30 min Dry Run Capabilities

[Droopystop]

I have been thinking about this since it has been a hot topic on here on number of threads.

There is a requirement to either design a gearbox lube system such that is has an extremely remote chance of failure. I guess that means it is as reliable as the other systems and components in the gearbox. Happy with that. If not, a manufacturer has to demonstrate a 30 min dry run capability.

Why 30 mins? These certification requirements are being used for heavy twin engined helicopters which are used for extended range operations over hostile terrain. As oil goes further offshore, the ranges get bigger.

To demonstrate this ability, what conditions are the manufacturers using? Max cruise power?, Max AEO hover power? Power at Vy with MGTW? Certainly in my experience if you loose your MGB oil, you are to fly at Vy. So that gives you 35 - 40 nm still air.

Now as far as I can see, if a manufacturer is to demonstrate a 30 min dry run capability, you need a gearbox you are happy to destroy, you don't want to have to do it more than once, so you are going to find a reasonable gearbox and make sure that any emergency cooling/lub systems are working.

Do the test conditions therefore relate to us trundling along with a gearbox that may be close to life, an emergency back up system that is just about to get its major overhaul and not been tested for a while when the MGB Oil Pressure caption lights up? Are we sure that we can then fly for 29 mins 30 secs to get to somewhere safe and then pull 100% Tq to make a safe landing on a turbulent (but only) helideck.

My point here is that 30 mins seems pretty pathetic as a means to get you somewhere safe. So I am wondering if the dry run certification requirement is there to allow you time to make an immediate power on landing (ie ditching or finding a flat spot if over land) following a powered descent from say FL080 perhaps IMC?

Already this year two gearboxes have failed offshore and the final catastrophic phase of each has been sudden. So how much of the 30 mins should we be happy to use? The dilema: go for a deck/clearing 29 mins away on the basis of a one off lab test or make sure you make a controlled ditching/emergency landing?

Food for thought.

[handysnaks]

My vote would be, use the time available to get the aircraft to a point where a safe landing can be made (if onshore) or a ditching is survivable (well, as survivable as it can be), offshore.

[docstone]

I recall being told by my TR examiner that the 407 gearbox (which is Kiowa derived), could run dry at 105% max contin for 30 mins - no plans to check it out though. Something to do with the dimples holding enough surface oil, plus presumably some meaty engineering.

[Sky Sports]

It will be interesting to see if anyone posts some official documentation on dry run capabilities. My personal view is that a lot of the facts and figures are urban myths.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

what conditions are the manufacturers using? Max cruise power?, Max AEO hover power? Power at Vy with MGTW?


From what I've seen on the mil side, the Aircrew Manual or equiv will provide guidance on the max power setting which can be used without detriment to the 30 mins, which in two cases I know of have been 'proven' by bench tests.


So how much of the 30 mins should we be happy to use? The dilema: go for a deck/clearing 29 mins away on the basis of a one off lab test or make sure you make a controlled ditching/emergency landing?


Good question! The crew would have to make up their minds based on how rough the sea is/how inhospitable the terrain/how seriously ill their cas is (eg if on SAR). 30 mins may seem pathetic but it's a lot better than nothing - is it realistic to expect a published capability much greater than this?

[maeroda]

At Agusta experienced guys told me the AB412 MGB is FOR SURE have been tested for 30 min run dry- that is, have been cranked at 100% NR for 30 minutes without any oil inside, than stopped and inspected for damage assesment.
On the other side a friend of mine had all the MGB oil gone out the casing because of a bad inspection at the sump chip detector o-ring.
He was flying day VFR over the sea and managed to reach the shoreline in time to get the skids on hard; he went down low 100Ft@Vy and shutdown after 18' the caption went on.
It was winter and OAT was 5° Celsius at MSL, no pax on board.
After Agusta on site inspection the MGB continued operations for awhile producing some very little chips and thereafter changed with a brand new one.

Maybe the 30' requirements come from Vietnam era on the Huey?

Maeroda

[Matthew Parsons]

To demonstrate this ability, what conditions are the manufacturers using? Max cruise power?, Max AEO hover power? Power at Vy with MGTW?

Not sure what manufacturers use, but the FAA demonstration requires the minimum torque necessary to sustain flight at the maximum gross weight and the most efficient flight conditions. The torque is increased at 25 seconds remaining and at 10 seconds remaining to simulate the loads of a landing. A small amount of damage is allowed, as long as autorotation is not affected.

You do bring up a good point in that when flying beyond 30min of a safe landing spot, you're committing yourself to a ditching. However, there are other failure conditions in FW and RW flight where flight cannot be continued to a safe landing area. A risk that has to be accepted or the flight can't go.

Cheers,
Matthew.

[Encyclo]

I know a little bit about 407/412 MGB performance with no oil pressure and let me tell you, if the pressure is at 0 PSI, you do what the Flight Manual says; land as soon as possible. It does not say to land within 30 minutes.

Some have decided to continue flight to shore, low and slow, and are no longer with us today to tell us how unfortunate the ending was...:=

[paco]

A battery is supposed to last 30 minutes - would you expect to actually get that? Nope - the same goes for gearboxes. My personal decision would be to get on the deck asap, which in reality would be several minutes even if you went for the surface below you (try it some time).

Phil

[Aser]

paco A battery is supposed to last 30 minutes - would you expect to actually get that? Nope - the same goes for gearboxes.


Model of chopper that crashed off N.L. failed first test by 20 minutes: FAA

The Canadian Press: Model of chopper that crashed off N.L. failed first test by 20 minutes: FAA (http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/article/ALeqM5jri7oGnDyA10KMQIeY2OP8JOQNGg)

Regards
Aser

[[email protected]]

The comment by Sikorsky's Paul Jackson that 10 mins is enough because you can get from 15000 ft to the ground comfortably in that time is pathertic and shows that Sikorsky really don't give a sh*t.

There is clearly collusion between Sikorsky and the FAA to sidestep both the letter and the spirit of the law and both should answer to a senate committee or similar.

The business practices of Sikorsky make the city bankers look like honest folks in comparison.:ugh:

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

Crab,

Such disdain for the manufacturer of your next steed...:{

[chopjock]

Why doesn't some bright spark design an emergency fuel feed to the MRGB, whereby, in the event of loss of oil, the remaining fuel can be cross fed into the MRGB? After all, Jet A is still an oil based coolant and would keep the gearbox running a little longer. I actually run a MRGB with JetA as the lubricant very successfully in an un manned helicopter.:ok:

[hueyracer]

Would that make any difference in your decision "Land ASAP"?

I don´t think so.....

I work as a MTP on Bell helicopters-the 30 min value is just a theoretical value-never experienced on a real flying helicopter, just on test runs...

Nobody can really assure that your MGB will run for 30 minutes without oil.....

If you loose your complete oil during flight, there is a major reason for that....so i wouldn´t risk my life.....

[chopjock]

Would that make any difference in your decision "Land ASAP"?

What if there is nowhere to land?

Some scenarios would be different. For example, you might be feet wet and 45 mins from land, at night and with plenty of fuel. Your MRGB runs dry so you decide to do what?
If you had the option to divert some of your fuel through the MRGB to keep the gears cool and wet, would you do it?.
Or would you prefer to just ditch?

[Gregg]

To get the details of what the run-dry testing means, you can pull up the online FAR requirements and look at the guidance that explains how the test should be completed:
The 30-minute test is just a gearbox test that to demonstrate a standard of reliability an it is shown once before aircraft are certified. It does not imply that the aircraft can or should be flown for 30 minutes after loss of lube.


Here is the rule that the gearboxes are certified to:

From FAR 29.927
c) Lubrication system failure. For lubrication systems required for proper operation of rotor drive systems, the following apply:
(1) Category A. Unless such failures are extremely remote, it must be shown by test that any failure which results in loss of lubricant in any normal use lubrication system will not prevent continued safe operation, although not necessarily without damage, at a torque and rotational speed prescribed by the applicant for continued flight, for at least 30 minutes after perception by the flightcrew of the lubrication system failure or loss of lubricant.
(2) Category B. The requirements of Category A apply except that the rotor drive system need only be capable of operating under autorotative conditions for at least 15 minutes.

Here is the guidance material for this test (from AC-29)
(1) Section 29.927(c) prescribes a test which is intended to demonstrate that no hazardous failure or malfunction will occur in the event of a major rotor drive system lubrication failure. The lubrication failure should not impair the ability of the crew to continue safe operation of Category A rotorcraft for at least 30 minutes after perception of the failure by the flight crew. For Category B rotorcraft, safe operation under autorotative conditions should continue for at least 15 minutes. Near the completion of the lubrication failure test, an input torque should be applied for 15 seconds to simulate a minimum power landing following autorotation. Some damage to rotor drive system
components is acceptable after completion of the lubrication system testing. The lubrication system failure modes of interest are usually limited to failure of bearings, gears, splines, clutches, etc., of pressure lubricated transmissions and/or gearboxes. A bench test (transmission test rig) is commonly used to demonstrate compliance with this rule. Since this is a test of the capability of the residual oil in the transmission to provide limited lubrication, a critical entry condition for the test should be established. The
transmission lubricating oil should be drained while the transmission is operating at maximum normal speed and nominal cruise torque (reacted as appropriate at the main mast and tail rotor output quills). A vertical load should be applied at the mast, equal to the gross weight of the rotorcraft at 1g, and the lubricant should be at the maximum temperature limit. Upon illumination of the low oil pressure warning required by § 29.1305, reduce the input torque for Category A rotorcraft to the minimum torque necessary to sustain flight at the maximum gross weight and the most efficient flight conditions. To complete the test, apply an input torque to the transmission for approximately 25 seconds to simulate an autorotation. The last 10 seconds (of the 25 seconds) should be at the torque required for a minimum power landing. A successful demonstration may involve limited damage to the transmission, provided it is determined that the autorotative capabilities of the rotorcraft were not significantly impaired. For Category B rotorcraft, upon illumination of the low oil pressure warning light, reduce the input torque to simulate an autorotation and continue transmission operation for 15 minutes. To complete the test, apply an input torque to the transmission for approximately 15 seconds to simulate a minimum power landing. A successful demonstration may involve limited damage to the transmission provided it is determined that the autorotative capabilities of the rotorcraft were not significantly impaired. If compliance with Category A requirements is demonstrated, Category B requirements will have been met.

[hueyracer]

I know that it is hard to give up a helicopter-but everyone has to decide this regarding the actual situation.

During emergency, there is not only "black or white".
Whatever leads to success is right.....

Unfortunately, you don´t know if your MGB go on..
Any idea what can happen if the MGB gives up?

I have several hours offshore-and yes, i thought about several emergencies that could have come up while over sea..

I think that i would prefer ditching....but actually (and luckily) i have never been in that situation-and hopefully will never be.....

[500e]

(My bold.)"That language is fully compliant with the ... requirement to prove 30 minutes of flight after detection of an oil leak," he said."(representative of SK)

The European regulators said the test showed a loss of oil would mean the helicopter could only stay in the air for "around 10 minutes," a finding Sikorsky does not dispute.
Sikorsky documents used to market the aircraft, dated August 2003, said the gearboxes of the S-92A have a "30-minute drive system after oil leak."
So the language complies !!! We are all right then :mad:
Semantics used to justify failings, with both manufacturers & regulator \ certification process.
I tend to agree with crab

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

I think that i would prefer ditching


At least with a premeditated ditching, there's time to steel oneself (and one's pax) for the coming ordeal, run through the ditching drills one final time etc - may prove more survivable than flogging the MGB to destruction especially as


Some have decided to continue flight to shore, low and slow, and are no longer with us today to tell us how unfortunate the ending was...


Definitely no 'one-size-fits-all' answer to this dilemma!

I'm interested in gathering examples of the above (ie trying to make it, low and slow, and the MGB giving up the ghost) to pass on to young bucks learning the trade, to reinforce to them that this is a scenario they might face - anyone able to help?

[Droopystop]

I am glad some seem to think like myself and that a test bench demonstration of dry running for 30 mins is no guarantee of it doing that in the real world.

So what do the EOPs say for an aircraft with demonstrated 30 min run dry capability, Land ASAP within 30 mins, or Land immediately, power on?

[500e]

No it did notpass the 30 min. it failed in real life at 10 min 47 seconds 47 sec approximately longer than the bench test,
What`I find unsettling is A. the box did not meet the requirement of 30 min run dry, B.the regulator then allowed the lessor level of safety to be certified, C. SK used the 30 min spec to appear in sales literature, presumably when they thought is was feasible?
What steps did they take to correct this erroneous advertising which would have been disseminated to a much larger audience than the rfm, & did the rfm state there was NO 30 minutes run dry

[Nigel Osborn]

I find the comments about the MGB run dry capabilities very interesting. When we did the S76 ground school in Oz in the late 70s, the factory sent an engineer out to lecture us. We were quite clearly told the run dry capabilty was 1 hour & this was backed up by the factory pilots who endorsed us. A year or 2 later while flying out to a rig some 254 nm out to sea, at TOD about 200 nm at 8000 ft, the transmission pressure started to drop steadily & the temp rise plus the various warning lights. On arrival at the rig the pressure was zero & the temp on the max red line. I had decided to ditch once those figures were exceeded or nasty noises started as I didn't intend to be the first person to test the 60 mins!
Strange thing, no one ever suggested there wasn't a 60 mins capability.

[FH1100 Pilot]

From FAR 29.927
c) Lubrication system failure. For lubrication systems required for proper operation of rotor drive systems, the following apply:
(1) Category A. Unless such failures are extremely remote, it must be shown by test that any failure which results in loss of lubricant in any normal use lubrication system will not prevent continued safe operation...

My good man! The rule only states that it has to run for 30 minutes after a "loss of lubricant." Does it say "TOTAL or COMPLETE loss of lubricant?" Heck no! Does it say "loss of ALL lubricant?" Not even! It just says "loss of lubricant" which we interpret to mean "loss of...SOME...lubricant."

Language is tricky.

But from the Advisory Circular:
Section 29.927(c) prescribes a test which is intended to demonstrate that no hazardous failure or malfunction will occur in the event of a major rotor drive system lubrication failure. The lubrication failure should not impair the ability of the crew to continue safe operation of Category A rotorcraft for at least 30 minutes after perception of the failure by the flight crew.
Seems to me that the intent of this rule is to allow the pilots to OPERATE THE AIRCRAFT for 30 minutes after detection a transmission oil pressure problem. Sadly, any pilot who was familiar with FAR 29.927 and Advisory Circular AC-29 would (erroneously) assume that by regulatory requirement his aircraft was good for 30 minutes after the transmission pressure goes to zero.

It must be noted that "minimum torque necessary to sustain flight" will be low, of course...which will provide a commensurately lower airspeed. So you obviously can't look at your map and say, "Well, I'm 60 miles offshore, doing 120 knots and my transmission pressure just went to zero. I can make it back to land!" Uhh, nope. Maybe you'll only make it halfway back. Maybe less if there's a headwind.

[js0987]

I asked the question on the other forum and haven't seen an answer. Since the intermediate and tail rotor gearboxes are "gearboxes," are they required to demonstrate a 30 minute run dry capability?

[rotormatic]

a advertisment...

http://sjdrimages.com/Mb/UserUploads/x16Fw33vuq8s18.jpg

[Pilot DAR]

The rule only states that it has to run for 30 minutes after a "loss of lubricant." Does it say "TOTAL or COMPLETE loss of lubricant?" Heck no! Does it say "loss of ALL lubricant?" Not even! It just says "loss of lubricant" which we interpret to mean "loss of...SOME...lubricant."


I don't agree with this interpretation. Though I am not delegated to make findings of compliance for this paragraph, I am delegated for others which have some similarities. Were I to be witnessing a test where "loss of lubricant" were an element of the test, I would be expecting to see a removal of all effective lubrication, and also the removal of the affect of cooling provided by the now absent lubricant. Though the wording of some design standards is less than ideal from time to time, the intent is usually understandable. Either a delegate (DAR/DER) and/or the regulator will interpret the intent, and create an appropriately representative test plan. This agreed test plan will be carried out and witnessed as required by the product certification plan.

Now, (and without knowing anything about the background of the testing associated with the S92), where a manufacturer employs the delegate who is drafting the test plan, and perhaps witnessing the test, the delegate can have a sense of "shared" accountability, to both the employer, and the regulator. I shall leave that statement at that.

At the times in the past where I have witnessed endurance tests of this type, not only was a time piece a part of the test, but charted information described the observations of the test article at usually one, or at most five minute intervals for the whole test. A test results/observations chart which was only one third as long as the design standard required, would not even be considered for a pass!

As for the term "land immediately", I share the view that the pilot should have some expectation that although a landing is immenent, he retains some opportunity to look for a suitable landing surface with a safe reserve of running time. I sure would not think that the water of the North Atlantic was a suitable landing surface, unless it was calm, and right at shore! And the rationale that from 15000 feet, you have exactly 10 minutes to get down at 1500 FPM, and land! Not a real world expectation in my opinion.

The Lear Fan airplane of the early 1980's employed one propeller and gaerbox driven by two engines, and thus did not make the grade as a true twin engined airplane. To improve the image of the required redundancy, the gearbox had helical teeth on the drive gears, so it could loose a whole tooth and keep running smoothly. It also had a block of wax inside. If you lost the lubricant, the wax got hot and melted, coating the gear teeth for the ride down. The need to go down was indicated by sprung contacts cast into said block of wax, which upon the melting of the wax told the pilot that the oil was gone, and you're running on wax, so head down - no fooling! (my words, not Bill Lear's!). ibelieve that aircraft was required to demonstrate the same 30 minute run time, and did so sucessfully (though the prop provided only thrust, not lift).

I think that a lot has been learned from the Cougar accident, about what we are willing to accept as a showing of design compliance. Our industry and passengers have a big role to play in indicating to the regulator what we will accept as a design standard, and demonstrated compliance. Happily, some of my clients require that I witness tests which are noticably more rigourous that the design standard requires. Perhaps off shore operators will consider requiring helicopter manufacturers to demonstrate compliance beyond the minimums of the design standard (or even just the standard!)

Pilot DAR

[topendtorque]

Strange thing, no one ever suggested there wasn't a 60 mins capability


In the words of Einstein, - "Any 100 scientists can prove my thesis correct, but it only takes one of them to prove it wrong."

That's been stated often just recently with the ETS debacle that is raging and the stacked 'houses' of collusion toward the debate.

Having operated heaps of heavy machinery at extremely high torque loadings that were made of the best steel, I can say with some experience that it is ludicrous to think that anything that is "DRY" will run anymore than a few seconds at peak loads.

There are only two Rules, when getting into trouble,

1) Unload as much as possible the torque settings, and

2) Inject some form of clinging lubricant to sate the grinding appetite of the affected component until the nearest landing place is reached.

What a stupid debate and a false advertising program from the past it seems, as has been suggested here and on previous threads.

Just design the blessed components with an add on lubricant dispenser that the pilot can activate at intervals to sustain life whilst safety is reached

Tonight I pray that Turnbull and the opposition Libs will inject some suitable brain juice into their grinding argument.
cheers tet

[madrock]

TopEndTorque,


Just design the blessed components with an add on lubricant dispenser that the pilot can activate at intervals to sustain life whilst safety is reached



Exactly !

Industry's just got to make some decisions :

Do you need run dry (uncontained oil loss) redundancy ?
If yes, how much, i.e. 10,30,60,90 mins etc..?
Who's responsibility is it to make the above determination/s ?

[clunckdriver]

At the time of the Lear Fan was in the testing stage I had the chance to have a look at the insides of the gear box and also inspected a gear box which we we informed had run for the required thirty mins with no lubricant other than the so called wax, If my memory serves me right after all these years I do not recall seeing any sign of heat stress or chunks of metal inside the case, maybe time to re visit this system methinks.

[Mars]

FH100 Pilot,

reading on from your extract of AC 29.297A - Additional Tests, one sees this text:
A bench test (transmission test rig) is commonly used to demonstrate compliance with this rule. Since this is a test of the capability of the residual oil in the transmission to provide limited lubrication, a critical entry condition for the test should be established. The transmission lubricating oil should be drained while the transmission is operating at maximum normal speed and nominal cruise torque (reacted as appropriate at the main mast and tail rotor output quills).
Whilst I agree with your contention that the language is, of necessity, imprecise, use of the word drained does rather suggest that the colloquially used term 'run dry' is close to the real meaning.

Mars

[FH1100 Pilot]

Mars, I'm with you 100%!

Run it in simulated flight conditions, drain the oil out, reduce mast torque, then see how long it runs. In the case of the S-92 it was 10 minutes. That was when SAC had to resort to Plan B.

The italicized text in my post (#23 in this thread) was facetious and not to be taken seriously, but was meant more as one possibility of how things get interpreted when there is room for it.

[HeliComparator]

js0987

Since no-one else is answering you, I will have a go. 29.927 applies to the transmission as a whole, not just to the MGB. Therefore the intermediate and tail gearboxes must have passed the test. Because these gearboxes run at very much less torque than the MGB, and have a much greater surface area to volume ratio (for cooling), I think the loss of oil thing is much less significant and I doubt any of these types of boxes would have difficulty passing the test. Indeed these gearboxes generally don't have a cockpit warning that oil level is low. They may have a temperature warning but I am not sure how that would behave with a sudden loss of oil - I am not convinced that it would show a particularly high temperature since it would be measuring air temperature inside the box and with the relatively good surface cooling I doubt that would get particularly high so maybe no in-flight warning.

Except for Sikorsky boxes of course, which one assumes only met the "extremely remote failure" part of the requirement:}

HC

[hueyracer]

As i have told before, i have never actually experienced a total loss of xmsn oil....

But i had a total loss of hydraulic fluid during mission flight at night (under NVG).
In the Bell 205, we only had one hydraulic system-so no redundancy available.

I decided to land ASAP-not one second thinking about stretching the landing and making it to the next airfield, which would have been a 15-minutes flight..

The mechanics found a broken seal and changed it.

In my opinion it doesn´t matter what the industry says-they are not sitting in the helicopter with me...

As a pilot (and as a Captain, too) we have to make the right decisions-to satisfy our customers, but to always keep the crew and aircraft well...

[407 too]

hueyracer, just to play the devil's advocate......

would you have done the same if you were 45 minutes over the sea/ocean, with sea-state exceeding that of your floats ???

[birrddog]

would you have done the same if you were 45 minutes over the sea/ocean, with sea-state exceeding that of your floats ???

Would flying at a survivable altitude and airspeed combo be an option?
e.g. 20kts / 20 feet above the deck with the floats deployed?

[hueyracer]

I don´t like discussing like "What would have happened if...."....

To be honest-I cannot tell you how i would have reacted..

As i told above-anything that keeps
1. Crew and passengers safe
2. Keeps the helicopter serviceable (or at least reparable)

will be okay.....but it is like most things:
Only success dictates the right way...unfortunately, you will only find out when it is too late...

[407 too]

fair enough hueyracer, birddogs approach to the situation may have been an option.

sorry for the thread drift

[[email protected]]

At least a 30 min run-dry capability might allow the option in high sea states of hover jumping the pax and rearcrew with their dinghies so at least they don't have to worry about getting out of an upturned helicopter - as the pilot you get to do the tricky bit of landing on the water and safely egressing by yourself.

[js0987]

HC

Thanks for your analysis. Sounds spot on, but I notice its still supposition. Frankly, I think that's good. While we all want to know the aircraft and its systems, I don't think its a good idea to know the destruct limits that every system was tested to. Perhaps an example of too much knowlege being a bad thing.

[Shawn Coyle]

Ditching doesn't have to be an all-engines out plop onto the water. Imagine sitting on the water (even with it heaving the machine up and down) with the rotors still turning and people exiting (more or less calmly) into a liferaft that the helicopter then water taxis away from before the crew shuts things down and exits themselves?
Does anyone even think about this sort of procedure? Does anyone practice it in the sim?
Ditching doesn't have to be a hit-the-water-instantly-turn-upside-down thing. Better to have the transmission self-destruct on the water than in the air.

[HeliComparator]

Shawn

Sounds good in theory but maybe you haven't seen a decent N Sea sea state close up and personal! There are various reasons not to:

1) The rotor blades are likely to chop the liferaft and its occupants up (and if you keep collective pitch on to reduce the liklihood of that, the downwash will have the liferafts everywhere except where the pax can board them dry)

2) After you happily taxy off into the sunset, what are you going to do when you find that all the pax are in the liferafts without crew members to lead them, and you are left with no rafts!

If its OK to shut down and then get into the crew liferaft (if there was one), surely its better to all do it at the same time. Or do you think that the captain should go down with his ship to save the women and children who might be on board? The difficulty with that is the cockpit of an S Puma or 92 is not tall enough to stand up and salute whilst the water comes over one's head, therefore rather spoiling the effect.

In reality, most of the time a big heli will float right ways up after shutdown, even though the motion will feel dreadful to the crew. If its that wild, chances are the liferaft will go upside down from time to time too. As we have said before, surely its better not to end up in the water in the first place, and for that we need good design, not paper safety.

HC

[Shawn Coyle]

Helicomparator:
All good points, but there should be something that is different (and better) than falling from a great height with no rotor....

[chopjock]

Why don't helicopter manufacturers build in a one way sprag clutch into the main rotor shaft, so that in the event of a gearbox seizure, the output shaft keeps turning in autorotation? This would help in the loss of tail rotor too! This is how we design our un-manned helicopters, we can auto rotate to the ground in the event of engine failure, main gearbox seizure or tail rotor drive shaft failure.:ok:

[HeliComparator]

Hi Shawn

Well you are right of course - and what is better than falling from a great height with no rotor is to follow the flight manual when it says Land Immediately, even if you don't like the look of the sea. Ditching under control in a wild sea is moderately survivable, falling with no rotor is not! But then again if the pilots thought that in reality they had 30 mins and the Land Immediately was just some certification arse covering...

chopjock - I think it might be a problem of scalability. On the Super Puma family the freewheels (sprag clutch) are after the first stage of reduction and run aroung 8000 rpm (from memory!) and still give the occasional problem, but by the time the rpm is reduced to 265 for the rotor drive, the torque is massive. I am not sure that its feasible to design a sprag clutch that would take the torque, and of course it would have to be more reliable than current transmissions (say <1 failure every 3 million flight hours) - it would be rather embarrasing to lose drive to the main rotor whilst the tail rotor was still working, and with you over that raging sea...

HC

[[email protected]]

So for really big sea states in extreme situations where a ditching will cause a rollover it would be better to evacuate the pax from a low hover/hovertaxi - at least you give the pax a fighting chance whether or not there are any crew members there to guide them.

I know I would rather drop into the sea and fend for myself instead of having to escape from an inverted helicopter with 15 or so others and then have to fend for myself.

If you as the captain then find yourself in the water without a raft a. your safety equipment provision isn't very well thought out and b. you are at least in an immersion suit with a lifejacket and an ELT/EPIRB/PLB.

In my mind a much better option than ditching and then having everyone use their dunker training. I am talking about 'in extremis' situations where you know the MRGB will seize and you only have limited time to deal with the situation and nowhere to land except the very large seas.

[212man]

in extremis

Which is pretty much the only time we would ditch - or are there other situations you can think of? (fuel leak, is about the only one I can)

How do suggest we co-ordinate the evacuation of 19 guys, with no crewmen in the back on intercom? Shouting "brace, brace, brace" over the PA is one thing, attempting a lengthy discourse on how we'd like "you all to jump out, in an orderly manner" is another thing entirely!

[Droopystop]

All this talk of ditching should be irrelevant. The industry has invested a huge amount of time and money on twin engine operations so that we should never have to ditch following an engine malfunction (OK PC2e is worthy of another thread). We now are in the situation where the next focus of attention should be never having to ditch following a transmission failure.

Of course the mechanical bits of the MRGB are designed such that the chances of failure are so small, they should never fail in the life of the gearbox. Great - the way it should be. Sikorsky tried this approach for the lube system on the S92. Maybe on the basis of the Blackhawk family, Sikorsky had a rightful claim to the "extremely remote chance of failure". Clearly this wasn't the case with the titanium bolts on the oil filter. But perhaps it is true now they have changed the bolts?

It strikes me that the inclusion of the 30 mins dry run capability is a cop out clause because manufacturers couldn't meet/proove the extremely remote chance of failure requirement. If the lube system was as reliable as the rest of the gearbox, we wouldn't need any dry run ability.

I have no idea if viable technology is available to make MGB lube systems as reliable as the rest of the gearbox. If it is, then FAR 29 should be ammended to remove the 30 mins clause, forcing manufacturers to make their lube systems reliable enough. If not, then instead of 30 mins, the regulations should simply require that following a failure (partial or total) of the MGB lube system, the aircraft should be able to return to a safe place to land. In other words, the dry run capability should be related to the range of the aircraft.

Of course this will probably mean some form of emergency lube system, like that on the S61 (by the way 2 hours at Vy!!!) or a glycol cooling system a la 225. Of course the reliability of the emergency system must also be regulated and we as pilots must be able to test the system is working prior to taking it flying. After all we need to know we really do have the ability the book claims.

[Variable Load]

attempting a lengthy discourse on how we'd like "you all to jump out, in an orderly manner" is another thing entirely!

And then finish off the narrative by stating that can they please just hang around in the water until I ditch the aircraft "just over there", deploy the external liferafts, get in said liferaft and then paddle over to them. :eek:

[[email protected]]

Makes you wonder how the regulators allow so many pax in the back as SLF without a cabin crew member to take care of them.

In my scenario I thought it was fairly clear that the co-pilot would escort the pax off the aircraft and into the dinghies - it might not be very palatable but a lot better than putting everyone at risk by ditching in a big sea where they all have to escape from underwater.

[hueyracer]

In normal missions, all people on board are well trained-because they have to go through lots of training....

As far as i know, everybody who is going to work on a rig in the sea has to pass underwater egress training-or is this not an international standard?

Before each flight, we have briefed all passengers telling them exactly what to do in an emergency situation....

Luckily, i never had to try if all emergency maneuvers would have worked as we briefed them....

[albatross]

In civil offshore flying I have never heard of any pax being trained in hover exit or even heard of it being mentioned.
Doing it with 19 untrained pax and expecting anyone to survive with no rafts in a sea state that wouldn't "allow" ditching is wishfull thinking IMHO.

Power on "controled" ditching is the best of a nasty list of options in the event of a "Land or ditch immediately event" -again IMHO

[maxwelg2]

Makes you wonder how the regulators allow so many pax in the back as SLF without a cabin crew member to take care of them.

In my scenario I thought it was fairly clear that the co-pilot would escort the pax off the aircraft and into the dinghies - it might not be very palatable but a lot better than putting everyone at risk by ditching in a big sea where they all have to escape from underwater.


Oh dearie me Crab, referring to PAX as SLF (self-loading freight I believe is the rather derogatory definition of that pilot-speak acronym) is not going to score you any Brownie points with the people that can apply a grinding halt to your working environment. Remember that it is the A/C buyer (big oil) that demand a 19-seat configuration and internal aux fuel tanks to boot...not the regulators, they just agree to this and I'm now wondering why...oh that's right, they believe that the helo is safe enough, well that's been proven wrong quite a few times now hasn't it?:ugh:

I don't see how providing training normally reserved for Navy seals (or Kevin Costner hoo haa) has a place in commercial aviation, where the rules and regulations are meant to prevent critical component failures with the A/C used.

Hueyracer, unfortunately not all offshore operators include the HUET in their offshore survival training. I know that Norway, UKCS, and Atlantic Canada do, and rightly so as a last case resort.

Droopystop has the right attitude IMHO, let's see more of this proactive discussion and less nonsense.

Safe Flying

Max

[madrock]

Does anybody have any hard information regarding what the limiting design factors are with regard to expected (and demonstrated) extended MGB running time on the S61, 225, or any other type/s (and the Lear Fan F/W mentioned earlier for that matter) after the ELS kicks in ?

Interested in any/all combinations (such as, but not limited to ) :

"spare resevoir capacity" ?
number of application points ?
pressure at which coolant is applied ?
type of coolant ?
liquid ? solid ? mix ? gaseos ?
aircooled ?
additives ?
internal (hard surface) cooling ?

Want to move away from generalities such as "difficult", "technically demanding", "current regulations don't require..." etc...etc...and move on - there must be tons of really good technical information out there available from sources who have no interest other than to make the thing work ?

Any real life ELS activation examples that can be shared by anyone ?

[[email protected]]

maxwel - some posters on here refer to themselves as SLF so it is hardly derogatory.

I am not advocating the hover jump as standard procedure - just a consideration when the gearbox is going to seize and the sea state is too big to guarantee a safe power on ditching - will your pax survive the aircraft disintegrating and rolling over as you hit the water with your main and TR blades, possibly damaging the flotation gear as you do so? With difficulty I would suggest and then they still have to find the liferafts and get into them. On the other hand, being given a fighting chance of dropping 20 feet into the water from a hover taxi along with the rafts might improve their chances of survival. I know what I would prefer if I were the pax.

Or should you comply 100% with your rules and regs and involve them in the crash?


On the Sea King, once the ELS has operated, you must monitor the MRGB oil temp - if it gets to 150 deg C you have 5 mins to land. The same 5 mins is the estimated run-dry time at 75% Tq before seizure.

[madrock]

Crab,
On the Sea King, what's the indicator/s of uncontained oil loss - temp, quantity, both ? If 150 degrees C is the maximum allowed after ELS activation, what flight constraints (Tq/V/Alt etc....also taking into account min. requirements for Autorotation) would there be to keep it under the 150 ? if possible ?
If it is possible, what prevents continued ELS protection - lack of spare resevoir or does the heat generation just overtake the ELS cooling capability after a certain period ?

[Pilot DAR]

Why don't helicopter manufacturers build in a one way sprag clutch into the main rotor shaft, so that in the event of a gearbox seizure, the output shaft keeps turning in autorotation?

Well, two thoughts:

Seizure of gears is one thing, but it's the seizure of the main transmission bearings which is also a very big factor, and the use of a sprag clutch won't help that situation at all. Were sprag clutch to be contemplated, it would have to be immense to transmit all of that torque at the relatively low main rotor RPM, and thus be very heavy, and probably more failure prone than the weaknesses it was there to overcome!

[chopjock]

Lubricant in a gearbox is primarily for the gears, You can have sealed bearings for example. I have actually designed and built (on a smaller scale) a second stage transmission which derives it's lubrication (and cooling) from the fuel. The fuel is sprayed directly onto the gears and then presurises the caseing. I don't see why this can not be modified as an emergency solution to loss of oil. All you would need to do is fit a fuel nozzel to the gearbox casing and attach a solonoid and fuel line to a boost pump. When the pressure drops and the temp starts to rise, you activate the solenoid and spray fuel straight on to the gears untill you find somewhere safe to land.
I'll get my coat... :)

[[email protected]]

Madrock, the torquemeters on the Sea King use oil pressure fed from a pump piggybacked onto the No1 MRGB oil pump and supplied from an addition to the MRGB sump at a lower level than the MRGB pumps. The tqmeter oil runs through a union which allows it to flow to the torquemeters only if there is more than 30-35psi in the MRGB system. If the MRGB loses its oil and the pressure drops, a valve in the union shuts and the Tqmeter oil is redirected to the MRGB. The indications that the ELS is operating are a caption on the CWP and the Tqmeter indications dropping to zero. There is another warning if the ELS pressure falls - the most likely reasons being that there is either a hole in the bottom of the sump or that the No1 MRGB pump has failed.

Once in ELS mode you have limited manouverability in order to keep the oil in the lower sump but at 70 kts should have a couple of hours of flying depending on the oil temp. I don't know how long the MRGB will run on ELS without failing but its a whole lot more than 10 mins 47 seconds!

[maxwelg2]

Or should you comply 100% with your rules and regs and involve them in the crash?


Crab

Perhaps we need to look at a more fundamental issue, and that is should the A/C be flying is such sea states? My opinion is no.

To my knowledge we currently have only SS5 on the S-92 as that's what they show in the helo brefing video. SS6 would give us potentially a better chance of not capsizing, but in reality we would most likely still turn over.

IMO If the A/C can't land with a relatively high personnel survivability ratio either under power and/or in auto-rotation then the certification should be such that the design must have an ELS like the EC225 or the S61 to allow sufficient flight time to reach a dry landing site.

Oh, and it's not my rules and regs, it's the FAAs, perhaps they should fly in the S-92 as their regular (or very irregular as it is these days) mode of commercial transport to work.:suspect:

Safe Flying

Max

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

I don't know how long the MRGB will run on ELS without failing


I remember the RN groundschool instructors at Culdrose stating that the MGB in ELS mode had been bench-tested successfully for 4 hours - though I quite accept the point that bench-testing is no guarantee!

[madrock]

Some interesting wording excerpts from a fairly recent (Dec.2006) SAC international patent application document filed with WIPO :

" ..............
.......The United States Department of Defence (U.S. DoD) currently imposes a requirement that all rotorcraft transmission systems be able to operate for a predetermined period of time in an oil-out condition. That is, the U.S. DoD requires that all transmissions have the capability to maintain flight operations, albeit at reduced power levels sufficient only to sustain level flight operations, under an oil-out condition for 30 to 60 minutes depending on the mission. For example, a transmission is required to operate, for a period of time, in the event that the flow of lubricating oil to the transmission is interrupted or terminated so that the rotorcraft may safely land. ..................

................................
Present Invention
The emergency lubrication system of the present invention will enable a typical transmission to more than double, maybe ten times, the time period under which a transmission system may operate under oil-out conditions. Moreover, the present oil system is capable of satisfying the U.S. DoD imposed requirements for all areas/components within the transmission system. ...................".

So, as we say around here, where's it at ? :ok:

[riff_raff]

The 30 minute loss-of-lube MRGB qual test requirement with the DoD and FAA exists because rotorcraft MRGB lube systems are prone to failure by nature. And there is no practical way to make any MRGB lube system fault tolerant enough to have it's failure considered a "remote possibility". The MRGB lube system is simply too complex, and too critical for flight.

Having said that, I don't honestly believe that Sikorsky's engineers intentionally disregarded the safety of the S-92's MRGB design. Achieving a 30 minute loss-of-lube capability in a high torque MRGB is incredibly difficult to do. But that doesn't mean they didn't make mistakes.

For example, take a look at this photo of an S-92 MRGB lube system filter housing from a fatal crash: http://www.flightglobal.com/assets/getAsset.aspx?ItemID=29667

Although it's hard to say for sure, but it appears that the o-ring seal on this filter housing is a "face type" seal. Normally, a "radial type" o-ring seal would be used for something like this filter housing. The reason being that a "radial type" o-ring seal would not result in leakage like a "face type" o-ring seal would, in the event of a single fastener failure as shown in the photos.

The design of an o-ring groove is just a simple thing, but obviously such design features can mean the difference between life and death in some instances.

[widgeon]

I think it was mentioned before that the oil filter on the S92 is a completely different location than the UH60 , is the UH60 also a face type seal ?.

[riff_raff]

FAA: Oil filter maintenance error puts Sikorsky S-92A crews at risk-04/12/2009-Washington DC-Flightglobal.com (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/12/04/335831/faa-oil-filter-maintenance-error-puts-sikorsky-s-92a-crews-at.html)

Apparently, the service manual specified the wrong o-ring part number for the filter housing.

[riff_raff]

Looking closely again at that photo I posted of the failed titanium studs on the S-92 MRGB oil filter housing, I noticed another issue. It appears that the locknuts on those titanium studs are silver plated (MS21043 types possibly?). It is generally poor design practice to use silver plating in contact with titanium, since it has the potential for galvanic corrosion. The lock nuts should have had a dry film anti-seize coating like moly-disulfide, and definitely not silver plate, if they're being used with titanium.

If those locknuts are per OEM requirements, then Sikorsky's engineers definitely should have known better. I wonder if the FAA will catch this one?