Tutor Mid-air report. [Archive]

mary meagher

7th Jan 2010, 20:59

Midair collision happens because neither pilot saw the other in time to take
evasive action. There are a lot of contributing factors involved here, not just the white colour of the Tutor.

1) Some witnesses mention that one of the aircraft performed a wingover shortly before the collision. Does this imply showing off? with insufficient lookout before performing maneuvers?

2) The structure of the Tutor canopy certainly offers an obstruction to the view. This requires an even more careful scan, many aircraft suffer from airframe blocking the view.

3) One of the pilots was wearing corrective lenses. I don't see mentioned if these were varifocals or not, varifocals screw up your peripheral vision.

4) I cannot imagine that wearing a bonedome improves your field of view or makes it easier to look around.

5) Should it not be part of the PIC's training to practice actually jettisoning a canopy -preferably on soft grass.

6) Taking off together in close formation is a very military sort of thing to do, is the usual thing to carry on then flying near each other? Without a plan, or a qualified observer in radio contact with the other aircraft, this was asking for trouble. Formation flying, or ariel photography require special care. Flying kids around requires even greater care.

I suggest that if the military are responsible for flying kids around, that they do not takeoff together, that at least 10 minutes should space their departures, that the sortie be plannned to be separate, to different areas, the flights to be planned and the plan followed.

Anonystude

7th Jan 2010, 22:05

Mary,

I appreciate you might not be fully informed, so I'll give you the benefit of the doubt rather than assume you're some journo out fishing...

1) Some witnesses mention that one of the aircraft performed a wingover shortly before the collision. Does this imply showing off? with insufficient lookout before performing maneuvers?

A properly performed wingover is a lookout manoeuver, not an aerobatic one. Not showing off in the slightest, it allows the best possible view into the area you're planning to perform aerobatics, particularly under wings and things like that. In other words, no - not showing off in the slightest, merely trying (unsuccessfully) to clear the airspace.

2) The structure of the Tutor canopy certainly offers an obstruction to the view. This requires an even more careful scan, many aircraft suffer from airframe blocking the view.

Yes, it does. That's why lookout is in the assessment criteria for every EFT syllabus trip, why it'a drilled into student and experienced pilots alike -- not just for safety but also because we're training these studes to be military operators of aircraft where seeing the bad guy first may be the difference between a war sortie completed and getting shot down. The EFT lookout scan as taught was pretty well validated by the report, furthermore there was evidence that it was being carried out as laid down according to the inquiry.

3) One of the pilots was wearing corrective lenses. I don't see mentioned if these were varifocals or not, varifocals screw up your peripheral vision.

Don't know on this one, someone else may have to comment, tho' I suspect aircrew corrective flying specs (administered by a Medical Officer, and checked annually) may well not be varifocals.

4) I cannot imagine that wearing a bonedome improves your field of view or makes it easier to look around.

Trust me, it has no impact whatsoever. You can't see any part of the helmet when you're wearing it, and it doesn't restrict movement in cockpit.

5) Should it not be part of the PIC's training to practice actually jettisoning a canopy -preferably on soft grass.

The motor memory part of locating the canopy emergency jettison handle had to be practiced monthly (IIRC) as part of the abandon drill when I last flew the Tutor. I doubt actually pushing the canopy off the rails would be of any use whatsoever; as the report suggests the hard part is finding the canopy handle in the first place.

6) Taking off together in close formation is a very military sort of thing to do, is the usual thing to carry on then flying near each other? Without a plan, or a qualified observer in radio contact with the other aircraft, this was asking for trouble. Formation flying, or ariel photography require special care. Flying kids around requires even greater care.

They took off a minute apart -- in no way whatsoever is that 'close formation'. Close formation takeoffs are done in echelon (or similar), even a stream take off (one behind the other) is done at no more than five seconds separation in the Tutor from what I remember. At climb speed, a minute's separation would put the aircraft over a mile apart in the climb.

To suggest, as I think you do, that these two pilots operated with anything other than the utmost care is, in my mind, pretty poor form.

cats_five

8th Jan 2010, 07:33

<snip>
My own (cynical) view is that the MoD deliberately does it this way to make it difficult to search and copy and paste from such documents.

OCR would turn the scan into text fairly easily... Those of us with Windows 7 can also use the Snipping Tool to do the same with small image files (I have no idea if it's in Vista), and there are 3rd party bits of software that will do the same for earlier versions of Windows.

korrol

8th Jan 2010, 08:22

This report seems to have plenty of detailed technical information but very little information on the action and intentions of those involved

We're not told, for examp[le, how many cadets turned up at UWAS for these flights - but that two were randomly selected. The odds of randomly selecting two cousins must be pretty long.

Both girls were issued with parachutes - but did they know, or were they told, how to use them?

The two girls aged 13 and 14 had never flown in the Tutor - or indeed any - aircraft before. However both were put in the left hand seat. Was this with a view that they should handle the controls at some point? If so, was one - or perhaps both - of them actually flying their respective aircraft at the time of impact.?

If one or other was flying - was their instructor's attention focussed on them rather than watching where the aircraft was going?

The RAF Inquiry should have interviewed other cadets who have been taken up on similar flights to ascertain how these air-experience flights are actually conducted in practice.

DeeCee

8th Jan 2010, 08:37

Judging by some of this speculation some people have too much time on their hands...........oh hang on a minute, do you think the position of the stars might have had some effect?

Gainesy

8th Jan 2010, 08:38

The RAF Inquiry should have interviewed other cadets who have been taken up on similar flights to ascertain how these air-experience flights are actually conducted in practice.

AS the RAF conduct the AEF flights on a structure developed over the last
60-odd years, the Service knows how they are conducted in practice. What could the cadets tell them that is not already well known? Or are you inferring something was going on that should not have been?

Spotting Bad Guys

8th Jan 2010, 08:46

Perhaps it's a legal thing so the MOD can prove the electronically published report is a direct copy of the original?

Anonystude

8th Jan 2010, 08:55

Korrol, in the Tutor the LHS is the 'passenger' seat, the captain of the aircraft sits on the right. All the instrumentation is laid out in front of the RH occupant. This is so trainee pilots get used to the layout of stick in right hand, throttles in left. For the cadets to be in the LHS is normal. Try Google for an image of the Tutor cockpit and you'll see what I mean.

Wholigan

8th Jan 2010, 09:27

Korrol - your points:

This report seems to have plenty of detailed technical information but very little information on the action and intentions of those involved.

The "actions and intentions of those involved" were exactly that same as the actions and intentions of the pilots in any AEF flight; namely to pass on their knowledge of, and their enthusiasm for, flying to the air cadets.

We're not told, for examp[le, how many cadets turned up at UWAS for these flights - but that two were randomly selected. The odds of randomly selecting two cousins must be pretty long.

Why do you need to know how many turned up at UWAS. You obviously have no idea how the AEF system works. Flying slots are allocated to ATC Wing HQs. The Wing HQs detail squadrons to attend for flying. The squadrons bring the allocated number of cadets to the AEF, where they are briefed and prepared for their flights. The AEF programmes all of the cadets to fly and flies them. They are not "randomly selected" from a cast of thousands, but if an ATC squadron happens to have cadets related to each other (highly likely and pretty common) the odds of them coming flying on the same day are pretty good. A fair few of our squadrons have sets of brothers and/or sisters, and they pretty much always come flying on the same day.

Both girls were issued with parachutes - but did they know, or were they told, how to use them?

The cadets are shown a safety film and they are also briefed on the use of the parachute. Incidentally, they are not "issued with" the parachutes, they are correctly fitted with them.

The two girls aged 13 and 14 had never flown in the Tutor - or indeed any - aircraft before. However both were put in the left hand seat. Was this with a view that they should handle the controls at some point? If so, was one - or perhaps both - of them actually flying their respective aircraft at the time of impact.?If one or other was flying - was their instructor's attention focussed on them rather than watching where the aircraft was going?

The topic of the left hand seat occupation is covered above. It is the passenger seat and all passengers occupy the left hand seat. Nobody knows or will ever know if the cadets were flying the aircraft at the time.

I don't know about you and your own particular level of skills, but I can walk and chew gum at the same time, and I can monitor the cadet's actions and still manage to keep a good and thorough look out for other aircraft, maybe even a better look out than when I am actually demonstrating and teaching a particular point to a cadet.

The RAF Inquiry should have interviewed other cadets who have been taken up on similar flights to ascertain how these air-experience flights are actually conducted in practice.

There are 12 AEFs in the country, each of which is staffed by experienced and highly professional pilots. These AEFs have been operating safely and successfully for a VERY long time and, as has been said, the "system" knows EXACTLY how each AEF flight is actually conducted in practice.

I have no idea what your agenda is with these questions, but you obviously think that AEFs are operated by gash people in a gash manner with no regard for the safety of the cadets. Nothing could be further from the truth. We all know precisely what our responsibilities are for looking after the cadets whose parents entrust them into our care, and we do our level best to ensure that safety.

I don't know just how long you have been involved with aviation, but everybody who has been in the aviation world for more than 5 minutes knows that accidents happen and that a lot of these accidents are indeed just random events that are immensely difficult to prevent. The fact is that the Tutor is very difficult to see. We know that and are, therefore, particularly diligent about looking for the "other aircraft" that may not see us.

cats_five

8th Jan 2010, 09:53

This is so sad that one simple thing could have prevented this

And what in your view would that be? When you made the above comment, had you read the relvent sections of the report?

Tankertrashnav

8th Jan 2010, 10:00

The terminology used in Mary Meagher's post suggests that she/he is in some way involved in aviation, which makes the naivety of some of her/his comments quite astonishing. Thanks Anonystude and Wholigan for putting her and Korrol right on some of their points, something they could have done for themselves had they read the reports correctly, eg mixing up a formation takeoff with one timed at one minute intervals.

Metman

8th Jan 2010, 10:10

Wholigan has it absolutely spot on.

Having been to a number of AEF's regularly as both a cadet and as VR(T) staff, I can say that there is a very high standard and degree of consistency between all of them with regards to safety briefing - be it on the aircraft, or on the parachute. All cadets are shown how to use the parachute on fitting.

Knowing how many cadets turn up for an AEF detail is irrelevant, however cadets from one or many units may turn up for an AEF detail. Certainly where I have attended, around 30 cadets will be detailed to fly in a session. In choosing which order to fly cadets in, it is most likely from my experience that those who have not flown will fly first, and those who have flown most will fly last (or possibly not at all in the case of any delays or weather issues), followed possibly by staff. The fact that these 2 girls were related is likely to be tragic but not unlikely coincidence, as neither had flown, being cousins they were likely to have attended together, therefore their 3822 record of service books may have been together in the pile, and having not flown therefore were likely to be at the top of the pile.

AEF flights for cadets are not a rare uncommon event - the Tutor is detailed, and was partly purchased to provide these flights. They happen week in, week out at all the AEF's around the country. it is an experienced and professional operation.

angelorange

8th Jan 2010, 10:31

Overall a very well considered Serivice Inquiry into a tragic event.

It confirms that "See and be Seen" is all very well if (a) the pilot can see out of the cockpit and (b) the other a/c is obvious to the Mk1 eyeball.

The current Tutor canopy design leaves much to be desired when compared to the old Bulldog or Firefly - especially in turns steeper than 30 degrees when having to look past the central spine.

The advice for a "go forward"/harness is laudable as the current design pins the shoulders back.

Conspicuity/Colour is another factor cited - the report has much to say on contrast and suggests slightly darker airframe colours (than background for daylight ops) are better with the advantages of fluorescent paint schemes debatable.

TCAS is recommended but there is no comment on the false indications these devices can give during high G / Aerobatic or pitching manoeuvres.

It remains to be seen what can be implemented to improve matters.

McDuff

8th Jan 2010, 15:37

I don't think that it's a legal requirement; that would be covered by the existence of the paper document, if necessary.

No, it's the appalling and inconsistent state of the MOD's (not just the RAF's) IT kit. Not many people have a way of making pdf files and they are probably unaware that it would come out much smaller and neater if it were straight from the original file – electronically.

If only the MOD had continued with Macs ...

MightyGem

8th Jan 2010, 19:46

If only the MOD had continued with Macs ...
Just what I was thinking.

The Nr Fairy

8th Jan 2010, 21:02

Minor addition about the varifocals. Missus Fairy (a dispensing optician of some years standing) tells me that varifocals DO interfere with peripheral vision and that you need to look with your nose to cover the gap.

Whether any of the crew were wearing varifocals I don't know, and I don't know if it was a factor in the accident but I wanted to pass this snippet on.

PPRuNeUser0211

8th Jan 2010, 21:03

Metman - The number of cadets at St Athan is usually substantially lower than 30, and it was not uncommon to have single figures turn up. Thus as you say, it is actually reasonably likely that 2 relations could be randomly selected to fly at the same time (especially with 3 a/c operating AEF).

To all those that seem to have an agenda(or think the RAF/AEF does) - remember, a lot of people involved in the AEF (both regular, VR and VR(T)) give up their time (both paid and unpaid) to make sure these kids have a great time and get something out of it. They're not there to show off how great they are, but to try and give the kids an experience they don't get anywhere else. That frequently involves doing things like aerobatics, which are not done for the purpose of showing off, but can be fantastic for building confidence in sometimes quite timid teenagers who are out of their comfort zone.

It's a fantastic system, that is the envy of many youth organisations the world over. It's tragic, but sometimes accidents do indeed happen, in all walks of life, not just aviation.

Fly safe everyone

mary meagher

8th Jan 2010, 22:20

To Anonystrude: Thank you for answering my points, and correcting any misinformation. Yes, I do still fly, and have more than 3,000 hours, though never in or near the military, and I am not a piscatorial journalist.

Nevertheless perhaps some of my points could prove useful. Trying to prevent anything like the Tutor Mid-air from happening again......hopefully the organisation will look respectfully at suggestions from another discipline; I have flown over the years as an instructor on more than 3,400 flights, with all ages.

1. We must have a different understanding of the term wingover.

2. You agree the canopy structure can possibly obscure the view of other aircraft.

3. Post 27 concurrs with my warning about varifocal lenses.

4. Nope, never wore a bonedome, except once in a microlite. I can only imagine its effect on your scan. Can you turn your head enough to look back over your shoulder while wearing it?

5. If finding the canopy handle in the Tutor is difficult, perhaps this requires a mod? Has an actual jettison ever been practiced to your knowlege? Not much use wearing a parachute if you can't get rid of the canopy.

6. As for those takeoffs, Tankertrash nav finds my ignorance astonishing. Quite true, I have no experience at all of either formation takeoffs or those timed at l minute intervals.

NEVERTHELESS, the report says, in part 1.3, item 1, that the Tutors took off at 1037 and 1038, and maintained approx. l minute separation during a standard VFR departure to the West. The actual collision took place at l046, approximately 8 minutes later.

Why are you then so scornful of my suggestion that " at least 10 minutes should space their departures, that the sortie be planned to be separate, to different areas, the flights to be planned, and the plan followed"?

And as for pba target's idea that aeros "can be fantastic for building confidence in sometimes quite timid teenagers who are out of their comfort zones", inflicting aeros on beginners, in my experience, puts most of them off for life.

Easy Street

9th Jan 2010, 00:05

4. Nope, never wore a bonedome, except once in a microlite. I can only imagine its effect on your scan. Can you turn your head enough to look back over your shoulder while wearing it?

Wearing the bonedome has no effect on ability to look all around. The same helmets are worn by fast-jet crews, who need to be able to see into their 6 o'clock to carry out defensive manoeuvring, so freedom of head movement is a basic design requirement. And the helmets (both Mk4 and Mk10) meet that requirement.

As noted in the report, the absence of a go-forward facility on the Tutor's shoulder straps is a minor hindrance to rear-sector lookout; some wizened old UAS QFIs of my acquaintance advocate slightly loosening the shoulder straps once airborne to achieve the same effect.

Why are you then so scornful of my suggestion that " at least 10 minutes should space their departures, that the sortie be planned to be separate, to different areas, the flights to be planned, and the plan followed"?

With so much instructional time you must surely know that you can't always stick to the plan on a VFR general handling sortie. Cloud or other aircraft could easily force you to shift your operating area. And if "see and avoid" is the only means of avoiding collision, then 10-minute spacing won't help - in fact, it would probably make things worse, as the following aircraft arrives in the operating area with little or no SA on the first aircraft's position.

My own main observation from this accident concerns the use of ATC services during medium-level general handling by us military fliers. For years, the culture was to get rid of ATC ASAP - "squawking 7000, enroute". It seems that was in operation on this fateful day at St Athan. My own corner of the RAF is moving away from this, probably as a result of years of medium-level operations in Iraq (where it was the norm to have some sort of ATC service at all times). Now, more and more crews are getting a Traffic Service whilst conducting medium-level training - with the general reduction in military traffic, it's usually possible to get a quiet frequency, and the gain in situational awareness is huge. Sometimes you get ATC talking when you're trying to deal with a JTAC on the other radio, but hey, that happens on ops as well! So kids, get a radar service (unless you're at low level - but then you've only got half the sky to search:ok:)

5 Forward 6 Back

9th Jan 2010, 00:17

1. We must have a different understanding of the term wingover.

You can't see through the wings. Clear the airspace left, right and above, then pull up, roll into the direction you're expecting to operate by about 120 degrees, and you have a perfect view into the entire area you're going to be working. It's a lot safer than bodging round in a circle before starting some aggressive manoeuvre.

Why are you then so scornful of my suggestion that " at least 10 minutes should space their departures, that the sortie be planned to be separate, to different areas, the flights to be planned, and the plan followed"?

I would imagine that it would have no bearing on a completely random accident as this. If you spaced them out by 15 minutes, you might find the same accident would occur with 2 aircraft entering and leaving the area, rather than 2 operating in the same place at the same time.

mary meagher

9th Jan 2010, 08:08

Thank you, Easy Street, for your considered reply. I am relieved to learn that the RAF is willing to accept assistance from controllers for situational awareness. Those of us forced to share some of the narrow VFR corridors remaining with medium level fast jet traffic (spotted one, where is the other guy?!*&@!) will be much happier. We are also grateful to the military radar services, particularly Brize.

Still hoping for an answer to my other question; has anybody actually practiced an emergency jettison of the Tutor canopy?

Best regards

RUCAWO

9th Jan 2010, 08:20

And as for pba target's idea that aeros "can be fantastic for building confidence in sometimes quite timid teenagers who are out of their comfort zones", inflicting aeros on beginners, in my experience, puts most of them off for life.

I have accompanied approx five hundred plus cadets on AEF over the last eight years to various AEFs including those at Cosford,Leuchars,Colern,Woodvale and Church Fenton and every one of those cadets have returned for more ,none have been "put off for life" by aeros and the silly grins on their faces on landing tell the real story.
The pilots at the AEFs are some of the most professional and experianced people I have ever met and none of them need to show off as most have been there and bought the t-shirt,you would not believe the former ranks and background of some of them .I would trust any of them with my life and have done,even more I have trusted them with both my sons lives and would not hesitate in doing so again.

Professor Plum

9th Jan 2010, 08:37

Mary, to address a few of your points:

1. We must have a different understanding of the term wingover.

I'm with 5 Forward 6 Back

2. You agree the canopy structure can possibly obscure the view of other aircraft.

I agree. Although having said that, The view from a Tutor is much better than that of a C150/152 which have aerobatic versions, and generally better than most other SEP aircraft too.

3. Post 27 concurrs with my warning about varifocal lenses.

I don't wear glasses, so Haven't a clue!

4. Nope, never wore a bonedome, except once in a microlite. I can only imagine its effect on your scan. Can you turn your head enough to look back over your shoulder while wearing it?

As Easy Street said, it doesn't affect your scan. I've sustained 6G (which is also the Tutor limit) in a bone dome, looking behind the aircraft. I,e, checking my 6 o'clock. Good lookout is absolutely fundamental to military flying.

5. If finding the canopy handle in the Tutor is difficult, perhaps this requires a mod? Has an actual jettison ever been practiced to your knowlege? Not much use wearing a parachute if you can't get rid of the canopy.

If you lift your left hand up, you'll find the jettison handle. It's also red. I don't personally think it's hard to find. But then again, I wasn't involved in a mid air collision, and suddenly found myself with a damaged aircraft, out of control, out of my comfort zone, getting closer to the ground. quickly. With the well-being of a young cadet as my responsibility, probably in a state of panic, and then finding myself having to recall the necessary drill in the very limited time available. I can't possibly say what my reaction would have been.

However, it has always been SOP to practice the abandon drill at least once a month. It's a currency, so if it hasn't been practiced, you don't fly until you have. This drill included a TOUCH drill of the jettison handle i,e, the canopy isn't actually jettisoned. Since the accident, the base I was at not too long ago (with an EFT sqn and AEF) started regular demonstrations of actually jettisoning the canopy. Not sure if this is a fleet-wide implementation though.

6. Has already been answered.

I don't think a 10 minute interval would help, as 10 minutes later, you'd be in the same airspace anyway. All AEF's and EFT Sqns (as far as im aware) have now "sectorised" their airspace. Prior to take off, they mark down what sector they're planning on operating in on a board in ops. e,g, if someone will be operating in the north sector, then the next pilot will operate in the east/west/south sector for example. Personally I think TCAS would be an excellent addition. When I flew the Tucano (which has TCAS) I was amazed at how many aircraft were out there!!

And as for pba target's idea that aeros "can be fantastic for building confidence in sometimes quite timid teenagers who are out of their comfort zones", inflicting aeros on beginners, in my experience, puts most of them off for life.

Aero's aren't "pushed" onto a cadets if they don't want to do them. Often the first flight doesn't include Aero's. However, if a cadet is particularly keen, then the pilot will happily oblige. If a cadet feels unwell, then Aero's are discontinued.

I still remember my first AEF flight with very fond memories. It included Aero's and I loved every second of it. 10 years later, and I'm in the RAF doing the best job in the world.

deltahotel

9th Jan 2010, 08:41

To reinforce some of the stuff above:

Helmets are fine. AEF pilots are all current or ex mil who have loads of experience and training wearing these things. They do not inhibit lookout which is taught from minute one of day one. From my Grob RHS I can see the fin if I wish (and I do).

Wingovers (gentle or less so) are an ideal way to clear a massive area of sky prior to aeros.

In my experience, introducing beginners to aeros is a fantastic way to generate the biggest grins you ever see. Very rarely do cadets ask not to and then there's plenty of other things to do.

AEF flying is astonishingly rewarding. Having been introduced to flying in the back of a chippy 30+ yrs ago, it is now a pleasure to do the same for others.

DH

PPRuNeUser0211

9th Jan 2010, 08:45

Mary - Aeros would never be "inflicted" on someone... but it's fairly easy to build up to them in a short space of time without scaring/making sick the person involved.

As for the "getting rid of ATC and squawking 7000" as soon as possible, my memory may be failing me, but did Cardiff ATC not change from providing a service to the AEF to asking them to go en-route where possible due to increased workload? I didn't read any mention of it in the report, and I may have the wrong end of the stick.

Mary - I've popped the canopy on the ground, but not all the way off, because, as I understand it, doing so would bear no resemblance to popping it it in flight, as in flight the principle is you pop it, push the leading edge up and back, then let the airflow do the rest of the work. Not sure if that's what you are referring to?

ShyTorque

9th Jan 2010, 09:51

There are always lessons to be learned after an accident (or a close shave, which we have all had).

Here we had two white coloured aircraft, the colour that most pilots agree is the most difficult to see in the air. Undoubtedly a failure of the "see and be seen" principle occurred.

Most of the discussion seems to be patronisation / thinly veiled criticism of the AEF organistation, some of it based on ignorance. What lessons might be learned by the gliding fraternity?

VX275

9th Jan 2010, 10:18

Canopy jettisons and egress trials were something done in the past at A&AEE Boscombe Down, but only in a 1 g environment. Aircraft (or just sections of them) were placed in front of the blower tunnel and 4 RR Merlins provided an airflow upto 500+ Knots. Canopies could be jettisoned, ejector seats fired and even crew abandonments carried out (catch nets provided).
To my knowledge the last unassisted abandonments conducted were on the Shackleton AEW (could the crew clear the radome when using the under nose escape hatch?) that means the Tutor as well as the Viking and Vigilant gliders haven't been tested even after fatal mid-air betwen two Vikings at RAF Sealand where the failure to jettison the canopy properly was identified by the investigation.

Could canopy jettisons and crew abondonments be conducted? Yes, the Blower tunnel is still at Boscombe Down. Will trials be conducted? No, they cost too much :ugh:

greenedgejet

9th Jan 2010, 10:55

Easy Street: good points on the whole. However:

"the absence of a go-forward facility on the Tutor's shoulder straps is a minor hindrance to rear-sector lookout; some wizened old UAS QFIs of my acquaintance advocate slightly loosening the shoulder straps once airborne to achieve the same effect."

It is not a minor hindrance - loosening them is against SOP and HASELL checks. The straps are there for a reason and the shoulder straps back up the negative g strap (which is too long at shortest setting for most) during aeros. Other a/c have a a mid torso fixing behind the seat with go-fwd setting. The Tutor has individual fixings for each shoulder meaning no flex to rotate the torso.

"Now, more and more crews are getting a Traffic Service whilst conducting medium-level training - with the general reduction in military traffic, it's usually possible to get a quiet frequency, and the gain in situational awareness is huge."

Tutors operate mostly below 5000 feet due to low climb rate. For EFT work a Traffic Service has proven unworkable due to a shortage of controllers and busy teaching environment. It may work for AEF. Quiet frequencies have been used for decades for teaching but are now under threat as this report suggests - increasing Mental Air Picture by using the radio more often.

Professor Plum: "The view from a Tutor is much better than that of a C150/152 which have aerobatic versions, and generally better than most other SEP aircraft too."

The view sideways and straight ahead is very good in the Tutor. The problem arises when you want to carry out turns steeper than 30 deg AoB or aerobatic pitching manouevres. Previous trainers such as the Chipmunk, Bulldog and Firefly were far better in this respect.

Most Civilian SEP are used for A to B PPL flights not aerobatics. There are very few C150 Aerobats flying cf almost 100 Tutors and for lookout below a Cessna has an advantage. Almost all those Civilian a/c used for aerobatic training have superb Field of view eg: Extra 300, CAP10, Yak52, etc...

Canopy Ejection:

The proceedure is more complicated than described by posters. It does not pop open. Indeed when the canopy is flown in the vent position (speed below 100KIAS) it will tend to move forward and try to close itself unless locked.

The red emergency pull handle does NOT release the canopy - it unlocks it. The larger handle must then be rotated through almost 180 deg. Then the INSIDE arm has to be used to push the canopy frame backwards and upwards. The proceedure takes a good few seconds to complete.

As far as I am aware only one Tutor has lost a canopy airborne - In 2004 a canopy detached due to vibration after a propellor blade detached in flight.

"Since the accident, the base I was at not too long ago (with an EFT sqn and AEF) started regular demonstrations of actually jettisoning the canopy. Not sure if this is a fleet-wide implementation though."

First I have heard of it and sounds very expensive.

Fitter2

9th Jan 2010, 11:18

ShyTorque asks

Most of the discussion seems to be patronisation / thinly veiled criticism of the AEF organistation, some of it based on ignorance. What lessons might be learned by the gliding fraternity?

I am mildly baffled what lessons could be learned in the gliding world from this report other than keep a good lookout, already emphasised and reinforced everywhere I have flown gliders.

Possibly he is confusing this incident with the other tragedy later last year, when a glider flying straight (according to its flight recorder) was in collision with an AEF Tutor in an area where, minutes before, a professional ATPL (flying a glider) has reported to Brize an airmiss with an AEF Tutor performing aerobatics. NATS tapes show an extremely high level of GA aircraft, particularly gliders, in this 'choke point' of airspace.

It is not known how many of the gliders were carrying appropriate anti-collision systems (certainly mine was). The systems carried are much more appropriate than TCAS, which is optimised for warning against aircraft in low density airspace, which in such a situation would be saturated and useless if all aircraft carried one; whereas FLARM warns only against close converging targets and highlights those with an actual collision risk.

No doubt the report on this tragic accident will analyse the causes and make appropriate recommendations, and I am content to wait for the conclusions of those with all the information, and the responsibilty of trying to prevent a repetition.

CheekyVisual

9th Jan 2010, 13:50

It's interesting someone has mentioned airspace because, although I haven't read the report, there has been no mention of this and it reminded me of something I was party to many years ago about this particular piece of airspace.

The airspace around St Athan is not plentiful. Cardiff has a large Class D zone which it doesn't like people flying through, even if you could to the East is the city of Cardiff and above this is an airway used heavily for inbounds to BRS, to the south is mostly sea and to the north is mostly mountains. This leaves a very small tight strip of flat, ruralish area for GH flying by St Athan and local GA (not much of that any more I grant you).

I was lucky enough to spend three very happy years at St Athan flying the Bulldog. At the time I was there CWL had no western class D stub. Not ideal for IFR airline traffic. So there was a big push to get this airspace reclassified.

I remember clearly the UWAS Squadron Boss telling the ATC bods that if this Class D airspace became totally unavailable for Military GH (as it apparently has despite CWL being a virtual ghost town) there would eventually be a light aircraft incident in the very small remaining piece of airspace. Unfortunately it turns out he was spot on.

kenparry

9th Jan 2010, 15:26

The Tutor's white airframe has been mentioned several times. My understanding is that white was selected by Grob for minimum solar heating - the composite airframe would be heated beyond safe limits if it was a darker colour.

ditchvisitor

9th Jan 2010, 19:14

RIP Marshy, watched Big Trouble in Little China the other day and thought of you and our Famil visit at Cranwell.

mary meagher

9th Jan 2010, 20:10

Greenedge jet says, in his knowlegable post 39, that CANOPY JETTISON IS MORE COMPLICATED than described by some in these pages. The red handle does not release the canopy, only unlocks it! you must then rotate the larger handle nearly through 180 degrees, then the inside arm has to push the frame back and up - THE PROCEDURE TAKES A GOOD FEW SECONDS TO COMPLETE. If this is true, merely touching the red handle once a month seems inadequate preparation in the event of need.

Fitter 2 reminds us that a second fatal midair involving a Tutor took place later last year. A collision with a glider. As no report has yet been issued, we don't know the details, BUT it is significant that the glider pilot was able to jettison the canopy and parachute to safety, while the two in the Tutor were not so fortunate.

It should certainly concern those using the Tutor that regardless of the original causes of the midair, it should be modified to provide a prompt exit.

On the question of colour, yes, white is preferred for composit aircraft to prevent different expansions. A Grob motor glider was imported from France tastefully decorated in two tones of blue; before the UK would give it a C of A, most of the blue colour had to be removed.
Studies have been made in using dayglow colours to make gliders more conspicuous, the effect seems to be one of camoflage, breaking up the outline, rather than making it easier to see. Remember how zigzags in contrasting colours were painted on shipping during WWII?

As for dark colours, I recollect the stealth plane is black.

It may be that FLARM is the answer, so we may learn something from the gliding people after all.

L J R

9th Jan 2010, 20:58

Mary,

I agree that white is a bad colour to see a moving aircraft in the sky.:eek:

Hawks and Tucanos are BLACK because trials were done to find the best colour to see these aircraft during the daytime - and despite your hint that black is not a good colour - MoD trials show differently (and yes day glow, cam and other colours were used in the tirals.). :ok:

Have you ever seen what it looks like inside a cockpit of an out of control aircraft in an advanced stage of departure? - especially with a ruptured airframe.....the assymetric and oscillitory 'G' makes movement very difficult, no matter how easy the operation of the escape mechanism is. :ouch:

Some of the AEF cadets that I have flown want Aeros on their first sortie, others do not....as a 'grown-up' I ask the passenger what he/she wants and determine if it is a good or bad idea as the situation dictates.:yuk:

Just because your knowledge of a term is not fully understood by you, please use your 3000 hrs experience to try and understand that some things are not done your way.

Other comments you make hint of your impression of ineptness by military aircrews, and their use of 'all available' methods, aids and techniques for best practice. If that is your perception, you are entitled to it, but (in my opinion) you are wrong.:eek:

...finally varifocals are NOT prescribed to Pilots in mil aircraft.:=

...LJR (7000 hrs - mostly with helmet on) AND recent ex AEF Tutor pilot

davejb

9th Jan 2010, 21:34

Forgive me if this seems either inappropriate or simplistic, in my defence I held Mike Blee (of earlier accident) in quite high regard....
it seems to me that you shouldn't make an aircraft colour difficult to spot in everyday use, as ultimately we rely on seeing each other to avoid collision (when all else fails). To construct aircraft from materials that dictate we then produce them in what is effectively a 'low vis' colour scheme is madness - either we have to solve the 'can only paint them white' issue, or we have to begin to accept that they cannot be made from the material we'd prefer, because the finsihed article is too hard to see.

Also, an escape mechanism that is at all difficult or complex, especially one that is taking up first time air cadets, simply has to be re-examined, as I'm not current on the aircraft in question I'll leave it at that. (I'll admit that the Chipmunk escape drills I did in 1968 probably exceeded my ability to carry them out...to be honest I was a titchy sort of air cadet and would probably have fallen through the straps anyhow).

Dave

angelorange

9th Jan 2010, 22:36

That old chestnut!

Grob will paint them any colour you like and even offered to do extensive trials in black (it's in the report) but the costs were deemed too high.

angelorange

9th Jan 2010, 22:51

cats_five

10th Jan 2010, 07:14

A good piece of kit but being DGPS and baro based it is not infallable:

"Differential effects do not always help us because aircraft bank when flying a curve and this may produce different sky-views, so those two aircraft might base their GPS navigation solutions on non-identical sets of satellites, and the differential effect is lost"

I wonder where that quote came from? Attribution is a good habit.

If you visit the FLARM website you will find it never claims to be more than an aid - that lookout is essential.

Fitter2

10th Jan 2010, 11:20

As well as being a 'traffic awareness' device, FLARM is also a flight recorder. If the concerns expressed above were a real, rather than theoretical problem, then discontinuities in the recorded track would be evident. A close up view of a recent trace, with turns at 45 to 55 degrees bank in both directions
http://i50.tinypic.com/157ynpw.jpg
shows no such features, and I have never seen worrying discontinuities in many other records.

As far a white aircraft being 'madness', there is a vast difference between a white glider being 'invisible' and the colour being less than optimal. Many aircraft of non-composite construction are primarily white in colour. I have no difficulty when flying gliders in spotting other ones (possibly because I am looking for them as one aid the using the energy of the air), and apply similar techniques when power flying. In my experience, the shape of conflicting traffic is visible before its colour can be distinguished. Some colours have been shown to be optimal for being more easily seen at closer ranges, but the limited evidence (and more research would be very useful) is that colour has very little effect on the maximum range of detection.

One could argue more cogently that it is 'madness' to perform aerobatics in an area not under full traffic control, since the Lookout part of the HASSELL check is only useful for the traffic in visual range, and a good lookout is unlikely to be maintained during the manouvring period. The saving grace is that an aircraft performing aerobatics is much easier to see than one maintaining a constant heading (which also applies to gliders which in general seldom fly on a steady heading for long) and conflicting traffic more likely to avoid an airprox situation.

Flying Lawyer

10th Jan 2010, 11:29

mary meagher

I don't doubt your expertise and experience as a glider pilot/instructor, but I'm not surprised your initial post provoked the reactions it did from those with expertise and experience in RAF flying generally, and specifically AEF flying. IMHO the responses were commendably restrained.
After giving readers the benefit of your wisdom "Midair collision happens because neither pilot saw the other in time to take evasive action" (which some might regard as a statement of the xxxxxing obvious) you asserted that "There are a lot of contributing factors involved here, not just the white colour of the Tutor." Correct again. However, first on your list was:1) Some witnesses mention that one of the aircraft performed a wingover shortly before the collision. Does this imply showing off? with insufficient lookout before performing maneuvers?
I've read the report of the Board of Inquiry from beginning to end and there is nothing whatsoever which supports your rather unpleasant implication.

The investigators examined all available evidence including eye-witness accounts very carefully (even the account of a 9 year old child) and researched every theory. The investigation was thorough and comprehensive. I've read several hundred accident reports (Mil and civvy) in a professional capacity over the past three decades and regard it as excellent.
None of your comments in your initial or subsequent posts add anything of value to the findings and recommendations already contained in the Report.

Link to BOI (http://redirectingat.com/?id=42X487496&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mod.uk%2FDefenceInternet%2FAboutDefence %2FCorporatePublications%2FBoardsOfInquiry%2FServiceInquiryI nvestigatingTheAccidentToTutorAircraftGbyutAndGbyvn.htm)

(Edit)
IMHO Recommendation 10 is unrealistic, and would have done nothing to prevent the collision, but that is a comment not a criticism.

A2QFI

10th Jan 2010, 14:01

Fitter 2, I can assure you that anybody I taught to fly did his/her HASSELL checks, commenced manoeuvering and continued to check for hazards throughout their aeros sequence or whatever they were doing. Anything less would have been dangerous and bad technique

korrol

10th Jan 2010, 19:41

I'm grateful to both ANONYSTUDE and WHOLIGAN for taking the trouble to respond.

It would appear from the report that :-
1.None of the four people in the two aircraft was injured in the actual mid-air collision.
2. Neither cadet made any attempt to bale out and both remained strapped in their seats - even though both wore parachutes and had just viewed an instructional video on bale-out procedure
3. Although both pilots had released their straps neither of them baled out .
4. The emergency canopy jettison handle was not activated in either aircraft

The emergency procedure for cadet flights is given in ACP34 as follows:-
"Action in an Emergency
18. Emergencies in a Tutor or any other Royal Air Force aircraft are rare.
However, even with the best-laid plans, things can go wrong. If an emergency
does arise the most important things to remember are:
* DO NOT PANIC
* DO AS YOU ARE TOLD
19. Having said that, an emergency is not the time or place for a captain to
explain what you must do in response to his orders. You must know what to do! If
the captain decides that the aircraft must be abandoned, he will give the warning
order "Check parachutes". Depending upon the time available, the captain will
already have jettisoned the canopy, or will jettison it shortly after giving the warning
order. It may be possible for you to help in jettisoning the canopy, and this will have
been explained at the pre-flight briefing. Having given the warning order, and when
it is certain that the aircraft must be abandoned, the captain will give the executive
order "Jump Jump"
20. As soon as the captain has ordered "Jump Jump", you should release the
aircraft safety harness (not your parachute harness!), stand up in the cockpit and
dive head first over the side of the aircraft, aiming to clear the trailing edge of the
wing. It is vital that you do this immediately the captain has ordered "Jump Jump".

21. Having fallen well clear of the aircraft, all you have to do is to pull the metal
handle (or "D" ring) which is attached to the rip-cord. The handle is on the right
shoulder of the parachute harness. It is large and not difficult to locate, although
you may have to look for it, rather than just feel! As the handle comes out quite a
long way, it must be held firmly and given a good pull to its fullest extent (Fig 3-4).
This releases the parachute from the pack and completes the essential part of the
bale-out procedure. A parachute landing is roughly comparable to jumping off a
wall about 3-4 metres high."

RB877

10th Jan 2010, 23:07

Korrol,

Not really sure of the intent behind your post, but for clarification ACP 34 is a training manual for cadet classification training. Like all of the other classification training manuals, its intent is to give the cadets an incite into aviation operations in order to pass an exam. I would no more expect cadets to be able to abandon an aircraft after reading it than I would expect them to be able to fly a helicopter after reading
Principles of Flight.

When at an AEF, as has been stated in previous posts the cadets are shown a briefing video and are questioned on abandonment drills. I agree that having a simulated cockpit and seats may help in the learning of this process, but when cadets often do not fly more than once a year, I question how effective this would be.

Personally, I would hope that abandoning the aircraft is considered by all as a last resort. Regardless of the amount of training that a cadet might realistically receive as a result of this report, I question the likelihood of even the most experienced person operating with a cool head in such a terrifying and tragic situation. Short of having a command ejection seat, I doubt that a reasonably practicable solution would be found that allows us to be confident that a young person will be able to do things correctly, in order to get out of an aircraft in the few seconds available. I would suggest that avoidance of an incident is a far more important focus.

RB

incubus

11th Jan 2010, 10:12

I agree that having a simulated cockpit and seats may help in the learning of this process, but when cadets often do not fly more than once a year, I question how effective this would be.
Because the seat and systems would be at the AEF and cadets would be cycled through a practical training session shortly before they flew, rather than just sitting eating crisps and watching Top Gun.

Yes, abandonment is going to be the last resort but it is no use as such if the process is too complicated (be that because of equipment, training or whatever) to actually carry out. If it is not a practical option then we should ditch the need to wear parachutes on AEF.

angelorange

11th Jan 2010, 16:07

BOI has detailed info on parachutes and how they might be improved both in use and design (handle high on shoulder is mentioned). In any case there was very little time post collision to assess a/c controllability, warn crew, jettison canopy, check parachute harness, release seat harness and evacuate.

GPS: Fitter 2: The quote was from the founder of FLARM discussing GPS reliablity. Nice trace by the way! However, why would a GPS error result in track discontinuity? Your trace could be 2km off from reality throughout the measurement period.

Karl Bamforth

12th Jan 2010, 06:39

"Since the accident, the base I was at not too long ago (with an EFT sqn and AEF) started regular demonstrations of actually jettisoning the canopy. Not sure if this is a fleet-wide implementation though."

First I have heard of it and sounds very expensive.

Greenedgejet,

The canopy jettison mechanism is tested as part of the servicing.

When the time came I regularly went to the crewroom and found instructors or students to come and "have a go".
No point in engineers pulling the red handle. Whenever possible I let aircrew pull the jettison mechanism with engineers standing by to stop the canopy being damaged.
It was not policy to give aircrew this opportunity but seemed like a good idea, and maybe will be implemented at all UAS/AEF sites.

As for how complicated the jettison is, that too needs more explanation.

Canopy normal opening is to pull the large D handle down and rearwards (90 deg), this unlocks the canopy and allows it to move rearwards. Pilots do this on every flight.

The only difference in emergency jettison is to pull the red handle, then proceed with the normal opening, IE pull the D handle down and back, this time the handle will move beyond 90 deg and unlock the canopy from the rails. If necessary then push the front of the canopy up into the airflow.

Essentially pilots carry out most of the jettison drill every flight.

I very much doubt that anyone would have had the awareness and time to complete the abandonment drill in this case.

incubus

12th Jan 2010, 08:09

With thought to the parachutes in the aircraft, what do you think of having the chutes (perhaps just the cadet's chute) fitted with a static line? They are put in and out of the aircraft by groundcrew so the risk of accidental deployment is low and it may simplify emergency egress.

teeteringhead

12th Jan 2010, 08:26

A worthwhile point on static lines incubus.

A few years ago one was visiting the US Navy at Pensacola, and got a trip or two in their basic trainers (T34-C I think?). Although these are used more in the Tucano rather than Tutor role, they have static line 'chutes.

Also interesting in this context is that before flight, we had to practice "egress procedure", which involved actually diving from the cockpit of a (real) training airframe on a rig in a hangar, about 10 feet into a safety net! Not my most dignified nor enjoyable "procedure", but I'm sure it would have helped in the unlikely event of having to dive for the trailing edge and miss the tailplane ........

Cows getting bigger

12th Jan 2010, 09:02

Al this talk of parachutes. I wonder whether the BOI even considered a BRS type retrofit? At very least, maybe the RAF want to consider such equipment for their next AEF/UAS aircraft.

Wholigan

12th Jan 2010, 10:13

OK - out on a major limb here and I expect to hear about this post from "official sources"!

Just to put all this talk about parachutes into perspective (in my view anyway), as I understand it, in the (approximately) 60 years of cadet flying there have been no instances of cadets jumping from an AEF training aircraft. Certainly if this is not true, then the figure involved is so miniscule that it is worth ignoring. Certainly I have found it impossible to find any record of such an event, and I was told when I took over 3 AEF that no such thing had ever happened. However, I bet someone will prove me wrong in statistical terms, but that will not change my overall views on this.

Also - and purely in my view - the chances of me deciding to get a cadet to jump from a Tutor are infinitessimally small. Under almost all circumstances I believe that it would be safer, and with a better chance of success, to put the aircraft into a field, rather than to try to get a cadet to abandon the aircraft and parachute to earth. There are only 2 occasions when it might be necessary to jump from the aircraft: if a control surface has been removed from the aircraft as a result of a collision; and if there were a raging cockpit fire. Almost certainly, if a control surface has gone, the aircraft is highly likely to be uncontrollable and doing its own - probably very violent - manouevres that would probably preclude successful abandonment. Even with a cockpit fire, I would certainly weigh the odds of me getting the aircraft into a field rapidly and then getting me and the cadet out of it, against the probability of successful airborne abandonment.

Why do I think that abandonment would be difficult even under totally controlled circumstances. This is something that I certainly would not raise officially, but in my view the majority of cadets are small and do not have the strength and agility to get out of an aircraft in an 80 plus knot "wind", and the chance of them getting the parachute release pulled successfully is very small. Why would I not raise it officially? Because the "system" would insist on "strength and agility" tests for each and every cadet that flies with AEFs. I believe that 70% plus of cadets would fail such tests and would thus be denied the experience of flying because of a perceived danger that - in reality - is pretty much non-existent. The odds of being in a situation where the chance of survival by abandonment is better than the chance of survival by forced landing in a field must tend towards zero.

That's my twopennorth and I stress that it is only MY view.

deltahotel

12th Jan 2010, 11:57

Wholigan - am completely with you. I have already made the decision that unless the a/c is uncontrollable or blazing fiercely I will not tell a cadet to jump. I trust myself and my training to land in a field more than I believe that a cadet would safely abandon.

DH

grobace

12th Jan 2010, 12:12

Well said, Wholigan. These were precisely my own thoughts before this tragic accident occurred. Furthermore, I have discussed this issue (and others!) at length with other AEF pilots since the accidents last year, and - as you doubtless already know from speaking to your pilots on 3 AEF - there is broad consensus on this.
The limb you are out on is pretty thick, mate.

PPRuNeUser0211

12th Jan 2010, 12:45

DH/Whols - I concur, the other one to add to that (particularly at St Athan) was ditching, which there was always much crewroom debate over.

The debate as to whether a cadet could find/pull their handle once out of the aircraft was also a big one. Static lines have been suggested, seems not unreasonable (but probably costly)

c-bert

12th Jan 2010, 13:15

As an ex-cadet and current PPL I totally agree with Wholigan. I also very much doubt that many cadets would happily leap from a plane that was capable of landing. God knows it would take an awful lot to get me to jump.

Also to add that I remember having to pull on a strain gauge to prove I had the strength the pull the rip cord, so the system is certainly not above these types of test.

airborne_artist

12th Jan 2010, 13:17

Wholigan - how many jumps were made from Bulldogs and Chipmunks in total, do you think? I know of one, on RNEFTS in 1979. The stude and his dark blue beefer (it was a joint RN/RAF QFI team) jumped after losing control under a huge Cb, and both landed safely. The beefer landed in a slurry pit...

Ace Brave

12th Jan 2010, 13:25

So do these previous posts indicate that a lot of the recent extra restrictions on cadet flying are actually to enable the "lowrarchy" or "mediumarchy"" to report to the hierarchy and the ministers "look at all the things we have done to make cadet flying safer" but they are in fact just papering over the cracks, rather than addressing the 2 main issues of conspicuity and situational awareness.

Let's look at some of them.

Minimum cloudbase raised from 1000 ft to 1500 ft and cadets not to be flown below 1000 ft above ground level. This actually has some merit as it may bring an extra field or 2 into play, as opposed to flying clear of cloud below a 1000 ft cloudbase. It certainly won't affect abandonment prospects, as the minimum height for abandonment under "controlled" conditions is 1500 ft.

Minimum height to fly cadets if cloudbase permits is to be 2000 ft above ground level, in order to increase the likelihood of a successful abandonment by a cadet. See posts above. It does still have some merit, but only in as far as the "bringing more fields into play" is concerned. However, it drastically reduces the number of days when cadets can be flown. Look at the stats!

Raising of aerobatics height from 3000 ft above ground to 4000 ft. No aerobatics to be flown that may lead to the loss of control of the aircraft. Sounds laudable eh? The same reasoning about the likelihood of successful cadet abandonment applies to the raising of the height. You could raise it to 9000 ft and nothing would change as far as cadet safety is concerned. In fact, the higher you go, the less responsive is the aircraft, obviously! Therefore, the more likely you are to get into a regime where you have to be more careful how you fly the aircraft.

In fact though, the Tutor is just the most benign aircraft you could imagine. It is so benign that it is actually quite difficult to teach stalling as the aircraft is loath to stall (as pilots of other aircraft understand stalling). It is so benign that you can actually "stall" the aircraft, keep the stick fully back and turn the aircraft, using rudder, under compete control!

As far as "flying aerobatics that may lead to the loss of control of the aircraft" is concerned, see the bit about how benign it is above. You would have to be a complete imbecile, with no motor skills whatsoever, and a death wish, to fly the aircraft in such a way that you lost control. Furthermore, even if you were so useless, all you would have to do if the aircraft complained about what you were doing is to centralise the controls and you immediately have a fully "in control" aircraft again.

I fully support the aims of increasing the safety of flights with cadets, but some of the new restrictions have more to do with "look what we've done to make it safer Mr Minister (with no knowledge of aviation so we can fool you)", than actually improving safety.

Wholigan

12th Jan 2010, 13:30

I know of one, on RNEFTS in 1979. The stude and his dark blue beefer (it was a joint RN/RAF QFI team) jumped after losing control under a huge Cb, and both landed safely.

Yep a_a but of course neither of them was a cadet who may be 13 years old and weighing only the minimum legal weight with its associated strength and agility implications.

airborne_artist

12th Jan 2010, 13:53

Wholi - agreed - I was more interested to know how many jumps had been made from RAF/RN/AAC single-engined trainers, full stop. There can't be much info/experience on the real-life issues of doing so. Factor in the issues of 13 y/o and you are in a very dark area, I'm sure.

cats_five

12th Jan 2010, 14:32

I agree a cadet of 13 will probably (but not always!) be light and relatively weak, suspect most of them are exceedingly agile though.

How does a Tutor compare for ease of emergency egress to a glider? I was thinking about the K21 struck by lighting about 10 years ago, and both instructor and P2 jumped safely, as did the pilot in the glider (Cirrus?) involved in a middair with another Tutor in June 2009. I also know someone else who has successfully jumped (a Kestrel I believe) following a middair in the mid 90s.

microlightgary

12th Jan 2010, 14:42

I think that Cows getting Bigger may havehit the nail on the head here:

"All this talk of parachutes. I wonder whether the BOI even considered a BRS type retrofit? At very least, maybe the RAF want to consider such equipment for their next AEF/UAS aircraft".
I also agree with Wholigans view that an outlanding would be safer than emergency egress in virtually all cases; so with that in mind, surely a last chance BRS system is more appropriate than parachutes for the statistically low mid-air collision scenario?

There are no guarantees in life but there is at least a fair chance these 4 people would have lived to tell the tale had BRS been fitted. Someone else can analyse the stats, but it is indisputable that there have been over 200 lives saved in Cirrus aircraft alone by BRS deployment.

microlightgary - serving RAF engineer/enthusiastic microlight/GA pilot and very grateful 'blagger' of AEF rides on more than one occasion...

The Real Slim Shady

12th Jan 2010, 15:20

All this talk of jumping out etc, and I haven't read the BOI report ony read through the thread, leads me to surmise that perhaps the 2 AEF pilots didn't jump because they were waiting for the cadet to go first, or, struggling to help them get out.

I don't know of any QFI, AEF pilot, who would abandon the aircraft before he made certain that his stude / cadet was out.

Tour as Bulldog QFI

mr ripley

12th Jan 2010, 22:35

I was more interested to know how many jumps had been made from RAF/RN/AAC single-engined trainers, full stop.

OK from 1966 onwards I know of:
12 Sep 67 Chipmunks WP838 and WK610 Bristol UAS 4 x abandon
22 Jul 76 Bulldog XX618 YUAS 2 x abandon
16 Nov 79 Bulldog XX542 RNEFTS 2 x abandon
20 Feb 82 Bulldog XX662 ELUAS 2 x abandon
25 Mar 85 Bulldog XX660 OUAS 1 x abandon (1 x unsuccessful)
25 Apr 89 Bulldog XX517 RNEFTS 1 x abandon
13 Jul 95 Slingsby T67M G-BUUH JEFTS 2 x abandon

Runaway Gun

13th Jan 2010, 05:38

Does the jump from the Firefly (spin) count too?

212man

13th Jan 2010, 07:16

There was also a LUAS student that bailed out in the early 1980s during an unrecoverable spin, which subsequently became recoverable and the instructor landed back at Woodvale!

korrol

13th Jan 2010, 08:27

No one wants a mid-air collision - and certainly everything possible should be done to avoid such an eventuality. But they do happen.

......So to whom would you rather entrust your daughter?

An instructor who actually would order her to abandon the aircraft after a mid-air colllision and parachute to safety?
An instructor who wouldn't give the order because he had already decided that no cadet is physically capable of making a jump in such circumstances?.As the outcome of the Scenario 2 is certain death, wouldn't it be worth at least attempting a jump after a mid-air- however long the odds?

As MR RIPLEY has established there are at least 12 people alive today because they did decide to - or were ordered to - jump. Surely the preflight parachute instruction and the parachute fitting has to be more than a meaningless charade - a placebo to calm nervous cadets before they fly. It must provide cadets with a realistic means of saving their own lives.

Gainesy

13th Jan 2010, 08:52

As the outcome of the Scenario 2 is certain death

You need to take your brain for a dump.

Wholigan

13th Jan 2010, 09:19

korrol - you really don't read anything carefully do you? Or is it just that you are determined to push whatever agenda you have on this matter, regardless of what others say?

Nowhere has anybody said that they would not order a cadet to abandon the aircraft via the parachute. What has been said is that, after a collision, the aircraft is "highly likely to be uncontrollable and doing its own - probably very violent - manouevres that would probably preclude successful abandonment".

Naturally, if this is not the case, and the aircraft is under some sort of control, albeit not full control, and the cadet is deemed to be sufficiently strong to be able to exit the aircraft and pull the parachute rip cord, then it may be that it would be safer to get the cadet to abandon the aircraft rather than attempt a forced landing with some controls malfunctioning.

Also, nobody has said that "no cadet is physically capable of making a jump in such circumstances". Some cadets will not be capable of making a jump under any circumstances. And there could well be some circumstances where nobody would be capable of successfully abandoning the aircraft, cadet or pilot.

That's what we have been trained to do ... weigh the circumstances and make the correct decision.

RB877

13th Jan 2010, 09:46

Just as slight reality check over the likelihood/ability to abandon the aircraft issue, as a ATC Sqn Cdr, I am far mor concerned about driving them down the motorway in a minibus to get to the AEF, than whether they will be injured as a result of a flying incident.

Cadets have been injured in car crashes too, but we don't invent new safety systems specifically for them. It seems the high profile nature of this case is clouding the judgement of some on here in the decision of what is reasonably practicable in this environment.

Flying has a risk factor, it cannot be removed completely and all eventualities cannot be covered.

bobward

13th Jan 2010, 10:46

I agree with RB887, the risks driving to/from AEF are far greater than those associated with flying. In my Wing, their airships have decided that individual units will drive their cadets to the local AEF, presumably for budget reasons. So we shift from a regime of professional, regimented drivers to something different. I'd like to see the risk assessment on that one.

Second, the visibility issue. Surely most civilian aircraft are white, yet there seem to be few collisions reported. On my AEF the usual sortie is around 20 minutes. Back in the Bulldog days it was 40. By reducing sortie length don't you concentrate the traffic, as it can't go as far?

Finally, the discussion on do you/don't you send the cadet over the side. I've been in the ATC since 1966. In my part of the world I know of no cadet who's had to do this. When you add up the number of sorties each year, that must run into a couple of million?

Last year was a very sad time for everyone, both in the Service and the Air Cadet family. Despite this, the kids on my unit still clamour for the flying slots we have. We always have more volunteers than spaces, so what does that tell you?

On a personal note, I've been fortunate enough to frequently bag empty spaces on AEF's over that time. What impresses me the most is the enthusiasm and professionalism of the pilots I've had the privilege to fly with. I have complete and absolute trust in them. If he says go, I'll go, likewise if he stays stay. I've only got a VFR PPL, and about 200 or so hours. I'll defer to the man (or lady) in the driving seat as their training, skills and experience far outweighs mine.

Thank you to all of you on the AEF's. I've seen the faces and heard all the chatter when the kids come back after their first ever trip in a proper aircraft. I just wish I could bottle and sell it!

A2QFI

13th Jan 2010, 10:51

There are occasions when the forced landing option is hardly available. I recall learning to fly the Bulldog at Scampton and that area of Lincolnshire is one huge emergency landing ground with a few hedges in it and that was good. Compare and contrast with the terrain around Woodvale, where I flew for 2 years and for 4 months of the year many available fields were waterlogged bogs and a forced landing would have resulted in a rapid halt and a forward somersault! I reacall that OC of the UAS in Northern Ireland was killed by hitting a dry stone wall during a forced landing. My own view is that the forced landing should be considered and is probably the better option than abandonment, but there are other factors re availibilty of somewhere to land.

We used to send a very few students solo around North Wales coast @500 ft on Navexes and we were lucky that there were no engine failures on these sorties

airborne_artist

13th Jan 2010, 14:53

We used to send a very few students solo around North Wales coast @500 ft on Navexes and we were lucky that there were no engine failures on these sortiesRNEFTS lost a QFI, Flt Lt "Jack" Piercy and stude Mid Mark Simon two/three courses before me on a LL navex at 250' in September 1978 - one of them survived the impact and got a few yards away, I seem to recall. Engine failure coupled with landing in a peat bog.

A page on the crash here (http://www.yorkshire-aircraft.co.uk/aircraft/planes/61-80/xx530.html).

korrol

15th Jan 2010, 10:24

I would just like to correct/elaborate upon my earlier Post 53 in which listed the following points derived from the Service Report :-

"1.None of the four people in the two aircraft was injured in the actual mid-air collision.
2. Neither cadet made any attempt to bale out and both remained strapped in their seats - even though both wore parachutes and had just viewed an instructional video on bale-out procedure
3. Although both pilots had released their straps neither of them baled out .
4. The emergency canopy jettison handle was not activated in either aircraft"

Point 3 in that list is not quite correct . Although both pilots released their straps and neither deployed their parachutes the Service Report says one pilot was found in the cockpit of his aircraft whereas the other pilot was found 23 metres from the wreckage of his aircraft- his injuries being consistent with ground impact. I had assumed from the report that he had been thrown from the aircraft on impact with the ground. However I now see that a local newspaper reported at the time :-

"Eye-witness Kieren Hamblin, 19, of North Cornelly, Bridgend said: “I saw one of the planes was doing aerobatics. “Then I heard an explosion above my head and saw one plane spiralling out of control, and the other shot off in the other direction.
“The first plane took a nose-dive. You could see the pilot trying his hardest to control the plane and he jumped out before it crashed.”

Sook

15th Jan 2010, 12:27

If you read the full report it says it's unclear whether he jumped out, or was pulled out by aerodynamic forces or aircraft motion once his harness was released. Either way he exited through the broken canopy, rather than jettisoning it. (Part 1.4 Para. 26 Sub Para. b)

Metman

15th Jan 2010, 13:30

korrol, did you read the report?? :confused: Its all in there, and quite clear?

fiery fred

9th Mar 2010, 17:42

I don't know why you guys bother to reply to people who make posts and clearly have no idea what they are talking about, question posts by people have some knowledge of the subject matter and would place more credabilty on witness statements reported in tabloid newspapers than investigations carried out by qualifed professionals.

mary meagher

14th Sep 2010, 20:48

There are a number of contributing causes, as usual.

The pilot of the tutor had a medical problem, which prevented an effective lookout.

The warning from RAF controller at Benson may or may not have come to the attention of those responsible, namely that there was a lot of air traffic in the constricted space chosen for the sortie; a less appropriate location for aerobatics is hard to imagine.

Once again I am horrified by the whole mess, and by the practice of giving young teenagers aerobatics on a first or a second flight.

Even if the instructor had been medically unfit to see properly, if aerobatics had not been normal practice, there might have been a better outcome.

How a lad of 15 can be expected to decline the offer of a thrill ride? He has neither experience nor judgement. The entire organisation should first of all make sure all the instructors are medically fit, and that in the future, aerobatics are not offered until the student is well advanced.

gpn01

14th Sep 2010, 21:59

ShyTorque

14th Sep 2010, 22:03

How a lad of 15 can be expected to decline the offer of a thrill ride? He has neither experience nor judgement. The entire organisation should first of all make sure all the instructors are medically fit, and that in the future, aerobatics are not offered until the student is well advanced.

MM, Why do you say that aeros should not be offered until a student is "well advanced"? What difference would it have made in this instance if the student was different? Are you saying that cadets are made to experience aerobatics against their personal will?

Having been a CCF cadet myself (well over 35 years ago), the one thing that was impressed upon us before AEF flights was that we might be asked if we wanted aeros and if we said not, it would not occur. Some declined, the great majority of us were only too willing to experience them. My 13 year old daughter has just joined the ATC. I know 100% that she will ask to experience aeros on her first air experience flight.

NigelOnDraft

14th Sep 2010, 22:05

Mary...

Prior reading your post I read the whole 107 pages ff the AAIB report.

I then read your post. A couple of major disagreements:
by the whole messIt was not a "whole mess" IMHO. It was a tragic accident, unforeseeable, but lessons have been learned.

and by the practice of giving young teenagers aerobatics on a first or a second flightif aerobatics had not been normal practice, there might have been a better outcomeand that in the future, aerobatics are not offered until the student is well advancedYou clearly have some concern, even obsession with "aerobatics"? The AAIB report list 13 recommendations, the word "aerobatics" features not once in these.

My reading of the report is that the aerobatic maneouvre, whilst it did immediately precede the collision, could equally have been a turn. Furthermore, there was no "student" involved - but a "passenger". That passenger could have been on their 1st, 2nd, 10th or 100th flight and what difference would it have made?

In short, and IMHO, a tragic accident with nobody culpable, nobody doing anything other than trying their best to give young people a supervised experience in life, one that did carry risks, but the best of intentions to reduce those. Lessons have been learnt, and I am not sure that without the accident, they could/would have been unearthed?

In short, AEFs have for many years given many cadets truly memorable experiences, with few incidents. A bad run last year, but my understanding is that the "uptake" in such flying by parents has been more realistic than your post suggests, and continues largely unaffected.

NoD

The Old Fat One

15th Sep 2010, 07:45

MM

Just to make sure you have understood what others above have alluded to.

AEF is not flying training. There are no students, only passengers. It is a series of Air Experiences of a military nature intended to develop and foster an interest in aviation for deserving Air Cadets. The organisation also provides gliding scholarships and, for the very select few, pilot scholarships - which is PPL flying training delivered to the prescribed syllabus by a civilian FTO.

There are forty six thousand Air Cadets and many more Sea Cadets, CCF, Scouts, Girl Guides etc etc. without whom our society would be a much poorer place. Most offer many types of adventurous training and with all such human endeavours, risk comes with the activity.

All these activites are managed to the Nth degree and accidents are rare (much more so than the teenage violence we see in other parts of our society).

If we ever stop our youth from partaking in these superb organisations, and their associated activities, with all that they bring to the positive development of these young adults - be it from a lack of funding, or risk adversity - then we as a society will be well and truly screwed.

mary meagher

15th Sep 2010, 07:47

Thank you, gpn01, for your cross reference.

The two occurences are linked, in any case.
I sincerely hope that a lot has been learned from these tragic events. Some of the more sensible suggestions have already been made in the other thread.

Clearly, lack of communication in the second midair - the Tutor pilot may not have had the heavy traffic in the air corridor on that day called to his attention.
Perhaps the RAF would like to ban cross country flying by civilian aircraft and gliders on a good day? Without a NOTAM in advance? A bit like the police chief up in Atherstone who wanted 24 hour notice of 16 gliders landing in a farmer's field during a competition!

And how the instructor's medical condition managed to be overlooked by the organisation implies improvements can be made in supervision. Whether or not parents are still happy to send their children up in a Tutor does not imply an informed decision. In my experience, parents trust those of us who actually do fly with trial lessons, and are willing to sign anything. It is up to us and our organisation to make sure they are safe.

cats_five

15th Sep 2010, 08:55

<snip>
Clearly, lack of communication in the second midair - the Tutor pilot may not have had the heavy traffic in the air corridor on that day called to his attention.
<snip>

According to the AAIB report it was the pilot's third flight of the day:

The pilot commenced fying at 1200 hrs and completed two fights of 25 and 27 minutes respectively; both these fights were fown in the accident aircraft and were conducted without incident. The accident occurred on the pilot’s third fight which departed at 1304 hrs.

(times are in UTC)

Surely he would have observed the heavy traffic during the earlier flights? I find the idea that he would have needed a briefing to draw his attention to it scary to say the least. But of course Mary might be being ironic.

AR1

15th Sep 2010, 11:42

Just trawled through this thread, and there is some utter nonsense being spouted. Its all in the report, and it's a clear case of not seeing each other. There is no evidence to suggest that any manoeuvre was the cause, or that Cadets are placed under duress in the aircraft as a captive audience.
I despise the use of phrases such as 'showing off' from people who don't have a clue.
I've flown as a cadet and airman on 'AEF' been offered and declined areo's. I've been offered and declined control. The offer was given once - to decline meant no further offers. Those flights included safety briefings relevant to type, an explanation of exactly what was going to happen next throughout the flight and have been flown with due consideration of my confidence - or indeed lack of.
This approach gave me complete confidence in the Pilots and aircraft and in due course I expanded my flying envelope. These people are professionals who's job is to foster the spirit of flying, and I would have no qualms whatsoever should my child one day end up in their care.
RANT OFF