Night offshore landings: a new approach?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

TO ALL

I have a Presentation on Stabilsied Night Approaches.

For those of you in Offshore industry I am offering sight of it.

To get it I will need your email address and an indication of who you work for and what you fly.

I am proposing a radical change in the concept of Night and Night ARTA approaches which to summarise, includes:

1. FORMAL IDENTIFICATION OF THE "REQUIRED VISUAL REFERENCES"

2. AN INCREASE IN THE NIGHT MDH FROM DECK +50 to DECK +200

3. PUBLICATION OF A MANDATORY VERTICAL & HORIZONTAL PROFILES - WHICH WORKS FOR ALL NIGHT APPROACHES whetehr they start in VMC or IMC.

My Company is currently evaluating this right now but if we are to have a chance of changing this archaic dangerous principles we need an industry wide chaNGE.

I have also send it to UK CAA and considering sending it to AAIB. If there is an AAIB member reading this please PM as I need advice on this issue.

[Mel Effluent]

Helimutt,

I hope that you never find yourself 'totally comfortable' with offshore night flying. I have found that a certain amount of adrenalin is a good thing!

[helimutt]

A certain amount of adrenaline, I enjoy, believe me, but beyond that amount isn't good for you!:eek::ok:

[Aser]

helimutt is right, yesterday night I had too much adrenaline low level over water calling the captain for more power and to keep the horizon...

BUT also Mel Effluent is right, I'm getting used to this and I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN the controls instead of telling the other pilot what to do.

well... nobody told us this job would be easy... :}

Regards & fly safe!

Aser

[DeltaNg]

I think what DB is trying to acheive, is a clear definition of what should become a standard procedure at Night.

Therefore, any deviation from the profile will give the PNF a clear mandate to alert the PF, and ultimately take control.

Without a standard profile, the PNF has no clear rules on when or how this should be undertaken. We all know it is not a nice thing to have to do, especially for a low-time co-pilot.

The proposals above will give the PNF clear boundarys to an acceptable night approach, by defining a standard template night landing.

Up until now, with the low and shallow type of approach associated with a manouvre from the .75nm point at 50 above deck, there is no real definition of the ideal flight path, which, rightly so, DB is now proposing.

I think it's a great idea.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Hi gents,

Those of you who have asked for a copy of the presentation have been sent a copy on the email.

I would like your feedback and also welcome discussion on PPRUNE.

Thank you all for showing an interest and for those of you who have already looked at the presentation I feel sure that you can appreciate the motivation behind the work.

Also I hope it helps to demonstarte that the Bond crew that night were actually just the last cheese, in a very long line of swiss cheeses, whoose holes had already lined up long before the poor b****ds left their base.

Changes is always difficult and seldom wlecomed with open arms. But the best changes are those that come from within!!!

Lets get together and make offshore night flying simpler, safer and less stressful than we all experience at present.

The problem with inappropriate limits and poor procedures is they place a onus onto the crew that "we must be able to cope with this cos thats the way its supposed to be done" NOT GOOD.

I hope Mike reads this and if you need a copy of my presentation, EMAIL ME.

SAFETY AND MANAGEMENT STAFF

If any others wish to see the presentation, especially those of you in Safety/Management/Training positions please email me and I will send a copy.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

I have sent out over 50 copies of the presentation.

Any other takers???

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

What!!!

No comments yet.

No howls of anguish!!!!

Some feedback if you have it would be greatly appreciated.

DB

[soggyboxers]

DB,

An interesting presentation which makes many excellent points. Thank you for putting it together and giving food for thought :ok:

[Airflowreversal_1]

Hey Double Bogey!

Would you mind to sent me a copy?

Thnx!

Airflow

[Winnie]

And although I am in "upper canada" I would not mind one either...

Cheers
W,

[Geoffersincornwall]

........... the comparison of the two sets of minima for the ILS and for the ARA are stunning ......... how come I never realised how 'adventurous' we were being offshore. Could it by any chance have something to do with the fact that ever since offshore ops began we have been trying to creep away from the quasi military style of ops that were justified 'in the national interest' when exploitation of 'mineral resources' deep in the continental shelf was started 40 years ago (hang on, must get my calculator out for CRAB) yes, nearly 40 years ago.

Can you imagine, back then:-

no immersion suits - at all!!!
no instrument ratings - my VFR minima was 200 ft and I could get in almost anywhere when the approved instrument procedures were below limits - remember the 'low level route'. Ah!!! nightmares
no rad alts
no coupling
no separation
no radio coverage - save for HF if you could bare to use it when it worked.
no performance calcs once you crossed the coast outbound where Group A was an alphabet lesson.
no IVLL
no helideck inspections
crap FTL schemes
etc etc

So at last we get to deal with the ARA - well I hope so anyway. Nice work DB.

G :}

[SASless]

Geoffers,

For the sheer sake of argument.....what was the difference in accident rates then and now?

Back then we spent 100 percent of our time flying the machine and not worrying about rules, regulations, SOP's, and all this other we do now.

Mind you I do not for a second suggest we should revert to the "old way".

The point is to see if we have made any true progress and if not.

That might show the need for significant change in the way business is done.

[Geoffersincornwall]

SAS

Read this lot:

Rotor and Wing
February 1, 2006



Armed with a slew of accident analyses, the oil and gas industry is prodding operators and manufacturers to make helicopter operations as safe as airline travel. Here's why.

By Mark Stevens and Bob Sheffield

The International Helicopter Safety Symposium last September in Montreal launched a collaborative effort to reduce the helicopter accident rate.

More than 260 international representatives of helicopter manufacturers, military and civil helicopter operators, and international regulators agreed that the current helicopter accident rate is excessive and unsustainable and that collaborative effort by all should be able to reduce that rate by 80 percent. Several speakers described how a few key risk-reduction measures could achieve this result.

Shell's "7/7=1" helicopter risk-reduction program advocates seven key measures that can reduce the current fatal-accident rate for offshore helicopter operations from just under seven per million flight hours to around one per million flight hours. This is consistent with the symposium's conclusion that the means are at hand to reduce the helicopter accident rate by 80 percent or more. Such a reduction is necessary to achieve the International Assn. of Oil and Gas Producers' (OGP) goal: "The individual risk per period of flying exposure for an individual flying on OGP-contracted business should be no greater than on the average global airline." Achieving this goal could save more than 200 offshore oil and gas workers' lives during the next 10 years.

While the "7/7=1" program focused on helicopters supporting offshore operations by OGP member companies, these same measures can help any type of helicopter operation reduce its accident rate by 80 percent or more.

Shell Aircraft, the organization within Shell responsible for aircraft operating standards, developed the "7/7=1" risk-reduction program as a result of its detailed analysis of 30 years of commercial airline safety improvements, published accident data, its own ongoing safety initiatives and comparisons of existing helicopter designs to the current U.S. FAA design requirements.

The poor safety record of the helicopter industry is well documented and many studies have been carried out to analyze the causes. There is broad consistency and agreement in much of the analysis; the causes of each new accident rarely come as a surprise to the industry. Indeed, some people believe that helicopters are, by design and operating concept, less safe than fixed-wing aircraft.

The current safety record of public-transport helicopters is actually not much worse than the airline industry's safety performance was 30 years ago. But while the airlines for the most part have consistently improved, offshore helicopter operations' accident rate is actually getting worse. Unfortunately, a large number of the helicopters presently operating offshore were designed and are still operated to the same criteria and procedures that the airliners were 30 years ago. Indeed, many of the helicopters themselves were built more than 30 years ago.

Analysis shows that the helicopter industry has not fully embraced the improvements in design, equipment, operating procedures, training and maintenance practices that enabled the airlines to achieve their safety improvements. In fact, the key steps taken by the airlines to improve their safety can be replicated with helicopters with similar effects.

Shell Aircraft analyzed numerous sets of accident data. These included: NASA's 2000 study of U.S. civil rotorcraft accidents from 1963 to 1997; a 1999 study of helicopter safety by the Scandinavian research group SINTEF; statistics and analyses of the U.S. Gulf Coast's Helicopter Safety Advisory Conference; Robert Breiling Associates' Annual Turbine Aircraft Accident Review; the Flight Safety Foundation's Flight Safety Digest, and U.K. Civil Aviation Authority studies of helicopter tail-rotor failures (in 2003) and helicopter health-monitoring cost-benefit ratios (in 1997).

These data show similar trends: a steady decrease in accident rate until the mid-1990s, followed by a disturbing upward trend in recent years. 2003 was a particularly bad year for accidents in the Gulf of Mexico, although all were on single-engine helicopters. In recent years, the overall accident rate for a representative sample of twin-turbine helicopters has averaged about 20 per million flight hours in the United States and about 12 per million in the North Sea.

Despite strenuous and continuous efforts by some oil companies and helicopter operators to reduce accidents, the trend of overall accident rates, also reflected in the rolling five-year average fatal-accident rate, shows a very disturbing upward trend in the last few years.

With the best available accident data and analyses in hand, our team carefully assessed Shell Aircraft's current and potential further risk-reduction initiatives, including:

* Aviation safety management systems (SMS) incorporating systematic hazard assessment and a structured approach to risk management.
* Quality assurance (QA) in maintenance.
* Operating, maintenance and training standards in line with industry "best practice" to minimize human error and improve the safety culture. These include, among other things, line-oriented flight training (LOFT) exercises with a focus on crew resource management (CRM) during simulator training, human factors training for air and maintenance personnel and the requirement for duplicate inspections after maintenance on safety-critical equipment.
* Health and usage monitoring systems (HUMS) on contracted or owned aircraft and the subsequent development of a minimum specification for HUMS/vibration health monitoring (VHM) for the industry, targeted at monitoring the machine and human error in maintenance.
* Cabin configuration guidelines and helicopter underwater escape training (HUET) standards to improve survivability for passengers and crew in the event of a ditching.
* Improved aircraft performance standards and standardized takeoff and landing profiles, i.e. Performance Class 1 (PC1) or Performance Class 2 enhanced (PC2e) as defined by ICAO Annex 6.
* Helicopter operations monitoring programs (HOMP), a version of flight data monitoring targeted at monitoring the pilot and his conduct of the operation in accordance with Flight Manual and Operations Manual requirements and enhancing training effectiveness through confidential feedback loops.
* Defensive aids such as automatic voice alert devices (AVAD) or enhanced ground proximity warning systems (EGPWS) to prevent controlled flight into terrain or water and traffic alert and collision avoidance systems (TCAS) to prevent mid-air collisions.
* Industry "best practice" for managing helideck operations.

Implementation of these risk-reduction measures has improved Shell's air safety performance fourfold since 1992. Analysis showed, however, that design deficiencies in many of the helicopters we currently fly would make it unlikely to achieve the goal of making them as safe as the good airlines. This fact is demonstrated by the helicopter safety record in the North Sea, where implementation of the measures mentioned reduced the fatal-accident rate to about two per million flight hours. Further improvement has proved to be difficult to achieve. Our analysis showed that to achieve a fatal-accident rate of one per million flight hours or less, industry must re-equip with helicopters designed to the latest requirements in Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 27 (for small aircraft) and 29 (for large ones).

We came to this conclusion after assessing the effectiveness of existing and potential risk-reduction measures against the common causes of helicopter accidents. Although the analyses we reviewed each used different ways of categorizing accidents, system failure (including engine failure), hitting objects, and flying into the ground featured prominently as the main causes and accounted for about 70 percent of all accidents. We analyzed the following causes (some of which have design implications) and assessed means of mitigation: airframe system failures, in-flight collision with objects, loss of control, loss of engine power and in-flight collision with terrain.

Most of the airframe system failures reported in NASA's study occurred in the rotor, transmission and control systems. Metal fatigue or other material failure caused about three quarters of them, accounting for about 20 percent of all accidents. The SINTEF study attributed about one fifth of all accidents to design deficiencies, most of which related to damage tolerance of rotor systems and flight controls. One of the greatest design deficiencies appears to be the tail-rotor systems on many helicopters.

Even with this most obvious difference between fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, designs can be improved. For instance, NASA found the industry and regulators could adopt more conservative fatigue-design criteria and incorporate additional fail-safe modes, such as a fail-safe tail-rotor pitch mechanism. SINTEF found rotor systems and flight control systems could be made more redundant, for instance with duplex drive shafts. The Flight Safety Foundation noted rotor-control systems could be designed so no single failure (or combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable) could cause an accident. This is similar to the requirements of FAR 25.671 for airliners. The table above shows some of the important amendments to FAR 29 that can help prevent airframe system failures.

Similar assessment of all the amendments to FAR 27 and 29 showed that many important risk-reduction measures are not present on older helicopter design types.

Together with the established risk-reduction potential of simulator training, quality and safety management systems, HUMS, HOMP, disciplined takeoff and landing profiles and defensive equipment like EGPWS and TCAS, our assessment showed that helicopters designed to the latest standards can indeed achieve the goal of reducing the fatal-accident rate by 80 percent or more. What's more, some of the new design types, like Sikorsky's S-92, come equipped with HUMS, a flight data recorder for HOMP, significantly improved takeoff and landing performance and EGPWS.

Having determined that Shell Aircraft's helicopter safety goal is achievable, we set out to show that the necessary risk-reduction measures are affordable. Within Shell, the ultimate test for safety measures is the expectation to reduce risks to a level as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). Meeting this ALARP test argues for investing in safety improvement until the additional cost becomes disproportionate to the incremental safety benefit. When you consider that the costs associated with accidents include material losses, loss of reputation, loss of production, costs of litigation and potential punitive damages, the cost of an accident with a medium or large helicopter involving multiple fatalities could be in excess of $50 million.

Our first step toward determining what is necessary to manage helicopter risks to the ALARP standard was to quantify the risk reduction expected from each potential corrective measure. Having studied the referenced reports, we assigned effectiveness levels to each potential risk-reduction measure and applied them where appropriate in three levels of defense. The values assigned were conservative relative to established data. For instance, we assumed HUMS would have a 65-percent effectiveness, while the U.K. CAA study found such systems 69 percent effective.

To illustrate the three levels of defense, the first level of defense against loss of tail-rotor effectiveness is the design. The second is a HUMS to warn of incipient failure, and the final defensive barrier before release of the hazard is simulator training for the flight crew to cope with loss of tail-rotor effectiveness.

When all these defenses fail, secondary safety measures come into play. These include crashworthiness of the airframe and passenger seats, the helicopter's flotation system (to keep it upright after alighting on water), upper torso restraints (to help prevent disorientation should the helicopter capsize on water), HUET, and the water survival equipment used by passengers and flight crew.

Having applied the estimated effectiveness of each mitigation measure to the accident data, it was possible to project the percentage of reduction in accidents that could be attributed to each measure. The graphs on page 36, derived from the SINTEF and NASA studies, illustrate the impact of each mitigation measure in isolation, with the others set at zero.

This analysis shows that designs adhering to the latest amendment combined with enhanced handling qualities (which of course can only be obtained with new types of helicopter) would prove to be the most effective mitigation to prevent accidents. The NASA study covers a period ending in 1997, whereas the AS332 and S-76 analysis includes another six years. The charts indicate that mitigation provided by training, quality and safety management systems with operational controls, HUMS and the disciplined takeoff and landing profiles of PC1 and PC2e are all lower for the AS332 and S-76 accidents than for the NASA study. This may be indicative of improvements progressively introduced over the last 10 years to these two helicopter types, which predominate in offshore operations. The only significant difference between the two analyses concerns EGPWS/TCAS. This can be accounted for by the very high number of S-76 accidents involving controlled flight into terrain or water, which has driven Sikorsky to deliver the C model equipped with EGPWS standard.

Many of the mitigation measures have already been deployed to a varying extent throughout the world. To illustrate how the trends in accident reduction relate to operating costs (and hence whether changes meet the ALARP test), we estimated the risk reduction and cost for a number of mitigation-measure packages.

Package A is the baseline, with no mitigation measures, and represents twin-turbine helicopters operated globally in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The baseline accident rate we used is 20 per million flight hours, although recent trends indicate this may be rising. Using the ratio of 0.35 between fatal accidents and all accidents, we get a baseline fatal-accident rate of seven per million flight hours. The corresponding operating cost is estimated at $2.5 million a year based on annual standing charges for medium-twin airframe and 1,000 flight hours per year.

Package B comprises the following mitigation measures: a mix of PC2 and PC3, partial implementation of HUMS and simulator training with some LOFT and partial use of enhanced quality and safety management systems (SMS) and operational controls (with elements of a structured SMS and helideck management). This represents twin-turbine helicopters operating in the mid-1990s in the North Sea and currently in most other OGP regions. Aircraft types generally are the S-76A++, Bell 212, AS365N, AS332L/L1 and S-61.

We projected that applying Package B mitigation measures to a layered system of defenses would result in an accident rate of 15.1 per million flight hours and a fatal accident rate of 5.3 per million flight hours

The corresponding operating cost estimate for the medium-twin helicopters in this group for future contracts is $4.6 million per year based on an annual standing charge per airframe and 1,000 flight hours per year.

Package C's mitigation measures include a retrofitted HUMS with associated effectiveness, PC2, full JAR Ops 3 quality assurance to JAR 145, effective SMS with safety case and helideck management to CAP 437 standards, partial implementation of design requirements to equivalent levels of safety beyond that claimed in the Type Certificate Data Sheets, full implementation of HOMP and of simulator training and installation of TCAS and EGPWS.

Implementation of Package C's measures is representative of most of one major oil operator's twin-turbine helo operations in the late 1990s and early 2000s and all North Sea ops with such aircraft as the S-76C+, Bell 412, AS332L2, and EC155.

We projected that applying these measures in a layered defense model would result in an accident rate of 6.19 per million flight hours and a fatal accident rate of 2.17 per million flight hours. The corresponding operating cost estimate for this group is $5.03 million per year.

Package D includes all the mitigation measures and is representative of new twin-turbines such as the AB139, S-92, EC225 and EC155B1.

Applying these mitigation measures to the defense model, we estimated, would result in an accident rate of 3.2 per million flight hours and a fatal accident rate of 1.1 per million flight hours.

The corresponding operating cost for the helicopters in this group is estimated to be $5.76 million per year, but it should be possible to reduce this figure with, among other things, smart procurement, improved utilization and sharing.

Package E is a prediction of the potential safety level that might be achieved in the next 10-15 years with derivative technology such as fly-by-wire, enhanced cockpit management and flaw/damage-tolerant design and more rigorous monitoring and operational controls. It assumes that FAR 29 design requirements have closed the gap with FAR 25 and that operations are being conducted to the more stringent requirements of FAR 121 or JAR-OPS 3/NPA 38 (or the equivalent). It also assumes HUMS analysis employs machine-learning techniques and has been extended into the rotor system and that all operations are conducted to PC1 to no smaller than 1D helidecks according to CAP 437.

Although it is difficult to predict actual costs, we assumed that a premium of at least 20 percent over the Package D annual costs would be conservative for an equivalent aircraft. We adjusted the effectiveness of the appropriate mitigation measures for the various enhancements upwards by 5-10 percent. Applying these upgraded mitigation measures to the layered defense model, we projected, would result in an accident rate of 2.34 per million flight hours and a fatal accident rate of 0.82 per million flight hours.

The corresponding operating cost for the medium helicopters in this group is projected to be $6.9 million per year based on an annual standing charge per airframe and 1,000 flight hours per year. As in Option D, it should be possible to reduce this figure with smart procurement, improved utilization, sharing etc.

The ALARP assessment plot on the next page shows that in the last decade, progress has been made in reducing accident rates through the implementation of some of the mitigation measures. Where there has been more extensive implementation, as in the North Sea, accidents rates have been cut further. Recent contract rates for Package B's older aircraft and Package C's new versions of older-design aircraft do not now show the significant difference that existed five years ago. The significant reduction in accident rates clearly justifies the added cost.

However, the aircraft in Package C represent the status quo and are unlikely to help us achieve an 80-percent accident-rate reduction. This can only be achieved with the introduction of new-design aircraft like those in Package D. Although they show a premium of up to 15 percent in annual cost for a medium, 12-seat helicopter, their use has the potential to reduce accident rates by 50 percent.

Package E is likely to increase costs another 15-20 percent and the mitigation assessment shows an improvement of about 25 percent in safety. This would indicate the effect of the law of diminishing returns and that the ALARP point, which coincides with the projected safety goal, is Package D.

Oil and gas companies contract for helicopters within an industry that has generally been under funded and, arguably, complacent in the past 15 years. Regulatory change has been insufficient, and regulators globally are not harmonized in their approach to helicopter operations and safety.

Whilst mitigation has been introduced with improvements in training, equipment, safety management and operational control, these measures cannot by themselves deliver our safety goal. The opportunity exists for the helicopter industry to learn the lessons from the airlines and the fixed-wing industry. Our study demonstrates what can be achieved. However, it is very unlikely that the International Helicopter Safety Symposium's goal can be achieved without the mitigation offered by all the projected further improvements, including introduction of new types. "Business as usual" is therefore not an acceptable option. The only option that will enable the long-term goal to be met would be to acquire new helicopters built to the latest design standard.

Mark Stevens was an engineer in the U.K. Royal Air Force. He left the RAF in 2005 with the rank of Group Captain and joined Shell Aircraft as director air safety and global projects.

As managing director of Shell Aircraft Ltd., Bob Sheffield is responsible for Shell's corporate fleet and for the standards for all aircraft used in support of Shell's operations worldwide. Shell operates or contracts for operation of about 100 aircraft that fly around 100,000 hr. each year in more than 30 countries.

The authors gratefully acknowledge the work of Peter Perry, Eric Clark, Cliff Edwards, and Grant Campbell, whose research paper on this subject was the foundation for this article.

Airline safety improvements:

1. Damage tolerant design; system redundancy

2. High fidelity flight simulators

3. Engine and vibration monitoring systems

4. Quality & Safety Management Systems to reduce human errors

5. Flight data monitoring programs (FDM)

6. Disciplined take-off and landing profiles (e.g. stabilised approach)

7. EGPWS/TAWS; TCAS/ACAS

Helicopter mitigation available now:

1. Late FAR 29 designs with glass cockpits

2. High fidelity flight simulators with LOFT & CRM

3. HUMS/VHM/EVMS

4. Quality & Safety Management Systems to reduce human errors

5. Helicopter Operations Monitoring Program

6. Performance Class1/2e & helideck operating profiles EGPWS/TAWS; TCAS/ACAS
Back to this month's issue



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[Brom]

DB,
Would like a copy of your presentation, if you would be so kind.

[SASless]

Oil and gas companies contract for helicopters within an industry that has generally been under funded and, arguably, complacent in the past 15 years. Regulatory change has been insufficient, and regulators globally are not harmonized in their approach to helicopter operations and safety.

Which industry do they refer to here?

The Helicopter Industry or the Oil Industry?

If the emphasis was on continuity, investment in captial improvements, modernization of equipment, enhancing of training, and perhaps not just getting the cheapest rates some of this lack of progress could have been avoided.

The Helicopter Industry has always been a cut throat business re competition.

So who steps up to the plate first.....the oil companies who will advertise and fund this magical solution or the helicopter industry who will refuse to do it the "old" way and demand the oil companies fund the contracts as needed to provide for the improvements?

Never mind the regulators.....they are too busy worrying about losing their paychecks if they pitch a stone in someone's mill pond.

[[email protected]]

Whilst you still have people harking back to the 'old days' as if they really were the 'good old days when men were men' then you stand no chance of making progress.

A fundamental sea change in attitude is what is required here - all the bells and whistles of modern helicopter design and certification haven't stopped two of them ending up in the water in the last 2 weeks - one sadly with far worse consequences than the other but only by the grace of God.

[flyer43]

If the emphasis was on continuity, investment in captial improvements, modernization of equipment, enhancing of training, and perhaps not just getting the cheapest rates some of this lack of progress could have been avoided.

SAS, whilst I fully agree with you that helicopter operators have been stretched by their customers, I can also remember back to days when contracted helicopter rates were much better for the operator, but some (perhaps most?) operators cut their own throats by not putting any of their income into future planning even when they were getting plenty of usable income as they were writing down the costs of their helicopters many times over.

Another situation where operators bring about their own demise is when they respond to a contract with a very low bid to "steal" the contract. After 6 months or so they then present a case to their customer that they are unable to maintain the level of service without more funds, relying on the probability that the customer will not pull out of the contract as there are few, if any, options available to replace the contracted operator.

Unless all parties are realistic and honest with each other, things wont change for the better.

Of course, on top of all this the regulators could be more prescriptive???

[bast0n]

Crab

A fundamental sea change in attitude is what is required here

Sea change

A radical, and apparently mystical, change.

Origin

From Shakespeare's The Tempest, 1610:

ARIEL [sings]:
Full fathom five thy father lies;
Of his bones are coral made;
Those are pearls that were his eyes:
Nothing of him that doth fade
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange.
Sea-nymphs hourly ring his knell

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

The best changes are those that come from within!!!

The CAA have had a peek at the proposal and they are thinking along similar lines, although they will wait until the AAIB have put out an statement/report.

I think the harping back to the good old days is not a bad thing. It is true that the accident rate seems to have stayed the same, if not risen slightly.

However, the type of accidents we seem to have these days, generally are somewhat different.

HUMs seems to have made a pretty good job of reducing in service component failure (recent S92 aside) but the greater tragedy is when serviceable machines are lost due to crew/procedure/WX etc.

It is these kinds of accidents that we, the flight crew, have the most influence in stopping.

I believe that the advent of automatics, although far safer on paper, are not been fully exploited by us at the moment.

We need to embrace the safety features with which we have been blessed.

Alleviations afforded by MELs in some instances should be removed. Why are we expected to operate a machine that has a broken leg before its even leaves the warmth of the hangar.

We tend to weaken the argument for better equipment when we seem incapable of fully exploiting the new kit when we get it.

CAA Standards Doc 28 (new) makes a pretty good fist of allowing training during checking. This is long long overdue. Also it actually encourages the operators to train and check using the full suite of displays and automatics.

The old and bold have a point. They had one way of doing things, they got good at it, and the balance of the cosmos was maintained.

Today, in a modern helicopter, there are several different ways to skin the same cat. And this leads to problems in itself.

Allied to all this, the trend of replacing old school Chief Pilots/Operations Directors and AOC postholders with non-aviators just cos they are the cheaper option seriously weakens the strength of an AOCs Flight Operations management to effect real change when it conflicts with the organisations commercial interests.

Personally I have never had a conflict with an Oil Company rep. I have many many with my Operations Staff trying to "force" a flight.

Most Oilys are happy to accept an explanation that "there is doubt" so there is no doubt. The bears we fly on the NS are trained in this ethos in their own walks of life.

But while we have crews who will happiliy launch into an airmass that is actively producing lightning (on the false promise that they can avoid by 10Nm), while we have crews that will fly when the freezining level is way below MSA, while we have crews that will not use automatics, while we have crews that will do anything....just to get the job done...........

WE SEND A VERY POOR MESSAGE TO OUR MANAGEMENT AND CUSTOMERS.

It is time to raise our game, the offshore helicopter industry, to the level of proffessional responsibility that it demands of us.

I often say that "The Enemy is always closer than you think"

In some cases we are our own worst enemy.

DB

[Aser]

DB, I sent you an email with the request.

Regards
Aser

[bondu]

DB,

You are so right when you talk of the Oilys concept of "if there's doubt, there's NO doubt"! :D

I think most of the NS pilots will agree that we will always try to complete a crew change flight, but we must always remember that we are only taking people to work. We are not SAR crew, doing our utmost (safely!) to save lives: we are, in effect, highly qualified and highly trained bus drivers.
All the advances in a/c technologies, better SOPs and stricter regulations will be of little use if pilots continue to be subject to 'commercial' pressure, whether from the client, company Operations or indeed self-imposed.
That's not to say that all those advances shouldn't be made and introduced; they should, and probably should have been introduced ten years ago!

bondu

[Geoffersincornwall]

Nobody that I know harkens back to what you refer to as the 'good old days'. That's your interpretation. not mine nor I suspect others that have pointed out that progress to standards we enjoy today came at a price and that price was paid by our colleagues and the pax we flew. Believe me there is nothing to enjoy about those days but it is, I believe, worthwhile reminding folk that once upon a time we thought it was OK to do things in that quasi-military fashion but now we look on things differently. This lays the ground for accepting that DB has made a resoundingly good point and once again there is the opportunity to put the bad old ways behind us and get with the standards that the rest of the (CAT) aviation world enjoys.

I've said it before and I'll say it again, extended flight with the skill meter at max is just inviting disaster.

G

[T4 Risen]

DB,

Thanks for sending me a copy of the presentation. Very well put forward and makes the point quite clearly.

One of my concerns with the current situation is, that there seems to have been a reduction in later flights during the winter months. As a result we do not get the practice and continuity that we need to fly either the current approach techniques or the ones you are proposing.

Why not role this out as "THE" procedure for day/night /bad weather/good weather.

I know there will be moans of "its not commercially expedient" and "it will result in more flights not completing". But surely if it means more hours in the air, it means more revenue for the heli operators? I am sure the safety concious oil companies would could be pursuaded to use a little of their billlions of £ of profit to help improve safety!!

I think i said in a previous post, if this were to become the only way of flying an approach offshore then everybody should get pretty good at it very quickly. It then doesnt matter what conditions you are flying in, the sight picture should always be the same. And during that night in Autumn when you get called from your slumber on night S/B to go and pick up a medivac etc, having not flown a night approach since the previous December, you can depart with the confidence that you have made the same calls and followed the same sight picture a couple of days ago when you did it in the day time.

Just a thought.

T4

[helimutt]

All well and good saying the oil companies could pay for it, but just recently they are requesting a 20% reduction in costs from the heli operators to 'help' them through these 'difficult times'.
Funny they never offered us extra when the oil price was sky high last year???

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

T4

I think you are absolutley right!!! The beuty of a structured mandated approach is that it can also be practised (and if necessary mandated) for daylight approaches.

For all of you out there currently doing this stuff - I have never intended to imply that most of us are not adopting safe practises. Majority of the pilots I flew with have a procedure (sometimes guided in the OM) to carry out some kind of approach that is essentially safe.

The key problem is the STANDARDISATION of those procedures to facilitate intervention parameters and policies.

[AndyJB32]

Hello DB, thanks for the profile.

I sent you an e-mail back with my thoughts, but i'd be interested to see what others think.

I think overall it's got some good points, and it will certainly get us thinking and talking about how we do things offshore at night. A couple of things just on first reading though:

1. i think a 1.5 nm final is too far. I think somewhere around 1nm, 60 Kts groundspeed and 500 feet is ample. The problem with starting too far out is the potential for the crew to become fixated on the lights of the helideck/rig as they spend a long time flying toward an unchanging focal point (ie the rig stays much the same until you're a bit closer and can pick at a bit more definition).

2. The speed for the approach gate should be based on a groundspeed that will also ensure the ASI is above Vtoss (or Vy). This is for the same reason as point (1). If we turn into a 1.5nm final with a 55Kt headwind, by the time we get to the point of our sightpicture for the approach, there's a chance that the crew will have been staring at a seemingly unchanging focus point of light for long enough to become fixated on it.

I think the idea of simplyfing the night approach by making the visual and ARA identical is an interesting one.

I also think that at the moment the focus of the training department does not accurately reflect the type of flying we do - we have as much emphasis placed on doing a night approach offshore with a trainer as we do getting evaluated on flying the hold - 1 per year. I think the training should be focused more on the offshore night flying that we do.

Andy

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Andy,

Your points are well made, but flawed (if you embrace the concept that Night VMC does not reallt exist).

The key to the profile is speed stability from the TOD to the CTB and IN ADDITION speed deceleration profiles such that the PNF has defined intervention parameters. This being the key fundemental to a monitored approach.

I understand you reservation about a 1.5Nm final, but WE ARE TRYING TO ENCAPSULATE THE ARA into one profile for all night approaches.

This necessarily means that the 1.5Nm "10 degree Offset Point" in the ARA profile must be catered for in the new profile.

In essence, if you look at the complete profile, although somewhat complex at first view, it is meeting all the ARA requirements, every time, on every approach.

To consider your suggestion, that a 1nm final such suffice, in essence if all your profile was trying to achieve was a night approach in VMC then it is sound.

You will see from the presentation that for shuttling (WX required at least 500 feet and 5 Km) we alleviate the FAG to the ARA MAPT, which prevents excess manouvering when rigs are closer together, but accepting that it will necessitate wider circuits than what are probably being done at the moment. IT IS A COMPROMISE FOR EXPEDIENCY.

My view is that all night approaches should be flown as a structured monitored approach in VMNC, which if flown when low cloud is present, IS EXACTLY THE SAME.

One profile, providing clear intervention parameters, supported by mandated intervention policy, that with a little practise becomes second nature.

I repeat, there is nothing wrong with your suggestion IF ALL YOU WNAT TO DO IS DESCEND IN AN UNCONTROLLED FASHION and land when there are no cloud.visibilty issues (I am deliberatley trying to avoid the use of the words NIGHT VMC cos I do not think it exists over the sea in the dark).

DB

[AndyJB32]

I need a bit more time to look over the profile to see if i agree with you about the approaches being identical regardless of the weather at night time.

[JimL]

Thanks to DB for providing his excellent presentation; it is a good for a number of reasons, not-the-least-of-which is that it provides the basis for further debate. However, there has been little comment since it was made available so it might be a good time to look at some of the underlying conditions of offshore approaches so that we can explore what we might, or might not, be able to do to improve procedures.

If I repeat some points/assumptions from earlier posts, I apologise but it is necessary, in the interest of understanding the issues, to draw a number of previously stated points together.

Firstly, the ARA is a non-precision approach which has more in common with NDB procedures than the ILS. It also has less risk (with obstacle clearance) than onshore procedures. Some points about the ARA:

Before the procedure is flown it is mandatory to ensure that there are no ‘targets’ (radar returns) in the final approach and missed approach segments. This ensures that there are no obstacles (apart from the surface) and those at the destination to consider.
Onshore procedures constrain vertical descent (and DH/MDH) to ensure that obstacles are cleared vertically; the approach segment is also oriented so that obstacles are avoided laterally (it’s built into the profile).
Offshore procedures are designed in the knowledge that the vertical extent of any obstacle may not be known; furthermore, it is likely that the highest obstacle in the area is the destination (hence the point about absence of targets in the final and missed approach segments).
Offshore procedures rely entirely on avoiding obstacles laterally; for this reason, from the OIP, the heading/track has to be divergent to provide lateral separation of 3-400m to one side of the destination structure (even if the missed approach heading is applied later than at the MAPt).
The MDH is no different to those onshore where, descent limitations should be plus 100ft minus 0 (based upon the RADALT – the setting of the baralt to RADALT is a wise option but only if checked as for normal procedures); these limits should be maintained until visual reference (see below) has been achieved or a go around, at the MAPt or before, has been commenced.
The approach should be oriented into wind and flown at 60/90kts with a ground speed of no more than 70kts.
The instrument procedure ends at the point where the pilot can proceed visually (unless there is a go-around at, or before, the MAPt).
Visual reference has a specific meaning in most procedures; if one goes to Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.430, and looks at the paragraphs that describe this for each type of approach (non-precision; CAT 1; CAT 2, CAT 3 and ARA) it can be seen that this is an important part of the procedure. For the ARA it says “No pilot may continue an approach beyond Decision Range or below MDH/MDA unless he is visual with the destination”. Without further guidance, that statement demonstrates a weakness in the regulation.So far this procedure (as described) has been non-decelerative within chosen airspeed boundaries. For fixed wing it remains (almost) non-decelerative, the visual segment (in a stable approach) is a continuation of the approach path (be it on ILS or provided by the FMS or another device). This can be achieved because the glide path is continuous to the threshold and fixed wing land-and-stop as opposed to stop-and-land. There are other benefits of fixed wing procedures: the obstacle environment clears at the runway approaches; the aircraft is inherently stable; the field of view remains (reasonably) constant throughout the landing manoeuvre; either pilot can see and complete the landing manoeuvre from anywhere on the approach path. None of these necessarily apply to helicopters making approaches to an offshore installation.

Because we are approaching the highest obstacle in the area, there can never be a stable approach in the sense of fixed wing, and obstacle clearance has to be achieved laterally; unless the MDH is raised extensively (almost to the level of the height of the installation), there will always be a level segment. This level segment includes a ‘margin of error’ (at the OIP and MAPt) which dictates the location of both of those points; improving the accuracy of positioning of the MAPt (or using a fly-by offset procedure) can move it closer to the destination.

In my view, the actual cloud break procedure is not the key issue – safety benefits from having vertical guidance are nice to have but not critical. The stability of the approach from (when visual) before, or at MAPt is the key issue (if it is just a matter of keeping a speed and height, it is easy to achieve and monitor). The key issue is in having both crew members briefed and/or aware of the envelope that is to be flown (and flying it). The level segment terminates at the point where the slope to the landing manoeuvre is intercepted. The flight path conditions at this entry point (or gate) will be dependent upon the height (distance) at which it occurs.

Let’s construct a flight path: Using a 3° glide would put the helicopter 220m back from the platform at 40ft above the deck (from which point the level segment of the standard landing manoeuvre could be initiated). Assuming a 150ft deck (which is 50ft above the mean deck height of the North Sea) distances would be:

For a 150ft deck and 3° glide, the distances back from the helideck would be:

40ft above the deck (190ft amsl) would be achieved at 220m
150 above the deck (300ft amsl) would be achieved at 872m
250 above the deck (400ft amsl) would be achieved at 1,454m
350 above the deck (500ft amsl) would be achieved at 2,034mFor a 150ft deck and 6° glide, the distances back from the helideck would be:

40ft above the deck (190ft amsl) would be achieved at 100m
150 above the deck (300ft amsl) would be achieved at 435m
250 above the deck (400ft amsl) would be achieved at 725m
350 above the deck (500ft amsl) would be achieved at 1,015mThe steeper the approach the longer the visual segment (my experience is that pilots are more likely to fly a 6° approach than 3°). I would also like to see what deck ovality is achieved with these approach angles – intuitively my feeling is that the shape on the presentation for ‘too low’ might be 3°, or even 6°.

Up to the slope intercept, we should have stable conditions – i.e. level flight, and a set speed (ground speed no greater than 70kts is recommended in the procedure) and monitoring and crew interaction is relatively simple. If the cloud base is 300ft at night, the intercept point will be 872m with a 3° slope and 435m with a 6°. Either of these intercepts might require a(n announced) deceleration (depending upon wind) but at least it would be in level flight – i.e. monitoring could be relatively easy.

Once on the slope, the NHP will see less and less of the deck until, by 40ft, nothing at all will be seen and further monitoring could be quite difficult. The speed the approach is flown will be dependent upon the wind speed; with light winds, there might not even be an indication of airspeed once the helicopter has decelerated below 40kts. Any monitoring will therefore to be based upon a floor of deck-height plus (say) 50ft and the (minimum) speed that has been declared for the approach (with a probable minimum of 35kts). If either element of this combination is called by the NHP a response would be required from the HP – no response would indicate a loss of control situation and an escalation in the procedure.

In my view, the key to safety is stability; on an ARA the aircraft should be stabilised (height, airspeed and heading) before the MAPt. If there is to be a circling manoeuvre, the aircraft must be stabilised before MAPt (at least 500ft, airspeed and heading); following on from that, night shuttling should be stabilised (at least 500ft, airspeed and heading) at the equivalent of the MAPt – which means any necessary turning must have been carried out and the aircraft stabilised before that point (as there is a requirement for 5km visibility, this should not cause any control/stability problems). Monitoring (up to the slope intercept) should be based upon a declared height of the level plus or minus 100ft and the declared airspeed plus or minus 20kts; any departure outside this envelope should be called by the NHP a response would be required from the HP – no response would indicate a loss of control situation and an escalation in the procedure. In the level segment, any bank of more than 20° or any undeclared departure of more than 20° from the heading should be called and invoke a similar procedure to that above.

I totally agree with DB that once a stable level segment has been set, there should be no descent until the slope is intercepted. There is no necessity for an offset to be applied with night shuttling as the destination will always be in sight and no missed approach is envisaged. A go-around should be performed at any time when either pilot considers that control is being lost or there are insufficient visual cues (the go-around should be discussed extensively and practiced – from the blind side - on periodic training). The use of automatics should be encouraged for all segments where stability is required.

Comments are anticipated.

Jim

[SASless]

JimL,

I am sat here with a real dose of St. Patrick's Day Remorse....but by golly it was a good time last night!

I found your post to be well written, thoughtful, and most agreeable in concept.

Now comes the "However but", where do we come up with weather minimums for offshore non-precision approaches that use onshore precision approach weather minimums (or way lower even)?

Why do we not apply proper "Non-Precision" weather minimums to what are by any definition "Non-Precision" approaches?

The MDH is no different to those onshore where, descent limitations should be plus 100ft minus 0 (based upon the RADALT – the setting of the baralt to RADALT is a wise option but only if checked as for normal procedures); these limits should be maintained until visual reference (see below) has been achieved or a go around, at the MAPt or before, has been commenced.

DB has done a very good job on his presentation.

The absolutely key point he made in my view is putting definition into the profile so the non-flying pilot knows what the flying pilot should be doing....and when a variance is seen....knows how to respond.

He used ten seconds as a time interval and I would suggest striking that and leaving it at "upon flying pilot's failure to correct" to be the intervention point.

If the check call is made, and the flying pilot does not respond correctly...both verbally and physically...then it is time to take the proper corrective action and not wait for a prescribed time period.

The key to DB's concept is improved communication and having a standard to work from.....he is spot on in that regard.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

It is very easy to get sucked into the whole "Weather Minima" debate. But really WX minima has F**K all to do with night approaches.

Night Approaches offshore, as described in my presentation, is about getting to the right point in space, stable (which means at least a sensible airspeed), and a height suffiecintly above the helideck to allow the reamining speed to be reducing in the final descent towards the deck.

To FORCE (to be frank) crews to get to that position we need to define a more appropriate MDH - AND THEN PREVENT CREW FROM DESCENDING BELOW IT UNTIL "THE REQUIRED VISUAL REFERENCES" are available. (my CTB)

The role that the actual WX plays, starts and ends at the MAPT. ie 0.75 Nm away from the deck way way before the CTB is achieved.

Forecast WX minima and actual WX minima play a greater role in the viability, or otherwise, of shuttling procedures.

Forecast WX minima plays an important role in pre-flight planning and the fuel plan in particular.

To confuse the role of WX with a procedure involving a defined horizontal and vertical profile is missing the point.

I have been very careful to "Encapsulate" the ARA into the night approach profile so that whatever the weather, the Decision Point (MAPT), IE CAN THE INSTALLATION BE SEEN AT 0.75 NM/MDH (Do I have Required references to continue) is absolutley not confused with the CTB....(Do I have required references to descend).

JIM L. I agree with some of your post but I cannot buy into the whole glideslope angle thing. The final descent towards the helideck from the theoretical CTB is actually more like 7 degrees...very similar to a Helipad landing as the ovality dictates the slope.

The only reason I compared the ILS with the current MDH for an ARA is to demonstrate the naiviety of the ARA procedure and highlight its key fundemantal flaw -

THAT 50 FEET ABOVE THE DECK does not promote a stable airspeed at the point that the theoretical glideslope (CTB) is achieved.

To be stable - THE SPEED IS WAY TOO HIGH.
To be able to land - THE SPEED IS WAY TOO LOW.

Move that sucker up and back by defining a more realistic MDH by increment above deck height and most of the problem is solved. WX at this point should have been delat with back at the MAPT.

SAS Appreciate you comments and support for the change.

Lets get the winds blowing.......In the right direction.


DB OUT.

[T4 Risen]

DB,

To take even more pressure off the crew why can we not push for an improvement in the facility off shore. how difficult would it be to install an Omni directional Chapi set up.

It gives a 6 degree glide slope and brings you nicely over the "H" at EGPD 23 at 20'?

T4

[Overt Auk]

I hope to proved wrong, but in my estimation, very difficult.

On a 6 degree slope, to give 20 ft eye height means that the CHAPI need to be 200 ft beyond the deck. Might interfere with the 5:1 gradient a bit!

OA

[T4 Risen]

I am pretty sure that the CHAPI at EGPD is not 200' from the edge of the hover Square on 23 in fact it is more like 30-40' and the last time I made an approach to it we finished up at 20' radalt over the H.

I am not saying that we should use the exact design, which i believe was initially thought out by a north sea pilot. but something similar possably set into the deck or at the edge of the deck.

The more we have in the way of visual guidance the better....

T4

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

T4,

I agree, but I have heard that it very difficult to produce a robust system that is omnidiractional. Also what about moving decks???

I think AC Carriers have a gyrostabilsied set up but it only radiates downwind of the deck runway. I think it is luminous "BALL" hence my phrase "Calling the Ball".

Any carrier jock out there who can elaborate!!!

[DeltaNg]

There is a whole load of guff and abbreviations going off here. At the end of the day we want to land a helicopter safely on a rig, with a load of people reading newspapers in the back.

When I started flying offshore, I had less than 200 hours Total Time. Can you imagine how I felt when I was introduced to night flying later on that year?

Every Line trainer has his (or her) techniques and pet hates. And usually, it's done on an okay kind of night.

I remember asking the question, what is it like doing this off an ARA when the weather is really bad?

"Well, son, then you've really got you're work cut out."

Great.

From then on, it's a kind of learning experience, watching others do a few landings, and having a go yourself.

Some people develop the rigid gate concept. Other just kind of wazz about as if it is daytime, and can often be pretty good at it.

The scary thing was, there really wasn't any defined profile that could be pointed to in a Manual. Lot of ARA diagrams and ideal 'commital points'. The bit in between decision point and LDP is kind of up to you.

When you have 200 Hours - you really don't want to be making that bit up.

Nor does anybody, because nobody can second guess you.

Db's profile is going along exactly the right lines. It should have been done years ago, and will have absolutely no impact on the commercial aspect.

In fact, it will simplify the entire decision making process, and make for a far better, professional operation. As an ex-NS commander, I can see the benefits of this shining from afar.

It should be embraced wholeheartedly. :ok::ok::ok:

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

DELTA NG,

You will be appalled to know that very little has changed from the situation you described at the start of your career.

I think some Companies are slightly better than others, but the margin is not great.

Appreciate your support for change.

Fly safe

DB

[gnow]

DB,
Thank You for your presentation. It was very well written. I will give it a go when I do my Night Deck Landing practice next week. Here we hardly do any night landings except once every 6 months for currency only as the night standby is done by the 76 fleet. I would like to add one more point.... the night approach MUST always be carried out by the pilot with the obstruction on his side.
ARA approaches are fine for single one rig text book situation but when there is a cluster of rigs (and usually there is) and the one that you have to land is in the middle of the cluster and does not have a beacon it becomes a bit complicated.
I believe ARA is very useful for the North Sea where fog reduces visibility but does not have the violence of a tropical squall so operators in the tropics must be very alert for downdrafts and wind shear associated with a tropical squall.

[Shawn Coyle]

Firefly (the night approach lighting system developed by Richard Walker back in the 90's) theoretically could be hooked up to a datalink system to take the GPS position of the helicopter and change the 'on-glide-path' signal as the helicopter approaches the landing site.
Hasn't been done obviously, but as it has a light head that can be motorized for azimuth and elevation, it could be done.

[JimL]

In an earlier post DB asked for comments on his presentation; I have already provided some and, in my last post posed the question:
I would also like to see what deck ovality is achieved with these approach angles – intuitively my feeling is that the shape on the presentation for ‘too low’ might be 3°, or even 6°.
Now one of main principles contained in the presentation is that there should be no departure from a stable (level) flight until the correct shape is observed (DBs CTB - am I the only one who does not like this). As this is such an important element (for me as well as for DB) I was intrigued to know if the representation (of the correct sight picture) in the presentation was accurate - hence the question that was posed. I have now constructed the perspective drawing and have found that DB's:

too shallow is about 10 degrees;
correct is about 20 degrees; and
too steep is about 35 degrees.Now I know that this was a presentation with the intent of moving the debate on and had to exaggerate to make the point; however, having had this view provided, do we now need to seriously evaluate exactly what we mean by the correct sight picture approach (the deck ovality)?

Jim

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Hi Jim,

That is really interesting. I always though we were about 7 - 9 degrees. I am pretty convinced that the rugby ball as drawn is what I like to see from the CTB. I have to say that the drawings were really done to convince non-aviators in my audience as to the "Concept" of the CTB an I certainly did not measure anything in process. Maybe the middel drawing is too steep when it is replicated on paper.

When we fly to 23 at ABZ I think the CHAPI there is set to 7 degrees (I will check) and the square on the runway which we use as a helipad seems to be at the right "Ovality" - accepting that is in fact a square.

CTB - I choose this rather than anything with the words "Decision" in it as we have passed the ARA MAPT and the "Committal" point for a Class 2 With Exposure" has not yet been reached. If anyone can come up with a better acronym that would be great.

It does what it says on the tin "Call the Ball" but I think as a previous poster remarked it is a bit "Hollywood" even for my tastes.

[Variable Load]

Hi Jim,

I too am surprised at your figures. Looking at DBs presentation I thought he was pretty close. One thing is for sure is that the 3-5 deg "fixed wing" approach is not where we should be!

I would also like to move away from CTB (sorry DB!). Maybe a better call is "I have the sight picture". That goes back to elementary training and is something we can all relate too.

My other comments will be by PM...



Cheers
VL

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Problem is:

"I Have The Sight Picture" IHTSP is a bit of a mouthful when you are trying to define the point in space for the purpose of profile drawings and descriptions.

How about the IGP (Ideal Glide Path).

[JimL]

DB/VL,

After your posts I went back and checked my numbers; you are correct the figures should have been: 10 degrees; 20 degrees; and 35 degrees. I have edited my original post.

You could always revert to 'intercepting' and 'established' - at least we all know what they mean.

Jim

[T4 Risen]

Aberdeen CHAPI's are set at 6 degree glide path and do bring you to a 20' radalt hover over the H. With a change of about 5' height at the diatnce of about 10m from the device you go either red green or green white.

T4

[Variable Load]

Jim

You could always revert to 'intercepting' and 'established' - at least we all know what they mean.

You have my vote!


VL

[windmill brake state]

DB

Can you please send me a copy of the presentation.

Thanks

WBS

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Hi,

I need an email address to send it to.

DB

[HeliComparator]

I think we will be going for "Site picture descending" and that will also be the time we suspend the AVAD / EGPWS. However "intercepting" and "established" are two necessary phases - its no good waiting til on the ideal GP before starting to descend - you will inevitably go too steep. There has to be an element of anticipation (Jim's "intercepting") prior to seeing the ideal picture.

I am sure we had this discussion before (but think I lost that time) - but isn't it "site picture" - ie the picture of the landing site,

rather than "sight picture" which seems tautological to me - what else can you relevantly do with a picture but have sight of it?

[Variable Load]

HC

tautological

You had me rushing to the dictionary. I am impressed :)

Please understand the timing of my message and the state I was in - hic!

I did mean "site picture" in my original message.



Cheers (hic!!)
VL

[SASless]

errrrrrrr...... "Sight Picture" I believe is the correct wording is it not?

After all, are we not "shooting" for the deck?

We want to have everything "lined up" similar to the concept of marksmanship.

[[email protected]]

I'm with you SAS - sight picture means you have the correct visual cues/references - site picture is a photo of the LS:)

[HeliComparator]

I still don't know what "sight picture" means. Would you ever say "hearing picture", "touch picture", "smell picture" etc? If not, the word "sight" is tautological. Calls should be designed to be clear and concise, not tautological. But if we just said "picture" it could mean anything - what we are trying to indicate is that we have the correct picture of the landing site.

Unfortunately for me Google returns 8 hits for "sight picture approach" and 1 hit for "site picture approach", however that doesn't necessarily mean site is right!

Never mind, it will all sound the same in the end...

HC

[SASless]

This is scary....Crab and I agree on something....this is getting all too common I fear!

HC,

I wish to report the FAA and US Army adopted the "Sight Picture" terminology very early on. Now I understand we are two peoples separated by a common language but surely with 8:1 stats you will accept the majority view.

This topic does not relate to EC/SK, the 225 or 92, or Nick Lappos....but I will have to admit the size of windows might enter into this in a limited way.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Gents,

Me thinks yoy lot are losing the plot somewhat.

The key issue here is not getting to the sight picture, or what we call it when we get there.

There real issue is what happens (or does not happen) prior to reaching that theoretical point in space, IE Not descend below MDH, not decelerate below VMIN-NVMC for the type.

To make this work the point needs to be plotted on a profile diagram and that menas a TLA I am afraid.

"You must not descend before the Sight Picture"

"You must not descend before the Intercepting"

See what I mean.

The Point in space, and the subsequent call, should ideally be the same. Using a verb to describe a place simply does not work.

CTB...............before you rush off to your keyoboards TEL ME WHAT IT MEANS!!!! I bet you have the answer immediatley....cos it says what it menas on the Tin.

Like it or not some things stick!!!!!!

DB

[Shawn Coyle]

Slightly related - I'm looking for some pictures of different oil rigs and the lighting of same at night. Any pointers as to locations of same?

[212man]

HC,
crab and SAS are correct I believe - the origin will be related to a 'gun sight', not 'eye sight' (though clearly the original term will have been) as aiming for the deck will be a shooting analogy.

[HeliComparator]

I am sure this is the second time I have lost this argument!

DB - your ideas are generally good but you have to lose the obsession with CTB - it will never end up in your or our Ops Manual! If you ask anyone for the primary properties of a ball, they will tell you its round (or spherical if they are posh)

To answer your question "what does it mean?", it means calling your ball to come to heel as if it were a dog. Maybe we should use a whistle instead? Bring on the men in white coats, anthropomorphism of balls is a bad sign...

How about FDP - final descent point?

HC

[Special 25]

Agreed,

This CTB has never made much sense to me - I'm sure the last couple of rigs I flew to at night had Octagon shaped green lights around the perimeter, not the circle.

I like the terminology 'Sight Picture'. Whilst I've been generally staying out of this discussion on the basis I feel any approach at night has too high a likelihood of going horribly wrong, if I am to continue night decks, then I feel your standardization and stable approach ideas are good. In order I think

i) Gate Position (1nm 500ft or so, after a short period of stable level run-in)
ii) Sight Picture (Start of Descent)
iii) Committal

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Helicoparitor and Special 25,

Some clarification/capitulation needed,

THE SIGHT PICTURE

Is the view afforded to the Crew when they are on the Ideal Glidepath. The Ideal Glidepath (and therefore the sight picture) extends upward and downwind from the Helideck at an angle that in the opinion of the Crew that night, based on their training and familiarity, is the approach/descent slope they should ideally to follow.

Without fancy glideslope indicators we are only left with "Deck Ovality" as JimL calls it to guide us regardless of the actual shape of the deck.

The MDH, is a horizontal line, drawn from abeam the helideck, back to infinity at an agreed Increment above deck height.

THE POINT INSPACE I CALL THE CTB

Is the point at which MDH intersects the Ideal Glidepath or sight picture.

HAVING SAID ALL THAT

HeliComapritors idea of "Final Descent Point" (FDP) is abolutley SPOT ON and again says exactly what it means.

I REALLY LIKE IT

So from now on I hearby offcially give up on the CTB and swap it (If helicomparitor is ameniable) to the FDP.

So can we all agree for the sake of progression that DBs "CTB" from now on is referred to as the "FDP" and is defined as:

The point in space where the MDH intersects the Ideal Glidepath, as determined by the crew on the night based on their training and familiarisation and drawing reference from the "Ovality" of the helideck lighting.

Helicomparitor. I would like to amend my submission and presentations using your new FDP would you please PM and say its OK as it was your Idea. Thanks.

[Jameson12]

I would like a copy of your presentation. I am new to this; do you have my email address as a result of this post or do I have to send it to you by some other means?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Jameson12

PM me with your email address, or if you are unsure how to do this just reply on the forum with it.

DB

[SASless]

DB,

Your concept is not complicated or hard to understand.....quite the contrary in my view....and something that is entirely correct in its design and purpose.

Even on an ILS procedure there is mention of when one may descend below landing minimums predicated upon having certain visual cues in the form of landing aides, lights, and landing thresh hold.....you are doing much the same here with you procedure.

The FDP terminology or anything like that works fine. It is your concept that is the exact right answer no matter what the wording is.

[bondu]

DB,

Thanks for sending me your presentation.

Your profile works for me. And I think HC's term FDP is spot on. Without denigrating your idea in any way, it is very straight forward to the point of being really quite simple. But there again, most of the best ideas around are 'quite simple'. Makes you wonder why its taken us all so long to come up with the best solution.

Well done!!

bondu :ok:

[roundwego]

Great discussion and I think DB has described what all sensible pilots would try do most of the time. The idea of mandating a specific profile and therefore the ability of identifying misalignment easily is good.

DB, how do you deal with the situation where visualisation of the helideck is restricted due to wind direction/approach path/obstructions until almost alongside?

[Swamp76]

I gave up on page 1. What a load of cr#p. Shell goes on for ages about all the helicopter industry can do to be better.

Airlines don't fly to rigs. They fly to airports.

If the OIL COMPANIES could at least follow their own rules, or perhaps the standards of an airport, then they could compare helicopters to airlines. Until then pi$$ off.

Hasn't this gone on long enough??

OK, enough rant.
----------------------------------------------

FDP sounds a lot like VDP. No?

I'll send you an e-mail to get a copy of the profile.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Roundwego,

You make a very good point and I think the way forward is as follows:

We need to make a very clear description of the "Acceptable Visual References" that provide the "FDP" along the MDH line.

This description in its simplest form would refer to the "Ovality" afforded by the deck lighting.

The situation you describe is by far much harder to cater for in a simple description but we have discussed it at some length and we think:

It must obviously must include sightof some, or all of the helideck lights. Otherwise you cannot make a plan to manouvre into position to land. If Ovality is lacking, due to obstructions and such like, then sufficient texture and references, coming off the surrounding structure, when combined with visual parts of the helideck, provide sufficient references to enable the Final Descent to be made by sole visual reference alone.

I am working on a better description for the updated version of the profiles but I rather suspect it needs some kind of expertise, both in language and the technical side, to tidy it up into something that is watertight (if that is possible).

Of course the very fact that we hopefully are 200 feet above the deck at this point should give us a far better chance of assimilating and interpreting the avialable references.

SWAMP 76

Not sure what prompted your tirade but "Shell Bashing" is not catered for on this Thread. Start one of your own!!!

"Things go well with Shell" (Apart from you - seemingly)

[Aser]

Hi DB,
Thanks for the doc. I thinks it´s great, but
Wouldn´t be better to reach the MAPT at Vmin + wind ??
I feel Vy 80kts it´s too much to decelerate from 0.75nm to the FDP. Not that it can't be done but may be too much nose high to keep an eye on the deck...
We usually end up at 200' / 60kts / 1nm when doing night apps to ships.

Just a thought.

Regards
Aser

[C4]

DB,

Sent you a PM a few days back requesting your presentation. Would you mind sending it.

Ta

C4

[T4 Risen]

DB,

Any thoughts on roundwego's post about approaches other than a straight in clear deck? Buchan for example with a strong southerly can be quite "interesting" at times as you cant see the deck until you are almost past the rig?

T4

[Aser]

T4, I was also waiting for that but after I re-read the posts I think he was trying to give a response with this:
It must obviously must include sightof some, or all of the helideck lights. Otherwise you cannot make a plan to manouvre into position to land. If Ovality is lacking, due to obstructions and such like, then sufficient texture and references, coming off the surrounding structure, when combined with visual parts of the helideck, provide sufficient references to enable the Final Descent to be made by sole visual reference alone.

I am working on a better description for the updated version of the profiles but I rather suspect it needs some kind of expertise, both in language and the technical side, to tidy it up into something that is watertight (if that is possible).

Of course the very fact that we hopefully are 200 feet above the deck at this point should give us a far better chance of assimilating and interpreting the avialable references.


Regards
Aser

[albatross]

Thanks for sending me the presentation - interesting read.:ok:

[MikeGon]

DB,

I would really appreciate receiving a copy of your presentation. This is a very interesting discussion that I would like to understand better.

Thanks,

[C4]

DB,

Could I get a copy of your presentation too please.

Thanks
C4

[SH_Mate]

DB,
Pls fwd copy of yr presentation

Tx:ok:

SHM:cool:

[Lt.Fubar]

Could this presentation be uploaded somewhere (sendspace (http://sendspace.com), rapidshare (http://rapidshare.com), mediafire (http://www.mediafire.com)) for all interested to download freely?

[ASV]

DB,

Could I get a copy of your presentation too please.

[thecloud]

Hi,
Me 2 plse ! Love a copy. Promise to provide my thoughts on it!

Great to hear people talk about standardization and simplification and mean it! Hopefully the end product won't go past any lawyers or non-pilots!

[C4]

DB,

PM sent with e-address.

Appreciate it

C4

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

He All,

Thanks to all of you who have requested a copy of the presentation.

I think I have managed to send you all a copy as requested. If there are any stragglers who still would like please PM me.

Thank you to those of you who have written back with your comments. I simple have not had time to respond to you all personally.

The interim AAIB report has been released. The reccomendations are not great. Completely miss the point of the "Required Visual References" for the final descent and landing.

CAA are on the case though and hopefully we will see some progress.

DB

[Lt.Fubar]

I agree, but I have heard that it very difficult to produce a robust system that is omnidiractional. Also what about moving decks???On the contrary it is very easy, although someone have to pay for it first.

For example, few minutes in CAD produces such simplified sketch:

http://img293.imageshack.us/img293/6246/45529613.th.png (http://img293.imageshack.us/my.php?image=45529613.png) http://img26.imageshack.us/img26/3747/36241706.th.png (http://img26.imageshack.us/my.php?image=36241706.png) http://img25.imageshack.us/img25/2899/57821001.th.png (http://img25.imageshack.us/my.php?image=57821001.png)

It's a simple design incorporating 3 light sources - in this case LED arrays, that cover 360° , and their visibility is blocked by those "plates" between, all inside polycarbonate transparent shell. Simple, cheap and don't weight much (mostly empty inside) - size dependent on the light source.

Depends what you need, you can change the design very easily. For example in this one, crew on approach will see the yellow light when at angle between -5 to +15, then green from +15 to +25, and red form +25 to +60. The angles can be easily changed, can be overlapping, or not.

For moving decks - mount it on two axis gimbals with electric servos, put gyro inside, and electronics that will steer the servos by gyro input. Small company could design and put into production such system in a week or two ;)

Although that design is not very size-efficient, the best way to do this would be with Fresnel lenses instead of plates, that way the size could be limited by at least 70%... but they're not cheap.

[JimL]

As I posted before, we fitted and trialled the Omni-direction Approach Path Indicator (ODAPI) on the Leman 'A' in the Southern North Sea in the early 90s.

The main issue was the lack of initial visual pickup because the beam was swamped by the ambient lighting. It might be better now because more powerful LEDs could be used. It was also a mechanical device (rotating mirrors I think); if built now, phased arrays might be used reducing the size and and mechanical complexity - it also needed a power supply.

There is also the issue of siting; to be omnidirectional it ought to be sited at the centre of the deck but that is somewhat impractical. The beam should also permit flight down the beam to the deck (with a threshold crossing height) but that would require siting above the deck level (or behind for a single azimuth approach) and still would not fit in with offshore performance profiles.

All-in-all a positive report was filed but the device was returned until problems had been solved. Flying constant angle curved approaches was good handling practice. Most pilots did not think it had much merit.

Jim

[Lt.Fubar]

In context of this topic, that kind of "ODAPI" would be used to 'pinpoint' the CTB, and guide for the most of the way - near the helipad where the guide path have increased error, there would be enough reference points to make a safe touchdown without looking at the device. On aircraft carriers the "meatball" is also useles when over the deck.

The LEDs may be very powerful these days. Look at the LED Beacons - those are single 40W LEDs, in such device you could fit tens or hundreds of 20-50W ones - it would be seen for miles, and could be actually blinding if looked at when on the deck (would probably need a power regulating circuit that would dim the lights after dark).

If there still would be a problem to pinpoint the location of the device on oil rig, it could also have a strobe, or the light itself could blink. As for power supply... that's no problem on the oil rig or a ship.

The presentation is very interesting and informative, I took liberty of providing it to pilots I know who fly to the rigs, and don't visit this forum. Although the main problem is of deterring "how fat, the 'fat egg' should be". Therefore an omni-directional system would give an definite answer to that - without guesing, see the green light = your on the glidepath.

[JimL]

I like the logic of your argument - I had come to the same conclusion; best to forget flying all the way down the beam (although it would be possible for a proportion of the final descent), the essence is only to establish the intercept, the initial descent path and hence the correct 'sight picture'.

There are pointers to the difficulties that could exist; for years we have been trying to provide a wave-off light (to avoid the problem of wrong-rig landings) - we could never find one with sufficient intensity that it would be noticed when the pilot had convinced himself that this was the correct rig.

Don't minimise the problem of power supply - this has to be an intrinsically safe device.

You cannot rely on the lights being dimmed on the rig - some platforms are the equivalent of small cities and the lighting is there for a reason; dimming will not happen and can't be relied upon - best to strive for intensity.

The siting would also be problematic as it would be masked if approaching from the Limited Obstacle Sector.

However:

It is probably time to revisit the basis for the ODAPI; the advent of powerful LED lighting has now probably changed the balance.

Finding the correct angle of approach just from the deck lights is not really that simple. As I indicated in an earlier post, when measured, the ones shown on the presentation were: 10 degrees for too low; 20 degreees; and 35 degrees for too high. So not as easy as it first appears!

An alternative solution (to establishing the point of final descent) would be with a waypoint on the GPS; this could be calculated geometrically using (say) a 6 degree angle, the centre of the helideck and the altitude on the final track to fix it.

Jim

[ambidextrous]

Lt.Fubar,
Sorry to be a 'wet blanket' re. your idea of using LED's. I ran my own idea of an ODAPI utilising LED's past Richard Walker some three years ago. Richard Walker, inventor of the "Firefly ODAPI", first trialled some twenty years ago & utilising gyros and mirrors opined that powerful LED's would be prone to 'scatter' thus giving inaccurate glidescope indications and glare!
However, don't let me put you off.
with fraternal greetings,
ambi
PS: Your assertion that a company could put such an instrument into production in a week or two is open to question I think.:ok:

[Lt.Fubar]

The power supply isn't really a major problem, you can incorporate into the design a set of battery's that would be constantly charged, when the power is available, and would be used when gone - providing power for XX hours. It's a matter of design criteria. Others for example would be - the operating temperatures (it would need a heating unit to work in freezing conditions). Intensity of lights at given distance. number of lights, their angles, angles of overlapping (if needed) etc. etc.

The lights dimming would be for the device itself, not for the platform, as you can produce some insane amount of light with todays LED arrays. With enough units, you can make it brighter than your landing lights. The high intensity LEDs usually produce light in 110° cone - in this case, the led would be visible on 110° horizontal, and given focused amount in vertical. Let's say a the glidepath would be 10° wide - you can easily focus it that way using a lense. So, using an ring array, with 24 LEDs, in any given moment there would be 7 hi-power LEDs visible to you, more if more rings is used... so, look at the modern strobes, and imagine that such ODAPI device would look to you as 24 such lights at once, non-stop. That's a lot of light.

Using GPS or radar return to deterring the CTB can be also used, although I thinks its application and accuracy depends heavily on the crew, as they have to prepare in advance the data they need. I think it could work as a start, but not very good for the long run. An ODAPI type device, or omni-directional ILS system (could be done, though much more complicated and costly) would be more useful.

Ambidextrous - Yes the glare might be bit of a problem, but not much. But it's all academics, if no one will take time to try and build a test system using today's technology.

[malabo]

Problem on rig landings has always been one of speed control. Stable approach allows the pilot now visual with the rig to give the correct amount of nose up pitch to achieve the steady deceleration and loaded disk required to end up at a hover over a deck suspended in mid-air. Incidentally, that is also the problem with trying to aim too far away from the deck in the latter part of the approach before deciding on committed - hard to do looking at the deck, even harder looking at thin air.

I doubt that we are actually flying a constant angle, but we'll know soon enough as we start to spend money experimenting with the technology of angle guidance. Virtually all pilots I've flown with that are not trying some OEI-obsessed profile will fly reasonable slope and decelerating approaches, just like we teach them. Start them back a reasonable distance like 1-2 miles, and start some kind of deceleration to a point with a reasonable slope to the deck (maybe around 1/2 mile?) and its all going to work out for you. Now you transition to a gradual descent all the while decelerating. Minor corrections are done in the final phase by looking at the shape of the deck.

As far as flying a profile flat on an ARA because of a low ceiling, well what of it? Seems like a normal day in the life of a helicopter pilot - adapting a profile to meet an operational requirement, normally introduced in the first third of a CPL course. The reason the ARA's for the past 40 years have not been a problem in this regard is because they were "set-up" a ways back, and stabilized with respect to speed. I don't see any justification in Bogey's presentation for raising the MDH on an ARA at all.

I've read the extensive (almost defensively so) credentials of the proponents of this new approach, but in the course of their argument I find it difficult to be convinced that they understand offshore approaches any better than anyone else.

Hope I don't sound too much like Swamp76.........

[Flying Bull]

Hi Lt. Fubar,

when consindering to build your device, I suggest you to contact
LED LENSER - Professionelle, fokussierbare LED-Taschenlampen von Zweibrueder Optoelectronics (http://www.zweibrueder.com/)
for the LED-part.
Nowadays the LEDs produced by them are brighter than the bulbs from tactical torches....
Got i.e. the T7 torch which has a laserwarning on it - so smal but so bright that you throw your other torches away!
Zweibrueder has a development department, which is always interested in new ideas.

Greetings Flying Bull

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

MALABO,

I am dumbfounded by your last post.

You apear (quite correctly in my view) to identify the critical issues of speed control (speed stability) and Pitch Attitude during a night or ARA approach.

However, in refusing to consider my call for raising the MDH (at night only) to Deck + 200 feet, you seem to think that stable airspeed and minimum nose pitch up attitudes can both be achieved when 50 feet above the deck and very close to it.

Just to be clear, the interim AAIB report on the 225 inadvertent ditching states that the crew were too low to see the helideck lights and the crew felt they were "too close to the installation" and the nose was raised to slow down (20+ degrees) , ROD built up (-1000 fpm) , airpeed decayed (<35 KIAS) and the helicopter hit the sea.

This situation is clasically synonymous with being below the ideal (Deck + 200 Feet) MDH/CTB intersect line whilst trying to keep stable until the CTB is reached.

MALABO - I assume the slight about credentials was aimed at me and that is your right to freedom of speech.

Heres mine - YOU ARE EITHER THICK AS PIG-DO-DO or a Manager.

LIGHTING SYSTEM.

I like the idea of any kind of imporvement but my personal experience of Night Approaches both from an Operational and Instructional point of view is that "Capturing" the CTB slope is not generally problematic provided you are operating in acceptable WX conditions.

Its the bit before the CTB where these approaches seem to go wrong.

[mario139]

DB,
Thanks for the thread and a very pertinent discussion. We are grappling with exactly this issue at the bottom of the world right now. One option we are considering / trialling is a constant groundspeed approach. The (hoped for) advantage is two-fold:
1. Constant ground speed means (on a given night), constant IAS, which means constant pitch attitude. I.e. the sight picture is fixed in the windshield. All that remains is for the pilot to hold the same glidepath with collective until reaching that point of full visual cues where the final transition to the hover is made.
2. Constant ground-speed means ROD is always the same for a given approach angle.

We are trialling 30 kts, with a commence descent at 500 feet, 1.0 nm. Sounds a little flat but actually is not too bad. Our aim point (target height) is 50 feet above the deck, and you do the math from there (ROD is about 200 fpm). I've flown it in nil wind which is probably the most difficult, and the helicopter is nice and stable and the approach easy to control. As wind increases, it gets easier.

The big problem I see with the classic decelerative approach is that everything is changing on that approach. The airspeed is decreasing (which requires a steady increase in pitch attitude so your visual cue is moving); power required increases, so collective input is necessary. This gives flapback so cyclic correction is required. The whole approach is very dynamic (aka unstable!), which is possibly why it is very difficult to make a good job of it first time up for a couple of months.

Be interested in feedback on this concept.

Cheers

[Burr Styers]

Reading this thread with interest. Have done the offshore thing N Sea, Single pilot night ops, shuttling etc. Now working in flight safety. One thing that you may want to consider in evaluating approaches to installations, irrespective of time of day, is your companys Flight data monitoring programme (FDM), or for those across the pond FOQA.

This will have objective data about approaches to offshore installations, and with todays interprative software, it would be very easy to see what profiles are actually being flown, versus pilots recollections of what they thought they flew - usually two different things.

This should be an area rich in data that could be used in a constuctive way, to benefit the safety, particularly of night ops to a helideck, which I think those who have done this will agree, is the most demanding discipline that you have to master.

I think those organisations that have a helicopter FDM programme, and conduct night operations, might wish to consider some depth analysis (if they haven't already) of what is actually being flown.

It could well be that what it finds, concurs with what is trained/SOP. It could also thorugh up some interesting material.

I suggest this, as nobody else on the thread has mentioned it yet, nor does it seem to have much currency in the helicopter forum - which is a bit suprising.

My three penneth

BS

[JimL]

Mario,

That is a 3 degree slope with a rate of descent of 175ft/min (using the North Sea mean deck height of 98ft plus 50ft); at 500ft, 30kts in still wind, you will be at the back-side of the drag curve with a difficult sight picture (the deck almost looks flat at 3 degrees).

Try doubling your approach angle.

Not sure what is wrong with the normal sight picture approach; keeping a constant speed will always start the procedure too slow and could end it too fast.

Jim

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

EXTRACT FROM AIIB BULLETIN INTO 225 CRASH

Since the accident, the operator has amended the procedures in its Operations Manual for offshore night operations.
For night visual approaches Stable Approach Configuration (SAC) criteria have been specified.
They are to be met by a Visual Gate Point, 2 nm from the destination installation or vessel.

In addition:
‘if at any time after the Visual Gate Point visual contact with the installation/vessel is lost or becomes uncertain, a Go-around is mandatory.’

I am left utterly speechless that the combined brains of the AAIB and the CAA think that the above is sufficient to prevent a further re-occurence of the incident.

The above singularly fails:

TO RECOGNISE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MAPT AND THE FDP/CTB

TO MANDATE LEVEL FLIGHT AT MDH FROM THE MAPT TO THE FDP/CTB

TO ADDRESS AT ALL THE INADEQUATE AMO0UNT OF SPACE ABOVE THE DECK PRESENTED BY AN MDH (ARA) OF DECK + 50 FEET

TO ADDRESS AT ALL THE REQUIREMENT FOR A PROPER, MANDATED, PUBLISHED PROFILE - LEADING TO PUBLISHED MANDATORY INTERVENTION PARAMETERS AND POLICIES without which the NHP is as much use as a chocolate fireguard, left to rely only on his common sense, experience and ever the victim of the severity of the cockpit gradient.

COME ON AIIB & CAA If thats the best you can do I need a TAX rebate!!!


I have sent the presnetation to about 600 people worldwide from all companies, agencies, safety organsiation and training orgainistaions.

I have not had one negative response and the general trend has been "Why has this not been done already"

If the combined planet sized brains of the AAIB and CAA result in the above reccomendations then god help us all.


Fingers out guys before we have another one!!!!

[JimL]

DB,

Stop shouting at us.

This is text for the establishment of the Visual Gate Point and clarification on the necessity for a go-around; you don't know what it also says in the Operations Manual. It might already say:

At night, there shall be no en-route descent to VFR unless the cloud base has been reported and forecast to be above 1,200ft.
At night, for a VFR approach there shall be no manoeuvring below 500ft until adequate visual reference has been achieved.
At night for shuttling, the en-route height shall not be below 500ft
At night for shuttling the en-route visibility shall be reported and forecast to be above 5km.Here are some other points -for a visual approach: there is no MDH; there is no MAPt; there are no such terms such as FDP or CBT.

The excerpts from the Bond Operations Manual are just that - they cannot be construed as recommendations from the CAA or the AAIB; the CAA are in no position to give recommendations because the AAIB has not yet reported.

As a matter of interest, the helideck elevation is reported to be 166ft.

Jim

[Lt.Fubar]

Mario,

That is a 3 degree slope with a rate of descent of 175ft/min (using the North Sea mean deck height of 98ft plus 50ft); at 500ft, 30kts in still wind, you will be at the back-side of the drag curve with a difficult sight picture (the deck almost looks flat at 3 degrees).

Try doubling your approach angle.The military is using 3° glide slope, although, it is assisted by SGSI (http://www.tpub.com/content/navyict/14121/141210077.htm), TACAN DME, ship and aircraft radar. Plus, to make the SGSI light more visible all other lights are dimmed when helicopter is on approach, and until above the deck, landing site is not crew concern.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

JimL,

The entire point to this debate is whether there should be such a practice as NIGHT VISUAL APPROACHES.

My argument, from the outset, is this practice should cease.

All night approaches should be conducted as monitored Instrument approaches, through the MAPT, to the FDP/CTB.

I accept that at present there is no formal recognition of the FDP/CTB.

The crux to the stability and therefore the safety of the approach is that there should be recognition of this theoretical and then physical point in space, and build the profile around it, and the MAPT.

Just because these things do not exist at present it does not mean they should not be invented.

I accept that many of you in the industry have been working on this subject for many years. Guess what....the solutions that have been implied by the current regulations and guidance do not work properly. This incident, and many others like it are the physical manefestations of failings in the past to recognise, once and for all, that night VMC over the sea simply does not exist.

The solution I have proposed works. Very well. It is safe, controlled and easy to mandate to implement.

The principles which it employs, that taken together to produce a complete profile, work regardless of the weather experienced during the approach. This is the key to preventing poor decision making due to slant range visibility during the initial descent leaving the crew "stranded" trying to execute some kind of VMC procedure.

I said from the outset that the proposal is radical. It is. It abandons some archaic presumptions which in my view are a throwback to the time when full IFR monitored procedures were something of a novelty.

For the most part, we now have equipment that if operated correctly, removes majority of the "Human Element" to night approaches and this is the key, just as it is during and ILS or NDB.

The fundemental chanllenge is to get the industry and the regulators to swallow the simple fact that being 50 feet above the deck (in extremis), when the wx is poor, is a nigh on impossible ask of a large transport helicopter. Increasing this margin is in my view a major step forward, not only providing the dynamics for a stable approach, but inherently improving the safety of such approaches.

DB

[Spheriflex]

Just wondering why it is so quiet from the main land Europe......

Maybe the wheel was allready invented! :hmm:

Night time: minimum 300' or deck height + 100' whichever is higher only with gs < 70kts. And lots more of usefull stuff.
Spheriflex.

[dipperm0]

In the French Navy, night VFR approach on a ship or deck is prohibited. Whatever the helo is ( from Super Frelon to Alouette III) and whatever the ship is ( from aircraft carrier down to fishing boat or sailing yacht) the let down starts at 2500 yards / 500 ft with passage by 2000/400- 1500/300 down to 1000 yards 200 ft. Speed is between 60 to 80 knots at the beginning, descelerating during descent toward 40 + wind at 1000 yds / 200 ft.

Durind the initial descent Both pilots are under instruments and non flying pilot report radar distances.

At 200 ft, flying pilot raises his eyes and look for visual references while non flying pilot remains head down, and starts reporting repeatedly radio altimeter height, ground speed and distance until instructed by flying pilot to stop. If at 800 yards, visual is gained, descent is resumed. If not, missed approach procedure is flown by non flying pilot.

Below 200 ft, non flying pilot puts his hands around ( without touching) flight controls and is ready to take the controls and apply the missed approach procedure if requested to do so by the flying pilot. Usual missed approach procedure is left turn 30 deg from approach course, takeoff power and Vy.

If it could help..

D0

[Vespertine]

Hey DB

Hope my message got through, would love a copy.

cheers

[JimL]

Just found this text in EASA OPS - it may already have been in EU-OPSAdditional specific training when not using the CDFA technique with level flight at or above MDA/H:

a. The training should detail:
i. the need to facilitate CRM; with appropriate flight crew communication in particular;

ii. the additional known safety risks associated with the ‘dive-and-drive’ approach philosophy which may be associated with non-CDFA;

iii. the use of DA/H during approaches flown using the CDFA technique;

iv. the significance of the MDA/H and the MAPt where appropriate;

v. the actions to be taken at the MAPt and the need to ensure that the aeroplane remains in a stable condition and on the nominal and appropriate vertical profile until the landing;

vi. the reasons for increased RVR/Visibility minima when compared to the application of CDFA;

vii. the possible increased obstacle infringement risk when undertaking level flight at MDA/H without the required visual references;

viii. the need to accomplish a prompt go-around manoeuvre if the required visual reference is lost;

ix. the increased risk of an unstable final approach and an associated unsafe landing if a rushed approach is attempted either from: and
1. inappropriate and close-in acquisition of the required visual reference; or
2. unstable aeroplane energy and or flight path control; and
x. J. The increased risk of CFIT (see introduction).
Looks like the regulator already had it covered!

Jim

[SASless]

Bless the Regulator's Pea Picking Heart then JimL!

Now answer the question as to why the Regulator failed to ensure that was not adhered to by the Operators?

Having neat stuff archived away and hidden amongst tens of thousands of pages of stuff speaks well of the system doesn't it?

Perhaps DB should be head hunted by the CAA or EASA folks!

[JimL]

SASless,

For the very good reason that it comes from:GM2 OPS.GEN.150.A Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operating minima
AERODROME MINIMA - CONTINUOUS DESCENT FINAL APPROACH (CDFA) – AEROPLANES
and describes, not only the continuous descent procedure, but also the perils of the approach without vertical guidance. For reason we have already enumerated, the ARA is not suited to the continuous descent approach; the beauty of this guidance material is that it examines the issue in great depth and provides advice in the cases where continuous descent procedures cannot be applied.

This is not just applicable to ARAs, the work that has been done on Point in Space (PinS) procedures can also put us in a position where continuous descent is not an option (i.e. where the MAPt is positioned to provide a missed approach in those cases where putting it closer to the heliport would raise it to an impractical level). In this case, there is a level approach segment (from the MAPt) which lead to a Descent Point (DP).

I hesitate to say this but there was no necessity for the invention of terms undertaken by DB (and in this thread); a reading of the Standard for the PinS in ICAO Doc 8186 (PANS OPS) would have provided enough clues. It was only when I had occasion to revisit the ICAO text (for an exchange of emails on hospital PinS procedures in France) that I remembered discussions leading to their provision.

Why is the guidance restricted to aeroplanes? You know as well as I do that helicopters are not considered to be real aircraft in the sense of IFR! Look at the lead in paragraph to the guidance:Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) is a major causal category of accident and hull loss in commercial aviation. Most CFIT accidents occur in the final approach segment of non-precision approaches; the use of stabilised-approach criteria on a continuous descent with a constant, pre-determined vertical path is seen as a major improvement in safety during the conduct of such approaches. Operators should ensure that the following techniques are adopted as widely as possible, for all approaches;and in cases where it is not appropriate:Visual reference and path-control below MDA/H when not using the CDFA technique. In addition to the requirements stated in OPS.GEN.150 and its AMC material the pilot should have attained a combination of visual cues to safely control the aeroplane in roll and pitch to maintain the final approach path to landing. This should be included in the standard operating procedures and reflected in the operations manual.(as for the reference to the visual cues required for non-precision approaches - don't bother to look for them in OPS.GEN.150 they are not there. They have magically appeared in the text that was originally provided for 'commencement and continuation of approach' - i.e. the text in JAR-OPS that was concerned with the 'approach ban'.)

and also:The operator should provide the flight crew with unambiguous details of the technique used (CDFA or not).

As for the question aimed at the regulator; they must answer for themselves. As must the operators who should, perhaps, be aware of this type of guidance.

Jim

[SASless]

When there is a void.....anything that fills it should not be criticized.

DB has done a good thing here....as he has not only defined a problem but has offered up an excellent remedy for it as well.

He has shown a willingness to incorporate changes that enhance the wording and concept.

So....will the CAA slowly creep aboard and embrace his ideas or will they produce yet another expensive study....offer up their version of the changes and then demand Operators comply with their viersion rather than letting the industry arrive at a "best practices" solution?

Worse yet....will they object and undermine the changes as it was NIH?

[JimL]

Work is progressing on the definition of an alternative ARA procedure (taking advantage of SBAS and providing omni-directional, offset, automatic approaches and eliminating necessity for a turn at the OIP) - a report will be issued quite soon.

It is my understanding that, as part of that work, there will be series of interviews conducted in Aberdeen with training-captains and line-pilots of the two larger operators to seek their views on the efficacy of, and problems with, the existing ARA.

These interviews will be scheduled for a two-week period starting in the third week of June, at a place and time convenient to the operators and pilots. The interviews will concentrate on the visual segment of the approach and be used in the provision of a hazard analysis.

This is just a heads-up so that you will be aware that this activity is being planned.

Jim

[squib66]

Perhaps some SNS input would be useful too.

[JimL]

That has not been ruled out but there is only limited time available to the person conducting the interviews - the same applies to Blackpool.

Jim

[YAK1956]

You may be interested in the new GL3 ODAPI system. A full Omni directional approach path indicator. See it at HeliTech or on their web site

[YAK1956]

There is a working ODAPI system, the GL3 which give clear vis range at night of 15nm over 360. It is at HELITECH 2009

[bondu]

JimL,

On the 4th June, your post stated that interviews would take place in Aberdeen during the third week of June.
Did these take place? I work with one of the 'two larger operators' and I was in at work during that period and saw no sign of anyone doing interviews.
So what happened?

bondu

[JimL]

Bondu,

Yes they did and the results are being analysed at this time; there was extensive prep before the interviews were conducted, part of which was to utilise experienced staff (not necessarily management) from the three operators to set up the interviews.

The interviewer was an MSc student from Cranfield University who intended to use the results for his final dissertation - he is an ex-Brazilian naval pilot. the CAA maintained oversight of the project which was, essentially, a risk assessment of the visual segment of the procedure.

The results will not correlate exactly with the CAA research work which is primarily concerned with the proposed SBAS Point in Space procedure -that being an offset procedure where the current ARA is a divergent procedure. The essential difference between the two (at least the point of the DR or MAPt - i.e. where the visual segment begins) is the amount of manoeuvring required to put the aircraft on a track to where the landing manoeuvre takes place. It is less with the divergent procedure.

All questions will have been with respect to the existing procedure; notwithstanding that, the principles are still the same and apply equally to both procedures.

Jim

[roundwego]

Work is progressing on the definition of an alternative ARA procedure (taking advantage of SBAS and providing omni-directional, offset, automatic approaches and eliminating necessity for a turn at the OIP) - a report will be issued quite soon.


As a matter of interest, how many safety incidents have been recorded while carrying out the present UK ARA procedure.

[[email protected]]

JimL - at the risk of sounding too cynical, it seems there may be a risk of intellectualising this problem and ending up with another 10,000 word diatribe within which may be hidden a couple of nuggets of useful facts and advice.

Rather than approaching this from a perspective that there is a safety problem that needs addressing, the CAA seems happy to take the opportunity of hijacking some research done by someone with a completely different agenda and using it in another study which may not be applicable to present ops.

Is the answer really going to be more manoeuvering at low level, at night or in poor weather whilst trying to land - hardly seems like progress?

[HeliComparator]

Jim

Do you have a diagram you could post showing the difference in visual manoeuvring required between the divergent and offset procedures? I could of course draw it for myself but 1) as you know, I am too lazy and 2) it might be interesting for others to see.

Is there a difference approaching MAPT as to where to look to see the installation, and would this affect the probability of seeing the installation and/or the ability of PNF to monitor the instruments?

roundwego, I think there have been few if any reported incidents on ARAs, however a night ARA to minima is a fairly rare event so we shouldn't be complacent (and not sure that reporting culture is particularly good at reporting what might be seen as "own fault" events)

HC

[JimL]

Crab - I PM'd; if there is a need, I will post answering your questions. At the moment I see no reason to enter into a debate about the quality of the risk assessment.

Before I attempt to address Helicomparator's point, I have to admit that I had fooled myself into thinking that there would be a major discrepancy in the relative position of the rig (in the FOV) between the 'offset' and 'divergent' approaches - my intuition was wrong.

It is difficult to do any maths because the 'offset' distances are not yet established; however we can make assumptions which will not be wildly in error. If a 10 degree heading change is made at the OIP (1.5nm) the divergence would take us about 490m abeam the rig (we don't actually get to that point because the procedure always requires a turning missed approach at 0.75nm). We can assume that this is the miss distance for the 'offset' procedure - if it is further than this, the differences increase.

At DR/MAPt (0.75nm = 1390m from the rig) with the divergent procedure, the rig will appear at just over 20 degrees to one side (10 degrees relative from the rig + the 10 degree of the divergent heading) and the track-offset will be 250m. With the 'offset' procedure the rig will be seen at (just over) 20 degrees (all of it relative to the rig) and the offset would be 490m.

If it was necessary to position the aircraft back onto the into-wind track, the 'offset' procedure would take more manoeuvring than the divergent.

With a DR/MAPt of 0.5nm (926m from the rig) the position of the rig in the FOV would be respectively 31 v 32 degrees and the track-offset would be 338m v 490m; the 'divergent' would be 20 degrees out of wind and the 'offset' 30 degrees. For both procedures the position of the rig in the FOV (now possibly to one side of the windscreen), the additional manoeuvring, plus the reduced distance for deceleration raises issues.

If you want to see this in diagramatic form draw a rectangle of sides 2778 and 490 with a line (from the OIP) joining the diagonals; put the rig at one end of the 2778 line and the OIP at the other; take two arcs of length 1390 (0.75nm) and 926 (0.5nm) from the rig and intersect the diagonal and the outer line; enter the offset distances/angles I have provided.

Jim

[HeliComparator]

Thanks Jim, yes I can see that the chosen lateral offset makes a big difference. Since the approach is to be flown coupled (and therefore drift is less of an issue) do you think we should fly the approach out of wind, so that at MAPt/DR we are directly downwind of the installation?

HC

[212man]

Jim, I don't see the slides, but am famliar with the European and US work being done, and I think the fundamental anomoly in your assumption is that for the diverging procedure the WX RADAR is the primary means of determining DR, whereas for the offset procedure it's the GNSS. The latter will therefore place you at a a more obtuse angle - using the proposed procedures with virtually abeam MAPts. Of course, for any given physical position - relative to the rig - the diverging procedure will require greater manouevering to resturn to the final approach track.

I think HC has a good point, and even now with the 'traditional ARA' the use of coupling, and GNSS to assist the process, raises interesting points on choice of approach direction and interpretation of achieved/desired offset e.g. use of the track-made-good bug (diamond in the 225, 'doughnut' in the 92) versus radar target orientation on the screen.

The work I'm familiar with taking place in the US will, undoubtedly , offer a huge step forward in safety for routine night operations - even though it's being developed for the instrument approach - and will allow the aircraft to be manouevred at low speed in a fully coupled state to the commital point (virtually.)

[[email protected]]

Thanks for the PM JIm - situation clarified:ok:

[sox6]

JimL

I had the same reaction as Crab. I would appreaciate a PM or a post for all.

[JimL]

212man - I have assumed accurate positioning at the DR/MAPt in order to provide the diagram; this always produces less manoeuvring for the divergent procedure (if attempting to regain the into-wind track) for obvious reasons.

The work on the revised ARA obviously took account of the FAA system which provided fixed tracks - this was also the basis of Norwegian modification (provide to eliminate the turning missed approach in a tight obstacle environment). Such procedures are probably too restrictive as they rarely provide more than a small number of fixed paths for any location. On the plus side, the offset distance can be calculated with some accuracy and meet international standards (DOC 8168).

I must say I was surprised when discovering that the revised procedure would be omni-directional; however this does introduce issues as, unless there is accurate measurement and representation of each platform's environment in the data-base, it will have to rely upon a single distance based upon the worst case (for each location). This is one effect of an offset procedure with a standard (straight ahead) missed approach (but deterministic and safer than a turning missed approach).

HC - I arrived at the same conclusion yesterday when drawing the diagram.

The main hazards of any non-precision procedure are not in the instrument segments but during the level segment and at the DR/MAPt (that is why there has been a move towards CDFA - see my earlier post on this page - to the point where non-CDFA procedures are penalised in the approach minina under the latest revisions of EU-OPS). It has been established for a number of years that the most critical point of any procedure occurs at the MAPt and the studies (CAA and FSF ALAR) provide substantial evidence of of this.

It is noteworthy that the studies only considered straight-in approaches; the ARA has the added difficulty that, in addition to acquiring the target, the pilot has to further manoeuvre the aircraft to the landing phase. Whatever profile is produced, it will not alter the basis of the procedure that there has to be an offset because the obstacle to be avoided in the missed approach is also the landing site.

As has been recognised for some time, once visual reference (in accordance with the requirements) has been established, landing into wind will require an S-turn to regain the into-wind track followed by a deceleration and let down. If the DR/MAPt is at 0.75nm, this will not result in a tight manoeuvre (less for the 'divergent' than the 'offset'); if at 0.5nm the whole procedure becomes squeezed because of the more acute angle and the reduced space in which the manoeuvre is performed (and this on top of the additional complexity of acquisition of a target 30 degrees to one side).

The revised ARA procedure appears to take an 'input' of the proposed track (we assume that this will be the into-wind track) and then constructs the complete profile (vertical and horizontal). There is no reason then why the profile could not be constructed such that the DR/MAPt is downwind of the landing site. This would also assist in the acquisition of the target as the drift angle would put the target closer to the centre of the windscreen. Such a procedure would then only require a single and maximum turn of 30 degrees (less if the DR/MAPt is at 0.75nm) to put the aircraft on the final track.

Regardless of any of this, the radar will still be necessary to ensure that there are no obstacles in the approach path - this might be complicated with any complex approach path computations. I believe that there are assumptions that the radar will not be necessary and other methods can be used; I do not subscribe to that contention for the same reason that I believe that use of the 'E' function of the EGPWS is flawed offshore.

Jim

[HeliComparator]

Thanks Jim

Those proposing to do away with the radar for obstacle avoidance are clearly not living in the real world!

Just a snippet on the bit between the MAPt and the deck - for the EC225 Eurocopter are proposing to activate the groundspeed hold mode for offshore helicopters (normally part of the SAR modes). This, along with the hover display on the FND, will allow fully coupled flight right down to nil wind hover. Its engaged using a button on the cyclic, you can beep the x and y groundspeed values, and a double press on the button sets zero zero, ie auto-hover. I think that (with suitable training) the ability to stay coupled right up to the commital point will be of big safety benefit. Should be in the next software update around the end of the year.

HC

[212man]

The proposals I've seen certainlyuse radar - there is even a corridor overlaid on the nav display to highlight the area that should stay clear.

HC, sounds similar to what I've seen - essentialy 'SAR AFCS lite'! Does it require an AHRS upgrade or is the existing hardware sufficient? Regardless, these kinds of changes will make a huge improvement in the safety of night offshore approaches for the types concerned.

[[email protected]]

HC - is the groundspeed control doppler-based or is it inertial or GPS based?

I only ask because in light wind/foggy conditions with a smooth sea, doppler based systems can struggle, especially in that crucial stage approaching the hover.

[HeliComparator]

212 - the existing hardware is retained, its just "turning on" something that is already in the AFCS software,

crab - fortunately EC have moved away from doppler, and having used it on the L2 I know what it can be like! Our system will just use gps and inertial. The full EC225 SAR fit no longer has doppler, again its inertial but with dual FMS/GPS (dualled for redundancy rather than integrity). Having flown with it in the prototype its certainly rock solid in trans down and auto-hover.

HC

[odracir52]

Please Send Me A Copy Of Your Presentation. Many Thanks!

[[email protected]]

HC - thanks:ok:

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

I am also concerned that this issue gets overshadowed by the "academics" trying to foist mathematical conclusions without adressing the bleeding obvious.

As a current operational offshore pilot what matters to me most is that the airspeed is stable when the visibility is poor.

The Bond dropshort stunk of a low/airspeed/height combination. That simple.

To overcome this problem the helicopter needs space to decelerate safley to landing speed whilst maintaining adequate visual refernces, which for an ARA at night, can only be provided by the "ovality" of the deck edge lighting.

When a pilot transfers from purely instrument refernces to hybrid or total visual, this ovality is the only reliable source of information available to him.

In my view the MDH is, and will always be, the pre-cursor to these problems occuring as the crew desperatley attempt to maintain, or reduce speed, when the aquisition of deck ovality is very late, despite being visual with the installation.

TWO SIMPLE CHANGES will make a world of difference:

1. RAISE MDH TO DECK HEIGHT + 200 FEET
2. DEFINE THE REQUIRED VISUAL REFERENCES AT DR/MDH as "Deck Edge Lights Visual"

Like it or not, these two simple measures will almost eradicate ARA problems at night.

Reading some of the posts, whilst the material is well thought out, the practical application of close tolerance flying required to execute an approach at night, down to Deck Height + 100 feet at 3/4 Nm, decelerate safely and land, presents a situation where the risks in doing so are unmitigated by the fact that we are just taking people to work.

Until someone can tell me why my minimum DH on the ILS (with a 1000 yards of tarmac in front of me on which to safely decelerate with pretty lights all along the sides) is 200 feet, I will remain convinced that raising the MDH is the only method to introduce an tangible safety mARgin over the current procedures.

S turns at Deck +100 feet in the dark, without crystal clear references to provide rock solid height control - is utter folly.

CDFA does not provide the answer as it simple serves to reduce the Aquisition Time for the references as we pop out of a theoretical flat cloud base at Deck + 100 feet and 3/4 Nm.

CDFA under EU-OPS is there for a reason, to prevent FW pilots descending immediatley to their MDH/A when the published procedures fail to provide a safe vertical profile - leading to the risk of inadvertent CFIT or speed instability associated with power changes in FW aircraft excerbated by wind gradient and wind shear issues. It has nothing to do with Heli ops.

[Phrogman]

Good info, thanks for presentation. I sent you a couple of slides from a ship helo presentation showing similar concepts, let me know if you don't get them.

[bondu]

DoubleBogey,

Spot on!! Raise the MDH to deck height plus 200ft! Totally agree. Simple solution to simple problem. Why make things more difficult.

bondu

[Mars]

...and remembering that this thread started as a result of the EC225 accident; that solves the problem - how?

mars

[HeliComparator]

Good question Mars, of course it doesn't! Although its not particularly nice coming off the end of a night ARA at deck height +50 and 0.75nm, with good procedures and modern autopilots I don't think its particularly high risk. What seems to be high risk, as indicated by REDU and BLUN, is the attempt to fly a visual approach in unsuitable weather.

You may be able to "legislate" against that, but perhaps its more difficult to get universal acceptance of the inadvisability of attempting a visual approach in marginal weather, when an ARA would be so much more controlled.

HC

[Training Centre]

HC - spot on, as ever.

At the risk of being contentious I will say that there is nothing wrong with the current ARA (look at the past 25 years for supporting data) but what IS wrong is the "we must land from this" attitude. DB is correct in saying that "we are just taking people to work" but to make it more complex makes my brain hurt. Why not just mandate an ARA for all night approaches? Pop out at the same place in space every time, then get on with it OR go around and go home. Easy, really.
BTW it has never been OK to descend below MDA until established on Final, which implies a stabilised approach - I have no idea how it became "normal" to descend below MDA without a sight picture of the landing site. Not in my aircraft anyway.

[AVISE]

Hi,

Thanks for the invitation. Could you send a copy to me at the following email address: [email protected]

Many thanks

Bob Dannatt

[oldrotorhead]

Hi DB. If this thread is still active, I would be appreciative of a copy of your presentation if possible. I can advise you of my email if you can let me know if you are still able to send me a copy.
Thanks in advance.
ORH

[pilotajay]

Hello,

I am Capt Ajay Kalia flying Bell 412 & Aw 139 off shore for GVHL in India off shore. Requesting you to please send me a copy presentation on night deck landings.

my e mail [email protected]

regrds
Ajay

[jjofk]

Hi everyone,

I am currently flying offshore ex Mumbai India. We often standby for night cas evac missions from platforms/rigs/ vessels to Mumbai. We have had our share of mishaps, and I was wondering if I could get a copy of the presentation made by Double Bogey sometime back on the subject.

If someone has it, please get in touch.

Regards

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Hi I have the presentation. If you pm me your email address I can send you a copy,

DB

[jjofk]

Hi DB,

My email :[email protected]..
Many thanks

jjofk