'Israelification' of Airports: High Security, Little Bother

[Graybeard]

The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother - thestar.com (http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/744199---israelification-high-security-little-bother)
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The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother
Cathal Kelly Staff Reporter
Published On Wed Dec 30 2009.

While North America's airports groan under the weight of another sea-change in security protocols, one word keeps popping out of the mouths of experts: Israelification.

That is, how can we make our airports more like Israel's, which deal with far greater terror threat with far less inconvenience.

"It is mindboggling for us Israelis to look at what happens in North America, because we went through this 50 years ago," said Rafi Sela, the president of AR Challenges, a global transportation security consultancy. He's worked with the RCMP, the U.S. Navy Seals and airports around the world.

"Israelis, unlike Canadians and Americans, don't take s--- from anybody. When the security agency in Israel (the ISA) started to tighten security and we had to wait in line for — not for hours — but 30 or 40 minutes, all hell broke loose here. We said, 'We're not going to do this. You're going to find a way that will take care of security without touching the efficiency of the airport."

That, in a nutshell is "Israelification" - a system that protects life and limb without annoying you to death.
Despite facing dozens of potential threats each day, the security set-up at Israel's largest hub, Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion Airport, has not been breached since 2002, when a passenger mistakenly carried a handgun onto a flight. How do they manage that?

"The first thing you do is to look at who is coming into your airport," said Sela.

The first layer of actual security that greets travellers at Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion International Airport is a roadside check. All drivers are stopped and asked two questions: How are you? Where are you coming from?

"Two benign questions. The questions aren't important. The way people act when they answer them is," Sela said.

Officers are looking for nervousness or other signs of "distress" — behavioural profiling. Sela rejects the argument that profiling is discriminatory.

"The word 'profiling' is a political invention by people who don't want to do security," he said. "To us, it doesn't matter if he's black, white, young or old. It's just his behaviour. So what kind of privacy am I really stepping on when I'm doing this?"

Once you've parked your car or gotten off your bus, you pass through the second and third security perimeters.
Armed guards outside the terminal are trained to observe passengers as they move toward the doors, again looking for odd behaviour. At Ben Gurion's half-dozen entrances, another layer of security are watching. At this point, some travellers will be randomly taken aside, and their person and their luggage run through a magnometer.

"This is to see that you don't have heavy metals on you or something that looks suspicious," said Sela.
You are now in the terminal. As you approach your airline check-in desk, a trained interviewer takes your passport and ticket. They ask a series of questions: Who packed your luggage? Has it left your side?

"The whole time, they are looking into your eyes — which is very embarrassing. But this is one of the ways they figure out if you are suspicious or not. It takes 20, 25 seconds," said Sela.

Lines are staggered. People are not allowed to bunch up into inviting targets for a bomber who has gotten this far.

At the check-in desk, your luggage is scanned immediately in a purpose-built area. Sela plays devil's advocate — what if you have escaped the attention of the first four layers of security, and now try to pass a bag with a bomb in it?

"I once put this question to Jacques Duchesneau (the former head of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority): say there is a bag with play-doh in it and two pens stuck in the play-doh. That is 'Bombs 101' to a screener.. I asked Ducheneau, 'What would you do?' And he said, 'Evacuate the terminal.' And I said, 'Oh. My. God.'

"Take Pearson. Do you know how many people are in the terminal at all times? Many thousands. Let's say I'm (doing an evacuation) without panic — which will never happen. But let's say this is the case. How long will it take? Nobody thought about it. I said, 'Two days.'"

A screener at Ben-Gurion has a pair of better options.
First, the screening area is surrounded by contoured, blast-proof glass that can contain the detonation of up to 100 kilos of plastic explosive. Only the few dozen people within the screening area need be removed, and only to a point a few metres away.

Second, all the screening areas contain 'bomb boxes'. If a screener spots a suspect bag, he/she is trained to pick it up and place it in the box, which is blast proof. A bomb squad arrives shortly and wheels the box away for further investigation.

"This is a very small simple example of how we can simply stop a problem that would cripple one of your airports," Sela said.

Five security layers down: you now finally arrive at the only one which Ben-Gurion Airport shares with Pearson — the body and hand-luggage check.

"But here it is done completely, absolutely 180 degrees differently than it is done in North America," Sela said.
"First, it's fast — there's almost no line. That's because they're not looking for liquids, they're not looking at your shoes. They're not looking for everything they look for in North America. They just look at you," said Sela.

"Even today with the heightened security in North America, they will check your items to death. But they will never look at you, at how you behave. They will never look into your eyes ... and that's how you figure out the bad guys from the good guys."

That's the process — six layers, four hard, two soft. The goal at Ben-Gurion is to move fliers from the parking lot to the airport lounge in a maximum of 25 minutes.
This doesn't begin to cover the off-site security net that failed so spectacularly in targeting would-be Flight 253 bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab — intelligence. In Israel, Sela said, a coordinated intelligence gathering operation produces a constantly evolving series of threat analyses and vulnerability studies.

"There is absolutely no intelligence and threat analysis done in Canada or the United States," Sela said. "Absolutely none."

But even without the intelligence, Sela maintains, Abdulmutallab would not have gotten past Ben Gurion Airport's behavioural profilers.

So. Eight years after 9/11, why are we still so reactive, so un-Israelified?

Working hard to dampen his outrage, Sela first blames our leaders, and then ourselves.

"We have a saying in Hebrew that it's much easier to look for a lost key under the light, than to look for the key where you actually lost it, because it's dark over there. That's exactly how (North American airport security officials) act," Sela said. "You can easily do what we do. You don't have to replace anything. You have to add just a little bit — technology, training.. But you have to completely change the way you go about doing airport security. And that is something that the bureaucrats have a problem with. They are very well enclosed in their own concept."

And rather than fear, he suggests that outrage would be a far more powerful spur to provoking that change.
"Do you know why Israelis are so calm ? We have brutal terror attacks on our civilians and still, life in Israel is pretty good. The reason is that people trust their defence forces, their police, their response teams and the security agencies.

They know they're doing a good job. You can't say the same thing about Americans and Canadians. They don't trust anybody," Sela said. "But they say,... ' So far, so good...' Then if something happens, all hell breaks loose and you've spent eight hours in an airport. Which is ridiculous. Not justifiable

"But, what can you do? Americans and Canadians are nice people and they will do anything because they were told to do so and because they don't know any different."

[Ultralights]

Sadly the technique involves Profiling, and some minority group will declare it Racist, and hence, we will be doomed to 5 hr checkin in western society.

[oleary]

This would never work in Canada because it requires a minimal level of intelligence.

And as we well know, there is not a single person in the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) or the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) with an IQ greater than that of a turnip.:ugh:

[Xeque]

Thank you for posting this.
Now, how do we get this in the faces of politicians, security agencies and airport administrators in the UK?
How quickly can we reset the system in line with what the Israeli's do so that common sense and a lack of hysteria will once again prevail?
The one thing that government must face up to is the fact that several thousand 'otherwise unemployable' will be back on the dole queue.
Are they prepared to accept that or will they avoid common sense at all costs and continue to make long suffering and completely innocent passengers (and crews) bear the brunt of their current lunacy.
Trouble is, it requires positive action on the part of the passengers and crews themselves to stand up and shout 'enough is enough'. Until this happens the politicians will ignore it, the airports will push it further back on the back burner, the security agencies will fight it tooth and nail because it's likely to detract from their (perceived) power base and the airlines will stay out of it because, already worried sick about passenger figures and the health of their businesses, they don't want to add anything that might make things worse.
The Israeli model is obviously the right way to go about it but I'm not holding my breath to see if the Brits will follow suit.

[plasticAF]

Perhaps by greybeard posting this here those wonderful people in the media (auntie beeb?) Will see, read and ask the questions. Yes it will take a large change in a collective mindset but wouldn't it be wonderful if that mindset was changed. I for one have no problem with security as an employee, as a passenger I would be happier if this system was introduced. It would stop my wife wingeing at me when we fly anywhere. Would also make me more agreeable to visiting her pal and family in the USA.
Ah well, here's hoping

plastic

[Xeque]

I hope to God someone in the 'media' does pick up on this.
The Daily Telegraph did a good job on politicians expenses last year. Perhaps here is a new subject for them to get their teeth into for 2010 - or the Times, Guardian, Independent, the Beeb - whoever.

[Croqueteer]

:ok:We have had similar here. As crew, I regularly went through Belfast Aldergrove at the height of the troubles, and found security to be fast and pleasant. They seemed to know who to target and caused minimum fuss for the majority, including crew. Unlike Luton, where once when a group of us were going through security on our annual training, my collegue was carrying two sticks of mock dynamite in his hand, and despite the usual body search and verbal grief, they were not noticed, in fact we were through before my pal realised the significance of what he had done!

[mantug01]

I flew out of Tel Aviv a few year ago and the secuirty was excellent and had no queues!!

At Abu Dhabi my baggage was screened before i got to the check-in desk.

If you manage the extra secuirty measures right there should be no further delays....But most UK Airports can't manage that.

[sussex2]

The profiling system used on many U.S. bound flights on U.S. registered carriers, has been in existence for years, at least since 1990. It is entirely based on the Israeli system and is practiced by Israeli based companies.
This system has caused few delays, and has been honed to be as pax friendly as possible.
What IMHO is the problem is that there are too many agencies becoming involved, and they are not talking to each other eg The UK department of transport refused for many years to recognise, or indeed understand, the profiling system. In other countries police/ customs etc have felt their roles diminished by this profiling system and interfered with it.
What the answer is I don't know, but I do know it needs to be coordinated and people need to talk to one another.

[akerosid]

I think the one big problem in the Israeli process is the fact that you will require a fairly high level of training in personal skills to be able to achieve this level of security; given the calibre of many of those working for the TSA and other security organisations (the phrase "marine corps wannabes" comes to mind), hired at fairly low wages - and not even (initially) allowed to become unionised, would they be able to carry out this level of security? Experience has shown that many security personnel take a confrontational approach, which of course antagonises even the most relaxed of passengers, so the opportunity to observe behaviour is effectively ruined.

Not everyone is going to be capable of carrying out this kind of "behavioural recognition" and it's unlikely to be people on minimum wages, so will the TSA and others be willing to consider this expenditure?

And reading through the article provided by Graybeard, it occurs to me that too much emphasis is being placed on profiling; if everyone is asked the same questions and treated the same way (subject of course to their responses), then profiling should not be as big an issue as is being suggested?

[no sponsor]

As someone who frequently went through Ben Gurion, for a non-Israeli, it is a complete nightmare (I'm white British).

Other check-points through into Israel (the Jordanian and Egyptian Boarders) are better but these are car/walk-ins.

If you fly on El Al then it is even worse.

I would anticipate something in the region of 45-90 mins of questioning - if flying non El Al. If I flew on El Al I would expect 90-120 mins of their 'screening' procedures. This started before I even got to the airport, as once they even called me at home before I left asking if I was going to be on the flight! Always the same questions, asked over and over again, with 2-4 people getting involved; the nature of the questioning could only be done by the Israelis! As soon as they phoned someone who I know who spoke Hebrew, and could vouch for me, then I was let on my way. The most bizarre thing was that leaving the country was far harder than entering it.

The length of time at Ben Gurion could be longer than necessary because my understanding was that it is a training centre, so perhaps they were using me as guinea pig. Anyway, I hated going through their security.

I can assure you that you really don't want to have Ben Gurion questioning tactics for passengers, unless racial profiling was very efficient (and accurate).

[BobHead]

I am not certain just the sheer scale of the operation would swamp any Major Airport. Figures(rounded) from Wikki for 2008 show.

Heathrow 478.000 a/c movements 67,000,000 paxs + Transfers airside
O'Hare 881.000 a/c movements 69.000.000 paxs
Ben Gurion 94.000 a/c movements 11.500.000 paxs
Birmingham 112.000 a/c movements 10,000,000 paxs.

Add to this that the vast majority of Paxs passing thru Ben Gurion are either Israeli citizens or Jewish and compare that to the passenger profile at LHR. Few if any Paxs at BG are transit passengers to destinations outside of Israel.

It is nigh impossible to get all the paxs into LHR's five terminals 7 am to 10 am let alone stop the transport of all the resident and transient staff for profiling. FC and CC are moaning away on other threads about being stopped already. Or are people suggestion that any vehicle with BA written on be exempt from a stop at is enters what ever the controlled zone is.

I am no against profiling and have always thought it to be the way forward but to compare Ben Gurion with LHR or O'Hare is chalk and cheese.

When Pax searches first started with El Al, Lufthansa and SAA at LHR in 1972/3 both full hand baggage, body search and profiling was conducted. No electronic equipment was available and it took a long time to load a 747 with paxs.

BobH

[blaireau]

Profiling would logically concentrate on the young, mostly muslims, however much the PC bleeding hearts bleat. Security is of far more importance than the injured feelings of the idealistic and naive.

[RoyHudd]

Well done Superpilot. The first to start attacking Israel and it's apartheid policies, moving on to West Bank issues, etc. Racist theme to your diatribe, I think you'll agree if you examine what you've written. There will be more like this in the thread, as the word Israel precipitates a Pavlovian response to those many sensitized by today's media. Including clever pilots.

This is a security theme, not a political one.

[Capot]

With experience of multiple trips to Gaza via Tel Aviv and vice versa, may I advise people not to think for one moment that the Israeli process is (a) no bother, or (b) done by intelligent people.

As an elderly Caucasian consultant, I was routinely pulled over on departure for a fatuous interrogation by an idiot, but only if the word Gaza was mentioned. And please, please don't tell me that I just didn't realise that this is part of the process and that the interviewer was not really stupid, but a skilled intelligence officer. I can tell the difference.

The same process happens on arrival at Tel Aviv, if you are travelling in that direction. Immigration gives your passport to a team of teenage cretins, who usher you off to a quiet spot.

TC1; "Why do you want to go to Gaza?" "It's in my contract."

TC2; "Where will you live?" "At the Beach."

TC3; "Who will you meet?" "Ali bin Falaan and his brother Ahmad".

All TCs write down this rubbish carefully in their exercise books.

The Israeli system is a huge amount of hassle, and achieves little. You may argue that the result is no successful attempts on Israeli aircraft or indeed on other aircraft operating to/from Israel. But that's the same fallacious argument as the one about elephant powder.

The best defence that El Al has is that an El Al aircraft is not a particularly significant target in terms of the impact on the West of knocking one out of the sky. Some superficial hand-wringing for a day or two, maybe, but little more. That's why there are very few or no attempts, successful or otherwise.

[MathFox]

Before we start praising Israel and El Al for doing efficient security, I want to get the raw data right. One side says 25 minutes (including check-in) while others say 90 minutes (or more). Another question I have is whether the security rules can be abused to frustrate legitimate trade with the "Palestine regions"... (and whether that abuse already has happened.)

On the other hand, Israel has some very good points that would be good to introduce on all airports. Saying "please" instead of shouting makes a difference. Employing well-trained personnel. Thought about how all the pieces of security fit together. If Mr. Pants-on-fire was on a security watchlist, why didn't the gate check in Amsterdam get a notification of that?

[Capot]

whether the security rules can be abused to frustrate legitimate trade with the "Palestine regions".

Well, yes; laptops are routinely taken away for examination "for security purposes" and if you won't hand over your password(s) you don't get it back. After a client in Europe was contacted cold by an Israeli company shortly after such an examination we took to deleting all data from laptops apart from a text file on the desktop saying "Dear Security Person, there's nothing on this laptop's hard disc for you to steal. Please return it in good condition". Most business travellers to and from Israel take similar precautions, or would if they have any sense.

If you are trading with the Occupied Territories and Gaza it often seems that your travel via Tel Aviv is made as difficult as possible.

[Gulfstreamaviator]

If the contract for all western security was given to a high profile Israeli company, and was blatently Israeli, perhaps the number of suspects (ie suspect looking chaps), would reduce.



glf


ps not going to Yemin for a while, either.

[SMT Member]

As a caucasian, non-israeli and non-jew, who travels to Israel through Ben Gurion around 1-3 times a year, let me add my experiences.

There are always lines, fairly long ones, leading up to the first check and x-raying of belongings. While you're slowly making your way to the x-ray machine, this is when you'll get your first interview. This process of standing in line and being interviewed will take from 10 to 30 minutes, if all goes well and you don't ring any bells.

After x-ray, there's another check of your hand luggage accompanied by the second interview, checking your answers from the first one; this will take 5 to 10 minutes, again provided all goes well.

Then you'll walk over to check-in, which are always chaotic since your average passenger leaving Ben Gurion has no concept of the idea of keeping an orderly que - but that happens in many other airports too. There'll be a bit of an interview, but it's the same as in most places around the world (did you pack your luggage yourself etc). Say 10 to 30 minutes, depending on class of travel.

Now you move off to have your passport checked, and a few more questions asked by the immigration officer. Add 5 to 15 minutes depending on length of ques.

Then it's off to have your carry-ons x-rayed, but before that there'll be another check of documents and perhaps a question or two. 10 to 20 minutes.

And, finally, you've passed security at Ben Gurion.

All times above reflect reality, but only if everything goes smoothly and you don't attract anything more than normal attention. It will take from 40 to 105 minutes. It's not for nothing you're requested to be at the airport 3 hours prior to STD!

My personal best, but only because I work for someone who knows someone and thus am able to apply for security pre-screening (it's just a document you fill out) AND is being escorted through the whole ordeal by someone who'll vouch for me, is 20 minutes.

If someone tells you it can be done, on average, in 20 to 30 minutes they're feeding you porkies.

[doubleu-anker]

Basic intelligence would dictate, profiling is a must.

The Israelis are pretty good at this, so they could teach us a thing or two.

However the imbeciles who run the security don't seem to have any smarts.:ugh:

To hell with the EU human rights agreement, as human rights doesn't feature very high on the terrorist’s agenda.

[Sallyann1234]

Basic intelligence would dictate, profiling is a must.
The Israelis are pretty good at this, so they could teach us a thing or two.

As the primary target, their security is necessarily very tight and they may well be able to teach something. But the Israelis have very little need for profiling per se because their passengers are effectively self-profiling.

This is very evident if you fly El Al and look around the departure lounge. The types of passenger who would attract special attention by profiling are notable by their absence, since they are generally people who have no need or wish to visit Israel and/or would choose to fly by other airlines.

Other carriers and routes have a greater need for profiling because they carry a much broader cross-section of people.

[Dairyground]

I well remember your type - hostile, sulking individuals, always full of indignant pomposity and sympathy for those who have brought this blight upon the world.


As is almost invariable when a topic touches Israel, two opposing and largely irrelevant viewpoints intrude, with assertions that, to the uninvolved, could come equally well from either side.

But, to get back to the thread. My one experience of flying out of Tel Aviv was after attending a large international conference last Autumn. We were advised to wear our conference badges, as that would ease out passage through the various security checks, but also to arrive three hours before SDT.

It took me only 25 minutes to get from kerbside to shopping, but that was at five in the morning. It had taken about as long, even through the "fast track" at Heathrow T5 on the outward trip. However, a group of Korean delegates from the same conference had been delayed so long in the system the previous afternoon that they missed their flight.

So, with plenty of space and time, provided you don't look too different, the Israeli system can work, but it probably helps if you have a fairly homogeneous set of customers, unlike the heterogeneous lot that pass through many major airports.

And of course, should profiling be put in place as a major part of the flight security system, the terrorists will aim to recruit people unknown to the security services and ensure that visits to their training establishments do not show up in travel documents and other histories. Perhaps the latest incident, using a black African, is the first sign of a move in that direction.

[No_Speed_Restriction]

It's all in the wording. A peaceful approach deserves a generous answer. By the way, I used work for an Israeli carrier and the amount of holes in security you wouldnt believe. I never used to get x-rayed when flying out of TLV on internal flights. All they used to do is check my name on the security register; big deal.

[MathFox]

I like to repeat my opinions:
The Israeli system of airport/airline security requires a significant investment of resources (15 minute or longer interview/embarkation). Is it worth it considering the number of attempted attacks on airlines in general?
It seems effective, but can be gamed by the screeners when they don't like a passenger.
The airport interview is only part of a larger intelligence system; getting US intelligence up to Israel information sharing standards may be a bigger step forward in security than harassing passengers with interviews.

[amos747]

As can be expected, the golden path routes somewhere in between the two extreme approaches to commercial aviation security discussed here. Obviously, "Israelification" across the board is probably not practical in busy international airports; on the other hand, indiscriminating security checks for all, with virtually no profiling, is both frustrating and plain stupid. Subjecting aircrews to the same screening criteria as the general public does not make aviation any safer. I guess the same applies for little old ladies etc.

[Heidhurtin]

It's also worth considering the liability issue. In todays litiginous world in the USA (UK is catching up), can security organisations really afford to allow our safety to rely almost solely on an operatives judgement, as per the Israeli model? (I agree wholeheartedly with previous comments about the intelligence and ability of said operatives in UK and USA!) Even forgetting the possibility of legal action, the propensity for the press to find somebody to blame at all costs means no elected politician is going to trust his position to the judgement of some "oik" on minimum pay! :eek:

At least by subjecting everybody to the same mindless routine, said operatives (and their employers et al) have an excuse in the event of a security breach. "Wosn't my fault. I dun my bit like wot it sez in my job description, di'nt I?" :sad:

IMHO the ideal solution would involve a combination of the blanket western approach and the Israeli practice. I do not think profiling is a dirty word, it's absolutely necessary. The police have been using it for years before anybody thought to give it a name. A suspect's behaviour will tell you more than the words he uses!

Lastly as frequent SLF through LHR, I am totally amazed that there isn't a separate route through the process for crew. I agree you have to go through the same process, but a streamlined or dedicated crew route would seem so logical. It's a real pain for me once a month or so - it must be hell to do it even more regularly. :ooh:

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

Has it occurred to those who post on here that those who work in 'Security' in Israel might possibly have a similar outlook to those who work in it elsewhere?

Or be subject to the same, rigorous, selection criteria?:ooh:

[sTeamTraen]

A couple of random thoughts/questions from someone who considers himself an agnostic on the whole "Israel thing":

- It ought to help with implementing security that Israelis undergo a lot of security checks in their daily lives and take the threat of terrorist attacks seriously because, well, those attacks seem to happen pretty regularly.
- In the same vein, pretty well every adult in Israel has been in the military. This means that not only do they have a pool of people with "serious" experience to hire at security; they also have a travelling public that knows "what to do", in all senses of the term, far better than the average EZY stag weekend pax.
- Losing an El Al plane would be a huge deal for a country of 7 million people. When that ferry went down in the Baltic a few years ago and about 600(?) Swedish people died, half the country knew someone who was on it. A 2000-person total loss would be the proportional equivalent of three 9/11s.

All of those seem to argue in favour of the way Israel does things. I'm not sure if they are scaleable to Western countries, regardless of "political correctness" issues. When I was "sort of profiled" at FRA last year it was a joke, I got referred to the supervisor more or less only because I was a citizen of country A, resident in country B, and flying from country C.

[RoyHudd]

Please explain yourself, barbies boyfriend. And explain what you mean by "security" in Israel.

[Carrier]

Quote: "It's also worth considering the liability issue. In todays litiginous world in the USA (UK is catching up), can security organisations really afford to allow our safety to rely almost solely on an operatives judgement, as per the Israeli model?"

Can they afford not to use all proven methods, especially the Israeli approach which has been proven by its track record to be effective? Any litigation lawyer or prosecutor worth his salt and operating in a genuine system of justice would have a field day with responsible security and political persons who were unable to prove that they had effective profiling in place - negligence, dereliction of duty, treason, aiding and abetting the terrorists, being an accessory, etc. They have a duty to use all effective methods and they cannot be excused for failing to use some, especially those proven to be effective, because the use of such methods might upset some group or PC interest.

[Carrier]

Quote: "This would never work in Canada because it requires a minimal level of intelligence.
And as we well know, there is not a single person in the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) or the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) with an IQ greater than that of a turnip."

To see why, take a look at the aptitude level required for a security guard on the Wonderlic test.

Wonderlic Test - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wonderlic_Test)

WonderlicYourself - Bolts From The Blue (http://www.boltsfromtheblue.com/2009/2/19/764397/wonderlic-yourself)

The test was given to miscellaneous people of various professions. Examples of scores from everyday professions included:
Chemist - 31
Programmer - 29
Attorney - 29
Journalist - 26
Teacher - 26
Accountant - 26
Sales - 24
Registered nurse - 24
Secretary - 22.5
Bank teller - 22
Clerical worker - 21
Police officer - 21
Gridiron player - 20
Security guard - 17
Warehouse - 15
Janitor - 15

[marchino61]

There seem to be two opposing and opiniated camps on this thread.

I won't join in this mud-slinging match; instead, I would like to present some facts, namely the latest check-in times for passengers on Swiss at various airports:

AmsterdamSchiphol40 min
Tel AvivBen Gurion International120 min
Heathrow AirportBusiness Class: 30 min
Economy Class: 45 min


New YorkJ.F. KennedyFirst / Business Class: 60 min
Economy Class: 90 min

Latest check-in times (http://www.swiss.com/web/en/services/checkin/Pages/latest_checkin.aspx)

OK, that's my contirbution to this thread - now I will crawl back to my hole and lurk......

[beachfront71]

I dont get it?
The proof is in the pudding. No airplanes blow up = security measures are working ... especially in a high profile area.

For those who apparently have a better idea, let us know your age and occupation.. Not to be a jerk but for all I know we could be arguing with some 15 year olds with no real world experience what so ever...

If you have "better way" to get things done, please do justify it instead of throwing out the idea.

As far as profiling goes, again, if you are a sane person and understand who and what is causing problems, you should be smart enough to expect it, prepare for it, and move on ... it is nothign personal, it is the most logical way to eliminate false positives and an effecient use of the time..

[Xeque]

OK. Fair enough.
Until last year when I retired (I am British, Caucasian, aged 67) I traveled by air (averagely) 3 times a year on long haul and 6-8 times a year on short haul.
I was born in the UK but have lived most of my life in Germany, Australia, KSA, Abu Dhabi and Bahrain. In the 60's I spent the decade working in the big passenger liners that preceded the B747 and the subsequent rise in popularity of air travel. I now live in Thailand where we have a major Islamic insurgency problem in the south of the country. I am a pilot (PPL) and have been flying for 30 years. Because of the amount of travel I have (until recently) done and my interest in aviation matters generally, I spend a lot of time thinking about the industry and what ails it at present.
Does that establish my credentials?
I know and many other people know (yourself included if you viewed the matter logically) that the current system of bashing passengers and crew in an effort to show that you are 'doing something' about the problem is a total waste of time, effort and expenditure. It is a complete sham and it's only result is to prove that the terrorists have gained the upper hand by inconveniencing and upsetting hundreds of thousands of people. All the terrorists have to do to keep the pot boiling is to throw in the occasional retard (like this latest Nigerian twerp) and the whole world, lead by the Americans, twitches in fear and intimidation. If the twerp actually succeeds it's a bonus.
Greybeard (when he started this post) explained how the Israeli's do it. I thought their system would work if it was expanded to UK airports. Instead of degenerating into an 'us and them' ridiculing exercise how about each of the contributors to this thread coming up with their ideas for a beginning to end security process that enables passengers and crew to get from the drop-off point to the aircraft in minimal time and that ensures flight safety WITHOUT the delays, humiliation, degradation and sheer bloody mindedness that they have to suffer at UK airports now.
Instead of just knocking things, come up with some ideas of your own. Please.

[MG23]

Instead of just knocking things, come up with some ideas of your own. Please.

I think a number of things mentioned are good ideas: for example, the purpose-built screening rooms for baggage so that if something bad is found then you can simply clear that room and don't need to worry about the rest of the airport.

However, I think that profiling is vastly more complex than people seem to believe it to be. For example, they imagine that they can detect a crazed Islamic suicide bomber by looking for someone who's 'nervous'.

Why would a crazed Islamic suicide bomber be nervous? He's about to become a martyr and be flown off to Paradise with 72 virgins to keep him company... surely he'd be extremely happy about that? And even if he was 'nervous', I'm sure there are at least a million times as many people who are simply nervous about flying as there are crazed suicide bombers, so how are you going to pick one bomber out of a million ordinary everyday flyers?

[mr Q]

The harsh reality is that there can never be 100% security any more than there is 100% safety...
It is a cat and mouse game and good intellegence appears to dictate who wins any particular bout but the bombers only have to be successful only once by breaching the security and getting on board an aircraft and the western world panics and reacts while the terrorists wait and watch .....
I am sure terror groups give Israeli airlines a wide berth because they are not easy targets.
Vigilence is the watchword but that alone is never enough

[Bergerie1]

Many years ago before I retired I was involved in an examination of Israeli security methods. It was shortly after the Lockerbie accident and we were investigating how to improve security screening at UK airports.
Without going into details here of how the Israeli process works a number of facts rapidly became obvious:-

1. At that time there were only two international airports, Tel Aviv and Eilat.

2. The passenger numbers requiring screening at these airports were low in comparison to those in the UK (see Bob Head’s post for current numbers, I quote:-
Heathrow 478.000 a/c movements 67,000,000 paxs + Transfers airside
O'Hare 881.000 a/c movements 69.000.000 paxs
Ben Gurion 94.000 a/c movements 11.500.000 paxs
Birmingham 112.000 a/c movements 10,000,000 paxs.

3. The Israelis, at that time, had a very specific profile to look for whereas at Heathrow they were multiple (remember we are not just looking for a Muslim man wearing a beard or a Muslim woman wearing a niqab or other concealing clothing) the possibilities are endless, and are even more difficult now given the number of radicalised UK nationals, some of British ethnic origins.

4. With the very large numbers of passengers being processed through large international airports, profiling on the Israeli model would require (a) a very large number of well trained and intelligent profilers (where would you get them from?) and (b) a very significant increase in processing time (and what would that do to the throughput and consequent queues?).

Clearly, the current methods are flawed, witness the failures that have occurred and the types of experiences posted by aircrew elsewhere on PPRuNe posts. But I am convinced that a certain amount of profiling would help, however to introduce the Israeli model at Heathrow would bring the airport to a near halt.

Croqueteer mentions Belfast Aldergrove. Yes, they did it there very efficiently but, again, at a small airport with low throughput and with very specific targets to profile for.

I fear we must accept that security will never be watertight, it is just not possible in a public transport system on the scale of current international air transport. Therefore you have to make a difficult decision. Do you have 100% security and virtually no air transport or do you have air transport on the current scale and accept a certain level of risk?

Don’t get me wrong, I am not advocating inadequate security but we do have to be realistic as to what exactly is possible.

[BobHead]

Wilod Goose

Yesterday you said' "It is of the person who desires to bring harm to passengers and the flight, or is being unknowingly used to do so - such as Anne Mary Murphy (Anne Mary Murphy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
This is not an easy task and requires highly trained personnel, and a system that evolves with the terrorist methods.

Remember - the Israeli system has never been beaten by terrorists since 1968. Contrary to what has been suggested here, this is not through lack of motivation of the Palestinians or Hizbollah and their agents. They have tried and tried again, but were beaten each time.

The West are incapable of overcoming their PC paralysis.
Many, as can be gathered from these pages as well, are even more incapable of recognizing the advantages of an Israeli method."

Examination of history, including Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, which incidently can be altered and edited by any interested party up until very recently, shows that no A/C that departed from a UK airport has ever been hijacked and Only Pan Am 101 has been blown up and that by a bag loaded onto the aircraft in Fankfurt origin from Malta. So it appears the UK Security sytems works so why would we need the Israeli sytem?

I only ask :ugh:

BobH

[Golf Charlie Charlie]

Just briefly, there was a hijacking from a UK airport in the 1970s - a British Airways One-Eleven on a domestic flight.

[MathFox]

BobH:
So it appears the UK Security sytems works so why would we need the Israeli sytem?
The Dutch admitted that their system was broken (vented anger at the EU that regulated the full body scanners to the storage closet) and made some tweaks to the system. Yes, the body scanners are allowed out of the closet again.

As a passenger I see value in a security check, I also realise there is a cost both in time and "security tax". I realise that 100% security guarantees are impossible, even with "El Al style" security checks. Planes also crash due to mechanical failure (or pilot error).
A sane goal for airport security checks would be to keep "terrorist incidents" significantly lower than other plane accidents. The "broken", "old" (2009) system worked in that respect.
Off course, regular reviews of how checking can be improved should be done. A reduction of cost (or smoother experience for the passenger) counts as improvement in my book too.

[PENKO]

Guys, the guy from Amsterdam was profiled in Amsterdam. Israeli style. All passengers flying on American carriers are profiled in Amsterdam.

Profiling is not perfect.
I takes a lot of time.
It takes a lot of manforce.
It is neigh impossible to do on a large scale and still continue to fly like we do now.

[MathFox]

Guys, the guy from Amsterdam was profiled in Amsterdam. [Israeli] TSA style. All passengers flying on American carriers are profiled in Amsterdam.
So, fixed that for you.
I have been through the [profiling] interview several times and it does not have the thoroughness of the profiling El Al performs. It is easy to learn the "correct" answers to the TSA questions.

[PENKO]

TSA has nothing to do with profiling in AMS. It is not as over the top as in Israel, but if you talk about peacetime profiling, the Amsterdam style is the closest workeable thing. And even that would mean the end of air travel as we know it.

Of course, the questions you could memorize are the standard questions that everyone gets. But that is not profiling. You were profiled before any questions were asked and deemed safe, hence no further questions. Think about it.

[Xeque]

AS I said in my post #39
how about each of the contributors to this thread coming up with their ideas for a beginning to end security process that enables passengers and crew to get from the drop-off point to the aircraft in minimal time and that ensures flight safety WITHOUT the delays, humiliation, degradation and sheer bloody mindedness that they have to suffer at UK airports now.
So, come on. Let's have some ideas.

[PENKO]

Well, if you are now already so annoyed by having to remove your shoes or your laptop, how annoyed do you think you will be after you have to explain to a security guard all your private travel details, because that is exactly what profiling leads to. So if you want profiling, make sure you want it for the right reasons.


And also accept that you will need to be at the airport hours before departure for even a domestic flight.

[MathFox]

Xeque: "let's have some ideas"

1. Imprison any government official or politician who claims that 100% security can be achieved.
2. Aim for a reasonable level of safety (under 1 plane loss/yr due to terrorist/criminal activity; for comparison, there were a total of 30 fatal airline accidents in 2009).
3. Design the security checkpoint and procedures with a smooth passenger flow in mind.
4. Have enough personnel and equipment available to avoid formation of queues.
5. Be polite, smile and say "please". DON'T SHOUT!

[PENKO]

Define the problem first Xeque.
The problem we percieve with security in the UK has greatly to do with mentality. Mentality on both sides of the x-ray machine I must say.

Yes, the UK has one of the most ridiculous implementations of security procedures. And some people manning the checkpoints are idiots. But we as UK pilots also have a huge chip on the shoulder and some of us are quite idiotic too. Put those two together et voila. All in all I have not queued longer than 15 minutes at any UK airport, and as a commuter I see a lot of airports, crew and passenger side! So that is not too bad. Come check out how long the passengers queue in Amsterdam before they can be profiled and you will think twice about profiling.

Now as Math says, begin to accept that there is no foolproof solution to the security problem. You can build a brick wall around the airport, you can subject everyone to a cavity search and still clever bad people will find a way around it. You can profile as much as you want, it will only lead to massive costs, delays, hassle, loss of privacy and still some Nigerian bloke will slip through the net, not to speak of all the intelligence networks set up by Bush the maniac. So...

[ShotOne]

The article would have earned more respect had the author (writing out of unashamed self-interest) been up-front and admitted how heavily the Israelis rely on RACIAL profiling. How many Arab-Israelis are dealt with in 25 minutes? Or indeed how many white UK citizens? Every colleague who has been there has experienced at least 90 minutes of deeply unpleasant and intrusive interviews which bear little relation to his account.

We could endlessly debate whether or not such profiling is wrong; but to arrogantly and dishonestly claim to have invented some "magic bullet" that the rest of the world must copy doesn't help anyone.

[bizdev]

I don't understand why the Airport owners are not more vocal in this whole security mess.

I went through LHR a few times shortly after the liquid ban came into effect. The check-in and security lines were horrendous. At T4 the lines snaked their way out of the terminal into a covered tent and out again into the street.

When I eventually made it to airside the shops were deserted - there simply was not time. OK things have got marginally better now but I bet you that added security = loss of takings in the shops - why aren't the Airport owners seeking a better solution on behalf of us all - what will be good for us will be good for them - won't it?

bizdev

[Heilhaavir]

And for all those who repeatedly state that EL Al security is not relevant because either they (A) only look for Moslems, or (B) Moslems and peace loving citizens stay away from El Al, reading about AM Murphy will be enlightening. There have been other cases before and after AM Murphy, all involved passport holders that were "Western, caucasian, non-Moslem" in origin.

Correct Wildgoose, and just to name a few: the Japanese Kozo Okamoto, Tsuyoshi Okudaira & Yasuyuki Yasuda, or Patrick Arguello (US/Nicaragua) or the Germans Wilfried Bose, Brigitte Kuhlman & Magdalena Kopp (who later married Ilich Ramirez Sanchez better known as "Carlos the Jackal")...

Suggesting to "Israelize" the system is not suggesting to fully implement El Al's, but rather to use the latter's expertise to better our/your own.

With experience of multiple trips to Gaza via Tel Aviv and vice versa, may I advise people not to think for one moment that the Israeli process is (a) no bother, or (b) done by intelligent people.

As an elderly Caucasian consultant, I was routinely pulled over on departure for a fatuous interrogation by an idiot, but only if the word Gaza was mentioned. And please, please don't tell me that I just didn't realise that this is part of the process and that the interviewer was not really stupid, but a skilled intelligence officer. I can tell the difference.

The same process happens on arrival at Tel Aviv, if you are travelling in that direction. Immigration gives your passport to a team of teenage cretins, who usher you off to a quiet spot.

TC1; "Why do you want to go to Gaza?" "It's in my contract."

TC2; "Where will you live?" "At the Beach."

TC3; "Who will you meet?" "Ali bin Falaan and his brother Ahmad".

All TCs write down this rubbish carefully in their exercise books.

Well Capot, that just tells me they don't only hassle Muslims... Furthermore, if you don't like it, either bite your tongue or simply don't go to TLV. Have your people in Gaza set up your travel through Egypt, or more precisely Rafah, and bring you in through the "Philadelphi Route". Just don't bring too many bags, the tunnels aren't that wide...

[Giolla]

Knowing airports, particularly SPL, I wonder sometimes if people do realize what it means to run an airport with 130.000 pax handlings per day - 7647 per hour.
To run a thorough check means a large number of trained staff in an environment that changes continually. El Al started at SPL by separating their pax from the other airlines, checking their luggage by hand, followed by another check on the 'buffer' at that time - mid 70' s the gate was not used. Pax were brought by buses to the platform.
Before entering the a/c all remaning handluggage was checked again and bottles etc. separated and put in rows on the platform. The whole check lasted for some hours, 2 - 3 depending on the flight.

Today, such would be impossible in terms of time and money.

Presently all current checks are done by 'normal' security staff, without any specific training - the papers were very clear when they laid out how strict the security measurements are in real.
Another point is that you might close your front door but do remember that the backdoor is left wide open. The backdoor is everything that moves in the luggage cellars and works in and around the platform.

Israelification? Why not. But it is not sufficient for running the daily SPL show moderately safely.
A total redesign of airport security is necessary. Not favored by politicians, airport authorities and airline operators. Not to speak of the pax.

[PENKO]

Giolla, saying that the security staff at AMS have no specific training is saying that pilots have no training either. The staff ARE trained. They follow a basic course which allows them to man the standard security checks, after which there is on the job training. On top of that, to profile there is an intensive follow up course which is much thougher and longer, followed by more on the job training.

Of course they won't hold a PhD in AVSEC, but neither do pilots know anything really worthwhile about aerodynamics...

Since when do we believe the papers to be correct when they report anything related to aviation? We should know better on PPRuNe! Look, I'm not trying to defend the way things are done in security. I just know it a bit from the inside, and it is not helpful in a discussion like this to say things that are just not true, or worse, quoted from a newspaper.

[OneIn60rule]

I would like to be able to see a comparison between the two systems.

Taking into account how many incidents, regardless of what it was. Be it a suicide bomber, attempted bomb planting, hijacking etc..

Looking at their methods, it doesn't seem that bad if this is what they are doing.
Of course one may not be able to use their ideas in the UK to the fullest but perhaps take on board a bit of it?

The examples of bomb proof etc and so on should be taken on board.

[Giolla]

@ Perko

I know the coy that carries out the checks. On top of that, to prove the present insufficient security, a UK photographer managed to get a syringe through the gate that escaped the security staff.
A shiftleader of this coy explained explicitly how she had a few hours basic training followed by many complaints of workload and working conditions fromother staffmembers.

You cannot improve technical matters only, you should improve the whole system, reducing chances, and that is what counts. Again, the system must be redesigned as a whole rather than shifting all responsibility to humans who are obliged to do their work on a commercial basis instead of achievement.

[PENKO]

Giolla, you quote directly from the Telegraaf, not Holland's most respected newspaper. The story from that shiftleader is BS. Anyone who has or had anything to do professionally with security at AMS will confirm that.

Managing to get a seringe through is, well, not the most difficult thing to do, neither the most worrysome. Again, not that security is perfect, checks get missed, and as you said earlier, I agree that the backdoor is quite open. But then again, how do you secure an airport properly whilst maintaining reasonable efficiency? If you have the answer to that... :)

[PENKO]

Wild Goose, people get stripped, at least down to their underwear. I can confirm you that. Not that it's a bad thing. But don't say it does not happen.

[Beausoleil]

From what I read here, it seems that profiling at Ben Gurion results in 3% being subjected to more stringent searches. I suspect that the same profiling at a major international hub would result in a much higher percentage, since the people who travel through Ben Gurion are a more biased sample of the world's population. The advantage gained would then be limited.

In essence, you are looking for people very different from "the average passenger" at your airport or for your airline. That's much easier for a specialist airport/carrier like Ben Gurion or El Al than it is for an international hub or carrier like BA, where the range of passengers is much more diverse.

[WHBM]

I imagine quite a number who are writing here have never transited an Israeli airport, and are working on hearsay.

My most recent experience, at Ovda, was that the Israeli "security" staff there appeared to be trained-last-week recent school leavers. Not one appeared to be over the age of 25. They didn't appear to have much of a clue about their substance testing technology, where they spent most of the the time looking puzzled, resetting, opening up the covers, and going for assistance.

As far as giving confidence in procedures was concerned, we got the exact opposite impression.

One thing among all this novice approach, they were never rude to the passengers. Their sentences may have been parroted without sincerity from their training manual, but there was none of the shouting and going red in the face that you get at Gatwick or LAX.

[peter we]

"First, the screening area is surrounded by contoured, blast-proof glass that can contain the detonation of up to 100 kilos of plastic explosive"

How thick does glass have to be protect against 100kg plastic Explosive? I'd hazard at few meters...

[sTeamTraen]

From what I read here, it seems that profiling at Ben Gurion results in 3% being subjected to more stringent searches. I suspect that the same profiling at a major international hub would result in a much higher percentage, since the people who travel through Ben Gurion are a more biased sample of the world's population.

Funny, I'd have thought the opposite. If they're doing profiling based on physical appearance, there's a lot of "swarthy Middle Eastern" types. But apparently they're doing it based on behaviour, and while I'd personally like to pull over drunken pasty white youths, they're probably exhibiting the most "suspicious" behaviour you'll see in an average hour of the day on the average short- or medium-haul out of Gatwick.

[ACARS]

I wonder how Ross Kemp got on trying to leave Ben Gurion after filming his latest Sky One series? "During your visit, who have you been in contact with Sir?" :mad:

I have travelled through Tel Aviv a few times as SLF. No problem for me. I appreciated the extra security and didn't mind the additional questions.

[Xeque]

Well, there we go. Just 2 responses in 24 hours with ideas for improving security at UK airports for yourselves and for your passengers.
What a pathetic bunch of 'wuzzes' you all are. You're content to moan and complain on this thread (and several others in this forum) about it all but, are you prepared to advance anything that might improve the situation?
It seems not.
Come on. You're all (one must believe) professionals using UK (and worldwide) airports on a regular basis. You must have seen good and bad and even worse (just as I have) and yet you have no ideas to offer to improve the situation?

[Looker]

Just my tuppence worth but.......

For all flight crew based in the UK who are able to prove their history of residence/employment/education and pass a high level security screening why not have a dedicated security channel with iris recognition and x-ray of hand luggage. An airside pass which swiped at all UK airports would be useful in combination with the iris recognition. Full body scanners? bring them on if it means not having to deal face to face with the average security person who seems disinterested in doing his/her job properly except when being checked by Government agencies.

[akaSylvia]

Why do people keep conflating "profiling" with "racial profiling" - I don't get it.

The interview makes it clear that they are focused on "behavioural responses" and that it is not based on race or age.

Reacting to a list of suspicious behaviour *is* profiling and it has nothing to do with race and yet every page of this has responses that imply that racial profiling is meant.

I'm not saying there aren't people in security reacting based on race - clearly it happens! But that isn't the system as described and I'm not sure if it's just presumptions (and a chance to whinge about bleeding heart liberals stopping progress) or what?

[moonburn]

Well said AKASylvia,
That was bugging me as well.
I suspect that it is the Not PP's who are failing to grasp what 'profiling' is all about.

[PENKO]

Guys, don't be naive. Just look at the extra scrutiny that president Obama announced against passengers stemming from certain Arab and African muslim countries: ethnic/religious profiling at its purest. Again, it's not necessarily bad, and it's what profilers have been doing for years. But don't be so naive to say that profiling will only be based on behavioural signs.

Think about it differently. Some people here welcome profiling saying that finally 'old grandma's won't be stripsearched'. Well, old grandma's can be pretty nervous when they fly, so I guess they will be prime targets for the profilers! Think again.

Profiling is one of the many tools, it's not a holy grail.

[Graybeard]

The West looks for dangerous objects.

Israelis look for dangerous people. A friend got extra scrutiny when leaving a conference in Israel a day earlier than the rest of her group. She really had to explain herself. Some Koreans were held so long they missed their flight.

GB

[R04stb33f]

Well a few months ago I went for a meeting in Israel - it was my first time to Israel so I was quite excited - it's a country I have wanted to visit for a long time.

Getting in was fine and the airport seemed little different to any other airport. Trying to leave the country was a different matter. What with the guard post at about 2Km out with machine guns pointed at the car and then the 2 hour interrogation etc. I frankly thought it was excellent. The interrogation was conducted with the utmost professionalism and the questioning techniques were clearly designed to trip people up if they weren't legitimate.

I honestly felt more safe in this airport than anywhere else in the world. I have no problem with taking more time to get to the airport early if I need to be interrogated etc. first if it gives me the same piece of mind that it did in Israel.

I suspect that a lot of the frustration comes from peoples attitudes towards flying and going through airport security.

Mind you, like I said, I have only been there once - and if I was a very frequent flyer and needed to be interrogated before every flight then I'm sure it would get on my nerves too after a few times!

Cheers

Rich

[Ian Corrigible]

Former AA CEO Bob Crandall seems to agree with the Israeli approach.

Fmr. CEO of American Airlines Calls Full-Body Scanners in Airports a 'Waste of Resources'
Fox News (http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,582463,00.html) January 07, 2010

.....

"I think the real issue is this. Most of the people that go through security don't need a full body scan.

Certainly, if we had a trusted traveler program, where people had been with a — had been — gotten a thorough examination, a background check before they got to the airport, we don't need to put those people through a body scanner.

What we need to do is, we need to differentiate between those people who are a risk and those people who are unlikely to be a risk. Let's put the high-risk people through the body scanners. That — now we will have enough body scanners, and, in fact, we will have enough much more expensive body scanners.

You know, a body scanner is about $150,000. An X-ray machine is about $10,000. You're not going to use — you cannot useful full body scanning on everything. And doing so is silly. It's just a waste of resources and a waste of money.

If you look what the Israelis do, the Israelis use layered security, four or five layers of security, all of it focused on the people, not on the things. And they use technology. For example, if they see a bag that might have a bomb in it, they put it in a bomb box.

If in fact they spot a bag at the ticket counter that might have a bomb in it, they're encapsulated within an area. They don't have to evacuate the whole terminal, the way we did at Newark the other day."

Video here (http://www.foxnews.com/search-results/m/28239538/fox-news-exclusive-on-airport-security.htm#q=crandall).

I/C

[MathFox]

Certainly, if we had a trusted traveler program, where people had been with a — had been — gotten a thorough examination, a background check before they got to the airport, we don't need to put those people through a body scanner.
The son of a rich Nigerian businessman would apply for such a program and probably get the pass.

There will be (potential) terrorists that slip through the background check and terrorist organisations could recruit among people after they got accepted into the program. So, we will need a minimal level of scanning for "trusted" travellers. (The same reasoning holds for airline and airport employees.)

[akaSylvia]

Think about it differently. Some people here welcome profiling saying that finally 'old grandma's won't be stripsearched'.

Specifying any population group as "safe" is a problem. If old people and women ("old grandma's") are not to be stripsearched then that is clearly a risk in itself.

I'm not sure who "some people" are but if anyone views profiling as protecting a specific population group then it's obvious what type of profiling they intend.

Again, it's based on behavioural reactions. If granny acts suspicious, then she's detained. Being questioned is nervewracking and the critical issue becomes "how far do we push and under which circumstances"

That's an important point. But we can't get there until we stop looking at race instead of reaction.

[ShotOne]

...which highlights a glaring "economy of truth" with the original article in that race and nationality as well as behaviour will be very much taken into account if we're going to "Israelify"

[EGGP]

This article seems to sum up the difficulties with profiling quite succinctly and indicates that even if you are 99.99% right you are still going to upset a lot of people.

BBC News - Can statistics help catch terrorists? (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/8452260.stm)

[Uncle_Jay]

So I wonder how Timothy (or someone like him) would fare in these Heightened Security as Theater arenas ?

White, wearing U S Army uniform, deferential and polite to authority figures ? It would all depend on whether he appeared nervous.. and some don't.

No matter what we do, a way will be found around it. These are global hostilities, local band aids will not fix them.

Also, all these 'measures' assume a 'person' is involved. Very bad assumption. Suppose a snack tray from Air Chefs.. never mind , I'll wind up on a no-fly list !

[opherben]

To avert terror intentions, one has to forget politics and politicians and work the problem with the right tools. Impossible? see the Swiss referendum system and its belated results.
Following the attack of Pearl Harbor, all origins of attacker culture, including second generation US citizens with DOD secret clearance were put into camps. Discriminatory profiling par excellance, but effective mitigation of the problem.
Is the terror wave profilable? ask yourselves, then use the tools and you are essentially done.

Another alternative is to keep waiting for the dwarf to put his bomb together, and see the outcome- terror will largely disappear for decades off the face of the earth.

[Xeque]

Last year, an Israeli Intelligence Agent named Juval Aviv (once Golda Meyer's bodyguard) lectured in New York city. Apparently he was the guy the movie 'Munich' was based on because he was given responsibility for finding and apprehending those who were responsible for the attack on the Israeli team during the Munich Olympics.

In the past he has made a couple of predictions based on information gathered from his own sources from within Israeli Intelligence.

He passed information to the George W. Bush administration one month before 9/11 where he described how aircraft would be used as bombs and targeted against high profile buildings and monuments in America. It has since become common knowledge that the US administration HAD been so warned, well in advance of the attack.

Speaking on Fox News (O'Reilly) he predicted the London Underground bombing. I wouldn't recommend the 'rabid right-wing, blond bimbo' news channel to anyone but the fact that he said it on air places the warning on public record. The attack occurred within a week.

He had some interesting things to say about airport security which he says is a joke, being reactive rather than proactive. "What is the point in using metal detectors when modern explosives are made of plastic", he asked.

During his lecture (I believe it was during the second half of 2009) he predicted that the next attack would be on the United States within months and that, after the (failed) shoe bomber, and the (failed) liquids bombers, the next attempt might well involve 'some suicidal maniac pouring liquid explosive onto his underpants'. He joked that the 'knee jerk' reaction that these failed attempts inevitably produced (take your shoes off - no liquids), would probably force passengers to fly naked.

Joke or not, on Christmas Eve we had the (failed) underwear bomber. Avivs' predictions seem to have been pretty good. Shame very little notice was taken of them.

He went on to say that it was now highly unlikely that further attempts will be made to hijack an aircraft or detonate an explosive device on board whilst in the air. The fact that passengers are now prepared to 'have a go' and subdue attackers will put an end to that.

He pointed out that the most effective deterrent is to screen everybody and everything BEFORE entering the terminal building because, he predicts, the next major attacks will take place against (not only) airports (but also) other heavily populated public buildings both in cities as well as urban areas. The perpetrators are likely to be 'home grown' - educated and (usually) born in the United States and therefore much harder to identify.

Interesting stuff. There was a lot more in the lecture that I have not included here because of space. The original was sent to me as an e-Mail and is over 4 pages long. I would be happy to pass it on to anyone if they PM me.

[cockney steve]

I think that private charter-flights bypass most of the "security" theatre. (a ton of verbal excrement will descend on my head if this is erroneous :} )

Therefore , the way forward is clear.
Regular travellers should join a "travel club" and will undergo whatever initiation checks are deemed necessary by the "club's" organisers.

Members would assemble at a seperate point in the airport ,from Scheduled Flight passengers.

They would then board their Club Charter flight (coincidentally ,flying a scheduled route and belonging to a major-carrier member) through their own gate and depart.

Yes, there would be the same risks involved , as with , say, Bungee-jumping....you rely on someone else to ensure a level of safety that YOU find acceptable.

As things stand at the moment, the tail is wagging the dog.
I don't fly scheduled and will not do so whilst this unacceptable delay and intrusion continues.

The airline industry mandarins need to wake up.....a large majority of pax are NOT business travellers (if they were, cattle-class would not be such a large proportion of the seating-plan)
Make the experience bad-enough and "Joe Soap" like me will go by land, sea or private means.

There are much easier ways to cross the channel ,than scheduled air-services and they're arguably "greener" too, but DEFINITELY simpler and lower-stress...also just as quick and cheaper.

(OK, these advantages lessen on long-haul)
Just trying to look at the problem with a bit of lateral-thinking!

[Xeque]

Actually, you've reached the logical answer to this whole, sorry, business.
The airport can conduct the blanket check on everyone and everything that attempts to enter the terminal building, turning away everyone who beeps the machine or otherwise attracts attention.
The final security check (at the gate, just before boarding) should be conducted by the airlines themselves. No more insane queues and confrontations with semi-trained yobos. No hold-ups between check-in and the final departure area. Just a slightly longer boarding process for each flight.
Let the airlines determine what substances they will allow on board their aircraft and what level of hand baggage can be carried on.
And if it costs a little more then, yes! Add it to the fare BUT reduce the airport tax because the current idiotic and completely pointless security checks will no longer be required.

[Dave Bloke]

Not sure if anyone's seen this. Feel free to substitute TSA for UK Transec at any point:

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[No_Speed_Restriction]

Evidence of strict Israeli passenger profiling......

CYuL6S4e64g

[petit plateau]

Wild goose

May I beg to differ. In my experience Capot is spot on. I used to travel to Israel quite a lot for pleasure to visit Israelis. Whilst I agree with you that the Israeli system is efficient and effective I can assure you that the recipient gets a very different treatment if they are non-Jewish and non-Hebrew speaking. In my particular case it used to take me quite a long time to get through security as the questions used to go like this ...

What do you do
- I'm an engineer
What sort of engineer
- a systems engineer
What sort of systems
- Originally weapons systems but these days I work in etc..
Please step this way ....

Tell the truth each and every time. Get questioned. And searched. Don't tell the truth and they check the records and see the difference from last time (passengers can do pattern recognition as well you know) and still get pulled.

It gets worse these days in USA so I avoid going there. But that's a different issue though trained at the same school. The point is that Capot's description is correct and we should not think that the Israeli method is a panacea in a much more heterogenous traveller mix. And yes I am fully aware of the very nasty tricks that not so nice people get up to so I understand all this. But equally we should recognise it for what it is and the extent to which it can be applied and its weaknesses.

pp

[Heidhurtin]

Erm, I did say a combination of techniques would seem to be the best idea...... This in addition to the existing security measures:

Heathrow in security alert as two men arrested on flight - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/6990006/Heathrow-in-security-alert-as-two-men-arrested-on-flight.html)

[Xeque]

Todays London Daily Mail:
Naked Germans protest over full-body airport scanners | Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/article-1243439/Naked-Germans-protest-body-airport-scanners.html)

These scanners are a waste of time and money and will only serve to increase passenger and crew frustration and anger at the way they are being treated.

[ttodd]

Some basic questions:

1. Do the security questions achieve anything?

2. Would a terrorist answer truthfully?

3. Couldn't profiling be applied to:
a. couples
b. SLF over 60 years
c. SLF with "clean" passports
ie. over 5 years validity
no "suspect" travel ie mid-east, Pakistan,Afghanistan etc.?
no flags on database ["son convicted of terrorism"]

I guestimate 50% of SLF would pass Q3

4. Wouldn't all the above be available from a scan of the passport?

5. What about explosives in checked luggage [remember Lockerbie]

tt

[Espada III]

Being Jewish and travelling to Israel a great deal I have often thought of the best way of improving the speed and accuracy of security. There are many flights from MAN to TLV on which I know most of the passengers.

So, the first passengers to turn up, profile them as normal and then ask if they are likely to know many of the passengers on the flight. If the answer is yes, ask them to assist. Then find out of they know and can vouch for the next set of passengers. Eventually you will end up with about 80% of the flight vouching for each other, so you only need to check the 20% who are unknown.

Would I be happy vouching for my friend and neighbour who I have know for 20 years and eaten in each others houses - Yes. Simples if a little too simple I suspect!

[praa]

I've been wondering how "profiling" relates to the recent security glitch at Munich airport. To recap: a passenger's laptop tested positive for explosive traces. He managed to repack his hand baggage and laptop and disappear into the terminal before he could be questioned any further. As a result, the whole terminal was cleared to recheck everyone, resulting in huge delays, cancelled flights etc, etc. It turns out the missing passenger calmly went to the duty-free and joined the thousands of other passengers for the 2nd security check (where his laptop tested negative). His identity remains unknown.
What we do know (CCTV coverage) is that he was a typically innocuous business traveller type. I suspect at the first security check where his computer set off the alarm that the security staff "profiled" him, i.e. came to a quick conclusion that it was bl**dy obvious case of the explosive test "overreacting"; that the passenger posed no risk; that he was not acting nervously or suspiciously (events seem to have proved that he had nothing to hide); that there was no need to keep him under close observation and that they simply got diverted from the task of submitting him to a secondary test. I suspect that if he'd been a young, bearded middle-eastern type, they would have been more alert and whipped him off for closer inspection.
So what's the conclusion? I'd hypothesize that routine and boredom led to strict procedures not being implemented properly. But also that the staff guessed (and in hindsight) rightly judged that the passenger posed no danger. Profiling, if you like.