Bucs and Black Buck

[hulahoop7]

Could anyone help me out with a few questions on Black Buck and the choice of aircraft?

I'd like to get a better understanding of why the Buccaneer wasn't used for the raids. I’ve read elsewhere that while the Buccaneer was better suited to the task it didn't have a large enough engine oil reservoir for the range of flight required.

Is this entirely the truth? The RAF certainly invested a huge amount time, energy and money getting the Vulcan’s up to spec, i.e. plumbing for the refuels, bomb aiming equipment etc. Then expended a huge effort to tank each single aircraft South. Would it not have been simpler to fit a larger oil tank on the Buc??

If this could have been managed, wouldn’t the Buccaneer have had a number of advantages, not least that they burned far less fuel and that they could also laser designate bombs – I understand the RAF purchased designators in 1979? Surely getting 2-4 bombs on target is better than hoping for the best from 22?

Was the Vulcan used because it was a useful way to demonstrate its utility… i.e. the RAF wanted to retain the large/medium bomber capability?

[Lima Juliet]

Mate

It comes down to unrefuelled range.

Buccaneer approx 2,300nm
Vulcan approx 4,750nm

Put bluntly, the Vulcan could miss more refuel brackets than the Bucc and get home...

I hope this helps...:ok:

LJ

PS They could have put pavespike on the pylons of the Vulcan, but I guess they didn't fancy hanging about lasing the target. Drop 21 bombs and knob off in quick order was the tactic used (shame only 1 in 21 hit the runway though!).

[scarecrow450]

Belive it was also to show we could hit the South American mainland as well.

[Archimedes]

Vulcan was trialled with a PWII fit - there is a photo somewhere of one with three PW mounted at the forward end of the bomb-bay, and IIRC, the potential load was for seven such weapons.

Also, if you look at the evidence which has since emerged via a commemorative seminar held at the purple learning centre, Admirals Lewin, Fieldhouse, Leach and Woodward were very keen on the thought of a Vulcan bombing the airfield, even though CAS had informed the war cabinet that to shut the runway he'd want to send at least 25 sorties and preferably more.

The reason for eagerness on the part of the senior dark blue was because of the signal that might be sent to the junta by carrying out a long range raid.

[hulahoop7]

No argument with the raids - they were needed - and the few SHARs available needed to be protected. No argument withe effort put in. I just question the choice of aircraft. I mean, they even had to borrow the jamming pods from the Buc???

I'm suggesting that the decison might have been made for other reasons. The RAF might have seen the RN demonstrating the utility of their carriers and amphibs (which were up for the chop) and might have thought here's an opportunity to hang on to the big bombers???

[Once_an_Erk]

HulaHoop - If that was the RAF's thinking (which I doubt) - it didn't work, did it? The tin triangles were gone not long after Corporate.

Your first post is more correct. The Speys on the Buccs used to gobble oil at a prodigious rate - Loosie - Goose could only go if headwinds were favourable (because of oil use).

[BEagle]

Ah yes, the joys of checking Spey oils during aircrew turn rounds on the F4 with a mirror on a stick and a torch. One side needed the starter door dropping, which usually meant gunk all over your immersion suit if you weren't quick....

Diverted to Valley once and went through this farce; one of our navs happened to be there on APC and asked "Why bother doing that, none of the sqn wheels are around!"....:hmm:

Re Black Buccs; I understand that a study was undertaken but that there was no way the RAF had enough tankers to support the Bucc, it would run low on oil and failed AAR might well mean a swim in the bracing South Atlantic.

The hush-hush new Tornado GR1 was also looked at - the person entrusted to look at the ODM was seen crying with laughter over its rather pathetic payload/range figures, compared to the Bucc....

[soddim]

The Vulcan did indeed trial Paveway 2 and achieved a very respectable score releasing two from medium level at West Freugh. Designation was the problem although later in the war the RAF Harriers were able to use LGBs designated by FACs and achieved excellent results.

[foldingwings]

Whilst most of the above is true there was more to the Black Buck raid than mere 'let's use the Vulcan for something really useful before it goes out of service'. Certainly, if the effect could have been achieved by any other aircraft I don't think we would have spent money upgrading the Vulcan for AAR, conventional weaponry (it had all been ripped out when the Vulcan went solely Strike), Smart weapons etc etc and all in just a few days too!

Black Buck was a well-considered strategic operation (Air Ops for Strategic Effect - Air Power doctrine, remember?) rather than a tactical mission. The purpose of it was purely to tell the enemy that we had their capital city covered. The fact that only one bomb hit the runway is irrelevent and was anticipated because of the limited millisecond stick spacing available on the Vulcan bomb distributor. An attack down the runway would likely have resulted in no strikes at all (crosswind/aiming issues) so, as is common with retard conventional weapons delivered in a laydown attack against a runway target, a desired cutting angle is calculated dependent upon the length of the runway (how many cuts can we achieve with how many aircraft?) and the width of the runway to determine the stick spacing and therefore the number of bombs that will hit the runway and prevent subsequent take-off (one stick rarely does the trick). QWIs usually calculate to put the middle bomb of a stick on the runway and, try as one might, it is virtually impossible to get more than one bomb (perhaps half a bomb crater on each side but that would not provide a Prevent Take Off kill) on any runway unless it is almost as wide as it is long. That's why we bought JP233 to provide a greater number of craters than was possible with a conventional retarded stick; just a shame that the peaceniks decided that the HB876 bomblets might harm somebody when that's exactly what they were designed to do!

So, it was a Vulcan because it was a strategic mission, it had the capability to do it and required fewer tankers than a couple of Buccs who might have made 2 cuts but would have been a logistical nightmare in getting them down there (without a mother carrier) under wartime conditions.

Turning now to the Bucc. Yes it did have limited gear box oil availability but at least 2 did actually deploy to the Falklands after Corporate was over to let the Argentinians know that we could deploy a strike force to protect the islands if that indeed became necessary. I was on Buccs at Laarbruch at the time and I believe that although the Bucc was considered for Black Buck it was eventually decided not to use it as we, in Germany, were still assigned to SACEUR and those at Lossie were assigned to SACLANT with all that that entailed on the Strike options.

Perhaps of interest is the fact that the Bucc has, oops that should be had, actually got very good legs unrefuelled and better than the Tornado for sure. The Laarbruch wing crossed the Atlantic without AAR en route to Red Flag by routing St Mawgan; Lajes; Gander. I was also involved in the flight planning of a round the world trip with 2 Buccaneers that did not use AAR and took in some rather exotic locations over 30 days, accompanied by a freighter VC10 with spare crews and engines on board, as we planned to bid farewell to the World when the Buccs were withdrawn from Germany! It was the Laarbruch Staish's idea and it was achievable with 23,000lb of gas on board (that includes the bomb bay ferry tank); however RAFG put the kybosh on it because it would have begged the question of whether the aircraft replacing it could do likewise.

Remember the day that the Bucc refuelled the Tornado on a mission from UK to Cyprus? The Bucc tanked the Tornado all the way down over Italy and returned to the UK whilst the Tornado just made it on to Cyprus!

Memory fades but I think most if not all of the above is kosher.

Weapons Effort Planning lecture over:ok:!

Foldie
(Last flew the Bucc on 14 Nov 08 at Thunder City! Brilliant!)

[Mandator]

FW: I was in a special hole in the ground during these events, splitting with my above ground day job in a certain Tornado office. My understanding of the Tornado to Cyprus (one of TWCU's jets if I remember correctly) was that it did not land at Akrotiri and went straight back to Honington (refuelled of course). The aim of the flight was to make accurate measurements of oil and LOX consumption. We were also looking at it taking the even more secret JP233 with it - I think it is that which Beags remembers making the ODM guys cry.

[foldingwings]

Mandator,

You're probably right, I did say that the memory fades. In fact, now that I think about it, I think that it was the Bucc that made it all the way to Cyprus having given its fuel to the Tornado - was that it?

Foldie

[taxydual]

As a total bombing amateur, the planting of 1x1000lb'er, a third along the length of the runway at Stanley does actually make some sense.

1. It reduced the TODA/LDA to Argentinian jet fighters.
2. As already pointed out, it certainly made a 'point' that the mainland wasn't immune from a visit.
3. And if you want the ground troops to capture the only airfield (with a viable FJ runway), that you'd wish to use later, it would be better to have only 1 hole in that runway, rather than 21 it could have possibly have!

Anyway, at the end of the day, it was a bloody good effort all round.

Sorry, just my 2 cents.

[Occasional Aviator]

Was the Vulcan used because it was a useful way to demonstrate its utility… i.e. the RAF wanted to retain the large/medium bomber capability?

Err, no. The withdrawal of the Vulcan from service had been agreed and planned some years earlier, and I don't think it could have been changed by anything that happened in the Falklands.

If you haven't read "Vulcan 607" yet, I highly recommend it - it's a cracking read and a really human account of the effort that went into Black Buck. You might also be quite surprised at how much the RAF did in the Falklands that one doesn't hear much about, such as the long-range MR sorties flown by the Victors and Nimrods.

[soddim]

I have to correct you, folding wings, the Vulcan did not deliver retard bombs but ballistic 1,000 pounders. Retarded bombs, in any case, would not achieve the required penetration to create the runway damage required.

As for the calculation used to achieve best results, stick spacing and anticipated crater diameter determined the cut angle to deny minimum clear width and weapon release was calculated to hit the runway with the middle of the stick.

In fact, as is well documented, the release error of the first Vulcan attack was such that the first bomb of the stick hit the far third of the runway and barely denied minimum clear width. However, the strategic effect was not only to persuade against use of the airfield by fast jets throughout the war but also to redeploy mainland based aircraft in defence of BA. A good night's work.

Much has been posted about the Bucc's oil consumption but the F4 with two speys flew non-stop to Singapore in the early 70's so that was not the reason it was not used. Both Bucc and Tornado were considered but the Vulcan was selected. Incidentally, the Nimrod crews also looked at bomb delivery and in training achieved better results than the Vulcan crews.

[taxydual]

This thread brought to mind something I read years ago, an extract from a history of the Falklands in which Dr. Samuel Johnson was employed to 'play down' reports of a 'foreign invasion' of the islands.

Quote

Dr. Johnson obliged with a pamphlet calling the Falklands "an island which not even the southern savages have dignified with habitation." It was a place fit only for smugglers and buccaneers, he wrote, and any British garrison sent there would "contemplate with envy the exiles of Siberia."

Unquote

OK, Dr J wrote that in 1770.

Blackburn's design office had plenty of notice!!

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

At the risk of stating the bloody obvious.................

The Falklands Air war belonged to the Navy.

The RAF Black Buck stuff was a blatant attempt to get 'in on the action'.

Strategically................a non-starter.

Tactically...................as above.

The only points it scored were politically, against the RN.:ugh:

Bluntly. What did it do that a local Harrier or SHAR could not have done?

[BEagle]

Are you that infamous bearded bull$hitter posting under a nom-de-PPRuNe?

Don't forget that the little SHAR posed no threat whatsoever to mainland Argentina - whereas the effective demonstration by the Vulcan most certainly did!

[Yellow Sun]

soddim,

Incidentally, the Nimrod crews also looked at bomb delivery and in training achieved better results than the Vulcan crews.

I was closely involved with the Nimrod weapons programme during Corporate and feel that the "results" you refer to may be somewhat selective. The Nimrod crews were only trained in visual delivery of the retard 1000lb bomb and the BL755 cluster bomb. The intended targets were maritime, i.e. surfaced submarines or ships, there was never any intent that they would be employed on land attack missions, with the obvious exception of Garvie Island!

The Nimrod bomb bay was measured up for LGBs, that occurred one Sunday afternoon, but that was as far as it went. We did ask how the designation was to achieved; with a regard to framing the necessary operational procedures; but received no reply.

In the middle of this Harpoon appeared and although we trained on the missile I don't believe that it was ever deployed on an operational sortie.

WRT Tornado and Buccaneer missions, I was told that when to navigator who had been closeted with the Tornado ODMs and some South Atlantic charts emerged his words were, "Not really the Tornado's kind of war". That pretty well summed it up.

Some possible Buccaneer missions were examined, but these concentrated on potential maritime targets, primarily the carrier 25th May. How well received these would have been by their crews would have been interesting as some of the likely profiles ended half way back.

YS

[Just This Once...]

I do wonder at the uninformed idiocy when I see post like that of BarbiesBoyfriend, which just look to start a fight. The Falklands was a stunning maritime effort and maritime was clearly the ‘supported command’. But the idea that the services operated (or even the capability or authority to operate) as an independent arm is ridiculous; this view is not supported in any knowledgeable account or factual record of the conflict. Wining the war was far from certain and gambling UK lives to score points is more than a little far fetched and rather insulting to those who served us so well.

Whilst the ‘tip of the spear’ in the Black Buck raids was unique, the sorties themselves were not. The use of massive strategic reach via AAR was ‘routine’ (well as routine as these gobsmackingly difficult sorties could be) during the conflict. Victors conducted the longest range MRR sorties ever seen, Nimrod MR2 / R1s conducted a range of activities and the Hercs conducted record-breaking long range air drop and para sorties across the South Atlantic operating area. Virtually all these sorties were in direct support of the maritime campaign – a true joint effort. Changing the tip of the AAR spear from a Herc / Nimrod / Victor to the Vulcan was a new challenge to the AAR force, but it was one of many such challenges over that period.

Can anyone imagine the difficulty of maintaining a ‘surface picture’ under EMCON over such a vast area without MRR, ELINT, Maritime Recce or being able to operate a couple of carriers in such conditions? Can anyone imagine protecting the UK fleet without an Argentinean Navy fearful of the Nimrod MR2 force? Can anyone imagine running a surface fleet so hard in such challenging conditions without the air drop of critical spares? Can anyone imagine running the Harrier force in the mud-moving role without Argentinean radars fearing SEAD, post the Shrike raid? Can anyone imagine SF units being stuck on the wrong bit of the globe without being ‘dispatched’ to the awaiting ships below?

The air component was far from a ‘one-trick-pony’.

[green granite]

Having been on the range at Larkhill filming the drop of 21 live retarded 1000lb bombs, the the effects of having 21 dropped near you would have been far more demoralising on the enemy troops than a couple of LGB bombs.

[spheroid]

Ah yes, the joys of checking Spey oils during aircrew turn rounds

The Spey is still in service and the oil still needs checking every 8 minutes !!!!!!

[foldingwings]

soddim,

Thanks for the corrections the Vulcan did not deliver retard bombs but ballistic

As I stated the memory fades and, in my defence, I meant you to understand that I was talking theory rather than practice. I never had the 'delight' of navigating a V-bomber (took one look upstairs during a Nav School visit to Scampton and vowed to work harder to achieve a 2-seat assignment) and we, on the Bucc, always planned to deliver retards against runways from low level during my SACEUR-assigned days (defences wouldn't allow anything else). When you say that it was meant to be the mid bomb of the stick that is aimed at the target I think I had already made that point too:

QWIs usually calculate to put the middle bomb of a stick on the runway

As for BarbiesBoyfriend:ugh:, let's stick to the facts rather than reduce this intellectual forum into another inter-service feud.

Finally, if you haven't read Vulcan 607 then I thoroughly recommend it and, when you have done so, go buy Rowland White's follow-up 'Phoenix Squadron' which will be published in 9 days time (Advance orders thro' a well known on-line bookseller). I am currently enjoying an advance copy of the true story of Ark Royal and its air wing and their involvement in the Guatemala/British Honduras (Belize) conflict of the early 70s.

Foldie

[coldbuffer]

Seem to recall that the Bucc which landed at Stanley after the conflict suffered an arrestor hook accumulator failure (loss of pnuematics) and caused the hook to bounce damaging the airframe

[Archimedes]

At the risk of stating the bloody obvious.................

At the risk of repeating myself from a previous thread...

...there is some evidence from the proceedings of a seminar held at the staff college five [at time I first posted this]years ago which is in the public domain. In essence, the then-CAS said that the plan was to do whatever could be done to aid the Task Force. The planning staffs worked out that bombing the airfield would need '25 and preferably 50' Vulcan sorties to guarantee closing it, but the raid went ahead with two aims. MRAF Beetham said [verbatim quote from the proceedings follows]:

'So it was primarily a military purpose to do what we could with the resources we had. But it did have a secondary deterrent effect, in the sense that the Argentines must have raised their eyebrows and the thought would go through their mind (which we ceratinly didn't try to stop them having) that if we could do that, we could bomb the mainland. We had looked at this, but discarded it because it would have been a major escalation. But the Argentines wouldn't have known that and therefore their Mirages and their other forces were being aware and taking defensive measures in case we bombed the mainland, which took a little bit of the pressure off the forces which were deploying against the Falklands [i.e. the Task Force].

So that was the major purpose. It was primarily a military objective to do what we could, but it did have this secondary effect.'

This was followed by Admiral Woodward, who in response said:

'I very much agree with what you had to say about it. My dark blue aviators said "Oh, it's the air force just trying to get in on the act", but I said, hang on a minute, there will be two things. If they do hit the runway, that can't be bad, they can disrupt it... but also it will have exactly that effect of causing them [the junta] to think they could come at us on the mainland. It is showing reach and therefore it is deterrent. And I suspect it made them hold back some of their Mirages, which could have acted as top cover for their A-4 raids. So I signed up for it and told my aviators to shut up.'

Therefore:

The RAF Black Buck stuff was a blatant attempt to get 'in on the action'.

Strategically................a non-starter.

Tactically...................as above.

If you'd like to write to Admirals Leach and Woodward and tell them that they're talking horlicks, be my guest.

The only points it scored were politically, against the RN.

Would seem, therefore, to have been an own goal by Admirals Leach, Woodward, Lewin and Fieldhouse, then, since they were more in favour of the raid than MRAF Beetham...:hmm:

Bluntly. What did it do that a local Harrier or SHAR could not have done?

Get the bombs falling vertically because it had the ability to get to the altitude required to deliver them without risk of skipping? Make the Argentine junta have to consider the possibility (no matter how unlikely) that the occupant of No.10 Downing Street might be nutty enough to bomb the mainland? Again, write to Admiral Woodward, and I'm sure he'll be delighted to express his views on the quality of your analysis of the matter.

Unless, of course, hindsight armchair judgement overules that of the CDS, FSL/CNS, Task Group Commander et al...

[Load Toad]

..and - er - contributed to a victory bought at the cost of brave mens lives for the pride of a couple of politicians. So stop quibbling.

[ProM]

for the pride of a couple of politicians.

I was only a school kid then, but as i remember it most people thought that we should and indeed had to go down there. So you can't say it was the pride of a couple of politicians

[Schiller]

Black Buck? Parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.

No. You want to know why it happened? Let me take you by the hand and lead you back 27 years or so.

The scene is the office of the Lord Chief Airship in Whitehall. It is a huge room that dwarfs the large, ornate, ormulu-decorated desk at the far end. The tall windows have heavy red velvet curtains, rather dusty and edged with old-gold tassels and hold-backs. In the spaces between the windows, portraits of past LCA’s look down. In a corner, left over from some long-forgotten colonial war, a punkah-wallah lies sleeping.

The rest of the room is dotted with occasional tables surrounded by faded armchairs. At one of these, the LCA is conferring with one of his Junior Airships.

LCA: Carruthers…
JA: Sire?
LCA: Things are going badly, Carruthers.
JA: Indeed, Sire?
LCA: Yes. There appears to be a war going on…
JA: Indeed, Sire, the newspapers are full of little else…
LCA: …and we don’t seem to have been invited.
JA: So it would seem , Sire.
LCA: It’s a bad show, Carruthers. A few years ago, when the Navy made their absurd bid for two new carriers, we told everyone that wherever the Navy was operating we could cover them…
JA: I remember it well, Sire…
LCA: …and we’re not there.
JA: It would seem not, Sire
LCA: It’s a bad show, Carruthers.

The LCA broods for a while. Then…

LCA: Here’s what I want you to do, Carruthers. Go down to Operations and Plans would you? Tell them to lay on a bombing raid.
JA: Very good, Sire. Did you have any particular target in mind?
LCA: Well, anywhere in the South Atlantic really. If they could hit those island thingies…
JA: The Malvi…the Falklands, Sire?
LCA: Yes, those are the jobbies…that would be simply splendid. The bombs needn’t go off or anything. In my experience, all that does is scare the Army’s horses.
JA: Very probably, Sire.
LCA: Didn’t I read the other day that nowadays our chappies can take on petrol from another of our chaps while they’re all whizzing along together?
JA: I believe it to be entirely possible, Sire.
LCA: Well, there you are, then. They’ll only have to do that a couple of times and they’ll be down there in no time. Go and fix it up, would you?
JA: Very good, Sire.

He rises to go.

LCA: Oh, just one more thing, Carruthers. On your way down, drop in on the fifth floor, would you?
JA: The Public Relations Department, Sire?
LCA: Yes, those are the chappies. Tell them I want a flat-out effort on this. One hundred and ten percent. By the time this war’s over, I want every man, woman and child in the country believing it was Us Wot Won It.
JA: You may rely on me, Sire.

Exit

[Load Toad]

I was only a school kid then, but as i remember it most people thought that we should and indeed had to go down there. So you can't say it was the pride of a couple of politicians

Yes - was only a skool kid too but politicians are supposed to be cleverer, wiser and and less prone to emotional mood swings to satisfy the ego. If you want mob rule of course then by all means carry on.

[hulahoop7]

If the UK hadn't acted decisively, then there would have been no end to it. Think about the Soviets and Spanish.

It was a bullying act by a junta that had got used to getting its way at home, and thought it could pull the same trick on 'sick man Britain'. But it didn't come off, and the bully was confronted and beaten on the islands.. and as a result at home too.

I'm no fan of Thatcher, if she'd got her way earlier we probably wouldn't have had a task force to send South, but when presented with the crisis she was up to the job. The Argies were the mob and they needed to be stopped. The UK enforced law and order.

[ProM]

Hell of a difference between a democratically elected government undertaking a course of action approved of by the vast majority of the electorate, and mob rule.

[Load Toad]

I didn't say the response wasn't ultimately necessary but I'm tired of trolls trying to undermine particular tactics or operations for petty point scoring when brave men risked and lost their lives to seal what was a quite remarkable victory.

Which - if the politicians had been half as capable - would not need to have been necessary at all.

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

Archimedes

You've plainly put a bit of thought into your post and it would be rude of me not to reply.

Your point about the 'vertical' arrival of the bombs is one that I had not considered.

Apart from that you seem to me old fruit, to merely regurgitate a lot of contemporary semi-political dogma.

The threat of bombing B-A? I think the Victor force would have been found wanting long before the Vulcan force, therefore 'carpet bombing' would surely been unlikely. And anyway, would we? Why FFS!

Of course we could of 'nuked' them, but really that's idiots talk.

I've read the Vulcan 607 book-and loved it. These guys were brave for sure. Also the whole thing was a great feat in aviation. I take my hat off to them!

Strategically..................scared some squaddies

Tactically....................as above!

It's not an 'interservice' thing (I'm ex AAC btw).

Some of the later Black Bucks, when they only fired a Shrike were plain daft!

They'd have done better if they'd mailed it to them!:eek:

[Polikarpov]

Some of the later Black Bucks, when they only fired a Shrike were plain daft!

At least one of those raids destroyed a SkyGuard unit, with four Argentine fatalities, and the demonstration of capability undoubtedly resulted in more cautious radar usage, arguably to the benefit of subsequent Harrier actions. Not sure quite how that can be viewed as daft in the context of a war.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

Why is that a simple question about Buccaneer capability degenerates into the standard squabble without additions to existing knowledge or insight? The original question was novel . The rest of it isn’t and has already been done;
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/273960-black-buck-1-not-cricket.html?highlight=falkland+vulcan (http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/273960-black-buck-1-not-cricket.html?highlight=falkland+vulcan)
and
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/274721-stanley-runway.html?highlight=falkland+vulcan (http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/274721-stanley-runway.html?highlight=falkland+vulcan)
and
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/180087-falklands-lgb-question.html?highlight=falkland+vulcan (http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/180087-falklands-lgb-question.html?highlight=falkland+vulcan)

The ex TWA types might like to be forewarned that there are lots of words and not many pictures.

[forget]

Of course we could of 'nuked' them, but really that's idiots talk.

How quaint. :)

[soddim]

Thank goodness we are never likely to rely on the tactical thoughts of BarbiesBoyfriend to determine our aims in war.

The Vulcan achievement was out of all proportion to the specific damage of its attacks and it made the enemy defend against a threat from outside the immediate theatre. The ability of air power to project this type of force is precisely the reason why we and others spend so much of our defence money on it.

[Archimedes]

GBZ - a good point, but forgive me for replying to BB's response, since he seems to have missed a couple of things.

BB - if you re-read my post, you'll find that my 'regurgitation' was verbatim quotation from the people who ran the campaign, notably those wearing dark blue uniform.

Admirals Leach and Woodward (and, for that matter, Secretary of State for Defence Nott, who was also present) were very clear that they thought that Black Buck might have a strategic effect, hence their supporting the raid, and they concluded that it seemed that it did.

As for the threat of bombing B-A, again, look at what CAS (again, not my words) said:

But it did have a secondary deterrent effect, in the sense that the Argentines must have raised their eyebrows and the thought would go through their mind (which we ceratinly didn't try to stop them having) that if we could do that, we could bomb the mainland. We had looked at this, but discarded it because it would have been a major escalation. But the Argentines wouldn't have known that (emphasis added)

The point I am endeavouring to make is that the senior RN officers involved in running and fighting the campaign would not agree with your contentions that the raids were the result of service politics or that the effect of the attacks was insignificant.

As for use of nuclear weapons, (a) I didn't suggest this in my post and (b) nor did anyone at the top in 1982.

[MAINJAFAD]

Some of the later Black Bucks, when they only fired a Shrike were plain daft!

They'd have done better if they'd mailed it to them!http://static.pprune.org/images/smilies/eek.gif

Wrong again.

4 missiles fired on the two missions that managed to get all the way down south (The first Anti Radition mission (Black Buck 4) was aborted five hours into the mission due to HDU failure on one of the tankers). Black Buck 5's Vulcan was armed with two Shrikes tuned to home on the TPS-43F Radar on East Falkland which was quite a thorn in the side of the Task Force due to it being used to vector attackers away from Sea Harrier CAP and also giving indications of the carrier task group's location thanks to Harrier climb out points. Both missiles fired at the radar, which just missed. The third ARM mission was armed with 4 Shrikes, 2 tuned to the TPS-43, and the other two tuned to home on to Skyguard transmissions.

Argies switched the TPS-43 off and kept it off, while one of the Skyguard's, decided to light up, and ate two Shrikes for its efforts (Killing an Officer, a NCO and two conscripts). Low fuel state, stopped the Vulcan from hanging around for any longer (it had been orbiting around Port Stanley for 40 minutes), So it headed back to the Rio RV, only to land at Rio with a broken AAR probe.

As for the Bombing missions.

Black Buck 1 did hit the runway with a 1000 lb bomb dropped from medium level, unlike any bomb from any mark of Harrier released from medium level or low level toss. (Low level laydown SHAR/GR3 attacks did put bombs on the runway, but they only scabbed the surface).

[Finnpog]

The SEAD missions shouldn't be under-estimated (nor should having a 'Wild Weasel' like a Vulcan!!)

[Pontius Navigator]

As for use of nuclear weapons, (a) I didn't suggest this in my post and (b) nor did anyone at the top in 1982.

Nor would they.

It was and remains HMG Policy to neither confirm nor deny . . .

It you declare the nuclear joker then you have to be prepared to have your bluff called.

[Load Toad]

..or playing it and getting no points. Used to happen in It's a Knockout.

[AndoniP]

why is he (i presume sharky ward) referred to as a bearded bull$hitter? is what he wrote or said untrue?

[Romeo Oscar Golf]

why is he (i presume sharky ward) referred to as a bearded bull$hitter? is what he wrote or said untrue?

The opinion of many (who also participated) is that his view of events lacked a little balance and was perhaps a touch one sided. I wasn't there so cannot comment.

[davejb]

This thread is beginning to look like the transcript of a 15 minute chat between a Sun reporter and an ex pilot with Alzheimers...

For those looking (on this and many another thread) for ulterior motives, try to remember that wars are fought with (often very) incomplete information and analysis that was anything from 1% to 100% incorrect. There will ALWAYS be somebody involved, who doesn't manage to carry the argument, who actually got it right. In retrospect they'll be seen to be right, and everyone will cluck about how even an idiot whould have seen the sensible path at the time. AT the time vision is rather more impaired.

Black Buck was quite ambitious, my abiding memory of Ascension is that of Victor tankers roaring into the sky at night ... repeatedly... In my view the Victor crews were tops, they supported everyone. That Black Buck actually worked was amazing, that anyone planted an ARM into a radar on the Falklands was amazing, and anyone who thinks that there was some sort of political agenda in the upper reaches of the RAF is probably a teeny bit correct - the RAF undoubtedly wanted to have bodies and platforms involved wherever possible - but to imagine that this was some sort of attempt to keep the V bombers involves the ability to insert ones's head up one's a**e to a significant degree.

Dave

[Art Field]

Thanks davejb for your kind words about the Victor crews participation in Corporate. I was proud of them, having been one of the UCU instructors for some time prior to the event. They were under considerable strain, being required to carry out essential multiple fuel transfers night after night in often foul weather and with equipment that was frequently playing up. Operating 600 miles from the nearest diversion and on very tight fuel plans did not help matters but as I have said somewhere else, they just got on with it!!

[Dan Gerous]

I can remember seeing the Buccs arrive at Stanley, and one did go U/S on landing. I heard it was due to the arrestor hook taking the wire and the hook being forced back up against the air frame. Something similar happened when the first two Phantoms arrived, but the damage was so severe that the next time it flew, was underneath a Chinook, to be deposited aboard a ship for return to the UK. Memory is a bit vague on this, but I seem to recall only one Bucc aircraft flew for the entire detachment, possibly only one or two sorties, but both aircraft left together, along with a sigh of relief from all the lossie folks, glad to be leaving the place. There were two wires at each end, and one in the middle, and there were difficulties with the two inner wires, as they were of an American design, and were a lot more severe in their stopping power than the British designed kit.

[wiggy]

Dan Gerous

My recollection is slightly different - you're right that an F-4 was Chinooked out of Stanley but from AFAIR it that was due to an incident that happened a month or two/three after the aircraft first arrived.

As I remember events the US shipped an expert down with a high speed camera and the problem was found not to be the hook hitting the airframe but that the cable whipped back from the end stops in a vertical motion and could slice through the ends of the drooped stab on the F-4.. The footage he took was B***dy scary. That led to us adopting an SOP of "hook down, stay down" to avoid the possibility of trying to get airborne after a missed engagement minus the stab.

Anyhow I digress...hats off as always to the Black Buck guys...

[Dan Gerous]

Wiggy, your cable story sounds right, I was a ground lecky, and along with the heavies we had to go and DI the stuff everyday. I got to Stanley on the 7th Dec 82 and the Phantom was all on its own on the pan and had been there for some time. Now that you mentioned the video, that also rings a bell, as there were some tales of hairy landings going around. I think they first arrived in Oct 82, and I was told it was one of the first two to arrive. They were also the same Aircraft that were on Ascension during the war, as I had previously seen them there in July. 27 years on and it still seems like yesterday.

[ProM]

Black Buck was quite ambitious, .... In my view the Victor crews were tops, they supported everyoneAs someone who was at school that year, may I amend that to

"The whole campaign was ambitious...in my view everyone involved were the tops"

To organise and implement that plan, that quickly, was an immense feat by all concerned. Hardly any other country would have or could have. And few thought that we could.

Hats off to you all, whatever colour your uniform. Thank you

[Pontius Navigator]

and anyone who thinks that there was some sort of political agenda in the upper reaches of the RAF is probably a teeny bit correct - the RAF undoubtedly wanted to have bodies and platforms involved wherever possible -

Agree with Dave. In our case with Avro's best, we didn't need any military-political pressure to get involved. We simply wanted to get there and assist our twinned ship - Invincible. Yes, there may have been top management saying go for it but certainly no pressure. That we didn't join in was simply because the Shacklebomber simply didn't have the legs and there was no possibility of AAR with Avgas.

We also had a brief look at flying down the other side but the gaps between neutral countries friendly to blue was simply too great.

The nearest to pressure was the idiot who asked how long we could spend on task and then ditch. Given a total force of 5 Shacks we could have provided AEW for 2hr 30 min.

[biscuit74]

While I think the idea of possibly using Buccaneers is fascinating, and the Vulcan Missions were technically interesting, whatever the arguments for or against underlying purpose or effect might be, it amazes me that so little seems to have been said about the Nimrod operations in the South Atlantic.

My recollection is that at some fairly early point in the war, at least one Nimrod mission ran IN DAYLIGHT at relatively low altitiude, around 6,000ft, all the way down off the Argentinian coast - less than 60 nm out, IIRC. That was before they had any form of defensive kit fitted. ("The Four engined Fighter")
It seems to me that was an extraordinarily brave effort. I have no idea whether their mission was purely visual surveillance or whether they were actively radar searching, which would have been even more worrying for the crew. 'Worrying' ? - I think I mean terrifying.

Why was it not made more of after the war? Is it because Coastal (as was) often seemed to be the Cinderella of the RAF?

[davejb]

This'll cause a fight I suspect...

Nimrods generally got a footnote in the average Falklands book - my faourite ran something along the lines of 'Nimrod MPA also flew in support of the fleet'. (Total amount regarding entire involvement for duration of the war).

Initially 42 were there, coincidentally, for a few days - returning from a visit or something in an Mr1 as I remember. A few days later 120 Sqn got down there (pre AAR), got settled into a routine of flying approx 10 hrs going as far as possible then turning round, doing radar sweeps from high level. Later on AAR came in, and long range recce occurred. Searchwater pre colour was not anything like as good as the colour version, a certain amount of reporting early on led, I think, to the Nimrod recce effort being regarded by Adm Woodward as less than reliable.

After AAR came in there was indeed some rather long range recce work done from Ascension, like all the very long range stuff - C130's etc too - hats off to the guys involved. As Nimrod self defence* was limited to blazing away with a Browning 9mm followed by chucking the teapot out of the beam window in the hope of getting it up the fighter's air intake.... and as Brownings weren't issued you were immediately on plan B....

Dave

* Officially Nim self defence involved a slightly different approach to things, mainly involving pixie dust and wishing a lot, although playing with fighters was always fun...provided they were our own...

[Pontius Navigator]

although playing with fighters was always fun...provided they were our own...

What the major means to says is that the slow speed and high manoeuvrability of the Nimrod, coupled with the superb ESM and visual look out made the aircraft very difficult to engage with CW weapons or gain an IR firing solution.

OTOH it was a dead duck to a Paveway or BVR.

[biscuit74]

I imagine the high maneouvrability might have been useful. Quite hard for a fighter to get a lock if you are turning hard at very low level.
Presumably you'd then have hoped (in the South Atlantic) that the Mirage or whatever ran low on fuel before you did.

I like the ideas of pixie dust and offensive action with the kettle !

Davejb - that 'also flew' is what I mean. Seems odd it was so sidelined. What you have described sounds to me like something that takes a lot of nerve. I'm amazed the RAF and MoD didn't trumpet about that afterwards.

" Oh, lets go fly unarmed, no parachutes, down off the enemy coastline, in daylight, fairly slow and low altitude - oh, and just for fun let's have lots of radar emission so they can home in on us more easily." Strewth !


'....found Nimrod recce... less than reliable'. Interesting.
My recollection is Adm Woodward was a submariner originally. Maybe he wasn't aware how hard it is to sweep a sea area really thoroughly. Presumably he'd rather have had dubious sightings reported than ignored? Or did he just mean that he recognised a surface air reconaissance sweep wasn't an assurance the area was clear?
(To be honest both at the time and afterwards I found him rather unimpressive. Definitely not one of the Senior Service's most shining examples of how to lead and inspire, IMO.)

[ian16th]

Schiller’s attempt at humour shows a conspicuous lack of awareness.

He that is disrespectfully referred to as the ‘Lord Chief Airship’, was at the time MoRAF Sir Michael Beetham, GCB, CBE, DFC, AFC, DL, FRAes. If Shiller took the trouble to look up the records it can be seen that Sir Michael’s knowledge of AAR was just a little above the superficial. As a Wing Co. he was the OC of 214 Sqdn when it carried out the trials of the Cobham Probe & Drogue system and was awarded his AFC for the successful completion of these trails.

In 1959, he was the captain of the Vickers Valiant that completed the 1st non-stop flight from UK to South Africa and the 1st non-stop flight to Cape Town.

A look at http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/361667-historic-flights.html will put this all into perspective.

The Black Buck flights were an amazing effort by RAF aircrew and ground crew that achieved much in spite of being, as usual, kept ill equipped by bean counting politicians and should be recognised as such.

[davejb]

'The Major'? Did I get promoted rather excessively? Time to double check the pension payments methinks!

(I suppose, at a pinch, Major Bloodnok and I share some features...)

Biscuit - Prior to The Falklands the upgrade to MR2 from MR1 included a huge leap in sensor capability, and whilst being biased comes with the job I cannot imagine a leap to match that of changing from ASV21D to Searchwater. By 1982 Nimrod was well known for its almost magical ability to classify contacts at long range. In the S Atlantic, flying at high level (to maximise range and coverage) dry operators were expected to classify surface contacts - I do not wish to get into how misclassification might occur, but had later models of Searchwater been in use back then the number of ships reported would have been more consistent and less inflated. Some people found what they wanted to find, and it works like that in every war.

Adm Woodward - he'd have been used to MR1...it's one thing to be briefed about a platform, quite another to be intimately familiar with it. In his defence, (and I suspect I would not have liked the chap personally), when he got his daily update of what the Nimrod found he must have been a bit puzzled at how the Argentinian navy kept appearing and then disappearing. I don't fault him for feeling the service could have been better. What the Nimrod fleet needed was experience, and we never really got it - crews rotated in/out during a very short war, in time we'd have been a significant asset but by then the war was over.

Some of the AAR sorties sounded interesting, I wasn't on any so can't comment, other than to agree that to go on an unarmed target down the enemy coast was something that called for a degree of nerve, and - I'd suggest - lack of foresight higher up the food chain....as generally speaking people only have to be brave if somebody else didn't plan things properly.

Dave

[soddim]

Not understanding the Nimrod capability was not the only Navy deficiency in their lack of knowledge of air power. They were quite surprised to learn the need to protect their ships from low level visual attack aircraft and a lot of modification and practise was completed on the way South once they had been given professional advice on the threat.

They were also not well-informed about how to use their on-board air power and it was not until the RAF contingent virtually insisted on the need to fly recce missions to identify land targets worth attacking that our Harriers were used effectively.

But it was the land forces who were the real stars of the show and even though it was claimed that 'this was predominantly a Naval operation' it was the land battle that produced the deciding result.

[The Helpful Stacker]

Indeed. Whilst the RN did a stirling job getting everyone down there and the RAF did a fair job supporting operations as best they could it is the land forces that deserve the most credit for the positive outcome of the operation. Yes it was a tri-service effort but its boots on ground that ultimately win battles and to those brave chaps who fought their way across a bleak island at the end of the Earth the highest praise should be heaped.

[Clockwork Mouse]

Ultimately only the infantry can take and hold ground. Everything else is in support of that task. However, was there ever a more shining example of successful jointery at every level, political, strategic, operational and tactical? The odds against success were enormous. Anyone involved in Op Corporate at any level and anywhere from MoD to the front line can be very proud. I know I am.

[biscuit74]

Davejb.

Thanks very much for that. Most interesting. It doesn't surprise me that there would be some very variable contact reports - it would have been quite natural to expect all concerned to be somewhat 'wound up', since virtually no-one had seen action before. Perhaps Admiral Woodward hadn't read as much as he should have about the 'fog of war'? Clarity is easy in a training exercise, though even there some confusion should be fed in.
Isn't that what makes command 'challenging' ?

As (it seems) always a very steep learning curve for everyone involved. And I agree, notwithstanding the usual British inter-service rivalries, good co-operation generally and impressively done overall. PBI and Marines are the folk who eventually have to hold the ground, as has been said.

Oh - and I agree Dave, the folk tasking those Nimrods were not using much imagination, to say the least. The 'distance from FEBA' bravery curve again, methinks ?

(On the original topic heading -what a marvellous thought, Buccaneers all that way !)

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Not understanding the Nimrod capability was not the only Navy deficiency in their lack of knowledge of air power. They were quite surprised to learn the need to protect their ships from low level visual attack aircraft and a lot of modification and practise was completed on the way South once they had been given professional advice on the threat.

Perhaps something to do with expecting to face Soviet attacks from migh/medium level?

More generally, some have suggested that the run down of naval aviation in the 1970s meant that the RN lost expertise in using aircraft as a task force weapon. I think the politicians are to blame for that one.

Admiral Woodward must have got something right as we did win, both the Argentine Navy and Air Force were defeated, without which their would have been no land campaign. As for not having a fuller understanding of aviation - see the paragraph above.

THS

The way you say "getting everyone down there" could be interpreted as if you're glossing over they had to fight once they got there...

[biscuit74]

WE branch fanatic -

"More generally, some have suggested that the run down of naval aviation in the 1970s meant that the RN lost expertise in using aircraft as a task force weapon. I think the politicians are to blame for that one."

A very good point. One which our politicians could do with thinking about again, right now. Allowing the Sea Harrier to be retired and pretending it can be replaced for Fleet defence by a ground attack variant Harrier. Good grief. And we are still an island, last time I looked.

Mind boggling folly. Let's hope our forces don't have to deal with the consequences of that political myopia (or ignorance) expensively, as too often before.

[Schiller]

Ian 16th

My LCA was intended to be an entirely imaginary character invented only to make a point. I certainly didn't intend it to cast any aspersions on the actual holder of the top post. I don't suppose his office looks much like that, either.

[foldingwings]

They were quite surprised to learn the need to protect their ships from low level visual attack aircraft and a lot of modification and practise was completed on the way South once they had been given professional advice on the threat

I served on the Buccaneer on 12 Sqn in the ASuW role from 1974-78. All our operational training was conducted under exercise conditions against NATO and, predominantly, RN surface vessels. The RN were always of the mind that, with the Soviet Navy having no fleet carriers or Fighter Bomber aircraft to attack them at low level, they were invulnerable to that type of threat and that, whilst they did use our low level attacks to train the ship and crew, the attacks were more for our benefit than theirs; this despite the arrival of Forger in the Soviet inventory and therefore the prospect of an increased capability in subsequent years.

Of course, we always flew over the target after we had released our simulated weapons either to simulate a MARTEL missile or iron bombs (which took us pretty close anyway) and to fully exercise the ships' AD systems. Fed up with the ships always failing to realise, despite our telling them, that we were 'simulated' missiles and not the aircraft themselves and therefore claiming kills against us, we decided on one particular mission to conduct our real weapon release profiles and not to fly over the targets as previously. With a 4-ship we attacked the prime target 3 times from 3 of the 4 cardinal points of the compass with each aircraft simulating one MARTEL launch on each attack. On the last attack from the North, we simulated a toss attack of 4x1000lbers (16 in total) which took us within 3 nms of the target. It was only on this attack that our RWRs began to illuminate and viable kills may have been possible. The Navy claimed kills on this last attack but failed to understand that they had already been hit with 12 MARTEL missiles on the previous 3 attacks.

At the subsequent exercise debrief at JMOTS in Turnhouse a very heated debate took place where the only Navy defence was that the Soviets wouldn't operate like we did!

Shame that they never looked beyond that threat despite them then being a global blue water navy. They learned to their cost during Corporate that there always was an air threat at sea.

Foldie

[engineer(retard)]

Foldie

12 were in Gib exercising with the RN on Springtrain when the Argentinians invaded. I feel that an opportunity was missed.

regards

retard

[Yellow Sun]

I feel that an opportunity was missed.


engineer(retard)

I am sorry, but I cannot see what operational opportunity existed at that time for employment of 12 Sqn, or do you mean a training opportunity? Would you be kind enough to expand?

YS

[foldingwings]

No training opportunity was missed as the Buccs at Gib were in an ideal position to work the ships up, and did, on their voyage south. Whether the Navy then took heed of the air threat training or not...........................

Foldie

[The Helpful Stacker]

WEBF - They ALL had to fight once they were down there, RN, British Army and RAF. Ultimately though the RN and RAF are a means with which to get teeth arms into position and support their ongoing operations. I notice how you aren't so quick to defend the RAF though (who's efforts I'd say were equally 'glossed-over'). A force who its argued could have contributed a whole lot more and lessened the burden of tabbing across the Falklands by the PBI had the RN better protected elements under its care, such as a large number of SHF assets.

[soddim]

As this thread indicates, there were some important lessons to be learned from the Falklands war. What annoyed me at the time was that the MOD refused to allow the dissemination or acknowledgement of lessons learned because 'it was a victory and should be celebrated as such'.

If one does not learn the lessons of war then lives will have been lost in vain and one is destined to repeat the mistakes.

In my experience, armed conflict is a series of errors and he who makes the least probably wins.

[Lima Juliet]

Here's one to ponder...

If they hadn't modded HMS Hermes for the pointless backwards-flying-at-airshows Harrier (you may guess I don't like them!), then they coud have got Buccs into the fight quite easily (and probably F4s as well). Take a look at this picture from HMS Hermes in the 60s:

http://lh5.ggpht.com/_iSr9Ujod5Cs/SSsoFCShbgI/AAAAAAAAFLA/B0jllGo2RTA/s720/img117.jpg

Now that's proper Naval Airpower!

They made poor Hermes nearly as ugly as Jump Jet Fanny so we had to endure the meloderous rants of bearded SHAR pilots for years to come!

From this beautiful sight...
http://navy-matters.beedall.com/images/victorious.jpg
to this abomination...
http://www.bbc.co.uk/nottingham/content/images/2006/04/06/hms_hermes_returnes_from_fa_319x470.jpg

I'll get off the fence now ;)

[Lima Juliet]

Just read up on F4 ops on HMS Hermes and apparently she is too short. She could use the Bucc and Sea Vixen though...:D

http://navy-matters.beedall.com/images/hermes1.jpg

[soddim]

Twas not only the RN that lost flexibility. The RAF removed the FGR2's bomb and rocket release wiring when the aircraft became single role and the FG1 lost it's carrier capability and it's air-to-ground weapons.

Flexibility used to be the key to air power.

[Brain Potter]

Foldie,

Your point is very interesting. Whenever this topic crops-up it seems that the RN immediately look to place the blame on the RAF for the loss of the fleet's AEW capability provided by the Gannet. However, this argument always struck me as coming from a postion of hindsight, because if they had truly appreciated their own vulnerabilty they would have acquired an AEW helicopter and a CIWS before the Falklands War showed that such equipment was vital to defend against low-level attack aircraft and sea-skimming missiles.

[LowObservable]

we simulated a toss attack

Which is great practice for this forum. Have you thought about running for Parliament? :}

[Load Toad]

I believe there is a special term for that in Japanese adult speciality movies.

[engineer(retard)]

Yellow Sun and Foldie

My intent was a training opportunity for the RN. 12 did stand by until about the end of August on 2 hours notice. My recollection was of a lot of sitting about after the fleet sailed and not too many sorties being generated. Then a wait for the flight home after the decision not to go south was taken and AT being in thin supply for the routine tasks.

I still have the sqn photo from that det in the loft showing hercs loading in the background before going to Asencion.

regards

retard

[andyy]

Seeing as FRADU were simulating fixed wing aircraft attack AND missile attack at FOST in Portland and JMOTS for many years before the Falklands it is reasonable to assume that the RN were very much aware of the threat that airpower can have to ships. Sadly, over many years, various defence cuts had resulted in the short range missile and gun systems being removed from some ships specs (T42s and CVS), in the belief that we were only likely to operate in the N Atlantic under the cover of the US CVN air groups. The RNs main role in 1982 was to act as the outer ASW screen against Soviet SSNs & was not expected to have to fight an littoral war against a low level & close in air threat. The fact that it did so with only 4 ships lost is still pretty remarkable. The RN believed they would lose a CVS at least.

[soddim]

The fact that it did so with only 4 ships lost is still pretty remarkable.

Yes it is, but at one stage I understand that there were 17 bombs in ships most of which did not fully arm. Maybe 'lucky' is a better word than 'remarkable'.

[TMJ]

Yes it is, but at one stage I understand that there were 17 bombs in ships most of which did not fully arm. Maybe 'lucky' is a better word than 'remarkable'.

Shall we compromise? Remarkably lucky...

[glad rag]

FG1 lost it's air-to-ground weapons.
Well not for one *"unlucky" http://tbn1.google.com/images?q=tbn:hR99dkG1RO38MM:http://chirpychicks.com/images/Gold%2520Brahma%2520cockerel%2520copyright%2520website.jpg crew!!

* well perhaps unlucky is not quite correct considering they missed!!

[biscuit74]

I think the 'RN blaming the RAF' came about largely because our political masters had decided our forces would not operate outside the NATO theatre area in future.
'No role East of Suez' marked the beginning of the end.
Hence we didn't need carriers because the RAF coud provide air cover for the fleet locally. This of course ignored the point that in any sort of shooting war in Europe the RAF would have been be more than busy enough trying to defend BAOR, let alone the sea areas.

Perhaps some RAF senior officers saw benefit in supporting this daft idea but I suspect (hope) it was not common.

[Pontius Navigator]

the RAF coud provide air cover for the fleet locally. This of course ignored the point that in any sort of shooting war in Europe the RAF would have been be more than busy enough trying to defend BAOR, let alone the sea areas.

Not quite. The RAF was assigned to support both SACLANT and SACEUR. You can be quite sure that SACLANT would have screamed blue murder if his forward offensive screen had been diverted to SACEUR, which is not to say that that might have happened if the need in ACLANT was negligible.

You could argue of course that splitting what small forces we had between 2 MNC was contrary to 'concentration of force'.

[biscuit74]

True Pontius. I think you make a very good point about dilution of effort. Also the snag for SACLANT was exactly that - he would not have had his own dedicated force, but would risk diversion to another theatre. Having your own organic force under command is much better. Naval airmen understand naval problems.

The apparently lesser threat gets sidelined by focus on the 'main 'threat'. All organisations suffer that. The RAF showed that before WW". Notionally in charge of Fleet defence, but that got ignored becasue of the much greater threat.
(Note - I'm not bashing the RAF here. This is normal behaviour, hard to avoid. It's one reason why the Captain of HMS Sheffield decided to abandon ship so soon - he was distracting the Task Force)

[Occasional Aviator]

Having your own organic force under command is much better.

... for you, parochially, not necessarily for the interests of the whole campaign - and can only be done if there are sufficient air assets to be able to afford to use them in this less-than-optimum way!

[AndySmith]

Does anybody know exactly when the 2 Buccaneers mentioned earlier deployed to RAF Stanley?

[TEEEJ]

Does anybody know exactly when the 2 Buccaneers mentioned earlier deployed to RAF Stanley?

The Buccanneers (XV353 and XV868) arrived at Stanley on 5 March 1983, staying several days before returning to the UK .....

See page 17 at following link

http://biblioteka.mycity-military.com/biblioteka/cyber%20fulkrum/E%20N%20G%20L%20E%20S%20K%20I/AC%204%20Publication%20i%20drugo/AC_-_RAF_Buccaneer__Ian_Allan_Ltd_Aircraft_Illustrated_Special_. pdf

Mar. 1983
Joined XV353 in detachment to RAF Stanley, Falkland Islands - coded '868'

XV868 - S.Mk.2 Production (http://blackburn-buccaneer.co.uk/S2_XV868_files/0_S2_XV868.html)

Mar. 1983
Joined XV868 in detachment to RAF Stanley, Falkland Islands - coded '353'

XV353 - S.Mk.2D Production (http://www.blackburn-buccaneer.co.uk/S2_XV353_files/0_S2_XV353-1.html)

[AndySmith]

See page 17 at following link

http://biblioteka.mycity-military.com/biblioteka/cyber%20fulkrum/E%20N%20G%20L%20E%20S%20K%20I/AC%204%20Publication%20i%20drugo/AC_-_RAF_Buccaneer__Ian_Allan_Ltd_Aircraft_Illustrated_Special_. pdf



XV868 - S.Mk.2 Production (http://blackburn-buccaneer.co.uk/S2_XV868_files/0_S2_XV868.html)



XV353 - S.Mk.2D Production (http://www.blackburn-buccaneer.co.uk/S2_XV353_files/0_S2_XV353-1.html)

Thanks TEEEJ.

There seems to be something amiss then, as the Yorkshire Aircraft Museum seem to think that their Bucc, XX901, was part of the detatchment.

Blackburn Buccaneer S.2B - Yorkshire Air Museum (http://yorkshireairmuseum.org/exhibits/cold-war-aircraft/blackburn-buccaneer-s2/)

[engineer(retard)]

I have a fuzzy recollection that one of the aircraft was damaged by the RHAG and took a while to be recovered.

[TEEEJ]

Thanks TEEEJ.

There seems to be something amiss then, as the Yorkshire Aircraft Museum seem to think that their Bucc, XX901, was part of the detatchment.

Blackburn Buccaneer S.2B - Yorkshire Air Museum (http://yorkshireairmuseum.org/exhibits/cold-war-aircraft/blackburn-buccaneer-s2/)

No problem, Andy.

I had a further search and found the airborne spare Buccaneer - XW547. Perhaps XX901 was a spare and remained at Ascension?

3 Mar 83 Flew to RAF Ascension from Lossiemouth with Buccaneers XV353 and XV868, in company with Victor tankers and Nimrod SAR, as part of Operation ‘Corporate’, as a spare aircraft. Flight time 10 hours, the longest
ever RN/RAF Buccaneer flight. XV353 and XV868 flew on to Ascension on 5 March 1983, with XW547 as airborne spare. XW547 returned to Ascension, then flew back to Lossiemouth on 7 March 1983 in company with a Victor tanker and Nimrod SAR.

https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/documents/collections/1993-0859-A-Buccaneer-S.2B-XW547.pdf

I've contacted the Yorkshire Air Museum and passed on the info.

[farefield]

I've just checked my logbook and I was on the 3 March 83 deployment, on one of the Victors. The op was called Latherton.

I flew 7:05 MR to DAK then 2:20 DAK to ASI. Can't remember the details but we probably topped up another Victor which carried on to ASI with the Buccs whilst we dived in to Dakar for a top up.

I then flew another Op Latherton trip on 5 Mar 83, ASI-ASI which was 10:10, so we must have gone a fair way south with the Buccs then.

[knarfw]

https://www.facebook.com/keith.evans.31105/videos/10201106806531067/

[cokecan]

this may be a very silly question, so forgive my ignorance, but why did anyone think it a good idea to send Buccs down to the FI in March 83?

there were already 4(?) Phantom FGR2 in the FI, and while they were AD orientated, the Phantom was still a handy strike/CAS aircraft - so why send another aircraft type with all the duplication of the logs/spt train that entailed rather than just bump up the number of Phantoms?

certainly the Bucc was a far more capable bomber than the Phantom, but was it really worth the effort of getting it down there and supporting it over the flexibility of having another couple of multi-role (ish) Phantoms?

[beardy]

the Phantom was still a handy strike/CAS aircraft

Not at that point in it's life. The capability to drop bombs had not been maintained and fell in to the far too difficult to reinstate bracket. It was thoroughly investigated at the time.

[BEagle]

...the Phantom was still a handy strike/CAS aircraft...

It certainly wouldn't have been used for strike missions! After the war we did a bit of strafe, but that was about it. Apart from the centre station selector for the gun, no-one with any sense ever touched the rusty old mud-moving crap in the centre pedestal. The wiring hadn't been checked for years and legend has it that when someone did move one of the switches, the tanks fell off...:\

It would have been one heck of a challenge, both in engineering and training terms, to have resurrected any A/G capability of the F-4 in 1982. Had there been a serious A/G requirement beyond the ability of the SHAR, the Buccaneer was the obvious choice.

But if we'd had CVA-01, perhaps even with P.1154...ah well :ugh:

[wiggy]

the Phantom was still a handy strike/CAS aircraft

What Beagle said..

By early 83 It has been a while since the UK's F4s had been used in any strike/CAS/mud moving role so heaven knows what state the wiring was in for any of the air to ground functions (though as Beags said the cockpit switches were still in situ, gathering dust..).

Obviously the centreline SU-23 hardware had been maintained for air to air purposes and before deploying south we did a limited strafe work up. I was down south for the first time late 82 - March 83 and some of us did the odd strafe "currency"" session against some surplus to requirement Pucaras but I'm not sure how well the profile we flew would have worked in anger against a grunt armed with a SAM 7 or Blowpipe....

The wiring hadn't been checked for years and legend has it that when someone did move one of the switches, the tanks fell off

I heard that one...someone supposedly couldn't resist playing with a certain selection ;) and lost the centerline tank...not sure if it's really true but it's a good story.....

[engineer(retard)]

The Bucc also had the MARTEL system for anti shipping use

[BEagle]

Obviously the centreline SU-23 hardware had been maintained for air to air purposes and before deploying south we did a limited strafe work up.

'Limited' indeed! I did a dual trip with the QWIL but the harmonisation wasn't good - as was confirmed by one of the Flt Cdrs. Next day I went on my one and only ever trip to Donna Nook; we were late off as the previous crew had been late back. Wattisham to DN at 500KIAS+, one dry pass then a couple of hot passes which was all we had time for. The NRL 'Griggles' was in the back reminiscing about his mud-moving days, then we waxed my Flt Cdr on his Tac check having timed our briefed bounce to occur right in the middle of his frequency change from Eastern to Neatishead..:ok: One of my few really enjoyable F-4 trips, made doubly so after I was told I'd scored 52% on the range!

[grobbling about]

Wiggly, the centreline drop did happen. It was the last of the pre-80-update FG1s on 43(F). The nav had recently completed the QWI course and both he and his pilot were working with the Navy up north with little happening. The nav remarked that all of the jets had had the special wiring removed which meant that if his pilot selected master arm on, 'special' on the pedestal, and if the nav were to make the consent switch, nothing would happen if the pilot pickled. There was a sickening thud and they came home. Great pair of guys, not so lucky a year or so later. RIP

[LOMCEVAK]

In October 1989 we flew a trial at Boscombe to increase the maximum take-off weight of the Phantom from 58 000 lbs to 60 000 lbs. We used a FG1 that had a high basic weight and flew with 3 tanks and 4 x 1000 lb bombs. I suspect that we must have still had the jettison facility available for the bombs (but cannot be certain), and as it was a standard squadron airframe that capability must still have existed in the fleet even then.

[MAINJAFAD]

The Bucc also had the MARTEL system for anti shipping use

That's if they would have worked after a 8 hour very cold soak at 40,000 feet for the transit down there. Supposedly one of the reasons the Shrike was used instead for the anti radar Black Bucks.

[WIDN62]

The Buccs were sent down to the Falklands shortly before the first anniversary of the Argentinian invasion.
Their remit was to fly around the islands, make as much noise as they could and generally let everybody know they were there. The thought was that word would quickly get back to the mainland. The Argentinians would know that if they tried anything on the islands again, then we had the capability to hit back at the mainland.

[RAFEngO74to09]

In 1983, Buccaneers featured in an Op Order for the reinforcement of RAF Stanley in the event of an Argentinian amphibious landing force setting sail again. There would not have been the airlift capacity to get the requisite weapons and Armament Ground Support Equipment (AGSE) down there in time. Remember this was at a time when there was just the occasional Hercules airbridge flight requiring AAR and everything else was still coming by sea (taking around 14 days).

There was also no proper Explosives Storage Area at that time - 1000-lb bombs and BL-755 were dispersed around the base in natural folds in the ground in as safe a manner as could be orchestrated. The bombs could only be accessed using a Rough Terrain Fork Lift and a 4-Ton 4x4 Armament Support Vehicle (not Land Rover + Type S trolley) - a very time consuming process. Air to air missiles were stored in ISO containers. Very few people knew were the bombs were and they were well camouflaged.

I was involved in the planning for pre-positioning MARTEL missiles which - along with all the requisite AGSE for Buccaneers - was stored in specially procured ISO containers with side opening doors.

Due to the large Net Explosive Quantity of the loaded ISOs, the only safe storage position for them had to be way off in the bondhu away from RAF Stanley beyond the as yet uncleared minefields and it was accepted that that the ISOs would have to be underslung load lifted on base by Chinook directly to aircraft when required. The nature of the boggy ground between RAF Stanley and the storage locations - routing between the minefields - made it inaccessible by vehicle for equipment transport purposes. You could make it in a Unimog driving through mud almost to the top of the wheels !

Fun times when ingenuity and initiative was encouraged to meet operational requirements without interference from on-base H&S jobsworths or too much long-handled screwdrivering from HQ STC due to sparse strategic rear link comms [1 x ASMA in Ops or signal !].

[wiggy]

LOM, re the 1000 lbs trial and the F4, yes, selectively jettisoning or clearing the aircraft completely with one button push of things like pylons and/or rails, tanks etc was still advertised as being possible in the AD days.

(Apologys to the Bucc purists for F4ing this thread again )

[BEagle]

Lomcevak, whatever were they thinking of doing to the F-4 so late in its life to warrant an increase in MTOW?

Was this some armchair strategists plan to replace the normal 2500 lb Fletcher underwing tanks with 4000 lb tanks as carried on the centreline, presumably freeing up the centreline to carry the gun?

Or perhaps to allow for the weight of the bits of old railway line and/or battleship armour being nailed on to compensate for the ageing structure? There was a rumour about a LERX proposal in around 1982, but I guess nothing ever came of it.

The Buccs were sent down to the Falklands shortly before the first anniversary of the Argentinian invasion.

Their remit was to fly around the islands, make as much noise as they could and generally let everybody know they were there.

Ah - the good old MoD obsession with event anniversaries! Mind you, the auth sheet must have looked good - "Wire the cr@p out of anything you see, not above 100' MSD" or similar.

[charliegolf]

Mind you, the auth sheet must have looked good - "Wire the cr@p out of anything you see, not above 100' MSD" or similar.

Would auth'ing anything different have stopped the 'kin hooligans?:ok:

CG

[LOMCEVAK]

BEagle,

The problem was that over the life of the F4 the addition of mods had increased the basic weight of some airframes to the extent that in 'D' fit (3 tanks) plus 8 missiles the aircraft were greater than the 58 000 lb limit. Therefore, the trial was to enable all airframes to be generated in the standard QRA D fit.

We did a similar clearance for the Tornado GR1 for Op Granby but due to the gear strength we took off with the 2250l tanks empty then tanked to full to get the maximum overload weight in flight.

Apologies for the thread drift but I was a Bucc pilot during the time period being discussed so does that count?!

[Busta]

Hi Wiggy,

The strafe profile did seem a little exposed, but firing 1200 rounds of HEI in three passes was definitely " the best fun you could have with your trousers on" as OC B used to say. I wish they had left some fuel in the Pucaras.

T+9

[Buster15]

In the interests of correctness:
There are a number of adverse comments against Tornado earlier in this post.
It is important to point out that in 1982, the GR1 was very early in its service life whereas the Buccaneer and F4 were mature if not approaching the end of their life cycle. It is correct that the engine had an oil consumption issue associated with the gearbox breather and there was of course a concern with that.
In an earlier post a comment was made that the Falklands was not a Tornado type war.
The events of the last 35+ years has shown that this aircraft is perfectly capable of operations in wars quite different to that it was designed for. Moreover the F3 was based at MPA for many years showing it was routinely was able to make that required long range flight. 1982 was just a little early for it to decimate the runway.

[dagama]

Err, no. The withdrawal of the Vulcan from service had been agreed and planned some years earlier, and I don't think it could have been changed by anything that happened in the Falklands.

If you haven't read "Vulcan 607" yet, I highly recommend it - it's a cracking read and a really human account of the effort that went into Black Buck. You might also be quite surprised at how much the RAF did in the Falklands that one doesn't hear much about, such as the long-range MR sorties flown by the Victors and Nimrods.


...... and not to mention the long-range air drops to the Fleet by the Hercules. My longest flight 26 hrs and 5 mins with 2 gulps on the way out and nothing on the way back - in the dark. Two sunrises and a sunset. :zzz:

[orca]

I recall one of the previous threads on this being quite informative - mainly due to Argentinian veterans contributing which was fascinating. IIRC we all agreed that the raids were a staggering effort and there was evidence to suggest that the Shrike raids did get a ‘shut off’ reaction. I think there was some evidence that the raids caused a shuffling of the Argentine DCA at on the mainland but less that this detracted from the units fragged with strike or sweep of the islands.
I’ve always harboured my own suspicion that the ‘wider effects of BB’ are arrived at by assuming the enemy reacted how we would have - without actually checking that they did - hence I found the evidence very interesting.
Incidentally - Vulcan 607 says that the attack run was made at 10,000 ft. I’ve carried 1000 lb weapons twice as high as that in a SHAR - whoever it was saying something (bogus) about weapon delivery and impact angle. Naturally the load was incomparable to the Vulcan’s but let’s stick to facts eh?
Repeat my first point. Staggering effort, hats off to striker, AAR and MPA crews involved.

[engineer(retard)]

That's if they would have worked after a 8 hour very cold soak at 40,000 feet for the transit down there. Supposedly one of the reasons the Shrike was used instead for the anti radar Black Bucks.

They would have been operating from Stanley at that point, I think that the weapons had been shipped down.

Whoops just caught up with RAFEngos informative post, his memory is better than mine. We were getting ready for the Key West trip that had been cancelled the previous year.

[ORAC]

Wiggly, the centreline drop did happen. It was the last of the pre-80-update FG1s on 43(F). The nav had recently completed the QWI course and both he and his pilot were working with the Navy up north with little happening. The nav remarked that all of the jets had had the special wiring removed which meant that if his pilot selected master arm on, 'special' on the pedestal, and if the nav were to make the consent switch, nothing would happen if the pilot pickled. There was a sickening thud and they came home.

I can confirm as I was the FA at Boulmer during the incident. The aircraft had launched as D44+8 and, after the incident, it reported that the aircraft was RTB as C44+8. The subsequent series of telephone calls I received during their recovery escalated to the Stn Cdr. IIRC a subsequent investigation revealed they were in the only aircraft where the wiring had not been cut as specified in the mod.

Of interest the hysterical conversation between the crew, including pressing the transit button rather than intercom, including the suggestion they eject and claim they had a different problem before senses cleared.

[BEagle]

ORAC wrote: The aircraft had launched as D44+8...

Really? D44+8....:\

[hunterboy]

Blimey, says a lot for the safety culture in those days that these guys thought to eject and write off an aircraft rather than return home and face the music. I’d always thought the RAF was a pioneer of in flight safety and just culture/learning from its mistakes?

[wiggy]

Blimey, says a lot for the safety culture in those days that these guys thought to eject and write off an aircraft rather than return home and face the music.

Don't take it too seriously....I rather suspect we are talking about "banter" and flippant remark under stress here, rather than it being a serious comment. I think most of us here would have rather have faced the certain anger of a Group Captain/Air Commodore/ AVM or above, at a tea and biscuits interview without the tea and biscuits rather than face the uncertainties of a M-B exit and subsequent let down into the North Atlantic.......

P.S. Busta, if you are still here - not going to be able make the annual do next week, PM on way shortly

[Tengah Type]

Buster 15 #108

The other day whilst searching for some historic paperwork amongst some
junk (sorry, treasured memorabilia), I came across an AAR plan I was asked to produce for a Staff College presentation by someone who later became my Sqn Boss. The plan was for a Black Buck style attack on MPA by 2 Tornado GR1s with JP233. The plan was to use Tristar Tankers for simplicity(?). The man provided me with the planning figures (given to him by a Tornado mate) that he wanted me to use. The plan required the Tristars to be stripped of all seats, pallets etc to achieve a very low Zero Fuel Weight and a fuel uplift of 135 Tonnes each. It also assumed that Tristar/Tristar AAR was possible. At the time the Tristar AAR probes had been removed and there were no crews current, but that would not be a problem as that was the situation for the Nimrod fleet at the start of Op Corporate, and easily sorted!!!

The plan used 3 Tristars for the outbound leg, with a Tristar/Tristar bracket up to MTOW between Tristars 2 & 3 some 6 hours downroute. That Tristar then completed Brackets 5 & 6 after Tristar 1 had completed Brackets 1-4.
The last Bracket was completed 250 miles from MPA and the Tristar loitered there whilst the GR1s destroyed the runway after 9hrs 45 mins airborne!!

After Post Strike RV with Tristar 3, the GR1s took 2 more Brackets before he RTBd and was relieved by Tristar 4 for the final 2 Brackets. If Tristar/Tristar AAR was not possible it required 6 Tristars(we only ever had a maximum of 6 Tristar Tankers). It also assumed that the Tristars had NO
HOLD or DIVERSION CAPABILITY at ASI.

The GR1 crews would land at ASI, for a well earned beer, after a total of 17:30, with all but about 3 hours where they had NO diversion capability if the AAR had failed. See Black Buck One to see what could happen.

The VC10 force would have been busy with the Nimrod SAR ( Rescue?)

The plan had a few other holes in it. It is highly likely that the GR1s would have run out of Engine Oil and O2 before or shortly after the attack. I also now know that the Fuel Figures I was given (pre GW1) were, shall we say, a tad optimistic.

I was not involved in the Bucc (one way at a time only) Deployment as I was busy flying the Brize-ASI airbridge in shiny white VC10s as the much better hemp coloured ones had yet to be delivered.

Yes the F3s did it (one way - on the limit of engine oil) on several occasions, but not lugging JP233 with the Drag Co-efficient of an aircraft hangar.

To answer the OP original question - Yes the Bucc would have had better performance (without dragging JP233 around), but the duration of the flight, the loss of an aircraft and crew or two if AAR had failed, and the issue of engine oli and O2 would still have precluded any sensible person from authorizing it.

The rationale was given in #2 by LJ.

[Busta]

Got the pm Wiggy, sent one back, stop calling me shortly.