Lightning Down At FAOB [Archive]

Gainesy

15th Nov 2009, 15:33

Have seen posts that DS reported 3 failed ejection attempts

So did I but I think that was a result of "Chinese Whispers" passed around spotters' websites in UK, SA and the Netherlands. Overberg authorities (ATC, Crash Chief and Station Commander) in various statememts to media said his RT mentioned on three occassions that he might need to eject, through various Chinese Whispers this morphed in to three statements by the pilot that his seat had failed. This latter BTW came from a spotter with a scanner apparently and not an official source, although an official source might not want to release it to the public of course.

You can trace this back for yourself, starting with the links at the top of the thread. Give yourself time to get through all the spotter bolli.

Jetscreen

15th Nov 2009, 16:02

Dave flew me supersonic on a Lightning sortie only last year. What an amazing gentleman, and aviator. So young, and such a tragedy. My thoughts are with all his family and friends in Hermanus and Cape Town.

RIP Dave

Ewan Whosearmy

15th Nov 2009, 16:53

Cape Town – “Hydraulic malfunction. I’m bailing out. Ejection seat malfunction.”

These were the last words heard by a former air force pilot before his fighter plane crashed on Saturday at the Bredasdorp air show.

Dave Stock, 46, from Hermanus, died in the accident. Rescuers found remains of his clothing about 10km from the Overberg air force base.

Stock was an experienced pilot who had completed close to 16 000 flying hours and had taken part in more than 100 air shows.

Stock was performing a display flight in a Lightning jet from Thunder City in Cape Town – one of only four in the world – when it crashed.

Investigation pending

Colonel Marius van der Heever, commander of the Overberg air force base, said the Civil Aviation Authority would investigate the accident.

“Right up until the end, Dave had communication with the tower and he was fully conscious when he crashed.”

“There were also indications that he could not eject successfully,” said Van der Heever.

Source: News 24 (http://www.news24.com/Content/SouthAfrica/News/1059/788ceecc95ab44d78cadf03c93aabeec/14-11-2009-02-15/Fighter_jet_crashes_at_air_show)

CharlieJuliet

15th Nov 2009, 16:56

Check the report on the loss of Lightning F3 XR721 on 5/1/66 for canopy problems. Post 14 is correct, there is an interrupter link between the canopy and the seat to stop the seat going till the canopy has gone as there is a large bit of metal frame in the way that is not frangible. The seat cannot eject if the canopy is on. There is a drill to manually jettison the canopy.

PFR

15th Nov 2009, 17:38

Thanks for that CharlieJuliet. All still very sad.

midman

16th Nov 2009, 20:01

A dreadful tragedy for the pilot and his family. Obviously a very talented test pilot and a great loss to South African aviation.

midman

16th Nov 2009, 20:07

Regarding the ejection, he would have had little time at low level to do quite a lot. In the event that the seat wouldn't fire, he'd have to diagnose that the canopy was the problem. Then he'd have to jettison the canopy, and repull the handle. If that still failed, he'd have to manually separate from the seat, climb over the side and bale out. An awful lot to do in an aircraft at low level with little/no control.

Very much secondary to the human loss, it's also sad to see the loss of a beautiful aircraft. I had many enjoyable flights in that very machine.

D120A

16th Nov 2009, 22:55

Quite right Midman. Pilot's Notes for the Lightning T5 state (as amended in 1973):

"During an ejection attempt, if the canopy fails to jettison after both seat firing handles have been pulled, it is likely that the canopy jettison system is faulty; in this event use the normal opening handle to remove the canopy."

That's an awful lot of lateral thinking to be done at low altitude with faltering controllability, and with no Duty Pilot in the tower with all the books on hand and able to offer instant advice.

Rest in Peace David Stock; you will not be forgotten by the Lightning fraternity.

MightyGem

17th Nov 2009, 21:35

A sad event. Richard Branson flew with him a couple of yeas ago in a climb to height record attempt:
Richard Branson's co-pilot dies after jet ejector seat fails during air show | Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1228084/Richard-Bransons-pilot-dies-jet-ejector-seat-fails-air-show.html)

Although I'm not quite sure why they call him Richard Branson's co-pilot. :confused: :ugh:

cessnapete

19th Nov 2009, 16:01

Recent photos taken of aircraft during display show a lower engine tailpipe fire on, or shortly after take-off. Fire burnt through to tailplane jack rendering aircraft unflyable. then reported ejection failure.

BEagle

19th Nov 2009, 18:52

I wondered about that - several of the photos show a small trail of smoke or vapour from the region of the lower jetpipe on take-off. Not being a WIWOL, I didn't know whether this was normal (e.g. oil breather of some sort) or abnormal.

The whole sad event is an utter tragedy.

dakkg651

20th Nov 2009, 07:55

Looks like a repeat of the George Aird accident without the happy ending.

What a tragic loss this is.

Perhaps the CAA were right after all!

Diablo Rouge

20th Nov 2009, 08:57

Perhaps the CAA were right after all!

I have read here & elsewhere that if the Tbird canopy does not detach the seat will not fire, and that a drill for manual release exists; but of course actions take time and he was on his own. The success of the S.A. Thunder City organisation (in terms of hours flown and business attributes) must have caused the CAA one or two headaches when it came to justifying refusing civvy fast jets a license, and even now, I believe that the stats are no more a risk then general aviation, and indeed probably less for you cannot treat such machines with nonchallence.

This is quite simply a tragedy, but almost certainly one within 'Normal operating risk', and not one that the CAA can jump on shouting "We told you so".

Snapshot

20th Nov 2009, 14:08

Gentlemen and perhaps ladies,

It is public knowledge now that on Sunday at Dave's house, in Hermanus
there shall be a celebration of his life! (and what a life)
This I am told shall be from 1500-2300

I am aware that many live far from Hermanus and might like to attend?
This being almost holiday season, getting a place to stay might
be difficult?

His home is just a couple of minutes drive from where I am in Hermanus
so, if anyone would like to stow their kit, go to his home, meet
and pay tribute etc. stay over at mine on Sunday night etc.
Then anyone is welcome! If it eases a bit of stress on what shall
be a difficult enough day then I am glad if I can help a bit!

I have limited beds but plenty of floor space, sofa, sleeper couch
and the usual! I can take about 10 but can adjust a bit
should the situation require just that?
Sleeping bags would be useful!

I would ask if you would like to do this, then please PM me
and also would prefer no one here before 1200 on Sunday!
From there you can shower, change, relax a bit etc. before
going to the house for 1500

I am going to post this on other boards so please take note
this is a first come first serve type offer! If I had a 400 room
hotel, then I assure you, it would be open to everyone!

Fly safe and I trust Sunday is truly a fitting tribute
to Dave Stock!

Regards
AB
'Snapshot'

setchell

20th Nov 2009, 18:36

I am at present on holiday in Cape Town from the UK and heard of the tragic news of Dave's death just before I left. Having spent an unforgettable day of flying with him in the Lightening a few years ago. I would very much like to join in your proposed celebration of his life this coming Sunday. Can I trouble you please to send me any details of the day: time, address etc and format for the day (if any).

I should be most grateful for your help.

Stephen Setchell (021-789-2933)

Sky Sports

21st Nov 2009, 10:48

R.I.P Dave......... and the aircraft.

BOAC

21st Nov 2009, 11:09

The canopy 'clearance' was required for all marks of Lightning due to the heavy metal reinforcement in the top. There was a sad fatal (1966 I think) from Wattisham where an ejection failed due to a stuck canopy, and in the subsequent !FORCED LANDING! the seat ejected from the INTACT aircraft when the canopy was released by a bump in the field in which it had crashed. A valiant effort which resulted in the death of the pilot. One puzzle here (to sidetrack this sad thread) is why the ejection drills were not changed until 1973.

curvedsky

21st Nov 2009, 12:53

A February 1962 copy of Lightning F1 Pilot's Notes states:

"Normal operation of the seat

When either firing handle is operated the canopy is jettisoned immediately and removes a restrictor from the time-delay firing unit. After a delay of one second the seat is ejected and the drogue gun, which is operated by a static rod, fires half a second later ......

NOTE: The seat cannot eject if the hood fails to jettison."

D120A

21st Nov 2009, 15:15

Similar wording to curvedsky's quote can be found in the Pilot's Notes (Part 1 Chapter 12) for both the F6 and the T5 at the end of their RAF service. Some words are subtly different compared with the early F1 sample above ("interdictor" for "restrictor", and "canopy" for "hood" in the 'NOTE' line), and the times have changed (F6, canopy depart to seat fire is 0.6 seconds, on the T5 it is only 0.4 seconds).

The 1973 amendment to the canopy jettison procedure, which I quoted in my post above, appears in Part 1 Chapter 9. BOAC is right; if the 1966 accident was the reason for the amendment, 7 years is an awful long time. Could there have been another accident in the early 70s, when someone ejected successfully after a canopy stuck and they got rid of it by using the normal operating handle? I am afraid that's a few years before my involvement with the Lightning began, but somebody may remember.

JEM60

21st Nov 2009, 15:54

What a lovely offer, Snapshot. I never knew Mr. Stock, but appreciated his flying when I went to Overburg four years ago, and also visited his[and your] wonderful town. Myself, and all the other enthusiasts who have visited Thunder City from England, will be thinking of him,and his family,and I would be grateful if you would forward our condolences to them. I am certain I speak on behalf of all Airshow spectators here.

Double Zero

22nd Nov 2009, 07:25

I seem to recall reading of a fair few hairy moments with Lightning seats, including a chap who felt his seat go ' click ' and move a fraction on the rail, resulting in a very ginger return & landing in what must have been a pretty awful time for him.

One thing; NOT apportioning blame or anything like it, but as Lightnings were notorious for jetpipe / lower fuselage fires, I wonder if a clued up Lightning person in the tower may have been able to see the smoke mentioned & transmit a warning, giving more time ?

Sadly irrelevant now, unless it should be thought worth adopting this practice in future ( sod's law of course is that the next problem will be completely different ).

D120A

22nd Nov 2009, 10:22

The Lightning's fire warning system was pretty good, and generally would set the Standard Warning Panel going before any external signs of fire became visible, even to a formating aircraft. The system was activated when the Instrument Master Switch was on, and its serviceability was tested via a button on the SWP during pre-flight checks.

Which is why I am puzzled about reports and photographic evidence of external smoke and fire when the pilot's radio transmissions were apparently about hydraulic problems.

Lightning5

22nd Nov 2009, 18:37

All Lightnings required the canopy to leave the aircraft prior to ejection. A cable was attached to the canopy that allowed the seat cartridge to fire once the canopy was clear of the aircraft. If my memory serves me, the 1966 (?) accident was caused by a defect with said cable.

BEagle

22nd Nov 2009, 19:19

D120A, the photos I saw showed a small, light coloured plume in the vicinity of the bottom of the lower jetpipe early in the flight. As I said, I didn't know whether or not that was normal.

Later photos taken immediately before the accident show a much longer, light coloured trail from the same area.

I haven't seen anything which looks like fire - that would surely be evident as black smoke? Maybe the reports of 'fire' were actually observations of reheat on take-off?

Did the Lightning have a dual redundant powered flying control hydraulic system - or would a massive hydraulic leak lead to complete loss of pitch control? Was there any manual reversion?

soddim

22nd Nov 2009, 19:29

There was no manual reversion but there were two independent hydraulic systems powering the flying controls. If both failed there was no control. The loss of control cases where fire was the primary cause were usually due to damage to control linkages.

Double Zero

22nd Nov 2009, 20:20

I realise we're talking about a very experienced pilot, with an aircraft I would hope is maintained in a relatively ' take your time ' manner.

However, if faced with a massive control failure, at a stressful period of the flight, might it be natural to think in terms of an instantly physical ( hyd' ) snag rather than something one might think a little more gradual like fire, of course this makes several assumptions as in no fire warning, who knows what the hyd' instruments were reading...

It seems no fire warning was mentioned, so if that system didn't work for any reason I suppose hydraulics ( possibly leaking through damage by then ) seem a likely culprit to suspect in the time available ?

soddim

22nd Nov 2009, 22:59

A fitting tribute:

Cape Times (http://www.capetimes.co.za/?fSectionId=&fArticleId=vn20091122081312881C369076)

curvedsky

23rd Nov 2009, 09:41

Shown below is a link to some early Lightning formation aerobatics by 74(F) squadron filmed 3 years before Dave Stock was born.

YouTube - BAC/English Electric Lightning (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYpl4wGeK2s)

The English Electric Lightning was a supersonic fighter aircraft of the Cold War era, remembered for its great speed and natural metal exterior. It is the only all-British Mach 2 fighter aircraft. Renowned for its capabilities as an interceptor, RAF pilots described it as "being saddled to a skyrocket". English Electric was later incorporated into the British Aircraft Corporation, later marks being developed and produced as the BAC Lightning.

The Lightning was used throughout much of its service life by the Royal Air Force and the Royal Saudi Air Force. The aircraft was a regular performer at airshows and was the first aircraft capable of supercruise. The Lightning was also one of the highest performance planes ever used in formation aerobatics.

Farns744

24th Dec 2009, 18:54

Priliminary accident report can be downloaded from South Africa CAA site here
http://www.caa.co.za/resource%20center/accidents%20&%20incid/reports/2009/ZU-BEX.pdf

cornish-stormrider

24th Dec 2009, 21:37

Seems quite conclusive for a prelim.

Sad loss for the pilot and his family.

One can but hope he's in a bar somewhere with a cold one, watching the sunsets and planning tomorrows flight. - Heaven, planes are not required.

Baedeker

26th Dec 2009, 07:02

While this interim report concentrates solely on establishing the facts of the accident, one would hope that a final report will criticise the operation of the airshow. Had the airshow director observed the break out of fire in the jetpipe/rear fuselage and at a one third chord position under the tailplane (as was captured by photographers on the airfield), the display could have been terminated and the aircraft brought down, possibly before the failure of the hydraulics.
Surely, with such potentially lethal 1940s/50s technology being displayed in the presence of a large gathering of spectators, the display director should have been following the complete display routine like a hawk?
Further, the SACAA seems to be falling over itself to be seen to be taking action to reach an outcome "to ensure the continued safety of passengers transported in South African airspace". I would have thought that the safety of the public on the ground was its primary aim. The carriage of passengers in Lightnings, surely, will be banned forever.
The SACAA says it wants to involve "the manufacturers". Are British Aerospace really going to take any interest in, as I've already said, such potentially lethal 1940s/50s technology which was maintained 24/7 in a Cold War ambience by a vastly bigger maintenance organisation? And yes, I know, the Vulcan is from the same era, but it's a completely different machine.

cornish-stormrider

26th Dec 2009, 10:32

Baedeker. I certainly hope they do not ban the carriage of passengers in the Frightening. A fatal accident is always a chain of events and what needs to be done is to ensure that this chain is broken, before another event. Maybe they need to tighten up the procedures regarding the seats, maybe they need to increase maintenance on a certain aspect of the jets. What they should not do is ban it, progress comes with an element of risk. This poor pilot died despite trying everything possible ( I draw this conclusion myself after reading the prelim) due to a series of problems happening at the same time.

Banning the flying is not the answer.

John Farley

26th Dec 2009, 19:39

I for one would like to know whether the canopy was on when it hit. I could not find any reference to this in the report - please put me right if I missed it.

wiggy

26th Dec 2009, 21:54

While we're on the subject of the seats and related items, the report mentions an incident relating to ZU-AHV where "the ejection seats were found to be unservicable" - something that I suspect the authorites may find much more worrying than the tragic accident itself. Can anyone shed light on the ZU-AHV incident/accident, my search skills have let me down.

D120A

26th Dec 2009, 23:01

Previous information was that the canopy was found with the main wreckage, in a position that suggests that it was on when the aircraft hit. That is not in the report, as far as I can see, and neither is any confirmation that the seat pins were found where you would expect them to be as a result of the actions of the seeing-off crew, i.e. in their stowage. Thus a great deal needs to be established, in my view, before the serviceability of the actual ejection seat can be questioned.

My initial reaction to the report is that the most significant word in it is 'Interim'. There must be much, much more to come.

Karl Bamforth

27th Dec 2009, 03:28

Baedeker,

An accident investigation is to concentrate on facts. It does not (should not) critisize or apportion blame.

Snapshot

27th Dec 2009, 05:12

John,
from people that were there minutes after the crash and from photographs I have taken from the air, (and of course the image from the report) it is clear the impact was huge and debris scattered over a wide area! To my knowledge, no parts of the canopy have been found so I do believe the canopy was still in place!
What I found interesting is the distance apart from each other the engines where!

I have not posted any of the photographs anywhere for obvious reasons however, now the images
and lat/long has been disclosed within the report, if anyone wants me to post some, I shall. They are not super quality but do show the entire area and clearly some of the main aircraft parts.
AB

GeeRam

27th Dec 2009, 11:03

The report states that fuel venting was evident on taxi and take-off run....but from this photo, is this fuel or hyd fluid pouring out of '451 on it's last take-off......:uhoh:
I don't ever recall seeing RAF Lightnings venting fuel in such a heavy fashion, on take-off when in service..... :confused:

http://i34.photobucket.com/albums/d115/whz64/skycam/141109-O-9999H-524cp1.jpg

D120A

27th Dec 2009, 11:58

Thank you GeeRam, that is the first time I have seen that very important photograph.

From its volume alone (and its colour, hyd fluid is red) that is unburned fuel, and looks as if it is coming from the rear fuselage under the No 1 jetpipe, and from the ventral tank attachment area in the bottom of the fuselage. No, Lightnings never did that in service, there are no arrangements for venting fuel in that area.

Could this be from pooled fuel in the bottom of the fuselage, accumulated (by dripping through the jetpipe gas seals) from the abortive start the day before (HP cock open, no ignition...). Take-off acceleration causes it to flow aft, just in time to contact a reheated jetpipe (reheat not necessary for a T5 take-off but engaged here for the display, according to a friend who saw it). Hence the later in-flight picture of an established fire in the Reheat Zone 3.

GeeRam

29th Dec 2009, 08:57

Could this be from pooled fuel in the bottom of the fuselage, accumulated (by dripping through the jetpipe gas seals) from the abortive start the day before (HP cock open, no ignition...). Take-off acceleration causes it to flow aft, just in time to contact a reheated jetpipe (reheat not necessary for a T5 take-off but engaged here for the display, according to a friend who saw it). Hence the later in-flight picture of an established fire in the Reheat Zone 3.

Does this not sadly beg the questions as to how the Tub was being operated that weekend...?
Surely they just didn't park it up after the flame-out engine incident, and then get in and start it and taxy for a display the next day without any investigation and inspection...:uhoh:
And what of the start-up and seeing-off crew......not Lightning experienced TC staff perhaps....:confused:
Is BP still living out there and involved with TC I wonder..?

hunty

29th Dec 2009, 09:39

BP is not involved with TC any more and does not live in SA

Hunty

JEM60

29th Dec 2009, 14:04

When I went to the Overburg show four years ago, the seeing off and ground crew were from Thunder City.

John Farley

29th Dec 2009, 19:02

Snapshot

Thank you

JF

XL391

20th Jun 2010, 16:16

Is it true that Thunder City's Lightnings are still flying crew currency and anti det sorties but no pax flights?

pzu

24th Aug 2012, 11:30

See

www.caa.co.za - /resource center/accidents & incid/reports/ (http://www.caa.co.za/resource%20center/accidents%20&%20incid/reports)

PZU - Out of Africa (Retired)

Nige321

24th Aug 2012, 12:07

Updated link to the report... (http://www.caa.co.za/resource%20center/accidents%20&%20incid/reports/2009/8706.pdf)

Daysleeper

24th Aug 2012, 12:36

Well that makes pretty depressing reading.

Q-RTF-X

24th Aug 2012, 13:29

Awfully depressing !

dead_pan

24th Aug 2012, 17:14

Agreed - an accident just waiting to happen, methinks. Any response from the operators?

Fox3WheresMyBanana

24th Aug 2012, 17:27

I was asked to fly a Jet Provost newly imported into the US, and flew a few qualification flights in it. When it became clear that the owner was not going to follow the full Service maintenance schedule, I walked away. Glad I did.

NutLoose

24th Aug 2012, 18:00

That is a pretty damning report, no wonder they closed their doors soon after, the poor guy had all the cards stacked against him :(
I am suprised that no one appears to have ended up in court.

.

green granite

24th Aug 2012, 18:06

No wonder they decided to close the company down, they couldn't possibly have carried on with that record even if they were allowed to which I doubt.

As Daysleeper said: Well that makes pretty depressing reading.

Fox3WheresMyBanana

24th Aug 2012, 19:11

When one leaves the RAF and climbs into a ex-mil jet, there is (certainly in mine and Thunder City's cases) the option of ignoring a large number of RAF procedures. After pouring over the Aircraft maint logs (which I'd never seen in the RAF), one realises that 98% of that annoying nausea is in fact very important.
I made it my business to know the Service record, life expiry and servicing schedule of every major component on my civvy mil jet. I also insisted on knowing the background and quals of every guy working on it.

And when the "delayed till next scheduled maintenance" plus "requested extension on scheduled maintenance" game started, I left.

Tableview

24th Aug 2012, 19:15

Thinking just how close I was to booking a flight with them, this leaves me chilled to the bone....... Me too. I've just spent an hour reading the report. It also makes me wonder how much my friends and family like me, or much they think my life insurance is worth, as one of the ideas touted for my 50th. was ..... a flight in the Lightning, which if I remember correctly cost about USD 900 at the time.

From Thunder City's website (which has not been updated for a couple of years)
Thunder City (http://www.thundercity.com/pages/499409045/about-us/history.asp)

These amazing jets are meticulously maintained by former air force engineers and always flown well within their performance limitations. Even so we do not take safety for granted. Therefore you will be trained to safely use the aircraft’s emergency systems such as the ejection seat, emergency oxygen etc. Ya well ...no - fine!

NutLoose

24th Aug 2012, 19:36

I do wonder how the passengers signing a waiver would stand up in court, as they were signed under the belief the aircraft were legal, Servicable and correctly maintained.

glad rag

24th Aug 2012, 19:38

Sad tale indeed.

One thing that does strike home is the culture that seemingly spread downwards through the company.

I don't see how they could just ignore the quite damming audits. Really who in their right mind would, unless it was all about the [lack of] money?

Tableview

24th Aug 2012, 19:45

The report states that the passenger should have been issued with a ticket. I suspect that the absence of that, which is a contract outlining legal liabilities and limitations, would, in the event of an accident, have placed the company (and not the pilot, for it is not his responsibility) in a very tenuous situation.

I am somewhat surprised to hear how bad things were at Thunder City as I have been there several times and know someone who was involved in its PR side. I had always held Mike Beachy Head in high regard. No longer. I hope he faces criminal charges.

Quote from guess who ............
Flying this fleet of seasoned fighters is one thing; keeping them going is another. Some of them are nearly 50 years old and just to keep the Lightning in the air for 40 minutes takes about 55 man hours of maintenance and preparation.

'Every little tiny thing, if it is not done right, becomes a weak link in the chain. If you cock up in business, you lose a bit of money and at worst it goes bust. If we cock up, you die,' says Mike.

GeeRam

24th Aug 2012, 20:02

the poor guy had all the cards stacked against him

Sadly, that 'poor guy' wasn't exactly blamless either it would seem, and one would certainley have to question some of his decision making, especially given his 'antics' of the previous day/evening, and electing to fly the thing in that state the next day :ugh::eek:

As for TC's maintainance proceedures :mad:

500N

24th Aug 2012, 20:09

The report and some of your informed comments in other countries have put paid
to my idea of going for a fly in one of the ex mil jets here in Aust.

Squirrel 41

24th Aug 2012, 21:15

Damning indeed, especially to someone as unmechanical as me. Bl**dy terrifying actually, esp. as I'd promised myself a go at some point, and delighted that one of my friends who did go (and absolutely loved it) was lucky.

Could any of the Brunty LPG guys comment? Are they intending to take on the remaining ex-TC Lightnings?

S41

Sir Loin

24th Aug 2012, 21:45

But that could never happen over here, could it?

Our main operator of a Complex former military aircraft is constantly reminding us of how their aircraft is operated by former RAF personnel and how safety is always at the forefronts of their mind.

...and surely their failure to adhere to RAF procedures, and then introduce a system of intentionally introducing FOD into the intakes of that aircraft, against all wisdom and practices of 30 years of RAF service, with no safeguards to remove it therefore resulting in the destruction of two priceless Olympus engines was nothing more than a mistake that anyone could have made.....

:ugh::ugh:

One day....

glad rag

24th Aug 2012, 21:58

Ouch, Sir Loin, but timely perhaps.

Once bitten........

NutLoose

24th Aug 2012, 22:07

I too thought if you are concerned about engine corrosion issues, especially with steel turbine discs then put the Silica in the Exhaust where it isn't going to go through an engine and have a foolproof system in place to remove it, what suprised me even more bearing in mind they are now down to I believe 1 spare engine and the above corrosion concerns to see it doing low passes over the salt ladened sea near cliffs in a high bird environment..

But to compare the Vulcan operation to that report and the Thunder City operation seems to be miles apart in real life, especially as the Vulcan still has full manufacturers support.

Sir Loin

24th Aug 2012, 22:57

But to compare the Vulcan operation to that report and the Thunder City operation seems to be miles apart in real life, especially as the Vulcan still has full manufacturers support.

That's the spirit, Nut Loose. I'm sure that the delegates from the South African Aviaition Authority would agree, along with Shell, and the other high profile sponsors who trusted Thunder City to operate in accordance with the stated and accepted proceedures.

As it goes, apparently, the were concerned with the corrosion in the HP and LP compressor casings as opposed to the turbines, and therefore, I'm as surprised as you are as to their chosen path to deal with that. They are also down to a supply of NO further certified engines now, there are no spares.

Perhaps in light of this, as harsh as it may seem, it might be a good time to look over the proceedures and practices of all former military aircraft operators.

NutLoose

24th Aug 2012, 23:10

In the Uk I would say 99% of all operators of ex warbirds in the Uk are rigorous in their attitude and working practices, I know there have been a few issues, but the CAA seem to work to a higher standard than most... Hence no Lightnings flying here.

The trouble is no matter what the rules, you will always get the good, the bad and the damn right ugly, the problem is recognising the ugly and dealing with it, unfortunately you often find they are very good at throwing up smoke screens.

Sir Loin

24th Aug 2012, 23:17

Amen to that.

Hence, I myself think that it may be an ideal time to look beyond the smokescreens thrown up by certain organisations.

And that's as far as I'm going to go with that...

phil9560

24th Aug 2012, 23:27

Whichever way you look at it these aircraft are getting old.Maybe we should accept the fact that they shouldn't be flying.
I'd love to see phantoms,lightnings,vulcans,buccaneers et al but sadly time passes

Momoe

25th Aug 2012, 04:53

"Whichever way you look at it these aircraft are getting old."

Great sweeping generalisation which just begs to be flamed!

So you'd feel the same way if the BBMF disbanded due to the age of the aircraft? Not to mention all the private WWII warbirds; on the commercial side Buffalo airways would be mightily irked as would all the private DC-3/C-46 owners.

It's about maintenance, implementing and legislating said maintenance and finally cost when the cost of the above makes it financially non-viable.

Displaying aircraft has become a safer spectator experience, having said that most spectators are aware that this, in common with all aviation related activities isn't without risk.
When spectators vote with their feet (or their pockets) all bets will be off.

phil9560

25th Aug 2012, 07:23

Not really a 'sweeping generalisation'-just an innocuous remark that 50 year old high performance aircraft may be better in museums.

glad rag

25th Aug 2012, 10:02

Not really a 'sweeping generalisation

A straight fact more like.

Fuel leaking from static ports on the pitot head. [read the report]

After 24 yrs fixing various cabs [starting with the canberra] I'm stunned with that one.

The design of the aircraft systems alone [obviously acceptable in those times] should have these aircraft permanently grounded today.

SandLat650

25th Aug 2012, 10:59

Having spent about an hour reading the whole sorry saga, it sadly confirms what I suspected all along: namely that the guys at Thunder City were a bunch of enthusiastic amateurs that really had very little idea what they were dealing with.

Having spent the best part of 10 years on Lightning’s, nearly 2000 hours and approaching 3000 sorties, reading the accident report leaves me amazed that I only ejected once. But in those days we had hundreds of well trained and well-motivated technicians looking after us, and we literally trusted them with our lives.

As most Lightning pilots will attest, most of the time the aeroplane was a pussy cat. But like most cats, in the blink of an eye it could turn on you and rip your eyes out. Thankfully, in the time I flew them, we buried very few friends and those we did were mainly the result of Operator Errors rather than technical failures.

Before the days of the modern generation of fighters, the Lightning stole the show at many air displays. Who can forget the sight of it performing in the hands of some seriously talented operators; Pete Chapman for instance? But those guys had hundreds and hundreds of hours on type, flew it day in day out, knew what they were doing and were regulated and supported every inch of the way.

With the aeroplane nearly 40 years old, systems and spares getting tired and hard to come by and a handful of technicians that have been proved to have been woefully lacking in experience and authority, I'm amazed they hadn't had an accident sooner.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing and it's easy for people to sit back after the event and pontificate. But the spectacle of a Lightning in burner rotating at the end of the runway and going vertical has an amazing effect and the desire to see it again and again and fly the things forever is very powerful. But the Lightning is no Spitfire and the costs of maintaining just one, let alone 4 must have been horrendous and the temptation to cut corners very compelling. Had those in South Africa had a bit more of an idea of what they were dealing with and listened to the CAA, we wouldn't be having these discussions and a fellow aviator would still be alive.

Rigga

25th Aug 2012, 15:51

What amazed me was the lack of the SA aviation authority involvement in all this.
I dont know how the SACAA work, or even if there is some form of regular renewal for "Permit" ex-mil aircraft, but if this organisation had been in the UK I suspect that some audit may have found anomalies very much earlier than this. Having said that - it depends how well the owner used the authority and how well he could waffle.

But the lack of a "CRS" for several years should have been obvious to anyone who looked at the books - so who should have looked at the books? and why didnt they see this?

sandozer

25th Aug 2012, 20:15

"Fuel leaking from static ports on the pitot head. [read the report]"

There are no static ports on a Lightning pitot head, the static ports are on either side of the fuselage below the front canopy.

NutLoose

25th Aug 2012, 20:59

Is there not a static sourced pitot head? Or simply a drain drilling?

.

sandozer

25th Aug 2012, 22:18

Nutloose I think you are correct, I can remember there were two transducers in the nosewheel well, an S and P-S for altitude, airspeed and mach data to the ADC. They had Pitot and Static feeds of alloy tubing routing direct to them. The feed also went to a pressure switch up in the engine intake on the port side. Can remember an access panel right where the bifurcation was in the intake. A pain in the ass to work in there I can recall. Which means the static ports I mentioned previously only fed the standby instruments in the cockpit ? Memory check time . .

Scruffy Fanny

25th Aug 2012, 22:30

Correct - either side of the Lightning were two brass plates with static holes in - the brass was pretty tarnished- can any engineer tell me how fuel could possibly end up in the Pitot system or even forward of the wing line??? As there are no fuel lines forward and fuel doesn't tend to go uphill

Milo Minderbinder

25th Aug 2012, 22:37

"namely that the guys at Thunder City were a bunch of enthusiastic amateurs that really had very little idea what they were dealing with"

Surely that same comment must now also be levelled at the South African regulatory authorities?
Who was mad enough to think he knew better than the CAA at regulating a aircraft which was built and based in the UK, and never based in South Africa? Irrespective of the faults with the company and its staff, those who allowed the aircraft to be imported and flown are also at fault here

Rakshasa

26th Aug 2012, 16:20

Jesus H. Christ! You couldn't make it up could you..? and if you did people would complain about cliches.

Just goes to show you can never take a reputation at face value.

lightningmate

26th Aug 2012, 18:40

Folk,

The static port on the main Pitot-Static probe comprised narrow slots around the circumference, slightly displaced longitudinally to avoid a circumferential 'cut'. The ports on the side fed the standby-altimeter.

lm

Scruffy Fanny

26th Aug 2012, 19:08

So I ask the question again - how could fuel possibly be leaking from the pitot -static vents whatever. I saw lots of fuel dripping out of Lightnings aft of the missile pack but never ever forward of that?? I think The SACAA were clutching at straws- Simple fact - Aircraft was overheated on previous sortie/ landing - pipes moved - fuel came out at High pressure - Aircraft caught fire - double Hyd Fail endex- No one seems to ask why he didn't use the emergency canopy jett between the seats or indeed just open the canopy on the left hand side ??
Lightning Mate any clues

Nige321

26th Aug 2012, 19:12

A lot of UK based pilots flew for Thunder City. Didn't any of them notice anything out of the ordinary, or check any paperwork at all?

Rigga

26th Aug 2012, 20:11

Nige:"A lot of UK based pilots flew for Thunder City. Didn't any of them notice anything out of the ordinary, or check any paperwork at all? "

There is no time line for when things started to go wrong. When these pax/pilots flew things may have been fine or even on the turn.

However, visiting or paying pilots are likely to have been given what they expect - Cockpit Briefs, Flight Plans and manoevers, etc, but may not have been expected to go through the Docs/F700. And they may not have recognised SACAA docs unfamiliar to them - just browsing through some vaguely familiar docs expecting/assuming them to be correct.

Anyone, but especially foreigners, in this situation could be blagged.

glad rag

26th Aug 2012, 20:29

30/10/09 1738.3 FLT by pilot Fuel leaking into pitot/static system (leaking out of pitot probe)

Pitot static system drained

Also

P37
1.16.10 The aircraft manufacturer also commented on the deferred defects related to the
fuel leak:
(i) Fuel leaking into pitot/static system (leaking out of pitot probe): Fuel leaking
into pitot/static system - the most serious problem. This is indicative of a fault
in a fuel valve; however, fuel in the pitot static system will also prevent correct
operation of the aircraft instruments and flying control feel system. Although
not a common occurrence, it can occur by internal failures in components in
the fuel venting system, either an Inward-Vent Valve Diaphragm, a Float
Control Valve Diaphragm, an Outward Vent Valve Diaphragm accompanied
with fuel in the vent pipe or by a leak in an Inward Vent Valve NRV. All of
these components are connected to the pitot/static system and are installed in
each integral wing tank. Extract from the Aircraft Maintenance Manual Sect 7
Chap 5 that states:
Note: "The main system provides the pitot and static pressures required to
operate the pressure switches, transducers, feel simulator and altitude and air
speed unit. The pressures are taken from a pressure head, extended on a
probe located under the nose air intake. In addition, the head provides two
sources of static pressure, one of which supplies the instruments and the other
which serves the fuel venting system."

:ouch:

Scruffy Fanny

26th Aug 2012, 20:52

Yes that would all seem reasonable that air from the Pitot could be fed to various parts of the feel system etc - still never ever saw an RAF Lightning leak fuel other than aft of the missile pack - thanks for taking the trouble to enlighten me

CharlieJuliet

26th Aug 2012, 20:58

Hi Glad,
Yes remember in the '60s being told that fuel leaking out of the pitot was not unusual, and ISTR seeing the odd pitot leaking. Our ships always seeemed to leak, and we always had one in the hangar Cat 3 with a centre section leak.

GeeRam

26th Aug 2012, 21:28

Nige:"A lot of UK based pilots flew for Thunder City. Didn't any of them notice anything out of the ordinary, or check any paperwork at all? "

There is no time line for when things started to go wrong. When these pax/pilots flew things may have been fine or even on the turn.

However, visiting or paying pilots are likely to have been given what they expect - Cockpit Briefs, Flight Plans and manoevers, etc, but may not have been expected to go through the Docs/F700

I think the reference was regarding two well known ex-Lightning pilots that flew sorties for TC incl display flying (on the occasion of the 4 x ship airshow formation display) and one of the T.5's (with a BBC cameraman on board) during a well know BBC funded documentary a few years ago.

Rigga

26th Aug 2012, 22:39

...so you agree with me then, Ram.

...and I'm not aware of the well-known documentary.

SCAFITE

27th Aug 2012, 08:32

I have put a link to a site listing the 80 or so RAF Lightning losses and major incidents during the aircraft time in RAF Service (plus some RSAF Incidents). I am no technical expert, but can read the comments against each incident.

During the 1960s it seems some Pilot error was to blame, due to a new very powerful aircraft coming into service. From the late 60s the problem of loss of control or having had fire warning lights seem prevalent from then until the aircraft left service in 1988. So no matter how good the Techies or how good the Pilots or how good the full logistical and industrial support this aircraft had, it seems to have been a problem child after the late 60s.

Overall it seems technical problems not Pilot error were the main reasons of losses esp after the late 60s

So if TC had dotted all the I’s and crossed all the T’s it was only a matter of time before this incident was going to happen, is it little wonder this aircraft was never flown in UK airspace after it left RAF Service.

To fly this aircraft from 2003 to 2009 with one loss seems to have been very very lucky with a capital L

List of accidents and incidents involving the English Electric Lightning - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_accidents_and_incidents_involving_the_English_Electr ic_Lightning)

Hammer Head Too

27th Aug 2012, 08:37

Such a sad and damning report which we should all contextualise in light of Haddon-Cave and the ongoing drive of the Safety Case here in the UK. It appears the whole of the TC outfit from Mike Head, through to the maintainers and operators were woefully unprepared for the complexity of this aircraft type. Naive or criminal may well be contested in the courts. Who authorised the “extension” of the critical escape system?
Being an ex-Lightning sooty this report made me reflect on “the way it was done back then”. Early 80’s at windy city. The Lightning was the top of the pile and the cream were selected to fly them... most of them being punchy, aggressive, no nonsense types who wanted jets at any cost to fly. The engineers were posted in from any background. With no selection process (someone may wish to correct me on that point), though the technical “Q” courses were good and thorough, you ended up with good, average and not so good maintainers working them. And the aircraft were very difficult and challenging and rewarding to work on. The point is if you followed every procedure to completeness, in a way a court would coldly look at it, nothing would have flown. Full stop. So if you wanted to fit in, get good assessments and progress up the ladder you worked in a certain fashion. If you were smart you learnt the systems in depth so you could make a judgment decision on what could cropped and what had to be carried out 100%. You also quickly worked out which engineering peers and superiors you both trusted and listened too.
How many ex OC’s, Flt Cdrs, duty pilots are reading this and reflecting on pressurising the Sengo/Jengo/Warrant/Rects controller for the jet “yesterday”? Just one illustration. An aircraft still on jacks have final U/C selections carried out when a FLM is despatched to carry out a AF/BF servicing, checking in the U/C bay he managed to select that leg to retract.... both he and the SNCO carrying out the checks were fortunate not to be seriously injured or worse. I don’t say it with any pride but corners were cut to meet the flying requirement.
I wonder what it is like today in the fast jet front line environment? Do the same pressures exist from the same sources? I read Tucumseh’s inputs to the Haddon-Cave with great interest.

Tableview

27th Aug 2012, 09:03

As an aside, last week's episode of 'When Britain Ruled the Skies' mentioned the complexity of the Lightning's maintenance and the fact that due to the construction it could require 25 manhours to dismantle and reassemble parts to replace or repair a simple component which in itself was a one hour job. One can well imagime that short cuts were taken or items ignored.

Ivan Rogov

27th Aug 2012, 09:34

Really good post Hammer, to outsiders everything is black and white, in reality it is shades of grey (Not 50!)

The RAF is making huge improvements to address the issues you highlight post HC. There is a program of Human Factors & Error Management training that ALL personnel should be doing, the concepts are still evolving. Understandably many are suspicious that it is just the latest additional stat and they are wasting their time, others think it is H&S flying prevention or just a new name for Flight Safety. I'll admit some of the current training is disjointed and needs tweaking but it will provide the backbone of a safety culture across the services and it had the ability to address all the issues you mentioned and many more. Many claim it is just common sense but as you point out there are good, average and not so good people in all areas. I'm sure it will take a generation to become engrained in what we do, hopefully it will and more of us get to collect our pensions :ok:

Easy Street

27th Aug 2012, 10:04

So, if maintenance corners have to be cut to get a 'flyer', whose fault is it?

The manufacturer, for failing to design an easy-to-maintain airframe?
The engineering authority, for making the official procedures unnecessarily long and complex?
The procurement organisation, for failing to procure enough aircraft to have a sufficient number of 'flyers' at any one time?
The manning organisation, for failing to provide enough technicians to complete the long and complex maintenance procedures?
(Or perhaps for providing too many aircrew?)
The logistics organisation, for failing to supply spares in a timely fashion?
The technicians, for not being able to carry out the official procedures at a suitable pace?
The tasking authority, for requiring aircrew to fly more hours than might be strictly necessary?
Or the aircrew, for wanting to fly more hours than are actually needed?

If aircrew did sometimes pressure for a jet to be fixed yesterday, that doesn't necessarily make it their 'fault' if things went wrong; they were simply another aggravating factor in a sub-optimal flight safety situation. Besides, any EngO worth his salt should be able to shield the coal-face techie from the wrath of the impatient flt cdr!

GeeRam

27th Aug 2012, 10:35

...so you agree with me then, Ram.

Certanley can't disagree.

...and I'm not aware of the well-known documentary.

It was Episode 3 of the BBC series 'Wonders of the Universe' hosted by Dr.Brian Cox. He was filmed taking a flight in the T.5 (ex-XS451) flown by Mike Beachy Head doing a rotation take-off and climb to 50k+ to view the 'edge of space'.

From his posts on another forum at the time, I beleive a well known ex-RAF Lightning pilot flew the BBC cameraman on the same sortie in the other TC T.5 (ex-XS452)
I would dearly love to be proved incorrect on that fact tbh.

Nige321

27th Aug 2012, 11:44

The passenger on the flight the day before was one James Clash.
He's posted his story here... (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-m-clash/supersonic-flights-fraugh_b_783346.html)

walbut

27th Aug 2012, 12:36

I spent the last 20 years of my career at Brough supporting Flight Systems on the in service Hawk fleet worldwide. One of the most common customer queries was 'Can we defer the scheduled service on X for Y flying hours or Z weeks because there's an exercise on or another aircraft is down for spares or there is a VIP flypast or whatever.' Usually there was no supporting evidence to back up the request so we invariably asked the customer to provide the service history since new or the last Major, so we could assess where the aircraft stood in the schedule. Quite often the response came back we need an answer tomorrow, Eng records are closed till next week, its only 20 hours, surely you can agree to that etc. We would then respond again, as diplomatically as possible that if the customer thought it such a trivial issue they could use their own engineering authority to underwrite the extension but we had to have some data on which to make a judgement. Almost inevitably we finally got the data and usually the previous history was quite sensible and provided the required extension was small, say 5 or 10% we would agree, perhaps subject to certain specific inspections or tests, depending on the particular circumstances.

However occasionally some really surprising servicing history would come back. Some customers who did relatively little flying would go years past the calendar backstop dates for servicing or component lives. One customer in particular had never done any of the more significant scheduled maintenance and just kept repeating Primaries and Primary Stars ad infinitum. Its not just small commercial operators who cut corners in their operation.

The Lightning accident was a good example of the Swiss cheese analogy to flight safety. Aircraft are designed to be as safe as practicable, subject to all the specified qualification, test, inspection, maintenance and operational procedures being put in place and adhered to. This particular South African cheese seems to have been absolutely riddled with holes and it is not surprising that they eventually all lined up.

I had never met Dave Stock but I had spoken to him on a number of occasions to discuss issues he had experienced while flight testing Hawk Mk 120 aircraft for Denel. He did not come across as being the sort of person who would take a cavalier attitude to flight safety so I was particularly suprised and saddened to hear of his death.

I can remember sitting in a conference room with my boss many years ago, waiting for our MoD visitors to arrive for a meeting. It was the day after the Challenger space shuttle disaster. My boss was an excellent engineer but not normally one for making deep philosophical statements. On that occasion he did. He said if you choose to ride on a big powerful horse then you have to accept that one day it will throw you off and you will get hurt. The analogy was very similar to one earlier in this thread comparing the Lightning to a pussy cat. Unfortunately a lot of people don't seem to realise that if you mistreat an animal for long enough it really will turn on you and bite. Perhaps its because many of these people have so little direct contact with the animal itself and have never seen the consequences first hand.

wub

27th Aug 2012, 13:31

It was Episode 3 of the BBC series 'Wonders of the Universe' hosted by Dr.Brian Cox. He was filmed taking a flight in the T.5 (ex-XS451) flown by Mike Beachy Head doing a rotation take-off and climb to 50k+ to view the 'edge of space'.

You might be thinking of Professor Iain Stewart who flew with Dave Stock in the second episode of his BBC series 'Earth the Power of the Planet', entitled 'Atmosphere'.

Rigga

27th Aug 2012, 16:31

Hammer said:"The engineers were posted in from any background. With no selection process (someone may wish to correct me on that point), though the technical “Q” courses were good and thorough, you ended up with good, average and not so good maintainers working them."

During the early 80s I had been in for 5+ years working as a Mechanic on Whirlwinds - Line, Minors and Majors. I learned a lot and became confident in my job. After my fitters course I was posted to Honkingdown and to Buccaneers. This was a bit of a culture change for me - I couldnt go on the Airtests, for one thing!

Buccs were grounded at the time - so we were drilling and polishing holes for some time.

After some months I got my Airframe Course and sat in a class for some weeks - probably three weeks - I cant remember now. I left there with less than 35 sheets of notes. Then, in the near "heights" of the Cold War, I believe, courses were just to tick boxes, not really to impart good or relevant knowledge to new guys, just to enable them to open panels and look inside with a bit of a clue as to what they saw. Don't get me wrong - I really enjoyed working on and with Buccs...but, in hindsight, the courses were cr@p!

Maybe later courses improved? - I did five type courses and found the Tornado F3 one lacking too (but that's me, I suppose). Luckily I didn't stay long with them.

Most times it's not up to the engineers what levels of aircraft course they get - they just make do with what they get - and then get experience as best they can.

Krystal n chips

27th Aug 2012, 16:38

The power of marketing.

Read the paragraph above the pic of the Bucc.

Fifty Thousand Feet Per Minute | Features | Lusso - British Luxury Lifestyle Magazine (http://www.lussoluxury.com/feature/74/fifty-thousand-feet-per-minute)

Alber Ratman

27th Aug 2012, 19:52

Absolutely damming of all management involved in Thunder City and the holes in the regulators systems who allowed them to operate with an AOC for so long without questioning the practices.. We would all like to see Buccs, Jags and other types flying in this country like the Vulcan, but the costs would be similar to the Vulcan, OEMs would have to be on board and the operator wouldn't be able to fly fee paying pax. Thats after if the CAA reckon the aircraft is safe enough to even be considered for a PtF. The Lightning isn't and believe it or not, the Jag was worse..

sunnybunny

27th Aug 2012, 20:38

No one seems to ask why he didn't use the emergency canopy jett between the seats or indeed just open the canopy on the left hand side ??

In the report the appendix by the Crash Lab suggested that the ejection handle was pulled which worked partially resulting in the canopy being dislodged on one side only and this jammed the manual release mechanism.

D120A

28th Aug 2012, 16:23

SandLat 650 and Hammer Head Too, please see your PMs.

PFR

30th Aug 2012, 20:50

Just recently published on an African based website.....

Last week the SA CAA released a report on the crash of Thunder City Lightning ZU-BEX 14 November 2009.
Thunder City Rejects SACAA report.
Thunder City was not aware that the SACAA aircraft accident report had been issued, thus we have not had the time to study it in detail; nor were we afforded the opportunity to comment prior to its release, nor were any senior members of Thunder City staff interviewed or statements taken. Our initial findings, after a cursory read, leave us in no doubt that this report is seriously flawed and smacks of a witch hunt.
Even at a superficial level, while the report appears to be thorough, we have found blatant falsehoods, errors, illogical conclusions as well as glaring omissions. Therefore, once we have studied this report in depth, we will pursue all options open to us to ensure that a true and balanced conclusion is reached.
As it stands, is a scandalous and libellous work that at the outset seeks to apportion blame while claiming not to.
It is our intention to embark on a further independent investigation with suitably qualified experts and to present such findings when complete. In the interim Thunder City will seek a court injunction to have this report withdrawn.

Thunder City Management

PFR

Fortissimo

30th Aug 2012, 21:08

Good luck with that.

Milo Minderbinder

30th Aug 2012, 21:09

I think the Mandy Rice-Davies aphorism applies

Waddo Plumber

30th Aug 2012, 21:58

I've no idea whether it is all true or not, but I think it is very badly written, edited and proof read in comparison with any other accident report I've seen.

DucatiST4

31st Aug 2012, 03:34

Its likely that whoever wrote the report probably doesn't have English as their first language.

DucatiST4

31st Aug 2012, 03:38

Thunder City ceased trading nearly two years ago now. That article relates to the interim CAA report released in 2010.

Hammer Head Too

1st Sep 2012, 05:57

I would be difficult to imagine that there is still a "Thunder City Management" in any meaningful form and whilst the way the report is presented is poor the underlying failings seem very apparent... only time will tell

Agaricus bisporus

1st Sep 2012, 07:13

Well, having read that incredible report I have to say its a damn good thing Thunder City have closed down. A ,more incompetent, irresponsible cowboy outfit is hard to imagine. In 30 years of aviation I don't recall seeing a report even five percent as damning as that one. Simply beyond belief that multiple criminal cases haven't resulted, so probably equally damning on the "regulating" authority.

As the French say, "Quel bordel!"

Rigga

1st Sep 2012, 20:51

I never learned RAf writing and decorum in letters and memo's and I have often been frustrated over the problem of many 'people' reading something of potentially massive importance and then completely disregarding the points made to make petty remarks on grammar and spelling?

Believe it or not, more than 99.999% of the world does not know what is in the RAF/MOD manual of writing stuff and has not passed a UK based GCSE A level in English - but still manage to get into jobs where report writing is needed.

Waddo Plumber

1st Sep 2012, 21:49

I'm sorry you feel that way, Rigga, but it's not the use of language, but the lack of a coherent arguement that is the problem with the report. Don't get me wrong, I think TC comes out very badly, but the report is a string of separate issues, mentioned, but not drawn together in a coherent facts, conclusions, recommendations fashion. Here's the nub, what specific issue caused the accident: ejection seat, canopy, fuel leak, double hyd failure, pilot?

Tableview

1st Sep 2012, 21:54

what specific issue caused the accident: ejection seat, canopy, fuel leak, double hyd failure, pilot?

We all know that there is rarely, if ever, one specific 'issue' (I hate the misuse of that word) that causes an accident, it's a combination of circumstances.

Ejection seat : That might have caused the tragic death of the pilot but it wouldn't have caused the accident.

flipflopman RB199

1st Sep 2012, 22:10

I find myself squarely behind Waddo Plumber.

I'm not one either for the 'grammar police' and freely admit to the odd use of the unwanted comma or extra dots in an ellipsis, however, there is no shame whatsoever in wishing for an official report to be written clearly, and in plain unambiguous English.

I too found the accident report to be a little odd in the way it didn't actually try to identify the physical root cause of the accident, merely picking up on all of the other, admittedly shocking, failures along the way. Do we actually know what failed, or was likely to have failed in order to cause this crash? It appears to have been lost along the way.

I personally think that in this instance, you're having a whine rather than making a point Rigga...

Flipflopman

Waddo Plumber

1st Sep 2012, 22:29

According to the report, the cause was hyd failure. That's my point, not the lack of literacy, but the lack of rigour. it's like saying someone died because their heart stopped. The primary cause was a fuel fire. There was an organisational failure which didn't recognise the serious fuel leak problems which are well documented elsewhere. When we had to put a diverted Lightning in my (Phantom) ASF hangar, my Lightning experienced WO rightly grabbed every available drip tray to put under it. The report does not pull these strands together.

All the ancillary points about lifex carts seats etc, are well made, but don't form part of the determination of the cause of the accident. However, they do indicate the organisation was inadequate.

flipflopman RB199

1st Sep 2012, 22:55

I suppose that in a way, that's made my point too, Waddo Plumber.

My initial intention was to say that in your average AAIB or RAF accident report, the physical root cause is always sought, as in..

"The nozzle lever was inadvertently moved to ...."

Or...

"At which time the main fuel feed to the engine fractured.."

As opposed to the meandering ramble that took place in this instance. We know that a double hyd failure caused the aircraft to crash, and we can all see how that might have taken place, but the report goes nowhere near HOW it may have taken place as regards which component was likely to have failed, and how that failure led to the other sequences involved

Al R

2nd Sep 2012, 04:59

Waddo Plumber,

In light of XV230 (especially) and of your WO's actions, why did we allow them to fly at all if we were aware of the risks and even joked about them (if its not leaking, it must be empty, etc) - different risk culture?

John Farley

2nd Sep 2012, 09:50

different risk culture?

In the 20th century when it came to military capabilities I believe there was an overiding need culture that determined whether aircraft were used. I would suggest that risk only comes into the mix when you doubt the real need.

Agaricus bisporus

2nd Sep 2012, 10:26

Agree completely with the incomplete logic of the report, leaving aside its tortured english which serves to call into question the competence of the investigation. How can you imagine an investigation was carried out properly if the report was written in an inaccurate and incoherent manner? It may not be an accurate assumption, but like posts here with greengrocers apostrophes, bad spelling and random capitalisation it gives the impression of illiteracy and therefore lack of authority or worse. And that isn't suitable in an official report.

As to the content, I too wondered when the conclusions were to appear and they never did. The repeated tales of substantial fuel leaks was never quantified and unless I missed it - I only skimmed the report - I never saw any indication of where these severe leaks were emanating from which seemed bizarre.

The ultimate "cause" may well have been "hydraulic failure" but the intense fire that caused that seemed glossed over to me, and the causes of that barely mentioned let alone investigated. Surely that was the real cause of the accident? There seemed to me to be a possible connection between the missing drag chute and its mechanical problems in the afterburner bay where it is located that were passed by too.

If I were writing a report for the "authority" that had overseen Thunder City's operation I'd have fudged the report to the point of incomprehensibility too...out of sheer self-preservation.

Tableview

2nd Sep 2012, 10:51

but like posts here with greengrocers apostrophes,ahem, or with missing apostrophes!

Back to topic, one has to bear in mind that the standard of English literacy in SA has dropped since 1994 and the report may well have been drafted by engineers and then given to others to edit and produce the final copy. Any of those people might not have been native English speakers (SA has 11 official languages although only 3 are significant in the Western Cape).

I read the report and whilst I'm not an engineer I do have some technical knowledge and this seems a classic case of multiple factors, or 'holes in the cheese lining up.'

John Farley

2nd Sep 2012, 11:59

I have another view about the report.

While I accept all the comments about the English I was extremely impressed with an organistion that went into so much technical detail during the investigation. Given that there was a great deal of RAF 'history' about fires in Lightning backends (as well as canopy issues preventing ejection), the investigators could almost have been excused if they had done a few paragraphs referring to the similarity with the past and left it at that.

Apart from the English I don't think the content can really be criticised. Mind you perhaps one does need to study the very lengthy and detailed report to hold that view.

Waddo Plumber

2nd Sep 2012, 14:04

The link at post #61 is to the full report. I have no knowledge or view on how good or bad the SA CAA's investigation ability is, and the fluency of English is probably a red herring. I'm certain you've read many more accident reports than I have, John, but I've read quite a few as an interested party, and helped write one or two. I feel fairly sure this one would not have passed muster in the RAF. As for the investigation, I was privileged to work with the AAIB on a Tornado GR3 crash at Mamby, and in my opinion, their analysis was far superior to this, which seems to be an assembly of information without any real attempt at synthesis into a coherent explanation. Perhaps the following statement near the front of the report explains this:

"In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (1997) this report was compiled in the interest of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents and not to establish legal liability."

John Farley

2nd Sep 2012, 15:01

Waddo

I do take your points.

However my view is this was not a typical accident where at first we all wondered what happened (and why) in order that we all learn from it. In other words an accident that required analysis for the benefit of aviation.

I feel this was history repeating itself and a very type related event that needed no explanation. Importantly there are no more of the type operating - so no lessons to pass on. Not all accidents are like that. That is why I would not compare it with other reports from the past that were written about some very puzzling accidents.

I guess all I am saying is nothing more profound than I don't see any need for all accident reports to meet a common standard.

Chugalug2

2nd Sep 2012, 16:12

JF:
I guess all I am saying is nothing more profound than I don't see any need for all accident reports to meet a common standard.
Your point is well made and I would agree that the standard of the report is less important than its honest search for the truth. In that regard those decrying this report, as not meeting the standards of RAF BoI's, should remember the advice given to those who live in glasshouses.
In this forum alone certain RAF fatal accident inquiries have been shown to have been at best partial in their search for causes and at worst guilty of blatantly ignoring known type deficiencies in favour of once again finding the crew responsible, even to the point of labelling them negligent with no evidence to support that finding. I know that I am about to be brought to task by being reminded that with Mull it was the RO's rather than the BoI that found thus. That's a bit like being told by Tesco customer services that they would happily refund you the money but Head Office won't allow it!
The RAF had the accident. The RAF held the Inquiry. The RAF found the pilots Grossly Negligent. The stain on its honour will persist while it still sits on the evidence of Gross Unairworthiness that its BoI would not consider 17 years ago.
Self Regulation doesn't Work and in Aviation it Kills!
(enough grocers and capitals in that lot for you Agaricus?)

M609

2nd Sep 2012, 16:53

Re:

Perhaps the following statement near the front of the report explains this:

"In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (1997) this report was compiled in the interest of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents and not to establish legal liability."

I think you will find that it is normal for investigation branches performing ICAO Annex 13 investigations all over the world.

Norway:

The Accident Investigation Board has compiled this report for the sole purpose of improving flight safety. The object of any investigation is to identify faults or discrepancies which may endanger flight safety, whether or not these are causal factors in the accident, and to make safety recommendations. It is not the Board’s task to apportion blame or liability. Use of this report for any other purpose than for flight safety should be avoided.

UK:

The sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident under these Regulations
shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents. It shall not be the purpose of such an
investigation to apportion blame or liability

Sweden (Both Civ and MIL)

SHK investigates accidents and incidents with regard to safety. The
sole objective of the investigations is the prevention of similar occurrences in the future. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability.

Waddo Plumber

2nd Sep 2012, 17:14

John, you're probably right, in that the technical investigation wouldn't assist those running a fleet of aircraft - the normal outcome, and the "legal liability" exclusion (I didn't think it was a SA only concept, M609) as I said, probably explains the presentation of a catalogue of organisational failures, rather than a discussion. Chugalug, I meant accident investigations, and specifically AAIB ones, not RAF boards of enquiry, but if I remember, the Kintyre board produced a report which was reasonable and competent, it was what happened to it afterwards that caused the furore.

Chugalug2

2nd Sep 2012, 17:30

Waddo:
..but if I remember, the Kintyre board produced a report which was reasonable and competent, it was what happened to it afterwards that caused the furore.
Well it causes me furore! The type was very recently in RAF service and had already acquired an unfavourable reputation within Squadron crewrooms.
The Aldergrove detachment commander earnestly requested that an HC1 be substituted for the ill-fated VIP pax task. He was turned down.
Boscombe Down were so perturbed by the uncommanded power ups/ downs and shut-downs caused by the FADEC's bad code that they stopped flying their aircraft and requested the RAF do the same. They didn't.
The Odiham Station Test Pilot had many similar alarming experiences with the FADECs and also UFCMs in 1,2 or all 3 axis. None of this came out in the BoI, and when Sqn Ldr Burke (The RAF Odiham TP) asked that he might present himself to the BoI as a witness he was told to keep quiet and wait to be called. He wasn't.
Competent? Whatever you say.

Waddo Plumber

2nd Sep 2012, 17:41

Chugalug, I understand your frustration. However, as I said, I wasn't talking about RAF BoIs. Can I suggest that we don't derail this thread into another Kintyre discussion.

Chugalug2

2nd Sep 2012, 20:12

On one thing we seem to be in agreement at least, Waddo. Your differentiation between Air Accident Investigations and RAF BoI's is well made and one that I fully concur with.
As to turning this thread into a Kintyre discussion, that was never my intention. It was being proposed that RAF BoIs were/are inherently superior compared to the SA one under discussion. I have attempted to propose otherwise. Indeed other threads on this forum have not been solely "Kintyre discussions" but have revealed that there is something fundamentally corrupt in the UK Military Air Accident Investigation system, even under the supposedly "independent" MAAIB. Until the MAAIB is truly independent of the MOD and the MAA, the investigation of military air accidents remains unreliable to say the least. Hence the inappropriateness of slagging off other nations' accident reports, I would contend.

Rigga

2nd Sep 2012, 21:45

Thank you for your responses - and yes, I was griping about the apostrophe police. But maybe thats because I did not not realise that the report was "inconclusive".

I had apparently missed that gem because I clearly saw the root cause of the incident: The lack of capable, qualified and competent management and staff exacerbated by the lack of adequate NAA oversight.

What you guys are now alluding to are the symptoms from that cause - why did the plane stop working.

Milo Minderbinder

2nd Sep 2012, 22:03

Surely this report has achieved what it set out to do: ensured that those involved in the company are unlikely to be allowed to work in a similar venture again.
What it hasn't done is explain the circumstances by which the regulatory authorities failed to notice the shortcomings and shut them down, Or even why the South African authorities felt they knew better than the CAA, and approved the operation. Was this due to naivety, incompetence, or some kind of financial inducement?
While the report has thoroughly explained the shortcomings of the company, the shortcomings of the authorities are not even considered

Navaleye

2nd Sep 2012, 22:08

I'm not qualified to discuss either of these reports and will not do so. I have seen several BoI's in action, mostly Navy. I'm reminded of the line from "Yes Prime Minister" which is "you naver have an an inquiry until you know what the outcome is going to be." I think there is a lot of truth in that.

jumpseater

2nd Sep 2012, 22:23

Or even why the South African authorities felt they knew better than the CAA, and approved the operation. Was this die to naivety, incompetence, or some kind of financial inducement?

Its sort of covered in 1.6.5.p12 of the report. The NDOT determined the technology was 'relatively simple technology' and they appear to be refering to aircraft systems rather than the military weapons/avionics/radar. No doubt a good argument was made by the operator that because the 'military' sytems were removed that the aircraft systems could be maintained adequately. What doesn't seem to have been appreciated, or made apparent was the difficulty of maintaining these systems.

At section 2.8 the report covers the change in the South African regulatory authorities which as it was concurrent with the registration and initial set up of TC lightning operations, could have aligned more than a few more holes in the cheese.

Waddo Plumber

2nd Sep 2012, 22:30

Just to be clear, the TC Lightning was a civil aircraft and a civil enquiry produced a civil report. Intoducing any connection to RAF BoIs is inappropriate. As for the technical enquiry, can anyone tell me from the report what was the root, not consequential, cause of the ejection sequence failing?

porch monkey

3rd Sep 2012, 04:33

My reading was a failure of the ferrule connecting the left canopy release actuator to the canopy jettison system (piping), thereby not releasing the canopy. If the canopy does not release, the seats can't fire, by design. I stand to be corrected. The reason for the ferrule failure tho, was not determined.

tucumseh

3rd Sep 2012, 05:54

but the report is a string of separate issues, mentioned, but not drawn together in a coherent facts, conclusions, recommendations fashion.

Not unlike Haddon-Cave’s, except he deliberately omitted key, verifiable facts.

Navaleye - you got it right. The Haddon-Cave report was, I believe, pre-determined. I said so (here) long before he reported and I have not change my mind. He omitted the Organisational Faults and blamed the wrong people; thus misdirecting the efforts of the MAA for ever more.

John Farley

I feel this was history repeating itself and a very type related event that needed no explanation. Importantly there are no more of the type operating - so no lessons to pass on. Not all accidents are like that. That is why I would not compare it with other reports from the past that were written about some very puzzling accidents.

I guess all I am saying is nothing more profound than I don't see any need for all accident reports to meet a common standard.

I think this may be the first time I disagree with you. MoD UK regulations require the possibility of “Organisational Fault” to be addressed (as alluded to above). That makes the fact the type is no longer in service irrelevant.

What is wrong with the UK system is that the same “organisation” that may be at “fault” is the same one allowed to judge its own case. That is an even higher level Organisational Fault.

Chug is right to cite Mull of Kintyre. There can be no greater organisational fault than the officer responsible for signing the Master Airworthiness Reference doing so, while omitting the rather important facts that (a) the new fuel computers were functionally unsafe (in fact, "positively dangerous") and (b) operational flight was not authorised because there was no clearance whatsoever to use any Nav or Comms equipment. There are calls above for legal action - why not start with MoK?

There is much justified criticism here about this Lightning case, but the great irony is that for 25 years the MoD have deserved far worse. There is no evidence presented that orders were issued in SA to completely ignore their airworthiness regulations and make false declarations that they had been adhered to. Yet that is precisely what MoD staffs were ordered to do from 1988 to 2009 (in my experience). That is a awful lot of people who have been "trained" under such a regime.

Waddo Plumber

3rd Sep 2012, 07:08

Porch Monkey, that's as far as I got too. Tecumseh, whilst it might be "right" to mention the Mull because both have roots in serious mismanagement, I think it would be a shame to divert a perfectly good discussion about a civil SA accident into yet another thread about MoD/RAF shortcomings since 1988. Nothing about the latter affected the former.

John Farley

3rd Sep 2012, 09:44

tucumseh

I think this may be the first time I disagree with you. MoD UK regulations require the possibility of “Organisational Fault” to be addressed

I did not mention MOD and I don't see how they can be connected to a discussion about this accident or its report. If my post gave such an impression I am sorry.

tucumseh

3rd Sep 2012, 11:29

Waddo

I stayed out of this one until MoD was mentioned. I posted in reply to other comments about MoD's rather tainted past. I won't bother reading the thread again, but did you challenge everyone else?

John

No apologies necessary. I was making a point that is too often overlooked - the obligation on BoI's to address Organisational Fault. Someone praised the MoK BoI but, as published, it is an appalling abrogation of this responsibility. This Organisational Fault served to hide the systemic failings (deliberately so, given how often it has happened and been pointed out). MoD like to compartmentalise such reports and simply do not address the fact that many airworthiness components are centralised functions; so if there is a problem on one aircraft, there will be a pan-MoD problem. It is a general point applicable world-wide, especially as very many countries follow our regulatory lead.

Regards

PPRuNe Pop

3rd Sep 2012, 11:35

I am not supposed to have an opinion - or to participate. However, on this occasion, having read this dreadful report I feel justified in making the following point - it is relevant.

I was told, many years ago when one of my aircraft (C404) crashed, the CAA were quick to tell me after the incident that this was yet another example of 'accidents never just happen, they are caused.'

I think this is probably a classic example and a very bad and sad one.

PPP

Waddo Plumber

3rd Sep 2012, 12:36

Sorry, Tecumseh, you've lost me there. I ddn't think I was challenging anyone- you or Chugalug, just pointing out that I didn't think a divergence into an MoD debate added anything to a story about a South African civil matter. I recognise others may feel differently.

What is true is that I've come round to John Farley's point. They investigated the engineering cause of the crash reasonably well, but only catalogued the organisational issues, because their ToRs required them not to get involved in legal liability - which precluded a discussion on management.

walbut

3rd Sep 2012, 12:56

I do not know the date on which the final accident report was published, nor do I know if any subsequent limitations or corrective actions were placed on Thunder City or the remnants of their operation. However it is not long since they flew one of their Buccaneers for the first time since the Lightning accident. I do not know any great detail of the Lightning systems but I am quite familiar with the Buccaneer's and I would have thought it would be considered of comparable complexity and risk. While it did not have the Lightning's propensity to catch fire, I would not have expected the operators to be allowed to continue their flight operations with such an aircraft, even if they are not in a passenger carrying role. Does anyone know if the South African authorities are still allowing this particular 'warbird' operation to continue in some shape or form despite the findings of the Lightning investigation?

Chugalug2

3rd Sep 2012, 13:13

Waddo:
I feel fairly sure this one would not have passed muster in the RAF. As for the investigation, I was privileged to work with the AAIB on a Tornado GR3 crash at Mamby, and in my opinion, their analysis was far superior to this, which seems to be an assembly of information without any real attempt at synthesis into a coherent explanation.
Waddo, you were one of the first to draw comparisons with RAF BoI reports, before tuc or I had even posted. It was very much with the supposed superiority of their reports versus this one that prompted me to post to the contrary. Now you say that this is a civilian accident thread alone (posted on a Military forum!). Pots and kettles?
Oh, in case it would appear that I am by implication criticising the AAIB, I included your reference to them merely to point out that when they are allowed by a BoI to investigate a military accident fully, they do indeed do as you state. The problem is that often they are not so allowed, then of course they cannot do so. I have one particular military fatal accident in mind, but better not mention it, given your sensitivity to it above.

tucumseh

3rd Sep 2012, 13:44

Waddo, sorry my turn to be lost.

You said the MoK BoI was reasonable and competent. The published report was grossly incompetent (how on earth do you miss the fact the aircraft was not airworthy, a fact even admitted by Wratten a few weeks after the crash?), but the detail I don't know is whether or not the 3-man BoI criticised the "organisation" in an early draft. We know the ROs sent it back to them a number of times. Given what we know, my opinion is the "organisation" protected itself (that is, Wratten and Day protected Graydon, Bagnall and Alcock) by not allowing criticism of itself, so blamed the crew. By no means the only time.

I'm afraid I cannot agree with the concept of failing to address Organisational Fault just because there is no other aircraft of that type in the fleet. If you study the systemic failures on nearly every accident discussed here (e.g. Chinook, Hercules, Nimrod, Sea King, Tornado) the majority of contributory causes could have been avoided by application of core, centralised functions in the organisation. In each case, all failures were notified well in advance - the failure to correct them is an Organisational Fault if ever there was. This principle applies regardless of the operator's country of origin.

I notice the operator has called the Lightning report a pack of lies. If true, another time honoured tradition that characterises the five UK examples above! There is a lot of harsh criticism here of what happened in this case; on the face of it, entirely justified. What was perpetrated by MoD was infinitely worse and I find it puzzling (but entirely consistent) that so few make the same observations about events closer to home.

Waddo Plumber

3rd Sep 2012, 17:28

Tecumseh, I didn't introduce the topic of the Mull of Kintyre, Chugalug did that, but to help this thread get back on track, I'll take back any comment I made about that BoI's competence or otherwise, which obviously derailed the discussion about TC, while not adding anything. I'm not going to edit my post, otherwise it makes subsequent posts look odd.

So, back to TC. While I agree with your second point about the failure to address organisational fault, because that reads across to all TCs aircraft types, the SA CAA ToRs said ""In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (1997) this report was compiled in the interest of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents and not to establish legal liability." and, as M609 pointed out yesterday, this is normal for investigation branches performing ICAO Annex 13 investigations all over the world.

Easy Street

3rd Sep 2012, 23:42

In this specific Lightning report, clear failings are identified in the regulation and inspection of the TC operation by the South African aviation authorities. To that end, the report should be making recommendations along the lines of "the certification requirements for ex-military aircraft should be reviewed", etc etc, which would be helping to prevent future accidents.

The fact that the Lightnings are no longer flying is irrelevant to this aspect of the inquiry, and to that end I disagree with JF as well.

tucumseh

4th Sep 2012, 07:28

Waddo

Thanks.

There is no conflict between "not to establish legal liability" and a BoI noting "organisational fault". I infer from your post that you believe a BoI would be pronouncing on legal liability if it mentioned such a fault. I don't think that is the case, although I also believe there are many examples when BoIs, and especially ROs, have been extremely careless with their words and not considered the consequences. Arrogance of power causes this; the belief they will never be called to account for their accusations. MoK is a classic example - which is why it is brought up so frequently. It is not to generate "yet another MoK thread", it is because it reveals all that is wrong with the "organisation" - far more so than the Nimrod case.

However, clearly, legal action COULD arise from such a fault, particularly if problems arose from, for example, the issuing of illegal orders (Chinook, Nimrod, Sea King etc). But an organsiational fault can also be something as "simple" as a breakdown in communications.

My point is that in every case discussed here, organsiational fault is demonstrably at the root, yet is never mentioned. One must ask why.

Waddo Plumber

4th Sep 2012, 17:47

I think you may be assuming military BoI procedures would read across into the civil field. From what I've gleaned from posts here, the TC investigation was working under rules which prevented them from buiding a case against the legal entitly, so could only catalogue facts about the organisation. Either that, or the investigation didn't go as far as it should under the SA CAA rules. As it stands, the organisation part is a dog's breakfast, and TC are saying they've been the subjects of emotive arm waving, with no solid accusation they could refute.

As I said in my first post, I wasn't impressed by the report.

Lightning Mate

5th Sep 2012, 15:14

If the canopy does not release, the seats can't fire

That is correct, although it did not occur in RAF service.

Maintenance?????

Tableview

5th Sep 2012, 15:18

According to my understanding of the report, the gas canisters that fire the ejection seat had not been inspected or replaced for 8 years, so even if the canopy had released, the seat would not have ejected.

walbut

5th Sep 2012, 16:55

Tableview,
Your understanding is not quite correct. Seat cartridges are qualification tested to ensure they meet the specified Installed and Total lives (Total life being the Shelf life plus Installed life). Provided the cartridges are used within these time limits there is a very high probability that they will operate correctly (but nothing is absolutely certain). If these lives are exceeded there is an increasing risk that the cartridges will not operate correctly and fail to give the required gas pressure to operate the seat mechanism concerned. In the worst case they may not ignite at all.

The cleared lives are usually conservative to account for all the possible variations in environmental conditions, explosive mix and other tolerances. For the escape system to operate correctly a number of cartridges have to operate in sequence and the older they are, the greater the risk that one will fail and interrupt the sequence. However they don't stop working completely as soon as the cleared life has expired.

Another interesting point in the report is that the cartridges were not supplied by Martin Baker so were the units fitted properly qualification tested by an approved supplier, or was this another example of irresponsible corner cutting by the operator.

Al R

5th Sep 2012, 18:25

Another interesting point in the report is that the cartridges were not supplied by Martin Baker so were the units fitted properly qualification tested by an approved supplier, or was this another example of irresponsible corner cutting by the operator.

Christ. If I had a Ferarri, I'd go to Halfords for oh, an air freshener for it. Everything else required.. OEM all the way.

BOAC

5th Sep 2012, 20:24

That is correct, although it did not occur in RAF service. - was there not a fatality where a jammed canopy forced a crash landing and the a/c dropped into a ditch which loosened the canopy and.....................?

Scruffy Fanny

5th Sep 2012, 21:21

XR721 -1965/6 January
Sadly as you say BOAC with Fatal result - Canopy Interlock not connected
SF

Audax

6th Sep 2012, 07:20

As said above, XR 721 crashed on 5 Jan 1966 with sadly fatal results, I quote from the IAM report:-

'The cockpit canopy jettison system had fired when the pilot initiated ejection but one lock or shoot bolt had failed so that the canopy could not lift from the front and it had remained held by that shoot bolt. The ground impact was sufficient to shake the canopy off and thus remove the interdictor.'

The report then says that the pilot would have had to pull the handle again to set the seat off or possibly the seat was forced up by the presumably very rough landing to start the sequence again. Whatever, a very sad ending after the almost impossibilty of deadsticking a Lightning.

Lightning Mate

6th Sep 2012, 07:33

was there not a fatality where a jammed canopy forced a crash landing and the
a/c dropped into a ditch which loosened the canopy and.....................?

Ah so BOAC - you obviously have more memory cells than my six!

Tableview

6th Sep 2012, 07:33

walbut: Thank you for that clarification. However, it is perhaps (and I only say perhaps!) a reasonable assumption that those cartridges would not have worked if they were so far beyond their 'best before date'.

Halton Brat

6th Sep 2012, 07:43

I seem to recall that the seat cartridges were obtained from a non-MB source, even 'locally manufactured'?

I would not knowingly risk my life in such a seat - would these cartridges have even worked properly when brand new?

HB

Waddo Plumber

6th Sep 2012, 08:28

Local Manufacture yes, but by an internationally recognised company. Pretoria Metal Pressing division of Denel, have been making military cartridges and ammunition since 1938. The carts were made to MB and (where appropriate) MiLSpec.

The cartridges which ejected the canopy fired. However, the pipework failed.

Halton Brat

6th Sep 2012, 08:43

Thanks WP - any slur retracted.

HB

bvcu

6th Sep 2012, 21:04

Interesting report , dont think it just applies to an ex-military a/c . What was documented meant it wasnt airworthy whatever type it was. And thats just the documentary evidence , could have been the best maintained jet in the world but the paperwork shows the mindset which is scary whatever the type. Recall doing the blow-off checks using compressed air/nitrogen on the canopy release on the lightning and the hunter. Being guided by guys with years of experience on both types . But did any of these guys have relevant experience , those of us that have worked these types know that the manuals are just a basic description , without the amount of info provided on more modern types. These older types are a minefield to operate without the relevant experience , which is hard to locate these days.