Nuclear Deterrent

[Herc-u-lease]

there is a little banner at the top of my screen that said i hadn't contributed recently. It encouraged me to ask a question so blame the banner for this:

bored the other day i was thinking about the monumental cost of trident replacement and the probability it may not happen. I understand the basics of the historic transition of the strategic nuclear deterrent from the air force to sub surface forces and the way in which they can be deployed.

as a potential cost saving measure could defence realistically look at our nuclear deterrent being retained by the RAF rather than by subs? we have already considered the prospect of having no nuclear deterrent in a different thread so would this be a happy medium? there are obvious technical challenges to this and i am not naive to the huge implications of operating a nuclear capable aircraft.

not intending to break any opsec here, just general chit chat

H-u-L

[MightyGem]

Well, to my, fairly simple, mind, given the word GO, the Navy could have a nuke on target in a time measured in minutes, whereas how long would it take the RAF to get to the target.

No slight intended to the RAF.

[4Greens]

As the nuclear sub is maintaining a silent almost stationary routine it is virtually impossible to detect. It is therefore much more effective than any land based solution.

[Pontius Navigator]

Detect by whom? Deter whom? Retaliate how quickly?

If we are to deter 1st rank countries that have capable defensive forces then an SSBN would appear the better option as it can avoid detection and it has penetration ability and penetration aids. At the moment the ICBM has the best chance of reaching any target.

If a SLCM was selected instead of an ICBM then a case could be made for ALCM instead as SLCM has limited range and therefore limited reach in a given time scale although an air-breather is vulnerable to an air defence system.

Against a 3rd rank country you could use an IRBM from a tramp steamer.

[sitigeltfel]

When the Navys deterrent weapon is 50 miles from is target, can it be recalled if a breakthrough is reached?

[tonker]

Well lets buy some of those then.

I don't fancy living on this tiny island if we end up exchanging nukes with the Russians etc anyway, so why even consider something irrelevent like the cost.

Silo a few of the things in Diego Garcia, and lets spend more time trying to be nice and friendly as opposed to some Victorian expeditionary superpower.

[dat581]

When the Navys deterrent weapon is 50 miles from is target, can it be recalled if a breakthrough is reached?

You would seem to miss the point of deterance. If the missles are launched then the subs mission is a failure. The point is Russia, China or any other country with Nuclear weapons will not launch at the UK because the UK will then fire back and remove said country from the face of the earth hence they won't dare!:ugh:

Also once the V-Force passed the Go-No Go line after recieving the go code they would not turn back no matter what radio messages were recieved. So you can't re call a bomber either.

[Triple Matched TQ]

And if we launched an airforce plane, we would have to hope there were no clouds in the sky the day we needed to attack!

:E

(hat on incoming)

[VIProds]

TMTQ

I seem to recall, that we had the all seeing Radar eye of NBS for that.

[Gainesy]

Not so sure we (RAF) had a Go/No Go Line did we? Or was it the upwind runway threshold?
(Hmm, why would you be sorting the wheat from the chaff on the active?)

[Pontius Navigator]

Gainsy, in a jokey way you are right. In reality it was 8 deg east for UK based aircraft.

[dat581]

"Vulcan Units of the Cold War" pp16

[dazdaz]

I fail to understand the need for an updated ICBM missile system that supersedes 'Polaris' Why? Even with our current nuke (submarine) system of defence, Mr. Brown :uhoh: can't enter the codes and launch without the ok of the US President.:ugh:

Lets get our (home grown nukes) back to the RAF. No ties with the US. If the UK wants to go alone, all the better.

[847NAS]

I always thought the advantage of a sub-surface system was the alility to be anywhere off of the UK almost completely undetectable, preventing the enemy from taking our system out so they can use their system? The subs have had a continuous 50 year patrol and at anytime there is at least one of the four (three yet?) patrolling UK waters.

Surely this type of continued detterance and secrecy is less achievable by air means?

[pr00ne]

dazdaz,

Wrong on SO many counts!

Apart from the fact that it has been Trident for many a year, it can be fired without any non UK involvement, certainly without the involvement of the latest winner of the Nobel Peace Prize.

[Manuel de Vol]

If the RAF did have nukes, what would it use to drop them?

I suppose you could strap one on a Tornado at Marham and go and 'brighten up somebody's day' in Norwich.

When the Americans developed their nuclear deterrent it was argued that - for an effective deterrent - they needed ICBMs in land-based silos, submarine-based missiles and air-launched missiles/bombs. That suited the cold war threat.

The RAF lost its nukes as a result of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties. If the RAF didn't need nukes in 1995 and if the Cold War is over, why does the UK need a fleet of submarine-launched nukes? What is the current nuclear threat? Which country is likely to launch a nuclear strike against the UK?

Given that the present government (and the next government) will probably make drastic defence cuts, does that nuclear threat take priority over national air defence or equipping other forces adequately? (and I'm thinking particularly of those soldiers currently deployed.)

The UK does not have the force levels (or the equipment) to use nuclear weapons as a part of an independent 'flexible response'. In the event that the UK was to declare war on another country, it has neither the forces nor equipment to fill the gap between the initial stages of the conflict - send in the Army - and all-out nuclear war.

Submarine-launched missiles make sense as a part of the UK's contribution to NATO, but if the UK can't afford to spend the necessary money on the other sectors of defence and if the UK must make drastic cuts, then surely eliminating the Trident fleet would provide savings to offset against the next government's cuts without emasculating the remainder of the UK armed forces?

If the UK did scrap Trident-armed submarines, then no doubt there would be an outcry from other NATO members. The US contributes handsomely, but the other NATO members might then find that they had to dig deeper into their own pockets to provide funds to make up the difference.

If the UK wishes to maintain a 'tripwire' nuclear deterrent, wouldn't it be far cheaper to establish one or two geographically-separated silos loaded with ICBMs on land?

[TEEEJ]

The UK had nothing to do with any of the nuclear arms reduction treaties. START, SALT etc are signed between the US and Russia.

House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 13 Dec 1995 (pt 19) (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199596/cmhansrd/vo951213/text/51213w19.htm)

'WE177 Free-fall Bomb

Mr. Foulkes: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what consideration led to the decision to withdraw the WE.177 in 1998; what was the original date for withdrawal; and on what date that decision was taken. [5165]

Mr. Arbuthnot: The decision to withdraw WE177 from service by the end of 1998, announced on 4 April 1995, Official Report, column 1097, was reached in the light of the good progress being made in providing Trident with a sub-strategic capability. This capability will be fully robust when Vigilant enters service in 1998 and there is no requirement for us to maintain two systems in the sub-strategic role after that point. We had previously assessed that WE177 had the potential to remain in service until the early years of the next century.'

See SALT and other links to START/SORT

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Arms_Limitation_Talks)

TJ

[ZH875]

The UK does not need a Nuclear weapon.


I suggest we take all that we have left, point them somewhere hot and sandy, and let them go.

no nukes, no problem.:ok:

[TEEEJ]

Manuel de Vol wrote

If the RAF did have nukes, what would it use to drop them?

Correct on the Tornado. The Tornado was the last assigned delivery platform for the WE177.

nuclear-weapons.info (http://www.nuclear-weapons.info/vw.htm#WE.177)

nuclear-weapons.info (http://nuclear-weapons.info/)

The Tornado was also assigned a nuclear role (US controlled free-fall bombs) by Germany and Italy. Belgium, Netherlands, Turkey and Greece utilised the F-16.

TJ

[Manuel de Vol]

TEEJ said:
"The UK had nothing to do with any of the nuclear arms reduction treaties. START, SALT etc are signed between the US and Russia."

Indeed, but the WE-177 armed aircraft were assigned to NATO in the event of war. The Russians and the Americans may have negotiated and signed the treaties and I can't comment on whether or not the Russians included the other WP countries in their discussions, but I would be very surprised if SACEUR and his political masters failed to consider the UK's WE-177s or to discuss their removal from service with the British government.

[glad rag]

Was there not some kind of British/French deterrent interface last year?
GR

[Pontius Navigator]

I always thought the advantage of a sub-surface system was the alility to be anywhere off of the UK almost completely undetectable, preventing the enemy from taking our system out so they can use their system? The subs have had a continuous 50 year patrol and at anytime there is at least one of the four (three yet?) patrolling UK waters.

Surely this type of continued detterance and secrecy is less achievable by air means?

Maths Sir. a continuous 40 year patrol

[vernon99]

You only have to look at the difficulties we faced bombing the Falkland Islands, of course if Maggie had been so inclined just how many minutes would it have taken mr polaris to reach downtown Cordoba. 15-20? I am assuming that the range was sufficient, or the launch sub had moved a little closer to the equator.

[TEEEJ]

Manuel,
The UKs free fall nuclear bombs wouldn't have come into it and certainly not under START/SORT. It was a unilateral decision by the UK Government to retire WE177 early and have that sub-strategic mission incorporated into Trident.

Those WE177s assigned to NATO would have been tactical munitions and not covered by the likes of START. The UK had no heavy strategic bombers to carry the higher yield WE177Bs. The US and the Russians didn't have treaties over tactical nuclear weapons but instead had Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. Those initiatives and pledges were already in hand to reduce the number of tactical nukes. It resulted in some 3,000 US tactical nuclear weapons not covered by START being destroyed.

TJ

[hval]

Major problem the UK has: -

1/ All relevant vessels depart RNAD Coulport
2/ It is possible to see when vessels are docked and receiving/ unloading armaments.
3/ Is possible to see when vessels depart/ arrive
4/ All vessels depart single point
5/ All vessels leave Clyde
6/ UK Trident not as undetectable as believed. But then nor is any sub surface vessel of these size
7/ Ever seen surface effects from these things? They are detectable from space. Forget about degaussing. That's irrelevant. Oh yes. The system (degaussing) don't work.
8/ Acoustics. Ever tried avoiding the noise from seismic sources? They totally give you away. Am glad North Sea is getting quieter. Except that the seismic sources also provided primary defence as well for us.
9/ sub surface fixed acoustic arrays. They can and are captured.
10/ The rims where weapons are stored are about as secure as a barn. That is no secret
11/ How often have Faslane and Coulport been interdicted? Lots.
12/ Want a quiet sub? Don't ask the Brits. We lost our lead a few decades ago. Astute class don't have it.
13/ We have very few vessels. It makes it even easier to trace us.
14/ We are allowed to use deterrents in a number of circumstances without US permission
15/ Any deterrents launched from a sub surface vessel leave the least response time compared to any other possible deterrent. The UK have no system better - as yet.

I could go on, but I bet you are bored by now.

Hval

[ozleckie]

Surely one of the major reasons for the RAF losing the Nuclear Deterrent Role was the due to the fact that, whether at high or low level, it was almost certain that the bomber would be shot from the sky the minute it crossed the Iron Curtain. Wouldn't that still hold true.?

[Double Zero]

Since the Tories ( who are sadly likely to get the next go, and I'm not a Labour fan either ) have already stated they will make 25% defence cuts; that is a HUGE cut !

In a perfect world - sort of - I'd agree with the Trident replacement, but if we do that aren't we certain to lose the carriers and / or JSF ?

My main worry is China, the nutter middle east states wouldn't care about being wiped out, so little deterrent effect.

My suggestion would be to bin the Trident, have more Astutes with nuclear Tomahawks ( yes they can be shot down but who's going to gamble on getting all of them ? ), build a sensible no. of Type 45's ( I believe the PAAMS missile can be used for point anti-missile work with a bit of tweaking, as the Aegis & Arleigh Burke American jobs can ), and build 3 more CVS style carriers flying Harrier 2+ with AMRAAM.

If cutting 25% - or more, we cannot afford Trident, the big carriers or JSF unless every useful bit of kit, ie the stuff that might actually get used, is forgotten.

[Pontius Navigator]

Surely one of the major reasons for the RAF losing the Nuclear Deterrent Role was the due to the fact that, whether at high or low level, it was almost certain that the bomber would be shot from the sky the minute it crossed the Iron Curtain. Wouldn't that still hold true.?

I don't think that they would have all been shot down - many yes, all, no. The key weaknesses was the time to generate the force and the time to launch them before the incoming strike.

The airborne deterrent is a classic use it or lose it play.

[Modern Elmo]

Surely one of the major reasons for the RAF losing the Nuclear Deterrent Role was the due to the fact that, whether at high or low level, it was almost certain that the bomber would be shot from the sky the minute it crossed the Iron Curtain.

Mathias Rust.

[Manuel de Vol]

Double Zero said: "My main worry is China, the nutter middle east states wouldn't care about being wiped out, so little deterrent effect."

China is certainly an impressive military power, but somehow, I can't see them nuking anybody. - They appear to be a bit too smart for that; they've cottoned on to the fact that you can win more easily through trade.

When European nations wanted wealth from Africa, they colonised various countries, farmed them, mined them, did help the locals to improve their standard of living, but extracted a considerable amount of wealth. Then they were booted out.

Nowadays, China is probably the biggest (in wealth) foreign power in Africa. They don't build hundreds of schools and hospitals, they don't import thousands of Chinese as permanent residents to colonise the countries - they have a much simpler, cheaper and more efficient method. Make impressively large payments to the local ruler, provide him with any 'assistance' he may need to stay in power, rent some farmland from him at favourable prices, import Chinese labour to do the work - then send them back home later (they've got a lot of people to feed back home) and all they ask for in return is cheap access to minerals.

China needs sources of energy and the raw materials -- including copper, cobalt, cadmium, magnesium, platinum, nickel, lead, zinc, coltan, titanium -- that African nations can supply. China competes with the United States for Angola's oil, controls most of the Sudan's oil, and is exploring for oil onshore and offshore in five other African countries. It is a major purchaser of timber from West Africa.

Where do you think Mugabe got those beautiful blue tiles which roof his palace outside Harare?

Supporting a government - particularly a government which may be under threat from its own people - is much cheaper than colonisation.

Another example: I've heard it said that the real reason for the war in Iraq was oil. (I'm not getting into that argument.) The 'coalition of the willing' spent huge amounts of money, materiel and manpower fighting a war in Iraq.

The Iraqi government finalised its first major post-war oil treaty this summer.

With China.

The Chinese are fighting (and winning) their 'wars' by trade. They import materials from Africa and other places in the 3rd world (cheaply) and they sell their products to the Western world.

Who would they want to nuke? - Their suppliers or their customers?

[Modern Elmo]

The mixed load option:

[I][/INo Non-Nukes on Ballistic Missile Submarines

Posted by David A. Fulghum at 3/6/2008 10:36 AM CST

Congress won't yield in its determination that U.S. submarines won’t carry a mix of nuclear and conventionally-armed ballistic missiles at the same time. They don’t want a nuclear war triggered by the launch of a conventionally-armed missile from a submarine.

So for the time being, at least, the whole discussion with Congress about a conventional Trident [missile] modification is dead. Nonetheless, four SSGNs have been converted to non-nuclear missions, and the concept of using a sea-based system is not ruled out, says Gen. Kevin Chilton, chief of U.S. Strategic Command. “It’s just that the proposal that there will be a mixed load out, is something that Congress is not comfortable with.”

The initial proposal had 14 Ohio-class SSBNs each loaded with 2 conventional D-5 missiles (with each carrying four kinetic warheads) and 22 nuclear missiles. From as much as 4,000 mi. away, the conventional missile could hit early warning radars, terrorist camps and enemy leaders. For military planers it would cover the initial one-hour gap in responding to a threat anywhere on the globe. However, the ambiguity produced by an unexpected launch, particularly in an edgy foe, is obvious.

“Congress has made it clear that the [conventional, submarine-based missile] is a capability they would not like to see deployed” as part of the long-range, rapid strike program, Chilton says. “But we were unsuccessful in getting [lawmakers] comfortable with the Trident approach. [They rejected the idea of] using the CTM proposal of a mixed [nuclear, conventional] loadout [on a submarine],” he says.

However, StratCom hasn’t stopped pursuing the capability. “We’re learning more as we continue to develop the technologies we need for prompt global strike that could be land-based,” he says.

Ares Homepage (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post:d39f0aca-ce31-4dc4-b0cb-bfcfbb59476d)

...

... A new deterrent posture could include conventional ballistic missiles (CBMs), a new factor in deterrence, but so far more dangerous to careers than to adversaries. Asked about CBMs at the Space and Missile Defense Conference in Huntsville, Ala., in August, Marine Corps Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responded: "You want to see the scar tissue?"

The case for CBMs is strong. "The only systems that we have that can get to the fight in minutes have been nuclear warheads," Cartwright says. "Is that prudent? It is relevant, in that the enemy believes we will use it." Air Force Gen. (ret.) Eugene Habiger, involved in the CBM effort, notes, however, "a 1,000-lb. conventional warhead with a few meters CEP (circular error probable) has the same effect as 50 kilotons at 3,000 ft."

CBM, Habiger told the Omaha conference, "was a great idea. The Navy calculated that they could provide 100 CBMs for $500 million. But Stratcom didn't get the regional [commanders-in-chief] involved to persuade the secretaries of State and Defense that we needed it, and that was a great way to kill it."

However, as Cartwright noted, the initial CBM--Conventional Trident--is being brought to a point where it could be fielded within 18 months (as Congress directed). Also, tests being conducted in "four to five months" will demonstrate technologies to deal with "ambiguity issues"--the problem of demonstrating that a missile launch is not nuclear. "That's seen as more of a way forward." ...

U.S. Rethinks Nuclear Strategy | AVIATION WEEK (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/NUKE090309.xml)

[Modern Elmo]

U.S. Rethinks Nuclear Strategy


Sep 3, 2009

Bill Sweetman/Omaha, Neb.



... The Obama administration entered office with a commitment to reduce the "numbers, roles and emphasis" associated with nuclear weapons and start the world on a "path to zero." Arms negotiations with Russia have restarted and there is renewed emphasis on non-proliferation measures such as test bans and controls on fissile material.

But at the same time, some planners, theorists in deterrence and military leaders are concerned that there is a new nuclear calculus that U.S. leadership's actions may not reflect. As John Hamre, former deputy Defense secretary and now president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, puts it, "We [in the U.S.] don't think nuclear weapons are useful. We think they are dangerous. But most countries think they are useful."

Indeed they are. Vice Adm. Robert Harward, deputy commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, reported on a five-day Joint Operating Environment war game held last November. It reflected some probabilities: That rising nuclear powers might be willing to use tactical nuclear weapons, and that both state and non-state actors "would not view nuclear weapons as a first resort, but might not see them as a last resort." The result: "The presence of nuclear weapons brought on operational paralysis."

Adds Frank Miller, a former arms policy official under the George W. Bush administration: "Iran and North Korea are not using nuclear weapons to deter U.S. nuclear weapons; they are using them to deter our conventional forces."

...

It is not only rogue states and new nuclear powers that are developing weapons. Russia and China, with all three "new nuke" states on its borders, have programs for delivery vehicles and new warheads. Later this year, France will become the first nation to publicly field a nuclear warhead--the TNA (airborne nuclear warhead) for the ASMP--A air-launched missile--that has been designed and developed without nuclear testing. The TNO oceanic warhead for the submarine-launched M51 follows next year.

...

U.S. Rethinks Nuclear Strategy | AVIATION WEEK (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/NUKE090309.xml)

[CirrusF]

If the RAF did have nukes, what would it use to drop them?

The Armée de l'Aire have an airborne nuclear deterrent on their Mirage 2000N fleet. Friends who have been on the fleet tell me that they regarded it as a suicide mission during the cold war.

[CirrusF]

Was there not some kind of British/French deterrent interface last year?
GR



A combined Anglo-French deterrent would be a logical step. We are only twenty six miles apart so it is inconceivable that one partner could strike without involving the other. A combined deterrent would help safeguard two European seats on the UN Permanent Security Council.

[M609]

Friends who have been on the fleet tell me that they regarded it as a suicide mission during the cold war.

Was that not the case for many nuclear roled strike a/c during the cold war? :confused:

[sitigeltfel]

The key weaknesses was the time to generate the force and the time to launch them before the incoming strike.

Active Edge, the Generation game before Brucie thought of it!

[Gainesy]

Was there not some kind of British/French deterrent interface last year?
GR

He's refering to the clonk between the two subs.:)

[Pontius Navigator]

Active Edge, the Generation game before Brucie thought of it!
Or Mick for the real big bang, but my point was that the force, apart from QRA, could have been eliminated long before weapons loading had begun.

Even if we had managed main force generation it could have been wiped out following an IRBM attack. At least the SSBN will only be vulnerable to a counter-strike after its missile launch.

[Pontius Navigator]

Was that not the case for many nuclear roled strike a/c during the cold war? :confused:

Many, maybe, but it was not part of the V-force planning philosophy. In 1972, in Cyprus, crews were distinctly worried when a new procedure was brought in that was planned on a one-way mission.

The Armée de l'Aire have an airborne nuclear deterrent on their Mirage 2000N fleet. Friends who have been on the fleet tell me that they regarded it as a suicide mission during the cold war.

This was well known of the Mirage IV force in the 60s. It was probably entirely realistic and certainly the only way that their force d'frappe could reach Moscow. I would suggest it was a necessary political card that they had to deal as they could not have reached Moscow and return and this would be know to the Russians. To make it clear that it was a on-way mission was essential if they were to have a credible counter-value deterrent.

[soddim]

Surely as we extend further into the demise of this once great nation we have to stop acting as a world power and cut our coat according to the cloth.

If we act on the world stage as befits our global ranking we will stop creating nuclear armed enemies and become more akin to Switzerland than the USA.

As we reach that status we can scrap our expensive arms and live within our means.

[Wader2]

The verbosity of the post by Modern Elmo either misses the point or is so obtuse that I missed it.

When we got Polaris from the USA it was said that it had to have a white ensign on it but a target country would not be able to distinguish between a 'friendly' US missile or a UK missile. In other words we were firmly wedded to the US trinity.

A similar concern must attach to a conventional BM. Does it have a conventional or nuclear warhead? If it originates from a nuclear power, can you afford to sit back an wait to see whether it is nuclear or conventional?

If it be assumed that detrrence will not work the only other option is to eliminate the nuclear option before it is developed. To use a CBM once the target country has its own nuclear capability is to risk armagedon.

[ArthurBorges]

I always thought the advantage of a sub-surface system was...

One serious advantage is that subsurface systems have complacent neighbours: fish don't lobby MPs and Congressmen to dig the silo someplace else.

Land-based missiles make local populations nervous, particularly when East/West tension rises and they start wondering how good their suntan lotion when the payback payload drops in.

Come election time, they vote for the wimpier candidate too.

And in between, military installations make natural lightning rods for demonstrations you can't always keep off the front pages.

[ArthurBorges]

Was there not some kind of British/French deterrent interface last year?I understand that France and the UK jointly developed the Chevaline warhead.

[ArthurBorges]

China is certainly an impressive military power, but somehow, I can't see them nuking anybody. - They appear to be a bit too smart for that; they've cottoned on to the fact that you can win more easily through trade.China cottoned on a long time ago. Read the books "1421" and "1434" by Gavin Menzies, incidentally ex-captain of a RN Polaris submarine, where he describes the naval expeditions of Adm. Zheng He and lays out the evidence that (1) China made the world's first world map in the early 15th century and (2) its technology transfers in that timeframe triggered the Renaissance. Obviously, this is so mind-blowing that it meets fierce criticism.

On the Chinese ICBM fleet, see Federation of American Scientists (http://www.fas.org). It has a total of about 200 warheads, mostly tactical. Same as France, India, Israel, Pakistan and the UK -- Russia and the USA are the only loonies to have thousands.

[Manuel de Vol]

... (1) China made the world's first world map in the early 15th century ...

Pity they didn't make it a few years earlier and sell a copy to that klutz Columbus.

... But had they done so, the Americans wouldn't be celebrating 'Get Lost' day today.

There might not've been a strong market for maps in the 15th Century, but the Chinese have certainly found a market for clothes, shoes, furniture, electronics, etc. It's getting difficult to find things that are not 'made in China'.

[Carnage Matey!]

Perhaps see 1421exposed (www.1421exposed.com) to see what credible historians think of Gavin Menzies fantastic history of the world.

[glad rag]

Quote:
Was there not some kind of British/French deterrent interface last year?
I understand that France and the UK jointly developed the Chevaline warhead.

Hmmmm thinking something more intimate than that....:p

[bjornhall]

If it originates from a nuclear power, can you afford to sit back an wait to see whether it is nuclear or conventional?

That is one argument I have never understood. A single missile, even with a few warheads, won't take out anyone's ability to strike back. Yes, you can certainly afford to wait! Why would anyone adopt a launch on warning strategy against a single inbound missile? :confused:

[PTT]

Several million voters in the cities the warheads are likely to be aiming at may well argue the point ;)

I know it's make no difference, but people tend not to think too logically when warheadds start raining...

[bjornhall]

Several million voters in the cities the warheads are likely to be aiming at may well argue the point

They won't be voters in the next election anyway... ;)


Yeah, I know, really bad taste...

[cornish-stormrider]

going back to the "Trident is crap and the Bomber is as niosy as a Megadeth concert" poster. I have a question. If they are so bloody loud how did they not hear each other prior to impact and take evasive action?

I do not think that trident will be so easy to destroy as is made out.

In fact, I will put my salary on it. (it's a win win, coz if I am wrong we are all going to get a real good tan)

I think we need a more moderately priced solution, multiple strike weapons on a mix of air, surface and sub launched platforms.

[MAINJAFAD]

Hmmmm thinking something more intimate than that....http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/tongue.gif Indeed your correct, The British SSBN in it's patrol area couldn't hear the French SSBN in its patrol area, the French SSBN couldn't hear the British one, and the first they knew of thier patrol areas overlapped, was when they collided (thankfully at a very low speed). Rumour has it that a national red top was offering lots of money for good photos of the damage to the British boat. BBC play on the incident here (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7892294.stm)

[Double Zero]

We don't need and cannot afford a Trident replacement - get a sensible no. of Astutes and let the world know we have the choice of conventional ( much more likely to be used, I hope ) or nuclear tipped Tomahawks.

Get 3 modern CVS style carriers, operating Harrier 2+ with AMRAAM ( and Sea Eagle, if anyone's sprayed them with WD40 or not sold them to India ) - and a decent no. of Type 45 ships and Harrier 2+ ( great deal of commonality with the GR9 bomber, and it can actually provide fleet or other defence with AMRAAM !

The carriers need to be more versatile as in amphibious warfare capable, and as for the chap who suggested we ditch the Marines, there are 2 choices; mad, or hooting mad...

[FJJP]

Don't worry, there will be a Trident replacement. If the Government got rid of the nuclear deterent, it would lose its place on the UN Security Council. They would not countinence that, so there will be an update...

[Blacksheep]

CVS Carriers - the modern battleship. Look what happened to the battleships when the balloon went up. :rolleyes:

The bigger the ship, the bigger the target. Remember the Atlantic Conveyor? Eggs and Baskets spring to mind. Meanwhile, you can launch a cruise missile from almost anything, including a lorry, and you can't see them coming until they're almost on top of you.

[Modern Elmo]

Submarine Launched Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (SLIRBM)

Submarine Launched Global Strike Missile (SLGSM)

A new SLBM would be needed in about 2029 to match the schedule for a follow-on SSBN. The Navy has begun studies to examine range-payload requirements and missile size, but no specific plans for a follow-on SLBM at this point other than extending the service life of the Trident D-5.

The Department of Defense does not plan to pursue a common ICBM/SLBM ballistic missile. However, the Air Force and Navy are cooperating in research and development on common technologies related to current and future ballistic missiles - the Guidance Applications Prograrn (GAP), Reentry Systems Applications Program (RSAP), Propulsion Applications Program (PAP), and Technology for the Sustainment of Strategic Systems (TSSS) programs.

The Trident II (D5) system is currently undergoing a life-extension (LE) program to extend the service life of the weapon system until 2042, to match the hull life of the Ohio-class submarine. The life-extension strategy uses a mix of continuing production of the existing design, as well as redesign based on component criticality, expected life, and future supportability and affordability. The D5 Life Extension program will be sufficient for training and transferring domain knowledge to the next generation of inertial guidance and electronics engineers.

However, there is no clear long-term strategy beyond the end of this decade. The combined impact of no clear national strategy, workforce demographics, and no planned development activity beyond circa 2015 will, in the absence of corrective action, put the workforce in serious jeopardy.

...

On 25 August 2003 the Department of the Navy, Strategic Systems Programs [SSP] issued a Request for Information (RFI) to determine the latest plans and programs including technology challenges and proposed solutions for affordable Submarine Launched Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (SLIRBMs), including launch considerations and potential payloads. Responses to this RFI were used by the Government to select presentations to be given at the upcoming SLIRBM Technical Exchange or to otherwise be reviewed by the government.

The SLIRBM requirements include: 1. System must be affordable 2. Range - IRBM 3. Missile diameter - 32.5 inches maximum [ie, half that of the current Trident-2] 4. Both conventional and nuclear payloads to be considered 5. Payload weights, diameters and length to be consistent with missile dimensions and range 6. Conventional payload system to have GPS accuracy 7. Missile subsystem hardened to Space Grade 8. Control of collateral damage to be considered (e.g., stage debris control) 9. Intermediate range ballistic missiles, including their payloads, and all of the launcher subsystem except for electronics, are to be contained within the 86 inch diameter TRIDENT missile launch tube 10. Usable missile tube length (for missile, payload and launcher) of 36 feet maximum.

...

On 12 July 2005 Alliant Techsystems and Lockheed Martin were awarded a $9.2 million contract by the U.S. Navy’s Strategic Systems Program (SSP) office to demonstrate and validate solid rocket motor technologies suitable for a Submarine Launched Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (SLIRBM).

Submarine Launched Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (SLIRBM) / Submarine Launched Global Strike Missile (SLGSM) (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/slirbm.htm)

[Modern Elmo]

... The proposed missile ... offering the war fighter an extremely accurate, no-notice prompt global strike capability from an undetectable, highly mobile platform that is on station around the clock.

In November 2007 Aerojet, a GenCorp company, recently conducted a critical static fire test of an innovative, low-cost large booster in support of the U.S. Navy's Submarine Launched Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (SLIRBM) demonstration. ...

With U.S. Navy personnel in attendance, the 12-foot, 32" in diameter, high-performance demonstration motor was tested, and achieved a peak thrust of over 50,000 lbf. Post-test inspection and data will be used to compare component performance and ballistic performance to analytical prediction models. Primary ballistic and structural composite case performance goals were met. Test data will be used to improve design margins in areas where performance fell short of analytical prediction models. Aerojet incorporated several state-of-the-art modeling and analytical tools throughout design, fabrication and testing.

The Aerojet team will use the results from the SLIRBM test to advance rocket motor design options for the Submarine Launched Global Strike Missile (SLGSM) concept.

Submarine Launched Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (SLIRBM) / Submarine Launched Global Strike Missile (SLGSM) (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/slirbm.htm)

[Modern Elmo]

The Russians have made a lot of noise about the possibility that advanced conventional weapons in the US arsenal place their nuclear forces at risk and, as a corollary, that certain capabilities should be included in future arms control negotiations.

Which raises an interesting question — do they? Can the proposed Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) program — the program to put a conventional warhead on a D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile — or its likely follow-ons, bust Russian silos?

I should start by noting that CTM, as proposed by the Navy had little or no capability against hard and deeply buried targets.

However, one of the little noticed aspect of the National Academies report on U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike is that the Committee invented a hard-target kill capability for the Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) program — a “committee-proposed additional CPGS option” that would have have the space for an “earth-penetrator munition weighing on the order of 1,000 lb” that could “attack small, hardened buried targets…” They called this little devil the CTM-2.

This surely has to be a first in the history of the National Academies.

So, could CTM-2 bust Russian silos?

Keeping in mind that this is a paper-weapon, as it turns out the Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike was not the first set of smarty-pants to think about arming an SLBM with a conventional penetrator. As the slide atop this paper demonstrates, Lockheed Martin’s Nancy F. Swinford and Dean A. Kudlick were were doing similar work in the mid-1990s.

Dennis Gormley found the Swinford and Kudlick paper, and then used it to assess whether a hard-target CTM (or similar capability) could hold at risk Russian silos, in his new paper, The Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions: Dealing with American Conventional Superiority:

Tomahawk cruise missiles are surely accurate enough to hit on or very near to a Russian missile silo, but their warhead carries only 450kg of either blast fragmentation or combined-effects submunitions. The former is a mere pinprick vis-à-vis hardened missile silos; the latter is only relevant against soft targets. Indeed, even a Trident missile armed with a conventional penetrator would require Herculean accuracy and absolutely perfect targeting conditions to have any chance whatsoever of threatening silo-based missiles. ( Not everyone agrees with that assertion. -- Elmo )

Russian concrete silo covers are dome-shaped and approximately 20 feet in diameter and 5 feet high in the center. This means that they have a radius of curvature of about 12.5 feet. Employing the targeting requirement of approaching the target at less than 2 degrees from the vertical, the penetrator would have to impact less than 5 inches from the absolute center of the silo cover, or within a 10-inch diameter circle whose center is at the apex of the dome. My thanks to Dr. Gregory DeSantis, a former U.S. Department of Defense scientist, for making these calculations based on the penetrator design discussed in Nancy F. Swinford and Dean A. Kudlick, “A Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat Concept”, op. cit.

As you can see, Dennis is very, very skeptical that a conventional weapon will achieve the accuracy necessary for busting silos.

But perhaps this is the sort of thing we might usefully crowd-source.

The Swinford and Kudlick paper — “A Hard and Deepl Buried Target Defeat Concept”, Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space, Sunnyvale, CA 94088, Defense Technical Information Center document no. 19961213 060, January 1996, — is online and unbelievable. Take a look.

And kudos to Dennis for digging out a hard and deeply buried bit of paper!



...


Interesting stuff. I look forward to reading the original report.

Before people begin to weigh in on “whether a conventional weapon will achieve the accuracy necessary for busting silos” we need to take a step back and ask ourselves about the scenarios — as the scenario will drive the accuracy requirements.

a) how many silos are we trying to destroy? 1,000 Russian, or 20 Chinese? For any given level of desired target destruction (e.g, 90%), the required pK of the system goes up rapidly as the number of targets increases. Therefore, it’s possible that we can get good enough accuracy with conventional Trident to destroy 20 hardened Chinese silos but not 1,000 hardened Russian ones. Or perhaps neither. But this is a key question before one can talk about accuracy requirements.

b) how many conventional warheads do we have per silo? Obviously, the more warheads per silo, the lower pK you need for each warhead to achieve any given level of success.

c) what is the required level of target destruction? If this is a preemptive strike on, say, China, you might need 95% (or greater) of destroying them all (which requires 99%+ per target). On the other hand, if North Korea has fired a nuclear missile at Japan, we might not require anything close to 95% of getting them all to launch a conventional trident strike — or a nuclear counterforce strike — because reducing the number of remaining NK nuclear-armed missiles would presumably be seen as vital, even if we couldn’t get them all.

This isn’t a criticism of the question you raise AT ALL. I’m just hoping to frame the debate that I hope comes in response to your post.

For what it’s worth, Keir Lieber and I have a Foreign Affairs article coming out in about two weeks that, among other things, argues that even highly-precise conventional warheads are unlikely to be sufficiently effective against hardened silos to obviate the need for nuclear counterforce capabilities.

— Daryl

— Daryl Press · Oct 5, 10:40 AM ·

Eugene Miasnikov wrote a paper on counterforce capabilities of U.S. conventional weapons back in 2000. It is available in Russian, but he may have an English version as well.

— Pavel · Oct 5, 10:49 AM ·

ArmsControlWonk: Can CTM Bust Russian Silos? (http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2486/can-conventional-trident-bust-russian-silos)

[Wholigan]

Modern Elmo

I may have asked you this before, I have certainly asked a few times in here. Is it possible that you might like to think about posting links to all this stuff that you find, rather than cutting and pasting pages of stuff that fill up PPRuNe's pages? Thanks.

[tornadoken]

FJJP: UK's seat on UN Security Council, like France's, USSR's and (Nationalist) China's pre-dates its nuclear status, and derives from the Allies' victory,1945.

ABorges: UK's nuclear weapons competence is wholly derived from licences of US products. Chevaline, TK-100 penetration-aids enhancement of US W68 warhead, was done with no link to France, which persists in wholly-solo nuclear work.

[ORAC]

British warheads: Britain’s Next Nuclear Era (http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2006/12/britains_next_nuclear_era.php)

The Warheads

The type of warhead deployed on Britain’s D5 missiles will last at least into the 2020, according to the White Paper. But the U.K. government says it doesn’t yet know whether the warhead can be “refurbished” to last longer, or whether it will be necessary to develop a replacement warhead. The next Parliament will have to make that decision, the government says, an option that of course will be harder to reject if a decision has already been made to build the new submarines.

How British are the warheads on the British SSBN fleet? The Ministry of Defence stated in a fact sheet that the warheads on the D5 missiles were “designed and manufactured in the U.K.” Even so, rumors have persisted for years that the warheads are in fact modified U.S. W76 warheads.

Now a U.S. Department of Energy document – declassified after eight years of processing – directly links the warhead designs on U.S. and U.K. Trident missiles. The document shows that the “U.K. Trident System,” as the British warhead modification is called, is similar enough to the U.S. W76 warhead to make up an integral part of the W76 engineering, design and evaluation schedule (see figure below).

http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/images/W76req.jpg

Specifically, the document shows that between 1999 and 2001, work on five of 13 “W76 needs” involved the “U.K. Trident System.” These activities included vibration and point shock models, impulse models, impulse and point shock tests, vibration tests, as well as “TSR [thermostructural response] and Blast Models.”

The activities listed in the chronology are contained in a detailed database that “maps the requirements and capabilities for replacement subsystem and component modeling development, test, and production to the specific organizations tasked with meeting these requirements.”

The “U.K. Trident System” is thought to consist of a 100-kiloton thermonuclear warhead encased in a cone-shaped U.S. Mark-4 reentry vehicle. The W76 is the most numerous warhead (approximately 3,200) in the U.S. stockpile. Built between 1978 and 1988, about a third of the W76s are being modified as the W76-1 (see figure below) and equipped with a new fuze with ground-burst capability to “enable the W76 to take advantage of the higher accuracy of the D5″ against harder targets. Delivery of the first W76-1 is scheduled for 2007 and the last in 2012. The W76 is also the first warhead scheduled to be modified under the proposed Reliable Replacement Warhead program.

http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/images/W76-1.jpg

[The Helpful Stacker]

Don't worry, there will be a Trident replacement. If the Government got rid of the nuclear deterent, it would lose its place on the UN Security Council. They would not countinence that, so there will be an update...

I'm afraid you've been hooked by one of the biggest urban myths out there.

The UK is not just a member of the UN Security Council but a permanent member of said security council, and the permanent members set themselves up quite a little cartel when it was formed.

In order for a permanent member of the UN Security Council to be voted off all current members must agree to it in a vote. As the UK has the power of veto any vote taken would fail unless the UK voted itself off. The words 'turkey', 'voting' and 'Christmas' might be apt here.

Ownership of nuclear weapons is not what gained the UK its place as a permanent member, rather its place was gained by being one of the 5 major allied powers at the end of the second world war. The fact all the permanent members have nuclear weapons is a 'happy' coincidence that came about by being the major nations involved in the Cold War.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

The “U.K. Trident System” is thought to consist of a 100-kiloton thermonuclear warhead encased in a cone-shaped U.S. Mark-4 reentry vehicle.

Leaving aside any detail of the yield, you did get that bit right. Aldermaston/Burghfield Common's bang pack in Uncle Sam's re-entry body and bus. Your diagram shows the necessary programme elements necessary to accommodate a UK bomb core that was not W76.

[Wader2]

That is one argument I have never understood. A single missile, even with a few warheads, won't take out anyone's ability to strike back. Yes, you can certainly afford to wait! Why would anyone adopt a launch on warning strategy against a single inbound missile? :confused:

It really depends on which end of the ball court you are.

you can certainly afford to wait

This presupposes an element of rationality by both, or all, players.

In the US they had a system called NUDETS. Any strike in the Continental US would be detected an a lamp would illuminate, and I guess a klaxon sound, in the SAC Bunker. What happened next would have been carefully scripted and pre-planned.

Now, suppose as a result of a bit of WMD activity on some of our property our leader decided that a CBM delivered some 30 minutes later to their MOD would serve as a suitable chastisement and warning. The enemy might assume it to be, a dud, then on the principle of use it or lose it they may launch a nuclear counter-strike.

There have been many instances of power play where in cold analysis afterwards the play was irrational.

Ballistic missiles are hard-wired in our psychic as deliverers of doom and gloom. If the enemy has the means then you cannot assume a rational "let's sit and wait." Look at the tensions in Israel when they did just that; it took lots of cajuns and lots of persuasion when Scuds started to drop in.

[ZH875]

As the UK has the power of veto any vote taken would fail unless the UK voted itself off. The words 'turkey', 'voting' and 'Christmas' might be apt here.


But let's not forget that we have gormless Gordon in charge, and he would probably consider it if he can save £20, so that he can give an extra £3,000,000 to impoverished 3rd world countries:rolleyes:

[ArthurBorges]

Pity they didn't make it a few years earlier and sell a copy to that klutz Columbus.Columbus sailed to Hispaniola (DR+Haiti today) in 1492; the maps date from 1421 onward.

It is indeed argued that he used copies of Chinese maps.

What I don't grasp is how, if he had such a map, he mistook the American continent for India.

An alternate explanation that comes to mind is that he sooner trusted the Norsemen's Vinland map, which has now been confirmed as authentic.

On Columbus himself, he was not a nice man.

[ArthurBorges]

Perhaps see 1421exposed (http://www.1421exposed.com/) to see what credible historians think of Gavin Menzies fantastic history of the world.It's only fair the author's own website: 1434 Gavin Menzies | 1421 | Chinese Voyages | Renaissance history |medieval history | maritime exploration |Chinese Exploration | Admiral Zheng He | Chinese Junks (http://www.gavinmenzies.net/index.asp)

Wikipedia trashes him lavishly for not speaking Chinese, ramming a US minesweeper when in command of HMS Rorqual and lying about the routes he sailed.

Somehow this helps prove that Admiral Zheng He's fleets did not circumnavigate the globe, I guess.

Although you can dig it up under "Discussion", the Wiki frontyard entry also omits that he served on HMS Resolution, a Polaris submarine. Um my guess is that the RN screens for reckless liars when assigning folks to duties involving nuclear weapons, so I'd say he was sane. Or at least he didn't let politicians do a whale jump with his submarine and sink a Japanese trawler over half a century after the end of World War II!

I see three reasons that "professional" or "credible" historians come down hard on Menzies (1) He lays down the evidence like a story teller rather than an academic versed in the norms of academic literature (2) His evidence requires a complete rethink of world history, viz Zheng He pioneered most of the world's trading ports and distributed world maps, followed by a period of Chinese isolationism, which allowed Britain, Portugal and Spain to expand as rapidly as they did, and (3) Christianity loses lots of points because Christopher Columbus was on God's mission and the Renaissance has been sold as a very Christian achievement.

By the way, some nitpicker researched the names of Columbus' three vessels Nina, Pinta and Santa Maria. There was indeed a Nina and a Pinta but the closest match to any Santa Maria was the Maria Galante.

All three names would inspire any sex-starved sailor: La Maria Galante = The Gallant Maria in the sense of a lady who obliges anyone's every wish; La Pinta = The Painted (Woman) in the sense of a sidewalk sex worker; and La Nina = The Cute Little (Woman). Addiion of "woman" is justified by "La", which is the feminine pronoun.

The shift from Maria Galante to Santa Maria traces back to Columbus' spin doctoring.

[Manuel de Vol]

1. The Micronesians were using coconut sextants circa 2000 BC. - By the time Colombus set sail, it was well known that 1 minute of arc subtended 1 nautical mile on the surface of the earth.

2. Columbus believed the earth was round. 360 degrees in a circle and at 1 nm per minute of arc if the earth was indeed round, its circumference was approximately 21,600 nautical miles. - Simple sums.

3. He knew where he was starting from. He knew how far it was (on an easterly route) to 'the Indies'. Had he subtracted that distance from 21,600 it would have given him a rough idea of how far he would have to sail to reach the same point on a westerly heading.

4. He knew the average speed of his ships and he should have known how many nautical miles he could expect to cover in a day.

5. He knew how many days he had been at sea when he arrived at the 'West Indies'.

Brave man? - Certainly.
Intrepid explorer? - Certainly.
Navigator? - Hardly. He made the biggest DR error in history.

As for 'discovering' America, well it already had people when he got there, so he could hardly claim to have discovered it.

If you sail west from Europe (and if you don't sink) then eventually your ship will stop sailing - You will run out of sea. He didn't 'discover' America, he ran into it.

He named the land he 'discovered' after his sponsor. Fortunately for the inhabitants of that continent, Columbus appears to have been an informal sort of bloke and he named it after that sponsor's first name.

Otherwise, they would be Vespuccians.

The American Federal holiday named after him is 'Get lost' day.

[Wader2]

Remind me, what is this thread about?

Or, why, when we had atomic bombs did we have a nuclear deterrent? Another case of the USA using a different English word from the one we use ourselves?

Viz - Bonnet = Hood and Boot = Trunk.

[ORAC]

Nuclear weapons (deterrent) = Atomic (fission) bombs + Hydrogen (fusion) bombs.

[Manuel de Vol]

Or as Caspar Weinberger was wont to say: "New, cooler weapons."

[cornish-stormrider]

What, they need the better thermal properties of CS95?
Or they hang around the beach with long hair talking about the tube and it being super gnarly rad?

[BEagle]

Nuclear weapons (deterrent) = Atomic (fission) bombs + Hydrogen (fusion) bombs.

So what is the fission-fusion-fission weapon in Spam-speak?

Surely they just invented the word 'nuclear' so that the world could laugh at that ******** GeeDubya's inability to pronounce the word?


EDIT: The net-nanny didn't like 'd ick h ead', hence the asterisks...:rolleyes:

[bjornhall]

This presupposes an element of rationality by both, or all, players.

Are you talking about what you would expect someone to do, or what one should be doing? In this case, I think one can act rationally no matter what one thinks the opponent would do.

Ballistic missiles are hard-wired in our psychic as deliverers of doom and gloom. If the enemy has the means then you cannot assume a rational "let's sit and wait."

But you can! If it turned out to be a nuke, you act accordingly. If it turned out not to be a nuke, you act accordingly. Nothing you can do at that stage would affect what the missile would do to your territory. Whatever it does, a single missile would not materially affect your war fighting ability, so no action has to be taken before impact.

Consequently, you can be rational, even if your opponent is not, if the scenario is a single incoming missile (or even a couple missiles). You can go to whatever your national equivalent of Defcon 2 is, you can start generating if you have a bomber force, you can start dispersing whatever should be dispersed, you can do whatever it is you need to do given what particular nation you are running, but you don't need to launch until after impact.

I think it's far too simplistic to assume everyone would automatically go dumb as soon as nukes are involved. Yes, things were scripted, but there were several scripts to choose from, and all had a play button that had to be pushed manually. Nothing was automatic, right?

What one would not do, however, is to launch a single conventional missile against a nuclear armed opponent with an early warning capability, because then you would have to assume your opponent was doing what you would consider rational. But maybe that was what you meant all along...

[TEEEJ]

Rust was intercepted and tracked during his flight within Soviet airspace.

YouTube - Mathias Rust INTERVIEW May 28, 2007 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aerA5oLif3k)

The Notorious Flight of Mathias Rust | History of Flight | Air & Space Magazine (http://www.airspacemag.com/history-of-flight/rust.html?c=y&page=1)

TJ

[Modern Elmo]

Whatever it does, a single missile would not materially affect your war fighting ability, so no action has to be taken before impact.

Consequently, you can be rational, even if your opponent is not, if the scenario is a single incoming missile (or even a couple missiles).

Great, so if that single missile track is closing on the city where your family lives, there's no need for panic. Just stay cool and rational. It's easy.

( Replying to another line of thought: )

What one would not do, however, is to launch a single conventional missile against a nuclear armed opponent with an early warning capability ...

Why do you keep saying single missile? The plausible and realistic scenario is a pre-emptive, spoiling attack using dozens of very accurate ballistic missiles with nonnookleer payloads against Foe XZY, which has a limited number of nuklur installations and IRBM or ICBM launch sites -- say, North Korea or Pakistan or Iran.

They have an early warning capability? How much reaction time will submarine-launched IRBM's allow?

Maybe some of Foe XYZ's fission or fusion weapons carrying systems survive the surprise attack. A quick situational assessment says no nookloor weapons were used.

But the attacking side is known to have newkalur weapons, nukes which are presumably ready to launch on short notice. Furthermore, the attacking side also has active ballistic missile defenses!

So, what's Foe XYZ's decision: counterattack with nukes -- or is XYZ deterred from doing so?

[Pontius Navigator]

ME, wrong abacus.

We are discussing, you may have missed the point, nookleer deterrence by UK. We have just 5 dozen launch tubes in total. We may not even have 5 dozen missiles of any flavour. We certainly don't have the capacity to launch even one boat load of CBM and then retain a nuclear capability. Certainly that deterrent would disappear in a flash if any CBM failed to work.

[Wader2]

What one would not do, however, is to launch a single conventional missile against a nuclear armed opponent with an early warning capability, because then you would have to assume your opponent was doing what you would consider rational. But maybe that was what you meant all along...

Quite.

I was not suggesting that a rational or irrational opponent would send a single missile against us, but that we might be tempted to send a single missile against them. I was going to mention the BMEW case but then considered that the unannounced arrival of a supersonic conventional penetrator might be confused not with an exploding gas main but with a dud nuke.

On irrational foe might then react on the use it or lose it principle. The say of course applies if fleets of stealth bombers start to pick off his missiles one by one.

The rational-irrational argument is very similar to the assymetric warfare issues too.

[ArthurBorges]

The rational-irrational argument is very similar to the assymetric warfare issues too.

So this is about getting stuck thinking inside the same box?

Sorry, but I have a hard time believing in the irrational madman with a leer on his face every time he fingers a bright red button. This is a myth.

What I also find interesting is the ideological inconsistency in US thinking: on the one hand there is mythical faith in the privately-owned firearm as the Great Equalizer (81 or 90 such firearms per 100 inhabitants there) and total opposition in the Great Equalizing powers that come with having your own set of nuclear weapons. After all, why shouldn't "little guy" countries be as equal as "little guy" Americans?

[Modern Elmo]

After all, why shouldn't "little guy" countries be as equal as "little guy" Americans?

If they're enemies of Christian, patriotic America, they deserve no equality.

[PTT]

If they're enemies of Christian, patriotic America, they deserve no equality.
I do hope this is said tongue-in-cheek.

What I also find interesting is the ideological inconsistency in US thinking: on the one hand there is mythical faith in the privately-owned firearm as the Great Equalizer (81 or 90 such firearms per 100 inhabitants there) and total opposition in the Great Equalizing powers that come with having your own set of nuclear weapons. After all, why shouldn't "little guy" countries be as equal as "little guy" Americans?
That would be down to the NPT that these countries signed up to. It was an agreement not to want to have a gun in return for a bit of help "paying the bills", so to speak. I wonder how many Americans would give up their firearms in return for a 10% reduction in income tax...

[Vox Populi]

There are absolutely NO conceivable circumstances in which a UK PM would authorise the launch of a nuclear weapon.

We know that.

They know that.

It's catastrophically expensive.

Why bother?

[pr00ne]

Vox Populi,

Aren't there? How do you know?

No we don't.

No they don't.

It's NOT catastrophically expensive.

If you don't bother you could be subject to some pretty compelling 'persuasion,' remember Suez?

[vecvechookattack]

You need to remember that the second missile of each salvo is targetted on to NYC.....thats the only way the salvo would be allowed to be released.