'No blame' Over RAF Tornado Crash [Archive]

soddim

26th Mar 2010, 23:57

I cannot let this thread pass without comment. It is inconceivable to me that our aircrew with so little experience should be so limited in allocation of training flying hours that they are expected to perform at low level in heavy operational fits safely. What have we allowed our politicians to persuade us to do?

As professionals we all should know what our maximums and minimums are. This pilot, and his experienced back seater, were hung out to dry by senior officers who should have fought harder to preserve the level of expenditure required to keep crews safe.

Ten hours per month is just enough to be dangerous in a fast jet and almost guarantees an accident if the jet is taken anywhere near its' limits in the role.

Apart from that I find it appalling that the complexity of regulations quoted in the report are so confusing. Why should the regulations be so complex? How do they expect the supervisors to cope with all the twaddle? The only part of supervision that really, really matters is to make sure that the crew authorised can safely complete the task. No regulation can substitute for that judgement but the level of complexity can sure make it difficult to sort out the wood from the trees.

Vox Populi

27th Mar 2010, 01:05

I was taken aback at reading that a full ration on an FJ squadron was 10 hours.

It would be interesting to hear from someone who's been on the F3 force over the past decade, because as far as I recall the reduction to such a mickey mouse level of flying has happened only in the last few years.

Wasn't that long ago that the ration on an FJ squadron was just over 30 hours with work up to LF and subsequent currency in that discipline a carefully supervised, somewhat painstaking affair. (Of course 40 hour rations aren't that long ago either).

I'd like to rant against senior officers who completely fail to stand up for standards, but I don't feel equipped enough...did the F3 run down make this a 'highly unusual situation'?

Awful anyway.

BlindWingy

27th Mar 2010, 09:44

When I left last year, a full 10 hour month was considered 'good' - sadly, it was only a matter of time....RIP Kenny and Nige

Jobza Guddun

27th Mar 2010, 09:50

Vox,

A contributary factor in the reduction of aircrew flying hours isn't just budgetary. In my view it's also down to poor spares support, ridiculous levels of contractoisation in maintenance, and most importantly, the reduction in engineers on the squadrons coupled with experience drain. End result our aircrew aren't getting the requisite number of hours to tick all of their boxes.

There is no question of standards being cut, but a decent number of engineers plus adequate spares provision would help to put more jets on the line thereby minimising the impact of a crew-out.

It seems to me that the business end of the RAF is striving to achieve with one hand tied behind our backs. The strong hand. Don't get me started on the increasingly civilian and jobsworth attitudes being adopted by RAF personnel on the support side...

PPRuNeUser0211

27th Mar 2010, 11:19

The lack of refresher on return from NFTC for people of Kenny's era is an interesting point. As far as I remember, the "official" word on the street at the time was that it would be pointless to refresh AD-bound students on the T1 at Valley, them having come from an aircraft with kit/hud etc and going to an aircraft with kit/hud etc.The real reason, afaik, was that 19 was packed to the rafters and they didn't have any spare capacity. I'm surprised the report implies that this policy wasn't sanctioned by the powers that be.

Whilst I don't think that the above had any real bearing on the accident, it is indicitive of a system with not enough money where corners are being cut. Let's all be sure we don't let that happen in our own areas of responsibility.

BlindWingy

27th Mar 2010, 12:23

So, it seems that the pilot achieved on average 15 hrs per month for the past year, which included a trip to the FI and a portion of his CR workup-normally these are fairly 'high' hour months in my opinion. Does anybody have any gen on how many hours he flew in the preceding few months to the accident i.e Apr, May, Jun? Apologies if I missed it in the report.

BW

MrBernoulli

27th Mar 2010, 12:59

Hamish 123,
And it looks like the clown [GB] is going to be re-elected.It is, perhaps, worth pointing out that the chump was not elected in the first place ..... :ok:

vecvechookattack

27th Mar 2010, 18:32

He was elected. He received an 18,000 majority and won 58% of the votes.

SammySu

27th Mar 2010, 18:47

The circumstances leading to this tragic accident are not a one off. Such a systemic failure is endemic throughout the RAF. Perhaps someone could submit a FOI request on hours flown per pilot in the FJ world over the 09-10FY.

Me? Frontline FJ, over 3000hrs, 09-10FY - 110hrs.

It's the JPs I feel for.

Trim Stab

27th Mar 2010, 19:04

Me? Frontline FJ. 110hrs

Do I detect an oxymoron there? Perhaps the answer lies therein.

vecvechookattack

27th Mar 2010, 19:15

Me? Frontline FJ. 110hrs.

Trim Stab - Totally agree. The answer is staring right at ya!!!!!!

Trim Stab

27th Mar 2010, 21:11

SammySu - in case you missed my drift, what FJ is "frontline"?

"Frontline" in asymmetric warfare is infantry, SH and medics.

SammySu

27th Mar 2010, 21:29

Aha, now on your wave. I mean not a training fleet. Regardless, you need more than 110hrs a year to be safe so I infer you mean ground all aviation other than SH as only they are "frontline" and so only they should be funded?
Doesn't matter what your viewpoint is about what constitutes usefullness in current op scenarios, this low a flying rate is what gets kids killed.

Golden Legspreaders

28th Mar 2010, 05:37

I was on the F3 fleet in the early naugties. I arrived on my first squadron full of enthusiasm, however 6 months later with 30 hours in my log book I was extremely frustrated and pi$$ed off. I've just been through my log book, my average over my tour was 8.5 hours a month.

I seem to remember a Jag mate was killed in the mid-late 90's when he hit the barrier on take off and currency and continuity was a major contributor factor. I guess nothing has been learned, sigh.

BEagle

28th Mar 2010, 08:13

Pure Pursuit

28th Mar 2010, 09:45

10 hours per month? Utterly shocking.

Other than the obvious tragedy of the report, I was mortified to read that Blacksmith 2 was on course to do exactly the same as Kenny & Nige. I may be reading the report incorrectly however, the fireball from Blacksmith 1 clearly forced BT2 to commence a low level abort with the selection of reheat being what saved them with approx 1 sec of room for error.

I dread to think what may have happened if the guys in BT2 had not seen the fireball.

zip29

29th Mar 2010, 00:37

This was a CFIT in clear weather. Thrust, speed, rudder input and wing sweep seemingly rendered the corner just about impossible. The #2 only squeaked it, and he had lots of experience.

I really don't think a missing form, or dual check, had much to do with it.

So, with no-one seemingly really up to speed because of lack of real currency... why was this hairy manoeuvre attempted?

I admit that I am not familiar with this bit of Scotland, and if it really is a routine bend in a valley, will happily be corrected. But that would only bring us back to the first sentence.

GB is no friend of the Armed Forces, but it is a bit of a stretch to to lay this squarely on him.

"Know your limitations" applies regardless of how many hours per month we do.

ExAdvert

29th Mar 2010, 17:03

There but for the grace of God go pretty much all of us involved in this unforgiving game at some point....

RIP Kenny & Nige

Gloria Finis.

Olly O'Leg

29th Mar 2010, 17:28

I saw the results of low flying hours amongst the Junta frequently on my last tour - knowledge of your own limitations and capabilities (and that of the aircraft you're flying) comes from time in the jet. No substitute. At this point, the guys are working VERY hard to be able to fly the aircraft competently and safely and have little hours to practice the operation of the jet (I can only speak for the FJ World here).

Gordon Brown, as the leader of our country, is at fault. Someone important, somewhere, needs to stand up and be counted.

Trim Stab

29th Mar 2010, 18:53

Gordon Brown, as the leader of our country, is at fault. Someone important, somewhere, needs to stand up and be counted.

Somehow, I very much doubt that GB is involved in the decision to limit F3 drivers to ten hours per month....

GB just sets the military budget - and has to juggle it against many other priorities.

RAF allocate their budget to their own priorities - and they obviously think that Typhoons and RAFAT are higher priorities than F3 training.

soddim

29th Mar 2010, 23:47

Whilst it is always difficult to bring the chickens home to roost at number 10, we know that our military chiefs have been openly critical of this PM's restrictions on the military budget.

The early run down of the Tornado F3 was a direct result of the increased and unprovisioned expenditure on wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The responsibility for getting our military into this expenditure can be laid firmly and justifiably at that doorstep - admittedly on his predecessor's shoulders but as Chancellor he was responsible for the miserly approach to funding those wars.

That our senior RAF officers made the particular decisions to manage within that reduced budget as they did is a matter for their conscience but the ultimate blame must lie with GB and teflon Tony.

Jackonicko

30th Mar 2010, 00:25

My how we sneered and laughed when we learned that the Russians were only logging ten to twelve hours per month in their MiG-29s in East Germany.........

wiggy

30th Mar 2010, 00:40

I had a quick look at an old logbook. In my (albeit short) time on 56(F) in the early 1980s, my average monthly total, with no allowance for Christmas, annual leave etc was 20 hours..... Factor in leave and the average was about 23 hours per month.

Just checked mine and much the same - seem to remember we got down to 15 hours a month briefly at some point in the early 80's (fuel/money crisis??)...I personally totaled just short of 1000 hrs :{ on the F4 in 5 years...and I thought that was "thin".

10 hours a month is criminal, IMHO..

Best Rgds.

Trim Stab

30th Mar 2010, 07:28

Whilst it is always difficult to bring the chickens home to roost at number 10, we know that our military chiefs have been openly critical of this PM's restrictions on the military budget.

The heads of all civil service departments have also defended their patch vigorously - that is their job. Moreover, the cuts are going to get a lot deeper after the election.

The RAF seem particularly bad at prioritising their budget. How many hours per month do the Red Arrows fly? If the RAF think the Red Arrows are a higher priority than the F3s were, then so be it - but don't blame GB!

Moreover, why did they try to string out the F3 fleet's existence? The Typhoon was operational late last year, so was there really still an operational role for the F3? If there was, did they really need to attempt to keep all the pilots current? Why didn't they halve the number of pilots immediately but give them a double ration of hours? History has shown that disbanding a squadron or ending the career of an aircraft often leads to accidents - surely somebody was managing that risk?

vecvechookattack

30th Mar 2010, 09:26

I'm not convinced we can lay the reduction on flying hours at the door of No 10. Does GB really decide which force gets to fly more hours..?

It worries me that other forces, be the FW or RW have different views on currency rates. My Force insist on a minimum of 15 hours per month....my oppos force insist of 10:30 hours every 3 months....never could quite work that one out.

It doesn't seem to be a matter of cost. It costs just as much per hour to fly a Merlin as it does a Tornado. Does the AT force also have currency cuts?

gashman

30th Mar 2010, 11:29

What makes you think that Typhoon pilots get more than the F3 lads and lasses?

Jackonicko

30th Mar 2010, 13:15

Trim Stab,

I have noticed that you seem to be very 'Brown Army' centric and woefully ill-informed when it comes to the RAF, yet at the same time, you're clearly a switched on aviator. What are you, an infanteer with a CPL?

"Why did they try to string out the F3 fleet's existence?"

UK AD, QRA, and the Falklands require five frontline AD squadrons to sustain. There are only two Typhoon squadrons. "You do the math" as our Colonial cousins might say.

"The Typhoon was operational late last year, so was there really still an operational role for the F3?"

Typhoon has been operational in the AD role since 29 June 2007. And in the A-G role since July 2008. The build up of the force has been slow, however, and the third Typhoon squadron (let alone the fourth and fifth) won't be operational until next year. There will continue to be a role for the F3 until there are sufficient Typhoons to replace it.

"If there was, did they really need to attempt to keep all the pilots current?"

Actually, F3 Squadrons have disbanded before the replacement Typhoon units are ready. The original plan was for a phased, dove-tailed withdrawal, carefully co-ordinated with the introduction of Typhoon. As any sane person would expect.

This plan has gone by the board, and as a result, there are now just three AD units - two Typhoon squadrons and a single, under-strength F3 unit. Is the latter needed? Yes, it is. And then some. Two Typhoon units are insufficient to maintain Southern QRA, the Falklands commitment, and to maintain currency in the A-G role, let alone taking over Northern QRA as well.

The intelligent question isn't why the F3 has been kept on so long, it's why have we got rid of so many of them so early?

When they replaced the SLR with the SA80, they didn't scrap every SLR the day that the first SA80 was received. When the Chieftain replaced the Centurion, Centurions served on until there were sufficient of the new tank to replace them. It really isn't rocket science.

Lima Juliet

30th Mar 2010, 19:37

Jacko - well said, Sir! :D

Uncle Ginsters

30th Mar 2010, 22:05

Does the AT force also have currency cuts?

I'm led to believe that certain elements of Lyneham have put pilots/crews into a so-called 'hibernation' for several months whereby they don't even stay current except sim currency - maybe someone could enlighten us?

The question of training and currency is very different for much of the AT world at the moment.

- Training cuts? Yes, because frames aren't available in the UK to do said training as they're either in theatre or servicing the airbridge.

- Currency cuts? Not necessarily as we're keeping current due to the high Op Tempo (on some fleets). What is suffering is currency for anything other than HERRICK tasking - are we truly globally capable or able to perform contingency ops at the moment? Some would (and have) said 'no'.:=

Back on thread though, and to tie in with post-Nimrad chat - maybe a fleet's true airworthiness is about more than the nuts and bolts that make up the airframe???

RIP Fellas.

mike rondot

31st Mar 2010, 11:10

Jacko, you know my views on flying hours quality versus quantity.

The best and most capable pilots I came across during my short spell as a driver were Swedish Air Force Viggen pilots. They were helped by the fact that their aircraft was light years ahead of anything the RAF was ever likely to get and by their operational procedures. Notwithstanding those advantages, their pilots were simply in a class of their own, despite being limited to 96 hours per year.

That's right, 8 hours per month, but virtually all of it flown in tactical training areas right on their doorsteps. But don't take my word for it; ask anyone who was lucky enough to get a back-seat ride in that fantastic airplane in Sweden. The way the Swedish Air Force operated was a model of how to get the very best from very limited resources.

I doubt that Tonka crews getting 50 hours per month droning around Iraq would have complained if they traded that for 8 hours of quality tactical training with no transit time.

Jackonicko

31st Mar 2010, 11:40

Mike,

Your modesty is typical but entirely wrong. To my certain knowledge your career as a driver was both long-ish and distinguished-ish (the latter -ish is a sop to that modesty;)) and on two types which demanded the very best. And as a painter - that garage door you did was first rate...... :}

I take your point about the quality of the Swedes, though interestingly they now fly FAR more than that, and FAR more than our chaps do, by the sound of it, talking to serving Gripen drivers.

And I take your point as to the relative value of hours amassed on different types of flying - the tragedy is that - in my very humble opinion - the F3 needs more than ten hours per month even if those hours are VERY carefully planned and structured, and I suspect that they are not.

Romeo Oscar Golf

31st Mar 2010, 12:04

quality versus quantity.

Back in the stone age, 45 Sqn Canberras ( RAF Tengah) had a boss who totally embraced the above statement. The problem in those days was trying to achieve the hours set by Command, failure often led to the Boss getting a bo***king. However he did not believe a four hour high level beacon crawl twice round Malaya was good use of assets so he said a dusk low level 4-ship with co-ord simulated target attack en route to weapons range for night bombing, high level return to carry out all the night currency stats was a far better use of two hours. He wrote routinely explaining to Command that he had again underachieved his monthly hours but had far surpassed the tactical/ weapon stats and all currency checks. He did make Air Staff.
However, back to the thread, lack of hours is only part of the story and my heart bleeds for all you guys placed in such a terrible position.
Of course the Government is to blame - it's where the buck stops- but the senior ranks have a lot to answer for. If only there were more like the Canberra Boss above.

30mRad

31st Mar 2010, 15:23

I knew Nige very well, and had a huge amount of respect for him and his professional experience in all aviation fields. I did not know the crew in BS2 or Kenny.

The crux of the issue is definitely currency and competency in that environment and fit. Compare the Mach Loop in Wales and the valley they flew down. I have flown the loop in a GR4 in small and big jugs and it is do-able but with care and not how you fly it in a Hawk. Looking at the 50k of the Tarbet valley into Glen Kinglas, I would not have attempted that 100 deg left turn in big tanks, and would prob have erred on turning early (pulling up to do so) in small tanks. That comes from being comfortable and experienced in the fits my aircraft flies in, and in the environment I routinely operate.

Have less than 10 hrs a month, come back from a theatre where the aircraft fit and performance is different (temperature plays a sizeable role here) and not routinely flying low-level valley bashing and you have the makings for a problem. Add in the break down in supervisory monitoring of pilot handling skills and it gets worse.

Surely this just adds weight to the need to maintain core flying skills, and ensure that suitable checks are in place to measure them and re-train if required.

I think we were very lucky not to lose 2 aircraft in the same place at the same time for the same reason.

RIP guys, and I hope the lessons are learnt not just given a cursory glance.

kokpit

31st Mar 2010, 16:37

I have a feeling we all have am element of blame to shoulder here….

Ever since SDR, and possibly before, we have continuously coped. Be it aircrew, groundcrew or associated manpower, we have always managed to make do with whatever drama has befallen us.

Manpower cuts, increase in tempo, lack of spares and equipment, lack of time, we always seem to succeed. No matter what they throw at us we seem to overcome.

We are probably our own worst enemies, but as long as the task gets done, those above will just let it ride. It’s a service mentality I think, possibly the same mentality that made us want to join up in the first place, and our lords and masters must marvel at how we cope.

We bitch and moan, and a few may PVR, but by and large the majority will still provide what is asked of them.

I honestly believe this will only change when tasks aren’t completed on time, repeatedly, and finally someone will have the gumption to realise that things have gone too far. People won’t speak out (other than amongst themselves), it’s not in the nature of the military man (woman).

I don’t profess to have the answer, I was one of those that had to walk after 25 years, there’s a limit to how many walls one can bang the head against.

Chugalug2

1st Apr 2010, 12:28

30mRad:
The crux of the issue is definitely currency and competency in that environment and fit.
I was never FJ (unless the JP4 counts? :) ), but it sure seems that way to me, so I'll take your word for it, 30mR. If that be so then the crux of this matter is, yes you've guessed, Airworthiness! It is not just a matter of nuts and bolts, as someone has previously correctly stated. Training, checking, currency, etc, are all part of the "A" word's world. So may we expect strenuous efforts by the "Independent within the MOD" MAA to deal with the chronic problems described both in the report and within this thread? No doubt this post will be condemned as yet another attempt at thread high-jack. I'm afraid that the real high-jack has been going on for decades, ie that of RAF Flight Safety by the bean-counters, aka its own Air Marshals!

Wwyvern

1st Apr 2010, 16:25

Just picked up on this thread and the lamentably low monthly hours allocated to FJ pilots. In the early sixties on a DFGA Hunter Squadron, as a first tourist I averaged just under 16 hours per month. The only simulator we had was the occasional trip to Chivenor for HSE (Hunter Simulator and Emergency) training. I seem to remember the dinghy drill, helicopter rescue and rum when back on the RAF Launch.

A bit off-thread - one pilot on one of my courses and the HSE Staff received a "Good Show" award for achieving the record for time elapsed between hitting the water and getting into the dinghy of 12 seconds. Some said he hadn't time to get wet.

The record holder subsequently ejected twice over water, but only his LSJ was found after the second one.

Safeware

2nd Apr 2010, 00:20

Having read the report, I see how lucky Blacksmith 2 were. However, it left me with a question... Given that if a) they hadn't seen the fireball and b) had left their recovery more than a second later, they would also have crashed, how many of the contributing factors would also have applied to them?

RIP guys - Gloria Finis

sw

Trim Stab

2nd Apr 2010, 14:12

This plan has gone by the board, and as a result, there are now just three AD units - two Typhoon squadrons and a single, under-strength F3 unit. Is the latter needed? Yes, it is. And then some. Two Typhoon units are insufficient to maintain Southern QRA, the Falklands commitment, and to maintain currency in the A-G role, let alone taking over Northern QRA as well.

QRA against who? The only credible airborne threat against the UK currently is from terrorist pilots. The QRA Typhoons are no deterrent or defence against them. All a terrorist would need to do is file a flight plan to overfly London to one of the satellite airfields and in the time taken to divert from the flight plan and hit the target, the QRA Typhoons would not even be at the end of their take-off run.

If Russia wanted to attack us (why on earth would they want to?) they are probably not even capable of launching a conventional sustainable aerial attack against us. Even if they did establish air superiority, what could they do next? They don't have anything like enough airborne or amphibious troops to actually invade and hold the ground, nor enough assets to enforce a trade blockade. RAF air defence thinking is still mired in WW2 mindset.

As for Argentina attacking the Malvinas - in '82 they had a military junta that was not accountable to the population and which had the tacit support of a superpower (USA) - they are now a democracy with international obligations and responsibility to their electorate. There would not be public support for an invasion, and Argentina would become a pariah nation.

The A-G role for the Typhoon? Maybe in the distant future, if it gets deployed to Afghanistan, then maybe the RAF should start to build that capability. But there are currently far, far higher priorities - especially ground troops who are currently training for deployment to Herrick XIV. I will be going (as a TA Officer) and we don't even get enough ammunition to carry out realistic live-firing training. So why are we wasting money maintaining Typhoon A-G capability when there are no current plans to use it?

As you guessed, my "other job" is in aviation - as pilot and TRI on a bizjet.

soddim

2nd Apr 2010, 14:27

Judged purely from the content of your last post, Trim Stab, if I were you, I would not give up my 'other job' but I wish you well in Herrick XIV.

Jackonicko

2nd Apr 2010, 22:33

God save us. Another Lewis Page manqué.

I'm astonished that any aviator could be quite so lacking in understanding of 'air' as you are, Trim Stab.

You shouldn't need to be told that UK AD, including QRA is part of the core military role of defending the homeland.

You should be aware of the levels of activity that NATO QRA and UK Adana generates.

Your remarks on Typhoon show you to be on an intellectual par with Page and all of the other infanteer subalterns who regularly spew forth this sort of pernicious bol.locks. It's self evidently worthless drivel, and that's why I'll waste no more time countering it.

I'm also astonished that you, as a self-proclaimed Terrier, should show quite such witless insensitivity to those who died in 1982 by referring to the Falklands as the Malvinas. Poor show.

LOAgent

3rd Apr 2010, 00:00

Trim Stab, whereas Jacko can no longer stand to counter your ill-informed drivel I feel it necessary to step out of the shadows to do just that.

The ignorance that you show in your posts with regard to UK QRA is reprehensible. I find it difficult to criticise one such as yourself who volunteers as you do, but in this case I must do as I am trained to and level 'constructive' criticism where it is due. You fail to understand the importance of the mission that is undertaken by the Typhoons and the remaining F3s. As an Officer in any branch of the military there is a requirement to understand strategic fundamentals of other branches of the armed forces. The sovereignty of UK airspace is by no means a given and is one of the most important military tasks undertaken by our armed forces. The Typhoons and the F3s are the 'trigger' men of a much larger political and military machine. It is an extremely specialised task that takes an awful lot of training to become proficient at to the levels that the British public requires and deserves. The 2 guys that died, and I knew both of them very well, did so training for a role that is by no means easy. Your flippant comments about UK QRA diminish what they were doing, something that I take personally, whilst also demonstrating an unforgivable lack in your knowledge of the UK Defence mission. I have the utmost respect for the mission that is going on in Herrick, however I do not allow that pride and respect to cloud sound military judgement with respect to the bigger picture.

Jackonicko

3rd Apr 2010, 11:17

There are too many targets that would be too quick for a Hawk to get to, surely? Quite apart from the lack of weapons options, radar, etc.

Trim Stab

3rd Apr 2010, 12:03

I am not arguing to abandon completely QRA. Merely that there is too much mantra about the need to defend UK against air attack, largely to "justify" having so many Typhoons. Other Euopean countries get by just fine without spending enormous slices of their defence budget on air defence fighters.

There are just far bigger defence priorities at the moment than air defence.

And I notice that in all the smug posts telling me that my views are naive that nobody has bothered to anwer my simple point that the most dangerous airborne threat we currently face is from a terrorist pilot. What use are the Typhoons against that threat? We spend a fortune developing defence systems against an alleged threat which is vanishingly small, but leave ourselves wide open to attack by a distinctly real threat. But then I am sure you will just dismiss me as naive - because that threat doesn't fit into your justification for QRA...

Trim Stab

3rd Apr 2010, 13:10

Finland - 61 FA/18, Sweden 141 Gripen (plus a few trainers), Norway 57 F-16.

If you really want to claim that Russia is still a threat to us, then those three countries face a far greater threat, not least because Russia would (possibly) still be able to invade and hold the land. Yet those three countries get by with far fewer QRA resources.

Our procurement of 232 Typhoons had more to do with job protection than any real need for such a large fleet. Job protection is a worthy objective, and one that I would wholly support. But don't pretend that we really need so many aircraft for air-defence - especially as they are completely useless against the only real airborne threat that we face.

To go back to the original thread, if FJ crews are not getting enough hours to stay current, then reduce the numbers of FJ crews. Better to train enough crew to fly 100 Typhoons safely than half-train crew to fly 232 Typhoons badly.

The Northern QRA launched a few months back to assist an airliner which had dropped a wheel on the runway without the crew being aware. Maybe if it was Trim Stab in his BizJet he'd feel differently about the money spent on QRA

I've been trying to find details of that incident as I am intrigued as to what possible assistance the QRA could have been to the airline crew. On the one occasion that I have been intercepted (by French Mirages) they just caused distress for my pax.

glad rag

3rd Apr 2010, 13:39

I think it's a shame that this thread has become a fastjet bashing exercise when the guys were doing their best to maintain currency under difficult circumstances

:D:D Well said.

soddim

3rd Apr 2010, 13:40

There seem to be a few on this thread with almost Ostrich-like efforts to totally ignore the most important reason why we pay good money (although not enough) to maintain military forces in this country. It is certainly not so that Blair/Brown can wave their willys on the world stage by supporting whatever foreign venture attracts America's eye.

The first and foremost role of our military is defence of UK. Without a credible air defence force that can in peacetime ensure the integrity of our airspace and in war protect us from air attack we might as well surrender at the first emergence of a threat.

Just in case someone wants to bang on some more about there being no threat, just remember that intentions can change overnight, a credible force takes years to assemble if you have none.

Our present air defence force is barely credible for defence and none too big to maintain integrity of the airspace. Whilst we all accept the difficulty of dealing effectively with a determined airborne suicide bomber, the ability to identify whether the aircraft in question is likely to be a real threat or is simply not doing what it should, is a good start in that process. A less capable aircraft such as the Hawk is simply not up to the task.

Jackonicko

3rd Apr 2010, 13:45

Trim Stab,

'So many Typhoons.......'

Currently we have two squadrons, plus an OCU and four aircraft with an OEU.

Add to that 12 Tornado F3s.

That's insufficient to adequately do the UK AD mission, plus Q, plus the Falklands, for which it was judged that a force of five dedicated AD squadrons would be needed.

And if you want to be able to do deployed AD, or to deploy Typhoon in the A-G role, then obviously you need more.

The original buy of 232 Typhoons was intended to sustain a frontline force of 137, seven squadrons, an OEU and an OCU, plus attrition and a maintenance reserve to allow a long service life.

THAT WAS NEVER AN UNREASONABLE OR UNREALISTIC ASPIRATION.

We're now getting 160. That won't sustain a big force for long, but you can do the math.

But the idea that we're somehow awash with Fast Jets is uninformed tripe.

Bilge of the type I'd expect from a 14 year old Army Cadet.

As to hijacked airliners representing the only threat........

http://www.armybase.us/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Russian-TU-160-Blackjack-bomber-intercepted-by-Royal-Air-Force-Tornado-F3-300x210.jpg

That may be true if you limit your 'look ahead' to a week next wednesday. But if we are to set our defence budget and force structure entirely to meet the current threat we can certainly save more money, more easily, than by trimming UK AD. Carriers, Trident, tanks, all ceremonial troops, horses and silverware, all NBC, we can bin the lot.

And I confidently expect you to campaign actively and vigorously for the British Army and the Royal Navy to be reduced immediately to the force levels of Finland and Norway.

As to the utility of QRA against a terrorist threat, I'd suggest the fact that there may be some scenarios where interceptors could not make a difference does not alter the fact that there are plenty of others where they could, saving thousands of lives in the process, and providing valuable deterrent effect.

airpolice,

If you're going to do QRA, then you need the tools for the job. Missile armed, radar-equipped, all-weather and supersonic are the minimum requirements. There might be a case for a dedicated force of four squadrons of Gripens or F-16s, but the Hawk (even with its 30-mm cannon) simply won't cut it. And if you know it's a false alarm, you don't scramble.

ShyTorque

3rd Apr 2010, 14:23

IIRC, In the 1980s the Belgian air force announced they would limit their crews to 12 hours/month and this was an issue because this was below the minimum NATO requirement.

Another case of knowing the price but not the value.

The B Word

3rd Apr 2010, 15:01

2 points to make:

1. The Hawks we have are not AAR capable. So pretty useless for QRA.

2. QRA is not just about defending airspace. Many of the Bear aircraft come over to hoover up our signals and also to look for signs of our nuclear deterent. Furthermore, they do not have Western transponders and, although they fly 'due regard', they will not show up on TCAS (including that of our resident idiot TA bizjet driver) or on Air Traffic's radar as a secondary radar return. That is why they need shepherding, in order to keep an eye on them and ensure that other air users are not endangered.

Having spent some time in the Q shed myself (a few times with poor old Nige), I thought it was time to put the record straight!

The B Word

Jimmy Macintosh

3rd Apr 2010, 16:23

I'm a little surprised at the suggestions that using the lighter aircraft for currency training would be good. One reason they report hours and hours on type, is surely to show that currency on type is important.

Personally I wouldn't like to train for a Grand Prix in a Peugeot 106 diesel then on race day step into a F1 car.

I'll leave the other discussions to those who have vast amounts of knowledge and experience way beyond myself.

fade to grey

3rd Apr 2010, 21:03

stab trim,
"causing distress for my pax", well I for one would be scared.

I think this thread needs steering back on track. I read the accident report, I feel those guys were let down by the system - how do you maintain currency on 10 hours a month in that domain ? I'd feel a bit out of the loop flying the 75 with that amount of hours each month, let alone 250' off a scottish hillside.

Let's not devalue this thread with ancient arguments about what we do or do not need, to me it's clear that with the rise in soviet aggression the QRA is most necessary.

Landroger

3rd Apr 2010, 23:30

Although I'm not military, indeed I am one of the population you guys are tasked with protecting, I was appalled to see that heavy 'banging machinery' drivers are limited to 10 hours a month.

Fade to Grey states he would feel 'out of the loop' if he was limited to 10 hours/month flying a 757. As a potential passenger in his 757, I'd say I would be pretty worried if I knew my driver was only flying our aeroplane for roughly twenty minutes a day.

I completely agree that flying anything else is simply not the same as flying a front line fast jet. And flying a fast jet means you have to be, basically, the dog's bo11ocks in the driving department.

The government, treasury and even the general public have to understand something very fundamental. If you are going to spend our - my - money on aeroplanes that can fly at 400 kt IAS at 200 feet through a Welsh valley, or accelerate into the sky for four or five miles in sixty seconds and then kill anything it finds we the public don't like, then there is little point unless you are prepared to pay the price of the aeroplane. The price of the aeroplane plus whatever it costs to ensure the young men and women who fly them, can do so properly and with enough opportunity to really learn how to do it, without killing themselves in the process.

I honestly don't mind paying for our fast jets - we need them - but I really don't want some time serving politician telling me he is saving my money, by restricting those highly skilled men and women to twenty mionutes of training a day. How about paying out less in compensation for prisoners whose human rights have been infringed by being in jail?

I agree totally that the crew of BS1 were sacrificed to the civil service accounting system. Thank you guys, but you were let down badly.

Roger.

Chugalug2

4th Apr 2010, 13:05

Landroger:
I agree totally that the crew of BS1 were sacrificed to the civil service accounting system.
Well not with me you don't, I'm afraid LR. They were sacrificed, as were the crews of Sea Kings, Chinook, Hercules, Nimrod, another Tornado, and no doubt others as well, by Airworthiness deficiencies. Those deficiencies existed because the existing UK Military Airworthiness Regulations were not enforced by those whose duty it was to do so. They were not enforced by those people because they were instructed/ ordered to not do so by senior Air Officers in the MOD. The politicians, like you and I, may well claim ignorance of such regulations and rely on those in the military and civil service who are professionally required to know them and to enforce them. They were sacrificed by their own, that is the great scandal that needs to be dealt with here.

soddim

4th Apr 2010, 14:13

I think in this particular case, Chugalug2, you do need to expand so that we can share your concerns over airworthiness issues.

I certainly was not aware during the extensive period I enjoyed flying the Tornado.

Easy Street

4th Apr 2010, 14:33

(Hours flown per crew, per month) = (Total fleet hours flown per month) / (Number of crews)

Look at the variables in the equation above. Think about who might care about each one...

Total fleet hours flown per month: The Treasury care about this one because it's directly proportional to £££! I think we can safely assume that the £££ has been on a steady decline ever since Options for Change.

Number of Crews: The MoD care about this one because it's a measure by which the population as a whole view can view our military strength. Reducing the number of crews can be seen as cutting the "sharp end" (i.e. not one of the government's legendary "efficiency savings") and is therefore not a step to be taken lightly.

Hours per Crew per month: Only the crews themselves give a stuff about this.

Over the last ten years or so there has been continual downward pressure on the £££ variable. Fleet hours have been affected by the ridiculous cut to Sqn engineering manpower a few years ago ("The answer's 115 engineers; what's the question?"... and a certain AOC should know all about that). The equation has been balanced by reducing the crew hours. Maintaining a constant number of crews allowed the MoD to say "look, we're spending less, and maintaining exactly the capability we had before" ....:hmm:

This, presumably, was going to continue apace - front line aircrew have all seen the questionnaires from QinetiQ asking "how much of your role training could be conducted in the simulator?".... However, I suspect that the recent upward curve in incident rates has given their Airships pause for thought - which might be a reason why they finally decided to reduce the numbers of crews, both in the Harrier and Tornado GR forces (with more cuts probably on the way). That way at least the remaining crews can attempt to maintain some semblance of capability...

Fox2long

4th Apr 2010, 15:13

Whilst still on the FL some 3 years ago I commented to Mrs F that the lack of practice (and I do mean time airborne each month) was leading to more mistakes. She tells me I said that nothing would be done to address the issue until someone lost their life. The argument about which aircraft should be doing the job is irrelevant, the fact remains that these aircrew were trying to acheive the aim without the tools. The cutting of crews from the front line means that yes the RAF will save money but less people to carry out the task! I think my point is the only way to get an effective force is to finance it accordingly. Cutting the hours leads to mistakes and in this case tragic loss of life. I did the Donny course with Nige, he became a respected and capable aviator. But even the capable ones suffer from skill fade if not able to practice.

RIP Nige and Kenny.

Chugalug2

4th Apr 2010, 19:22

soddim:
I think in this particular case, Chugalug2, you do need to expand so that we can share your concerns over airworthiness issues.
My concern is that there is still, after the various threads on the Chinook, Hercules and Nimrod accidents, a misunderstanding of what Airworthiness is.

So, pedant hat on:
_Definition of Airworthiness_

Airworthiness is defined as “/the ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate with out significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which the airborne systems are flown/”.

Pedant hat off.
Self evidently the pilot's training, currency, checking and continuity has to be such as to ensure that they do not provide for the significant hazard mentioned above. The consensus of those posting here would point to that not being the case, and either the regulations have not been complied with, or they themselves no longer provided for the airworthiness needed. Either way that compromises the aircraft system of which the pilot/crew is part of.

Safeware

4th Apr 2010, 21:18

The problem that I see in trying to throw everything into airworthiness, is that the monster would then be to great to manage under one umbrella and would fail. If that happened, it would only help those with a "see, told you so" attitude.

Aviation is a complex , multifacetted beast. The aircrew operators, the aircraft, the ATM system and it's operators, the maintenance organisations, the ground operating organisations all have their part to play in Aviation Safety. The are all links in the chain.

But be cautious of wishing everything to be about "airworthiness"

sw

Chugalug2

4th Apr 2010, 22:41

Safeware:
....trying to throw everything into airworthiness
Not everything quite, Safeware, but the definition of airworthiness is by design all encompassing. I seem to remember someone on this forum opining that airworthiness merely concerned engineers and not pilots, or words to that effect. Well, it certainly concerns engineers, and the sidewalling of them in the RAF and the MOD is hugely responsible for much of the mess that we have now, but it most certainly does include aircrew as well. You could have the most gold plated airworthy aircraft in the inventory, put an untrained pilot in the driving seat and it immediately falls foul of the definition of airworthy. I didn't decide that, anymore than "Flight Safety concerns you!", that's simply the way it is. Thus the complete training plan, simulators, trainers, checkers, hourly requirements, etc, should ensure that the crew do not compromise that airworthiness but enhance it. The common factor with the more familiar nuts and bolts aspects of airworthiness is of course money. The lack of it denied ESF, functional FADECs, HISLs, IFFs and AAR systems, and now it would seem crew competency. In every case though the deficient systems had to be signed off, including those relating to crew competency. That was when the Airworthiness Regulations were breached, that was when those crews were betrayed.

Safeware

4th Apr 2010, 22:56

Chug, One also has to remember what 553 says about airworthiness beyond the headline that you quote (often):

For peacetime flying, the design standard of a UK military aircraft type, its associated equipment and software may be considered airworthy where the conditions in a and b, or a and c, are met as appropriate:
a For all military aircraft types, their associated equipment and software, the Aircraft Designer has satisfactorily demonstrated, in a Safety Case, the airworthiness of the design. The demonstration of airworthiness may include design analysis, application of specified standards (such as Def Stan 00-970) and procedures, historical evidence of successful use of particular design features, system tests, and ground and air tests to arrive at an overall assessment of airworthiness. The demonstration should be as specified in the aircraft or modification contract including the operating conditions to be applied, and should be undertaken during the development phase for the aircraft or modification.
b The cumulative probability of the loss of an aircraft due to a technical fault and the cumulative probability of a technical failure of the aircraft (inclusive of its systems, structure and stores) which could result in the death of any air crew or passengers, should both be assessed to be of the order of one in a million per flying hour (probability of occurrence 1x10-6 per flying hour) when operated within the conditions used for the airworthiness demonstration.
c Aircraft derived from civil passenger aircraft and used by the MOD in the passenger‑carrying airliner role should meet a higher standard of safety. Such aircraft may be considered to be airworthy if the cumulative probability of the loss of the aircraft due to a technical fault and the cumulative probability of a technical failure of the aircraft (inclusive of its systems, structure and stores) which could result in the death of any aircrew or passengers, are both assessed to be of the order of one in ten million per flying hour (probability of occurrence 1x10‑7 per flying hour) when operated within the conditions used for the airworthiness demonstration.

The Principles of War also apply - Selection and Maintenance of the Aim - diverting into other areas of Aviation Safety is going to dilute what has already been achieved post XV230.

sw

Chugalug2

4th Apr 2010, 23:17

Result, one gold plated airworthy aircraft for the use of. For the use of who, Safeware? Stick my untrained pilot into it and the plating will be pealing off like that of a "cheap Changi watch" (one there for those of a certain age)! As for selection and maintenance of the aim, is the aim being that all future accidents are not due to technical failures, but rather Human Factors? I would rather we simply regain the age old aim of RAF Flight Safety; to avoid all avoidable accidents. That, rather than arguing the toss about the definition of airworthiness, or angels dancing on pin heads for that matter, should be our aim. Slashing back the hours to maintain competency is as deadly as issuing an RTS to an aircraft that Boscombe Down refused to fly.

Safeware

4th Apr 2010, 23:57

Chug,

I think that as someone working in the field of Aviation Safety, I'll think I'll just have to disagree with the disparate aspects that you are trying to bring together in one mass.

FWIW, in terms of proportion, non-technical issues cause far more accidents than technical ones, so, let's not make schoolboy errors regarding technical matters but also put as much, if not more effort into those non-technical ones that make up the vast majority of accidents.

sw

soddim

5th Apr 2010, 00:18

Now I see where you are coming from, Chugalug, but I think most aviators understand that airworthiness is an issue to do with the machine and its' suitability for safe operation by a competant crew.

In this case we are, I believe, simply questioning the failure to provide sufficient resources to maintain the competancy of the crew. We are not questioning the airworthiness of the aircraft.

It is, I think, important to separate those two distinct issues as their use as a single issue can otherwise be used to hide a multitude of failings that are better identified separately.

tucumseh

5th Apr 2010, 05:49

Gents

My own opinion is that you are not as far apart as it may seem. Any differences can, I think, be explained by ones background and role in attaining or maintaining airworthiness. I think many posters have experience in one discipline, but few in both. Haddon-Cave didn’t articulate this very well; his report largely discussed the latter but many in MoD assume he was talking about the former – hence the focus on regulations and procedures being re-written when the real problem is lack of knowledgeable, practical implementation.

The thrust of many comments on this thread is the 10 hours per month flying time. As someone who was taught how to maintain airworthiness before moving to attaining it, my first thought turns to the EP (or LTC) Support Parameters, one of which is fleet flying hours. A key question which needs answering before pointing fingers is - What is the EP Assumption? This is expressed as x hours per year, per aircraft, broken down by FAE, TAE, Half TAE, IR, IR6 (or whatever the latest terms are). You add this up across the fleet and, a simple example, it tells you roughly how much aviation fuel that fleet is allowed in a year.

To any Support Manager/Authority (terms again?) this is THE “fixed” component of the formula that is his entire raison d’etre. It is dictated to him from on high. So, if those ”on high” have agreed this, then that is where I’d look.

The Support Manager’s sole task is to maintain the rest of that support formula – such as repair pipeline times, recovery rates, mean time between removals (not failures) and so on. Everything in that formula can be linked to fundamental components of maintaining Airworthiness. Competence, training, experience etc. For example, the long held rule of thumb is that if the 2nd line recovery rate falls below 50%, then you must begin to rob aircraft. It is the SA’s job to prevent that happening. It can be seen that, if these variable support parameters cannot be maintained due to lack of funding, competence, experience or training, then by definition something must give in the hitherto “fixed” parameters – flying rate and fleet size. So, my second question – Did the 10 hours per month arise from a failure to maintain the Support Parameters rather than a policy decision to reduce?

What has this got to do with airworthiness? The simplest, but crucially important, link is how the money is spent to maintain these Support Parameters. If the SA doesn’t analyse any problems in the above “variables” properly and solve them quickly, then funding is inevitably wasted chasing the solution and the only place that can come from is the pot that funds the most important part of maintaining airworthiness – maintaining the build standard. That pot should be sacrosanct (ring fenced”, but it is the very pot that has been targeted with draconian cuts because so few understand its purpose. If that BS is not maintained, then the Safety Case cannot be properly validated and will quickly become invalid. The above is precisely what has happened in each of the cases Chug refers to.

Chugalug2

5th Apr 2010, 12:31

soddim:
I think most aviators understand that airworthiness is an issue to do with the machine and its' suitability for safe operation by a competant crew.

I'm sure that you are right, soddim, but now of all times is surely the time for us all to take stock of the situation and ask simply; "Why did it go so wrong?". Now the easy answer is, of course; "Already asked and dealt with by H-C, nothing to see here, so just move on!". tuc tells us, with all his experience and knowledge of UK Military Airworthiness, that H-C in many ways missed the point and was at times even plain wrong. In particular tuc points out that H-C and the MOD have gone for reforming the airworthiness regulations when the real problem was awareness, knowledge and implementation of them. The regulations didn't cause 62 people to die, not enforcing them did IMHO. The "priesthood" to whom Airworthiness was largely entrusted was that of the engineers, both military and CS. Well, we all know what happened to them, don't we? Thus the faith was left in the hands of the ungodly, ie of the two winged master race and others collectively known hereafter as "The Beancounters". Now it is just possible that if those Beancounters had been as inculcated in the faith as the "Priesthood" they would not have so supinely allowed the money changers into the Temple. I think I'll shut down this analogy now while the going is good! All I'm trying to say is that airworthiness isn't just about the aircraft itself, it extends to the FRC's, ACM etc and to the crew themselves. To use tucs parlance they are just another system within the system. "Competent Crews" don't just happen, they are caused. If they are not caused the total aircraft system constitutes, per the definition, the significant hazard both to themselves and to the General Public they overfly, ie the aircraft is unairworthy!
H-C's solution to all this is, of course, the "Independent within the MOD" MAA, ie the Military Airworthiness Authority. Are we to expect the MAA to give a green light to UK Military Airworthiness with pilots getting a mere 10 flying hours per month on very demanding FJ types as per this thread, merely because that has no bearing on airworthiness? We need to all stop and take stock here, I earnestly suggest.

soddim

5th Apr 2010, 14:25

I sincerely hope, Chug, that todays 'two-winged master race' do not have to refer to H-C to work out that 10 hours per month is just asking for disaster. To me the issue is just so obvious that it is not a matter of consulting the rule books or examining the small print. I would not have authorised that flight at low level in that fit in that role - full stop.

Safeware

5th Apr 2010, 20:04

Tuc,

I know Chug and I are not far apart - the issues he sees as needing to be dealt with are valid issues, and the support issues you detail also affect the bottom line. However, as Soddim has acknowledged, parcelling them all up as "airworthiness" isn't the answer.

In many of his posts, Chug looks to the CAA model, however, it isn't the Civil Airworthiness Authority, but Civil Aviation Authority. And byond our shores Airworthiness is seen as a subset of Safety.

So, I have no problem with ensuring that all Chugs concerns are addressed, but not under the single banner of Airworthiness.

sw

tucumseh

6th Apr 2010, 06:59

Safeware

Thanks. What concerns me is that the underlying causes will be missed by a too narrow definition of airworthiness. When you have been told to cancel projects or waive contractual requirements because "it involves integration, that's too risky and costly" and in the same breath urged to get the Safety Case or MAR report out, then you begin to worry at what these people are being taught. Not the regulations and most certainly not how to implement them - which was the base critisicm in the Nimrod report, not the content of the regs themselves.

My point is that, demonstrably, most of the accidents discussed on pprune would have been avoided had the extant regulations (and, in slightly older days, CA Instructions) been followed. Mull, C130 and Nimrod definitely. The airworthiness criticisms in the Sea King and Tornado/Patriot BoI reports would have been avoided had the regs been followed, although in those cases there were other factors (but at least some of the cheese slices wouldn't have been missing altogether). That they weren't followed is entirely down to failure to appreciate the wider and deeper aspects that are only touched upon in the top level regs. As you know, these regs were written in the bygone days or yore when those who had to apply them understood all this detail implicitly. Thus, training, experience, competence of everyone in the chain are vital components of the airworthiness and wider safety processes.

As long as these wider issues are addressed by the MAA I'm reasonably happy to go along with whatever definition they come up with, but at the moment there are too many who still equate airworthiness with the ability to take off and land. It is better to embrace these wider issues up front than to hope someone happens to think of them. I look at the DE&S staff list and cringe at the memory of some senior figures telling me not to bother with 00-55/56/57/970, 05-123/125, Critical Design Reviews, systems integration, EMC testing and a raft of other airworthiness and safety fundamentals - just sign it off, if a problem occurs we'll deal with it as and when. Pity some problems manifested themselves in fatal crashs.

That same attitude still prevails and can be seen in the utterly facile MoD statements, oft repeated on pprune, that "This aircraft fleet has a good track record". That is no justification for deliberately targetting airworthiness funding and telling staff to ignore the regulations. I utterly despise those who were told by Boscombe that aircraft were unsafe yet paid off the contract, made a false declaration and walked away. Their actions have nothing to do with finer points of definition or what the regs say - it is all about people. And I don't think the MAA have the authority or will to sort that one out.

Chugalug2

6th Apr 2010, 21:31

tucumseh:
Their actions have nothing to do with finer points of definition or what the regs say - it is all about people. And I don't think the MAA have the authority or will to sort that one out.
As succinct a summary of my reservations re the "Independent but within the MOD" MAA that I could ever have wished for tuc. And Safeware makes the very valid point that it is the Military Airworthiness Authority. So if the accident that is the subject of this thread had happened on their watch, having decided that the aircraft was airworthy, might we expect them to say the equivalent of "Sorry, Chief, we don't do safety only airworthiness, you'll have to enquire elsewhere"? This has all the makings of a Whitehall Farce, though the track record to date is perhaps more of a Shakespearean Tragedy. I think tuc has the measure of this. Many years ago the system used to work as well as it did, I suspect, not because of definitions or regulations so much as peoples attitudes and sense of duty. I know this comes across as old Fogey blah, blah, but that strikes me as the nub of it. Unless and until we restore that motivation in people to regain that old Flight Safety philosophy, be they Engineers, Pilots, Cooks, or Bottle washers, we are on a hiding to nothing.

Gainesy

7th Apr 2010, 15:10

What was the "light aircraft flying" to which the accident report refers? Was this in a civilian aircraft or an RAF asset?

engineer(retard)

7th Apr 2010, 16:18

Chug, Tuc & S/W

I have sat and read your posts, finding myself nodding in agreement with you all. For me, JSP553 details the hurdle which has to be jumped to demonstrate that the platform is fit for purpose. I have never seen the safety case revisited post MAR to a significant level of scrutiny unless driven by a significant formal design change. Consider the changes made when aircraft are being operated under theatre pressures. Since GW1, the pressure from operations has been sustained on various aircraft types that are carrying out roles and profiles that were not considered at the outset of the aircrafts life.

The safety case of a design is often underpinned by various assumptions that change or may prove to be invalid in service, again I have never seen the assumptions re-visited or even considered in light of significant support cuts. You can achieve airworthiness but I feel that the through life maintenance of the safety case is a nettle that has never been firmly grasped, not through any lack of competence but purely due to complexity, cost and manning.

regards

retard

tucumseh

7th Apr 2010, 18:00

Eng

Quite right.

A maintained Build Standard is a pre-requisite to a valid Safety Case.

It has not been MoD policy to routinely fund the maintenance of Build Standards since 1991. Today, it not uncommon for a BS to be more than two decades out of date.

As this thread is about Tornado, I suggest a quick glance at the recommendation at para 19b in the Patriot shootdown report of 2003. There is something very wrong when a reviewing officer has to recommend basic, mandated safety pre-requisites and engineering disciplines should be implemented. Given this very recommendation was made twice, on Tornado, to different 2 Stars in 1998 and 2001, it is doubly wrong that the BoI or ROs didn't seem to know that the problem was identified, notified and completely ignored 5 years earlier by the officers directly responsible for ensuring SofS's regulations are implemented. People again. Always people.

SlopJockey

7th Apr 2010, 19:15

As has been intimated the theoretical airworthy aircraft is nought but a (un)controlled ballistic missile if the crew are not competent for task and that definition must include a measure of currency. Some of the more gifted and talented may be able to maintain competency with ease and others need much more stick time.

The overall safety case, that raises the questions that need to be answered to assure system safety, should have considered the possible outcomes and attendant risks arising from reducing flying hours. It would appear that it did not.

It is the appetite to address and manage this risk especially the frequent updates that are required to the safety case, including the career moments that may come with raising objections/observations, that need to be reasserted.

Not a pilot so can only trust opinions that 10 hrs per month is woeful but I know that as a motorbiker I need to get my eye in after some time out of the saddle, anything else is inviting disaster.
SJ

Red Line Entry

8th Apr 2010, 07:27

Tucumseh,

You're tending to assume a level of background knowledge amongst the readership here that I for one don't have.

What recommendations from the reviewing officer re the Tornado/Patriot BOI? In what context was the recommendation previously twice made? To whom? Why was it not acted upon?

I follow the thrust of your main argument, but a bit more supporting info would be welcome (without impacting libel and National Security laws of course!)

tucumseh

8th Apr 2010, 07:58

What recommendations from the reviewing officer re the Tornado/Patriot BOI? In what context was the recommendation previously twice made? To whom? Why was it not acted upon?

As I said before, there were other factors in that crash, but a Reviewing Officer recommended that IFF failure warnings be integrated into the cockpit. He doesn't say which ones were missing (or not integrated properly) but the report confirms modification action is in hand. If such safety related warnings are not presented to the crew, the functional safety of the aircraft has not been assured. It is a feature of Safety Management in MoD that physical safety is usually addressed reasonably well, but functional safety is often ignored.

As for context, Boscombe identified the general problem (failure, and subsequent flat refusal to integrate failure warnings) in 1998 (perhaps before, not sure) and specifically on another platform. Under the same programme the same IFF was being fitted to a Tornado variant and a recommendation was made to have all other aircraft installations, but especially Tornado, inspected for correct installation. This was made at the time, and later in 2001 to, inter alai, two Directors General / Executive Directors in PE/DPA as well as the project offices involved.

I'm afraid you'll have to ask them why they did not act. One reason given to me was "It worked on the bench, so it'll work in the aircraft" - which is a typical response to why system integration obligations are waived. The failure to act was the subject of a complaint to CDP (4 Star) who, in 1998, twice ruled that it was perfectly acceptable to deliver the aircraft in this state, and pay off the contract in the full knowledge that it was not fit for purpose. I say twice, because he was asked to reconsider as it was suspected he'd just had a lackey write the first reply.

I am but a pleb in the great machine and they must have had good reason. But, whatever that may be, it perfectly illustrates the complete ambivalence toward the subjects of safety, airworthiness and fitness for purpose. The point I make is that this, and many other examples, meant that the Haddon-Cave report and the vast majority of his recommendations came as no surprise whatsoever. This multitude of warnings throughout the 90s should have served to highlight, at the highest level, a systemic failing which has brought parts of the MoD to its knees in the last few years.

The above example is but a single step away from the main topic on this thread - lack of currency, training etc. On that subject, the BoI did not address whether or not the simulator was at the same build standard as the aircraft; but the programme I mentioned certainly did NOT modify the simulators. That is also a common safety failing.

Hope this helps.

MATELO

8th Apr 2010, 10:18

I have my doubts, but can't see how we could establish the requirement for the Typhoon, when there are Hawks available much cheaper.

Mutli-tasking for the Reds.

That would be an impressive photo. A Backjack shiloutted against the diamond 9.:oh:

Squidlord

8th Apr 2010, 10:41

I agree with Safeware (& soddim) on the airworthiness vs. safety thing.

I have to admit I don't feel that confident that I understand airworthiness particularly well (unlike safety) but I reckon that's largely because it's so badly defined and documented. Whatever, most of what follows is imo ...

Chugalug2 gave us the (MoD) definition of airworthiness (from JSP 553 - others bits of 553 support Safeware's interpretation as he pointed out):

The ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, ground-crew, passengers (where relevant), or to the general public over which such airborne systems are flown.

The key word, to me, is "ability". If you have an airworthy aircraft then you have an aircraft that is safe if:

1. It is operated in a safe manor
2. It is maintained in a manner that enables safe operation
3. Other stuff, e.g. ATM

And competence of aircrew is clearly essential to safe operation, so aircrew competence is not part of airworthiness but is obviously part of safety.

To be safe, an aircraft must be airworthy. The converse is not true.

So when Chugalug2 writes:

You could have the most gold plated airworthy aircraft in the inventory, put an untrained pilot in the driving seat and it immediately falls foul of the definition of airworthy

I disagree. The fact that you've chosen to fly the aircraft (unsafely) with untrained crew does not affect the "ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate without significant hazard [...]". It's gold-plated so it still has that ability if you operate and maintain it properly.

Chugalug2 again:

Safeware makes the very valid point that it is the Military Airworthiness Authority

I don't think he did. In any case, it's not. It's a Military Aviation Authority (despite the letter of Haddon-Cave's recommendation). And if you look at its web page, you'll see it is concerned with safety as well as airworthiness. Admittedly, it's a bit buried but that, to me, is just a reflection of a general MoD unwarranted focus, possibly unintentional, on airworthiness rather than safety. Hopefully, we can get this changed.

Part of the reason I don't like the concept of "airworthiness" much, besides the fact that it's vaguely defined and there's lots of disagreement about what it means, is that, imo, it tends to detract from really counts ... safety. And that is Chugalug2's main concern, I think, and there we do agree.

On a slightly different subject, engineer(retard) writes:

I have never seen the safety case revisited post MAR to a significant level of scrutiny unless driven by a significant formal design change. [...] The safety case of a design is often underpinned by various assumptions that change or may prove to be invalid in service, again I have never seen the assumptions re-visited or even considered ...

Totally agree with this. In my experience, MoD aircraft Safety Cases (SCs) do tend to get thrown in the filing cabinet and forgotten. Aircraft mods tend to be dealt with piecemeal rather than as part of a coherent whole aircraft Safety Case update. And even worse, imo, updating the SC in response to in-service experience invalidating assumptions ... well, it just doesn't happen on the platforms I know of. This includes the Nimrod where in-service experience totally and massively invalidated the estimates of (effectively assumptions about) fuel leak probabilities. From The Nimrod Review, 3.11.1 ...

The [Nimrod Safety Case] quoted the potential for fuel system leakage as ‘Improbable’, which is defined as ‘Remote likelihood of occurrence to just 1 or 2 aircraft during the operational life of a particular fleet’. The BOI’s analysis of fault data, however, indicated an average of 40 fuel leaks per annum for the Nimrod MR2 fleet between 2000 and 2005

I know the MoD are trying to address some of this, specifically the validation of assumptions, with Operational Safety Cases but progress seems painfully slow to me.

tucumseh

8th Apr 2010, 15:36

To be safe, an aircraft must be airworthy. The converse is not true.

As we are talking about legacy aircraft, we must consider the Military Aircraft Release and Release to Service documents. I’ve therefore quoted some older policy documents while assuming the current equivalents are available to anyone who is interested. The newer GARP process differs, primarily in that there is no MAR, but the fundamentals remain the same. That is, the Safety Case is based on a build standard, which must be maintained for the SC to be valid. The SC is the primary evidence supporting airworthiness. Lacking this audit trail, the MAR and RTS cannot be issued. (The Mull failings in a nutshell!).

The MAR was based on the build standard presented at MAR trials, which was not necessarily the “as flown” standard “and is, inter alia, the statement that an acceptable Safety Case has been prepared for the aircraft”. (AP 3456, CA Instructions etc).

The RTS includes the MAR as Part 1, but reflects the “as flown” standard by, for example, including Service Deviations. The RTS is the Master Airworthiness Reference, and it can be seen, by definition, it also requires a maintained build standard and a valid Safety Case. The Secretary of State mandates all this but, demonstrably, this has not been funded policy since 1991. Hence, the “systemic failures” noted in many reports, most recently by Mr Haddon-Cave.

Also, from AP3456 and CA Instructions.....

"Airworthiness is defined as the ability of an aircraft, or other airborne equipment or system, to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which such airborne systems are flown. Airworthiness is not only concerned with engineering aspects, but also with the way an aircraft is flown and how its systems are operated".

Jig Peter

8th Apr 2010, 16:57

Long, long ago in a "ready-to-go" Air Force, there was an all-pervading general, but quite simple, Flight Safety campaign. (I think "they" were trying to hammer home the fact that "Flight Safety" is more than just Accident Prevention, as well as being more positive).
The most visible part was the appearance of large posters with different picture, but all bearing the message, in big, aircrew-friendly letters -

Flight Safety is YOUR business

Pix of be-ringed sleeves as well as rolled-up sleeves in every Station Office as well ..;

Too expensive, Mr/Mrs/Ms. Treasury ??? Have a few hundred yourselves !

Just a thought, but a Real campaign would seem to be needed .. innit?

Chugalug2

8th Apr 2010, 17:01

Squidlord:
It's a Military Aviation Authority (despite the letter of Haddon-Cave's recommendation). And if you look at its web page, you'll see it is concerned with safety as well as airworthiness.
Well I'm banged to rights and no mistake, guv'nor! I dunnit, I dunnit, I dunnit, it's a fair cop and no mistake! Don't think I can get away with a "Well done, I wondered who'd spot that first, but it might be worth a try...in the meantime thanks for the correction, Squidlord.
While we're discussing this organisation's title, perhaps we can now consider the word "Authority". So here we go again:
"authority, n; The power or right to control, judge or prohibit the actions of others"
So the MAA could indeed have dealt with this accident, whether or not it involved the airworthiness of the aircraft. Suppose it decided that a prime cause was the lack of flying continuity of the crew? Could it insist that this be subject to, say, a minimum of 15 hours a month? Could it enforce that? What would it do if, despite its ruling, 15 hours a month were not flown subsequently? In other words, how much authority has this Authority?

Trim Stab

8th Apr 2010, 18:13

I have just got back to this thread after a trip to Moscow on my employer's bizjet. That was preceded by a weekend spent training with our troop for deployment on Herrick XIV. As a private-sector taxpayer, having been made redundant recently and now working freelance, but contributing to our defence voluntarily at weekends, I admittedly have a different perspective to some contributors here.

However, I am left wondering what planet some of the supposedly well informed people on this thread live on? Have you actually been to Russia recently? When was the last time any of you actually visited Argentina? These are not countries filled with one-eyed monsters intent on starting unnecessary wars. These are countries filled with citizens who just want to do their best for their families like anybody else. The notion that we need to maintain hugely expensive QRA forces against the non-existent threat from these thriving and increasingly stable democracies is absurd!

I completely accept that we need a core QRA force - but nowhere near the level that we currently have.

There are far higher priorities - especially the threat of airborne terrorist attack on the UK, for which our vaunted QRA assets are no defence. Indeed, I would like Jackonicko to explain what possible scenario our QRA could actually save "thousands of lives"? Presumably he is talking about fighting "yesterday's war" against a 9/11 type attack, the risk of which a repeat has been thwarted by profoundly increased airport security and intelligence activity. Do you think terrorists are not aware of these changes? Do you think they don't read the internet? I can easily provide a scenario by which a terrorist, working as an indvidual (rather than requiring a large team with attendent risk of compromise) could, at a cost of a few thousand euros, evade all security, and destroy any target in central London. Our QRA could do nothing about it. I am obviously not going to provide details of the scenario here.

And Jackonicko, I don't support cutting the RN to levels of other comparably sized countries to the UK. Indeed, the RN nuclear deterrent and diplomatic/humanitarian contribution should be augmented.

All I am arguing against is the disproportionate RAF expenditure on air defence, which can far better be spend elsewhere at the moment. QRA air-defence has been "talked up" since the end of the cold war for job protection, not for genuine strategic necessity.

And while I am on the subject of wasting taxpayers' money, let's bin the RAFAT - they should be ashamed of themselves posing about wasting taxpayers' money crashing jets when there are young men risking their lives and limbs on the front line against a real threat, who have the where-withall and means to carry out the scenario I allude to above.

Wrathmonk

8th Apr 2010, 20:04

Trim Stab

they should be ashamed of themselves posing about wasting taxpayers' money crashing jets when there are young men risking their lives and limbs on the front line against a real threat

Are you CirrusF reborn.....?

Banter over, you say we should have QRA but not at the level know. So lets just have UK QRA and ignore any of our NATO commitments we have. How many jets on alert do you think we should have and how many crews will it take to man these 365/24/7. I know what the current answer is based on the current QRA commitment but curious to know what the TA view is. May even be able to turn this into a RN v RAF SAR force discussion as well :E

I also take it that given we are not fighting yesterdays war (9/11 ....!) that you would advocate the immediate scrapping of all heavy armour (cold war shock army blah) and its associated engineering support vehicles. And the Kings Horse Troop (when were horse and guns last used in anger). And all the Armys ceremonial duties (who needs horses, shiny breastplates and swords these days). Just curious.

Ivan Rogov

8th Apr 2010, 20:21

Not from a FJ background or a driver, but....

From what I have read about this tragic event, it is not too dissimilar from other fleets issues. Our currency was X hours per quarter, then the hours were reduced, then dropped all together and replaced by flights (profile not important). Then people started to use the term keeping current, unthinkable and not an issue a few years ago!
Luckily most of us recognised that it wasn't X hours or X flights which would keep us alive but a healthy mix of competency, experience and supervision, and we made sure we squeezed every training opportunity out of every sortie.
Also the message came down loud and clear from the top that safety was the absolute priority regardless of any perceived pressures.

What I'm getting at is that currency is just a number, it is the absolute minimum (from what I have seen) and not a target to achieve, if you are regularly just achieving it then alarm bells should be going off.
Content is also very important, 5 hours of quality training is better than 50 hours of transits.

Trim Stab

8th Apr 2010, 20:36

Wrath Monk

Neither you, nor I, nor Jackonicko, nor CAS, can possibly decide what absolute "minimum levels" of QRA are required. It is a pure judgement call, balancing risk against resource.

All that it is possible to speculate upon is the best use of the resource that the democratically elected government can afford to give to the MOD. The entire reason that I entered this thread is that some of you decided that Gordon Brown was responsible for the crash that ended the lives of the F3 crew.

There seems to be a general assumption by (presumably) serving members of the RAF on this forum that the general public owes them a living, and that the RAF should be allowed to spend public money ad nausea for the thinly justified existence of QRA and RAFAT.

I fully admit that I have a very different perspective from many of you on this forum. When I fly as a civilian pilot, every minute of our flights we are trying to save fuel by negotiating with controllers for short cuts, juggling winds and flight levels for best efficiency, taking visual approaches whenever possible to save a few minutes, and constantly calculating where it is cheapest to upload fuel. All that is motivated by trying to keep our jobs, to keep the company afloat, because of the taxes we pay! And where do those taxes go? I don't mind paying tax to support the old, the sick, the weak, and the defence of our country, particularly the latter as I am a TA volunteer.

I would just like to see the RAF take the same cuts as the RN and Army. RAFAT and air-defence (which are loosely linked) are disproportionately expensive. RAFAT in particular gives the impression that the RAF are not taking the current political and economical situation seriously - they write off £5m of my taxes attempting pointless stunts, burning more fuel in 20 mins than I save in a year of parsimonious flying (not to mention the raw diesel they into the atmosphere at the same time).

I fully support the RAF - but just give the funds to the hard-core front line guys - SH, RAF Reg, Medics, AT etc - and relegate the AD FJ and RAFAT to REMF status that they deserve.

PS The BBMF rocks - they represent all that is best of the RAF when up against the real front line - just like the ceremonial parts of the Army, or HMS Victory.

BlindWingy

8th Apr 2010, 21:41

What a clown!

Wrathmonk

8th Apr 2010, 21:48

It is a pure judgement call, balancing risk against resource.

And that, Sir, is the nub of it! The Defence Board (for it is they who sign off the Military Tasks for all the Services) have directed the level of QRA required. This has forced CAS to make the judgement and balance the perceived risk of real-QRA usage against the resources available across the board - he has, IMHO, cut the hours required to undertake QRA safely too far already (and that is the whole thrust of this thread - nothing to do with RAFAT, or poseurs or anything like that). He is also being forced to cut the GR4 force (currently on ops) and the GR7 (the best thing since sliced bread:E). Cut the Typhoon any further and not only will you not have QRA or fast air available for the FI but you won't have a CAS platform to support LAND in AFG / Iran / wherever.

Doesn't SH come under the LAND budget .....?

RAF Regt are being expanded. Guess they must already have got funds from the QRA pot .....

Medics is a purple organisation - the RAF can't be held to account for the shambles which was DCS 15.

AT - if the RAF/MODs hands weren't tied by the A400M saga ....

And finally - the 9/11 scenario is still a very real threat. IMHO.

You're right about one thing. You do have a very different view to most people on this board. But to call AD and RAFAT REMFs is a bit rich coming from a weekend volunteer. About 6.2% of the TA deploy on ops each year (figures taken from this (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6868921.ece)article - and thats probably the same ones over and over again). And thats from an annual budget of £143,000,000 (same article). So how about we reduce the TA budget by 93.8% [approx £134M] (to plug all those gaps we desperately need to ..... (and I know there was talk of cutting back TA training but did it ever happen:confused:)

Anyway - back to thread. Apologies. If they (the government) want the MOD to do everything required of it then they need to fully fund it. Regardless of what GB says - they don't.

Jackonicko

8th Apr 2010, 23:33

Trim Stab,

Did OASC turn you down? Is that why you’re quite so anti-RAF?

You really should have tried harder at school.

“I would just like to see the RAF take the same cuts as the RN and Army.”

They have done, and then some.

By most metrics (numbers of personnel, number of frontline squadrons, etc.) the RAF has actually been cut back more than the Army or the Navy since the Cold War. Despite being a more relevant post Cold War service…..

“I completely accept that we need a core QRA force - but nowhere near the level that we currently have.”

A core QRA force, eh? What do you think? Sufficient to maintain two jets on alert, 24/7 at each of two airfields, one North, one South?

That’s what NATO expect us to do.

That’s what we do. That is a core QRA force. It’s quite easy to determine what absolute "minimum levels" of QRA are required – two interceptors ready to go 24/7 (with reserves) at each QRA station – each of those stations needing at least two squadrons to sustain the commitment and retain currency more broadly.

Don’t forget: QRA is f*cking meaningless if you only do it two days per week.

But you do want to ‘augment’ the Strategic nuclear deterrent?

What, six Trident subs instead of four? What on earth for?

And your remarks about the Red Arrows are a disgrace. They “should be ashamed of themselves posing about wasting taxpayers' money crashing jets when there are young men risking their lives and limbs on the front line against a real threat…?” They, and FJ AD are ‘REMFs’?

Anyone who comes out with that sort of crap is either a troll, or a clueless chimp.

soddim

8th Apr 2010, 23:39

Jacko - I prefer chimps. Who let Trim Stab out?

glad rag

9th Apr 2010, 00:04

REMF status

Yep, says it all.

Why the **** has this clown drawn the thread down to this level??

GR

Safeware

9th Apr 2010, 08:53

Tuc,
I agree with you again there.

wrt your last 2 statements in bold, and particularly Airworthiness is not only concerned with engineering aspects, but also with the way an aircraft is flown and how its systems are operated this still shouldn't be construed as meaning that currency and competence form part of the airworthiness of an aircraft. As you know, issues about the way the aircraft is flown form one part of the RTS, defining the flight envelope for the varying configurations of an aircraft, and limitations on how the systems are to be operated form another. The fitness and suitability of the operator doesn't form part of the RTS.

sw

whowhenwhy

9th Apr 2010, 09:27

But should it? You talk about a system safety case - the human is part of that system. If you treat them as 2 separate entities then problems start to creep in. I think that we're almost all agreed that the level of flying time available to maintain currency is an issue, but it's an issue across a lot of aircraft fleets and ATC and WCs. Does it come back to trying to do too much across the board with too little?

tucumseh

9th Apr 2010, 09:55

safeware

We speak from same page.

As has been noted, the regs, rules and instructions have been for many years contradictory and sometimes downright confusing.

Who does what part of airworthiness/safety/fitness for purpose? The MoD were embarrassed into not being able to answer the question at the C130 inquest - and I could sympathise (up to a point!).

In system integration terms this is a boundary definition and control issue. What often happens in MoD is that a rule or organisational change will shift the boundary of responsibility to remove a responsibilty from one person, but there is no complementary shift (or financial provision) to make sure the gap is closed. These gaps are numerous, and each constitutes a risk. If you are lucky, this simply manifests it self as a delay - but increasingly the result is more serious. Very often it doesn't matter who does the job, as long as it is done properly, on time and efficiently. The problem arises when no-one polices this from on high to ensure the gaps don't exist. They used to liken this to a roof of interlocking tiles. For 20 years the MoD have systematically removed the tiles, the rain has got in and rotted the foundations.

The_Observer

9th Apr 2010, 12:36

Gainsey, I'm not sure, but I think I'm right in saying this was Kenny's aircraft. If you look up the details on G-INFO this might confirm it.

engineer(retard)

9th Apr 2010, 16:10

Tuc & S/W

I stand to be corrected but I recall many cases where human error forms part of the safety case and a figure of 1x10(-3) operation comes to mind. I have a feeling that it used to be derived from Def Stan guidance.

Where is this figure derived from, there must be some basis on having an operator trained to a defined level?

regards

retard

tucumseh

9th Apr 2010, 19:09

Eng

Sorry if I don’t answer your question directly, but I think the issue of training, and its undoubted link to airworthiness, is important, but the actual problem is organisational and failure or misunderstanding of process.

The regs (and mandated instructions to officers charged with implementing the regs) say the RTS is a pre-requisite to the commencement of aircrew training; and we already know the Safety Case (which must consider Human Factors as you say), FRCs, ACM and ODM are pre-requisites to the RTS. (Thus, they are all inextricably linked). However, I don’t think it should expressed as simply as this; I have managed many programmes where the training commences, and progresses incrementally, long before the RTS is issued. One has to be more flexible and “tailor” the introduction to service according to the nature of the programme.

Historically, as long as all were seen to be controlled by the same person (say, the Project Director), then I’d be satisfied. But then along came Integrated Logistic Support (v. 2.0, not the original concept ditched when AMSO was formed around 1990) and training came under the ILS Manager. This created two main problems. First, the ILSM was seldom part of the project team delivering airworthiness so control and oversight was lost – he was part of the Service HQ and increasingly untrained for the job. Secondly, ILSMs were (and probably remain) fixated on the “LS Date”, usually set in concrete at 3 months before In Service Date.

Any pilot can see the problem. If you deliver training at the LS Date, you only have 3 months to train sufficient aircrew and ground crew (and, for example, deck crew on ships etc). This seldom computes if the ISD is defined as “10 operational aircraft” and a pilot takes 6 months to train. I think Apache is a good example here. The training requirement is more likely to be scheduled properly, and integrated into the overall programme, if under the control of the programme manager who will understand the RTS may be issued, but it is of no practical use, without training. Thus, ACAS should not sign the RTS until he is satisfied it can be put to its intended use; rather like the obligation on me not to sign the Critical Design Review until satisfied it meets the spec (including safety). Again, the close dependency between airworthiness and training. In this sense, it is both, or none.

But to the problem here, lack of flying hours. That is an aviation safety matter. It is directly related to the Master Airworthiness Reference (RTS) as the RTS is based on a Safety Case which assumes a given level of currency and competence; in turn linked to the TNA and Training Plan. If that currency is lost, the Safety Case validity is compromised, and so too RTS.

The aircraft is but one part of a system (“a combination of physical components, procedures and human resources organised to achieve a function”). This last introduces the concept of functional safety. The aircraft may be physically safe, but the overall system is functionally unsafe if the operator is not trained. Therefore, to declare airworthiness, one must first train an aircrew to demonstrate functional safety in the system, and this process must then continue and be maintained through-life. Therefore, and this is where my views originate from, the RTS is a statement that the training plan has been verified, and a properly trained pilot can operate the system safely, within defined limits.

I believe in this case, if currency was lost or compromised, then the RTS should have been amended to impose limitations or restrictions on crews who were not current. This is where I have to stop as I don’t know what aircrew think of this, but it would seem from the discussion that the final manoeuvre was made “difficult” by a combination of the aircraft configuration and lack of currency. The former is quite definitely a fundamental component of the RTS so there is a clear overlap. To a Risk Manager, lack of currency is a risk (was it notified as such by Tornado bosses?). It would seem reasonable that mitigation would include restrictions until currency was achieved. It works the other way round when the RTS is first issued. One builds up to flying within the complete envelope through progressive issues of the RTS, as the aircraft and its behaviour are understood. I’d be interested in aircrew opinion.

Chugalug2

9th Apr 2010, 20:15

I too would be interested in aircrew opinion, not only to the questions you pose tuc, but to the larger safety/airworthiness/MAA questions that have been raised in this thread, mainly by engineers past or present I suspect. There seems to be a bit of a one sided discussion going on here, to the effect that airworthiness is to do with aircraft and hence engineers, and currency is to do with policy implemented by aircrew commanders. So none of it is to do with PBI aircrew? Of course not, for as Jig Peter reminds us:
Flight Safety is YOUR business
So let's hear from you! Personally I am not so concerned about the demarcation between these various aspects of safety, for the very goal post moving by the MOD that so bedevilled things in the past will now come under the control of the MAA, or should do! Just as BA cannot chop and change the duties and responsibilities of its engineers or aircrew without the sanction of the CAA, so will it be with the MAA, or should be! So the real bottom line to all this is the MAA, and once again I pose the question:
how much authority has this Authority?

BEagle

9th Apr 2010, 20:49

Recommendation 1 d. of this report states:
The supervisory measures for aircrew that (sic) fly multiple ac types are reviewed, including General Aviation.This is an utter red herring. They may as well 'recommend' that you don't drive a car or ride a bicycle if you have to fly a fast jet. Many RAF aircrew fly both Brenda-jets and light aeroplanes with no difficulty whatsoever in switching brain cells between the disciplines. Along with many others, I've gone straight from instructing on the VC10 to instructing in a Cherokee on the same day - there really is no problem. The only occasion when flying light aircraft should perhaps be avoided is when the pilot is undergoing military helicopter flying training - although I don't actually subscribe to this view personally.

The real issue is the scandalously low allocation of flying hours to each fast-jet pilot per month. This horse$hit about the effect light aircraft flying might or might not have played in this fatal accident is smoke and mirrors and is complete and utter bolleaux.

sycamore

9th Apr 2010, 21:15

How about something radical,like a `Station Flight` of 3-4 Hawks......

Squirrel 41

9th Apr 2010, 22:30

Trimstab.

Good luck on Herrick XIV; as a reservist myself, I understand the special kind of passion required to do this as well as possible. Be safe out there, and look after your team.

When you get back, feel free to PM me; we should be able to arrange a visit for you to QRA and you can tell the REMFs sitting around with nothing to do exactly what you think of them sitting in the shed waiting for the call. In fact, please do let them know that about 3 Hawks would be sufficient and do let's discuss exactly what you know about the force structure and the job; don't worry, it's already clear that it won't take long..... :ugh:

A little knowledge and all of that!

S41

Easy Street

9th Apr 2010, 22:30

BEagle,

The real issue is the scandalously low allocation of flying hours to each fast-jet pilot per month. Agree totally. The rubbish about light aircraft flying is clearly heading towards a new GASO that would show that "lessons have been learned" from this tragedy, and allow the chain of command to show that they've discharged their supervisory responsibilities. An increase in flying hours, needless to say, will only come from cutting crew numbers.

5 Forward 6 Back

9th Apr 2010, 22:37

BEagle,

Regarding FJ flying at the same time as light aircraft flying; it's in the BOI report that the pilot stuck in a bootful of rudder not long before impact. Do you think that this was a total red herring and nothing to do with his light aircraft experience, or was it related to his GA experience but would have been mitigated if he had a more appropriate number of hours in the F3?

BEagle

9th Apr 2010, 22:49

Do you think that this was a total red herring and nothing to do with his light aircraft experience.....

I certainly do. 'Sticking in a bootful of rudder' is as equally out of place in a light aeroplane as in a fast-jet. Or in any other aeroplane except during deliberate spin entry.

Easy Street, I thought that these days the hierarchy only refers to 'lessons identified' rather than 'lessons learned'?

soddim

9th Apr 2010, 23:37

The 'bootful of rudder' is not anything that a pilot has learned to help in this situation but it is an example of why it is necessary to supervise adequately an inexperienced pilot on type and to provide continuity in training.

Whatever the symantics of 'airworthiness' definitions, this is a simple case of failure to provide both supervision and continuity of training.

The buck stops well above those who perished in this tragic accident.

Lima Juliet

10th Apr 2010, 12:07

I agree with BEagle on light aircraft flying having little to do with this. According to the registration earlier the aircraft the pilot flew was a Jabiru 400 - this aircraft has a small amount of adverse yaw to deal with using a bit of rudder. However, when you compare this to the Spitfire, Hurricane and even Chippie that BBMF fly the rudder required on the Jabiru is tiny. Don't forget that the majority of BBMF pilots are all current FJ pilots and I don't see them spearing in every 5 minutes. So I disagree with the Board's finding on this - the President, I understand, is a Navigator with little PPL type experience, so it would be interesting to see where he got his advice from! Everyone, knows that the rudder pedals are foot rests in the Tornado unless there is a crosswind on landing! Even the CSAS removes most of the rudder input for single engine work.

However, the rest of the Board looks about right IMHO as the currency and competency from 10hrs a month is definately the biggest root cause.

LJ

PS. I believe that airworthiness is about aircraft engineering and nothing to do with competency, currency and regulations. Furthermore, if we did as some suggested and only released the RTS when all the crews are trained and competent - how would we train them in the first place without an aircraft RTS :ugh:

Westy5

10th Apr 2010, 12:45

This is not the only FJ accident where a bootfull of rudder was applied by a relatively inexperienced pilot.

I believe that BoI took the advice of a psychologist who suggested it was a reflex action when faced with an impending impact.

Now I don't know when Kenny applied the rudder with regard to the impact time, but I wonder if this BoI sought advice, rather than assuming it was a learned response from light aircraft flying?

Easy Street

10th Apr 2010, 13:13

This is not the only FJ accident where a bootfull of rudder was applied by a relatively inexperienced pilot.

Remnants of ingrained Tucano experience perhaps?

BEagle

10th Apr 2010, 13:35

Remnants of ingrained Tucano experience perhaps?

If that's true, which I doubt, it makes one question the suitability of turboprop trainers for military flight training.

Nope, I suspect the core reason for the accident was lack of recency. When the hirearchy kept cutting away at flying hours, the old wise heads said it would all end in tears. Others quit whilst the going was good...

Another issue which will bite one day is the experience levels of pilot coming out of training - particularly their PIC (Captain) time.

OK, I know it's a bit 'swing the lantern and pull up a sandbag', but back in the early 1970s I arrived at RAFC with 55 hrs PIC from the UAS, plus the PPL from my RAF Scholarship. On the JP course I amassed another 37 hours PIC and a further 20 during my Gnat course. Add TWU, a few holds and refreshers and I arrived at my first (:\) OCU with 185 hrs PIC.....

I met someone recently who told me that ME pilots are arriving at their OCUs these days with only 30 hours PIC. To those who say that the dual training would more than compensate I say "Bolleaux! Quantity has a quality of its own! Learning to save your neck when there's no-one to turn to is a very useful lesson".

Two's in

10th Apr 2010, 13:49

Having read all the preceding posts, in which most people seem to be in violent agreement that this "organisational" failing was both systematic and preventable, I have not seen anything about the final link of the chain before the crew strapped in and took off - the Authorisation. It certainly used to be a function of the Authorising Oficer to ensure the crew and the task were successfully mapped to the aircraft fit/role and the flying conditions, but in this case the experience and currency of the pilot seem somewhat at odds with the sortie - MSD specifically.

This is in no way intended to cast aspersions about the final Auth, just to indicate that those organisational failings led to low hours and experience levels combined with a taxing role fit and weight, being viewed as a normal occurrence within the unit. Alarm bells that may have rung only a few years ago were silenced by repeated exposure to institutionalised shortcomings in training and currency and as a result the Authorisation, the last safecheck in the system, was effectively negated.

soddim

10th Apr 2010, 15:07

Ref the Authorisation, Two's in, see post No 75.

I agree with you.

Chugalug2

10th Apr 2010, 15:54

Two's in:
Alarm bells that may have rung only a few years ago were silenced by repeated exposure to institutionalised shortcomings in training and currency and as a result the Authorisation, the last safecheck in the system, was effectively negated.
Silenced TI? I think that is a rather easy out for every one who is now wise after the event! This is not about some esoteric "not me Chief, I'm airframes" feature of aircraft operation. It's the one thing that we are all aware of from the time we seek to drive aeroplanes- hours! They dominate our life, get logged to the minute in our log books and describe our experience. Of course ignorance of the extent of this parsimony is some excuse, and one which I would claim, but those who keep their ears to the ground, let alone those who suffered it, were surely aware. Nothing said though, or was it? If this were solely about FJ flying then I would leave it to those far more informed than I (right! I heard that!), but this is very very basic business indeed. We are all agreed that currency is all important, so why no outcry before the event? ESF was pursued for decades by those who cared. Did anyone care about this?

engineer(retard)

10th Apr 2010, 18:53

Tuc

I'm in violent agreement with you as usual. Having previously been an ILSM I have been exposed to the mantra that doctrine that support will always maintain pace with the project. However, I've yet to see that realised on any programme. The support agreement has always been slipped and the budget plundered to pick up procurement shortfalls. Moreover, with simulators going the PFI route, it is nigh on impossible to build a simulator on time bacuase you are reliant on flight test data to design it. Consequently, you cannot fix the simulator spec and price until the design is very mature.

Back to the question I was trying to get to the bottom of, and I was hoping S/W might answer. What assumptions are the human error stat used in the fault trees based upon. It seems logical that it is based upon an average level of training and competence rather than the average number of keystroke errors a secretary makes. When I have looked at fault trees, the human error case is considered in many accident chains. If this assumption is invalidated because of lack of flying hours then the safety case also becomes unravelled.

regards

retard

jumpseater

11th Apr 2010, 16:56

It certainly used to be a function of the Authorising Oficer to ensure the crew and the task were successfully mapped to the aircraft fit/role and the flying conditions, but in this case the experience and currency of the pilot seem somewhat at odds with the sortie - MSD specifically.

Just a thought, but if the Authorising Officer themselves only has experience of the current 'low hours' system, perhaps this would be the default normal ops to them and hence this is what we do, we've 'always' (in their experience), done it this way. Therefore it'd be ok to authorise the trip, its no different to any in their experience.

But ten hours a month! :mad:

BlindWingy

11th Apr 2010, 17:18

10hrs was a good flying month on the F3 a year or so ago. The whole attitude of the force was about producing results with the less than ideal equipment provided, I suspect that "can do" mentality transferred across to training hours as well.

I'm still curious as to how many hours the accident pilot had flown in the couple of months prior to the accident - not much in the report about that.....

Two's in

11th Apr 2010, 20:21

Just a thought, but if the Authorising Officer themselves only has experience of the current 'low hours' system, perhaps this would be the default normal ops to them and hence this is what we do, we've 'always' (in their experience), done it this way. Therefore it'd be ok to authorise the trip, its no different to any in their experience.

Jumpseater - exactly the point. When the supervisors begin to view 10 hours a month as "normal" (BlindWingy), the very act of supervision becomes diluted by the pervasive inexperience of the operating community. Eventually those who truly understand the relationship between currency and competency begin to form the minority (or end up posting on PPRuNE) and the corporate or tribal knowledge is lost until a tragedy such as this brings it sharply back into focus.

Chugalug - that relates to your point, it's not a question of being silent, it's simply that the more experienced crew crew becomes almost an anochronism in a crew room full of bright new shiny people eager to get any flying, never mind a whole 10 hours a month.

The checks and balances we have in place to prevent the erosion of skill levels and maintain flying standards, be it at Unit or CFS level all fall victim to the reduced flying rates and the ever present "Op Tempo" where training hours are always at a premium. All driven by the cheerless scotsman in Number 10 of course, but an awful lot of people in the chain of command have to play ball before these failings become as institutionalised as in this case.

And finally I would agree completely that Airworthiness and Release to Service are all predicated on an assumed operator skill level and maintenance of that skill level. When that assumption is incorrect, the RTS by default is effectively invalid.

Chugalug2

12th Apr 2010, 11:07

TI, thanks for coming back to me re "the silence of the lambs". Not directed at you personally of course but to the collective of those still serving and in particular, serving military aircrew. That there has been a failure of leadership here is plain, but it is too easy to simply blame "them" and see oneself as victim rather than perpetrator. The old Flight Safety slogan:
Flight Safety is YOUR business
means just that. If you are a very junior pilot and feel, together with your colleagues, that the level of continuity is just insufficient then say so loud and clear. It may not be well received, you may be seen as a trouble maker, tough! It is your professional duty to know when "Can do" becomes "Shouldn't do". Pressonitis is as deadly as it ever was in aviation. Of the 64 deaths including this one that I ascribe to airworthiness, fitness for purpose or currency shortcomings, the total enemy presence was AFAIK one AK47 round that killed 10 of them. That is just unacceptable and is down to you to prevent in the future. It is not all down to "them"!

Squidlord

15th Apr 2010, 10:00

In response to my claim that:

competence of aircrew is clearly essential to safe operation, so aircrew competence is not part of airworthiness but is obviously part of safety.

To be safe, an aircraft must be airworthy. The converse is not true.

tucumseh wrote:

Also, from AP3456 and CA Instructions.....

"Airworthiness is defined as the ability of an aircraft, or other airborne equipment or system, to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which such airborne systems are flown. Airworthiness is not only concerned with engineering aspects, but also with the way an aircraft is flown and how its systems are operated".

On the face of it, this clearly contradicts my claim. Except that I think it's just another example of poorly written documentation (that should be authoratatively error-free - there are many examples relevant to safety, e.g. Def Stan 00-56). The two sentences tucumseh quotes from AP3456 contradict each other, imo. So why is it written the way it is? Well, given that I have never read a jot of the documents tucumseh refers to you might, er, take my words with a pinch of salt. Anyway, I think the author of the documents in question probably knew that they had to cover wider (than airworthiness) safety issues such as, "the way an aircraft is flown and how its systems are operated". Rather than realising the subject they wanted to address was safety, and not just airworthiness, and rephrasing accordingly, they just tacked on the extra bits they wanted to cover as best (and as clumsily) as they could. Like I say, supposedly authoritative documents are riddled with such errors throughout MoD safety but also safety in other industries (e.g., the new drafts of IEC 61508 suffer similarly).

I understand (I think) the rest of what tucumseh writes about MAR, RTS, build standard, SC, etc. in the post I quote from above but don't understand its relevance to the airworthiness vs. safety issue. In particular I don't see that it contradicts my claim at the top of this post.

To me, the RTS is very clearly a safety document, not just an airworthiness document (even if it is the "Master Airworthiness Reference"). So, of course it follows that the RTS is based on the Safety Case (which subsumes an "Airworthiness Case", if you like).

Squidlord

15th Apr 2010, 10:10

engineer(retard):

I recall many cases where human error forms part of the safety case and a figure of 1x10(-3) operation comes to mind. I have a feeling that it used to be derived from Def Stan guidance.

Where is this figure derived from, there must be some basis on having an operator trained to a defined level?

For any (safety-related) system where humans perform a control function, the Safety Case is likely to include consideration of human error (erroneous control of the system!). Even if humans don't control the system, they surely designed and built it, so many Safety Cases for systems that are autonomous of humans will also consider (a different class of) human error.

All MoD aircraft Safety Cases should consider human error. They tend to do so in quite different ways and to quite different levels of rigour. I am aware of some that tend to use the same 1E-3ish figure no matter the error or context concerned and that is just poor. Def Stan 00-56, Issue 2, Part 2 (Guidance) did contain a handfull of ballpark probabilities for human error in different contexts. The lowest figure, 3E-3, was supposedly for "Errors of omission when the actions are embedded in a well-rehearsed procedure" or "General error of commission". The figures really are very broad-brush. For example, UK train drivers achieve much better than 3E-3 for stopping at red train signals (thank goodness).

There are techniques for analysing and quantifying human error, e.g. HEART, THERP, etc., but I always wonder whether, in their complexity, they just add a false patina of accuracy to what must inevitably be a very inexact science.

As for the derivation of the figures in 00-56, Issue 2, I forget. But whatever it was, it can't be that authorative. It's just not possible to make accurate broadbrush statements about the likelihood of human error (of all different kinds in all different contexts).

Generally speaking, most of the MoD aircraft Safety Cases I've come across tend to make a broadbrush assumption that the aircrew (and indeed maintainers) are appropriately trained and competent (this is not to say that the SCs don't consider human error in their risk assessments but for the most part, they only consider it in response to hazards arising, e.g. a failure to safely recover from a hazard, rather than as causes of the hazards in the first place). To be fair, there's not much else a BAE or Westlands, for example, can necessarily do. It's up to the MoD, or suitably delegated organization, to ensure that the assumption is valid. I suspect this will be part of the new MoD Operational Safety Cases but as I said in a previous post, progress on these is very slow.

engineer(retard) again:

What assumptions are the human error stat used in the fault trees based upon. It seems logical that it is based upon an average level of training and competence rather than the average number of keystroke errors a secretary makes. When I have looked at fault trees, the human error case is considered in many accident chains. If this assumption is invalidated because of lack of flying hours then the safety case also becomes unravelled.

I would suggest the aircrew human error probabilities used in quantitative risk assessment, e.g. in FTAs, should be based on the least experienced and capable aircrew reasonably forseeable. If you base your risk assessments and your risk acceptance on some sort of average experience and capability then you could be unacceptably endangering aircrew (and others) of below average experience, capability, etc. So, if you know you have a defined requirements for training, competence, etc., you assume a minimal level of experience, capability, etc. consistent with meeting the training, competence, etc. requirements.

This bites for me when I am involved in risk assessments that incorporate aircrew error because I often seem to end up talking to test pilots. As we all know, test pilots are supermen ... or they think they are :). So I often have to remind them that just because they estimate there is an 80% chance that they could safety land the aircraft that has lost a wing, I need to know the chances of the minimally qualified, experienced, etc. pilot doing the same thing.

But engineer(retard) is absolutely right that "If this assumption [about competence of aircrew] is invalidated because of lack of flying hours then the safety case also becomes unravelled". This is not well-addressed in most aircraft Safety Cases I am familiar with but, again, Operational Safety Cases should, hopefully, address it thoroughly.

engineer(retard)

15th Apr 2010, 17:28

Squidlord

Thanks for the update. I have been out of that field for a while now and anticipate having to pick the books up again if I do. The typist retort was not meant to be derogatory, as I have seen a safety achievement level that was based on the probabiltiy of being struck by lightning whilst stood in a field. These figures seem to gain a life of their own without ever coming into question.

regards

retard

SirPeterHardingsLovechild

19th Apr 2010, 12:00

The Sun have an article on this today

RAF pilots’ flight hours axed in MOD cutbacks | The Sun |News|Campaigns|Our Boys (http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/campaigns/our_boys/2937388/RAF-pilots-flight-hours-axed-in-MOD-cutbacks.html)

RAF Top Guns are furious after MoD bean-counters slashed their flying time to save money, it was revealed yesterday.

Sixteen crews of the illustrious 111 Squadron were told to cut their 15 hours a month to ten.
The Ministry of Defence aims to save £80,000 a month in fuel and other costs.
But members of 111 Squadron, whose 14 F3 Tornado fighter jets protect Scotland and the north of England, say they are being left "dangerously short" of practice.
One said: "The cutback to ten hours is just enough to make you dangerous. It almost guarantees an accident if the jet is taken near its limits in the role."
The squadron, formed in 1917 and nicknamed the Tremblers, are based at RAF Leuchars in Fife, Scotland.
Following high-level protests, the hours have been "slightly" increased - but pilots are still angry, saying their allocation is worse than Soviet pilots were allowed at the end of the Cold War.
A crewman said: "I saw the results of low flying hours amongst the junior pilots on my last tour.
Knowledge of your own limitations and capabilities - and that of the aircraft - comes from time in the jet. No substitute."
Last night an RAF spokesman told The Sun: "Tornado F3 flying hours were reduced in line with the reduction in its operational role during 2009.
"Following a careful review, it was decided to increase the number of flying hours to a slightly higher level to make absolutely certain that the F3 is both safe and sustainable."

London Eye

19th Apr 2010, 15:18

to make absolutely certain that the F3 is both safe and sustainable

I was once told on a flying supervisors' course that the only certain way to do this was to fit bigger padlocks to all hangar doors.

soddim

19th Apr 2010, 15:56

Proud of The Sun - using comments taken directly from PPRune too. Shame that our senior officers need this sort of reminder to increase flying hours.

Fox3WheresMyBanana

19th Apr 2010, 17:45

To chuck in a slightly different angle; what do the Flight Safety Officers have to say about this? I was an SFSO for a bit, and understood that part of my job was to say what everyone else was thinking. One had the option to phone up Harry Staish or even the Air Force Board about this sort of thing. A quick flick through the log book shows 220 hrs per year on my first tour (around 1990). And yes, decreasing hours and likely consequences thereof was on my PVR form. It's very hard to criticise the JP or his authoriser directly, as the frontline has been trying to keep going the proud RAF tradition of doing everything with nothing. A senior USAF Officer once told me "If you guys had our airplanes, we'd still be a colony." I think the responsibility for Nige & Kenny (RIP) has to lie with the Senior RAF types who accepted the loss of hours.

Chugalug2

19th Apr 2010, 18:46

F3WMB:
I think the responsibility for Nige & Kenny (RIP) has to lie with the Senior RAF types who accepted the loss of hours.
Amen to that Fox3, but responsibility is a very eroded concept these days. "Senior RAF types" had the responsibility for adhering to the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations and yet issued a Release to Service to a type so grossly unairworthy that Boscombe Down grounded theirs and begged the RAF to do the same. It didn't, with fatal results. Despite a current SIB investigation into airworthiness enforcement irregularities, I'm not holding my breath waiting for such "Senior RAF types" to assist them with their enquiries let alone face charges. All are equal under Military Law in the RAF, but "Senior RAF types" are more equal than others it seems. Meanwhile other squadron commanders operating other types face similar cutbacks to the minimum monthly training allocations and have to try anything and everything to keep their guys current. Responsibility just stops with them these days it would seem.

Safeware

22nd Apr 2010, 22:32

Sorry BGG, been away on holiday. Nice to know you're hanging on for me tho :)

Anyway,Back to the question I was trying to get to the bottom of, and I was hoping S/W might answer. What assumptions are the human error stat used in the fault trees based upon. It seems logical that it is based upon an average level of training and competence rather than the average number of keystroke errors a secretary makes. When I have looked at fault trees, the human error case is considered in many accident chains. If this assumption is invalidated because of lack of flying hours then the safety case also becomes unravelled.

Specifically, I don't know about "the fault trees" you talk about however, as has been pointed out, Def Stan 00-56 used to give figures that have commonly been used. They're not there now, and Def Stan 00-250 (used to be 00-25) is the HF def stan. An issue I have often had to argue about was how people had used such figures, particularly when it was to mitigate a piece of kit with poor reliability to achieve the technical airworthiness target.

eg lets say in the case of the 43 Sqn Tornado there was a piece of kit that could provide a warning that CFIT was an increasing risk. Lets say it provided warnings to both crew, but had a probability of failure of 1E-3.

It would not be uncommon to see safety arguments that said that this was ok as it required the kit to fail, AND the nav to fail to notice AND the pilot to take notice and take appropriate action. Hence the prob of CFIT would be shown as of the order of 1E-9. The risk of CFIT would therefore be within the airworthiness limit. Right?

Wrong, see my #72: The cumulative probability of the loss of an aircraft due to a technical fault and the cumulative probability of a technical failure of the aircraft (inclusive of its systems, structure and stores) which could result in the death of any air crew or passengers, should both be assessed to be of the order of one in a million per flying hour (probability of occurrence 1x10-6 per flying hour) when operated within the conditions used for the airworthiness demonstration. Deals with technical failures.

Too often, fault trees use the aspect of simply ANDing human failure into the argument to shore up a weak technical argument.

Yes a safety case needs to consider the HF aspects of accidents, and the numbers cited have merit, but people need to be careful how they use them.

As regards the assertion that arguments are also based on average training and competence, yes I agree with what you say. When assessing aircraft tps are considering the ability of the average sqn pilot to handle the aircraft. Being controversial, given the info presented in the accident report, one could ask if that average standard has dropped such that the assessment by tps needs to be adjusted to accomodate for this?

sw

tucumseh

23rd Apr 2010, 15:50

BGG

What assumptions are the human error stat used in the fault trees based upon. It seems logical that it is based upon an average level of training and competence rather than the average number of keystroke errors a secretary makes. When I have looked at fault trees, the human error case is considered in many accident chains. If this assumption is invalidated because of lack of flying hours then the safety case also becomes unravelled.

I agree with Safeware, and the above. It may help if you were to seek out the "Safety Case Policy" manuals from various Aircraft Design Authorities e.g. Westland, BAeS. They are prepared for and used by the DA but, obviously, they meet MoD and CAA requirements and MoD call them up in contracts (or did, in the days when Safety Cases were routinely maintained). Regarding your specific question, the version I have to hand, covering both MoD and CAA, uses this phrase;

".....using emergency procedures but without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength"

which, I think, tends to confirm your assessment of what skills are assumed. It also confirms the assumption of adequate training is a fundamental component of the Safety Case and, hence, the RTS. If training / currency is compromised, so too is the Safety Case and the Master Airworthiness Reference.

I'm afraid I don't know where it is laid down what the flying hours per pilot are, for any given aircraft; someone like me would be more concerned with Fleet Flying Rate, which is stated in the annual EP Assumptions. (Or not, as the case may be. MoD stopped doing this a couple of years after introducing the policy not to routinely maintain airworthiness - 1991. As the funding was denied for the latter, there was no longer any point providing the annual data used to work out how much funding was needed!). Pilot hours is not quite as simple as dividing the Fleet hours by number of pilots, but it would be a rough guide.

Chugalug2

23rd Apr 2010, 22:13

Not sure what point you are making here BGG. Retard asks a question of Safeware who answers it following hellish return journey from ash ridden holiday in a far off country of which we know little. Well, I though I'd put a bit of topical spin on things while we're at it. Tuc adds his bit, endorsing Safeware's post and you go off on one. So what's your point? If it is that we very soft carbon units do not perform predictably to 10-3, or whatever, I think that was what Safeware was saying wasn't it? Or is that is what is just blindingly obvious? What seems blindingly obvious to me is that a whole clutch of professional pilot trainers (don't know about the WSOps) seem to have obsequiously submitted to the bean counters and accepted monthly hours being slashed to a dangerously low level, if comment on this thread is anything to go by. Sh*t happens when good men and women do nothing. All this talk of no experienced pilots and no-one knows any better these days is hogwash. The pity and the shame of the RAF is that a whole lot of what was done over the years, and so concisely described by tuc, was done by very senior and very experienced pilots. Far too many of their juniors have died as a result. Time that people faced up to their duty and responsibility and said No! "Can do" is often the easy way out in such a situation.

Chugalug2

23rd Apr 2010, 22:47

BGG:
That said, I don't disagree with you.
Lol, your ringing endorsements are grudgingly given BGG, if you don't mind me saying so! I may be re-arranging the words in my posts sunshine, though not necessarily in the right order, but they all add up to the same thing. Flight Safety in the Royal Air Force is at a very dangerous low, deliberately driven there by its own senior commanders. Far too many have died as a result, possibly including those in the subject accident of this thread. Your advice to me is calm down? My strong advice to you and anyone else for that matter is get agitated and agitate!

Safeware

24th Apr 2010, 01:15

BGG, cheers :)
I'll have you know i've upgraded - a number of times since. Now on an 09 :P and a nice new fast pc :P

You're right it didn't take rocket science to spot the ANDing, it's just sad that people who believe themselves to be safety engineers come up with such crap.

So, if I tried to answer it, why don't you give us the breadth of your knowledge :)

sw

tucumseh

24th Apr 2010, 04:44

BGG

Having tried to help, you suddenly have a pop.

You say I am "stating the obvious". Well, what is obvious to me, and probably Safeware, certainly isn't obvious to, or even remotely understood by, those in MoD whose job it is to maintain airworthiness. Until it is, and they take the next step and demonstrate a willingness to do the job properly, then it is perhaps worth repeating.

engineer(retard)

24th Apr 2010, 10:33

Thanks S/W, I knew you would get back. Unfortunatley, I have seen the "AND" argument used a lot.

When did the human numbers drop out of 00-56, as I have seen them used recently?

regards

retard

Safeware

25th Apr 2010, 11:05

BGG,

Didn't think there was any thunder to steal - you wanted an opinion from me, duly offered, was just thinking you could give something from your experience - balanced viewpoints and all that.

sw

Safeware

25th Apr 2010, 15:24

Eng(retard),
The HF table was in 00-56 Iss 2 but removed at Iss 3, released Dec 04, so a number of years ago.

sw

engineer(retard)

26th Apr 2010, 10:16

S/W many thanks, was that upgrade to a 2009 or 1909?:)

BGB

As S/W mentions there were numbers in 00-56 and they have been used. The appropriateness of use is where my original question was aimed. The reason I asked when the change came about, is because I have seen the numbers recently. Now that is probably because of the standards called up when the RFQ was put out. However, in the future it could be expensive to take them out as the whole safety case would have to be re-visited and the answer may not be palatable. Additionally, because the guidance has disappeared, I think that some later safety cases are reaching back and still using the Issue 2 numbers because it is assumed that they are legitimate.

regards

retard

Chugalug2

26th Apr 2010, 11:18

BGG:
Whether this through laziness, ignorance, just plain stupidity, or some combination thereof is open to discussion.
I'm afraid that you've omitted the most likely reason that the numbers game has been played out to one end only, ie to slash safety costs, and that is the one theme that permeates the Mull, Parliamentary, Nimrod threads and now this one. That theme is of deliberate preplanned suborning of the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations by very senior professionals, uniformed and suited. It is a classic case of self regulation gone rotten. The MAA as presently constituted will not change that. This is a monstrous scandal, and all those who have served it should be brought to book. Good people have died and more yet will do so until things change radically. More irritating words I'm afraid BGG, but many more to follow I vow!

engineer(retard)

26th Apr 2010, 15:05

BGG

I am not claiming to be a safety engineer, and have not been an airworthiness signatory for some years now, but I understand your argument.

However, these numbers are being applied in the real world for new designs as an assumption, in lieu of justifiable evidence. As I mentioned in a previous post, I have never seen the assumptions challenged when historical data is available. I personally prefer the approach S/W implies; if you remove the human element, does the system stack up as safe. If not then a critical appraisal needs to be carried out. In my experience, this rarely happens.

regards

retard

engineer(retard)

28th Apr 2010, 07:21

BGG

I think we are mostly in agreement and I understand the cost implications if you looked for a wholly fail safe system. However, I think that many system hazards may be masked by the use of the operator figure. If you remove that element from the hazard analysis it would highlight the weaker areas of design. I'm not suggesting this as an approach to design rather to find a method of turning the tones during independent review.

regards

retard

Squidlord

30th Apr 2010, 11:12

engineer(retard):

When did the human numbers drop out of 00-56, as I have seen them used recently

As S/W mentions there were numbers in 00-56 and they have been used. The appropriateness of use is where my original question was aimed. The reason I asked when the change came about, is because I have seen the numbers recently.

I'm not sure whether you mean:

1. you've seen quantitative human error rates assigned
2. you've seen quantitative human error rates assigned in a way that's either in tune with, or explicitly justified by reference to the scheme in Def Stan 00-56, Issue 2, Part 2

If 1, there's nothing wrong, imo, with assigning quantitative failure rates to humans performing specific tasks in specific contexts. You just have to be very careful not to underestimate the true failure rates . So, the use of quantitative human error rates in a Safety Case prepared in accordance with 00-56 (any issue) is not surprising or necessarily a concern (imo).

If 2, then that might be more worrying if the numbers had been used without validating them (this could just be demonstrating that they are not underestimates) but that may have been done. If it has been done then, again, it's not necessarily a concern (imo).

Additionally, because the guidance has disappeared, I think that some later safety cases are reaching back and still using the Issue 2 numbers because it is assumed that they are legitimate.

I certainly see this happen from time to time. In the same way that some projects are "reaching back" and using the obsolescent Def Stan 00-55 (software safety) because since it was made obsolescent there's otherwise been very little MoD guidance material on software safety (this has changed more recently).

I agree pretty much with everything BigGreenGilbert says in his post 153 (though I'll note that "actual experience" is often not available for the kinds of novel situations and scenarios that MoD often encounters). I'll give my answer to his/her implicit question:

the table [of human error rates] in [Def Stan 00-56, Issue 2, Part 2] is an example, and its inclusion highlights the problems with providing examples. The same way as the HRI tables provided in issue 2 have been misused over the years. Whether this through laziness, ignorance, just plain stupidity, or some combination thereof is open to discussion.

Assuming BigGreenGilbert is referring to the "example" risk matrix and associated definitions in 00-56, Issue 2, I think ignorance is at the heart of its repeated misuse. Ignorance of what a risk matrix (and associated definitions) represents, ignorance of what it means, ignorance of what it should be applied to (given that there are often multiple possibilities) and, most particularly, ignorance of how one might construct an appropriate risk matrix (or matrices, as often more than one is needed).

As it goes, I don't think it's particularly easy to construct an appropriate risk matrix. But if a risk matrix is to be used (it doesn't always have to be), it is such an absolutely fundamental part of safety management that it is totally unacceptable that safety managers, in general, should not have the necessary skills to construct an appropriate one. I think MoD are trying to address this as a particularly aspect of their drive to increase the competence of their safety-responsible staff (not that this will address the issue for industry, of course).

Safeware:

eg lets say in the case of the 43 Sqn Tornado there was a piece of kit that could provide a warning that CFIT was an increasing risk. Lets say it provided warnings to both crew, but had a probability of failure of 1E-3.

It would not be uncommon to see safety arguments that said that this was ok as it required the kit to fail, AND the nav to fail to notice AND the pilot to take notice and take appropriate action. Hence the prob of CFIT would be shown as of the order of 1E-9. The risk of CFIT would therefore be within the airworthiness limit. Right?

Wrong, see my #72:

I think there are potentially any number of issues with the argument Safeware critiques above but I'm not sure what it's got to do with post 72. Are you suggesting, Safeware, that in demonstrating adherence to the JSP 553 cumulative risk target, it's not legitimate to take (quantitative) account of the ability of the aircrew to recover safety from hazards or technical failures (e.g., your CFIT warning failure)?

Safeware again:

As regards the assertion that [safety] arguments are also based on average training and competence, yes I agree with what you say.

I disagree. I think safety arguments should be based on the lowest level of training and competence reasonably foreseeable, for the reasons given in my post 131.

BOAC

30th Apr 2010, 13:39

Putting all these 'statmystics' to one side for a moment, it beggars belief how the same RAF can come to two such wildly different findings on the Mull and this accident.

Was it perhaps that there were fewer careers/knighthoods at stake here, plus, of course, a vastly less polically charged accident?

engineer(retard)

30th Apr 2010, 14:28

Squidlord

The answer is (2). What I am not sure is if they have been used because:

a. It is a documented number that they can stand back from if it goes pear shaped.

b An assumption because no other data was available.

c. Because it makes the safety case add up.

d. Its too expensive to come up with their own data for that particular situation.

That said I am not sure that it is a solvable problem until you have fleet data to work form.

regards

retard

Safeware

4th May 2010, 16:07

Squidlord,

No, I don't think you can exclude HF completely, and AMCs for civil Certification Specifications cover 'reasonably anticipated' errors and crew capability. But I don't think 'reasonable' extends to passing the buck to the human because of poor system design and reliance on the human. Def Stan 00-250 Pt 3 is of this view as well:
10.5.11 Combining Equipment Reliability and Human Reliability predictions in Safety Cases Often, the designer must combine equipment reliability predictions (or failure rates) with similar predictions for human actions informal documents such as HAZOPs, fault trees analysis, event tree analysis, probabilistic safety analyses, etc. The foregoing arguments illustrate the difficulties in qualitatively different sets of data.

In such cases, the designer should identify a range of bounding values for Human Reliability, and should initially use such data to identify critical human activities and the sensitivity of the system to human actions. Where system safety is critically dependent on human actions, the designer should aim to reduce the system sensitivity (i.e. produce an error-tolerant design) through iterative design, and to incorporate suitable Workspace / workload and automation strategies to prevent predictable human performance limits being exceeded (e.g. appropriate allocation of functions).

Specialist advice is required where automation strategies are likely to impact on mission or safety critical functionality.

As for defining a safety case in terms of the lowest level of training and competence, I think that is ineffective. If the safety case and RTS for, say, Typhoon, was based on the ab-initio FJ jock on his first sortie, life would be rather restricted. Instead, have a design safety case, airworthiness argument (and RTS) based on the average pilot and then use the management of safe operation to provide the ab-initio with the required comfort blanket of supervision, sortie allocation, currency etc etc to build up/ maintain the skills required. Unfortunately, it seems clear that this is one of the failures in the F3 case.

sw

Chugalug2

5th May 2010, 11:57

BOAC:
...it beggars belief how the same RAF can come to two such wildly different findings on the Mull and this accident.
It's notable certainly, BOAC, but quite understandable I'd say. From what we know now it seems likely that the Chinook HC2 was knowingly forced (what other word for it, given that Boscombe's urgent pleas to not do so were blatantly ignored?) into RAF service in a Grossly Unairworthy condition. Given that it was a mere matter of months later that Mull killed 29, including the cream of the UK's anti-terrorism front line, and that the cause was obscured by lack of evidence (no ADR, CVR or direct witnesses) let alone a 'briefed' BoI that ensured no circumstantial evidence would muddy the water, the need and opportunity to nail the pilots for it was clear to those so implicated. That the nailing was so OTT and incapable of standing up to informed scrutiny is a comment on the arrogance and incompetence of those who wielded such a sledge-hammer to this particular nut! This accident by contrast may well raise similar questions of decisions taken by the RAF Higher Command, but more of poor judgement (ie what are the safe minimum monthly hours for a Typhoon AD pilot?) rather than the Gross Negligence that lead to Mull (and not by the pilots!).

Squidlord

6th May 2010, 10:10

Safeware, thanks for the reply. I understand where you're coming from wrt the combination of system (excluding humans) safety and HF (and agree, for what it's worth). I guess I was maybe mislead somewhat by your choice of example (and I'm still not sure how all this relates to post 72). After all, TAWS/GPWS type systems are really only backups to the main protection against CFIT. And that's the pilot (right?). So, it would seem odd to shift all responsbility for avoiding CFIT onto some technical gizmo - some of that responsibility surely must stay with the pilot, which would suggest it's not only legitimate but essential to take the aircrew abilities into account when determining whether the risk of CFIT is acceptable. I doubt if any TAWS could be engineered to a sufficiently high standard to provide the necessary protection to allow the aircrew to stop worrying about CFIT, as it were (I know you didn't claim that). And given that we have lots of aircraft flying around, apparently safely enough, without any kind of TAWS, it suggests that, in principle, even a relatively unreliable (1E-3) device like the one Safeware suggests would just make things safer (not necessarily true, of course, if the aircrew come to rely on it too much).

As for what you say about average vs. least level of pilot competence, I think we disagree but I'm not even sure now. And if I try and explain, I think I'll just expose my ignorance of how aircrew are trained, when they are considered to be trained, etc.

Incidentally, changing subject, what on earth does this mean (from Def Stan 00-250, Part 3, 10.5.11):

Often, the designer must combine equipment reliability predictions (or failure rates) with similar predictions for human actions informal documents such as HAZOPs, fault trees analysis, event tree analysis, probabilistic safety analyses, etc.

Is it just me (that can't parse this) or is this another case of hopelessly low quality control on what is supposed to be an authoritative MoD document (as in my post 130).

The B Word

23rd May 2010, 21:04

Just been thinking about this and ZE982 was the 13th F3 to be totally lost (ie. Cat 5) - unlucky for some :(.

1. 21 Jul 89 ZE833 CFIT 30nm North East Newcastle
2. 21 Oct 93 ZE858 Catastrophic fuel leak near A66 near Barnard Castle
3. 7 Jun 94 ZE809 Catastrophic engine failure 60nm East of Newcastle
4. 8 Jul 94 ZH558 CFIT near Akrotiri
5. 10 Mar 95 ZE789 Catastrophic engine failure near Donna Nook
6. 30 Oct 95 ZE733 Midair near Boulmer
7. 10 Jan 96 ZE166 Midair near Cranwell
8. 10 Jan 96 ZE862 Midair near Cranwell
9. 28 Sep 96 ZE759 MOD(PE)/BAESYSTEMS aircraft
10. 5 Jun 98 ZE732 CFIT near Flamborough Head
11. 17 Nov 99 ZE830 Catastrophic engine failure near Torness
12. 14 Oct 05 ZE962 LOC near Leuchars
13. 2 Jul 09 ZE982 CFIT near Glen Kinglas

Unless anyone else can correct me?

The B Word

Pure Pursuit

23rd May 2010, 21:54

I remember 3,4 and 6 rather vividly.

Can't think of any others B word. The frightening thing about no.13 is that there was very nearly a no.14 right behind it. Thank god Blacksmith 2's front seater rammed that throttle forward when he did...

The B Word

23rd May 2010, 23:18

Yes, I guess they both owe Kenny and Nige a few beers with St Peter for that...

soddim

24th May 2010, 13:19

The F3 might have been the RAF's 13th but it was not the 13th F3 loss because the RSAF lost two in a mid-air and one off the runway on landing.

Fox3WheresMyBanana

27th May 2010, 19:20

Sobering to think I have half of them in my logbook. ZE 789 was IIRC always in the shed with something broken, and ZH 558 was brand new in 1993.

Safeware

27th May 2010, 19:43

Fox3, re 558
It was the last F3 delivered, the fastest (so I heard) and hadn't even had a primary IIRC!

sw

Fox3WheresMyBanana

27th May 2010, 19:54

I thought that 559 was the last? Either way, I think it was the AOC that nabbed the last delivery flight. I delivered 556 and 557, after very careful walkrounds. They were digging major components out of the training shops to build the last few. Can't say I was upset about not getting the last one.
I remember the time it took for Manchester to approve a climbout heading of "vertical".

Safeware

27th May 2010, 23:32

F3, did a search - sad eh? Apparently both delivered 24 Mar 93!

http://www.tornado-data.com/Production/Production%20List.pdf

sw

Fox3WheresMyBanana

28th May 2010, 13:22

No sadder than I, or we could just call it 'getting our facts straight'. Some data on there is wrong (e.g. ZH557) as the guy running the site admits - he's grateful for updates.
Time to get back to the point; The mechanical / design / engineering accident total doesn't seem to show that the F3 was spectacularly dangerous from that point of view, but what is the overall rate of unknown/aircrew error accidents these days? or if that's class. , is it getting worse? I would have expected a general chopping of hours / currency to show up across the Air Force, rather than on one particular type.
It's very difficult to comment from such a distance in time, but deep valley-bashing with the big jugs on, especially half-full and down that valley, is not something I would even have considered. It's not something I would have expected Nige to do; but something led to him, and the other 3, thinking it would be OK. I suspect it's down to familiarity with low level. I remember around 1990 getting about 40+ hours a year of LLOL affil / sweep / whatever. There'll be less now then. Perhaps more importantly, how much do baby pilots get now through flying training, and who with (i.e. recent operational types, which I had even back on the UAS)?

Distant Voice

13th Jan 2019, 10:55

Does anyone know how I can get in touch with any family member of either Flt Kenneth Thompson or Flt Nigel Martin?. I have information that could be of interest to them.

Please PM only

DV

SASless

13th Jan 2019, 11:38

I doubt if any TAWS could be engineered to a sufficiently high standard to provide the necessary protection to allow the aircrew to stop worrying about CFIT, as it were (I know you didn't claim that).

A question from someone with no experience in all of this....I fully grasp the difference between TAWS since it has found its way into Helicopters finally and have read up on Terrain Following Radar (ie. F-111 and other newer and better systems both US and UK).

As terrain following radar autopilot systems exist now....could not that be incorporated into latter Marks or Types at not a lot of additional expense?

The comments about lack of training and reduced flight hours due to budget cuts is very accurate as is the concern of general lack of experience in the new pilots arriving for operational duty with limited exposure to this type of flying.

Yet we all started out as newbies and managed not to weed ourselves out along the way.

Was it our skill and training or just plain old fashioned luck that prevented us from joining the ranks of the departed?

Distant Voice

14th Jan 2019, 13:51

This was an accident in which the State was implicated, and according to the Crown Office’ s own manual, plus guidance from Lord Cullen, mandated an Inquiry which engaged Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Such an inquiry calls for an independent and effective investigation which is open to a sufficient element of public scrutiny and appropriately involves the nearest relatives. In other words an FAI, but one was not called.

DV

oldmansquipper

14th Jan 2019, 16:05

Ahh. 558. AKA "tango in the night'
IIRC, It was ON the runway at AKR not "near" ?

Tashengurt

14th Jan 2019, 18:01

Ahh. 558. AKA "tango in the night'
IIRC, It was ON the runway at AKR not "near" ?

I think you're confusing incidents OMS.
558 was a 43 Sqn jet that flew into the sea.
Flt Lts Walker and Orme were killed.

Distant Voice

14th Jan 2019, 19:13

I think you're confusing incidents OMS.
558 was a 43 Sqn jet that flew into the sea.
Flt Lts Walker and Orme were killed.

Not sure what you guys are talking about, I am talking about the Kinglas accident

DV

57mm

15th Jan 2019, 14:42

Fox3 has a valid point. The F3 with fuel in the 2250ltr tanks had a severely limited flight envelope. Whoever thought of low flying in this configuration was, how shall I put it, mistaken.

falcon900

16th Jan 2019, 08:32

DV's recent post caused me to revisit the incident report, and I was struck by the fact that the report was silent on the point made by 57mm above.
Even in a best case scenario, the route chosen was highly marginal for aircraft in Lima fit. That Blacksmith 2 came within 1 second of a similar fate surely proves the point, and we can all be thankful that we were saved from the horror of two fully serviceable RAF aircraft being lost one after the other due to CFIT on a routine training mission.
Surely the biggest contributor to this accident was the choice of route? Surely there was some form of review / sense check? Given all of the other checks and sign offs preflight, surely someone other than the crews had to approve this? Glen KInglass is hardly on the dark side of the moon, and must surely have been flown over/ through on many occasions by many fast jets. Its challenges must have been well understood corporately, such that there should have been an appreciation by all concerned that this flight would be pushing the boundaries to a considerable degree.
Despite the multiple acknowledgements of this after the event, I would have expected the report to make much more of the fact this wasnt identified beforehand.