that comment applies to the US Military in spades!!!

I won't take the thread off target by pointing out why that is so.....as we can all come up with lots of programs, projects, aircraft, spare engines, and the like the US Military has wasted multiple Billions of Dollars upon and are still doing.

[Bushranger 71]

And; regarding profligate spending on defence worldwide, consider this article and numerous others on the same website: http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article27737.html

Pardon the slight thread drift, but a cost-effective approach to defence planning will likely eventually be forced upon Australia by emerging world economic circumstances.

We could reasonably quickly fix some capabilities gaps by just storing deficient/inappropriate hardware, shaving or killing off some problematic programs and spending more modest funding on refurbishing/optimising in-service hardware like C-130H, Sea Kings, Blackhawks and Iroquois awaiting disposal. The primary aim should be to restore/enhance some lost capabilities ASAP.

[herkman]

It is easy to sit back in your younger years, confident that you have all the answers of today, and would it not be great if that was the situation.

Bushranger deserves a little more respect than some posters seem to want to extend. Bushranger is not only a senior officer but also is a very experienced helecopter pilot in his own right.

Comes from the era of the Air Force flying and picking the helicopters, not like the garbage of today's line up. The Blackhawke was the last aircraft chosen by the RAAF and we must agree that their performance just as the UHIH was well above what we see today. He also comes from the era of crews who used to fly 1000 hours a year and I would suggest that most of today's helicopter pilots strugle to do a quarter of that.

The problem is that it is hard to impart years of doing things without actually living and doing the walk.

Yes things change over the years but the garbage that the army has bought is really not fit for purpose. The best helicopters in my and many other opinions come out of the USA, UK and Russia. Ones from Europe look nice, have lots of nice things but I suspect would not cut the mustard in today's conflicts any better than many others operating.

Perhaps you might like to consider how well your combat flying compares with Bushranger. If I were you I would suck up every comments he makes, it could save your life one day.

Best of luck to you all

Regards

Col

[SASless]

The last very well cared for UH-1H's flying for the US Army in Europe are about to be given to the Afghans.....perhaps some senior folks in Oz could try to prevail upon the US Army to divert them and fund the upgrade to Huey II's and the Australian government fund the armament and other proprietary mods.

Yes Toto....there are still Huey's flying for the US Army!

[Felix the Cat]

the garbage that the army has bought is really not fit for purpose. I think you'll find that 'the Army' wanted Mike model Black Hawks, not MRH-90.

If I were you I would suck up every comments he makes With the utmost respect to Bushranger, experience - particularly that obtained in a different environment to that being fought in now, does not mean that he has The Answer or exclusive rights to providing a point of view which is accepted without question.

Many of the people who have expressed an alternate viewpoint have equally valid points of view, based on their own experience, research and employment. There is room in this debate for differing points of view without resorting to the 'get some time up sonny' debating posture.

BR71 - I don't reckon there are any of the over-weight, single engined versions of the Kiowa (such as the ones that we have) operating in the Middle East. And whilst the Iroquois was undoubtedly a robust, much loved and respected aircraft, you cannot seriously compare the crash-worthiness of the design in comparison to modern helicopters.

Anyway, I reckon Sweden might have the right idea: Sweden in final negotiations for Black Hawk fleet (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/04/21/355863/sweden-in-final-negotiations-for-black-hawk-fleet.html)

[Bushranger 71]

Hi SASless; your post $172 very interesting. More than 200 Huey II are now in service around the world with the UH-1H factory upgrade program ongoing. That of course says they have adequate crashworthiness features for multiple military and civil operators, although apparently not Australia.

A few months back, I wrote to the Australian Minister for Defence pointing out the utility helicopter capability gap being created by disposal of UH-1H, intent to shed Blackhawk and acquisition of the medium lift MRH90 in lieu of both. A response from one of his advisors stated in part:

...The future mix of Defence helicopters delivered through this process must provide aircraft with contemporary levels of crash protection for Defence personnel...

If the supposed Iroquois deficiencies in this regard relate to seating design, then I am sure that is easily remedied and I ponder what (if anything) has been done in that respect for the UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey). Additionally, what about the Bell 412 leased by Army Aviation?

There is a hugely dominating bureaucracy in Australia that generates very restrictive workplace occupational health and safety regulations which hamper industry and business enormously, with similar effects on the military. Additionally, it has been pretty common practice within the DoD to write new military hardware requirements around features that might not exist in competitor types or others in service that are cost-effectively upgradable.

Felix; although the UH-60M is a good aircraft, it is twice as heavy and 10 times more expensive to acquire than the Huey II with more than 4 times the operating cost based on DoD figures for Year 2007. But now, the ADF is stuck with the unproven hugely costly MRH90 which is also heavy and quite unsuited in my view for utility battlefield support roles. And, the Huey II has superior hot and high performance to both types.

AAAvn shed the Iroquois Bushranger gunship capability mid-2004 so the Service Chiefs have been accepting of a close fire support capability gap ever since with Tiger being an inadequate replacement for that role in my opinion, and who knows when that type might be adequately operational!

It is thus contradictory for politicians and the Defence hierarchy to argue that we had to acquire Super Hornets because the JSF program was turning to worms and shedding of the F-111 would create a capability gap. Also acquisition of C-17 (a good move) because the C-130 fleet was being flogged with airlift capability diminishing. And short-notice purchase of a Bay Class amphibious support ship (another good move) because amphibious capability has declined.

The flawed helicopter fleet rationalization plan will leave the ADF sans any adequate light utility battlefield support capability for the foreseeable future as funding for any downstream costly replacements for Iroquois and Blackhawk will become scarce.

The simple modest cost solution is to put what remains of the ADF UH-1H fleet through the US Huey II upgrade program and acquire some more through Bell Helicopter if necessary. Shaving maybe $50-100million off other foundering programs ought to be easily achievable; but it would require DoD planners, including Service Chiefs, to admit shortcomings in the helicopter fleet rationalisation plan, which seems unlikely under the present regime.

[SASless]

There are design aspects of the UH-1 that fall far short of the UH-60 re survivability and crash worthiness. I guess there is a trade off between holding to the new standards and accepting the risks that occur when one uses less well designed equipment.

The current fighting in Afghanistan is not all that unlike the situation when the ol' Huey was in its prime. The major threat now days is not all different than when the Huey was doing its thing...RPG's, Small Arms, 7.62/.51 Caliber automatic weapons. The threat of Manpads exists but does not seem to be very prevalant now.

The Kiowa and Huey are peas in a pod as to their design dates....thus an argument against using the Huey again would also argue against using the Kiowa in my view.

Without getting into specifics....ROE's determine what weapon systems would be the proper fit.

The ol' Huey is long in the tooth...but reliable, well known, and if souped up...could still be very useful due to its low cost and ease of maintenance.

The USMC is doing just that with their new Y model. (What happens after "Z" one wonders!)

[Bushranger 71]

Perhaps my final input to this interesting thread. There are design aspects of the UH-1 that fall far short of the UH-60 re survivability and crash worthiness. I guess there is a trade off between holding to the new standards and accepting the risks that occur when one uses less well designed equipment.Much of the manufacture-generated hype re battlefield survivability and crash-worthiness emerged during the UTTAS competition and of course added appreciably to the cost of the competing airframes. Military types cannot expect to be cocooned against harm in war-fighting and defence planners ought really be focused more on cost-effectiveness in hardware acquisition. The high unit cost of some helo types and their operating costs have been more or less shrugged off by the Australian DoD, including the Service Chiefs, but there will have to be more accountability in this regard as defence expenditure is tightened - the money tree is going to be pruned. Rigorous cost-benefit analysis of all hardware projects would highlight the wisdom of enhancing proven gear in service with adequate capabilities. The current fighting in Afghanistan is not all that unlike the situation when the ol' Huey was in its prime. The major threat now days is not all different than when the Huey was doing its thing...RPG's, Small Arms, 7.62/.51 Caliber automatic weapons. The threat of Manpads exists but does not seem to be very prevalant now.Agree SASless and the coal face of combat will foreseeably always embrace close quarters engagement with pretty basic weaponry. Operating techniques are of course adapted according to the threat although MANPADS have hitherto not dominated any battlefield to the degree predicted. Stand-off weaponry like Hellfire is great stuff but very expensive and hardly justifiable for use in knocking over a few insurgents. The basic need still applies of eye-balling the opposition within gun range and being able to deliver accurate helo fire support very close to friendlies during ammunition resupplies and casualty hoisting in particular.

In finality, an attempt to crystallize the theme question: 'Why no helo transport?...'. Unquestionably, flawed defence planning in not maintaining continual adequate military preparedness through progressive optimisation of in-service assets. Shedding of capabilities and/or running down availability of various types before proposed replacements (Tiger, MRH90) have adequate operational capability is really inexcusable. Australian military leaders have been complicit in helo capability gaps emerging by endorsing the very flawed ADF helicopter fleet rationalisation plan, whereas their obligation is to ensure that adequate military preparedness is continually maintained. Exercise of command authority also requires accountability.

[Barry Bernoulli]

There are design aspects of the UH-1 that fall far short of the UH-60 re survivability and crash worthiness. I guess there is a trade off between holding to the new standards and accepting the risks that occur when one uses less well designed equipment.



I struggle a bit with this 'crashworthiness' concept when it is applied to the helo transport in isolation. Is the crashworthiness of the helo more important that the battleworthiness of the combat system as a whole? Is there any point carrying a digger to battle in a crashworthy aircraft when the price of that is him dying in battle due to insufficent airframes to support, resupply, extract or medevac him during the subsequent campaign? Or is the military only concerned with preservation of aircraft and aircrew; the poor digger being a disposable commodity in the piece in order to preserve the reputation of the transport capability?

Let's take this to the ridiculous. What if you could buy a combat body armour that was impervious to all kinetic attack at all angles, weighed absolutely nothing and allowed the wearer to become completely invisible for periods of up to three minutes; but you could only afford enough of those to equip one third of the combat troops? Would you buy it? Or would you say 'Nice to have, but let's get real and buy something that is cheap enough so that we can get it for everyone so that everyone has an equal chance of survival?'

Who is being looked after here?

[Frazzled]

okay ramblings of a half drunk man - here I'll pull to pin, throw the nade and run like hell.

We all agree the MRH90 is crap - however in defence to army, they did not pick it there is DMO, pollie's, lying europeans and a host of people who decided this is what the army needs. The only replacement for a blackhawk is a new blackhawk.

Why are our blackhawks not there - because defence in it's infinite wisdon have spent next to nothing upgrading it - still with the same engines and avioincs we bought it with. Think how many times the F/a-18 has been updated in it's lifetime. Fact of the matter they are old and do not have the performance. Can remeber going to the mary feature in timor and having to fly ractracks to burn enough fuel to fly an approach - cause we had 3 pax on board.

Blackhawk does have struts that compress at about 11G, seats which collapse with a heavy landing, an actual seat for the loadmaster - my memory of a huey was seeing he loady knealing on the floor - okay for 60's and 70's but does cut it this century (unless you're in a MRH90).

As stated earlier - buy american, fit into their spares supply network. Stop buying products with promises on paper and buy what is tried, tested and current. That's why we do not have any helo's in the MEAO as we didn't buy american. Look at the recent defence programs - C-17, F/A-18E/F quickly up and running as opposed to KC30, tiger and MRH90. Don't even go awacs - who else is using that radar?

Sorry but huey won't be bought even though it may be updated, it's associated as a backward step, just like the new cobra. They look old and pollies want shiny shiny.

More red wine please

Frazzled:ugh:

[TBM-Legend]

A TROUBLED $4 billion project to supply the army and navy with 46 multi-role helicopters has narrowly escaped the Federal Government's Defence project list of shame.

The European built MRH-90 chopper has been dogged by technical faults, including major engine problems, and delivery is 18 months behind schedule.

So far 13 machines have been accepted by Defence for testing and crew training.

The Defence Materiel Organisation conducted a so-called "gate review", or detailed investigation, of the project and recommended the chopper be kept off the "projects of concern list" - for the time being.

That list includes:

• Sustaining the Collins submarine.

• Project Vigilare command and control.

• Tactical unmanned aerial vehicles.

• Project Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft.



• High frequency radio modernisation.

• Lightweight antisubmarine torpedo.

• Anzac anti-ship missile defence.

• Medium and heavy vehicle replacement.

• Multi-role tanker aircraft

However the high frequency radio upgrade and the Vigilare command and control system are about to be removed from the list.

The MRH-90 is built by Eurocopter and assembled at the Australian Aerospace plant in Brisbane. It is made from composite material, flies further and faster than other machines and is equipped with the latest technology.

The company and Defence have agreed to a wide ranging remediation plan before another "gate review" later this year that will determine whether or not it remains off the list of shame.

The MRH-90 has suffered serious engine problems related to uneven heating and cooling which, in turn, generates a bend in the compressor shaft.

Another concern has been insufficient protection from "foreign object damage", or damage caused when materials such as stones and sand are sucked into the engine.

Other problems include windscreen cracking, a faulty guidance system over the ocean, an inadequate machinegun mount and poor electronic warfare self-protection.

"This will be a good machine, but at present it is a long way from being a battlefield helicopter," a Defence source told The Courier-Mail.

[Like This - Do That]

Senate Additional Estimates 25 Feb 09

Major Gen. Fraser: In the MRH90 program we have accepted five aircraft, and the fifth of those was the first Australian manufactured aircraft—that was last year in December. Their flying rate needs to improve to meet the milestones. The first major milestone for that is Navy’s, which is a flight at sea mid next year. For Army the milestone is an operational deployment of four aircraft the year after or potentially having an aircraft deployable capability by mid-2011.

[Like This - Do That]

Senate Additional Estimates 4 Jun 09

Major Gen. Fraser: For the MRH90 we have accepted five aircraft at this point and we are in the process of accepting the sixth aircraft. The flying rate for the first year was not up to the level that was desirable and the company has taken initiatives to improve that. We have seen those results in the last few weeks with an increased rate of effort. At this point we are on schedule to achieve the Navy initial operational capability mid next year of the first flight at sea, but we are about six months behind in the Army training at this point to achieve four aircraft, deployable capability, for mid-2011.

[TBM-Legend]

at least the Italian NH90's have proven GE engines from same stable as Blackhawk/Sea Hawk.

50% problems could have been solved there.

[Like This - Do That]

Senate Additional Estimates 23 Feb 11

CHAIR: As to the diagnostic review that Minister Smith ordered on the MRHs—correct me if I am wrong, but we have received about a dozen or 15 up there in Brisbane?
Mr Warren King (Deputy CEO DMO): Thirteen.
CHAIR: We have received 13. Minister Smith has now ordered a diagnostic review.
Mr King: That is correct.
CHAIR: We have 60-odd to receive yet. That is a very serious step that he has instituted?
Mr King: Of course.
CHAIR: Having had 13 in service for some time now.
Mr King: Yes, of course. Far be it for me to second-guess a minister, but of course it is a very necessary step. Each one of these projects are key for Australia’s defence capacity and it is always going to be a serious issue when a project is late or when the capability is not being delivered as we anticipated. I think what this allows Defence to do and then feed back to the minister obviously in a very detailed analytical way is what is the state of the project, what is the likely impact on the national capability and what are the right ways to approach that problem?
CHAIR: Have any of those 13 helicopters been signed off into full operational service?
Mr King: No, they have not.
CHAIR: Are they all a long way from being ready for that?
Mr King: I have just had the first meeting in the gate review, so I am reluctant to be definitive on that, but I can say that they are not at the final delivery baseline.
CHAIR: If they were at the final delivery baseline and the minister had ordered a diagnostic review, we would have a whole heap of problems, would we not?
Mr King: There are clearly challenges on the project and that is why the minister has directed that this diagnostic be undertaken. My obligation is to assemble all of that information in a very objective and analytical way. We will speak to the company to take their view of the position. We do not look at just the technical aspects; we look at the business relationships and the support from the parent company. Once we have looked at the project status, if you like, the capability manager puts the overlay and, in this case, it is both Chief of Army and Chief of Navy, for their take on the conclusions that are drawn on any capability and schedule impacts and how that affects them in meeting their obligations.

[Frazzled]

even sober I still think the MRH90 is a piece of ****

Frazzled:ugh:

[Bushranger 71]

Hi Frazzled; you have enticed me to re-engage re your post #178.Why are our blackhawks not there - because defence in it's infinite wisdon have spent next to nothing upgrading it - still with the same engines and avioincs we bought it with. Think how many times the F/a-18 has been updated in it's lifetime. Fact of the matter they are old and do not have the performance. Can remeber going to the mary feature in timor and having to fly ractracks to burn enough fuel to fly an approach - cause we had 3 pax on board. You are singing my song re progressive optimisation of in-service assets and it seems that Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky consider ADF Blackhawk and Seahawk assets as low time airframes by world standards. Can you please enlighten re height AMSL of the 'Mary' feature in East Timor and whether the requirement was for Blackhawk to hover IGE or OGE?Blackhawk does have struts that compress at about 11G, seats which collapse with a heavy landing, an actual seat for the loadmaster - my memory of a huey was seeing he loady knealing on the floor - okay for 60's and 70's but does cut it this century (unless you're in a MRH90).Methinks you are referring to the UH-1B/C cabin floor plan whereas the workhorse UH-1D/H fuselage has rear crew stations (with seating) that do not intrude into main cabin space and are also adaptable for deflatable auxiliary fuel bags (quad tanks) for range extension.

It seems some lessons of previous war-fighting have been shed in aircraft design regarding helo gun stations and Sikorsky and Boeing erred in my view in not modelling UTTAS competitors on the UH-1H cabin floor plan, which has been continued by Bell in the slightly stretched UH-1Y. As outlined in several threads, a utility helo has to be suited to involving directly in enemy engagements to best support the guys on the ground, which sometimes means hovering over a fire-fight for extended periods. The broadest possible fields of view and fire are highly desirable to enable defensive suppression virtually directly forward, behind and near vertically below a hovering aircraft. This requirement is achieved well with the outboard XM-23 Sub-system door-gun arrangement for the UH-1H, which was enhanced by 9SQN RAAF to incorporate a 600 round rotating ammunition bin that largely eliminated gun stoppages due to ammunition chute flexing. The spacious Huey door-gun stations allow gunners pretty unrestricted movement to operate their weapons and to more or less hang out of the aircraft as required. Inboard gun stations as for Blackhawk and larger helo types do not have comparable fields of view and fire with lessened mobility for gunners. These considerations are of course a bit academic now considering ADF helo fleet rationalisation planning.

Apparently, inboard door-gun stations for the medium lift MRH90 will significantly impede cabin space and movement, apart from whatever other deficiencies there may be with the gun mount system.

[SASless]

UH-60's can be well armed....if one cares to do so.

The only thing that holds folks back is thinking inside the box...ignoring what strangers are doing....and by being flat assed stupid!

http://www.specialoperations.com/Images_Folder/library11/mh-60lside.jpg

Sikorsky will gladly sell you off the shelf kit....proven kit....and in use by the US Army today....and up grade your "old" Blackhawks into something that roots and toots!

[hanoijane]

the outboard XM-23 Sub-system door-gun arrangement

Ask any person in Southeast Asia of a certain age what really scared them back in the day and 'that screaming gun' will be at the very very top of their list. Strange, therefore, that a similar arrangement hasn't been an integral part of the design of every troop carrying helicopter since then.

As an aside, did you ever conduct a formal study into the direction from which the significant hits were fired on downed Hueys, relative to the helicopters position when hit? If so, what did you discover?

[Bushranger 71]

Hi hanoijane and trusting that you are not that femme!

To my knowledge, the Royal Australian Air Force never studied ground-fire origins relative to Iroquois airframe orientation; but I am aware of where most battle damage was incurred on airframes and am confident that these generalisations would be pretty correct. For hovering aircraft, most hits were sustained in the hemisphere from the engine forward and from below. During forward flight, hits mostly originated from abeam. The ability of Huey door gunners to suppress virtually directly behind the aircraft probably deterred the opposition from engaging aircraft when they were exiting a scene of action or target. The image illustrates this aspect:


http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/Firing-pattern06b.jpg



The ability to see and especially hear ground-fire from a Huey usually enabled pretty swift response; more eyes and ears of a 4 man crew being very beneficial, be it a slick or gunship. This anecdote from a comprehensive US Army analysis of Vietnam War operations:

'...While many (US Army) gunship crews liked the speed, agility and hard-to-hit slender lines of the Cobra, there was another faction that preferred the old Huey gunships since the door gunners not only provided additional eyes and ears but could lay down suppressive fire to the rear of the helicopter…The debate between the two factions went on through the war.’

271 Hueycobras were lost during that campaign and maybe about half resulted from enemy action. As with other AAH, a crew of only 2 cocooned in an air-conditioned tandem cockpit have lessened visual and aural surveillance capacity than the doors open gunship versions. AAH may of course have other sensors, some of which can also be fitted to Blackhawk, Huey II, UH-1Y Venom.

[TBM-Legend]

spent some time yesterday with an old service colleague. 40 years rotary and still instructing. Tells me that the Tiger ARH helmet system that is common to the MRH90 has now been ditched in MRH90 and does not work in Tiger. No night ops/pilot headaches because of design etc//// DMO answer to pilot headaches is that they should not get headaches!!!! He also told me that Army failed to keep the mod status up on the D model Chinooks inspite of their statements otherwise.....

He was the last Huey QFI in Army by the way...

[hanoijane]

Thanks bushranger. Interesting reply.

I was taught the preferred location for AA was about 300m from the estimated LZ, positioned so you'd be directly behind inbound helicopters. Gunners were taught to aim low and the helicopter would descend into their fire. Focus was very much on hitting a full troopship. Even if you didn't bring it down, casualties in a crowded cabin were almost guaranteed.

AA in that position was pretty suicidal though. They may not have been exposed to fire from their target, but they certainly were from the accompanying gunships. It was, however, considered the optimum effective position to secure a knockdown. From what I heard it worked rather well.

In closing, I spoke with an army colleague today and asked him how he'd deal with a minigun equipped Huey-successor. His answer? "I'd trade one gun or missile crew for one helicopter, just like my father did 40 years ago." It seems harsh, but the economics of this approach are sound and appear to be well understood by your current adversaries.

[0497]

SASless
UH-60's can be well armed....if one cares to do so.


EcWFsXkdl4E

[Brian Abraham]

Iroquois ground-fire hit statistics were US Army 1 in 1,147 and RAAF 1 in 9,512 sorties and shoot down statistics were US Army 1 in 13,461 and RAAF 1 in 79,270 sorties (more prudent operating practices)So in what manner were the US Army operating practices less than prudent?

[Frazzled]

Bushranger,

Mary feature about 9,500ft AMSL from memory, approach flown was to a IGE hover I think. Below 5000ft performance no probs - used to laugh at Kiwi's with the Hueys as they had to offload either fuel or pax to get to some places where as the blackhawk took full fuel and load until it got high.

Having said that I can't remember being very limited in the C model chook when a boggie at 12Sqn - guess that's why the there are so many chooks in theatre. Shame the army hasn't kept them up to the currnet mod. Though RAAF guitly of doing the same with some of it's airframes - unless of course it's a fast jet.:*

Don't suppose we can do a "seasprite" and scap the tiger/mrh90 and just get mike blackhawks and D model apaches?? You know - off the shelf like teh C-17

Frazzled:ugh:

[TBM-Legend]

OBL raid was done with four Blackhawks and a couple of MH-47G's. :D

*I guess the Aussie MRH90's would have had to wait around another ten years to get to any level of comparable readiness.

Pox on those who bought this piece of flying dirt....:*

[Heathrow Harry]

To be blunt with only 25 million people and a small defence budget you can't hope to buy the same kit as the yanks

we (the brits) are only just starting to realise that

[Bushranger 71]

Apologies for delayed responses but at another Air Force related funeral yesterday in Canberra.

Hello again hanoijane. Just great to get opposing force perspectives in military forums. Apologies if I seemed a bit blunt in my preceding response, but I feel sure you will understand how many of us feel concerning the actions of Jane Fonda.

Your comments regarding anti-aircraft teachings of the Vietnam War era are most interesting and have triggered my memory. I now recall at least 2 instances where we were investigating some ground happenings (large explosions or whatever) and could see movement although were not being fired upon. However, as we departed the scenes of action, we were engaged by 12.7mm from our rear hemisphere detected by the crewmembers down the back who saw the big tracer balls heading our way. There is a long-standing military axiom: 'Never underestimate your enemy' and my view is that happened to significant extents during that conflict.

A possible counter of course to utility helicopters being engaged from their rear was, weather and situation permitting, climb to about 4,000 feet AGL (above 12.7mm range) and respond with 7.62mm doorguns, which can be quite lethal against personnel without overhead protection as evidenced by the success of AC-47 'Spooky' gunships during that campaign.

Hi BA; re your post # 192. The US Army doctrine of heli-borne combat assault emerged pretty early in the Vietnam War and seemed to derive from a belief in some quarters that instead of walking into combat, troops could leap from helicopters and immediately begin engaging the enemy. There are numerous accounts of instances where troops were inserted by helos directly on to enemy held objectives with consequent aircraft losses and casualties. Some of those happenings were recounted to several of us from 9SQN who flew short exchange stints with you guys at the 135th AHC.

The US Army Aviation commitment to the Vietnam War expanded quickly and enormously and in such circumstances, there had to be operating guidelines for relatively low experienced aircrew. But in my view, US Army procedures for so-called combat assault became too stereotyped allowing the opposition to predict how an operation might be conducted, as intimated by hanoijane in post # 190. Landing zone suppression by gunships for example became almost religious, but was often counter-productive in setting fire to vegetation with the stench of explosives masking signs of human activity. The better ground commanders endeavoured to select landing zones a reasonable distance from enemy occupied objectives, preferring slow and orderly forward movement with gunships loitering fully armed out of hearing range for quick response if necessary.

US Army formation flying procedures were unsound in our view being extremely tiring and potentially dangerous as evidenced by several catastrophic instances of clashing rotors. 9SQN RAAF simply adapted fighter aircraft battle formation procedures to helicopter operations enabling greater tactical flexibility, more relaxed flying, better visual situational awareness and much more effective door-gun cross-cover. The following image compares the different practices and the finger-four tactical formation depicted could be expanded to whatever aircraft separation was appropriate for weather conditions to facilitate broader dispersal and diverse ground tracking to reduce ground-fire risk. In that respect, the Air Force did apply lessons of war-fighting from previous conflicts.

http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/TroopingComparisons_640_405.jpg


Frazzled; thank you for the feedback re Blackhawk performance in East Timor. Huey II can operate IGE at about 12,000 feet AMSL at ISA +20C, fully armed with a crew of 4, full fuel and at MOGW with roughly a 2,000 pound payload of troops, however equipped. Am still trying to ascertain comparable performance for the UH-60M.

Digressing somewhat to make people aware of a brilliant work that is essential reading for those concerned about what is unfolding in defence realms around the world. See this link to 'The Pentagon Labrynth': http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/TPL_FullText_2.9.11.pdf

[cj0203]

According to an article in the latest Fourays journal, the stated withdrawal of the Blackhawk is 2012-14.

Does this seem likely?

The UH-1H was shedded in 2007 with a platform still not operational leaving a huge capability gap, so I'm wondering if it will be the same story with the Blackhawk, withdrawn with no real replacement yet ready for operational and/or frontline service?

I'm currently post Flight Screening and have Army first preference and personally would much rather be flying proven hardware (Blackhawk/Iroquois) than something all new and shiny without any real proven capability!!! May not get the chance!!!

Just my two cents

Chris

[SASless]

Bushranger,

Perhaps you forgot what a "staggered trail" formation looks like?

Those nice pretty Vee's (Vic's to some" were not used often...and then usually only in Vee's of three not five's.

Just how do you keep a Huey gunship out of sound range...and achieve timely response?

With approximatley 7,000 helicopters in South Vietnam at the peak of the War...it was said a Huey could be heard from border to sea, DMZ to Ca Mau at any time of the day or night.

Landing on an unprepped LZ with bad guys in position was a very bad choice....much worse than a fully prepped (Air, Arty, Gun Ship, Smoke Ship, and Lift Birds door guns) even if brush fires and the stench of cordite permeated the area. Least ways the Gomers were ducking and weaving while all the boom-bang was falling around their heads.

[hanoijane]

With approximatley 7,000 helicopters in South Vietnam at the peak of the War...it was said a Huey could be heard from border to sea, DMZ to Ca Mau at any time of the day or night.

or...

With approximately 3,305 Hueys destroyed in South Viet Nam during the War... it was said that Huey wreckage could be seen from border to sea, DMZ to Ca Mau at any time of day or night.

They were clearly doing something else other than just 'duckig and weaving'. Damn those pesky Gomers :)

[Peagasus]

In specific response to Shadow and 7X7, and in general support of the current "on the ground" posts, the dewy eyed RAAF notion that Air Power solves everything, so obvious in the subject comments, has been perfectly demolished in a very closely argued and researched paper"The Close Air Support Group", that I have read on the Australian Army Aviation's web site 'Fourays". Apparently written in 1993, apparently no one in the RAAF has come remotely close to refuting its conclusions. I have seen extracts on other sites around the world.
Shadow has absolutely no concept of Patrolling Operations. A R/W full of squaddies is very vunerable to, if not scarce Stingers. the ubiquitous RPG 7, almost as common as AK 47s. Then you get 10 plus KIA at one swoop. Shadow is plainly only experienced in SAS type covert reconnaisance insertions and extractions, not Air Mobile Company type mainstream operations with conventional forces, as is the case in Afghanistan. R?W is very useful, but not in the "bull in the China shop" manner proposed.
Soldiers, believe it or not can navigate cross country on compass and terrain, avoiding obvious routes (and IEDs) without the need of a Navigational Suite on the Flight Deck.
There is a now Unclassified Australian Army Doctrine Manual" Infantry Tactics, Volume IV" ( I got mine at a stall in Notting Hill a few years ago). I sugget Shadow reads it. Its pricinples are not out of date and he may just get out of a 40 year old mental rut in the process.

[Andu]

Soldiers, believe it or not can navigate cross country on compass and terrain, avoiding obvious routes (and IEDs) Hmmmm, why do I suspect that that comment will excite some possibly heated replies, particularly in regard to the terrain in Afghanistan limiting usable routes in and out of remote bases?

[Mythbuster20]

Have checked out that paper as suggested by Peagusus. Some interesting articles on that site by the Australian Army Aviation Association - they even agree that the Tiger and the MHR 90 are ill considered and the wrong choice:

Paper on Vietnam Air Power and the lack of RAAF Air Support to the Australian Task Force

Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc (http://www.fourays.org/features_2005/air_support/closeair3.htm)


Tiger critique - written in 2005 and virtually predicts what is happening now
Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc (http://www.fourays.org/features_2005/chickenhawk/chickenhawk7.htm)

[SASless]

Did anyone hang ( as by the neck...hang) for the "No Fly" policies?

How does one perform Medavac/Casavac missions without going into "un-secure" locations?

Is not the mission of all air assets, Army assets, to support troops in contact with the Enemy???????????

[Bushranger 71]

Hello SASless; re your post #198. My credentials first to support my contentions. Formerly flew fighters where formation flying is bread and butter stuff; FAC qualified, Vietnam stints in 1968, 1969, 1971 flying Hueys, appreciable C&C involvement for helo trooplifting, introduced RAAF Bushranger gunships to operational service.Perhaps you forgot what a "staggered trail" formation looks like?No; and aircraft formation can of course be adapted to suit the tactical need.Those nice pretty Vee's (Vic's to some") were not used often...and then usually only in Vee's of three not five's.Apart from some brief service with the US Army, we operated jointly with many Assault Helicopter Companies who usually fronted up with 10 slicks and 2 gunships. They almost always flew pretty tight vics of 5 between PZs and LZs; except perhaps when only smaller flights were needed.Just how do you keep a Huey gunship out of sound range...and achieve timely response?...it was said a Huey could be heard from border to sea, DMZ to Ca Mau at any time of the day or night.Nonsense on the noise bit. Unless you are strongly downwind and the Huey avoids tight 'wockering' turns, it cannot be heard if loitering at say 100 feet AGL between 5 and 10 clicks from a scene of action. At 90 knots, that equates to less than 3 minutes for timely response. Having spent time on the ground with the infanteers in jungle type terrain, you cannot hear an Iroquois approaching at low level until it is pretty close or determine from which direction, until it passes nearby.Landing on an unprepped LZ with bad guys in position was a very bad choice...much worse than a fully prepped (Air, Arty, Gun Ship, Smoke Ship, and Lift Birds door guns)Agree; but the big noise methodology masks signs of human activity and so risks blundering into defensive positions with higher casualties. The LZ preparation approach was so stereotyped it also allowed the opposition to easily figure out what was intended and react accordingly. Far better in my view for special forces (SAS) to covertly recce an LZ a bit remote from enemy locations, for the infanteers to employ their basic human activity detection skills after insertion and to have fighter-bombers or AC-130 and helo gunships loitering and/or artillery (if within range) laid on for prompt response if needed. Even in that scenario, all of the essential locations identification and clearance processes still take 2 or 3 minutes.

[Mythbuster20]

I think the "heads that rolled" was the later decision to have the Australian Army operate the battle field helicopter. Despite what some people say, RAAF rw support to 1 ATF was never what it should have been. Their insistence on remaining at Vung Tau instead of basing forward with the Task Force for example, added time to their deployment (and their sortie count...2 aircraft to and from Nui Dat each day, 4 sorties per day, 1460 sorties per year)

Even with Dustoff, they were reluctant to remain at Nui Dat overnight, the 9 Sqn support would fly out around 1600hrs, and a US Army dustoff would position at Kanga Pad over night.

Generally US Army support was superior to 9 Sqn support in every aspect. Tales of them being unreliable are fiction, and their gunnies were more than willing to jump in and support Aussie troops.

As for 9 Sqn developing their own dedicated gunships, ask the question, "why did they take so long to start developing them, and why did they re-invent the wheel?"

From memory it wasn't until 1970, only a short time before we pulled out. Again the story of a "superior product" is self made fiction. US support was always superior.

All this contributed to the decision to have Army Aviation operate these assets.

:ok:

[Bushranger 71]

In specific response to Shadow and 7X7, and in general support of the current "on the ground" posts, the dewy eyed RAAF notion that Air Power solves everything, so obvious in the subject comments, has been perfectly demolished in a very closely argued and researched paper"The Close Air Support Group", that I have read on the Australian Army Aviation's web site 'Fourays". Apparently written in 1993, apparently no one in the RAAF has come remotely close to refuting its conclusions. I have seen extracts on other sites around the world.
Pegasus, Mythbuster20, SASless; with respect, you are all succumbing to what Josef Goebbels figured out: 'If lies are told often enough, they will become the accepted truth'.

The author of the referenced paper was not an aviator but a Task Force Maintenance Area Platoon Commander at Nui Dat. The erroneous anti-RAAF bile in his paper (especially in Part 3) has been refuted by many over time; but the Australian Army Aviation Association point blank refuses to accept any countering views for publication on their website. Similarly, for another erroneous paper by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF.

Consider this statement by the author of 'The Tactical Air Support Group': 'It could be said that apart from the Caribou Squadron, RAAF involvement in Vietnam was almost inconsequential to the conduct of Australian ground operations in a war that was essentially a ground conflict.'

9SQN flew 58,768 hours during 5.5 years of Vietnam involvement in support of 1ATF and allied forces - the highest effort for any flying unit in any theatre in the entire 90 year history of the RAAF. The squadron effected 4,357 casevacs/medevacs, expended 15,562,361 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition and 29,285 x 2.75" rockets. 2SQN also operated Canberra bombers out of Phan Rang including close air support of 1ATF ground forces. Was all of that inconsequential?

I will shortly provide some references rebutting such misinformation; but meanwhile, I suggest everybody temper their comments in that regard, otherwise moderators might conceivably choose to close an interesting thread if contributions become too unsavoury.

[Mythbuster20]

I must thank Bushranger 71 for directing attention to this paper, hadn't seen it before. It makes very interesting reading.

Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc (http://www.fourays.org/features_2005/australian_experience/aust_1.htm)

What is important in this discussion is that the facts are revealed. The problem becomes that the "system" is all too willing to make out that everything was OK and always was OK with Australian Army/RAAF operations in SVN.

The lesson must remain open so that the problem never happens again, ie a unit, 9Sqn, went to a war with peacetime SOPs.

The problem remained ongoing throughout the Australian involvement, resulting in the correct decision to have Army Aviation operate the battlefield helicopter.

Why else was that decision made?

:ok:

[ozbiggles]

Well at least some of the pro army side here are admitting that they own the decisions for the MRH 90 and Tiger and the continued support of the Caribou!
But it was an interesting paper from 1992 wasn't it. I didn't see the bit about the Americans having about 200 times the number of assets the RAAF had however or the influence the 9 SQN personal would have had on the politics of how those assets were used.
Best that we just tar everyone with the same brush just to try and make a point however isn't it.

[Bushranger 71]

Hello Mythbuster20. You are way off track in your post #205.Despite what some people say, RAAF rw support to 1 ATF was never what it should have been. Their insistence on remaining at Vung Tau instead of basing forward with the Task Force for example, added time to their deployment (and their sortie count...2 aircraft to and from Nui Dat each day, 4 sorties per day, 1460 sorties per year).Basing of 9SQN at Vung Tau was for sound reasons, being co-located with the US Army supply system and enabling 24 hour maintenance activity as required. Nui Dat was only 25 kilometres or 10 minutes Huey flight time from Vung Tau. And VT received many more rocket attacks than Nui Dat because it was a worthwhile target.

I attended the 2002 Chief of Army History Conference on the Vietnam War and it was conceded at that symposium Army made 2 major planning mistakes; basing of the Task Force at Nui Dat in lieu of Vung Tau and establishment of the infamous minefield, which was an indirect cause of about half of own casualties incurred.Even with Dustoff, they were reluctant to remain at Nui Dat overnight, the 9 Sqn support would fly out around 1600hrs, and a US Army dustoff would position at Kanga Pad over night.9SQN aircrew resources were limited on initial deployment to Vietnam but after becoming established at Vung Tau, a night dustoff crew was always scheduled and later increased to 2 crews as the squadron re-equipped with Hotel model Iroquois and aircrew resources were built to full squadron strength. The US Army initially provided gunship and dustoff resources although 9SQN did the overwhelming bulk of casevacs/medevacs on the basis that the closest aircraft would do the job to get people to medical care ASAP. 9SQN unit history is replete with night casevacs/medevacs. After the Squadron had become established with 16 aircraft and fully manned, a night dustoff standby aircraft was provided at Nui Dat with back-up at Vung Tau, but a US Army dustoff aircraft also positioned during daylight hours which was ongoing support offered earlier by the US Army.Generally US Army support was superior to 9 Sqn support in every aspect. Tales of them being unreliable are fiction, and their gunnies were more than willing to jump in and support Aussie troops.A whole bunch of writings regarding the Vietnam War embrace misinformation, including some authored by so-called historians. The Bushranger gunship capability did not originate because US Army gunship support was inadequate - it was quite good in my view. The problem was availability as nearby gunship elements would often be tasked in areas 2 or 3 hours ferry time distant and vice versa. So, on occasions, gunship support might only be available from about 1000 to 1500 as many commanders preferred that their crews did not transit in darkness. That presented a perilous situation for support of SAS patrols in contact which was the main driver of 9SQN Hotel model gunship development.As for 9 Sqn developing their own dedicated gunships, ask the question, "why did they take so long to start developing them, and why did they re-invent the wheel?"...From memory it wasn't until 1970, only a short time before we pulled out. The Bravo model Huey was unsuitable for gunship operations which is why the Charlie model was introduced into US Army service and they began to be replaced in the late 1960s with the early model AH-1G Hueycobra. 9SQN began replacing Bravos with Hotel model Iroquois early in 1968 and I was appointed project officer on arrival early March for development of a unique Hotel model gunship not in service elsewhere. The project was supported by Army at HQ 1ATF and COMAFV level in Saigon. Development took 13 months and was not achievable quicker due to hardware and funding availability. Bushranger gunships entered operational service on 21 April 1969.

The Bushranger gunship version carried more ammunition than the early model Hueycobra, was arguably much better suited for the intimate close air support role and could be fully refuelled and re-armed in 10 minutes. Consider this anecdote from a comprehensive US Army study of Vietnam War operations:

'...While many (US Army) gunship crews liked the speed, agility and hard-to-hit slender lines of the Cobra, there was another faction that preferred the old Huey gunships since the door gunners not only provided additional eyes and ears but could lay down suppressive fire to the rear of the helicopter…The debate between the two factions went on through the war.’Again the story of a "superior product" is self made fiction. US support was always superior. Oh really! You should speak with the people who received Bushranger support and not rely on hearsay for your contributions in forums.

[Mythbuster20]

"Oh really! You should speak with the people who received Bushranger support and not rely on hearsay for your contributions in forums"

Bushranger 71


Suggest you speak with the former operations officer (KL) of 1 SQN, SAS 67-68 (during the hotest period TET1) about the SAS Sqns preferences for support.

Preference was US Army.

:ok:

[MTOW]

Was the paper Mythbuster20 is referring to the one penned by the novelist Mister Ea**er?

[Peagasus]

Hmm - am I the only one who thinks Bushranger, Shadow, 7X7 and MTOW seem to be written by the same person - perhaps they all went to the same creative writing class.
On the identity of the CAS paper on the Australian Army website, the guy who wrote it was an Airborne unit commander, flew observer missions in Viet with Aussie Army Aviation, has an MBA and went to Command and Sraff College - doesen't sound like a know nothing to me.
I went back to the Australian Defence Force Jounrnal and the issue that the paper appeared in was an Air Power edition, with many articles by RAAF officers - are they just as much "novelists (MTOW's term) as the author. The Chairman of the Editorial Committee was a RAAF Wing Commander?
Come clean,"Shdow, Bushranger, MTOW and 7X7", are you rerally the multiple personalities of one writer?

[hanoijane]

In terms of his comments on the general tactical use of helicopters in Viet Nam, Bushranger is essentially correct. I also agree with his comments on the type of helicopters suitable for current and likely future operations involving your country.

Sometimes you can't see the wood for the trees. Or the suitability of tin helicopters with miniguns through the glare from the carbon composite wonder-beast loaded with sensors.

And before you ask, no, I am not Bushranger, nor even a friend of his.

[Brian Abraham]

Bushranger, it would be perhaps be helpful if you could post a copy of the Department of Air Organisation Directive No. 11/66, 6 May 1966 by way of providing background - should you have a copy.

The point of contention, it seems to me, is the Directives instruction for "operations to be limited to staging areas which were relatively secure, and free from expected enemy resistance".

Was this instruction ever rescinded, or otherwise amended in any fashion? If amended, what replaced it? And I don't mean superiors turning a blind eye to what lower ranks may have been doing to get the job done. None of the "More honored in the breach than the observance".

[ozbiggles]

So you are basing your opinions of an entire organisation on a 1966 political directive?

[Bushranger 71]

Mythbuster20; you are still off track and see what I said previously. I got there during TET 1968 and 9SQN were then in the early throes of re-equipping with Hotel model Iroquois. The Squadron had no gunship capability at that time and the Bushrangers were not operationally introduced until April 1969.

To those interested; I suggest you review the title thread initiated by Brian Abraham re the paper: 'Command and Control of Battlefield Helicopters' by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF posted on the Fourays website. Last post on Page 55 of Military Aircrew threads for the last year and lots of reading there; but see my posts #7, 12, 16, 20, 31, 46 regarding the validity of the paper. 'The Tactical Air Support Group' document on the Fourays website can be similarly challenged.

Hi BA; re your request in post #213. My copy of DAOD No. 11/66 was unfortunately lost in a domestic fire. The document was never amended or rescinded as I recall and remained in the Confidential Order Book to be read by all Officers. But it was in practice just ignored and that largely came about because we had a solid nucleus of veteran pilots from WW2, Korea, Confrontation, Malaysia who saw the directive as impractical if the guys on the ground were to be given adequate support. The junior pilots soon got the message as indicated by the levels of intimate support that evolved post-1966.

[Brian Abraham]

So you are basing your opinions of an entire organisation on a 1966 political directive? Not at all. I only asked the question because the Vietnam era was raised by previous posters, and I have a lot of personal history in the era. I kicked off the RAAF/Army thread in the hope that some education on the history of the relationship between the two parties may be gained for those who are interested in history, and hopefully that those currently serving don't subject themselves to the same inter service rivalries that bedevil the deliverance of services to those in need - support for the grunt who has to hold the ground. Of course Oz is not the only country where this fight between services has gone on, the USAF/Army has had notable fights over jurisdiction and responsibilities. And we have current threads here re RAF/Army/RN.

[Mythbuster20]

Perhaps, Bushranger 71 can tell us why the decision was made to remove the battlefield helicopter from the RAAF and place them under AAAVN command?

If, after all, 9 Sqn's support was as good as he suggests, then there would have been no reason for control to be removed and 9 Sqn disbanded?

I'm sure we'd all like to hear his opinions about what the background to this decision was?

Surely those who made the decision knew what they were doing?

Or did they?

:ok:

[Bushranger 71]

Mythbuster20; you have been pointed in the direction of some enlightening reading, but like many of the bigoted fraternity, you are seemingly unwilling to shed hearsay and absorb some facts.

The basic reason the helo transfer decision eventuated was that lies were peddled by a former Army CDF and CGS, abetted by writings of Professor Paul Dibb who was the author of Defence White Paper 1987. Go read the account in post #12 of the referenced thread (19Jul10) by then Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Jake Newham.

That foolish politico-military decision has generated the helo battlefield support capabilities shortcomings evident today and cost the Australian taxpayer dearly.

[Doors Off]

Nothing like a bit of thread drift.

Brian did kick of the Army/RAAF thread which had some interesting reading. As for "Bigotry", it is the pot calling the kettle black. It is a rumour network, if you get a bit of sand in your knickers when somebody has a differing opinion then maybe, think twice before posting.

Yes, yes I know, here come the "Veteran" calls, though there is more than one conflict in the history of helicopter warfare and these "other" conflicts have their Veterans as well, whom are also very experienced Helicopter combat pilots. The non veterans, may not have had the unfortunate or fortunate experience of pure fear mixed with pure elation of combat, this does not mean that their words need to be dismissed. Most will certainly do all of us proud if the government decides to cash their cheque.

Is there a capability gap in troop lift? I guess the obvious answer to that question is yes, given the retirement of an out of life airframe and the slow introduction of another. I am quite sure that the first phase of NH90 purchase by Oz was "additional" troop lift, not a replacement for Blackhawk, I think that was phase 2 or something. Was the Uh1h seen as "Troop Lift" per se, within the Army or merely an LUH? So is there a gap? However, without doubt the lift being provided by civil contractors in the Solomon's is most certainly being done more cheaply than it would have been utilising the retired type. That really is the only theatre that the Iroquois would still be serving in. So, practically not much of a gap there.

S70's are still in service in Aus and none have departed the fleet into retirement as yet, so no gap there. I think that the overall "Deployability into a high threat environment ie: Afghanistan" troop lift really does not have a gap as yet, though on current timelines of S70 withdrawal and NH90 introduction there will be one in the future.

On getting back to the "Why no helo transport?" question, I guess that is a question for the CDF, Defence Minister and PM. Fact is though, there is "Helo transport" in Afghanistan in the guise of the 2 Chinooks. Is that enough, of course not, but there is some there. Could the S70's deploy? I guess they could, as there are other variants in theatre (upgraded uber stealth versions and classic Chevy Pickup types). Not sure of the EWSP fit/capability, maybe that could be stopping them? Or maybe just the Oz government does not see the benefit of sending 5 times the crews and airframes to provide the same "lift" capacity as two chinooks?

Do the soldiers in Afghanistan need more Helo Transport, I would suggest that the answer is definitely yes, not just Australians either. Without doubt road moves increase the exposure to IED's for the guys on the ground, but eventually they have to get out and seize the ground, which they do bloody well:D I guess by not having enough "Helo Transport" we are pretty much condemning them to an easy victimology. I am sure they would love their awesome Tigers above them as well, but there is whole separate thread on that topic.

Thanks to the guys for raising the "other" historical facts, albeit from a different and maybe not as air force friendly environment. I have read the links provided and done a bit Googling as well. Nice to hear the other side of the story, I am sure the truth is half way between the two, but without the two sides of the argument (RAAF v Army) it would just be a one sided story.

Doors Off

[emergov]

No-one should ever doubt the proud record of 9 Sqn in Vietnam, or the dedication of the crews. I certainly don't ever dispute the professionalism or motivation of any RAAF helo pilot. The various opinion pieces that have been written will always support one side or another. When someone writes a truly balanced piece, both sides will claim it vindicates their own point of view.

There is an issue that is consistently avoided by BR71 and his warrior brothers. While they all enjoyed a good and productive relationship with the units they supported at the tactical level, there was general level of dissatisfaction with the support provided by the RAAF from senior Army commanders from Vietnam onwards. It was this long-felt frustration that culminated in the decision to transfer command of all battlefield helicopters to Army, not a carefully concocted web of lies from one evil, politically motivated general.

Since then, there has been very little dissatisfaction with the levels of support provided by AAAvn to Army, because Army has always received all the support available.

I am certain that the posts to follow will assert that RAAF could have done better, and that RAAF would have avoided all of the issues which currently beset AAAvn, but the fact remains. If RAAF were operating the current inventory, Army would still be dissatisfied at some level because 'Army Support' is but one of the things that Air Forces do.

Calling it a foolish political decision, and asserting that RAAF would have magically avoided all the issues associated with our current fleet is a biased opinion. It infers that if RAAF were still operating our helos, then somehow CDG would have not selected the platforms they recommended to government, and that the RAAF would have magically kept the same number of aircraft they operated in Vietnam. In other words, it assumes that all of the strategic, political and technological changes of the last 24 years would have been cleverly avoided by the same people who have given us MRTT, King Airs, Wedgetail, HUG (10 years late), C-130J, and F-35/F-18E.

As I have said before, you can't have it both ways.

[BBadanov]

emergov: "It infers that if RAAF were still operating our helos, then somehow CDG would have not selected the platforms they recommended to government, and that the RAAF would have magically kept the same number of aircraft they operated in Vietnam."

Did CDG really recommend MRH90, or was it foisted upon Defence?

Frankly I was away from Defence from its Force Development era of the 90s (when ARH AIR 87 just kept bouncing around) until going back in there as a Resrvist in 2007 when MRH90 had been selected as the S-70A replacement. [So, nuthin' to do wiff me guv.]

I have talked before of the debacle of AIR 87, and we now have the 22 airframes I believe but still no IOC.

I believe the frogs have really taken us for a ride with MRH90, with about 13 airframes flying but..:mad:... I won't give details.

How on earth have the European air forces (or armies) accepted this into service? Configuration management is evidently non-existent. :ugh:


...and another thing, RAAF techos never treated them like trucks. It's not the diggers' fault, it is the mentality of everyone connected to AAAvn who is not aircrew.

[SASless]

The Bushranger gunship capability did not originate because US Army gunship support was inadequate - it was quite good in my view. The problem was availability as nearby gunship elements would often be tasked in areas 2 or 3 hours ferry time distant and vice versa. So, on occasions, gunship support might only be available from about 1000 to 1500 as many commanders preferred that their crews did not transit in darkness. That presented a perilous situation for support of SAS patrols in contact which was the main driver of 9SQN Hotel model gunship development.

Where were these gunships based that they could only operate from 1000-1500? Gunships did not operate in the dark? What of this thing about B Model gunships being no good?

The H Model gunship the Ozzies had seemed more a situation of wanting to arm some of your own into "gunships" and as you only had H Models and no B-C-M or AH-1G models, very few aircraft to begin with, and the in-ability to form American style aviation units that incorporated both Lift and Gun style aircraft......along came your armed H Model.

I see your situation in much simpler terms....rather than admit a structural failure by rights of having the wrong force structure and composition...and correcting that problem....the fix was to arm a few H Models. The failure was at Senior levels of command. The folks doing the fighting and bleeding were very darn good Soldiers (and Sailors too).

[emergov]

BBadanov

Tiger and MRH90 were both pretty much doctrinal post-Kinnaird capability decisions. MRH90 was considered along with Black Hawk, and Merlin. Government selected MRH90 for the additional troop lift project (AIR 9000 Ph 2), and then again for the Black Hawk and Sea King replacements (Ph 4 and 6). CDG identified the requirement, and then did the analysis required to inform the government decision for both aircraft.

I am not sure what you are saying about Army Avn maintenance. All Avn maintenance has always been conducted in accordance with RAAF tech pubs, and all Army tradesmen have been trained at the RAAF School of Tech Training since I can remember. There has never been any way that Army could maintain their aircraft differently to RAAF. It's the same tech system.

[Andu]

there was general level of dissatisfaction with the support provided by the RAAF from senior Army commanders from Vietnam onwards.You certainly got that right! I'm going to try to turn the level of bile down in what I say here, because I'm distressed at what seems to me to be the high level of anger emanating from some on the Army side.

Back to the quote: I agree that there was a general level of dissatisfaction among senior Army officers regarding RAAF helicopter (and, if we're being honest, fixed wing) support, but I don't think it was at the level of support offered, it was their (the Army officers') lack of direct control over the asset in the field.

Speak to any RAAF helicopter pilot who's ever done Army support and I guarantee that 9 out of 10 of them would be able to cite at least one instance where he, usually as a Flying Officer (1Lt equiv), quite possibly as a Pilot Officer (2Lt equiv) refused to carry out a patently ridiculous instruction from an Infantry or other non-aviation Major - which invaribly went down like the proverbial ton of bricks with the Major.

In refusing to comply with such instructions, those junior officers prevented aircraft being damaged and quite possibly, people being killed or injured.

That was what caused the high level of dissatisfaction, not the quality or amount of service on offer. They wanted junior officers who would understand the rank structure and who would obey - and that's why they wanted the helicopters operated by the Army and not the RAAF.

Secondly, many of the (some would call them) myths about the poor level of RAAF support in Vietnam stem from the early days when 9 Sqn was
(a) under equipped, (the B model simply couldn't do everything demanded of it in the high temperatures of Vietnam, and in the first few years, 9 Sqn didn't have enough of them), and
(b) the RAAF was sent to Vietnam under ridiculously limiting operating instructions that were totally unrealistic, a fact that was quickly recognised by the middle ranking and junior RAAF officers there, if not by those in Canberra. The first time that I know of that those orders were blatantly ignored was in August 1966, some five months after the squadron was deployed to Vung Tau, at the battle of Long Tan. (It was before my time; there may have been earlier instances.)

If there's an Army supporter who thinks Frank Riley or Cliff Dohle should have hung their and their crews' arses out further than they did in taking their helicopters in to do that (what turned out to be vital) ammunition resupply to D Coy's position in the appalling weather conditions they flew in that evening, I'd like to know how they think some Yank might have done it better.

I had a good friend while I was on choppers with the RAAF, the Army GLO attached to the squadron. He was of the same opinion that many Army people are, that the Yanks did it better than the RAAF. He cited an example of why he thought this was so. When his patrol needed a dustoff, the 9 Sqn aircraft said that the LZ the patrol had selected was unacceptable and told them they'd have to move to another one. The US Army dustoff did not refuse - he came in and used his main rotor to chop away the trees obstructing the LZ and quite literally cut himself a pad. Through good luck or good management (your choice which), he didn't crash his helicopter onto the waiting patrol below and he got the casualty out - and required two new main rotors, so badly did he damage his rotor.

From his point of view, as a grunt on the ground, my GLO friend couldn't see that there was anything wrong with what the American pilot did. Neither, I dare say, would some reading this. However, there lies the difference in operating cultures between the US Army and the RAAF - of the 1960s at least.

[SASless]

To be fair....the US Army had its own large share of dullards....some of which were not involved in "Aviation" and more than a few of the real duds were within Army Aviation. It does bear remembering....the Marines like their own close air support jets and pilots as compared to the Navy...or worse yet...the Air Force!

I once sat in on an all aviator safety meeting where a US Army Colonel....a rated aviator no less...suggested the cure for tail rotor strikes in Kiowa/Huey aircraft was to install rear view mirrors quite similar to those used by truckers. A senior Warrant Officer Pilot improved on that by suggesting to the Colonel we install two more mirrors on the tail stinger which would allow the Colonel to see the back of his own head in the process of clearing the tail.

The "unknowing" shall always ask for the unwise, unsafe, un-doable no matter what uniform or rank they wear!

The courage and devotion to duty shown by ALL involved in the fighting during the Long Tan battle is worthy of respect and admiration. That they had to confront such interference from Superiors and existing dictates of policy is what should be condemned.

When Brave Men are fighting and dying....the rule book does not apply! As a Soldier....one's only decision is to do whatever possible to come to the aid of those in the fight. That is what being a Soldier is all about...and should be about.

[Mythbuster20]

Let’s summarise Bushranger 71’s points. From posts in here and statements elsewhere he asserts:

1. The paper, The Tactical Air Support Group is ill conceived and riddled with inaccuracies.

The author isn’t qualified or have sufficient active service experience to write such a paper, as he was only a Lieutenant in a transport unit based at 1 ATF in 1967-68.

The fact that the author post Vietnam went on to attend staff college and in civilian life later gained an MBA from Macquarie University and held senior executive appointments in international corporations aren’t evidence or demonstrations of his capability to indulge in logical military thought processes.

The original publishers of the paper in 1993, The Australian Defence Force Journal was remiss in publishing this treatise. Bushranger 71 claims that the editorial committee was biased and didn’t have sufficient (or any) persons who’d seen active service. The head of the editorial committee who approved publication of the paper was then a RAAF Wing Commander.

2. The paper, Command and Control of Battlefield Helicopters - The Search for a Joint Approach by Wing Commander Martin Sharp (RAF) published in 1998 by the Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, is similarly flawed.

3. The decision in 1996 to allocate command of the battlefield helicopter to Australian Army Aviation, was a conspiracy perpetrated by a lying Chief of the Defence Force and Chief of the General Staff;

“The basic reason the helo transfer decision eventuated was that lies were peddled by a former Army CDF and CGS…”

Thanks for clearing that one up Bushranger 71.

:ok:

[Bushranger 71]

SASless; re your post #223.Where were these gunships based that they could only operate from 1000-1500? Gunships did not operate in the dark? What of this thing about B Model gunships being no good?Some of the US Army gunship elements that supported 1ATF pre-April 1969 were based in the IV Corps area embracing the Mekong Delta. The problem was an inefficient tasking system which we were told aimed to give a balance of experience to US Army aircrew. On one occasion while I was doing a short exchange with 135th AHC based at Blackhorse near Nui Dat (Phuoc Tuy Province), we were tasked for operations around Tay Ninh up near the Cambodian border.

http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/04-VietnamMap640x480.jpg


I did not say US Army gunships did not operate in the dark; on 2 night tasks where I led missions, they provided excellent support. But on one occasion where a LFT left us late in the day to transit home somewhere down the delta (callsigns escape me now), we were told both aircraft were found about 2 weeks later but no awareness of what happened to the crews.

The XM-16 weapon system as fitted to old Bravo models, and trialled by 9SQN, had 4 x traversible M60s beset with a lot of reliability problems. It was being replaced by the XM-23 system fitted to Charlie models incorporating 2 x traversible miniguns and that model aircraft also had an enhanced rotor system. US Army units naturally had precedence for hardware and spares support in their own supply system, so we had to barter XM-23 components for experimental adaptation of that system to Hotel models. After we had proven the Bushranger concept, the Australian government then authorised the princely sum of $94,000 for acquisition of 4 sets of hardware. The US Army gave us some crap gear which we ultimately replaced with newer stuff through conniving their supply system and also having high level representations made in Saigon. As we began receiving Hotel models early in 1968, the Bravo models were progressively returned to Australia and were utilised mainly for helicopter aircrew training and for search and rescue detachments at multiple Air Force bases.

You infer in your later post #223 that the successful development of the Hotel model Bushranger gunship was inappropriate and the Air Force should have perhaps re-organised along US Army lines. I am sure you would have trouble convincing many contributors here that would have been beneficial considering the achievements of 9SQN thoughout the whole campaign. What has always irritated the senior echelons of the Australian Army was that they wanted supporting elements under command (sort of like helicopters tied up outside tents like horses) whereas operational control was adequate and conformed with the joint doctrine existing at the time.

On a separate tack, the 9SQN effort in the Battle of Long Tan was laudable, but that was an early days microcosym of involvement in other significant actions. Hovering ammunition resupplies and coincident casevacs during enemy engagements were also not uncommon throughout the remainder of the campaign. Recorded history does not get those aspects adequately in perspective.

[Mythbuster20]

Seems B71 is being very selective in his examples.

Many times additional gun teams were allocated by the US Army, to supplement the daily LFT they based at Nui Dat. (mainly from Bein Hoa) These "opportunity" LFT's did sometimes come from "far away", but they were a "bonus" addition that we were grateful for.

They weren't the regular or main taskers that B71 likes to infer they were.

:ok:

[Bushranger 71]

Hmmm Mythbuster20; maybe you have just revealed yourself as the author of 'The Tactical Air Support Group' as featured on the AAAvn website (www.fourays.org (http://www.fourays.org/)).

I am not aware who the RAAF Wing Commander was who headed the Editorial Committee of the Australian Defence Force Journal, but that group blew their credibility by allowing publication of a paper that embraced this ridiculous assertion considering recorded history of the Vietnam War:

'It could be said that apart from the Caribou Squadron, RAAF involvement in Vietnam was almost inconsequential to the conduct of Australian ground operations in a war that was essentially a ground conflict.'

See my guidance in post #216 regarding a critique of the another paper on the AAAvn website: 'Command and Control of Battlefield Helicopters' by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF. Interestingly, I have previously sought to respond to both papers, but the Fourays Executive have point blank refused opportunity (and for others). I also offered to allow them to publish 'The Bushranger Story' which they would not allow without editing.

The misinformation regarding the RAAF helo force since inception in 1962/63 has been voluminous. Its structure was developed largely along joint planning lines with 3 utility squadrons and 1 MLH squadron created and facilities developed where preferred by Army. While all of that was happening, the most significant portion of Air Force helo activity was Army support training for a proliferation of units/sub-units all around the nation, which has seemingly much diminished since transfer of battlefield helos to Army Aviation in 1989. The ambitions of the Generals wanting helicopters under command dismantled a structure that had greatly benefited Army.

The capabilities gaps that have emerged from the flawed ADF helicopter fleet rationalisation plan (spawned within Army Aviation) would likely not have materialised had the helo transfer decision not eventuated. The Army has crapped in its own nest.

[Bushranger 71]

If you review some previous posts Mythbuster20, you will see that the gunship capability was developed within 9SQN (with support of 1ATF) due to non-availability of US Army gunships at times from wherever based, not their adequacy. On a few occasions, they did not turn up for whatever reasons.

As an interim measure, a twin door gun installation that had been developed for Bravo models was also adapted for fitment to 2 Hotel models to provide more firepower for SAS work and this system was subsequently further modified for Bushranger doorguns.

[Mythbuster20]

According to my sources, the editorial staff of the Fourays website, have not refused to allow any counter point of view to the Air Support paper to be published on their website.

They had a standing offer; Produce a well reasoned argument/paper and it will be published. No such paper was ever submitted to the Fourays website editorial staff.

As for the Bushranger story, I'm told it was never submitted to them for publication, BUT for a REVIEW. You were riding on the expectations and offer of publishing a logical counter argument to the Air Support Paper, but instead pushing your own publication, which had very little to do with the subject.

It was requested in doc format or PDF, however you (B71) refused to send it stating that it could be "plaugerised". The content had little to do with the Air Support Group paper, and as indicated was a commercial offering being sold by the author ($25)

Now if they were being asked to publish it on their website, the author would have sent it in an extractable format as requested. But, as I'm sure you will recall, only a disk version with a "locked" PDF was offered, which according to the author was "plaugerise" proof. It was never sent because the DISK was not wanted - a doc or unlocked PDF was.

As it turns out the story is some 44 pages long with almost 200 photos. Even if you had offered it for publishing on the web, it would have needed editing down in size and in a format that could be extracted to HTML And as you were then stating (in 2004?) you were sending a disk, from which you stated the PDF could not be extracted which would have prevented it from being put to the web as a PDF download.

The editor of any journal has the right to specify the conditions and format required for any article they publish, however you decided otherwise and demanded (very abusively) that it be accepted for review.

So again, selective amnesia and misinformation.

:=

[Mythbuster20]

I have to agree that "Wallaby Airlines" as we affectionately knew them, did a great job in SVN.

I can always remember one day while on VR somewhere in the province, hearing one them calling up "Luscombe, this is Lorrea Desmond in Wallaby Zero Four..."

You could set your watch on them rain or shine (no hail)

I can still hear the clatter of those radial engines...

Well done guys. :ok::ok::ok:

[Shark Zero Six]

Interesting posts. I've been a spectator for a long while and resisted making any comments.

My first comment may well be my last, however I'd suggest that Bushranger 71 should go back to Notre Dame Cathedral and resume his career as the resident bell ringer.

[Bushranger 71]

Okay Mythbuster20; you have now clearly identified yourself.

Fourays Executives were assailed by multiple former RAAF types in 2004 re 'The Tactical Air Support Group' paper appearing in Feature Articles on their website, but cannot recall any offer that a well-reasoned argument/paper in response would be automatically published. So, will try again and see if they will now publish critiques on your paper and that by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF.

The Bushranger Story is published in pdf format on CD embracing 188 images including an Image Library (of 100) with another non-saleable version excluding only that library. The story being available commercially has nought to do with it being offered to Fourays for publication among Feature Articles on their website. Like any pdf document, it is adequately reviewable via Adobe Reader yet Fourays would not accept it for review in other than word format(?). I will not allow editing of either version as they are both identified by ISBNs.

It might be interesting to see where debate goes if greater awareness is created of the 2 subject papers, so enough dialogue from me this topic.

[hanoijane]

If you guys had fought as hard in Viet Nam as you fight each other today you might have made more of an impression on your adversaries.

Just a thought.

[Mythbuster20]

No, B71, you have not made a correct ID.

But I do know him and other members of their Association.

However if you have the rebutal - seeing you stated it had been offered but rejected - you should be able to resubmit it to their website within a few hours.

To assist you, go to that website and click on contacts, they have form submits there and I'm sure they will be only to happy to receive a well reasoned argument/paper. I'd also suggest it includes references and bibliography etc to the same standard as the paper published in 1993.


Also be a good idea to resubmit the counter argument to the 'Command and Control of Battlefield Helicopters' by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF published 1998 that you've indicated you had done some time ago. Same high standard applies.

One point - the offer is/was for a logically constructed argument, (quoting that millions of 7.62 round were expended does NOT constitute a logical argument) and the words automatically published were not used. These are your words used in your post - not theirs. Their editors reserve the right to not publish if they find your paper unsuitable.


Looking forward to seeing these well reasoned and well written treatises on the web. Should only take a few hours to check them over seeing that you state that they have already been done but were rejected first time round. I'm sure you made copies.


:ok:

[Peagasus]

Went back to the Aust Army Avn site to look at the Air Support Paper to check what "bile" had been published about 9 Sqn RAAF, prompted by ANDU's comment about F/Lt Riley. Without further comment, this is what the author said:
"This one battle(sic. Long Tan) was pivotal to the survival of I ATF and, at a crucial time in its progress, RAAF support was available only because of the conscious decision of one pilot to disobey orders and that of a senior RAAF officer to both encourage and turn a blind eye to that disobedience. If Air Board orders had been followed, the RAAF would never have flown in support of the Long Tan battle.


.....the RAAF officers were aware of these orders, more so Raw, who was also the RAAF Commander, Vung Tau. D Company was facing a desperate lack of ammunition calling artillery fire almost on their position to break up enemy attacks and on the verge of being overwhelmed. Riley overheard all this from radio traffic. In spite of objections by one of his pilots on breaking Air Board directives that would risk aircraft and that they would be killed', Riley, on his initiative, offered to fly ammunition to the beleaguered infantry 'at all costs ... to support fellow Australians in difficulty', taking all responsibility as detachment commander. One other pilot, Lane, also volunteered to fly, alone if necessary. Raw immediately authorised Riley's mission, more closely aware of the dire situation of D Company and that the Iroquois was the only aircraft capable of the task. He declined to advise 9 Squadron at Vung Tau to both save time and to avoid creating a situation for Scott(9 Sqn CO) where he may 'not have been in a position to authorise it.' D Company received the ammunition resupply, delivered by Riley's two aircraft and their crews, in appalling visibility and rain, without gunship cover and into the teeth of intensive small arms fire, and the battle was saved. The delay in this ammunition arriving due to procrastination over the "legality" of the situation, however was considerable.( Ref 41 (http://www.fourays.org/features_2005/air_support/references.htm#ref41)) The analogy with Milne Bay is telling in all but one respect; Riley's airmen flew the sortie in support of D Company in spite of RAAF policy, not because of it.


To their everlasting credit, the integrity and courage of Riley, the devotion of his aircrew, the sense of duty and sagacity of Raw, all honoured the legacy of Milne Bay. All had recognised, in the furnace heat of combat, the insistent imperative of the land battle."


This is bile?

[Brian Abraham]

the 9SQN effort in the Battle of Long Tan was laudableI feel the Long Tan incident was a seminal event in destroying any long term institutional relationship between the two parties ie who should control the helo assets.

I have great sympathy for Group Captain Raw, who on the one hand was being asked to task his crews for a mission that was fraught with danger, and the instructions from their airships that the aircraft were not to be exposed to hostile action. He suggested that approval may have to be sought from Canberra. The Army commander reportedly fumed "I'm about to lose a company. What the hell's a few more choppers and a few more pilots!". The request for support then went to the Americans. Had Raw approved the task and it had ended badly it is highly likely that it would have been career ending. It is not clear to me if Raw did in the end give his imprimatur.

Whether Raw did or not seems to be immaterial, as one of the RAAF pilots, Flight Lieutenant Frank Riley, insisted he would go on his own if necessary. Flight Lieutenant Bruce Lane was of the same opinion, though copilot Flight Lieutenant Bob Grandin was less keen, and felt it was a suicide mission. Bob is reported to have said "It was insanity. I felt petrified. I tried to talk Riley out of it. Frank said shut up, stop giving me the ****s".

What is laudable is the calibre of the crews who look the bit between their teeth and did the job. What is not laudable is the position in which Raw found himself.

[Mythbuster20]

Brian Abraham is correct in what he says about Raw and those aircrew.

What B71 has ignored from the day that paper was first published is the fact that the author gave credit to the crews who flew the support mission at Long Tan, despite flawed SOPs.


"To their everlasting credit, the integrity and courage of Riley, the devotion of his aircrew, the sense of duty and sagacity of Raw, all honoured the legacy of Milne Bay. All had recognised, in the furnace heat of combat, the insistent imperative of the land battle."

[emergov]

HanoiJane:

"If you guys had fought as hard in Viet Nam as you fight each other today you might have made more of an impression on your adversaries"

Good point well made mate.

Rest assured the current generation of RW combat aviators couldn't care less about this ideological pissing contest.

[Peagasus]

Given all the comments about anti 9 Sqn bias, I went back to the Air Support paper on Australian Army website, prompted by ANDU's comment on F/Lt Riley. Without comment, here is what it says:

"This one battle (sic.Long Tan) was pivotal to the survival of I ATF and, at a crucial time in its progress, RAAF support was available only because of the conscious decision of one pilot to disobey orders and that of a senior RAAF officer to both encourage and turn a blind eye to that disobedience. If Air Board orders had been followed, the RAAF would never have flown in support of the Long Tan battle.

Both of the RAAF officers (sic. Raw & Riley) were aware of these orders, more so Raw, who was also the RAAF Commander, Vung Tau. D Company was facing a desperate lack of ammunition calling artillery fire almost on their position to break up enemy attacks and on the verge of being overwhelmed. Riley overheard all this from radio traffic. In spite of objections by one of his pilots on breaking Air Board directives that would risk aircraft and that they would be killed', Riley, on his initiative, offered to fly ammunition to the beleaguered infantry 'at all costs ... to support fellow Australians in difficulty', taking all responsibility as detachment commander. One other pilot, Lane, also volunteered to fly, alone if necessary. Raw immediately authorised Riley's mission, more closely aware of the dire situation of D Company and that the Iroquois was the only aircraft capable of the task. He declined to advise 9 Squadron at Vung Tau to both save time and to avoid creating a situation for Scott(sic. CO 9 Sqn) where he may 'not have been in a position to authorise it.' D Company received the ammunition resupply, delivered by Riley's two aircraft and their crews, in appalling visibility and rain, without gunship cover and into the teeth of intensive small arms fire, and the battle was saved. The delay in this ammunition arriving due to procrastination over the "legality" of the situation, however was considerable.(Ref 41) The analogy with Milne Bay is telling in all but one respect; Riley's airmen flew the sortie in support of D Company in spite of RAAF policy, not because of it.
To their everlasting credit, the integrity and courage of Riley, the devotion of his aircrew, the sense of duty and sagacity of Raw, all honoured the legacy of Milne Bay. All had recognised, in the furnace heat of combat, the insistent imperative of the land battle"


This is bile? It brings into question the reliability of, particularly, comments by Bushranger.

[Mythbuster20]

As we've seen B71 has a way of using selective amnesia and ignoring the facts...

He's accused reputable publishers and historians of lacking credibility, being biased or being stupid. He's also claimed that a former CDF and CGS were conspiritorial liars.

Everyone is nuts, ignorrant or stupid, according to B71 - except him who he puts forward as the ultimate authority. As someone has already pointed out, he should retire to Notre Dame cathedral and resume his bell ringing career.

For those who regard it as a mere squabble between old farts, remember one thing.

If the truth is concealed and as a result history is ignored, the mistakes of history will be repeated.

One day you too may have the misfortune to see comrades die in battle because of the stupidity and ignorance of ground operations by those in command who should know better, as has been pointed out in the two papers referred to.

The Tactical Air Support Group: Original Defence Journal paper

Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc (http://www.fourays.org/features_2005/air_support/closeair.htm)


Command and Control of Battlefield Helicopters: Wing Commander Martin Sharp

Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc (http://www.fourays.org/features_2005/australian_experience/aust_1.htm)


You all be carefull out there now.


:ok:

[Peagasus]

Sorry to belabour this, but Bushranger 71 claims that the Aussie Def Force Journal Editorial Committee "blew their credibility" by publishing the Air Support Paper. Does this mean that everything else in that edition was crap, too? Interesting, as all the other articles are by RAAF officers "peddling"(to use B71's term) the primacy and overarching importance of the RAAF to the defence of Australia.
There, I knew it - all BS, as irrefuteably determined by another RAAF officer, Bushranger 71.
Quad erat demonstradum.

[Like This - Do That]

Mods, people are starting to get a bit cranky. Might it be time to close the bar before the furniture gets broken?

[Doors Off]

Just because some new points of view, that provide balance,:D are being presented with facts, does not mean that this thread should be closed.

Name calling has been going on for a while from both sides of the fence, if some can dish it out but can't take it :{ it doesn't not mean that the pissing contest should end.:} It is entertaining and educational. Great stuff

The thread title is topical, pertinent and worthy of debate.

Keep it going

[chippymick]

The awards and decorations allocated for the battle of Long Tan have been a contentious issue since 1966.

Oddly enough, given the ill feeling generated by the RAAF's initial refusal to fly the Long Tan resupply, there has never been any subsequent dispute regarding the DFC's that were earned that day.

Glorious stuff.

[Shark Zero Six]

I wonder if any here realise the relevance of what has been “discussed”, to the original subject of the thread? That is, the lack of helo support to Australian troops in Afghanistan?

Maybe I can explain.

The Australian Defence Department has created a top heavy and somewhat paranoid PR machine, devoted to spin doctoring and politically sanitising all information coming out of Afghanistan and other operational areas of Australian involvement. Some of this censoring is justifiable on grounds of operational necessity, but unfortunately this mantle tends to be used to cover anything that might reflect adversely on the ADF’s political masters, and of course any blundering within the defence department – particularly your DMO.

Part of the “spinning” has involved furthering the ANZAC legend. A common phrase that has been popularized is that the Australian Digger can “punch above his weight”. While the Australian soldier is certainly well trained, this statement may or may not be accurate.

Now before you Aussies clench your bayonets between your teeth and swim pirate-like across the Pacific in pursuit of my hide, let me explain the dangers of perpetuating such a belief.

Your politicians for generations have continually under equipped your defence forces. The reason is simple, it costs big $$$ to do it properly. There have been a litany of bad decisions in equipment acquisitions (just look at the Collins Class submarine fiasco and the Seasprite) that have drained funds.

Meanwhile those who really have taken the brunt of the action – the Australian Army – has been continually short changed.

I read about how one battalion deploying to Iraq in 2006, purchased their own webbing and how the head of your DMO admitted they’d failed the troops in the subsequent investigation (he kept his job though)

Your politicians and senior officers who should know better have relied on this mantra of “They can punch above their weight” to avoid their responsibilities by adequately equipping the ADF at all levels.

Whether the mantra is correct or not, doing this is fraught with danger. It runs counter to many of the principles of war – assuming you’re superior is underestimating your enemy and leads to disaster.

Because this belief flows through to politicians, they have tended to remain ignorant of reality. After all it’s an extension of the great Australian “she’ll be right mate” ethos.

A classic example of this has been the current situation in Afghanistan. Because you have politicians and senior officers who unfortunately remain ignorant of the lessons of history, they accept the belief – after all who’s going to dispute such an accolade?

So when your Defence Minister visits as has recently happened, and is confronted by a vast array of US weaponry lined up in revue order and when told by some cigar chomping jarhead one-star that "these are all available to support your men” he floats away with a glowing feeling that the objections and warnings being sounded by your diggers are merely the usual rumblings that the grunts of all nations are renowned for.

What politicians do not fully understand is the difference between “in support” and “under command”. They believe that all the toys on show can be instantly be thrown into the conflict to help out our favourite ally if the time comes.

This of course is far from true.

To explain further, let’s review the Battle of Long Tan, since it’s been raised already.

This will be done in Part Two, currently awaiting moderation.

[Shark Zero Six]

Part Two:

In August 1966, Delta Company, 6RAR fought one of the most remarkable battles of the Vietnam war. In the USA it was played down, General Westmoreland didn’t like having his own methodology shown up for what it was. Even the United States most decorated veteran of that war Colonel Hackworth (who later lived in Australia for a time) had been pressing for the US Army to adopt more of the Australians tactics, something Westy was very much opposed to. He was duly silenced.

The outcome of the battle is well known, 100 Aussies were up against a force that’s now known to number close to 2000 enemy, dedicated to wiping out the newly lodged Australian Force at the Nui Dat location (which was the right location for them to interdict VC activity and protect the rice growing fileds in the area, not Vung Tau as some would have us believe.)

That they survived was not only due to the bravery of the men of Delta Company, but to a combination of factors, that may be titled “operational methodology”.

A decisive factor was artillery support. Accompanying the patrol was a very capable New Zealand FOO (recently passed away) As the company moved the FOO continually updated the company’s position via radio (the old reliable, but then new PRC 25 backpack) to the artillery command post.

Remember these were the days when navigation was an art form, no GPS then, merely counting paces on a compass line and using a map.
The artillery battery – 6 x 105mm howitzers - was manned, ammunition ready. One gun was continually being laid on the FOO’s reported location plus 200 yards, a selection of rounds near the gun ready to rock and roll (smoke and H.E depending on the FOO’s call)

The other five guns could be manned and laid within less than a minute when required. So when contact was made and the artillery was needed, it arrived on the ground, when and where required. The shooting that day was vital to the outcome of the battle. The gunfire was so intense at the battery location that the gunners were in danger of being overcome by the accumulation of cordite fumes.

Also decisive was the ammunition resupply by 9 Sqn. As luck would have it two slicks were on the ground at Nui Dat having delivered a moral boosting concert group. They were in effect available to directly support the commander if needed. The following brouhaha is well document, considerable delay in the resup was caused as the “legality” of flying the mission was “sorted”. But it was done, and the crews subsequently credited as Pegasus has described in a pervious post.

No one would ever deny that the crews deserved the awards made to them that day. (however one pilot was denied an award - no doubt due to a vengeful mindset somewhere. It was an error that I think has recently been rectified by "the system")

The Australian Army had always wanted helos in direct command, however RAAF policy at the time was based on an unrealistic philosophy that was started in New Guinea during the last year of WW2 (read the Bostock Schism)

Someone has posted that the army expects helos to be available immediately (“tied up like a cavalry horse outside the tent”) This reveals unfortunately a certain amount of ignorance by that writer of military operations on the ground. It might sound like a clever analogy by said writer, but using his own cavalry axiom as an example, the cavalry doesn't park their horses miles from where they are living.

What the army (including the US Army) wants is;

Assett availability with minimal delay.

One doesn’t get this by basing aircraft 20 minutes away from the main base along with another 10 minutes overfly to target. If possible (and it was possible in Vietnam) the army wanted them based forward at Nui Dat night and day. After all the army operated a squadron of 6 recon helos and 4 fixed wing at Nui Dat. Small aircraft sure, but they maintained a very high availability rate and managed to service them at night (seems the writer of that objection hasn’t heard about hanger doors and blackout curtains)

This night servicing objection was raised by the RAAF hierarchy as just one reason why they should remain at Vung Tau.

But one thing has always puzzled me, as B71 has pointed out, Vung Tau was a target for more rocket attacks that Nui Dat. Therefore one would assume they’d welcome the relative safety of the forward base at Nui Dat. According to B71 Nui Dat was an oasis of calm by comparison.

Clean air, sunshine, good view of the mountains and the bombing strikes upon it by F-4s, smiling natives surrounding the base with Ak-47s tucked down their black pajama pants. The occassional foray against the wire and the rumble of exploding land mines. The never ending thud of out going artillery at night. (One learned to sleep with it, and awoke suddenly if there was too long a period of silence...)

What more could one want? Certainly beats that holiday resort climate of Vung Tau and the very high risk of catching battle-clap in its 2000 or so brothels and bars. Penicilin injections in the ass could be a bitch.

However I’m digressing again.

What was learned (again) was that the ground forces need assets such as gunships, slicks, artillery in direct support and under command.
In Afghanistan they rely on having the US supply these assets and often they aren’t available in the timeframe required because they are in use elsewhere. Politicians of course, know zip about the reality of the ground war and having reviewed an arsenal of toys and whizz bangs and then being told by our jarhead GI Joe clone that all these will come a’ rushin’ to your aid, go back to Australia in ignorant bliss. They can run the war - a war they elected to become involved in - on a shoestring - and use the funding instead to support their favorite causes and handouts to pressure groups who vote.

Meanwhile the troops are gagged and the defence PR machine spins on. The wounded veterans are treated abissmally.

Bushranger 71 is correct in this respect. The situation isn’t helped by the blundering stupidity of Australian Army Aviation in selecting the Tiger and the MHR 90.

Just on interoperability alone these two helos should have been disqualified. Lt Colonel Glen Duus summarised it prophetically in 2005 so for those who’d like some real insight into what appears to be jobs for the boys and even corruption within, (and there has been) go take a look on the Fourays website. It's on the home page in the Chickenhawk chronicles.

The honchos who should know better have forgotten to study or have ignored the lessons of history. They've forgotten how valuable assetts under command and in direct support are. The result is your troops are denied these valuable supporting assetts in Afghanistan because some dumb ass politician surrounded by kowtowing service chiefs believes that the line up of US toys is at their beck and call. Your service chiefs aren't prepared to rock the boat and do the right thing - as someone wrote in the beginning of this thread the loss of 20 men over the total period of engagement is a cheaper trade-off than equipping them correctly. To a politician that's a neat way round it - all they need do is shed a few crocodile tears and utter meaningless sympathy to berieved families at military funerals.

History in some aspects in now repeating itself because some people figured they were too smart to bother about the lessons of history, after all, that stuff is forty years in the past.

The result, lack of equipment - including helos.

Thanks guys

www.fourays.org\history\history_50.htm (http://www.fourays.org\history\history_50.htm)

[Brian Abraham]

No argument there Shark, and unfortunately has been so when committing to all conflicts, and not just Oz.

Though don't agree with the
After all it’s an extension of the great Australian “she’ll be right mate” ethos.I think that's a quality you'll find across the board with military folks, whatever the service, whatever the country. Doing the best they can with inadequate gear.