A Third Way for Afghanistan?

[highcirrus]

Apologies for the size of post. However, it's probably one of the most arresting pieces that I've recently read and would value the opinions of the more thoughtful Pprune membership.

From: Small Wars Journal: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/301-khan.pdf

Don’t Try to Arrest the Sea:
An Alternative Approach for Afghanistan
Major Mehar Omar Khan

Over the last three months that I’ve spent in the United States, I’ve heard with concern and trepidation the growing calls for a possible pull out from Afghanistan. No sane citizen of our world, let alone a Pakistani infantry officer who may soon end up being another name on an ever-growing list of the fallen soldiers in the war against terror, enjoys thinking about the painful possibility of our world’s greatest military power and history’s most inspiring nation retreating in the face of an onslaught by Kalashnikov-wielding bearded barbarians riding on the back of motorcycles, hungry horses and perspiring mules. What is being realized with increasing intensity is the pain of a seemingly endless and bloody war for almost a decade now; the pressure of a US public opinion that’s almost irreversibly weary of war (at least for now); the misery of a mismatch between resources and mandate; the rising groans of despairing allies unwilling to persevere and, the scary scarcity of success stories. However what needs to be realized is the fact that abandoning Afghanistan will be an unmitigated tragedy.

For the United States, I believe, Afghanistan is not a case of ‘success or failure’. The USA is too big and too powerful to fail against a collection of miserable fanatics holed up in the treacherous mountains of Southern Afghanistan. It’s instead a case of doing too much with too little care and attention. It’s a challenge (still quite surmountable) aggravated by ditching smart choices and contracting wrong compulsions.

The current US approach to fixing Afghanistan is impressive in detail but seriously flawed in design. Despite recent adjustments reflected most profoundly in Gen McChrystal’s Counterinsurgency Directive, the ship is still headed for rough seas. The overall design continues to be based on ‘mending and reforming’ Afghanistan the country – as a whole. The brass-tacks continue to be muddied by unclear strategic intent. The ‘reform route’ continues to be pursued ‘top-down’. Too many coalition personnel and too many international dollars still reside in Kabul or at best in the provincial headquarters. The majority of Afghans continues to stare angrily from the sidelines while a few thugs rule the streets and corridors of Kabul. Too many criminals continue to be respectable and powerful despite being in the neighborhood of so many well-meaning people. While too many US soldiers continue to die, radical surgery is still being pended in favor of cosmetics.

What is being tried is too much. What needs to be done is economizing the force and maximizing the effect. What needs to be done is to increasingly get smarter or leaner in physics and more effective and skillful in chemistry. What is being done is more and more of physics. What is
needed is more skill. What is being poured in is more troops. US public opinion is rightly angry about all of this. Why should young men continue to fall for a ‘losing cause’?

But is it a case of a ‘losing cause’ or one of a ‘badly managed success’. I believe it’s the latter. And it is with this belief that I want to suggest an alternative approach to what is being done. This approach is embedded in the belief that troops required to manage or govern Afghanistan will never be ‘enough’ and the right route is ‘bottom up’ and ‘hub to spokes’ and not the reverse. I also believe that promise and prosperity is the only magnet that can wean desperate people away from violence and that Afghanistan is too big to be made prosperous all-together. Hence the process of rebuilding and development will have to be ‘selective’ to start with.

The approach, suggested hereunder, is based on some ‘can’t do’ and some ‘can do’ principles for Afghanistan. The identification of what can be done has to be based on a dispassionate recognition of what can’t be done.

First, therefore, the ‘can’t do’ part:

Can’t ‘govern’ this country: It is historically incorrect to call Afghanistan a country or even a place. It has always been and is a people. Afghanistan represents a people who have always been divided and loosely managed; never properly ‘governed’ at any level even in the loosest sense of that word. Any effort to reverse that historical trend or reality will be a terribly misdirected investment of blood and money. Afghans, vastly ignorant as well as illiterate, have never been clever enough to submit to a central authority. ‘Liberal democracy’, ‘united vision’, a ‘social contract’, ‘tolerant co-existence’, ‘civil society’, ‘civil debate’, ‘national discourse’ – are all misnomers largely tossed around in a small section of expatriate community residing in the West. Hence, even the smartest bunch of people can’t govern this place as a whole.

Can’t ‘protect’ all Afghans: The emphasis in the ISAF Counterinsurgency Directive on ‘protecting the civilians, instead of killing the Taliban’ in unachievable in its entirety. Coalition troops can never reach the numbers necessary to extend adequate protection to the populace across Afghanistan. It will only give an additional propaganda tool to the Taliban, in addition to increasing the range of their target zone. Every suicide bombing will now be seen and portrayed as a sign of coalition’s failure to deliver on its ‘promise’ of ‘protecting’ the people. And promises mean a lot in that medieval society. My proposed ‘approach’ addresses this dilemma.

Can’t have ‘total’ peace: In Afghanistan, peace has always been relative – both in time as well as space. In that unfortunate part of the world, ‘peace’ has mostly meant ‘less fighting’ or ‘fighting contained to a few a tribes in a few pockets’ or ‘bloodletting restricted to family feuds’. Afghans are fatally skillful in digging up reasons to fire and fight. No amount of money, time or effort can reverse this tragic historical reality in a space of few years. It will instead take sincere national leadership and international commitment spanning generations – something very hard to come by.

Can’t have ‘rivers of milk and honey’ flowing in a few years: After centuries of war, Afghanistan is now way ‘beyond a quick or economical repair’. Too much is required to be set right and built anew. Roads, hospitals, schools and colleges - nothing is there. Attitudes, dreams, aspirations, ideals, sense of unity, and a ‘unifying’ sense of patriotism – again, nothing is there. It’s all broken; shattered by wounds and trauma inflicted by unkind times and endless misery. Brigades of straight-thinking US soldiers with scant support or commitment from Afghan ‘national’ leadership or international community (if there ever were two things by those names) can’t do it in decades, let alone years.

Can’t do it without Pashtuns: Like it or not, Afghanistan has always been a Pashtun country. Many as they are though, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras have always been the ‘outsiders’. Regardless of who holds the banner (the Taliban or anyone else) Pashtuns will never cease fighting unless given their leadership role in Kabul. They have always shed blood for the defense of their ‘right’ on the throne of Kabul. One can’t mess with that ‘right’ without incurring serious consequences. What we are facing in Afghanistan is ‘Pashtun Intifada’. It is only ‘led’ by bearded mullahs calling themselves ‘Taliban’. Take out Taliban and the insurgency will continue.

Now what ‘can be’ done:

The list is very short. Don’t try to arrest the sea. Create islands. Having gone well past the phase of breaking the back of Al-Qaeda and dispersing the Taliban, concentrate on ‘creating and building’ examples. Set the beacon and you’ll see that all the lost ships and boats will come ashore. Here’s how to do it.

First and foremost, believe that it’s not God that drives these people crazy; it’s poverty. Believe that Pashtuns don’t submit to the Taliban out of sheer love for the one-eyed Mullah Omar; its deprivation and fear that drives this herd to the first man holding the flag of power and promise. Raise your flag higher than the Mullah’s and the half-blind lunatic will be devoured by Pashtuns. What is being done is unfortunately not the right way of raising the banner. It defies the logic of ‘can’t do’s’ given above. The Pashtun face of the country is not sufficiently visible.

Kabul or the Provincial Reconstruction Teams will NOT work. Provinces are too big a governance laboratory for Afghanistan. Instead, pick a few districts (nothing more than that) in the heart of areas worst-afflicted by the Taliban-led insurgency. Invest heavily in these districts.

Do it in two phases; first craft the message, then two, let the message spread itself.

Here’s is how to create the message. In selected (preferably non-contiguous) districts, give them an honest and polished leadership from ‘amongst themselves’, a transparent and efficient court, a model Pashtun police heavily armed with both weapons and motivation, schools (separate for girls and boys), a few hospitals, electricity, money for farming and setting up small businesses through a few efficiently functioning banks, paved roads, a model transport system and, not the least, build a beautiful grand mosque and an FM station that recites Quran with Pashtu translation 24/7. If possible, build a few plants and job-creating projects around mineral mines and informal fire-arms industry. Let these people serve as an example for rest of the Pashtun country. Having created these models, international community can then work ‘upwards’ and ‘outwards’ to include more and more areas and tribes. Simultaneously the governance, right from district up to Kabul must be painted with an unmistakable Pashtun color. As of now, Pashtuns are being seen and treated like Sunnis of Iraq. In reality they are a majority and deserve to be empowered like Shias in Iraq.

A few examples of model districts would unmistakably mean this: that the USA means good and only good; that Islam is not the sole monopoly of Mullah Omar; that Islam and Quran can co-exist with banks and schools and hospitals and businesses; that life without bloodshed is a good life and that what Americans do is better than what Taliban do or plan to do. The approach will give Pashtuns an irresistibly attractive reason to ditch the message and manipulation of the Taliban in addition to stripping Mullah Omar and his Al Qaeda cohorts off their narrative and their manifesto.

Militarily, the coalition must hold fast to these model districts as bases and let the Taliban fester and sulk in the outlying, ungoverned margins. Their lack of ability to give in their areas of influence what coalition gives in its area of control will delegitimize them in due course of time. This may sound like giving away vast swathes of land to Taliban. In reality, it means a considerable improvement on the current situation. The Taliban structure of governance stands on a foundation of both fear and promise. The existing effort to pursue them everywhere leaves them surviving everywhere. They thrive on the coalition chasing their shadows. This new approach of excluding them from selected pockets will progressively deprive them of targets for violence and an audience for propaganda. Their brutalities in areas without coalition presence will discredit them while doing no harm to coalition’s image. Relative peace in coalition-governed districts will fuel discontent in Taliban-controlled districts. It will also give coalition and Afghan Forces the strategic advantage of operating from the ‘interior lines’ instead of having to hopelessly roll up the Taliban from the margins to the center.

Such ‘model district projects’ should not be the responsibility of the USA alone. Other members of the international community must also partake by taking up a district each.

These islands of peace and prosperity, though small, will be seen by all the lost mariners in the sea (of chaos and cruelty). It is my sincere belief that these model districts will serve as the ‘clarion call’. Pashtuns, hungry for food and promise, will come running and rally to the cause that gives hope of a better future, of peace and of return to the ‘throne of Kabul’.

Major Mehar Omar Khan, Pakistan Army, is currently a student at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served as a peacekeeper in Sierra Leone, a Brigade GSO-III, an instructor at the Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul, and as Chief of Staff (Brigade Major) of an infantry brigade. He has also completed the Command and Staff Course at Pakistan’s Command and Staff College in Quetta.

[sisemen]

Seems like a more than reasonable take on the situation from someone who actually knows what he is talking about.

Wonder if this is required reading in the White House, Downing Street and Kirribilli House? (Apologies to the Canadians and other NATO countries that are involved but I'm not sure where your big man lives)

[L J R]

...so 'Drones' ARE now allowed to operate from inside is country now...?

[Finnpog]

A good and sound argument. I particularly like the 24/7 FM transmission of the Koran - very clever to disenfranchise Omar.

The Pakistani army and police are getting lumps knocked off themselves in their NW frontiers, and they do have an insight which we could listen to.

[Jabba_TG12]

Interesting perspective. Worth looking deeper into.

[4Greens]

I like the idea. Would be interested in the views on the West buying all the opium to take the baddies out of the trade.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

It isn’t the first time that an SO2 has had a better grasp of situations than the “starred” ranks. Basil Liddell-Hart springs to mind.

[27mm]

Major Khan makes some cogent points - but fact is that every occupying foreign force in Afghanistan, throughout history, has lost not only large numbers of soldiers, but also the will to carry through an impossible mission. I believe we lost an entire division, some 10000 men, in Queen Victoria's time and the Soviets lost double that, before withdrawal. No "mission" is worth that. We should also ask ourselves why, if we are in Afghanistan, we are not also (God forbid) in Somalia.

[Climebear]

It also sounds very familiar to the British strategy in Malaya

[Load Toad]

I think the world has to resign itself to the fact that 'we' have to stay in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. There is no cure all, magic bullet or snake oil that is going to solve the multitude of problems. But - being seen to being fully committed to never ever leaving and to gradually bringing improvements to the parts of the country that can be safe areas will over time wear out the opposition.
I don't like it, it contradicts a lot of my liberal beliefs but I see no other way. Because we are not dealing apples with apples, it is 21st century ethics versus medieval intolerance.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

I believe you are right. I also believe it is important that we repair the Afghani infrastructure elements that the Coalition broke in ’01.

Regrettably, the entire operation isn’t helped by;

Peter W. Galbraith

Afghanistan's presidential election, held Aug. 20, should have been a milestone in the country's transition from 30 years of war to stability and democracy. Instead, it was just the opposite. As many as 30 percent of Karzai's votes were fraudulent, and lesser fraud was committed on behalf of other candidates. In several provinces, including Kandahar, four to 10 times as many votes were recorded as voters actually cast. The fraud has handed the Taliban its greatest strategic victory in eight years of fighting the United States and its Afghan partners.

The election was a foreseeable train wreck.


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/02/AR2009100202855.html

[ArthurBorges]

Where's the music sheet that goes with this?

"Model districts" smells lots like the "strategic hamlets" that were, um, shall we call them "gated communities for Viet Cong sympathizers"?

At any event, Maj. Khan is a good pupil and sure to graduate with high marks from the Leavenworth staff college.

I feel sorry for anyone serving there: I understand that anyone taken prisoner gets his eyes gouged out, jinglebells cut off and then skinned alive before being left out to dry. I leave you to imagine what that does to a man's enthusiasm to bring democracy, freedom, justice and KFC to a landscape of mountainfolk who have their own definition of freedom.

Muslim hospitality is among the finest, most refined and considerate in the world but they just this thing about gatecrashers.

[ArthurBorges]

27mm, you might note also that regular troops plus mercenaries now total about 150,000 while the Soviets topped out their commitment at 115,000.

HighCirrus, for more input, you might want to follow M.K. Bhadrakumar's writings on the subject and there is also Col. Evgeny Khruschev's video blog at Russia Today.

[rmac]

He might be a bit flawed in the operational detail, but I reckon that he has got the politics spot on regarding the Pashtuns, even if there may be a bit of Pakistani interest in promoting them.

[highcirrus]

ArthurBorges You got links for M.K. Bhadrakumar and Col. Evgeny Khruschev? I'd be very interested to read/view.

Rgds. hc

[dead_pan]

Would be interested in the views on the West buying all the opium to take the baddies out of the trade


To completely disrupt this market we could then offer heroin for free to addicts in exchange for them signing on to & attending a rehabilitation programme.

I think we need to re-define our measure of success, after all we have more-or-less done the job we set out to do i.e. driving AQ from the country and installing a democratic (by the standards of the region) Government. We can also dominate any area militarily at will, so we could easily counter any attempts by AQ to re-estalish its presence in the country.

Khan has struck the nail on the head re focussing our efforts on selected areas rather than trying to cover whole swathes of the country. Lets create a network of safe havens to give the NGOs, construction companies etc the opportunity to improve the lot of ordinary Afghans. The bits in between could become a playground for McChrystal's beloved special forces.

[Chugalug2]

It all seems so beguilingly simple, provide safe centres where the local economy can thrive providing employment and raising living standards, and keep the Taliban out. Major Khan knows that is the answer and now so do we, but does the Taliban? Strikes me that if they can infiltrate the so called secure areas and let off bombs, human or otherwise, then they can do much the same anywhere else that is supposedly "safe". Templer had many challenges and overcame them with great lateral thinking, but even he would be hard pressed to cope with a mindset that can now literally make a bomb out of a human being without any external indicators whatsoever. I'm not saying it can't be done, just that the security of these centres will have to be absolutely stringent with minimum coming and going permitted. In that alone there would seem to be a message from the Malayan emergency.

[ArthurBorges]

Col. Khruschev is at RT ? Latest News (http://www.russiatoday.com/). Hit the blog button in this homepage and you'll find him. I love RT's slogan: "Any story can be another story altogether".

M.K. Bhadrakumar is lots of places, but you can scroll through the articles at Asia Times Online :: Asian news hub providing the latest news and analysis from Asia (http://www.atimes.com).

Beyond that, I strongly recommend Tomgram: Ann Jones, Us or Them in Afghanistan? (http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175116). Scroll down past the first few paragraphs directly to:

Meet the Afghan Army

Is It a Figment of Washington's Imagination?
By Ann Jones

Ms. Jones' observations of ANA and ANP training raise issues that need to be addressed before Washington opts to up the ante.

[dead_pan]

Perhaps we could learn from the Israeli's experience of plonking new settlements in the middle of nowhere? International law aside, these have been quite successful in terms of providing secure living space for their populous.

Security will of course be paramount regardless of what you end up doing. You will never be able to gaurantee this, as Khan has noted. Maybe we should encourage the Afghans to regard suicide bombers as another of live's inconveniences, along with careless drivers, dodgy kebab vendors etc.

[ArthurBorges]

Perhaps we could learn from the Israeli's experience of plonking new settlements in the middle of nowhere?

Nowhere? There were/are real live families, olive trees living there: they're called Palestinians. Here's some insight into your "nowhere": Concerns over olive harvest increase for families under threat of settlers :: www.uruknet.info :: informazione dall'Iraq occupato :: news from occupied Iraq :: [vs-1] (http://www.uruknet.info/index.php?p=m58683&hd=&size=1&l=e)

As for "settlements" in Afghanistan, they're called "forward operating bases" that would more perfectly the Israeli model if their populations were given farm tools and a few bags of fertilizer -- that's what the PLA does for hardship posts in China and the installations become self-sufficient for food.

And kebab is as tasty as falafel.

Oy vey... think again!

[ArthurBorges]

Perhaps we could learn from the Israeli's experience of plonking new settlements in the middle of nowhere?

Nowhere? There were/are real live families, olive trees living there: they're called Palestinians. Here's some insight into your "nowhere": Concerns over olive harvest increase for families under threat of settlers :: www.uruknet.info :: informazione dall'Iraq occupato :: news from occupied Iraq :: [vs-1] (http://www.uruknet.info/index.php?p=m58683&hd=&size=1&l=e)

As for "settlements" in Afghanistan, they're called "forward operating bases" that would more perfectly ape the Israeli model if their populations were given farm tools and a few bags of fertilizer -- that's what the PLA does for hardship posts in China and the installations become self-sufficient for food.

And kebab is as tasty as falafel.

Oy vey... think again!

[dead_pan]

Is it me or is there an echo on the line?

Msr Borges I did allude to the plight of the Palestinians in my post. I was saying that the Israeli's seem adept at creating secure communities on land that previously seemed to be fit only for grazing goats.

[Low Flier]

What this guy is proposing was tried in Rhodesia during UDI. It didn't work.

It was also tried in Vietnam during The American War. It didn't work there either.

It won't work in Afghanistan either.

A much better role model would the 100% successful British Hearts & Minds operation(s) in Oman. There we didn't make any of the mistakes which this guy is proposing to make.

[Wader2]

I like the idea. Would be interested in the views on the West buying all the opium to take the baddies out of the trade.

Buying the opium might be considered a panacea solution but opium is only part of the equation.

Opium - Taliban

Farmer grows opium poppy. Opium smuggled out to the market. Cash paid to traders and farmers - taliban take their cut.

Opium - open trade

Farmer grows opium poppy. Opium exported to legal market. Cash paid to traders and farmers - taliban take their cut.

Spot the difference.

Instead let us switch to wheat production.

Wheat trade

Farmer grows wheat. Wheat exported for cash. Cash paid to traders and farmers - taliban take their cut.

Spot the difference.

Khan's solution, and Templar before him, was to separate the baddies from the goodies to that:

Farmer grows wheat. Wheat exported for cash. Cash paid to traders and farmers - taliban excluded.

Protection of closed centres of population is what Khan is proposing but a weakness remains. The farmers' fields need protection too to prevent the taliban destroying the crops and disrupting the trade.

[dead_pan]

Low flier

Sheesh, talking of harking back to past glories. Next thing you'll be proposing we send a gun-boat up the Helmand river.

The world is a very different place now, and Afghanistan a whole different ball-game to Malaya in the 50s or Oman in the 70s.

Incidentally, anyone care to name any successful British Army-led hearts & minds operations since the 80s? Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Northern Ireland?

[Load Toad]

So Wader2,
Taliban will take a cut then no matter what he crop - cos they'll just use extortion on the farmers whatever.
But having a legal avenue for opium cash crops will make a) the farmers more likely to choose the legal market because b) the Taliban will be simply running an extortion racket which will be all the more unpopular and liable to face resistance from the (organised and protected) farmers.
Maybe not but - we seem to be faced with:
- Give up, turn tail and run out leaving the whole area to the medieval lawless terrorists types who may not be happy with just being evil in their own back yard.
- Carry on the war in some form hoping one way or the other we can find a method which will work.

Are there any more options?

[Low Flier]

Dead pan, You're dead wrong about Oman in the 1970s being much different from Afghanistan in the TwentyNoughties.

Oman then, just like Afghanistan now, was a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual feudal society riven by factional warfare for centuries. Exactly the same set of problems in both cases. Very different approach and results in each case though.

In Oman we did not make the cretinous mistake of attempting to ram a Westminster or Warshington style Anglo-Saxon "democracy" down the throats of a culture which palpably is not capable or willing to absorb such an absurd misfit.

In Oman we did not try to bash a square peg into a round hole. In Afghanistan we react to the failure of the peg to go into that hole by using ever bigger and bigger sledgehammers. It hasn't worked and it won't work because it can't work.

In Oman we did not make the catastrophic mistake of excluding and marginalising 60% of the population by picking a large minority to favour, as this guy is proposing. We did the opposite. We ensured that no ethnic minorites were ever excluded or ever had any reason to feel that they might be excluded. We brought them all onside, even the really difficult ones.

Sure, we always retained the capability to call in an airstrike from the Hunters and Strikemasters, but on the rare occasions when that was the only course of last resort, we always felt that we had failed miserably. There were never any cheers or high-fives when the bomb(s) struck the target. Only a feeling that we had buggered things up so badly that we could find no more intelligent way of interacting with fellow human beings than to bomb them to bits.

[minigundiplomat]

A much better role model would the 100% successful British Hearts & Minds operation(s) in Oman. There we didn't make any of the mistakes which this guy is proposing to make.


Brits in charge of a Brit outfit. No septics (politicians) with ever changing strategies, trying to produce results for Billy Bob and Marleene in time for the evening news bulletins.

(although the UK governments sticky, unwashed fingerprints weren't as much in evidence either)

That's why it worked.

[highcirrus]

ArthurBorges: Thanks very much for the links - I'll include them in my bedtime reading

Rgds

[Wader2]

So Wader2,
Taliban will take a cut then no matter what he crop - cos they'll just use extortion on the farmers whatever.

Quite.

But having a legal avenue for opium cash crops will make
a) the farmers more likely to choose the legal market because
b) the Taliban will be simply running an extortion racket which will be all the more unpopular and liable to face resistance from the (organised and protected) farmers.

True, legal market as it would be the easier option. As for b) I believe similar extortion rackets have been run much closer to home too. It might be possible to safeguard the farmers within secure bases but as I said before, the Taliban could simply torch the fields. They are not trying to win a populatirty contest but to kick us out and gain power - power of an AK47.

we seem to be faced with:
1. - Give up, turn tail and run out leaving the whole area to the medieval lawless terrorists types who may not be happy with just being evil in their own back yard.
2. - Carry on the war in some form hoping one way or the other we can find a method which will work.

Option 1 is probably the popular option today
Option 2 seems to be what Khan is suggesting. We are doing what we can to build or rebuild an infrastructure but Khan's other main point was a political one and not a civil or military one.

We took hundreds of years to evolve democracy. We deported the Lockean model successfully to several countries to a greater or lesser extent and have had plenty of signal failures too. The Communist model has also been exported and worked, after a fashion, for a good number of years before it too crashed and burnt.

The only other model that has endured with time is tribalism and we have proven that you cannot change from tribalism to democracy overnight.

[Caspian237]

That was an interesting read though a tad conceited IMHO. This is not really a new idea. If anyone is interested in this theory then can I recommend that you read up on the British policy of villagization during the Malayan Emergency? I have sometimes considered whether or not this could be utilized to pacify and then win over the Pashtun.

I fear that these pockets of civilization must be heavily protected otherwise it defeats the exercise in the first place. Protection might mean a physical barrier or at the very least a "digital wall" (can I copywrite that term? :)) restricting movement to and from the area. In the heavily agricultural based afghanistan this might not be practical and it is certainly an alien concept for the people.

Sadly in previous attempts at villagization there has always been a level of coercion which would be quite unpalatable in the world today. The British were succesful in Malya in he absence of visual news cover. The Americans employed a similiar policy in Vietnam which proved to be highly controversial. I know that the proposal put forward in the report is different in many ways to these historic events but truely I think the same difficulties would arise.

In my opinion the end results of this policy would be succesful and have positive outcomes for not only ISAF but also for the participating Afghans. However getting to that point I fear would be so traumatic and unpopular that it might be impossible to work. On the otherhand taking half measures would likely result in failure as well, at least in respect to what is already being achieved with todays strategies.

Digital Wall ©2009 :8

[muduckace]

[QUOTE][Can’t ‘govern’ this country: It is historically incorrect to call Afghanistan a country or even a place. It has always been and is a people. Afghanistan represents a people who have always been divided and loosely managed; never properly ‘governed’ /QUOTE]

As threatfull as it is you sir have defined freedom in this statement. A lack of governance "proper governance" "managed"... Hah loosley managed?? Close to correct. Men, sons and grandsons of war, their culture is war. No man needs to be managed just influenced, the russians developed this culture, we americans supported it (not having a clue of the fallout in their extremeist culture)....We could not percieve.

Bull****, their culture is managed with a defined influence of extremeist muslim belief, some of their hearts may differ thus is the complexity of the true strugle.

Truth is we are seeking out a man we have not found, binladen. Makes me feel impotent that we have not drawn blood from the source that killed so many innocent lives.

[ArthurBorges]

Shortly before her death, Ms. Benazir Bhutto was interviewed by David Frost. She added in passing that bin Laden had been for two years -- and Mr. Frost went directly into his next question without blinking.

Last I saw of the FBI website several years ago, Mr. bin Laden was wanted for all sorts of interesting things, but 9/11 did not figure among them.

[Load Toad]

Osama bin Laden is irrelevant. Dead or alive the Alchlamydia idea is out there like a viral video. The post 9-11 reaction of building the terrorist organisation into some almighty supergroup with complex underground bunkers descending 14 floors down like some sort of Tracey Island and cells operating everywhere ready to rain down fire in any country they wished just made the swine even more attractive to those that feel they need a figurehead in their battles against the great satan, little satan and all their minions.
Every time we announce we've killed a senior commander or terror #2 or such it is like that sorcerers apprentice scene in Fantasia - another mad mop just turns up out of the wreckage.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

It’s perhaps both disturbing and ironic that Government words of solace and encouragement to the homeland voters probably does have that very same galvanising and inspiring effect on the Islamic fanatics (or maybe any individual who generally detests the “West” and what we represent).

It must be very difficult in the ‘Stan where one region is being subject to a softly-softly, hearts and minds campaign when, elsewhere, there are regions subject to focused aggression and overwhelming fire power.

[LurkerBelow]

It's puzzling that no one has followed up in the Italian initiative of
keeping peace - pay the local insurgents to stay away. It is probably
cheaper in the long run and the West's financial resources would be
able to outbid any counter offer.
However, the current political climate in Westminister would make the morality of such scheme somewhat unpalatable and suspect.
Such a pity...

[highcirrus]

LurkerBelow - From Defence of the Realm, 15 Oct 09 (http://defenceoftherealm.com)

Bribing our way to victory

Much shock and indignation is attendant on the revelation in The Times that Italian forces in charge of the Sarobi area, east of Kabul, had been "been paying tens of thousands of dollars to Taleban commanders and local warlords to keep the area quiet."

This has come to light after the incident last year when ten French soldiers were killed in an ambush by Afghan "insurgents" in what was thought to be a relatively peaceful area.

It is reported. however, that the Italians hid the existence of these payments from the incoming French forces. Thus, no further payments were forthcoming after the departure of the Italians. Haji Abdul Rahman, a tribal elder from Sarobi, recalls how a benign environment then became hostile overnight. But, with the French unaware of what had been going on, they made a "catastrophically incorrect threat assessment", sending out lightly equipped patrol into the area, with the tragic result recorded.

What is perhaps best demonstrated by this affair, however, is the fact that the Italians were able to "buy" peace in the areas under their control, and that this was maintained for as long as, but only for as long as, the payments were forthcoming.

So, while The Times is reporting that, once the US discovered that payments were being made, they made a diplomatic protest to Silvio Berlusconi's government in June 2008, this was perhaps entirely the wrong reaction. A more intelligent response might have been to investigate how, and under what circumstances payments were made, and then to replicate what seems to have been a highly successful pacification strategy.

The use of bribes or "allowances" has, in fact, been a long-standing instrument of political control in this region and, indeed, we made reference to its use in our earlier piece, where we recalled the insurrection led by the Faqir of Ipi.

Author Milan Hauner noted that the British had paid allowances in cash to tribal maliks which for the year 1940 amounted to nearly one million Rupees for the whole Tribal Territory spanning what is now the Afghan-Pakistan border. While these payments were theoretically for services rendered, Hauner notes that Wazirs and other Pathan tribes came to the conclusion that the shortest cut to lucrative allowances was not through loyal service, but by occasional demonstration of their nuisance value.

The thrust of this observation was picked up recently in another piece in the context of contemporary suggestions that bribing the Taleban could again bring peace to the region. Author Martin Parsons noted that the Pushtun (Pathan) tribes had been given muwajib - an "allowance" - to live peacefully. They accepted the allowance, claimed Parsons, then a year or so later rose up against the government until they received another allowance.

Parsons may, however, be misunderstanding the position, and certainly the nature of the mawajib allowances. It is certainly the case that ad hoc payments had very little lasting effect, but it also appears that the system of payments did continue and became highly formalised – to the extent that, on partition, it was adopted by the Pakistani government and became one of the primary mechanisms of control in its Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

According to this source, there was a structured system which comprised in the first instance the maliki. This was a hereditary allowance to the head of a tribe, paid subject to "good conduct" of the heir of the Malik (head of the tribe), and approval of the government.

There was also the lungi, a personal allowance for individual service, which could be modified on the death of the lungi holder, and then there were the mawajib allowances which were paid to the entire tribe biannually. In other words, these were continuous payments, the purpose of which was "to maintain amicable political relations with the tribes, to bind them to the government of Pakistan by excluding other 'influences' and hence outside interference in the area."

Interestingly, the maliks and elders who received allowances for a tribe/section were perceived as the political medium and were required to restrain and control their tribesmen from committing any act hostile or subversive to the state – exactly the purpose for which the Italians paid their "bribes" to the Taleban.

To a very considerable extent, this system seems to have been successful up and until the Soviet invasion of 1979, before which the threat had been neighbouring Afghanistan. Its governments had been hostile to the creation of Pakistan and were blamed for assisting and abetting Pukhtan (Pashtun) demands for a separate homeland for which the term "Pukhtunistan" had been coined. Thus, the Pakistan government sought to counteract Afghan propaganda and influences with the help of those who received allowances, namely the maliks and elders.

What appears to have broken the system was the Soviet invasion. Quite how devastating the breakdown was is recorded in great detail in a PhD thesis by a Pakistani researcher, available from the Pakistan Research Repository. The effects were later to bring Dr Christian Tripodi, writing for RUSI to conclude that the colonial model of laissez faire administration no longer had any lessons for us.

The flood of radical elements into that region during the Afghan-Soviet war since 1980, he wrote - a trend that has only accelerated since the coalition invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 - and the increasingly ambitious political agenda of certain of those elements has only highlighted the weaknesses of what is to all intents and purposes the British colonial system, in the face of a radically changed strategic environment.

Even more recently though, Fred Kaplan has reactivated the debate, asking whether we can bribe our way to victory. For certain constituents, he writes, such as officials and tribal chiefs, a barrelful of money fits the bill - and could ease the path for letting us, or the central government, pursue more broadly appealing programs, such as building roads, providing jobs, and sowing crops other than poppies.

The idea, he notes, may seem outrageous, until one considers that we're currently spending about $4 billion a month on this war. A discreet and well-planned bribery program would cost pennies on the dollar - a mere rounding error in a calculation of the budget.

Outrageous it may seem, but what might one ask are the subsidies paid by the UK government to the outlying regions of Wales and Scotland, and the massive payments made to Northern Ireland, if not "bribes" by any other name?

It is difficult to find any firm evidence of a structured system of allowances or "subsidies" paid in the main areas of Afghanistan, although this report suggests that allowances of the nature suggested by Kaplan have long been a central part of the governance of the country.

And, with our own government recently announcing a £12-million scheme to fight working-class "extremism" in Britain, it might not be untoward to suggest that the Italians, in spending a somewhat smaller sum to counter "extremism" in their own sector of Afghanistan, were not altogether misguided. Their only mistake, it would seem, was in not telling the French.

[sisemen]

Perhaps just pull out, leave the whole sorry mess to the locals and turn a very blind eye and deaf ear to the wailings and rantings of the huggy left/women's liberationists about the way that women are being treated in that tearful part of the world.

One wonders where the huggy left/wl are now, now that we are giving Afghani women a modicum of freedom? I guess when it comes to bullets and bodies they just fade away :yuk:

[Wiley]

An oversimplifiction certainly, because there were many very complex elements involved, but what do many consider to be the 'magic bullet' (no pun intended) that ended the Malayan 'Emergency'? (The only instance where a communist insurgency has been totally defeated by a colonial power.)

The answer is cash for bullets/guns.

The British came to a similar conclusion as the Italians and the writer of the article above - that it was cheaper to pay the communists (and turn them into capitalists:)) for turning in their bullets and guns than to have to take them off them in a far more costly to all concerned firefight.

They came up with a price per bullet, per pistol, per rifle and per machine gun. One communist became an instant multimillionaire when he led the British to a huge cache of buried arms and ammunition that THEY had dropped to the CTs during WW2. But they paid up, and the communists, almost overwhelmingly Chinese, (and therefore really businessmen at heart), quickly saw the error of their ways when they saw ex-colleagues, forgiven and granted full amnesty, buying mansions and businesses.

If there's anyone out there with no life willing to troll through the PPrune archives, you'll see that I predicted back in 2003 that this would be the only way the Americans had any chance of winning in Iraq.

Exactly the same system won't work with the Afghans, (no rural Afghan is going to give up all his guns), but a variation, even if it isn't totally successful, will probably achieve as close to success as any foreigner's going to get in Afghanistan, and be a damn sight cheaper, if only in that most valuable asset of all - our soldiers' lives - than Plan 'A'.

[North Front]

Templar's Malayan villages plan and the US version in Vietnam - 'Strategic Hamlets' did work. Albeit, the Strat Hamlets plan failed once the US had colluded with those plotting Diem's assasination.... and regretted it instantly.

However, using the sucess of the Malayan strategy as an exemplar is flawed... as it was in Vietnam... because the key factor that the British had in their favour was that they were able to effectively control things going in and out of Malaya. With the porous borders today (and with the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and Cambodia during VN) this is impossible.

As an aside, Robert Thomson, Templar's COIN expert and later adviser to Kennedy and Nixon, was an ex RAF officer who had been an ALO with the Chindit columns. His autobig 'Run for the Hills' is well worth a read.

Who says ELCs aren't a good thing!

[Low Flier]

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[Low Flier]

As many will have seen in the Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/26/AR2009102603394.html?hpid=topnews&sid=ST2009102603447), one of the most senior State Department officials in Afghanistan has resigned and has openly declared his reasons for doing so.

His resignation letter (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/hp/ssi/wpc/ResignationLetter.pdf) shows a great understanding of the problem(s) of the US/UK military occupation of Afghanistan.

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[Load Toad]

For a start changing the drug laws we have might be some help.

[Low Flier]

Changing the drug laws they have might do a lot more.

It's not as if the occupation troops don't know where the poppy fields are. They could be doing something useful while they're there. They're not.

Cut the supply of heroin at source. That would be something useful for the occupation troops to do while they're there. Simply skittling Pashtuns isn't a particularly useful pastime.

[Load Toad]

Then people will find a place to get opium from somewhere else and so you'll just move the problem. Oh and for a short while the price of scag will go up so there will be more street crime n such - but hey - if you are happy with that lets just carry on.

[Low Flier]

Opium production, more than 90% of it anyway, takes place in the occupied territory mostly because it's geographically suitable for the opium poppies. The crop producers have protection in the form of the occupation forces.

Unlike marijuana, opium poppies cannot be grown in attics in Liverpool, Newcastle or Glasgow.

That American restaurateur, who is actually little more than a puppet mayor of Kabul but was made "president" by his puppetmasters early in the occupation, has been a godsend for the opium trade in Afghanistan. That's why heroin is more available on the streets of Europe and elesewhere than it has ever been.

[Modern Elmo]

Changing the drug laws they have might do a lot more.

And how would further liberalizing of drug laws in the EU or in the EU provinces formerly known as UK decrease opiate-related revenue for the Tallyban?

Opium production, more than 90% of it anyway, takes place in the occupied territory mostly because it's geographically suitable for the opium poppies. The crop producers have protection in the form of the occupation forces.

Unlike marijuana, opium poppies cannot be grown in attics in Liverpool, Newcastle or Glasgow. ..

So let's spray the Afghan poppy fields with weed killer. Repeat as often as needed.

Less drug revenue for the T.'s, less heroin for Liverpool, Newcastle or Glasgow.

[Wiley]

So let's spray the Afghan poppy fields with weed killer. Repeat as often as needed.I think many of our troops on the Stan wish it was so simple. The Americans, to some degree, want to do just that, while the Brits (quite probably correctly) see such moves as a guarantee of turning a 90% of the time peaceful farmer into a 100% of his time Taliban.

As I read that resignation letter, before I got to the writer's reference to Vietnam, I was thinking how incrediblly closely the situation with the US and the current (US/UN-appointed) Afghan Government parallels the situation in the early to mid sixties during the time of Diem and the series of generals who followed him pre-Thieu.

As history is wont to repeat itself, one can only wonder if the current Afghan President, (when, like Diem, he is deemed by Washington to be not delivering the goods), might meet a similar fate to Diem's. Nothing would surprise me. What might keep him alive is the sad fact that there's probably no one in the wings who the Americans consider suitable to fill the void.

[ArthurBorges]

That's why heroin is more available on the streets of Europe and elesewhere than it has ever been.

And who has the logistical capability to ship out all those tonnages?

Think 'bout it.

[Load Toad]

Indeed Arthur.

[ArthurBorges]

Agent provocateur | Friendly Fire | Blogs, RT info | RT (http://www.russiatoday.com/About_Us/Blogs/Friendly_Fire.html)

[minigundiplomat]

Only education, and correct law enforcement in the UK can stop the use of heroin or opiates.

Spraying agent orange around the Helmand valley will just help us lose the battle quicker, and cause more deaths amongst the UK contingent.

A stark question but which is worth more: someone prepared to put their life on the line for their country, or someone who despite knowing it will ultimately kill them, can't say no to a pusher?

The whole counter narcotics issue is a govt justification red herring. It could happen in the future, but there is a whole lot of stuff that needs to happen first.

[rmac]

Watching the news about the recent Moscow conference on the AIDS crisis doing its best to reduce the Russian population it would appear that the vast majority of infections are shared needles full of Afghan heroin.

Without going off on to a tangent about whether the Russians are over conservative about not allowing needle exchanges and methadone prescriptions, it does rather bring me to consider that the Russians might be a rather useful ally in putting the Afghan Drug Lords out of business if we made that the focus of the war and not regime change....

[ProfessionalStudent]

Times Online - Army Want to Retreat in Afghanistan (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6907939.ece)

Could this be a move towards the "Third Way"? From my recent experience in theatre it is apparent we have spread ourselves thinner than ever, so this could be a good thing as long as it is handled correctly...

It will be interesting to see what CDS has to say bout it on The Andrew Marr Show shortly (get it on iPlayer if you miss it).

[Load Toad]

OK - some people will always want to do drugs and frankly currant drugs laws have been a total failure. Anything that stops nasty people getting drug money is a good thing but since our rulers and foolers like to be all holier than thou and 'hard on crime and the causes of crime' we are cursed to have street crime and black money going to criminals and terrorists. Just f' great. Thanks.

Gassing, poisoning and spraying chemicals over vast swathes of Afghanistan - a good idea? No - it wasn't a good idea when Mussolini did it in Ethiopia, it didn't help when the Americans did it in Vietnam; public opinion would go ape-**** and the populations thus affected would have a greater reason to want to kick out the occupiers and support the Very Nasty People.

Now it seems to me there are some fairly / relatively wealthy people in Afghanistan and they live in towns and they want a democracy and they want a peaceful place so they can encourage investment, cream as much off as they can and then go about making money and being decadent and such. And then there are these people out in the countryside and some of them just want to be left alone, some of them hate the occupying forces and some of them wish that the taliban would chill out and just let people get along. And it seems they don't really want outside help that much because they know one day it'll move out and then it'll be a case of 'You fraternised with the enemy you collaborator so now we take revenge.' Which isn't nice.

And of course there is the issue of this Allbranistan (for there will be another) currently being a focus for everyone that doesn't like damn western christian imperialists.

You can tell that our great leaders are slowly getting utterly fed up with these wars upsetting the opinion polls back home and oh how they wish it would go away. So they'll want an out soon. Even if there is a 'surge' it'll be to set the scene so they can get out and say 'Now it is up to you Mr. Middle class of Thisstan 'ere.' And then they'll be off out saying 'Job well done - exit with honour, heroes all.'

In summary - look after the towns, set up as best can oases of security - leave.

In about 2 years I reckon.