Nil wind rig operations

[VH-XXX]

Someone on an offshore rig (an offshore worker) was telling me that they were stuck there for a couple of days because of the recent nil wind conditions offshore (Victoria).

What would be the reason for this?

Are the S76's so close to the bone in terms of weight / fuel single engine climb performance in nil wind that they won't fly off a rig?

Are the operators just being tight in that they only want to go out with a full load and will only do that if there's wind?

Also is it usual practice to do the agressive dive off the platform coming within only feet of the ocean in order to fly out safely to gain speed I again assume for single engine operations?

Thanks, just curious as a fixed wing owner.

[Nigel Osborn]

Basically 'no" to all your queries. Diving off the rig should not be necessary, maybe just a pilot showing off to his pax. Nil wind doesn't matter, just calculate your take off weight accordingly.

[spinwing]

Mmmm ...

Yup .... I agree with Nigel ... In fact there are times when a windy day can require more power to take off from a rig then a calm day (all depending on deck construction, T/O direction and deck turbulence).


:)

[Brian Abraham]

Diving off the rig should not be necessary, maybe just a pilot showing off to his pax
Falling off the edge of the rig was, and perhaps still is in some quarters, standard practice. I note your "should not" though Nigel.

Also is it usual practice to do the agressive dive off the platform coming within only feet of the ocean in order to fly out safely to gain speed I again assume for single engine operations
On a take off there is a period where an engine failure may deposit you in the wet stuff. Depends on environmental conditions and weight as to whether you can get away with it. Speed is life when marginal and beyond. With a failure in the 76 you can get very close and personal with said wet stuff in making a successful fly away, as in 5 feet, and that's doing everything by the book in relatively benign conditions.

[topendtorque]

The original query sounds like all cock an bull to me. can you imagine a mob of rear seat hanging-rail pax being all cheery and friendly while some clown trotted out those sorts of stories for two days?

WRT to diving off a small height, may I relate it as a dangerous pastime and illustrate.
It goes like this.
One clown that I had working for me once had developed the self same habit. diving off the pad over the edge with a clearance of about fifty feet, usual doctor from the left quarter front, albeit behind a few trees to the left. get the picture? wind tumbling over the edge even on a light wind day.

It was something of which I was oblivious otherwise what did happen would not have. Yep you guessed it, not quite enough speed or wind.

As he neared the bottom below the parapet, flaired, picked up a sickening dropping feeling, and rolled the bloody thing up in a whole heap of large rocks and flying debris.

All three pax bounced out with barely a scratch. very lucky, so was he many years later as he was gratuously handed a safety award and his citation mentioned that he had a nil accident record!!

yessir, it's a funny industry this one of ours.

I cordially suggest always lift and hold on its own engine merit, provided both horses are still kicking, in a climbing attitude, howsoever slow a RofC it be.

[VH-XXX]

I'm not sure on the model of s76, Brian A would know what they are. Unless they upgraded from 10 years ago they would be just S76C. Have heard a few underpowered stories from out that way including hovering for lengthy periods as the jet-a burns off before being able to take off and the runway not being long enough in some conditions however I believe all in a days work when driving an S76 in those conditions.

[Squeaks]

Doubt it. The operator will charge the customer whether they are carrying one passenger or ten. More likely the customer was being cost efficient!

The 'customer' owns the operation and S76's: there is no monetary commercial aspect to the flying.

[parabellum]

may I relate it as a dangerous pastime


Regarding going over the edge of the pad and then going down before going up - in the Arabian Gulf in the summer and Autumn, in something like a WS55 series 3, if you didn't use the pad height above the sea to your advantage then you would most certainly have met the warm, wet stuff not far from the rig.

I think it is wrong to say, 'No, don't do it, regardless' - from my experience it is the pilots call on the day taking into account the prevailing conditions, there can be no hard and fast rules, either way.

[VH-XXX]

The 'customer' owns the operation and S76's: there is no monetary commercial aspect to the flying.

I would argue that this would NEVER be the case! Just ask the head of flying operations about his yearly budget. If finances were not an issue you would not be needing to dive off the deck as you wouldn't always be at or near MTOW.

[Squeaks]

XXX,

I would expect that you are referring to Esso's helicopter operation out of Longford. They own the operation, they own the helicopters, the S76C's only fly to support their production platforms. The S76's are not there to make a profit, they are there to support the Bass Strait oil production.

Where is the commercial pressure to operate any way but safely and professionally?

[VH-XXX]

I'm not suggesting that they are unsafe in any way. I am suggesting however that there are ALWAYS commercial pressures regardless of the operation type. Do you not think that every aviation operation would have a budget? If not they would be flying no less than 2 year old machines half loaded as an example. There is a fine balance usually driven by finances.

[Brian Abraham]

Have heard a few underpowered stories from out that way including hovering for lengthy periods as the jet-a burns off before being able to take off and the runway not being long enough in some conditions
They are 76C at Esso.

Re runway. There was a great deal of misunderstanding in the operation as to the requirements of Category A (full accountability for an engine failure), and Category B where there is no accountability. The charts published by the company for Cat A operations were remiss in not taking into account the distance required for a failure after the critical point, accelerating, and climbing to the screen height. There is no requirement to operate to Cat A, but despite trying to get the company to acknowledge that their Cat A was not necessarily Cat A, nothing had changed up to the time I left in 04. You can imagine the result of a failure after the critical point and a chap thinking he is Cat A capable, and finding he is not. BBQ anyone? :ooh:

Platform take off. The book procedure was to have 3% N1 margin between hover and max available. Climb vertically to 25 feet on the RADALT with at least 200 ft/min and rotate. Not always complied with as the ethos was get the bloody job done. Platforms did not have temp gauges (despite the company standards manual) so you would never knew if you were going to be over your max landing weight, and a couple of interesting events took place as a result. Planning of the take off weight could be problematical at times, and I recall having to drop 600 lbs below the book figure once. Never resorted to it personally, but did hear of the burning off of fuel to get off with the load required.

You may think there is no commercial pressure, and in a sense you are correct. But, management made it plain that pilots were to do what they were told, and remember their salary is subject to a yearly appraisal. Going to kick the traces? Unions have their place. Pretty much lip service was paid to standards. CASA went so far to add a supplement to the flight manual spelling out the alternate requirements, on top of those contained in the ops manual and AIP's. Why did we not provide for alternates? The chances of anything going wrong and requiring use of an alternate are so infinitesimal that it need not be worried about was the company reply. With logic like that you have an uphill battle on your hands.

Oh and did I mention the budget. A manager lived or died by his budget. Spend a penny? Not if you could get away with less, for that's how his appraisal was judged.

[griffothefog]

What happened to hover + 15% (TQ) needed for departure? Sure, after the initial vertical climb and rotation you will sink, but you will also clear the deck with comfort. If we didn't have that margin in the hover, we were expected to offload the appropriate amount of freight/pax. It used to be called common sense!!:ok:

I can associate with diving off the decks in an underpowered 365n way back in the mid eighties, but I put that down to the fact that I was A) single pilot ops, B) young, dumb and full of cum!! :{

It's a no brainer these days....

[hueyracer]

I think that there is a big difference between starting from a "closed" surface or deck (like concrete, for example) or a net.....

On a closed surface, you can hover in ground effect-and use that factor when taking off.

On a net, you are hovering in OGE.

When fully loaded, it can happen that the heli-when coming OGE while reaching the border of the platform-can come into a dive.
This is a really dangerous situation-the tail can hit the deck, or the tail rotor can get into a stall because of the different wind situations, which can result in an uncontrolable turn.

[WLM]

If you are operating a C model, MTOW from the rig, nil wind, you have no choice but to dive off the platform once clear of it to get your airspeed to 60kts ie Vtoss asap; if you don't and have to go on OEI, you will get wet. I have seen too many macho guys simply pulling 101.7 and upwards to prevent that dive... simply stupid in my books

WLM

[check]

There is some c**p written here. If you have to dive off a deck to gain air speed something is wrong, you've cocked up or you’re overweight. If, in your nil wind condition you are about to take off knowing you are going to have to dive for air speed, and when on rotation one of your engines stops what is going to stop you going in the water? If you can make a 15 to 25 foot climb at the recommended rate of climb the amount of dive is slight. Lose an engine now most will recover and fly away with about 10 ft to spare based on a 100ft helideck.

If you are at the correct weight you will take off and fly away without undue diving, even in 76A+. The answer is always in the weight. I have worked with all operators on the British and Dutch North Sea and all had limitations regarding light winds. The 155 was particularly bad and had multiple wind limits. The oil companies were quick to respond to passenger complaints that passengers had been scared by particular crew’s actions.

I have never had a comeback following passenger offloading because of wind and weather conditions.

My rant is regarding leaving the deck from a low hover, and I have been there in my distant past in the Middle East flying a B205, but then all operations were bush and nothing was weighed. Times are different now!

[212man]

The 155 was particularly bad and had multiple wind limits

Really, like what? Why?

[check]

Why? easy - two of the 155 operators on the SNS had a number of overtorques in light wind conditions (fenistron et al) and so a payload penalty was imposed when winds were less than 10 kts. It was found that this payload reduction was not enough in less than 5 kts, and so a further reduction was imposed by the operators. The amount of reduction was set by the individual operators, but was up to 300kg.

By the same token both the 76A+ and B models had wind limitation payload penalties, to varying degrees.

[212man]

I see. Curious as I don't recall a particular problem, but then we always flew in slack winds so possibly didn't find it a shock (compared to being used to windy conditions)

[Eric T Cartman]

Once saw a Bo105 do a go-around from about 20 feet above the helideck & fall off the edge.It was a highly effective method of teaching the goons in the back not to ignore the safety briefing by unclipping their seatbelts before the aircraft had landed :cool:

[NorthSouth]

check:Lose an engine now most will recover and fly away with about 10 ft to spare based on a 100ft helideckAren't you supposed to clear all obstacles by 35ft (JAR-OPS 3 and all that)? I imagine the 35ft is there to allow for variations in pilot technique etc eroding the margin. If the margin's only 10ft it's surely not a margin. If you're at 10ft and still not at Vtoss you still only have one option - keep it going down to give you enough speed to climb.

And what about at night?:eek:

NS

[check]

Northsouth,
You are correct in what you say, however after many years of sim work, I found some made the water, but most kept it in the air but many were down to 10ft or lower. Some are smooth on the controls, some not so. Reaction time between individuals is different and so a target is set and if you are on the ball then perhaps you will meet 35ft. if not, but still dry - you are a still a winner.

[Colibri49]

1985 and I found myself re-employed as junior co-pilot on the S61N after 2 redundancies in 3 years on the North Sea, following 10 years as a military heli pilot. New employer sent me to the Shetland Islands to fly from their Sumburgh base to Shell installations in the East Shetland Basin.

One starry and completely windless night I found myself paired with their worst pilot. He would shout "Shut the f**k up!" to any co-p who tried to read from the checklist and he swatted my hand out of the way when I tried to turn the radar to standby after landing on a helideck. He was a bullying swine and an ignoramus of such matters as performance.

The met info showed nil wind anywhere within 200 miles of the ESB, which was confirmed by the vertical platform flares and limp windsocks. As luck would have it, the last stop of our offshore shuttle was a semi-sub with low helideck and the client wanted a full 19 taken back to the beach.

You can imagine the abuse I got when I dared to suggest shuttling the pax in 2 loads to a nearby platform with a much higher helideck. Now you just have to believe me. We lifted into a low hover with not much more than the prescribed fuel minima to return to Sumburgh. Matched torque was wavering around the max 103% as he tried to gain a couple of feet.

We continued hovering like this for 16 minutes while he muttered rubbish like "waiting for a wind gust". Then an engine fire light glimmered for obvious reasons. To my brief relief he landed and the fire light disappeared quickly. I was starting to undo my harness with a view to getting the pax off for dividing into groups, when the collective shot up.

We leapt (slowly) into the air as the torque went above 110%. On forward rotation, we sank close past the helideck edge and I saw out of the corner of my eye our rotor wash ruffling the mirror-flat sea. The anguished gearbox transmitted the remaining horsepower from screaming engines to struggling blades, while the airspeed increased at snail's pace.

After descending to 10' on radalt we returned to Sumburgh in silence, apart from him telling me about take-off techniques like "bouncing off the cushion". We landed with less than 150 lbs fuel per engine, perhaps 5 minutes before a flame-out.

Next morning I told everything to the spineless chief pilot who told me not to worry myself too much about their very senior captain, who really wasn't nearly as bad as people made out. Why didn't I report it to the CAA? Well, it was one man's word against another and in those days we didn't have IHUMS data recorders. But I moved swiftly to another employer as soon as they accepted my application.

The bullying swine has long since retired and you can imagine what kind of retirement I wish him. I believe it's not for nothing that his colleagues experienced gearbox problems resulting in ditchings.

[NorthSouth]

I'm not a helicopter pilot but have been offshore as a pax a few times, including launching off a semi-sub in the ESB at night in a gale and horizontal rain, sitting in the back in awe at what the guys up front were doing in that split-second transition from dazzling floodlights to pitch black 50ft above a raging sea. I'm very pleased I hadn't heard your story then Colibri49. But I would just like to say that I think the job you guys do/did offshore is amazing.:D
NS

[Deck Clear]

Colibri49 that story is horrifying..I just want reassure non aviators and non North Sea pilots that sort of thing is/was so rare... I've been flying in the North Sea for 30 years and I have never seen anyone else or personally been in, anywhere near, that position....10ft rad alt...Its bad enough at any time to descend below the helideck, never mind just skim the sea. In 1985..in the days before CRM...there were old and scary old captains flying..maybe there still are:} But I can not imagine anyone getting away with the He would shout "Shut the f**k up!" to any co-p who tried to read from the checklist and he swatted my hand out of the way when I tried to turn the radar to standby after landing on a helideck. ...never mind the sort of actions that should have got him grounded immediately.
...thanks for sharing that.
As for nil wind operations, I flew 76s for years and it could be hard work in nil wind at higher weights..especially in the 76A. Now with the superb 139 its a dream...so much power... vertical take off with a fullish load...nice:ok:

[AviatorAtHeart]

I came across this video clip sometime ago. Perhaps it is relevant to the discussion.

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[Colibri49]

You guys can relax a bit. I never met or flew with anyone else remotely like that bullying swine. One thing he was reputed to have done was to “moon” his arse/ass out of the helicopter window while it was being taxied, but I doubt that he could have contorted himself that much in the pilot’s seat. Surely he must have gone to a cabin window, perhaps leaving the co-p to do the taxiing. Some older guys who will remember this story could furnish us with the specifics. Surely he qualifies as the ultimate arsehole.
The greatest leap forward during my ¼ century + on the North Sea was the introduction of regular CRM (Crew Resource Management) courses, which teach pilots how to interact properly with each other and undoubtedly have prevented helicopter and airline accidents due to arguments/sulks/disagreements. Our few remaining potential bullies now have to keep themselves in check, or else!
Another huge advance was IHUMS (Integrated Helicopter Usage Monitoring System) which provides data to engineers on the health/condition of every critical heli component, even down to which gearwheel tooth has a chip or crack. It also acts as a “spy in the cab” to monitor pilots’ control actions which exceed defined parameters. It is said that the Chinook disaster off Sumburgh wouldn’t have happened if IHUMS had been available then.
As regards nil wind operations (which require the most horsepower to transition from hover to forward flight) no helicopter today has such reserves of power that if one engine should fail while transitioning forward and heavily laden, it would be certain not to descend a bit. But a comforting thought is that the statistical chances of this happening at the crucial moment are vanishingly small (never on the North Sea) and when the wind is nil the sea is calm, so ditching is very survivable.
Now I fly the mighty EC225 which has got to be the best for years to come. I’m sorry it’s a bit cramped for the guys in the cabin, but has the best power to weight ratio of the 19 seaters, quickest cruise of 145 + knots, can always carry full fuel with 19 pax on the North Sea, 440 nautical mile range, superb glass displays and automatics which enhance flight safety. Need I go on? Yes it’s more expensive than the S92, but you gets what you pays for. And no bullies allowed!

[Deck Clear]

looks like a downwind take off to me

[WLM]

Deck Clear u could be right as the rescue/tug boat seems to be into the vaves; but it's minimal wind as far as I can see; also the HP sided right of the deck before he went forward and lost his lift...

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Gents, I think the "diving off the rig" scenario is a common misconception of the pax.

Most of us offshore pilots utilise the standard rig take-off technique which can give the pax the impression that we are "diving" the helicopter when we rotate at the theoretical "TDP". Especially if the rotation is overly aggressive which tends to be our instinctive reaction when winds are slack and TOM is high. (Its a good experience just to sit at the back during a rig take-off) not suggesting you vacate a crew seat to do this of course!!!

In Europe we are still operating Class 2 with exposure but the mass of the helicopter should equal that required at least for an AEO OGE Hover, to provide an adequate thrust margin for take-off. See JAR-OPS 3.517.

DB

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

"North South" and "Check",

both of you have your wires well crossed. A clearance of obstacles by minimum 35 feet, is a requirement of full blown performance models such as BCAR Group A or CAT A where the helicopter is required (in the event of OEI - an engine failure) to either continue the take-off or land safely, clearing where necessary all obstacles by the prescribed 35 feet.

It is simply not possible to provide an unequivocal performance solution in the offshore environment. This is because of obstacles, turbulence and the inability of the crew to adequatley plan approach paths into predictive wind flow patterns.

To get around this thorny issue the regulators have long since accepted that under certain conditions the loss of an engine could result in a catastrophic crash. Horrific right!! well it would be if that was the end of the story.

To mitigate this risk the regulators require that the engines are maintained to a certain standard, trend checked and subject to a reliability program and monitored in flight with a full HUMS system. These requirements carried out to reduce in so far as possible, the chance of the engine failing.

Also the flight crew are trained and checked in their flying profiles and procedures to minimise the risks of deck edge impact in the event of OEI. Hence the funny vertical climb followed by swift rotation to clear the deck edge.

There are measures afoot to try and increase the performance criteria for offshore helicopters but so far non has come close to being workable.

I, like all my collegues have come to accept this risk much as we do the chances of the tail rotor failing, which under almost all conditions would result in catastrophy during the early phase of flight.

I think until someone comes up with a better design than Igor Sikorsky's basic original we must live with what we have and continue to improve the monitoring and reliability systems that we have to nail down those pesky in service failures before they actually happen.

The system does seem to work very well.

As for the S76 take-off above...he is either showboating or is not at the prescribed AEO HOGE mass. I have no idea where in the world he is so maybe he is not required (like we are under JAR) to operate to this mass.

Taking off downwind when heavy in the offshore environment is just plain stupid......but we have all done it when the wind appears really slack apart from the residual 5 knots that developed up the arse whilst we were refuelling....right!!!

DB

[Brian Abraham]

Following an engine failure on a rig take off, information was obtained that depicted the profile of an S-76C having an engine failure at CDP. I've built the following illustration based on that information.

Test Conditions
CDP 25 Feet
Sea Level
OAT 30°C
Gross Weight 10,800 Pounds (NB. Book allowed 11,350 under these conditions)

http://i101.photobucket.com/albums/m56/babraham227/n0012.jpg

The RED line is aircraft flight path. Please note the angle of descent. I've included a notional deck edge (BLUE) - I used to keep the upwind edge of the deck just in sight through the chin bubble, so the aircraft would be positioned further back from the deck edge than depicted. The aircraft attitude depicted is 25° nose down, as that is what the copilot says is what we reached.

[Pofman]

Brian,
Surely the helicopter path will be displaced to the right from CDP. There should be upward momentum( thank heavens for Sir Issac) which you convert to forward speed at CDP/Rotation point. This must be part of the technique to get deck edge clearance. If you had no vertical speed at CDP would you not need to use a modified TO technique?

[Brian Abraham]

Pofman, does not show too well on my graph, but the raw data shows the peak at 26 feet. With a called for minimum of 200 feet/min ROC, inertial effects are not going to carry you very high.

Below you can see the effect of reducing the gross weight down to 10,400 pounds (with our aircraft this would typically represent a combined fuel and pax load of 2,431 pounds) with the conditions remaining as before ie CDP 25 feet, OAT 30°C.

http://i101.photobucket.com/albums/m56/babraham227/n0013.jpg

[fender48]

G'day Brian,

Reference your post of 12 Feb....Ouch!

What you describe is circa < 2004 and not present day.

One point to ponder. The term 'alternate' that you refer to and is also used in the Flying Ops manual is inaccurate. AIP dictates the requirements of an alternate and they are required for weather, lighting, and navaids...period.

What you refer to is a land based OEI landing area for the offshore installations that used to be included at the front of the RFM but has now been removed from the RFMs and included in CASA Regulatory Policy CEO-PN029-2005 "Multi - Engine Helicopters Operational Performance Standards" dated July 2005.

The verbage is the same vis:

Full OEI accountability requires the ready availability of an OEI landing area following engine failure or adequate performance following engine failure, which assures continued safe flight.

An area may be selected as an OEI landing area if it has:

A smooth level surface
An obstacle free approach gradient of 5 degrees from 500ft AGL to touchdown
Two directions of approach not less that 150 degrees apart
A strip width of at least 30 meteres
Landing distance available in accordance with requirements of the RFM for OEI landings.The Longford runway meets these requirements. AIP alternate criteria do not apply, CASA confirms this (they most certainly do to IFR and VFR flights with respect to weather, lighting, and navaids). When the Longford runway is nominated as the OEI landing area, a constant weather watch is maintained. If the heliport clags in, the fleet does not fly until it becomes available again. If an advantage can be gained by applying AIP weather minima to the TAF for another unsighted aerodrome such as Bairnsdale, then it can be nominated as the OEI landing area and flights can go ahead.

Also,

New charts have been developed for CAT runway ops taking into account continued takeoff distance and headwind.

New charts have been developed from the RFM HOGE chart for offshore lifting that are dead accurate.

regards,

[WLM]

S76C, Offshore helideck 120', OAT 30C, Nil Wind, QNH 1013: the MAUW is Lbs 10,450

That is what we are supposed to use as reference; but some pilots go to MAUW of lbs11,000 and simply overtorque, overtemp to get out.... seen it many times and when you say something to the contrary, you are looked upon as a sissy

Thanks God for VEMD and HUMs our days on more modern machines, as the "she'll be right" attitude is getting non existant...

[helimutt]

That is what we are supposed to use as reference; but some pilots go to MAUW of lbs11,000 and simply overtorque, overtemp to get out.... seen it many times and when you say something to the contrary, you are looked upon as a sissy

One word! Begins with A, ends with S, has rsehole in the middle! :ugh::hmm:

[Brian Abraham]

Well may you say Ouch!, given the price I paid I think the term should be reserved for myself.

One point to ponder. The term 'alternate' that you refer to and is also used in the Flying Ops manual is inaccurate.

Really!!! I’m not sure to what you refer as “inaccurate”. The manual was quite specific in stating “The PIC shall comply with the requirements of AIP alternate requirements” and also “All offshore operations require a land based alternate”. Certainly most interesting to see you state “AIP alternate criteria do not apply“. I hope you don’t really mean that.

CASA Regulatory Policy CEO-PN029-2005 "Multi - Engine Helicopters Operational Performance Standards" dated July 2005.

I don’t know why they bothered. The requirements were covered in full in the prevailing documents (AIP, Ops Manual, Flight Manual). The Policy document (CEO-PN029-2005) merely regurgitates what was already required/stipulated.

Ops Manual
Whenever a forced landing is made due to weather, an ATSB Incident Report and Level A Early Alert Report are to be submitted.

Having made literally hundreds of shutdowns on platforms due inclement weather at Longford I’m not aware of any reports called for by the above having ever been made. Or does a landing on a platform due to inclement weather at Longford not constitute a “forced landing”.

For the readers, a couple of examples as to how we operated.

Call out in the middle of the night. Management in the Captains seat, moi in the other and having made his displeasure known. A platform is dead in the water with no electrics and personnel need to be moved from one platform to the other to get the down platform back on stream, for production is paramount above all other considerations. Alternate minima for the only available bolt hole is 1,097 feet, with the TAF calling for 8/8ths at 1,100. Launch with 30 minutes reserve fuel and punch into the overcast at 600 feet. No flight plan as required by all regs/ops manual, to do so would be self incriminating (IMC flight). Half way out to platform become VFR on top and not having fuel to do a legit ARA (would add 20 track miles which we don’t have fuel for) conduct an enroute descent and break out at 300 feet. Pick up pax and make a successful landing on the next (destination) platform sans lighting – its got no electrics remember. Having landed, Longford require us to spend the night on the platform as Longford is now closed due weather – surprise, surprise? – well it wasn’t to some.

TAF forecasting fog till 1100, take off made at 0730 and returned at 0915 to find fog rolling over the heliport. At the time of shutdown viz 100 or so feet, fuel remaining 318 pounds (statutory 30 minute reserve 280 pounds). The question was asked of management what would you expect the crew to do had they had an engine failure on the way home with an ETA >0915. You have unwarranted concerns was the reply – and shut the f$&^ up and do what you’re told. Somebody want to reiterate the responsibilities of a PIC?

HC or 212man, there's a job awaiting.

[fender48]

"All offshore platforms require a land based alternate" is NOT (emphasizing not shouting) an AIP requirement, it was written in the Ops Manual, extracted from that defunct para in the RFM and "alternate" is not the correct word as I have painstakingly pointed out. You are wrong about this. We are endorsed by the regulator. What else can be done.

If you can direct me to the whereabouts in the AIP that requires a land based alternate for all offshore platforms (regardless of the weather) then I will gladly comply and apply AIP alternate criteria to it. It does not. As I said, it is a requirement of the Ops Manual taken from the CASA Policy that used to be in the RFM. Therefore AIP criteria do not apply, how we provide that land based OEI landing area is up to us. We do it by real time weather watch at Longford by qualified observers or, if an operational advantage can be gained by using the TAF at an unseen airfield, we DO apply AIP alternate criteria and use it.

You obviously have a beef with management about the way things were done circa 2004 and for the many years before, things are different now. You could have always put your hand up for one of these positions and effected change.

Most criticism in my experience that is directed towards any management comes from the Monday morning quarterbacks in the crew room.

You are well respected for your many years of tireless service and Vietnam experience that I admire and can not conceive of, but there are a lot of things that the current crop have done in helicopters that you haven't.

There has been a complete overhaul of culture and personnel attributes in the last six years.

As for your treatment by the global multinational, can't comment but they are doing all right by the rest of us.

best regards,

[Brian Abraham]

Aaaaaaah, I think I see what you might be getting at.

Regulatory Policy – CEO-PN029-2005
Multi-Engine Helicopters Operational Performance Standards
Performance Standards – Non Passenger Charter, Aerial Work and Private Operations – All Weights
VFR/VFR Night/IFR
For all non-passenger charter, aerial work and private operations, a multi-engine helicopter may be operated without OEI accountability.

Whereas
Performance Standards – Passenger Carrying Charter Operations – All Weights
VFR
En-route. The helicopter, in the OEI configuration, shall be capable of maintaining 500 feet terrain clearance to a location suitable for an OEI landing. Drift down techniques are acceptable to meet this requirement.
Approach and Landing. At the destination or the single-engine alternate, the helicopter in the OEI configuration, shall be capable of maintaining a zero gradient of climb at 500 feet above the landing level.

As for
You could have always put your hand up for one of these positions and effected change.
Why is it deemed necessary to take on a management position to effect change? As she would have said, "Please explain". Management at all levels at the time had absolutely no interest in affecting the slightest change, witness the take off charts - how many years did that take?
there are a lot of things that the current crop have done in helicopters that you haven't
Only too true, and was a major failing within the organisation at that time as no fertalisation from outside sources was to be had. Always inward looking, as when the C models were obtained and the TRE given the responsibility of introducing them to service was not permitted to contact current operators. May have undercut someones empire presumably, he never found who was so anal. Great to see that people of the calibre, and with real world experience, such as CH, HS and the like are on board.
they are doing all right by the rest of us
At the moment. Best keep naivety and rose tinted glasses in the top drawer. ;)

[212man]

HC or 212man, there's a job awaiting

Thanks for the offer (is it your's to make?) I'll stick to the one I have, right now :ok:

Looking at your last post, I see that the operation is private - 'my' operation has obvious parallels, but we went down the AOC route in 1999. One of the reasons was/is that it allows the ability to contract services to third parties, thereby generating revenue.

[Brian Abraham]

Certainly not mine to make 212man (I wish, but unfortunately retyred), but it could do with someone of your expertise to bring a measure of professionalism to the operation. The current incumbents in management, great people though they be, are straight out of the military, with no exposure to the offshore world, other than Longford.

[212man]

but it could do with someone of your expertise to bring a measure of professionalism to the operation

You must be confusing me with someone else.......;)

[fender48]

Hey Brian,

Weren't you straight out of the military? And isn't your offshore experience Longford, Longford, and Longford???

[Brian Abraham]

Sure, the greater part was fender, but not all, and I came to realise the limitations that fact and the sheltered workshop brought with it. Late in life though, and only after the company managed to kill two people and injure eight others, and like the good corporate citizen they are, they tried to duck shove their responsibilities, which took a Royal Commission to bring them kicking and screaming into the real world.

To paraphrase Sergeant Phil Esterhaus, "Be careful out there."

[fender48]

Fair enough Brian,

It would be fair to mention that the fatal incident leading to the Royal Commission was not aviation related.

Rest assured that the current crew are slowly overcoming the inertia of the most centralised multi national on the planet.

We are shopping for a new fleet as you will know, have a new roster that has been in service for 14 months now and working a treat (happy pilots), an Interdyne fatigue measuring system and the list goes on.

I always did enjoy flying the Bass Strait line with you and getting stuck into meaty discussions.

all the best

[floatsarmed]

Are the Esso guys on an equal time roster now?

[trapezoid]

Yes floatsarmed,

4 days ON, 4 days OFF
fixed base home every night
42 days annual leave

T

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Brian,

I "See you" (AVATAR wise). What you describe in your post about that management pilot is truly horrific. I know it is easy said, and somewhat harder to practise, but we should always work as a crew, and that means our decisions (within reasonable limits) default to the lowest common denominator. Ie if one crew is not happy, the other should listen and act accordingly.

My view is that management must not "interfere" in a Commanders decision when it is based on safety, but it is entirely appropriate for them to question our processes and comment as appropriate. After all, it may be that the Commander is simply unsuitable for the role in which he has been employed.

Thankfully I work for CHC Scotia, and I have to say that majority of our management "interference" is actually the other way round - ie "Why did you continue" "Why did you do that" and generally aimed at maintaining safety rather than errodding it.

Long may it remain that way.

DB