Pt. Cook Fatal Accident ~1990

[YoDawg]

I finished reading a document written by Steve Eather in which he mentions a RAAF pilot (Mike Birks, Vietnam vet, ex-Canberras) was killed in a aircraft accident at Pt. Cook in about 1990.

A search using google has not found anything on this event. Does anyone have any facts they can share about this accident? Aircraft type, circumstances, etc.

Thanks in advance for any info...

[Arm out the window]

I left PCK before 1990, but hazily remember hearing about a fatal in a Tiger Moth that crashed near there (something to do with how the slats were set up I think?), and perhaps a Tomahawk at some point as well? Total stabs in the dark here, but may provide some leads.

[JESSIE ELIZABETH]

On 12 December 1991, while instructing a student in a Tiger Moth , Mike experienced an engine failure after take-off resulting in the aircraft crashing. The student survived with minor injuries; however, being in the the front seat, Mike was fatally injured when the engine moved rearwards and the fuel tank ruptured.

[dostum]

The 'student' was a RAAF pilot in a staff job at PCK. I think they sufferred an EFATO and GPCAPT Birks tried to turnback, resulting in a stall. Not a good idea to try a reciprocal turnback in a low performance machine like this one. You need plenty of height and smash to pull this off.

[Arm out the window]

I remember being told, or reading somewhere, that the slats on the Tiger had been fixed in position rather than being allowed to extend or retract as airflow and pressure around the wing dictated (as they apparently should have - I don't know much about the type), which was cited as a contributing factor.
As I said, this is hazy recollection, but I did hear something along those lines.

[Captain Sand Dune]

I think they sufferred an EFATO

Pretty sure it was just a practice too.:uhoh:

[YoDawg]

Thankyou JESSIE for the information. I learned to fly at Pt. Cook so it particularly caught my attention, recently, when I read the brief comment in this Vietnam air war account that Mike had died about two decades later in an accident at Pt. Cook.

So ironic to go in such a benign aircraft as a Tiger Moth after the dangers faced on a regular basis flying Canberras in VN.

Pretty sure it was just a practice too

JESSIE sounds like she knows exactly what she's talking about and it doesn't sound like a practice.

Dostum, if you have the name of the stud would you mind PMing it to me, please?

Was GPCAPT Birks still serving then or retired with that rank?

[Chimbu chuckles]

AOTW I fly a Tiger regularly - probably some thing like 30 hrs in the last 6 months - and I can tell you the slats are little more than a stall indicating device when they are unlocked, which is virtually never. Many Tigers have the slats 'disarmed' via the expedient of being screwed down just to save the maintenance/rigging hassle, I assume.

The slats on the Tiger I fly are fully functional and I have played with them enough to realise they are useless and just leave them locked. I have had them pop out assymetrically because the locking device is typical 1920s pommy (somewhat less than utterly effective) half way around a roll/loop etc and you just don't notice from a handling perspective - eventually you look out and see one or the other deployed or the lever out of the full retracted/locked position so you pull it harder and lock the stupid things down again.

Just yesterday I was out doing circuits at YRED and did a number of glide approaches from downwind at 500' (why go higher when no one else is in the circuit) 'on the perch' (abeam the desired touchdown point) and the Tiger requires quite a steep nose low attitude/constant curve onto finals to get in with enough energy to flare and land.

The old joke is when flying a Tiger carry a half brick and if the engine fails;

1/. Throw out brick,
2/. Follow brick,
3/. Land, get out of cockpit quick and run away lest ye be hit on head by said half brick.

I have no knowledge of this accident but a Tiger Moth is one aeroplane that will NEVER get around the corner and back on the runway from an EFATO unless you've taken off into a howling headwind and were still over the runway at 400'. Some aircraft will, depending on a host of factors, but not this one.

This is one BIG reason why I turn left onto crosswind at 200' - 250' when departing - to stay within gliding range and have the aircraft pointed back towards the runway asap - a CASA dude watching me depart one day asked everyone who 'THAT' was after he watched me takeoff and turn early/depart the circuit off a 500' downwind (out of everyone else's way under the school traffic) rather than stooge out over the swamp to 500' in classic flying school fashion and then follow students around a circuit I could NEVER hope to reach the airfield from, let alone the runway, if the engine failed.

Of course everyone feigned ignorance and when I returned my batphone buzzed with SMSs 'warning' me. I was hoping the miscreant was still around so I could explain some facts of life regarding vintage aircraft but no such luck.:rolleyes:

The Tiger is a wonderful aircraft but its quite literally WW1 technology - the prototype first flew around 12 years after WW1 ended. The ailerons are just a tad better than wing warping - its very easy to understand why the old girl produced so many pilots with superior airmanship in her heyday. But its not an aeroplane to be dicked around with if an engine fails - follow all the golden rules however, and lets face it those golden rules were invented when the Tigermoth was still the common trainer, and you'll be touching down in the swamp/water/trees/whatever with so little energy to dissipate the likelihood of injury is minimal.

[Howabout]

YoDawg,

I broke bread with Birksy a long time ago. When he died he was a GPCAPT; and no doubt, destined for something further. Just a hell of a nice guy.

[runway16]

Interesting to see the Tiger on the June 3 issue of the ERSA book.

No slats visible at all.

[Arm out the window]

Thanks, Chuckles. That makes it a bit clearer. I'll go and search a bit to see if I can find where I read that info.

[tipsy2]

I believe the aircraft was SGS.

Might help with any data search.

tipsy

[prospector]

" and I can tell you the slats are little more than a stall indicating device when they are unlocked".

And when using a slat equipped DH82 for glider towing they did a lot of indicating!!.

[4Greens]

Learn to fly on the Tiger in the fifities and all circuits were flown so that a forced landing could be made from any point. Failure on take off, land straight ahead.

[dostum]

Yo Dawg,

I heard the name of the student some time ago, but its escapes me at the moment. I will find out this week. I believe GPCAPT Birks was serving at the time as the Chief of Staff at Training Command.

[ozbiggles]

May I suggest you DON'T try and contact the other pilot
It would seem to me obvious that they may not want to discuss it with anyone.
I'm sure you can find a report somewhere on it, but what makes you think anyone would want to be contacted over it?

[Centaurus]

The RAAF Museum Tiger Moth (the one that went in) had its slats permanently locked for nothing more than costs reasons. I flew several hundred hours in the RAAF as QFI on Tigers and the noise of the slats "fluttering" on short field landings plus the wind noise over the bracing wires gave students the indication that the aircraft was uncomfortably close to the stall. Slat lever unlocked was one of the vital checks for landing. I believe that most civilian owned Tiger Moths now have the slats removed to save maintenance costs. Scratch one very useful stall warning indicator.

The RAAF Point Cook fatal accident occured when the CO of the RAAF Museum was checking out another RAAF pilot who was part of the RAAF Museum complement. After a touch and go landing to the south, the Tiger Moth had climbed to about 300 feet when the instructor in the front seat closed the throttle to simulate an engine failure. There was ample space ahead to comfortably complete a forced landing but instead a turn back manoeuvre was attempted. The aircraft entered an incipient spin and crashed. The instructor in the front seat was killed but the RAAF pilot in the rear seat was only slightly hurt. He was wearing a crash helmet and the vizor was smashed when he was thrown against his straps and his face hit the padded coaming.

If the slats had been operating they would have provided a few seconds warning of the impending stall.

For many years since the Fifties, and also when the instructor did his instructors course at Central Flying School at East Sale, it was RAAF training policy to conduct a turn-back manoeuvre following an engine failure on take off, if a landing straight ahead was fraught with terrain difficulties. The turn-back manoeuvre was never taught on Tiger Moths or Wirraways during the war or post war. Then the Vampire dual trainer became part of the instructor course syllabus in the late Fifties. With the advent of Vampire training on pilot courses at Pearce and of course during instructor courses at CFS that provided the new instructors at Pearce, the powers that be introduced turn backs.

Basically, it was found that provided the Vampire reached a minimum of around 220 knots after take off there was enough energy to zoom and turn sharply back towards the departure runway. Ejection seats on those aircraft were not ground-level certified and you needed at least 300 feet to ensure a successful low level ejection.

The fact that you might be landing with a tailwind was not considered a serious event. In retrospect it was a high risk manoeuvre - but instructors at CFS enthusiastically accepted those risks as standard operating procedure. I did many practice turn backs at East Sale and most times I had to apply power to reach the airfield. The problem was that if the engine failed because of an engine seizure, the aircraft gliding characteristics were much worse than if a flame-out had occurred. Inevitably, that led to a false sense of relative security because it was not possible to effectively simulate the flying characteristics of a Vampire with an engine seizure.

The first turn back fatality happened at East Sale when a dual Vampire with two trainee instructors (but both experienced pilots) experienced an engine failure after take off and crashed short of the runway while attempting a turn back. The terrain ahead on take off was flat with fields and it would have been safer to lower the nose and take their chances landing straight ahead wheels down. As it was, both pilots were killed. With the teaching of turn backs, came the real danger of forgetting that a straight ahead landing in most cases is the safer option.

Despite this accident, CFS continued with turn back training on Vampires and in turn this was taught to students at No.1 AFTS at RAAF Base Pearce. However, solo students were not permitted to conduct practice turn backs - which confirmed the high risk nature of the manoeuvre.

CFS then introduced the turn back practice to Winjeels. Sure, it could be done with adequate height, but with the low touch down speed of a Winjeel especially into a headwind the low energy would make a straight ahead landing a safer option than ripping into a limit turn at low altitude to land downwind. The first Winjeel turn back fatality was at Point Cook. The aircraft with an instructor and student, took off on the grass strip to the south-east and at 500 feet the instructor called ATC announcing his intention to conduct a practice engine failure. Soon after, the Winjeel was seen to initiate a nose high steep turn, before entering an incipient spin. It had almost recovered when it crashed back on the airfield and burst into flames. Both pilots were unable to exit and died in the fire. I know - because I was part of the official Court of Inquiry.

Some years earlier at Townsville where I was a QFI on Lincoln aircraft, we used a Winjeel for communication flying. An experienced senior flying instructor arrived to be a flight commander on the squadron. He had been posted from CFS where he was qualified to instruct on Winjeels.

He required a dual check on the squadron Winjeel. We took off on runway 19 and on reaching 300 feet I closed the throttle to simulate engine failure, fully expecting him to lower the nose and land ahead on the ample remaining length of the runway. To my dismay and complete astonishment, he ripped the Winjeel around 180 degrees at 60 degrees angle of bank and landed in the opposite direction we had taken off from. To this day I don't know how he made it. It happened so fast I had no time to take over control and in any case, fighting to take over control would have only exacerbated the situation.

He was a senior ranking officer to me but after we stopped I remonstrated with him saying it was the most dangerous moment of my flying career. He seemed quite unconcerned and said turn backs were taught on Winjeels at Central Flying School as part of instructor training.

So, it is with this background that I have tried to explain the circumstances of the fatal accident to a senior officer at Point Cook in the Tiger Moth when he decided to "test" the competency of his experienced student by setting up a turn back from a very low altitude. Since the very first flying machine got airborne, it has always been considered good airmanship to land straight ahead following an engine failure on take off unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.

[YoDawg]

Centuarus... thankyou, that was an interesting and extremely well-written post. Streets ahead of the usual standard here at PPRUNE.

I had the turnback demonstrated to me at 1FTS but was not allowed to perform it myself. From a safe vantage point here on the ground, performing a turnback from 300ft in a Tigermoth is a frightening concept.

Your post is an illustration of many of the positive and not-so-positive aspects of FTS and CFS competencies and initiatives. The B707 accident (which killed two of my contemporaries) is another case in point.

I did not previously know ANY details of the accident which killed GPCAPT Birks. As stated in post 1, after reading an interesting account of air-warfare, my intent was merely to enquire into the nature of the accident which claimed the life of a war-veteran pilot.

Thankyou for all of the replies which have provided accurate information.

Dostum, thanks for that.

Ozbiggles, please calm down; it is not my intention to contact anyone or, indeed, to re-open any can of worms.

Ozbiggles, if you're confused, then re-read the initial post. Having spent time in the RAAF, I was interested to know the details including the stud's name in case it was someone with whom I had crossed paths over the years since.

Please do not try to make it into any more of a drama than that.

[Captain Sand Dune]

Centuarus,
Good post mate.
the instructor in the front seat closed the throttle to simulate an engine failure. Thought so:sad:
Recprocal turnbacks were never even mentioned to us as students on the
CT4A at PCK. On the Macchi at 2FTS they were flown for QFI practice only, i.e. not taught or demonstrated to students.
However when I arrived at 2FTS as a PC9 QFI I reckoned (although I wasn't aware of it at the time) the wheel had turned. During sorties with other QFIs (i.e. SCT) it was the "done" thing to simulate an engine failure at ~500FT AGL and to fly a reciprocal turnback. Quite often this involved ~60 degrees AoB and pulling to the light buffet. Bl**dy lunacy, really.
During my second tour there my take-off emergency brief had changed in that I would not attempt a reciprocal turnback below ~ 1,000FT AGL in the event of an engine failure after take-off. The M.B. Mk11 is a pretty good seat
(0 FT/60KT).
However the reciprocal turnback must have a strong allure. Have had a few junior QFIs turn up at Tamworth briefing that they would try it in the CT4B. Not with me they won't!:mad:
I don't know Mike Birks and I don't wish to speak ill of the dead, however this accident typifies the attitude of some where ego overcomes common sense.

[Arm out the window]

Good thought-provoking stuff, Centaurus and CSD.

Turnbacks can be an option in the pre-takeoff safety brief, but only in some types under some conditions.

It's possible to perform a safe reciprocal turnback in a CT4 from 800 ft or so, but only if there's 10 kt or more blowing you back towards the runway, you get the turn going quickly, very carefully watch your speed, don't pull too hard etc etc...in short, something of a party trick, where you would most probably be far better off to not even attempt it and land ahead into wind.
I bet in the real case I'd waste a good few seconds in dumbfounded disbelief before acting, by which time it would be too late to turn anyway.
The landing speed's low, it's made to land on grass, so unless there's total tiger country ahead a turnback's not sensible.
In the circuit from crosswind - certainly; you're already half-way round the turn and the possibility becomes obvious.

It becomes a trade-off when you talk about higher-performance types, though - when you have more glide potential, combined with the likelihood of rolling or flipping it on landing with fuel and oxy going up, there's certainly a good case to be made for planning to turn back with clear cut-off heights.

I don't think it's unreasonable to consider turnbacks as long as we're realistic about things like our probable reaction time, and the safe gliding turn capability of the aircraft type (things which can be explored at a safe height in the area, for example).

It's good to discuss these things, even though it's sparked off by a sad fatal accident. Respects to the poor bloke in question.

[BULLDOG 248]

I haven't instructed in a while, but didn't CASA require a demo of a 180' gliding turn to show how much height is lost in C+D lesson?????

[Delta_Foxtrot]

It was VH-SGC. I did a lot of hours in the little beast during 1987-8 including a precautionary landing on an ag strip near Yass with a suspected engine problem on the way back to Point Cook after the Canberra Air Pageant on 13 Mar 88.

I heard that Birko's accident was a slow response to an insidious simulated engine failure. I also recollect that it happened very close to 1 December.

[HarleyD]

I don't think turn back per se is the key element of this particular accident though i wouldn't be up for one in a tigershmit at any time, especially from 300' if that is correct. Having said that a practice TB is different from what any of us may do in a real engine failure situation. landing into a headwind in a tiger is a low speed affair and highly survivable regardless of the location or landing area

There are a couple of other aspects of this (or similar) accidents.

If the take off was flown from a glide approach (which I was told it was) the trim would be FNU, applying T/O power without a reset would promote a higher attitude and lower speed than usual, and even slightly lower is an issue in a low energy, high drag vehicle.

PEFATO at a low height from a low(isher) speed would be problematic unless nose lowered , immediately and dramatically, any hesitation would bleed speed and existing energy rapidly. no slats - little stall waring indication. rudder bias (fixed) would tend to yaw the aircraft with compensating opposite aileron, which stalls lower wing and pilot impulse, at nominal altitude, MAY be to not be sufficiently aggressive in the push down, and to try to maintain the wings level with aileron against rudder in what COULD be an even slightly cross controlled config.

A turn back may not have been the intention in this particular instance, regardless of what was briefed prior to flight, but could have looked like it from the ground. without a CVR impossible to say.

So: low and decaying speed, proximity of ground, falling wing, nose up trim, spring bias (against non-existant power) and you MIGHT POSSIBLY be in a very bad place that, if not immediately recognized and rectified MAY enter a spin with insufficient height for recovery. the vital need to push hard forward can be very difficult when the aircraft nose is falling (region of reversed command) already and ground is approaching and ground rush impluse is to pull.

These are possibilities, not facts, but could fit the frame.

I knew the IP, he was a top bloke, I and was at a course at Richmond the day it happened. I remember the hearing of it in a lecture room and all the pilots on the course were dumb struck. We were just discussing the elevated risk involved with un-briefed procedures and spontaneous demonstrations of flight characteristics or handling, so there was much ongoing, and i add relatively uninformed, speculation regarding the circumstances that may have surrounded such an event. Three of us on course had reasonable Tiger time.

Very many considerations surround this accident which occurred on a nice day when a couple of blokes were having a well intentioned flog around the paddock to tick some boxes in a liesurely and gentlemanly sort of way. Not in any way saying that this was any ones fault etc etc.. just that we should all have a good think and brief before any type of exercise however innocuous it may seem at first glance.

Lessons can be learned

HD

[Centaurus]

A turn back may not have been the intention in this particular instance, regardless of what was briefed prior to flight, but could have looked like it from the ground. without a CVR impossible to say.

I think you hit the nail on the head. In the Tiger Moth at 58 knots climb speed, an instant throttle closure will produce a dramatic loss of airspeed unless you immediately stuff the nose down well below the horizon. That, coupled with an aircraft well known for its strong yawing tendency unless kept in perfect balanced flight, would make it easy to enter an incipient spin (already yawing when throttle closed and high angle of attack adds up to potential danger of incipient spin).

The Winjeel accident at Point Cook as described earlier was a similar event. At the Court of Inquiry we could never prove that the intention was a turn back or whether in fact the student attempted a turn through 90 degrees (approx) to aim at a nearby beach. We did know from witness statements that the initial turn after the instructor had called he was doing a simulated engine failure, was made quite nose high and the aircraft went into the incipient spin from that position.

Some years ago I learned that a senior pilot of the RFDS and in charge of endorsements to the PC12 was reaching turn banks on the PC12. Turned out he was a former RAAF instructor. The theory was the PC12 had excellent gliding characteristics with its prop feathered and that it could safely do a turn back after take off once a certain minimum height was reached.

I know little of the PC 12 but shook my head in disbelief that after accidents that had ocurred over the years with pilots practicing turn backs and getting killed, the lessons of the past were being ignored. I dropped a line to CASA who never even bothered to reply. Ops normal....

[Arm out the window]

That's the thing though, Centaurus, it may be appropriate for some types if carefully thought through, briefed and practiced, because of the tradeoff between low glide performance/good chance of pulling off a safe paddock landing on the one hand, or good glide performance/good chance of hurting or killing yourself landing off the airfield on the other.

[HarleyD]

The address is of a document about safe ETAFO procedures and why there are many good reasons to Not turn Back
http://www.gofir.com/aviation_accident_prevention_program/docs/pdf/single_engine_failure.pdf (http://www.gofir.com/aviation_accident_prevention_program/docs/pdf/single_engine_failure.pdf)
However there are a couple of issues I would take with it. The figure 1 shows how turn radius affects the distance required for those who are not familiar with this procedure, which I hasten to add I would only advocate as a method of last resource, when you are faced with certain death ahead and maybe in the damned if you do and damned if you don’t situation:

Figure 1- Although doubling turn rate halves turn radius when attempting to turn
back to the runway, stalling speed increases dramatically.

The author then posits that the following stall speed increases would apply in such a situation which I do not agree with. Whenever teaching (or mainly demonstrating) such a procedure I strongly advocate steep bank angle and sufficient nose down to ensure a well safe speed (quite high descent rate). This will result in a significantly lower loading than the table below as you are not conducting a LEVEL turn, at least not in any (failed) single engine plane that I have ever flown and a much better view.

Bank Angle Stall Speed Increase (%)
0 deg. 49 knots 0%
35 deg. 53 knots 8%
45 deg. 59 knots 20%
60 deg. 71 knots 43%
75 deg. 97 knots 97%
Table 1-Typical chart for a four-seat single shows relation of stall speed to bank
angle.

This high descent rate is what determines the possibility of executing a turn back and the altitude required for such a procedure, when done correctly and the planets are in line. If you need about 40 – 50 seconds to lower the nose and execute the 120 degrees or so of turn required, with an average descent rate of about 1000 fpm (normal glide 600fpm) then you will be needing about 1000 feet as a practical minimum as you will have only about 1 minute from EF to LDG so this si definately not a low level option.

Turn back has so many other considerations, singular and in combination, such as terrain, structures, wind strength and direction, micro climate wind, runway /field layout/shape, approach obstructions etc. this is not something to do as a spur of the moment option, if it was not included at the pre take off brief it is most likely not a viable option to be sorting out whilst fumbling with engine and fuel levers,, flaps, trim and all that stuff.

It can work, BUT……It is a very risky alternative to the traditional option of: land ahead (45 either side) , into wind, present the vehicle at minimum energy at touchdown, it is not so important WHERE you land, rather, HOW you land, if you are in control at touch down you have quite a good chance of survival usually…….and with any tricycle aircraft with a fixed link nosewheel steering, remove feet from pedals immediately before touch down.