Another Night-HEMS accident in US

[skadi]

N911LZ American Eurocopter EC-145 Medical copter crashes, crew walks away with only sprains, bruises (http://diamondpilots.*************/2009/08/n911lz-american-eurocopter-ec-145.html)

VIDEO/PHOTOS: Medical copter crashes, crew walks away with only sprains, bruises : naplesnews.com (http://www.setanchor.com/news/2009/aug/17/breaking-news-medical-helicopter-crashes-captiva-i/?print=1)

skadi

[MightyGem]

Well, at least everyone "walked" away from this one.

[ChopperFAN]

Wow... great to hear there were no fatalities

The pics of the wreckage recovery show the complete tail boom ripped off and the tail gearbox not attached to... I would say from impact but heres a link showing pics anyhows

http://www.alecbuck.com/

Fly safe... :D

[Special 25]

How do they get insurance for these operations ???? Perhaps the accident rate isn't as bad as it seems from this side of the pond ?

[spinwing]

Mmmmm ...

Damage very typical for Bo105/Bk117/Ec145 ...... like a Hu500 very crash worthy airframe.


So sad it had to happen .... but happy everyone walked/swam away from it !


:ok:

[InsuranceGuy]

They do get insurance, but it costs a packet, US medevac is not the most liked class of risk, in fact prob slightly better then Ab-initio....:)

[Mars]

NTSB Identification: ERA09LA464
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, August 17, 2009 in North Captiva Island, FL
Aircraft: EUROCOPTER DEUTSCHLAND GMBH EC-145, registration: N911LZ
Injuries: 3 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On August 17, 2009, at 0031 eastern daylight time, a Eurocopter EC-145, N911LZ, operated by the Lee County Division of Public Safety, as MedStar 1, was substantially damaged when it impacted water near North Captiva Island, Florida. The pilot and two medical crewmembers were not injured. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight that originated at Page Field Airport (FMY), Fort Myers, Florida. The positioning flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to the pilot, she received a call around midnight for a patient pickup on North Captiva Island. After departure from FMY, she flew west over the water, with the autopilot engaged (set on altitude hold), at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The helicopter remained at 1,000 feet to assure obstruction clearance (towers on Pine Island). After passing over the towers, the pilot descended to 800 feet, using autopilot. At the same time, she was attempting to contact the Captiva Fire Department (FD) on the radio. The pilot reported she tried to call the FD 4 or 5 times with no response, and then contacted Lee County Dispatch to confirm which frequency the FD was using.

When the helicopter was approximately 3 minutes from landing, the pilot selected 500 feet using the autopilot and the helicopter initiated a descent to that altitude. She continued toward the airfield and made a final transmission to the FD that she was "one minute out."

The pilot commented to the medical crew that she could see the FD moving fire trucks to the center of the landing zone (a grass airstrip). She stated she wasn't concerned that she could not reach the FD since she was landing on an airfield, and was familiar with the obstructions in the landing zone.

The plot could not remember the exact sequence of the final 500-foot descent; however, at some point she remembered the medical crew commenting they "couldn't see anything." She responded, that the flight to Captiva is usually very dark over the water and there's "never anything to see." She remembered turning on the search light and shortly after, impacting the water. She also stated she thought she "pulled power and cyclic" when she saw the water; but didn't have time to warn the crew. After the helicopter impacted the water, it flipped over and was submerged within seconds.

The pilot and two paramedics were able to egress from the helicopter and swim to the surface of the water. They climbed onto the underside of the helicopter and waited for a FD boat to pick them up.

The pilot had flown to North Captiva Island numerous times prior to the accident flight. She reported that the "sight picture was the same as previous flights;" however, the pilot did remember that during the accident just prior to impact, she saw an amber altitude alert on the primary flight display (signifying the autopilot was disengaged). The pilot did not remember ever disconnecting the autopilot during the flight, and knew she was "at the controls at impact." The pilot additionally reported no mechanical problems with the helicopter.

Both paramedics reported the flight was routine (with the exception of being unable to contact the FD), until they were within a few minutes of landing at North Captiva Island. At that time, they commented that they "couldn't see anything" outside of the helicopter. They observed what appeared to be rain outside the helicopter; however, since they knew it was not raining at the time, they thought this was the rotorwash from the water below. The helicopter then immediately impacted the water, flipped over, and the cabin filled with water within 5 seconds.

A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector examined the helicopter after the accident. According to the inspector, flight control continuity was established and no anomalies were noted with the helicopter's engines.

The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. She also held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. The pilot's most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on February 24, 2009. At that time, the pilot reported 5,800 hours of total flight experience.

The weather reported at FMY, at 0053, included winds from 060 degrees at 4 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 25 degrees C, dew point 23 degrees C, and altimeter setting 30.07 inches mercury.

[alouette]

these folks were unbelievably lucky having walked away from that one:ok:

[Epiphany]

Are the paramedics part of the flight crew in these single pilot operations and if so why are they not assisting with navigation and situational awareness? Sounds as if they were sitting in the back with no patient to distract them yet having no input whatsoever.

[SASless]

The following link has a very good news report on the event, a spot map showing the crash site off the island.....and a nice video. In the article you can see a google earth link (text in purple print) that shows the dirt strip that runs across the island "between" houses on either side of it. The landing strip cuts a developed area in two and is dark on each end.

Crews still working to recover downed helicopter - NBC-2.com WBBH News for Fort Myers, Cape Coral & Naples, Florida (http://www.nbc-2.com/global/story.asp?s=10939794)

DoubleBogey can have fun with this situation I would think.....it would play right into his concept of a formalized approach procedure rather than peering out the windows.

I do have to wonder if the Pilot was using the GPS distance readout to determine distance from mid-field....along with her MK I's? Also...wonder what the RadAlt bug was set to? Did they have the Night Sun fired up and pointing down? I don't reckon the crew had NVG's either!

[helmet fire]

I too wonder if they had used any of those helpers. Seems like it was a known, airfield approach and she was a human who may have relaxed at just the wrong time with task familiarity. We have all been there.

Glad she and her crew are still with us that we might all learn how to avoid the trap that got them.

I will go out on a limb here: they were not wearing NVG. If they were, I would expect extreme hysteria about the dangers of NVG.

Nevermind the extreme dangers of not seeing the ground!

[alouette3]

From the NTSB's preliminary report, it would seem she set the auto pilot to descend to 500 feeet and flew into the water.She was using the auto pilot alt. hold for her cruise at 1000' feet agl(or amsl).
Will try and find the link and post it here.
Alt3.

[alouette3]

Oops ! Sorry! Just saw somebody had already posted the NTSB prelim report.
Alt3

[skadi]

Seems to be another classic Night-CFIT with a very lucky outcome!

skadi

[Hullaballoo]

Are the paramedics part of the flight crew in these single pilot operations

Unfortunately they are not, although it might make a lot sense if there were (particularly for operations that use NVG's).

In many cases, the paramedics are hospital employees, whilst the aircraft and pilot are leased by the hospital under "for hire" operations. So the pilot is flight crew, but not the med crew...

[Devil 49]

For-profit or otherwise; Single or twin: IFR/VFR; autopilot or handflown; until we, in the industry, deal with the real issue, night EMS accident rates will continue out of proportion. Pilot error is problem in all accidents, and a pilot handicapped by a poorly considered transition to a night shift is going to make more errors.
A021, risk matrices, all the rest of the easy answers are not going to make a pilot any smarter. We don't need to reinvent the wheel- sleep deficiency issues, circadian and sleep disruption, a/k/a jet lag, general fatigue, are known issues with some fairly well established resolutions. They may require unsettling, inconvenient and disruptive changes to 'the way we've always done it', but tradition is killing us: For-profit or otherwise; Single or twin: IFR/VFR; Autopilot or handflown.

[windowseatplease]

Sounds like a DH bug setting of 200 feet and the use of 'cruise-height' mode on the AP would have prevented this accident.

Doesn't the company have standard procedures for things like this?

[BV234driver]

Mars, thanks for posting the NTSB prelim. Helmet-fire, you're right on the money: why isn't the HEMS community leaning towards the use of NVGs? With over 500 hours of NVG time in some very demanding enviornments, I can honestly say that I don't like flying unaided. For some commercial ops, it's a non-issue. For HEMS, PD, and other ops that are conducted to field sites at night in low visibility, it seems like an unwise safety decision.

And there will be nay-sayers touting the limited field of view when using NVGs, etc, but the proof exists in the numbers. I'd be curious what the statistics are for accidents per 100,000 hours for operators using NVGs and those without. -even operators in similar mission modes (border patrol, PD, etc).

Not to mention, three sets of NVGs, initial and yearly training won't add up to more than the cost of that EC.

[Gomer Pylot]

Most operators seem to be working towards using NVGs, but the FAA is a severe holdup. Their extremely slow approval rate is the problem. My company has the goggles on the shelf, but the FAA will only approve bases at about the rate of one a week, and that's only because the company is pushing them. It will take well into next year to get the NVG approval for all the bases, even though the equipment is on hand, and the installation is as standard as it can get. The FAA fought all NVG use by civilian programs for years, and only started allowing them very recently. NVG use will become pretty much universal, I think, but it will take time.

I also think SASless is well behind the times. FAA inspectors visit one of our bases pretty much every day. Enforcement has been a priority for some time, and the only holdup on that has been the lack of personnel, left over from the previous administration which didn't want to enforce any regulations on any company at any time. It's getting better, but slowly.

[SASless]

Gom,

They checking weather reports, flight plans, and routing on night flights to see if ya'll are seeing enough lights where you fly? They done any night flights with you to see for themselves you are complying with the rule?

It is not how often they show up but what they do when they are there.

I am not suggesting they become the Gestapo by any means but look into areas of concern that are known factors in these accidents we seem to be having due to the same old causes year after year.

Checking paperwork and duty hours logs and looking in the maintenance log or doing an audit on training documentation is not going to make that big a change in the safety performance. Monitoring the flight activity and all the operational issues will.

[TimeOnTarget]

I think the old school geriatrics at the FAA are to blame due to their unfounded fear of NVGs based on their own ignorance. Today's goggles are leaps and bounds beyond the cut-away 5s that I first used over 20 years ago.

I can make any pilot safer by a multiple factor in as little as 5 hours of NVG training. It is criminal to send a pilot out unaided. Shame, shame.

[Gomer Pylot]

How would they go about checking lights after the fact? And no, they don't ride with us, because there is no room. We can't carry an inspector and a patient at the same time. Either we follow the rules or we don't. We aren't children, and we should know right from wrong when it comes to the rules. If we don't, people can, and often do, die. The regulations are there, we know what they say and what they mean, and when we're out there alone, we have to follow them. The feds cannot, and should not, look over our shoulders every minute of every flight. Personal responsibility is still important.

[rotorspeed]

Gomer is spot on. And in fact personal responsibility is not just important but fundamental and crucial. Harsh though it sounds, this accident is surely basic pilot error and I'm sure she'd be the first to admit it. A clear night, pretty flat terrain, a sophisticated helicopter and it simply gets flown into the sea on approach. Scanning the altimeter should have prevented this, let alone the radalt. Sure ground reference was scanty, but all the more reason to fly with careful reference to height.

The real lesson here is that as pilots we can all make mistakes and so have to be continually careful and not get complacent. It is important that a culture doesn't develop where people default to blaming systems and lack of equipment etc unreasonably and as a knee jerk reaction.

Wonderful all safe. But a huge waste of money and another blow to the reputation of helicopters.

[SASless]

What is it about American EMS Helicopter pilots that allows for such poor decision making then? It is not the individual as the problem is wide spread across the entire industry. Why do we continue to fly perfectly sound helicopters into the ground/water year after year? Why can we not see the "trap" being sprung on us until the trigger snaps?

This poor lady is no different than probably thousands of pilots now filling seats of EMS helicopters....it happened to her....and she is only the most recent victim....and Lord knows we have hundreds of others that fell prey to the same situation or very similar situations.

What is the answer to the problem?

Better yet....exactly what is the problem?

Until we know that....we cannot address the situation with an effective response.

[alouette3]

SASLess,

We have had this discussion before on this forum. It all boils down to culture. Right from the word go, Americans are taught to be independent, self reliant and courageous.Risk taking is valued. All good qualities if you have to win the wild west, open a business after quitting a well paying job or invent the airplane. But the down side : risky behavior,anti -authority(dont' want the FAA or anybody getting into my stuff!) and,in a single pilot operation like ours, deviations from standard procedures that go unchecked.The key difference is that the rest of the world will not do anything unless it is specifically authorized, whereas we Americans will do everything that is not specifically forbidden.
Hard to change a mindset of a culture. Wouldn't you say?
Alt3.

[rotorspeed]

SASless, you're generalising here too much. With many EMS accidents there are clearly hazardous, challenging, specific circumstances, and sensible operational changes should only be established by looking at each of the incidents and identifying what the cause/major risk factors really were in each one.

For example, most seem to involve poor weather at night. And one can see logic in implementing better weather reporting, use of IFR helicopters and pilots, NVGs etc if one is going to operate at night, though I'm no expert in this field.

But the difference here is that this incident didn't have any really challenging elements.

The problem is that we are human beings, and can make mistakes. In the future, as affordable technology increases and tolerance of accidents reduces, our ability as human pilots to have the freedom to fly, be responsible for the control of aircraft (and cars etc), and exercise judgement, is going to depend on our ability to make fewer mistakes.

[SASless]

A3,

Never having been one to challenge authority or resist oversight by those I perceived as less knowing or not as skilled as I.....I find your suggestion Americans in general and helicopter pilots in particular resist standardized, regulated, and monitored conduct in the performance of their duties and in establishing a risk adverse approach to flight. Don't the rest of you out there embrace such concepts as most of us truely professional airmen have?

One would suppose rational, semi-intelligent, and reasonable folk would be able to discern when risk taking compared to the expected return fails to measure up to the level that is acceptable.

Are you saying Americans and Helicopter pilots being creatures of our environment are not suitable equipped by our socialization to confront the demands of Helicopter EMS flying? If that is so, your suggestion as I perceive it, and the result if true, then there is no hope for turning this situation around without the import of foreign influences.

Am I wrong in my perception?

[alouette3]

SASLess,
I certainly hope that the majority of the pilots here are like you. That they can distinguish betweeh high risk and low risk activities and make proper judgement calls. And,no, it is not too late to turn it around. After all the airline industry of the 1950's went through the same problems we face today: poor safety record, low wages due to excessive supply of pilots ex WW2, labor strife etc. Look at them now. If they can do it so can we.We certainly don't need the European model or the Canadian model here. What we need to do is adopt that which is good from them and make it work for us.The answer probably lies somwhere in the middle between Capitalist Cowboys and the Nanny state.
Alt3

[What Limits]

We certainly don't need the European model or the Canadian model here.

Perhaps you do as they are killing a lot fewer people than you are.

[alouette3]

What Limits,

Yes, we certainly are. However, we are flying and saving a lot more people than the two are too. Does Natasha Richardson ring a bell?I am convinced that if she had been skiing in Colorado, she would be alive today. Somehow or the other, an 'unsafe' yank, flying a poorly equipped helicopter would have got there and done his/her job. Of course, it maybe quite possible that the insurance company here would not have paid the bill,unlike the Canadian and European sytem of govt. sponsored HEMS.
ALT3

[SASless]

Well now....this exchange brings up a question.

When we count the "dead"....should we include those that snuff it because of the lack of, non-existence of, or the lack of flying due to regulations and counter the numbers of those that are killed in EMS crashes, to arrive at a net gain/loss analysis to determine whether we are gaining or losing in the lives saved/lives lost tally?

After all....human life is precious (except maybe to those on the far left of the political spectrum as evidenced by the current debate on healthcare here in the USA or those in the UK who accept the NICE doctrine) thus even if we lose a bunch but save one more than we lose....then the cost is worth it. Right?

[alouette3]

SASLess,
My point was not about benefit-risk. Any one life lost in an HEMS crash is one too many. Just wanted to highlight the fact that the volume of HEMS flights conducted in the US versus those in other developed nations,will not compare favorably.Higher volume therefore higher accident rate. Does that mean we accept the status quo? Certainly not. But this constant comparison with the Canadian system and how great their safety record is odious.Apples to Oranges, my friend. Every discussion centered around that is ---er--- fruitless.
Alt3.

[Gomer Pylot]

You have to look beyond just numbers. ISTR that there are more helicopters flying daily in the Gulf of Mexico than exist in either Canada or Europe. With much larger numbers of operations, there will inevitably be more accidents. You have to look at the rate, not just the raw numbers. Yes, there are more accidents in the US, but there are many more helicopters flying many more hours.

[Aussierob]

Does Natasha Richardson ring a bell?I am convinced that if she had been skiing in Colorado, she would be alive today.


Natasha Richardson's death had nothing to do with the lack of an EMS helicopter and everything to do with her declining treatment and going back to her hotel for a few hours. If she had taken the patrols advice to go to the clinic and get checked out, she may well be alive.

[SASless]

That might be Aussie Rob but upon discerning there was a problem.....the lack of a Helicopter EMS service doomed her to her fate without any doubt. If there had been a service perhaps she might have survived...at least there would have been a chance.

Is that situation a case of Nationalized Health Care bureaucrats weighing cost benefits against the value of lives? How does a Canadian Province justify not having a Helicopter EMS service when the rest of the country does?

[ramen noodles]

Poor SASless is alone, let me help out. Is European helicopter flying safer than in the US? No, statistically, the US accident rate and fatal accident rate per hour is actually a tad lower, although not enough to declare a significant difference. Eurpoeans fly less (about half as much), have more rules, pay more (because they think it buys them something), gnash their teeth more, and brag more, but in the end, they harm their passengers at the same rate.

[Devil 49]

Think about it- Why would night EMS be disproportionately more dangerous?
The same pilots, aircraft, area, and flights as they do in daylight, but the accident rate is somewhere in the area of 4 times the day rate. This event reinforces the pattern that it doesn't seem to matter if the aircraft is a single or twin, IFR or VFR, or autopilot equipped: pilot error seems to be more common at night.

[Gordy]

Devil

doesn't seem to matter if the aircraft is a single or twin, IFR or VFR, or autopilot equipped: pilot error seems to be more common at night.

Agreed, but take a look at your logbook. I just looked at mine and low and behold 3% of my total time is at night. I am guessing that most pilots have infinitely more experience of flying during daylight hours. How many training flights take place at night? I would hazard a guess that all required training is done in day VFR conditions.

Have to agree with Sasless about the FAA oversight. I have NEVER seen an FAA inspector after 4pm. In general, the oversight is to check paperwork and duty hours. (Caveat--I am NOT in EMS, nor have I ever flown EMS, or do I ever wish to..).

[windowseatplease]

Gordy? Surely you mean 3%?

If you have 10,000 hours then 0.03% would mean you only have 3 hours night?

[Gordy]

Window:

Gordy? Surely you mean 3%?


You are correct. Ahhh the conversion from a decimal to a % gets me again.. I will correct--thanx.

[BV234driver]

After all the FAA and industry complains about HEMS having a higher standard accident rate than GA, and there's demand to fix the problem... But like sas said, and I have to agree- where are the inspectors? No, we don't like them there- I'm not the main guy at our operation, but pretty near for purposes of responsibility; and I can objectively say that there are times we need to tighten up a bit.

If the FAA is serious, then they need to spend some time with several operators in the highest risk sections- several that operate different ways (with NVG, without, single/dual pilot). And agreed- taking a VFR ride in the day is supposed to evaluate someone who routinely performs at night or under NVGs either overwater or into/out of confined areas? That's something the military types have been doing for years- evaluating people in the most demanding flight environment.

Ask ourselves this- Why is it that USFS determined the need to card pilots for operations, and operating in HEMS requires nothing other than meeting the FARs? I know we dislike oversight- me included, but the implied statement is that by not carding or any other requirements- it's not as difficult or risky.

Just like I've told the guys that have worked for me- it doesn't take anything other than a couple minutes walking onto the hangar floor to see what kind of maintenance is going on and where the problems lay- the key here is being there and finding out for yourself. Spot on- paperwork and auditing is only 1/8th to 1/4 of it.

[Gomer Pylot]

USFS carding is a joke. They sent a guy down to the Gulf of Mexico from Boise, ID, to card us. He had never been in or near the model we were flying, and had no idea even how to start it. All he wanted to see was slope landings, which are seldom required on offshore platforms. It was a complete waste of his and our time, but he got a vacation on the Gulf.

EMS pilots are supposed to be trained and checked by the operator. Carding is just a customer requirement, with the government being the customer. We have quite a few washouts in training, more than one would expect from experienced pilots, and we get annual recurrent training, just like everyone else. I do agree that the recurrent should include night checkrides, but that isn't likely to happen. The FAA cannot, by law, prevent or delay flights, so there is no way they can ride along with most operators. They could theoretically require field checkrides, but they have to justify those, again by law, and it's not that easy. If they're not going to ride along, what good is a night inspection? The FAA is doing what they can, and my main complaint is the slow progress of NVG approvals. I want those, but it's going to be a year or two before I see them, at the rate they're approving them.

[Gordy]

Gomer:

USFS carding is a joke. They sent a guy down to the Gulf of Mexico from Boise, ID, to card us.

While I agree in your particular instance it may have been a joke,---in the fire world it is not always a joke. Not too many wild fires on oilrigs huh?? I have had to demonstrate the VR standards with a bucket on more than one carding ride.

In theory, the carding system is good, and could "possibly" be applied to the EMS industry. If nothing else--it is a good discussion point.

[Gomer Pylot]

No, not many wildfires on offshore oil rigs, at least none that are fought by helicopter. No buckets, no long lines, no slingloads of any kind, just straight and level to the rigs and back. But we were on government contracts, so we had to be carded, even though the check pilot had never even seen an offshore rig, and had no desire at all to fly over water.

So who is going to apply carding to EMS? The US government isn't a customer or contractor. USFS carding applies only to US government contracts. Nobody else is affected.

Now if the US government wants to take over all air ambulance service, and card the contractors, it might be possible, but that won't happen this year.

[SASless]

I suppose it assumes those doing the "carding" or "flight checking" have the experience and background to kniow what they are doing. That I submit is the point at which the FAA meets its Waterloo!

You see lots of Inspectors that are out of the Army....never flown in the commerical world.....or who are green as grass and and are a danger to themselves but can pass an FAA Checkride. There are some very good guys in the FAA but the FAA system does not promote "Helicopter" guys as they do those from the Fixed Wing side of the house. Thus in my view, there are serveral ways the FAA walks on its own Willy.

Add in the bureaucracy and the hurdles it presents and we cannot look to the FAA to be the shining star in the Points of Light out there.

There are consultants working in this field but do you think the Operators are going to call in some outsiders to tell them how they are messing up? Worse yet, as a consultant how do you tell your client that and get invited back again?

[Gordy]

Gomer:

So who is going to apply carding to EMS? The US government isn't a customer or contractor. USFS carding applies only to US government contracts.

I agree with your points. My only point is that the "carding model" appears to work for the fire industry. I have NEVER been questioned for turning down flights. The relationship I have with my crew is one of mutual respect. From what you say---you have a good working relationship. The "carding pilots" I have flown with have all been former fire pilots in the industry with vast experience. My last carding ride was conducted by someone with 30 years fire fighting experience who just got hired by the government as a check pilot last year.

I do not claim to know anything about EMS, but maybe the carding "model" would help. How about having some "senior EMS pilots" who are well respected in the industry being "appointed" as "carding pilots". I do not know how it would work--just thinking out loud is all.

[SASless]

The USFS has a very stringent Safety and Operations policy. Everyone has the same book, the book clearly lays out procedures, responsibilities and authorities, uses a risk matrix, and safety is priority number one with fire fighting being secondary to that. They do not worry about expense being added to the cost of their doing business. The pilot has the last word after everyone else has signed off on the flight....but usually is involved in the initial planning. That gives him two chances to say no and plenty of oversight to prevent him being put into a bad situation.

That certainly isn't the case with EMS flying as it stands now.

[Devil 49]

Gordy-
About 10% of my experience is night unaided. My EMS log varies between 25% and 33% night experience, as usual in the biz it's feast or famine, calls cluster. Night flight is a minority of EMS flight, but in no way exceptional. I'm on the low end of night experience at my program at time of hire, but we had a lot of Army from the cusp of the transition to NVGs.
Which comes to another issue you mention, night checkrides. Perhaps 10% of my training rides since commencing EMS has had ANY night at all. I'd guess that's about to change dramatically as we go to NVGs- fulfilment of that promise was about to expire under statute of limitations. NVGs will make a significant difference in the night accidents purely because we'll be able to see issues in time to DO something about it, be it weather, wires, or whatever.
The issue of pilot error being way more common and dangerous at night won't be resolved by any of the above.

[hostile]

What that USFS do with EMS or in the Gulf operation. If you need to met PC 1 or 2 take-off and landing requirements it should and will be in the company's procedures anyway. Now I am talking to twin-engine operation. Please explain me how this helping us?

:confused:Hostile

[What Limits]

There is a system of "carding" in UK HEMS. This is carried out by examiners "carded" in turn by the regulator. Flight is by day or night as appropriate to the operation.

Very few HEMS operations in UK are Government fully sponsored or funded.

Trying to justify your HEMS operation on the basis of lives saved is a big mistake. My experience of just 400 missions is that we may have saved a life on 3 occasions. Trying to get a Doctor/Consultant to support that argument is almost impossible.

Perhaps the main issue is:

"There is no life more precious than my own - until I have to pay the bills"

Discuss

Issue 2

"The accident rate will be reduced by technology."

Discuss

[BV234driver]

What limits-

Won't discuss point 1, since I don't operate in the HEMS side. I could offer opinion, but it wouldn't be worth much.

Point 2: years of statistical data, and actual hands on experience in older models and glass cockpit also- not in flat safe areas either. 90% where large helicopter catching devices like mountains, antennas, wires, extreme DA and weather, blowing dust landings, etc exist. The technology can and will save your life- IF used correctly. Some guys can fly to 50 AGL on three axis, some to a complete 40ft hover hands-off, but in areas without any navaids, then what options are there without technology? What else would you suggest?

Not that it's a total replacement for things- like I see happening.

And NVGs- what's the ambient light amplification? It's been a while, so someone needs to help me out, but it's well more than a couple thousand times. If I follow your logic, then visual technology isn't important... I'll begin wallpapering my windscreen and chin bubble immedately.

Again, I'd venture three sets of NVGs costs less than that AW.

*There are inherent dangers when operating WITH NVGs, particularly dimishing weather, but there wasn't any visibility problem that night from the report as I recall. Only darkness.

[alouette3]

What Limits,
It is not always about just saving a life. A limb saved from amputation, a burn trated early, a premature baby flown to NICU, a stroke reversed in time. These are all good reasons to have HEMS in far flung rural areas where the nearest metro hospital is a three hour ambulance ride away.Such is the quality of life taken for granted by the world today.
Technology certainly assists but has to be applied judiciously. For instance, to run a full fledged, two pilot full IFR certified aircraft in an area where there are no approaches to hospitals in the IFR system would be extravagant. But to run an IFR capable aircraft and pilot for a VFR only program would be reasonable.The trick is to find the happy medium between one and the other without too much impact on the bottom line.

Alt3.

[Elvis70]

This is an interesting thread.

If I may weigh in.

This crash seems to have been pilot error in operating the autopilot coupled with failure to monitor the instruments to see that the autopilot was keeping the aircraft where the pilot wanted it to. I would say that messing with the radios was the main distraction as she was having trouble reaching the FD on the ground. The crews in the back should be handling that function in my opinion.

Proper use of the RADALT could of prevented this. HTAWS like I have in my aircraft could of prevented it. NVG's are essential in this type of dark terrain flying. She basically states that on this particular flight she is never complying with 135.207. I have violated that in the past. One night my hairs stood up on the back of my kneck a little too high. I no longer do it. I could of crashed like this gal, I was over rough terrain in an unoccupied national forest, it would not of ended so well.

I do this job currently and I love the HTAWS I have. It has wx radar, metars, etc., traffic (relies on ground equip. though so not always available, so we need to go to a true stand alone system like I used in the GOM), But the terrain warning feature on this equipment is the cats meow.

What is the one thing that makes night so much more dangerous than day? This isn't rocket science guys. You can't frickin see. How many more car crashes you think there would be if engineers hadn't invented headlights? Headlights are useless of course at altitude since there is nothing out front to illuminate. So NVG's are our equivilant answer. My company is installing them now and will be 100% compliant on both HTAWS and NVG's and they will become regulatory. Guarantee you that.

My 2 cents in short: Yes this accident could of been prevented with the tech on board. Probably illegal to start with though (135.207). Almost certainly wouldn't of happened with HTAWS and NVG's. But even with all these tools occasionally somebody will still plow one in. But I for one believe it will become much more rare, and I know I will feel and be safer with them.