Military principles

[Canadian Break]

I know this is a Light Blue forum and I'm about to ask an army type qustion, so excuse me while I put my body armour on:ouch:! This is, however, a serious question (research for an OU essay) and I'm sure some knowledgeable chap here will have the answer. I seem to remember from somewhere that, to be successful, an attacking force should outnumber the defending force 3:1 - anyone got any reference for that? Here's hoping.
CB

[countdeblades]

Two up, one back and stacks of smoke!!! :ok:

[rock34]

No reference without sticking my head in a PAM, and even then it might not be in there. It's just one of those principles that gets drummed into you.

Personally, I'd go in echelon, right flanking with bags of smoke whilst support weapons brassed the place up.

[Double Zero]

Like Rock 34 I have no particular reference to point at, and being BAe in an earlier life I've never had to get involved in real fighting.

However lots of books mention the 3:1 ratio as the standard necessity for any invading / overtaking force - one source which might suit your needs is ' One Hundred Days ' by Admiral Sandy Woodward, re. the Falklands 1982.

Good luck with the O.U, and this may be an aviation site, but it ain't light blue, plenty of FAA & Army aviators around !

DZ

[Pontius Navigator]

CB, don't forget to point up where 3:1 was not the case. Battle of Thermopylae - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Thermopylae) - the Greeks lost but the Persians had even greater superiority.

More accurately even when theoretically 3:1 was not achieved but victory ensured, there may well have been local superiority in time and space.

I have found a reference that should suit your purpose (Google is your friend) but you will see that 3:1 is quoted as Infantry superiority. You will also see reference to time/space that I mentioned.

Article: Evolution of principles of military art. | AccessMyLibrary - Promoting library advocacy (http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-191685812/evolution-principles-military-art.html)

What course are you doing?

PN
BA(Hons) History (Open), BSc(Hons) (Open)

[S76Heavy]

Seem to remember it is also dependent upon the nature of the defensive structures and the intensity of the exxpected resistance. AFAIK the US invasion of Japan would have required larger numbers than 3:1 due to the expected fanatical opposition. One of the reasons they chose the nuclear option.
On the other hand, the Blitzkrieg in 1940 might have had local superiority in numbers, but above all superiority in mobility (acting as a force multiplier) as well as flying artillery (Luftwaffe tactical air support).

I suppose as long as you can make a convincing case, any number goes..theoretically :8

[L J R]

...Go nuclear early - surprise them all.

[airborne_artist]

Ask the US forces landing on Omaha beach about superiority ratios.

A well dug-in force with good weapons and training could resist a force 10x bigger if the attacking force had no CAS/NGS.

[helo425]

This has got to be in either Clausewitz or SunTzu.

Heard it reciently but cannot rember in which volume.

[tucumseh]

I don’t think one can simply say 3:1, but there is the “Principle of Four” enshrined in the Manoeuvrist Approach which illustrates the general requirement for numerical superiority of Land forces. The Commander needs:

1.Forces to provide fire to fix an enemy.
2.Forces to Move or Strike
3.A Second echelon to regenerate and support the main effort
4.A Reserve to deal with the unexpected.

These Four elements need not be identical. I suppose this is very simplistic and their effectiveness would depend on “rear” forces, such as artillery, logistics etc, and Air superiority. As our Government doesn’t think such things important, the ratio is probably nearer 10:1, always assuming the ammo has been issued (and the rifle works)! And they have a working radio to call for help with. And a decent armoured vehicle to Manoeuvre in.

[Double Zero]

I'm not sure what the last mailer was referring to, the 3:1 ratio has been quoted for a very long time, way before WWII.

The Americans at Omaha beach suffered heavy casualties because they faced a well dug-in enemy with a vastly superior position ( and weapons ) despite the Allies having Air Superiority, almost Supremacy.

One good soldier in the right place, with rations & ammo', can fend off an army; ( the fictional but realistic book & film ' Brown on Resolution ' springs to mind ) but only for so long, which of course is where the superiority in numbers comes in - as the Falklands participents mentioned, the 3:1 ratio is regarded as standard from the Iron Age to present, but of course it varies if say the defenders have nukes & the attackers have spears !

[Melchett01]

Two up, one back and stacks of smoke!!!

Don't forget that smoke is a double edged sword! (unless it demonstrates a standard Gaussian plume distribution, in which case it is fairly predictable).

However, with the right enablers and multipliers used intelligently, effectively and at the right time, a numerically inferior force stands a pretty good chance or winning.

As I recall, McCarthur made great use of his enabling assets during the UN forces' break out from the Pusan perimeter against a vastly larger force. Indeed it was only things like his use of tactical SIGINT which prevented his forces from being wiped out before they had even started the fight back.

Just one example I know, but it does serve to demonstrate the point that numbers aren't everything. Just ask the boys wandering round here with black bars over their eyes!

Melchett BSc Geography MSc Meteorology.

[Herod]

Wasn't it Patton? "Get there fastest, with the mostest"

[Wholigan]

3:1 definitely applies to "Risk"! ;)

[Been Accounting]

3:1 goes back to the Romans

[davejb]

(US) Civil war general Nathan Bedford Forrest,

Forrest is often erroneously quoted as saying his strategy was to "git thar fustest with the mostest," but this quote first appeared in print in a New York Times (http://www.pprune.org/wiki/New_York_Times) story in 1917, written to provide colorful comments in reaction to European interest in Civil War generals. Bruce Catton writes:
"Do not, under any circumstances whatever, quote Forrest as saying 'fustest' and 'mostest'. He did not say it that way, and nobody who knows anything about him imagines that he did."[34] (http://www.pprune.org/#cite_note-33)

...not Patton, who probably was even more blunt and direct....

3:1 is an oversimplification (a rather gross simplification in my never humble opinion), for example there's a difference between having superiority of numbers globally and locally - and quality of equipment, preparation, and training will all skew things. Caesar, for example, won plenty of battles against numerically superior opposition, whilst WWI amply illustrated that numbers don't mean a thing against a well entrenched and prepared enemy.

Dave

[Archimedes]

Where to start (those with a low tedium threshold, look away now...)?

First, you could look up FW Lanchester's equations and Paul K Davies, Aggregation, Disaggregation, and the 3:1 Rules in Ground Combat (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR638/) might help, and you might find Kicking Butt by the Numbers (http://www.designersnotebook.com/Columns/064_Kicking_Butt_By_the_Number/064_kicking_butt_by_the_number.htm) useful

If you're looking for more general references, the bunfight between Mearsheimer and Epstein in International Security from the 1988-89 timeframe might fit the bill. In simple terms, Measheimer wrote an article in 1982 about why the Soviets couldn't win in Europe - 'Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe', International Security Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer, 1982), pp. 3-39, and some years later, Epstein wrote a piece in the same journal calling into question the 3:1 force ratio, and the fun (?) started...

The specific references:

Joshua M Epstein, 'Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe', in International Security Vol 12 No 4 (Spring 1988) pp.154-165

John J Mearsheimer's response, 'Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics' in International Security, Vol 13 No 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 54-89,

Response to Mearsheimer by Epstein, 'The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model and the Future of Security Studies' International Security, Vol 13 No 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 90-127

And a response to Mearsheimer by Col Trevor Dupuy, 'Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule' in International Security, Vol 14 No 1 (Summer 1989) pp.195-201. (Dupuy felt that Mearshiemer's piece criticising Epstein's views was in fact more critical of him [Dupuy])

The debate was hotting up nicely and on the verge of getting into proper academic bitching when the Berlin Wall fell and spoiled it all... :ouch:


Archimedes (MA, Killing Threads with Dull But Hopefully Helpful Info)

[Clockwork Mouse]

3:1?
How did the Paras win Goose Green then? There's a lot more to it than numbers.

[soddim]

Although quantity has a quality all of its' own, technological superiority can overrule the long-held theories of numerical strength.

The David versus Goliath type of conflict where one has a weapon that is devastatingly accurate and the other has not is today's type of warfare. The old days of ground pounders slogging it out in hand-to-hand fighting produced the numerical equations that might not be valid in modern warfare.

However, since the media nowadays accompany the forces to battle and public opinion heavily influences politicians, if western forces take casualties or non-combatants are killed or maimed, the will to continue influences the outcome. A quick victory is most palatable - a prolonged conflict tends to result in compromise.

[fallmonk]

Look up "Battle of Mirbat in Oman"

9 SAS soldiers
30-40 Omani soldiers, gendarmes, and militia facing
250 Adoo guerrillas

plus not forgetting the RAF' help in straffing and dropping a 500lbs bomb on the Adoo position ,

Numbers generaly win every time , and I would rather the odds where in my favour BUT a well armed/ trained force can do suprisingly well!!!!!!!

[VinRouge]

This has got to be in either Clausewitz or SunTzu.

Heard it reciently but cannot rember in which volume.Its more of the former than the latter. With modern weaponry, does this still hold true? We didnt approach anywhere near 3:1 in GW2, with the ability of destroying moving vehicles in sandstorms, with a single B1 armed with in flight updateable JDAM. How many B-17s would that have taken during WW2?

A more appropriate ratio these days must be the ratio of troops on the ground to local population, especially in this coin centric world.

If we go up against a massive land army, do we need 3:1 ratio of tanks for example? Or can we use a single GR4 with 12 brimstone to redress the balance. This is the whole point of netcentric. By increasing the offensive power and SA of a smaller number of assets, you can now focus and CONCENTRATE FORCE much more easily.

By going after the achilles heel, ie centre of gravity, you also minimise the required amount of projected force to achieve an aim. In the GW1 and 2 examples, this would be the highly authoritarian Iraqi leadership structure. Take out the lead ING tank and the conscripts in the 20 vehicles behind go AWOL. In other wars, that may be the will to fight, or some national infrastructure system (electricity, water, oil, or how about the internet?)

Anyone expecting wide-scale assault purely based on numbers these days needs to look at the last few conventional wars we have fought. The next "big one" will be fought across national boundaries, with combatants able to attack national infrastructures across the internet, as opposed to the physical location of the battlefield. Imagine the carnage that would result if national communications networks were disrupted? That to me is our "centre of gravity" that can be exploited by some geek on the other side of the planet.

[larssnowpharter]

As others have suggested:

There's a lot more to it than numbers.

And you may wish to title your thesis/paper along those lines and then destroy the hypothesis. History is full of examples.

One of the earliest was the Battle of Thermopylae when around 2-3000 Spartans, Thespians and Thebans held off a force estimated at 500,000. The naval battle at Salamis shortly after is another example.

Study the tactics of the 'Horse People' from the steppes. They had never heard of the 3:1 ratio.

Look at Hannibal in Italy; Cannae. Perhaps the biggest loss of life until the Somme in warfare. Roughly equal numbers on each side.

Throw in a bit about how Mao strutted his stuff whilst vastly outnumbered.

Others have quoted more recent examples.

The fact is that superior equipment, training, morale and tactics are a force multiplier. May not always prevail, however.

Suspect the 3:1 was a Clauswitzian thing but not sure. Fellow has a lot to answer for.

[Double Zero]

No-one is suggesting it's as simple as ' Have 3:1 superority and you'll win a ground battle ', modern weapons and practices have seen to that; the mailer who mentioned Goose Green had a point, a well trained, motivated force - even not particularly well armed - can knobble one far larger in numbers; but it was a close run thing, the Argentinians having 20mm rapid anti-air cannon which could be depressed low enough to wreak havoc.

However, speaking of the Falklands I think you'll find Admiral Woodward and his colleagues in planning did indeed refer to the 3:1 ratio as a ballpark figure, not relying on it but quoting it historically ; ' One Hundred Days ' by Sandy Woodward, I think also mentioned by others involved in that war, if I get time I'll look them up.

[GreenKnight121]

A different 3:1 ratio...

Napoleon said that in battle, the moral is to the physical as three to one.

[teeteringhead]

About Mirbat ...

plus not forgetting the RAF' help in straffing and dropping a 500lbs bomb on the Adoo position , ... shurely shome mishtake ...

SOAF Strikemasters in support (might have had RAF Loan Service pilots, but might not have .....)

[VinRouge]

Didnt current CDS get his afc for action in Oman?

[fawkes]

I think the ratio is more figurative than actual, but the point is well made - you have to mad or desperate to attack without some sort of advantage.
IIRC Bernard Montgomery preferred odds of 15 -1. On the other hand
many of Alexander the Great's victories were against vastly superior numbers, but unless numbers are actually brought to bear they are spectators.

Superior equipment and training are force multipliers, and can redress the numerical balance but ultimately warfare is not about mathematical attrition and body counts, but about morale - breaking the will to fight of the opposing force.

Saul David's populist books "Impossible victories" and "Agaisnt all odds" are worth reading to point you at the exceptions that prove the rule.

[teeteringhead]

Didnt current CDS get his afc for action in Oman? .... no, I think that was during his time on Jags - it was certainly post Oman.

As a Loan Service officer in Oman, wearing the Sultan's uniform, he could have earned (and been allowed to wear on RAF uniform) the Omani Distinguished Service Medal (AFC equivalent) or Distinguished Service Medal for Gallantry (DFC equivalent). In fact he only wears (the last two on the end, after the Jubilee Medal) the Dhofar Campaign Medal and the As Sumood Medal.

Edited to add:

Jock's AFC:

In March 1983, Stirrup, by then a Squadron Leader, was serving as a Flight Commander on No. 226 Operational Conversion Unit which was based at RAF Lossiemouth. His duties centred around the instruction of trainee pilots on the SEPECAT Jaguar. On 7 March 1983, Stirrup was carrying out a student progress check from the rear seat of his aircraft when they suffered a serious bird strike. Stirrup was unable to ascertain whether his student was conscious and forward vision through the canopy was obscured. One of his engines caught fire, and although ejecting from the aircraft would have been justified, not knowing whether the student was conscious or not, Stirrup managed to land at RAF Leuchars. Stirrup was later awarded the Air Force Cross for his actions.

[Double Zero]

Thermopylae was a case in point, amazingly ' Thespians ' is no misprint, and though this may be the original phrase, the Spartans were indeed backed up by actors; thinking about it I'd run like hell, faced with a screaming horde of Luvvies & Danny La Rue's !

The Battle of Mirbat in Oman was a classic, superb action by SAS; there is a documentary about it on Sky TV, repeated fairly often.

Like Rorke's Drift ! Another example to disprove 3:1, to put it mildly.

Maybe the Alamo and ' Black Hawk Down ' ( please read book, don't bother with the film ) are also worth mentioning.

I do still say the upper UK Officers in the Falklands do refer to the classic 3:1 ratio, as a historical point to worry about rather than any such numbers they could deploy.

[Canadian Break]

Chaps, thanks for all the useful (and not quite so useful, but very amusing) steers. The context is WW1 and the course is AA312 Total War and Social Change: Europe 1914-1955. In places the course literature seeks to underline certain theories based on body count, but nowhere can I find any reference to the fact that as one side was attempting to do more advancing than another an 'uneven' body count could have been expected. Thanks again to one and all. CB.

[VinRouge]

You may want to look at the origins of the Germans Storm Troopers in which case.

Stormtrooper - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stormtrooper)

[Flarkey]

I was once told that the 3:1 ratio really comes down to the land commander's ability to control forces during an attack....

It makes it much simpler if all he has to think about is "This one, that one, and the other one!"

[barnstormer1968]

I was only ever taught to have a three to one scenario (at least).

Something I always found to be of massive importance was the time of the attack.

I would find it difficult to mention any numbers involved and their pro's and con's without adding a ref to the actual start (of attack) time. Whether this involves a large force, or even tiny numbers (including whether to attack when the nearest sentry has just come on stag, or is just going off. Just coming on being my personal favourite, as his eyes will not have adjusted yet, and will not know which sounds/movements to ignore).

A good commander will also try to take into account the religious or cultural habits of his/her opponent. There may be 1000 troops stationed at a base for example, but most of us would realise that they may not all be there at certain times (7pm on Friday for Brit troops, or ramadan etc for others).

The experience of the attacking troops will also be important. In a force of 400 average western soldiers with no combat experience, it is reckoned that in the initial attack, only 300 would be shooting to kill, thus removing 25% of the advantage. This of course would be very different in seasoned troops, as would their communication skills and battle drills.

Just my two penneth.

[Clockwork Mouse]

In any operational planning, only military amateurs think first of combat. Professionals think of logistics. Logistics is the life-blood of war.

[The Old Fat One]

Canadian,

I wouldn't worry too much. I did OU 87 to 93...

My experience you could send in your bank statement and you'd still get 60%.

Awesome summer school in Bath though....toga, toga

[chippy63]

As has been pointed out by folk much better qualified than me, it's not just numerical factors. Terrain, training, morale, equipment, element of surprise, intel, logistics, casevac, weather, orbat mix, symmetry, etc. Even stuff like weather: eg the sun will be in our eyes at that time.
Google "force multiplier".