Wheel Well Fire Actions....

[blueloo]

Hypothetically:


If you are at cruise altitude - say 39000' - and have been there for a while - say 60 mins after takeoff....and you get a wheel well fire warning -

what would your thoughts/actions be?

For info assume landing gear limit is 270kts/.82M (B767)

There are several reasons I ask this question:

1 - high speed aerodynamics is not my strong point - hence the interest in extending the gear at high altitude (as per the Non Normal Checklist) - so if anyone wants to tackle a good explanation of IAS / mach crossover feel free - the effects of compressibility and resulting effects on gear doors etc

2 - the likelihood of a genuine wheel well fire warning so long after takeoff....

Cheers

[SNS3Guppy]

Wheel well fire at FL390? What's out there to burn? Not a lot burns in that atmosphere...very high probability of a false indication.

Gear speeds are generally indicated airspeeds, and that's what you go by at altitude. Verify the speed, put out the gear where appropriate, in accordance with the checklist, if warranted.

[411A]

Cancel the warning and continue reading the newspaper....unless you might have other indications.
Very unlikely at cruise altitude (long time) if it has not been indicated before.
Don't know about Airboos, however...:}

[blueloo]

I agree with the false indication being the most likely reason as per 411A - but - tend to agree with directanywhere with regard to actioning the checklist.

My only comment would be - how long would it take for other indications to make themselves apparent - would you wait to find out?

The Wheel well detector is a single loop - and shouldnt be tripped for hot brakes. There isnt a great deal else in the gear bay that would trip it is there? Unless some hydraulic system has caught fire..... not sure what would though (HMG out of control?) .

Some of our other guidance material (training manual) suggests slowing to 250kts - presumably for an adequate margin.

If at or above optimum - putting the gear out will also presumably put you at your thrust limit aswell - so force a descent - not sure how fast this would happen - depending on gross weight etc.

[bobrun]

I would like to add that the airbus has a limitation of FL210 for gear extension, with speeds of 250/M0.55....

[an3_bolt]

I would have thought that it is impossible to assume a false warning until proven otherwise - and one should act in a conservative manner.

I believe it would be prudent to treat any indication of a wheel well fire as an actual occurrence, requiring prompt actioning of the appropriate checklist. Without suppression capability - time would be of the essence to conduct a timely diversion and landing.

Thought provoking exercise: as mentioned previously unable to maintain altitude due to gear extension, diversion to an enroute airport, fuel flow with gear down and ability to actually divert to an airfield with the gear still down or the need to retract the gear at a later stage, how to handle the landing regarding possible braking difficulties/reduced stopping performance, or asymmetric braking on a field length limited airport, use of reverse thrust, where and how to park the aircraft - into wind, on the runway or other, cabin preparation required and how to manage the aircraft and occupants after landing? At an airport with RFF and smoke around the wheels (no reports of flames or communication/language problems) do you bang the doors and exit? Or at an airfield with no support or communication?

Life, universe and everything? 42

[A Comfy Chair]

B767

Checklist Introdution.

"There are some situations where the crew must always land at the nearest Available Airport. These situations include, but are not limted to, conditions where:
- The non-normal checklist has the words "Plan to land at the nearest Available Airport"

The Wheel Well fire checklist includes this line.

Also in the Checklist Introduction (my Bolding)

"It must be stressed that for persistent smoke or a fire that cannot be positively confirmed to be completely extinguished, the earliest possible descent, landing and evacuation must be done"

I am fully aware that, as PIC, you can vary checklists if required, however Boeing have gone to pains to stress an immediate landing, and I think I'd have serious questions for any crew that chose to ignore this one.

[RobinR200]

Its not so hypothetical, I experienced it on a CRJ in FL310 after about 25 minutes of flight.
Bing, bing, bing.
Pulserate 200.
Whats up?
Wheel well fire? Here at this level? After 25 minutes? The computer must have gone wild!!
Actions taken: CPT makes PA announcement. I took control. descended rapidly and then (in my recall) level off at F250, slow down to max gear and do the procedure.
Message went out.

In my opinion, this is the only safest course of action. Reading newspaper...HA. Where are u coming from.....

[SNS3Guppy]

Not so hypothetical? Did you have a fire, or not?

Aside from the burner can, have you ever had a fire at FL390 outside the aircraft in an unpressurized area?

[Rainboe]

I can recall a 727 long ago had a wheel well fire. Heat from the brakes can take a significant time to spread to the tyre and heat it up to cause trouble. I would take any fire warning as genuine and land nearest suitable.

[DA50driver]

I would check brake temps, then go take a look with my belly mounted camera to see if there were any indications of fire. Then I would do whatever I decide as PIC is the most prudent thing to do at that point and follow the recommended checklist procedure.

[BelArgUSA]

In the 747, unlike 707, 727 and DC8, we have brake temperature gages.
As per company procedures/policies, we only takeoff with temperature in GREEN.
If brakes temperature continues to rise after gear retraction, extend the gear.
xxx
If fire warning BELL comes ON, for WHEEL WELL FIRE, crosscheck brake temperatures.
If brake temperature are in the RED zone, extend the gear.
The "gear doors open" with that procedure no longer required by Boeing.
If the gear brakes temperature is normal, it is captain's decision.
Likely to be a false warning.
xxx
Suggestion to those of you still doing "touch and goes" with airliners...
Leave your gear DOWN for an entire circuit every 3 landings for gear cooling.
And mention to your boss that simulators are good enough. No fuel used.
xxx
:D
Happy contrails

[bcgallacher]

On 747 classics it is possible to get a wheel well fire warning from a leaking pneumatic duct in the left wheelwell - it is pressurised in flight from the engines although it is usually referred to as the APU duct.
I have seen this in the case of a duct joint which was sealed with high temp sealant which blew out - it should have had seal rings but the Mexican FAA approved maintenance organisation was out of stock at the time of a check! If both wing isolation valves were closed the warning should stop - you would be a bit short of breath though!

[forget]

The world's most infamous wheel well fire?

Report on the Diierrenaesch Accident. A preliminary report, just
published, of the investigations into the Swissair Caravelle crash at
Diierrenaesch on September 4 last year (1963) concludes, as predicted
during the initial investigation, that overheating of the brakes prior
to take-off was the primary cause. The aircraft had caught fire in the
air and crashed five minutes after taking off from Zurich. The fire
started when the tyres of the two rear wheels of the four-wheel port
undercarriage bogie burst, causing damage to hydraulic and fuel
pipes, with the fluid and fuel subsequently catching fire on contact
with the hot brakes. The fire was also fed by the rubber tyres and the
magnesium rims of the wheels. The report, written by M Carl
Hoegger, director of the enquiries, notes that the aircraft was taxied
to and fro along the runway to clear the ground fog and states
that such "tunnelling manoeuvres" are not regarded as an official
operating procedure for Caravelles. This technique had, it appears,
once been described in Swissair's Caravelle operating manual, but
was dropped from the 1962 manual onwards. The effects of a
tunnelling manoeuvre on the temperature of the brakes and wheels
had never been analysed.

http://www.flightglobal.com/FlightPDFArchive/1964/1964%20-%202341.PDF

[IGh]

Wheel Well FIRE INDICATOR? It's still NOT required by Part 25. The Douglas Products still do NOT have Wheel Well FIRE Detection (even after NationAir DC8fatal Hull Loss.

After ValueJet, industry went back to the 1947 regulations (the narrow-body's Fwd Cargo and Aft Cargo Compartments must have Detection/Protection). But the ValueJet CHANGES never forced WHEEL WELL Detection for DPD's DC9's, MD8's and DC8s.

What would have been the result, if the following GRND mishap, had instead happened inflight:

NWA / 3Jan98 DC9-51 N-776NC, ground mishap at DTW. Wheel Well fire, electrical wire (three phase) powering Aux Hydraulic Pump overheated after one phase failed. See FAA Incident Rpt 980103002669C, FAA web page.

Here's that PropAir case:
PropAir / 18Jun98 Sweringin Metro II diverted to Mirabel YMX crashed landed approach to Rwy 06-24, left side on fire, incl the engine -- observed by firefighters. Left wing departed with the engine in flames; off the rwy, swampy ditch, overturned. 11 sob killed. CVR recovered; MP mentioned that a/c suffered inflt breakup (wing separation) prior to landing. CBC rpts of 26Sep stated TSB/c said pilot did not know the source of smoke was a fire in the Left MLG Wheel Well [retracted]; hot break, fire, NO INDICATION. Design-annunciation of a/c should show WARNING of fire in wheel well. CBC Rpt 26Oct, final AAR not expected until '99.
Here's that monster fire, pilots crash landed:
USAF / 27Sep74 Lockheed C-5A 68-0227 hull loss: Wheel Well fire, in-flight, uncontained, at night, crashed-landed at grass airport (rwy lights in sight) at Clinton OK. [ Later mod'd LG Wells for fire detection and suppression. Date & ship # from Bill Harms, details merely from memory.]
Here's a B737 case, not wheel/tire really:
Pan Am / 2Apr86 B737 N164AF taxi-out at London LHR, at #1 spot prior to takeoff, following aircraft spotted smoke coming from the B737's Wheel Well area. An electric Hydraulic Pump had shorted, burnt through casing, hydraulic fluid-spray ignited. [Flt Int'l, 24Jan87, pg 39.]
Here's an example a what could occur on any DPD product (eg, an MD8):
Nationair / 11Jul91 Canadian registered DC-8-61 C-GMXQ ... crashed after an inflight fire; impacted 1.75 miles short of runway 34C at Jeddah. Prior to flight, mechanic determined that an inboard tire on Left MLG had low-pressure. To avoid a delay aircraft dispatched without servicing tire. \\ F/O's takeoff, at 50 Kts (15 seconds and 500' of roll) noted sounds of flat tire, followed by sound of second “flat” 2 seconds later. Flames visible in the left main gear until gear was retracted after T/O. \\ Taxi on under-inflated tires caused over-deflection, overheating and structural weakening of the tire. Friction created enough heat to start a self-sustaining fire; two wheels severely damaged, and piece of broken wheel rim struck the airframe (embedded in left flap). When gear retracted after T/O, burning rubber brought near hydraulic and electrical system components. Wheel well fire involved tires, hydraulic fluid, magnesium alloy and jet fuel (fire burned through center fuel tank). Fire spread from Wheel Well to Cargo Compartment, cabin floor was breached, control systems disabled. Cabin pressurization lost, hydraulic pressure lost. \\ Five minutes after brake release for T/O, F/A entered cockpit and reported, "smoke in the back, real bad." While at 2000' on downwind leg, SSW of field, CVR recorded F/O's comment, "I've got no ailerons!" Crew told ATC there was fire onboard, declared an emergency, and said they were returning to base. On final 11 miles out (suspected point that LG was extended) numerous pax bodies fell from the aircraft. \\ Airframe structural integrity lost, control lost prior to impact. Impacted 1.75 miles short of Rwy 34C. \\ Lessons: dangerous under-inflation of tire not discernible visually. After T/O, gear should not have been retracted. Sob = 14 + 247; all killed. [Extract of Saudi report in AWST Oct25'93 pg 49; better rpt excerts from ICAO's AAD; and "NTSB Reporter" Nov'93. DG's"AD" pg 214+ has some errors.]

[411A]

The aircraft had caught fire in the
air and crashed five minutes after taking off from Zurich

Said Caravelle had to have had a mightly steep climb to have reached 390 in our original questioners scenario...:ugh:

New(er) pilots simply have to look at realities of the situation to make a reasonable decision.

In the heavy jets that I fly, we sure as heck aren't getting to 390 anytime soon after takeoff...far too heavy.
It would be at least six hours into the flight, and that would be optimistic.
Any sort of tire/brake problems resulting from an overheat during taxi/takeoff would have manifested itself far sooner than the time to reach FL390.
Bleed air leak from a duct that passes through the unpressurized wheel well area?
We have duct overheat sensors for that on the type that I fly so...these would indicate a problem, independantly of the wheel well overheat sensors.

Don't specifically know about the many types that pilots might fly here, but on the type I fly (L1011)....yes, barring any other confirming indication...cancel the bell and resume reading the newspaper.

Gotta know your specific type folks...general scenarios simply will not result in a one-size-fits-all approach.

[silverhawk]

Somebody direct me to the 'ignore' function for this jerk please.

[forget]

silverhawk, Leave it. His one benefit is that he makes me look good. :p

[smo-kin-hole]

I've never read a worse gear fire story than that NationAir story. If it isn't a "landmark accident," it should be. Thanks for posting it, it'll be in the back of my mind on every preflight.

[411A]

I've never read a worse gear fire story than that NationAir story.

Yes indeed, very serious.
However, you might note that this scenario did not occur at FL390, but instead, right after takeoff.
It was also in an older type with poor (or no) overheat loop protection.
A completely different scenario from what was originally posted.

I repeat, gotta know your specific type folks, you absolutely cannot generalize.
In the type that I fly, wheel well overheat situations (and that is precisely what these loops do, they indicate an overheat condition, not a potential fire), long into the cruise, without other confirming indications, does not demand a highdive and/or rapid slowing, to lower the landing gear, which may well not be possible, due to structural or performance considerations.

[BelArgUSA]

Hola 411A -
xxx
Appears that some NG (Nerds/Geeks) cannot read (i.e. newspapers).
Reading ability only required for captain and flight engineer positions.
NG need coloring books and crayons to exercise their intellectual capacities.
By the way, you and I are expected to know any aircraft types and procedures.
Do you know what is the wheel well fire procedure is for a DH Dove...?
I do not know, maybe you know.
We are going to be subject of criticism by the many experts.
xxx
:E
Happy contrails

[763 jock]

OK. What about an APU fire warning 2 hours into the cruise? It's been shut down since after engine start. Ignore that or get it on the ground? We had this in our airline a few years ago and the crew lobbed into the nearest suitable.:ok:

I'd rather be safe than sorry. Get it wrong and your airline will have a lot more to worry about than the cost of a diversion!

[411A]

What about an APU fire warning 2 hours into the cruise?
Different scenario, altogether.
Many other potential problems, including fuel to the affected area.
Carry out the drill indicated in the QRH, and if indications are then suitable, continue toward the destination.
No need for diversion if indications are suitable.

[BelArgUSA]

From 747-200/300 QRH - CK-LIST
Boeing STD Procedure
Does not specify ground or in-flight.
xxx
APU FIRE SWITCH......PULL... (F/E)
FIRE BOTTLE........DISCHARGE... (F/E)
xxx
That is it.
:8
Happy contrails

[411A]

APU FIRE SWITCH......PULL... (F/E)
FIRE BOTTLE........DISCHARGE... (F/E)
xxx
That is it.


Yup, same on the L1011, and in addition, we have APU auto fire shutdown, on the ground and airbourne.

I would suggest to some of our new(er) pilots...don't make the situation more complicated than it already is....or needs to be:rolleyes::}

[763 jock]

Same deal on the 75/76. My point is, if the fire warning doesn't go out after pulling the handle or dropping the gear what next? The Boeing QRH is quite clear as pointed out above.

Seems like sound advice to me.

[con-pilot]

OK. What about an APU fire warning 2 hours into the cruise?

I had one about an hour after takeoff in a 727. (For you 72 drivers here I'll bet you already know what happened.) We were at cruise and the fire bell sounded, my well meaning and just out of recurrency school co-pilot immediately canceled the bell. Well, no real problem I guess, except no fire light was illuminated on the fire warning panel on the instrument panel.

So my co-pilot and the FE are staring at the fire panel waiting for a fire light to illuminate. To be honest it has not sunk in yet on what has happened to me either. I tell the co-pilot to test the fire system to see if any of the bulbs had burned out, very doubtful as with dual bulbs in the lights, he does and all the lights illuminate.

Hum I think, then 'click' in my mind. I look back at the APU control panel and yep, sure enough the APU fire light is on and the APU is still running. I make sure that essential power is not being power by the APU and inform the FE that he left the APU on and to shut it down.

His immediate response was, "I turned it off before takeoff!" I replied that if so, we just had the first auto-start of an APU in Boeing history. So then he grabs the start-run switch and places into off. Of course nothing happened because the gear is up. As I am explaining this to the FE, the co-pilot grabs the throttles and starts to pull the power off. I, being an inquisitive type of person, inquired as to why he was reducing power. He replied that he was slowing down so we could put the gear down.

At this point I don't whether to laugh or cry.

Very patiently I explained to the two of them that we do not have to put the gear down (not that it would have helped to put the gear down anyway, as the APU control for the start-run control panel is on the squat switch), to put the power back to cruise and for the FE to pull the APU fire handle and see if the light goes out. He did, it did and we carried on.

When we landed the APU started and ran just fine. As there never was a fire, just an overheat condition. And yes, I inspected the APU before we started it after we landed.

To be fair, in training we had always been taught that the first indication of the APU being left on was a 'Wheel Well' fire warning, but obviously not always the case.

Oh, when we got back to home base I told the Chief Pilot that we needed to go back to the Dalfort (Braniff) school, as the new one was not doing a very good job.

[FullWings]

Wheel well fire indication in the cruise @FL390? Suitable airport(s) nearby? QRH drills + land seems like a good idea, even if it is most likely to be a false warning. Covering backsides and all that.

Same thing mid ocean or in an area with high MSA could require a bit more thought... You may not have enough fuel to make the nearest alternate without bringing the gear up again (warning or no warning) and if you're over the lumpy bits, throwing the wheels out could take you below the tops quite rapidly. :eek:

In the 777, gear down, the fuel flow is approaching twice normal at a slower speed; the aircraft ceiling comes down dramatically (as I'd expect the airframe to do!) There's potential here to create a dire situation out of an uncomfortable one.

You can't write checklists to cover all eventualities, so sometimes pilots have to fall back on logic and experience. I'm not saying ignore the QRH but IMHO you have to be aware of the direction it might take you (down!) before you follow it to the letter...

[411A]

In the 777, gear down, the fuel flow is approaching twice normal at a slower speed; the aircraft ceiling comes down dramatically (as I'd expect the airframe to do!) There's potential here to create a dire situation out of an uncomfortable one.

You can't write checklists to cover all eventualities, so sometimes pilots have to fall back on logic and experience. I'm not saying ignore the QRH but IMHO you have to be aware of the direction it might take you (down!) before you follow it to the letter...

Logic and experience.
Yup, that will do it.
Younger guys need to realise that sometimes...it is best not to jump to conclusions....and put yourself in a more dis-advantagious situation.


IE: Take your time and evaluate, in these scenarios.

[BelArgUSA]

Very few EMERGENCIES require a speed contest for execution of check-list.
Best example is engine fire during takeoff.
While burning, that engine will give you full thrust for the next minute.
Long enough to get you up to a safe altitude.
xxx
When training 747 pilots, I also trained 747 flight engineers.
I often said, IMMEDIATE ACTION starts by sitting on your hands 30 seconds.
The F/E better move his seat 2 feet back and look at the entire panel.
And up-front as well, such as engine instruments.
xxx
Accomplish (PNF or F/E) the IMMEDIATE ACTION as required.
Then go to the book. And proceed slowly with REFERENCE ACTIONS.
Understand the problem before moving any switches or handles.
Especially moving from one reference paragraph to another one.
Or going from one malfunction to another.
One check list followed by another might make problems WORSE.
xxx
In 747s, check-lists that include FLAPS and FLIGHT CONTROLS can be killers.
In memoriam of the EL AL Cargo crew in Amsterdam...
They lost engine nº 3 and 4, and then got LE/TE FLAPS on LH wing... only.
Yet they followed the check-lists to the letter. One check list, then another.
xxx
:*
Happy contrails

[galaxy flyer]

C-P

Funny story and I started laughing shortly into the first sentence. Which brings up a funny story. In Braniff's 72 ground school in about '78. instructor tells story about a Captain in recurrent who asks, "we got a fire bell at top of climb, but no fire indications." Instructor, silently noting giggling F/Es in the back row, tells Captain, "I cannot imagine what happened as the APU cannot be running in-flight." Captain swears it happened and, then notes laughter from the back row. He's been had!!

Hard to get good help at the Marshall's Service? :rolleyes:

GF

[Loose rivets]

IE: Take your time and evaluate, in these scenarios.

What I want to know...(said in a Ronny Barker on the allotment sort of way.) What I want to know, is ow can you 'Take your time and evaluate' when you're reading the newspaper?

[galaxy flyer]

Well, I was taught, if accidently in an F-100 spin.

Look at watch, note time for accident board

Place and hold right hand on PITOT HT switch to ensure accurate IAS readings if out of spin

Place and hold left hand on TRIM FOR T/O button to ensure...ta da...trim for T/O

Wait and watch altimeter for 15,000 feet, if still spinning-EJECT.

IOW, do nothing to prevent the plane from recovering itself.

GF

[411A]

What I want to know, is ow can you 'Take your time and evaluate' when you're reading the newspaper?

Older more experienced folks have no particular problems in this area....:}

BTW, Ronny Barker...one of my favorites.

[stilton]

Stranger things HAVE happened, about 20 years ago while serving my time as a new hire 727 S/O while we were cruising in level flight out of the corner of my eye I spotted the EGT on the APU control panel start to rise, sure enough it was starting by itself !

I relayed the information to an incredulous Captain who confirmed it was running then shut it down (with the regular on / off switch)

I was there and saw it happen.

You never know :ooh:

[bobrun]

About that APU fire story:
the FE to pull the APU fire handle and see if the light goes out. He did, it did and we carried on
To the "older" guys (I don't consider myself old yet, although some disagree :)):
You've had the APU fire warning while in cruise, then pulled the fire handle and all warnings went away. Why would you want to continue to a distant destination when there's suitable airport nearby at that point I wonder?
How do you know for sure that it was a false warning, or that the real fire is really out. Even if the extinguisher worked as designed, how do you assess the possible fire damage to the area? If you're on an airbus, with electrics controlling all your flight controls, how can you assess that all that wiring going to the tail is still intact? Sure there's a firewall of some kind ahead of the APU, but I wouln't want to bet my safety on it.

[an3_bolt]

What I want to know, is ow can you 'Take your time and evaluate' when you're reading the newspaper?
Older more experienced folks have no particular problems in this area..

....are you trying to tell us that fibre is your friend?:E

Sit there for too long reading the newspaper - you might end up with hemorrhoids....

[bcgallacher]

Re 411A - the duct overheat sensors on classic 747 cover the area from the left body gear rear bulkhead to the apu firewall . from the gear firewall forward it is a single loop firewire.

[con-pilot]

Okay, I'm a little confused here by some responses. Are you saying that the APU on the 727 cannot run in flight if the FE forgets to shut it down prior to takeoff?

I have had it happen to me twice, once I caught it right after takeoff and the second time was the story I related. If I recall correctly a American Airlines 727 crashed shortly after takeoff on night, west bound out of LAX, when the FE left the APU running and essential power on the APU and when he realized what he had done he shut down the APU with the Fire Shut off switch causing the loss of all flight instruments.

Now, to answer this question.

You've had the APU fire warning while in cruise, then pulled the fire handle and all warnings went away. Why would you want to continue to a distant destination when there's suitable airport nearby at that point I wonder?
How do you know for sure that it was a false warning, or that the real fire is really out.

Now this just in the case of the 727. The APU sits in the main gear well, actually between the main gear. In that area there is a fire detection system for the APU and a separate system for both gear wells. The wheel well fire detection is not separate, one system for both wells. When the APU fire handle is pulled the container that the APU is in is sealed off from the wheel well area. When the FE pulled the fire handle the light went out immediately. The wheel well fire lights never illuminated, we did not fire the extinguisher as we had a positive proof of what had caused the fire warning to go off. In truth the fire detection system in the 727 is more of an 'overheat' system as opposed to an actual fire detection system.

In the situation I described in my previous post if we had both an APU and Wheel Well fire indication and if either light had not gone out the second the fire handle was pulled I would have reacted differently.

Hard to get good help at the Marshall's Service?

Actually we had some really good pilots there, but sometimes a few slip through the crack. In defense of the two guys with me that day, they were new to the system and both became very competent pilots that I later enjoyed flying with.

Oh, by the way, it is Marshal, with one 'L'. ;)

[411A]

If I recall correctly a American Airlines 727 crashed shortly after takeoff on night, west bound out of LAX, when the FE left the APU running and essential power on the APU and when he realized what he had done he shut down the APU with the Fire Shut off switch causing the loss of all flight instruments.


In actual fact (circa 1969 or thereabouts) it was a UAL 727 that went into the drink just off LAX...nothing to do with the APU, it was the misinformed Flight Engineer that switched OFF the ships battery switch, after having all generators trip offline, due to a differential fault (dispatched with one generator inop).
I know because I helped look for/find the wreckage.
Not a happy night...:sad:

Be aware...in too big a hurry sometimes makes the problem/situation worse, and results in bypassing the hospital altogether, and proceeding directly to the cemetary.

As in...dead as a doornail.

[BelArgUSA]

As 411A mentions here, correct.
Regarding the 727 accident - UAL 1969 off Santa Monica...
xxx
Was one of our favorite classroom subject for F/Es then.
The plane had been dispatched with 1 GEN INOP.
It was a 727C or was not, but here was a slight difference between the two.
Battery switch and galley power switch next to each other.
Both switches were NOT GUARDED.
NOTE - After the accident, all airlines installed a GUARD on the BAT switch.
xxx
They got down to ONE GEN operating - it tripped, overload.
The flight engineer intended to switch galley power OFF.
He confused the two switches, and got the BAT switch OFF.
Cockpit became dark, nothing electrical operating.
In these days there was NO standby attitude indicator SAI.
NOTE - After accident, all airplanes got requirement for SAI with battery.
xxx
A part of the story I got from a UAL pilot... is it a legend...?
Apparently, SAI equipment had been offered for UAL airplanes as option.
But would have cost a lot of money. So they said NO.
Daughter of the UAL idiot that decided not to install SAI, was a F/A aboard.
xxx
:rolleyes:
Happy contrails

[galaxy flyer]

BelArgUSA

Ref UAL accident: aviation is terribly unforgiving or stupidity or inattention!! The price to be paid is high.

BTW, I pm'd you about the El Al B747 AMS accident, if you have the time to answer, please.

GF

[BelArgUSA]

GF -
Sure will - was my favorite simulator scenario for the past few years.
Busy but will do tonight..
xxx
:)
Happy contrails

[con-pilot]

411A and BelArgUSA

That was the accident I was thinking of. I should have researched it before posting, as I remembered someone telling about the accident and the cause, which was wrong, instead of looking it up. The actual cause makes more sense, as having all those generator lights on at night would be very hard not to notice just before takeoff. The very last thing I did on every takeoff before going onto the runway in the 727 was to look back at the FE panel to make sure no lights were on.

Thank you.







(Hey, at least I got the type of aircraft correct.)

[IGh]

From slot #21:
"... that NationAir story.... It was also in an older type with poor (or no) overheat loop protection..."

Part 25 still does NOT require Wheel Well Fire Warning -- the DC8, DC10, MD80, MD11 still have NO Wheel Well Fire Detection. We'll need another Nation Air exemplar -- in the USA -- to get that fire safety feature included in future Part 25 Cert' Standards. That's how a FIRE inside ValuJet Cargo Compartment prompted regulator to re-establish the same Fire Safety standard [detection in Cargo] that had first been law in 1947 (after "Star of Lisbon"), but then later abandon in the early '50's (in favor of the narrowbody's newer air-tight concept for the Cargo Compartment on B707).

[IGh]

Some pilot-bashing several slots above (degrading a B727 Crew). "...the story I got from a UAL pilot... is it a legend...?"
UA266 / 18Jan69 B727-222QC N7434U Night T/O from LAX at 1817 hrs (climbed into low cloud), reported Fire Warning on #1 Engine; then loss of all electrical power, after a minute-and-a-half crashed into sea [950 feet depth].

FAA & airline permitted MEL of that Gen-inop during prior 42-Hrs of flight time; then T/O LAX, ENGINE FIRE warning (nuisance) ...

You can see some of the comments earlier in this thread disparaging the PILOTS and FE of a UA B727. Note the comments -- from other pilots -- focusing NOT ON the REGULATOR, nor on DESIGN, but instead focusing on some mythical pilot-err. These rumors start early after any mysterious mishap, the rumors are difficult to stop, even decades later, even with the AAR publicly available.

From the NTSB AAR:

PC is on the bottom of AAR pg29:The Board determines ... probable cause ... loss of attitude orientation during a night, instrument departure in which the attitude instruments were disabled by loss of electrical power. The Board has been unable to determine
-- (a) why all generator power was lost or
-- (b) why the standby electrical power system either was not activated or failed to function.
Among the Rec'd:In his response of July 28, 1969, the Administrator stated that the FAA had issued NPRM 69-26 which provides for the installation in large turbojet-powered airplanes used in the air carrier service of a third independently powered attitude indicator. [note #33] The proposal embodied in NPRM 69-26 was adopted on January 8, 1970, and became effective on February 5, 1970, as Section 121.305(j) of the FAR, which requires that the additional attitude indicator be installed on all large turbojet aircraft after August 5, 1971.

"... In order to remove any doubt as to the status of the standby system during a "Loss of all Generators" emergency, it is further recommended that the second officer on a B727 be provided a positive indication on his panel when the standby system is being powered from the battery. Such an indication could take the form of a light ..."
Think of the poor pilot attempting to fly INSTRUMENTS, night, IMC, after FIRE WARNING, loss of all generators, Thrust asymmetry with the #1 pulled Fire Handle:

From page 26, “Analysis” Section... "I don't know (what’s going on). [comment from S/O]”

"The remaining question concerns the causal relationship between the electrical system problems discussed above and the eventual crash. Flight tests indicated that electrical power outages would not have a substantial impact on the flight control system. It therefore appears that the most significant adverse effect of the electrical power loss on the capability of the pilots to fly the aircraft would have involved the attitude reference instruments, which are so critical to the operation of an aircraft under instrument conditions.

The basic instrument in the cockpit from which a pilot in a B-727 derives attitude information is the attitude indicator, which in turn receives data from an electrically powered vertical gyro. When N7434U was initially started up, this vertical gyro would have established a vertical plane with reference to the ground. When electrical power was lost in flight, a flag labeled "gyro" would have appeared in the lower face of the attitude indicator instrument and the indicator would have ... [default-bias] to a 90-degree pitchup attitude. [see footnote #29][footnote #29, on page 26 bottom) The only other instrument in the cockpit which provides attitude information, the turn needle, is controlled by an electrical signal and therefore would also have been rendered inoperative. When the electrical signal to this instrument was removed, the needle would have remained centered, thus indicating level flight.
The gyro itself would then have started to coast down, although a certain amount of stability would have been retained in the gyro assembly. However, if the aircraft attitude were altered from the level position by climbing or descending, or banking left or right, precession of the gyro gimbals would have occurred.

Upon restoration of power, the attitude indicator presentation of 90-degree pitchup would have rolled [repositioned] back toward the attitude of the vertical gyro. In addition, the vertical gyro would have gone into the fast erection cycle. However, if the gyro had precessed during the period electrical power was lost, or if the aircraft were in a position other than level when power was restored, the gyro would not be referenced to the ground, but rather would be sensing and erecting toward a false vertical plane. Accordingly, if the captain had attempted to change the attitude of the aircraft toward an instrument indication of level flight under the above conditions, he would have been maneuvering the aircraft with reference to a false "horizon," which would have served to aggravate further an already serious orientation problem.

[411A]

UA266 / 18Jan69 B727-222QC N7434U Night T/O from LAX at 1817 hrs (climbed into low cloud), reported Fire Warning on #1 Engine; then loss of all electrical power, after a minute-and-a-half crashed into sea [950 feet depth].


"...the story I got from a UAL pilot... is it a legend...?"



Urban, I'm afraid.

The referenced flight had departed about five minutes prior to my approach to 25L at LAX, and the tower controller asked if we could proceed out to sea, and agree to be radar vectored to where the target disappeared.
I agreed, and did so.
I don't recall any clouds being present, and we were able to circle the location for about ten minutes, at 500 msl (in a BE99 type aircraft) while other aircraft and surface vessels were enroute.
I returned for landing at LAX and resumed normal duties.
There was no fire in any engine that I know of, and yes, the airplane had been dispatched with an engine generator inoperative, in accordance with the MEL.

Sorry. Igh, it was crew error, plain and simple.
The Flight Engineer switched OFF the battery switch after the remaining engine generators had tripped off line.

A fatal mistake.

[BelArgUSA]

Hola IGh -
xxx
Read posts nº 41 and 42 above.
Exactly as you state in your own post.
At the time of the accident 1969, I was a brand new PanAm 727 F/E.
This accident was subject of long briefings in classrooms and simulator.
xxx
N7434U was a QC - Yes there was a slight difference with PAX 727s
On 727C/QC the BAT + GALLEY PWR switches were placed next to each other.
There was then NO GUARD on 727 BAT SW.
The F/E intended to reduce KW load on the remaining GEN.
One of the first power reduction items on CK-LIST is "GALLEY PWR - OFF".
Unfortunately, he moved the BAT SW to OFF. Killed all power and lights.
xxx
After the accident, a GUARD (RED) was placed on BAT switches.
And SAI with independant battery power were installed as new requirement.
xxx
So, exactly as you describe. What is your point...?
Do you have 20/20 vision in the dark...?
:8
Happy contrails

[RAT 5]

What happened to the maxim "if there's doubt, there is no doubt? If you land and find no problem you have covered your backside in bullet proof material. If you don't you will have some explaining to do. The outcome of that will depend on your relationship with CP.
However, what would you do if in ETOPS territory or Africa? The nearest suitable/available could be a very long way away. I wonder if your decision would be the same as when over central Europe. Remember, you are likely to ground the a/c.