The ADF buys another Lemon

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN.

[illusion]

Found it . It's over here!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(apologies to the naked vicar show)


Four Corners (http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/)

[another superlame]

I understand where you are coming from AFGAN but the Seahawk Blackhawk fleet is not without politics and problems.

The ADF has struggled for years to get the same level of support and spares availability as the US counterparts but were basically held to ransom.

If I remember correctly HDH at Bankstown were overhauling the engines for these aircraft but couldn't hoour the contract because GE would not supply parts to allow the job to be done, in the end all engines have ended going back to the states for overhaul at no doubt a higher cost.

Then there is the problem of a lack of main rotor blades. This hae been in the media a number of times inyears gone by. Do you remember seeing a row of grounded Blackhawks on the news at Townsville all waiting rortor blades.

While the MRH helicopter is new and unproven maybe the ADF is sick and tired of being taken for a ride ny the US military and its suppliers.

I think going to the MRH and Turbomeca engine is a good thing. Australia has been overcharged and screwed by Boeing, GE, Kaman the US navy in recent years. Cost overruns, delivery dates 2 years late or no delivery at all, someone with balls made a decision to go away from the yanks. Good on them. At least 1 person inCanberra has a set of balls.

It seems the US president is over the American suppliers as well.The next presidential helicopters are going to be based on the European EH101, I bet Sikorsky wasn't happy with that.

[Trojan1981]

Totally agree with you superlame.
It is not that long ago that the Blackhawk was the 'lemon' on four corners. To many issues to mention in one post. with regard to survivability, there was a time (very recent) when BHs could not deploy due to lack of EWSPS. This may have changed now.
I don't understand, however, why the ADF is not purchasing MRH-90s with blade-folding capability like the NFH-90. I know this adds weight and expense but it also adds versatility.

[tail wheel]

Fifteen countries (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NHI_NH90) have now ordered or optioned over 650 of the €16,000,000 NH 90 series helicopter.

Should one assume all those countries also made a mistake in ordering that aircraft?

:confused:

I don't recall any ADF aircraft purchase in the last 30 years, which has not been controversial!

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[porch monkey]

Not necessarily tailwheel, it is after all a multi role helicopter. It may well fit the roles envisioned for it in other countries. It obviously doesn't fit the envisioned role in this country. Whether we do or don't get "ripped off" by US companies or not isn't really the point. Whoever the supplier is, the equipment should at least do the job it is bought for......... Keeping in mind of course, that this country has a sad history of speccing one thing, and then requiring changes and modifications to the design to encompass roles, uses and integration of equipment not envisioned by the manufacturers. Blame usually being apportioned to someone else, depending upon who you ask!!!

[tsalta]

It is not just the MRH. The Tiger has more than a handful of issues as well.

Eventually, both types will be able to produce a moderately effective capability. The MRH will not be able to do some of the roles they do in the S70. It will however be able to do some that the S70 can not. The Tiger is a capability that we have never had and so is a substantial improvement.

The key for both types is the timeline, which remains the great unknown.

In the meantime, because the Army is conducting so much R&D on both types the corp is hurting. Both the MRH and ARH are sucking up so much manpower that the rest of the corp is in a massive hurt locker.

Apart from the SO role which is all hush hush, the only output of the entire core is a couple of CH47's for about 8 months of the year in the sandpit.

If the politicians had listened to the advice provided we would have all the extra capability (Whisky model cobra and S70M) stood up and operational by now.

The tax payers of Australia should be extremely upset at the politicians for foisting these two lemons on the country.

Hell, I'm a taxpayer and I'm pissed! You should be to.

tsalta

[Arnold E]

Ya gets wot ya vote for

[tail wheel]

Not necessarily tailwheel, it is after all a multi role helicopter. It may well fit the roles envisioned for it in other countries.

Ah, yes. I think that was what I was alluding to? :E

A perfectly good helicopter but an expectation (by ADF) that it will do something the manufacturer never intended it to do?

[tsalta]

an expectation (by ADF)

Definitely not an expectation by the ADF. The two types which have been purchased were not those recommended to cabinet. These were political decisions which have turned into disasters.

tsalta

[Trojan1981]

Ya gets wot ya vote for

Those who made the decision were toppled in the 'Rudd revolution':}.

Army Avn is hurting for a number of reasons, not just project overuns. Although from the outside ARH looks to be a a bit of a nightmare. Do we need that capability (if no ops in the sandpit)? Is it cost effective?

I understand the MRH is virtually off the shelf so hopefully it will all come together in the end. Remember, the F-111 was once considered a 'lemon'.

[tsalta]

Do we need that capability (if no ops in the sandpit)? Is it cost effective?



Do we need it? YES
Is it cost effective? NO, not with the present aircraft

I understand the MRH is virtually off the shelf so hopefully it will all come together in the end

The MRH is still a developmental airframe. All the glossy photos and magazine covers don't mean much. It is producing no output and has no prospect of doing such within 2 years.

tsalta

[ebt]

^ Tsaltsa, are you sure on that? This article (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/05/28/224182/ila-2008-heer-we-go-nh90-gathers-pace.html) from Flight International in May says that they are operational in Germany (as the TTH). I believe that it is the ASW version which is facing some issues, rather than the transport one.

[tsalta]

Dead set certain. Army Aviation does not have the manpower required to introduce two new developmental aircraft at the same time.

The Army has accepted several airfames so far. However, just like the Tiger, they are still develepmental.

The 5 or 6 airframes which have been accepted so far produce about 5 flight hours per month each. Most of that is test flying. As a battlefield helicopter, when compared to the S70, they are truly hopeless.

tsalta

[Naked_recommiting]

Remember, the F-111 was once considered a 'lemon'.

How did the MRH perform up north with the jet guys recently?

[Trojan1981]

Dead set certain. Army Aviation does not have the manpower required to introduce two new developmental aircraft at the same time.

The Army has accepted several airfames so far. However, just like the Tiger, they are still develepmental.

The French, Germans and Spanish are all working through development of their versions as well. Thats what you get when buying the latest tech. It has always been that way with every new aircraft aquisition. Nothing new.

Manning problems are the Army's problem, not the helicopters.
There are plenty of areas in which the department could trim fat from the ADF and redirect funds to where they are needed. Indications are this will probably happen over the next twelve months.

The S-70 has had its share of problems. Anyone remember aircraft having to be re-skinned (particularly Seahawks)? What about fatigue cracking adjacent to BH stores pylons and rotor delamination? There were also accute spares shortages and reductions in the acceptable operating temp of the turbines.

[FUN.LEVER.FORWARD]

Take a step back....'Those who choose to ignore history are destined to repeat it'...Ok not quite the quote I was thinking of, but let's cast our minds back to the Iroquois. Developed in the 50's to be a Medevac, adapted to be a ground attack, electronic warfare, troop carrier, and gun-ship...all in a very short period. Sure things were a little simpler back then, but the lesson to be learned is don't take a 'frame at face value. The NH-90 has the potential to be all of the above, all it wil take is a little Aussie ingenuity, aka some bungy cord for the door gun, and you will have a very capable utility helicopter.

[slow n low]

The NH-90 has the potential to be all of the above, all it wil take is a little Aussie ingenuity, aka some bungy cord for the door gun, and you will have a very capable utility helicopter.

nah those days are long gone... changing ANYTHING on a state aircraft requires a mountain of engineering proposals,approvals, ammendments ect .. I am pretty sure we need SPO approval just to change seat covers theses days :bored: Mounting anything on the airframe that does not come from the OEM forget it. It would be about a simple as planning a space shuttle mission :{

Thanks DMO :ok:

[Wiley]

What about fatigue cracking adjacent to BH stores pylons...?That's because the Army, in spite of - (because of???) - strident RAAF opposition, insisted on flying them around with the *** external fuel tanks permanently fitted!

Any AAVN recce drivers out there care to give their opinion of using the Tiger for recce as opposed to a Kiowa or its modern day equivalent?

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Trojan1981]

That's because the Army, in spite of - (because of???) - strident RAAF opposition, insisted on flying them around with the *** external fuel tanks permanently fitted!
:D True that.

I would like to hear about Tiger v Kiowa for recce too if someone is really in the know.

[Tibbsy]

Just how much baggage do you have in that barrow you seem to be pushing AFGAN:p?

[slow n low]

With regards to the MRH, some Army Officers need to grow some balls and start telling their superiors the truth who in turn need to push it all the way to the top.

AFGAN, I don't really think the headshed really give a **** about aviation specific problems with new aircraft. They see aviation as an expensive waste of resources, and the blame for any failure to bring capability to the service gets landed squarely at AAVN's feet. All the rest of the Army cares about is 'can you lift x troops from A - B at this time?' or 'can you provide recce on this area?' When the answer is no for whatever reason -confidence is lost. Fair enough too I think, after all they are the customer. There is only so many times one can approach CA and say ' well er sorry sir will still cannot give you a recce/lift capability this week because of a broken thingamabob':uhoh:

Tiger v Kiowa, IMHO apples and oranges. Loose flexability and gain sensor reach / weapons capability. Army doctrine is see's ARH as an important part of the big picture, network centric warfare and all that stuff, we are heavily invested in its future. Most non avo types see ARH with a big "A" and little "R" however.
I got into the Sqn after the golden years of Kiowa. Our brothers in years gone by could achieve exraordinary things with the little fella. And they flew there arses off, when some one needed recce support just yell out and they were there. :{ An unarmed helicopter on todays battlefeild is a liability. The days of camping with armour or cav in a hole in the tree's are gone me thinks. Lots of pers/equipment to support ARH, thats about all I can say. I can say once they do finally sort it, it will provide great capability but not all day and night. nuff said

[Wiley]

The days of camping with armour or cav in a hole in the tree's are gone me thinks.Gee, you mean those RAAF "brylcreem boys" might have had a point way back when when they said it wasn't sensible to leave multiple Hueys, (which required considerably more manpower, spares, POL and God only knows what else than a Sioux) right up on FEBA with everyone living rough "like real men" in a shellscrape?

[DBTW]

slo n lo you make some excellent points. This one in particular.

An unarmed helicopter on today's battlefield is a liability.

All helicopters when operating have a rotor disc. Have any of you seen the strength of a helo return on a modern fighter PD radar? It is quite a sight to behold. Doesn't matter if you are a BH dude, an MRH-90 hero or a Tiger king.

Not a helo mate myself, and I really appreciate the job you all do. Not much point in knocking either the MRH-90 or the BH. Military has to get on and do what it's told. There is no doubt that helicopters are important, but the job is really dangerous. I understand helo operations will involve much mutual support from surface and airborne friendlies, but somewhere in this debate you need to realise everything close to the ground over the battlefield is at risk from all sides these days. An AMRAAM or similar is so attracted to a helicopter they should get a room together... their relationship will be explosive!

I don't really think the headshed really give a **** about aviation specific problems with new aircraft.

Wasn't there a headshed bloke who got a job with the manufacturer just after MRH-90 was signed for?

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Like This - Do That]

Geeeesh! Yers reckon if we sell 'em to the RAAFies they'll let us buy some more armoured vehicles?:}

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Seems to me AFGAN that your only issue with the MRH so far is its lack of a door gun... anything else?

What about the things it does better than a Black Hawk?

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Chronic Snoozer]

Surely everyone realises that the decision to buy this platform or that platform has less to do with what the ADF wants and more to do with what votes can be won and where?

It all has a great deal to do with industrial cooperation/offset programs. I imagine the makers of the NH-90 simply offered a better program than the rest. (perception being reality in a politician's mind of course)

[another superlame]

AFGAN you need to move on. I am not a fan of any government but at least this government had the balls to cancel the seasprite project. I hope they do have their fingers in the pulse with other contracts as well so this doesn't happen again.
Time will tell.

But while we are talking about ADF aviation lets mention the Wedgetail and the KC30 tanker. Both behind schedule, not sure about budget.

The Wedgetail is just another broken promise from Boeing, they promise everything to everyone but in recent times have failed to deliver, ie 787 ,767 tanker.

I think the RAAF made the right move with the 330 tanker, seeing that the 767 fiasco with showed Boeing to be the thugs they are.
I know the 330 is late as well, but now Qantas is on the job things will all come good (said with tongue in cheek)

[slow n low]

Gee, you mean those RAAF "brylcreem boys" might have had a point way back when when they said it wasn't sensible to leave multiple Hueys, (which required considerably more manpower, spares, POL and God only knows what else than a Sioux) right up on FEBA with everyone living rough "like real men" in a shellscrape?


Hey Wiley, I do think the RAAF guys make some good points about Aviation logistics, after all they are the subject matter experts. I believe the Army was pretty successfull in treading the line between servicibilty/safety and op flexibility with Kiowa. They operate from the up near the FEBA as long as they had to and would shoot back to a FOB to get maint done if they had to. The RAEME guys are a clever bunch and could do most things with a tarp a tool roll and some heavy lifting. There are heaps of photo's/old Army pilots around to back that up. (yes this is all in peacetime conditions) I understand the Huey lads live in "basic" conditions for months in the Solomans as well. The fact is the airframes were basic enough to live out for up to a month or so. Plus the ground guys have you and the machine right there ready to go ;)


Wasn't there a headshed bloke who got a job with the manufacturer just after MRH-90 was signed for?


DBTW, yep wouldn't be surprised, gota be honest I would likely take a job as well if were offered. Having said that, Army still have some very clever folks up top in aviation. (much more betera than me) I assume you mean it was an Avo guy?

Chronic Snoozer, you hit the nail on the head there. Plus the bad publicity with BH would no doubt influence things in the Govt's mind I suspect.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

But while we are talking about ADF aviation lets mention the Wedgetail and the KC30 tanker. Both behind schedule, not sure about budget.

The Wedgetail is just another broken promise from Boeing, they promise everything to everyone but in recent times have failed to deliver, ie 787 ,767 tanker.

I think the RAAF made the right move with the 330 tanker, seeing that the 767 fiasco with showed Boeing to be the thugs they are.
I know the 330 is late as well, but now Qantas is on the job things will all come good (said with tongue in cheek)

The Wedgetail and KC-30 are fixed price contracts, so they won't cost us a cent more than that signed for.

Yes, Wedgetail is late, but it will eventually come good. The fact that MIT has been brought in to 'baseline' the radar's performance means they're getting close. :ok:

KC-30 is only eight months late, and only because the mod process for the first jet took longer than expected. While the first jet will be late, the remaining four will be more or less on time. And while Qantas is providing support to the mod process at BNE, the work is still being project managed by EADS.

And, whilst Boeing has had a bad run of late, almost all major contractors have a habit or over promising, so it's not unique to Boeing! :D

[Wiley]

slow n low, I admit I was taking a snipe at an attitude that was pretty widespread in the Army in the days when the RAAF operated the Hueys. Many of the (mostly non aviation) green machine couldn't get it into their heads that a Sioux (or later, a Kiowa) with one pilot and a single groundie, not a hell of a lot more than a tool roll, a hand pump and a 44 gal drum, was a very different kettle of fish for a front line unit to support than (usually multiple) Hueys, with four air crew (OK, only three - no gunner - if we 'pretending' to fight a war, which we all too often were) - one, but usually as many as three or four groundies for a multiple ship detachment, a (if you wanted to keep 'em flying) relatively bulky spares/maintenance package, and (compared to a Sioux/Kiowa) a relatively voracious appetite for avtur. Having all this right up with a forward unit was a big logistics drain, and one that in my experience, was simply not sustainable.

This sillyness, post Vietnam, even extended to Caribou crews having to dig themselves shellscrapes every night to sleep in the field beside their 'mortar magnets'. If there'd been real bad guys out there on those ops, we 'blue forces' would have run out of tac air, both FW and rotary, within a matter of days, with damn near every one of them destroyed where they were parked overnight. (Ever tried to effectively cam. a parked Caribou's tail from a ground level observer who was within a two - make that five - mile radius of you?)

The AAVN guys did a superlative job with equipment well suited to their task – simple, robust and (I don’t think I can overstress this last point) easily maintained in the field. Recce, in the olden days I refer to, was best done from ultra low level with the door off. The pilot was not unlike an airborne stock musterer – he could stick his head out the window and SEE (and sometimes smell) what he was looking for.

I accept the argument from people who are currently in the business that the days of unarmed helicopters in the modern battlefield might be gone. However, I can’t believe a Tiger pilot, even with all his electronic sensors - (when they’re working!) – will see, from his enclosed, air conditioned, elevated cockpit, what a Kiowa pilot would see. I also don’t believe that AAVN will be able to field enough Tigers to actually have one, available for even a small proportion of the tasks that will be demanded of it. A ‘cheap and cheerful’ light recce helo, (perhaps with nominal on board anti air defence when required), that can be backed up with heavy gunship support when needed, would seem to me a far more efficient use of the very limited budget the ADF has always been forced to operate under.

The Tiger, in my humble opinion, risks becoming not unlike the battleship of WW2 – too valuable to commit to many areas it will be needed because, with having so few available, (and no simpler alternative platform), the ground commander simply can’t risk losing one. I also believe that serviceability, particularly in the remote north of the country, (and where else, apart from the ‘Stan or somewhere similar overseas, let’s face it, will it be needed?), will be such a huge issue that it will become a multimillion dollar ‘hangar queen’, if not before high intensity ops, then certainly soon after they start.

I know many will disagree with me, but I can’t help but think we’d be a lot better off (and offer a far superior product to the customer) with a lot of ‘cheap and cheerful’ airframes that will continue to work with minimal tech support for the many jobs that don’t require a ‘high end’ aircraft like the Tiger.

[Gnadenburg]

Wiley

Wouldn't a combination of UAV's and modern, sensor equipped helicopters be the way forward ?

A Kiowa type capability in a place like Afganistan would be homicidal.

Why didn't the army buy the Apache BTW? Isn't that what our troops work with in Afganistan? Dutch, British and US use it.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Why didn't the army buy the Apache BTW? Was about twice the cost of the Tiger, and the price didn't include the Longbow radar!

[Gnadenburg]

Was about twice the cost of the Tiger, and the price didn't include the Longbow radar!

Fair enough. I seem to recall at the final play-off, 16 Apache being the numbers to be procured. So 16 Apaches is double the program cost of the Tiger.

As a taxpayer you have to ask a few questions. Firstly, 16 Apaches would have been in-service and with the ability to have deployed to Afganistan with good support in place.

Secondly, all the banging on about a network hardened army, how does this figure with a European helicopter. Wouldn't have Apache been already integrated in the US and a less high risk project?

Seems ludicrous that the RAAF doesn't have the ability to deploy fast jets in a close air support role ( Afgan' ) and the army bought a troublesome, un-proven battlefield helicopter. It seems structurally out of balance.

I hear the Singaporians bought the Apache. Got a good deal on the radar and the Israelis are involved in consultancy on training and deployment.

[LimitedPanel]

I'm pretty sure with the cost increases Oz Aerospace have been able to squeeze out of defence post contract the cost difference between Apache and Tiger is now nil or minimal.:ugh:

[Lefthanded_Rock_Thrower]

Not sure exactly why many here are so suprised about another untried, flawed in design procurement.

The list is long and distinguished ( in terms of wasted tax payer dollars, please add more ), JSF, ANZAC ships, Seasprite, Collins class, what was that poxy Army RADAR system ? and LST's.

I believe the more technology they bolt into these machines the less suitable for extended deployment and greater amount of down time will be seen.

[tsalta]

Although the Collins Class subs ended up being expensive, I would hardly call them a waste of money. There are not too many subs to have ever made it inside a US carrier picket, except our Collins.

Tsalta

[ftrplt]

Seems ludicrous that the RAAF doesn't have the ability to deploy fast jets in a close air support role ( Afgan' )

An incorrect statement

[Lefthanded_Rock_Thrower]

tsalta,

Any Diesel owned by the RAN has, does not make the Collins unique IMHO.

[tsalta]

LHRT,

Did I say they were unique?

After almost 900 posts, I would have thought you would have some measure of reading comprehension.

I said they were not a waste of money as they are now an outstanding weapon system.

Is it that hard to give credit to a capability when credit is due?

tsalta

[Hempy]

ftrplt, yes it is, but only just :ugh:

[Lefthanded_Rock_Thrower]

Did I say you said they were unique ?.

I guess after some 25 odd posts, I thought you'd know what a straw man argument is.

I said they were not a waste of money as they are now an outstanding weapon system.

No you didn't.

There were a number of other products on the market at the time the Collins contract was signed, that were both cheaper and proven.

Is it that hard to give credit to a capability when credit is due?

No, I believe they are quite capable, the final price tag and timeline were amazingly different to the original forecast, do you remember the days when HMAS Collins was nick named Building 69 ?.

Diesels have always had some considerable noise advantages over Nuclear powered, but thats not the arguement, is it ?.

Don't believe everything you were told on your submariners course.

the submarines' total cost was put at more than AU$6 billion as of 2000, compared to the AU$3.9 billion stated in June 1987 when the project was started by then Prime Minister Bob Hawke's governmentHERE (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins_class_submarine)

A Diesel Sub kicking ass at RIMPAC is nothing new.

[slow n low]

Wiley, have you been listening to the conversations in the crew room or what??? I would say a fair proportion of the junior-ish guys (like me) think along the same lines. :cool: I think its fair to say the traditional role of recce is changing, like I said Army thinks big A little R in ARH.


Wouldn't a combination of UAV's and modern, sensor equipped helicopters be the way forward ?

A Kiowa type capability in a place like Afganistan would be homicidal.


Gnadenburg, hmm interesting thought process, keep an eye on out, after all we are "losing" a Sqn of fixed wing... saving K Rudd $X mil :uhoh:

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Seems ludicrous that the RAAF doesn't have the ability to deploy fast jets in a close air support role ( Afgan' )...

Well, we do, but only if we can find a tanker to get us there! Don't even ask me why the Pigs are going to Red Flag next month and not us... :suspect:

[Lodown]

Don't know much about choppers, but I do know that the next combat zone won't resemble the previous one. Cheap RPG's and missiles in Afghanistan and Iraq sent patrolling helicopters up to considerably higher altitudes where their effectiveness was reduced. The absence of demarcation lines between friend and foe in a guerilla war make a low level helicopter gunship very vulnerable, regardless of armour. The PR effectiveness in downing a well armoured helicopter and crew is also very desirable for an enemy force.

Aerial dominance and more accurate weapon systems for friend and foe meant less reliance on choppers for the gunship role as it was deferred to patrolling fixed wing aircraft, which on balance were less vulnerable, better capable of the element of surprise, more responsive, easier to supply in terms of logistical support, better armed and every bit as, if not more accurate (which was the helicopter gunship's main advantage in previous fights when fighting as a helicopter unit).

Modern warfare is progressing more and more towards a systems approach and response and away from stand-a-lone fighting capabilities. The Army, Navy and Air Force will work more intensely as an ADF and as a partner in an international force in the future. I think the best days for helicopter gunships are in the past except for applications involving face to face invasion like Desert Storm, but I can't see Australia invading too many countries in the future. Even then, twenty years ago, helicopters were considered a main attacking weapon, but that is no longer the case.

I spoke with a Grade 8 student in the US today and asked him about his career options. His school career counsellor told him that 70% of the jobs that he will be applying for after college haven't been invented yet. 70%!!!?? Trying to choose a chopper based on similar developments in the military must be difficult at best.

[Hempy]

Cheap RPG's and missiles in Afghanistan and Iraq sent patrolling helicopters up to considerably higher altitudes where their effectiveness was reduced. The absence of demarcation lines between friend and foe in a guerilla war make a low level helicopter gunship very vulnerable, regardless of armour.
http://i87.photobucket.com/albums/k144/h3mpy/raafac130.jpg

:ok:

[Flyingblind]

Ahh so thats where the H model is going, well done, finally a decent use for older airframes instead of rotting near the fence awaiting an uncertain future.

[FlexibleResponse]

Hempy,

Obviously another lemon!
Strangely, rather comforting.
Thanks for the photo!

[wessex19]

Although the Collins Class subs ended up being expensive, I would hardly call them a waste of money. There are not too many subs to have ever made it inside a US carrier picket, except our Collins.

Tsalta

I remember seeing pics (from the periscope) from HMAS Ovens, Orion and Otama all getting with strike (torpedo) distance of USS America, Independence and the old IKE (USS Eisenhower) at RIMPAC. RAN subs have been doing that at RIMPAC for a good 35 years.

[Going Boeing]

Yeah Wessex, the Yanks have no idea how to detect and track a Diesel/Electric sub and the "O" boats were very effective during exercises. The Collins calss subs have (like the F-111s) matured into very effective military platforms & it would be great if the RAN could attract enough sailors to man all of them.

Wrt the ARH & MRH, the jury is still out as they have not had enough time in service to prove themselves. There have been some very interesting thoughts on this thread so the development of these choppers will be followed with interest.

[Hugh Gorgen]

A mate flying the Black Hawk suggested that the MRH90 has issues with landing in brownout conditions. The Black Hawk touches down tail first and can land in such circumstances (obviously very common in Aus).
Can anyone confirm this remark?

[slow n low]

Hugh, any helo can go tits up in a brown out if the correct technique (for that airframe) is not applied. What I think he means is the BH can handle a greater nose up pitch on touchdown by virtue of design. This can assist in landing in dusty conditions as you can 'pin' the tailwheel on and lower the mains on with a little fwd speed. I understand MRH has smaller clearances with haging bits and as such will need a different technique (flatter) with RVO landings. MRH would smack a tail on using BH attitudes I suspect. Some aircrew have reservations about how "enthusiastic" ones approaches can be into rough pads with the nose wheel config. After all one hopes to get into and out of said pad without faffing about. :bored:
I hope to confirm all this when I move to the dark side (airmobile) get my S-70 transition done :p. I am sure more experienced punters around can give you a more pucker answer.

[reallyoldfart]

It has been an interesting read, so far, but there is a lot of banter from persons with either no memory, short memory, or are too young to remember our previous dealings with the frogs. It has to be one of the former reasons, or else it is a smoke screen to cover the real facts.

I remember this being brought up at decision time in both the Tiger and MRH buys, only to hear the 'experts', and I use the term loosely, say "Oh, no, it is differnet this time".

BS!!!!! They screwed us before and will continue to do so whilst we have ill-informed, greenhorned, and know it all people in Defence and DMO dealing with seasoned experts in selling defence equipment.

Example: Will the ARH be able to hover in Darwin on a 30 deg at MAUW without the "generous" offer by the frogs to re-engine it for many millions of tax-payer funded dollars???? Why are we talking re-engining before the aircraft is operational??? - see prev para.

Why, after the first airframe was delivered more than 4 years ago, do we not have a real operational capability with this aircraft. I think we have been screwed again!!

[crank1000]

I don't know about anyone else on this forum but I did 5 years on Collins boats and we didn't even get to Rimpac as we couldn't make it more than a week out and we would have to come back because of
1. Running out of servicable diesel engines
2. Couldn't make any fresh water
3. Combat system would continuously crash
4. Radio's broke
5. Freezer's broke
6. Periscope's broke
7. Torpedo handling system broke

and about 20 other reasons. Anyone on this website who says that they are now a capable and cost effective submarine, I would like to hear from you. When asking my mates who still serve on these vessel's, I'm told it's not that much different today.

PS I also enjoyed hearing a story from my mate on boat 4 who explained to me how a flexible salt water cooling pipe came off and the boat took 5 ton of water in 15 seconds and nearly didn't surface again.

[Lefthanded_Rock_Thrower]

Through friends that were bugmariners (O boats) that went to Collins Class, they tell the same stories as Crank1000.

Unfortunate really.

5 Tonne, in 15 sec, wow that was close.

The Collins is no where near the worst procurement to date. There was a very comical movie on an American Tank, ?The Bradley Tank?, I feel truth is stranger than fiction.

[Trojan1981]

Geez....Does anything work?:}

[Hempy]

Caribou still works..

[Trojan1981]

Caribou still works..
Periodicly:}, but at least it has an excuse!

[Willoz269]

Reading all this dribble, some people would like our RAAF to still fly the tried and tested Sopwith Camel and our cavalry to go back to horses!

This same arguments come up year after year...when the Blackhawks were procured, a whole host of UH1 pilots came out with the same dribble, too much expensive technology, will not work in the heat, too expensive, untested technology, why dont we just keep re-engining the Iroquois.. blah blah blah....when the Hornets were chosen, same thing, too expensive, too much technology, will never do what it says it would do, slower than the mirage, why didnt we get second hand F-5s and upgrade them for a fraction of the cost, blah blah blah...it really will never end.

When the Seasprite was purchased....why did we buy old helos when there are new models out there.....when we buy off the shelf ones.....why did we buy new technology when we could have upgraded an older one and keep it going for a little bit longer...

The thing is, technology and times go past whether we llike it or not. A commercial, political and field decision has to be made on procurement and some you get right and some you don't. The trick is recognise the ones that wont work and back out (Seasprite) in good time, and recognise the ones with potential despite the detractors and stick with it (F-111 and Blackhawks).

[DBTW]

Good on you, Willoz269! What you say is the truth!

[Gnadenburg]

I think the argument is whether, as a small nation with a limited defence budget, you should be looking at technology being ironed out by other countries ie: obviously the US services.

Buying in production, in service and probably combat proven equipment seems logical. Especially if it's American as they are the folks we seem to always be going to war with.

Super Hornet and the C17 would be good examples.

Quote:Seems ludicrous that the RAAF doesn't have the ability to deploy fast jets in a close air support role ( Afgan' )...
Well, we do, but only if we can find a tanker to get us there! Don't even ask me why the Pigs are going to Red Flag next month and not us...

Ceremonial swan song for the F111's? And the political rumors were the RAAF's ability to deploy to Afganistan wasn't always the case.

[Roger Greendeck]

Willoz269 you hit the nail on the head. The other common thing I see in these discussions is people comparing the selected system against their own personal wants not against what the system was purchased for. Trade offs need to be made in any selection and the only way this can be done is by having well established requirements. Sadly even when these are available many don't read them. When the selected system then doesn't meet their own personal requirements they then assume incompetance, political interference etc as the reason behind the choice.

In this case both Blackhawk and MRH 90 have strengths and weaknesses. Which ones are important depend on what the Govt want done with it.

[Like This - Do That]

.... and our cavalry to go back to horses

Not too far from what has happened.

Oh! Is that my coat .... ?

[Lefthanded_Rock_Thrower]

Willoz,

No arguement, some resist change for the sake of resisting change.

What I find concerning is change for the sake of change, this is tax payers money, ours, and often decisions are made regarding procurements that are purchased from the shiney brochure without talking to those that are in the know.

For example, a Minister makes a decision, is this Minister more in the know than the CDF, is the CDF more in the know that the CO of the present Squadron ?.

Change is a hard thing to manage, risk is more controllable, buying a product off a drawing board IMHO is very very risky.

[airtags]

just yet again proves that the biggest column in the risk matrix has to be pollie intervention and the unwillingness of the Dept Heads to tell their masters that they are wrong.

'Yes Minister' in reverse......

[wessex19]

The thing is that our budget isn't that small. Apparently the ADF has the 12th largest defence budget in the world, I can apreciate that the wages of our personel are considerably higher (as well as all the other deserved expenses that the men and woman should get) but for the 12th largest budget in the world, shouldn't we be getting a little more bang for our bucks!!

List of countries by military expenditures - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures)

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/c/cf/Military_expenditure_by_country_map2.PNG/800px-

[Willoz269]

I agree Wessex, which is why I understand "most" of the decisions taken.

We tend to go out and spend the money NOW on stuff that will be effective in the battlefield and support mechanisms of today and tomorrow.

Hence the F-111 was chosen, large scale high level bombing was the norm for the Brits and French, but we saw it differently. We were right.

The Fa-18 was chosen because it is a multirole fighter, no need to purchase dedicated fighters and dedicated attack aircraft, hence we did not choose the F-15, F-14 or any other. The Blackhawk was chosen because it was a new and expandable platform, we could have bought more Chinooks or more Sea Kings or more UH1s but again we were vindicated, it is an extraordinary front line transport chopper.

Lessons in support operations are being learnt, our ADF is required in Afganistan, Iraq and throughout Asia in a multirole requirement. So we buy the best multirole platform there is in the market at the moment, upgradeable, improveable, etc. it does not do ONE role exceptionally well, but it is able to do a LOT of roles in an acceptable manner, and we can modify it in the future.

Risk management is done at a level different to the people in the coal face, and this needs to be so. It does not mean that their opinion is not regarded, it simply means that there are far more angles to look at. If you ask chopper pilots, they would like the Apache, and a Blackhawk...we don't need something that big that needs so much on field support when we tend to stretch our support mechanisms through Asia, so we go for something smaller, less capable, but supportable. If you ask the Fighter Pilots they would like the latest and greatest, an F-22 or similar, and maybe even a B-2! why would we do that? we could only afford a small fleet of aircraft so we have to make sure they are effective in the battlefield for the next 20 years (the battlefield of tomorrow will always change tomorrow!) and they can do a wide variety of roles.

The funny thing is, the one aspect of Risk Management that is always forgotten is Change Management!!!

[slow n low]

Willoz, all good points but we need to pay a little more attention to CAPABILILITY. Agreed that the decision makers have a mountain of priorities but the thing that seems to be slipping out of focus is the end state. Can this machine do what it is desigend for and fit into our doctrine as advertised in a timely manner?

We tend to go out and spend the money NOW on stuff that will be effective in the battlefield and support mechanisms of today and tomorrow.

Sure thats sensible, but are we focussed too much on tomorrow at the detriment of today? The most disapointing thing is the contractors who make a mountain of money out of defence and provide a whole bunch of promises, thats it. At the end of the day they drive home and defence is left without its tools of the trade.

Lessons in support operations are being learnt, our ADF is required in Afganistan, Iraq and throughout Asia in a multirole requirement. So we buy the best multirole platform there is in the market at the moment, upgradeable, improveable, etc. it does not do ONE role exceptionally well, but it is able to do a LOT of roles in an acceptable manner, and we can modify it in the future.

Yep fair enough, but it still needs to work before its outdated by the next latest and greatest.

If you ask chopper pilots, they would like the Apache, and a Blackhawk...we don't need something that big that needs so much on field support when we tend to stretch our support mechanisms through Asia, so we go for something smaller, less capable, but supportable.

Yep we all have our own idea's and preference. Smaller, less capable and supportable is smart thinking, get something that is proven and we can handle with our flimsy logistical system, (and heavy reliance on contractors) I don't think the French are going to bend over backwars to rush parts to us when we are stuck in the sand pit with a blown fritz. They will take their sweet time and sting us mega $$ for the pleasure. Personally I would rather not be stuck on the ground while our troops are getting smashed begging for AAVN support. :ugh:

Rant over... time for a cup of tea or something..;)

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Freewheel]

Can anybody tell me where I can buy a civilian NH90?

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Freewheel]

No you can't.

It's not civilian type certified anywhere, so paint it pink and you still can't use it.

Tell us all, how is it merely built to civilian standards and how does it become inadequate in military use?


So far, 14 countries have been hoodwinked into going into combat with a supposedly inadequate aircraft. I'm interested in what your bagging of it is based on.

[JaseAVV]

I'm no fan of the new helo (it looks cool though) but I was just wondering if Blackhawks in general have a background of making it home or landing safely with damage that the MRH couldn't sustain?

Haven't seen any pics like I have of things like the A-10 getting home full of holes and with broken wing spars.

If anyones got any links to photos of shot up Blackhawks I'd really like to see them.

[Going Boeing]

Afghan, I've been told that the Blackhawk requires a larger cleared LZ than the MRH90 - can you confirm?

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Trojan1981]

besides, you are clearly not my target audience). Clearly you know more than AAAvn and all the Army pilots who work on this project.
Careful mate, there are plenty of current and ex defence aviation pers on this forum. You are just not getting the response you wanted.

Unless you are involved in the project, how would you know how the figures are shaping up? I imagine the personel involved would be keeping the numbers pretty quiet until they are ready to deliver the product.

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Freewheel]

I don't claim to know more than the collective AAAvn & anybody else, otherwise I would have had a set of points to put rather than questions.

The NH90 is in a similar payload/range category to the EC225/S92. The Puma is currently selling well and without it slumping I can't see EADS certifying it themselves. If they wanted to sell it, they'd certify it.

You're absolutely right about the cost of operation being a big factor, witness the failure of the civil EH101. The Chinook is used by a heavy lifting company, Colombia. It used to be used on the oil fields of the north sea, but it's size was difficult to accomodate on the rigs and it became unfashionable after an accident.


On your points;

1. payload and range,:

Can't think of a reason where more of both of these isn't better, however the mix does need to be flexible enough to meet unknown requirements.

2. proven simplicity and reliability (just the basics as you need the smallest logistical backup possible. Helo's are complicated enough and by design are a logisticians nightmare). Must have a rugged build and be able to withstand climatic extremes (hot, cold, dust, sand, humidity, tropical rainfall,salt etc) :

Comparing a concept without any operational history against one with 30+ years of operations is an apples/oranges exercise. There is certainly more potential for reliability to be an issue in a concept much closer to it's start date than the Blackhawk was when it was purchased in the 80's, time will tell. As you point out, Helos are complicated enough beasts for new problems to be found in airframes approaching 50 years in service.

3. Ability to rapid egress and emplane troops (via rope or direct).:

You've mentioned that both airframes can do both.

4. Survivability. Airframe must have key components protected including crew and pax (from small arms fire). Key system redundancy where ever possible. Threat (missile/radar) early warning and evasion/protection equipment.:

You've doubted the NH-90's survivability, without any specifics. I understand that the blades are designed to be "ballistically tolerant", as with most military blades nowadays, but what weaknesses does the NH-90 have? We all know the Blackhawk can receive a large amount of damage and remain intact, along with several demonstrations of it's ability to withstand very high accident forces, but without an NH-90 with a full load of troops getting pranged, what concerns do you have? I understand that the NH-90 has crashworth seating for all persons. Is this a retrograde step? FBW provides more options for redundancy than hydro-mechanical controls, but the weakness is still a single disk/swashplate/link set.

5. Self protection for landing at unsecured LZ's whilst carrying out function 3. Normally GPMG's or mini guns from both side gunners stations provides this.

You've made your point about the NH-90 repeatedly. Are you suggesting that the NH90 is completely defenceless because it's gun is mounted in the doors or that the field of fire is restricted? I'm having trouble picturing this one.

6. Ability to operate by day/night, preferably in poor weather (but need to balance this with requirement 2. Probably Req 2 more important as broken helo's are of no use to anyone).

Broadly speaking, modern avionics are a) more reliable and b) more modular, ie easily replaceable, than older avionics. I can't comment specifically on the NH-90, but that's been my experience.

7. Good cargo hook load capacity.

Agreed, we'll see how it goes. I suspect it'll groan and complain like everything else, but the RPM won't droop if you need to move in a hurry.

8. Large and proven spare parts supply chain (read previous comment about logistics). This is crucial.


See my response to point 2.

[Lodown]

With respect to buying proven technology and equipment. The ADF is not buying a platform for today, but instead trying to determine what is going to be important in 10 or 15 years. Something proven now will be on its last legs strategically in 10 or 15 years. Products and strategies will have advanced to reduce the effectiveness of equipment that is proven now.

[Willoz269]

AFGAN,


I doubt this NH90 is carrying flower pods on their doors!

YouTube - M134D Gatling Gun on Italian NH90 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOUcDNhgGkc)

Does this satisfy your concerns for self protection??? Maybe your sources have not seen this?

Or the "normal" gun configuration for troop carrying

http://www.guncopter.com/images/nh-90-cabin.jpg

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Willoz269]

That's what I am trying to show you Afghan, in the UH60 you have 2 extra wide doors which srhink to half the size when you put a door gunner that the troops have to scurry past when deplaning.

The NH90 has 2 rear windows for side gun mountings and still leaves 2 doors and a rear ramp with no obstacles to deplane. I will have this any day!

I have seen the bird up close and know a fair bit about it, and am keeping an open mind until I see the final production series, but the gun support is not an issue in my view!

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Freewheel]

Afgan,

Governments of various kinds have ignored numerous recommendations from the ADF over time;

The adoption of the Steyr rifle
The associated adoption of the 5.56 for broad use rather than specialist use
The F18 (I believe the RAAF wanted F15A with the then projected E for an F111 replacement some time later)
Not buying a carrier
Building Collins

There have duly been some problems with each of these items and considerable opposition to their adoption. By and large, with the notable exception of not buying a carrier of some form (a pair of LHA's would have been more sensible, but even more expensive), all have been justified with time (and it has to be said, more money than they should have been).

It was also a requirement of the ADF that brought us Seasprite.....(don't mention the war!)


I take your point about the door size and a kinked egress path, but while the NH90 may lose on the swings and gain on the roundabouts compared to Blackhawk, anybody who currently operates from Sea Kings will be very glad they don't have to all go through a single door, with no gun at all.......

[Hempy]

That's what I am trying to show you Afghan, in the UH60 you have 2 extra wide doors which srhink to half the size when you put a door gunner that the troops have to scurry past when deplaning.

http://www.guncopter.com/images/gallery/uh-60-m60.jpg

[Gnadenburg]

With respect to buying proven technology and equipment. The ADF is not buying a platform for today, but instead trying to determine what is going to be important in 10 or 15 years. Something proven now will be on its last legs strategically in 10 or 15 years. Products and strategies will have advanced to reduce the effectiveness of equipment that is proven now.

I think the taxpayer has been too often bitten. In the above approach, the cost is prohibitive in hindsight when compared to proven solutions.

Wessex provided a comparative listing of total defence expenditure by differing countries. There are many nations spending less than Australia, with on-paper credible looking defence forces- how Israel spends less than us beats me though.

But look at the old chestnut Singapore versus Oz. The ruthless Chinese negotiation and procurement techniques. Their budget is 28% the size of ours.

Here's their air force-

RSAF Assets
Type Country of Origin Role Quantity Program
Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft 143

Boeing F-15SG Strike Eagle United States Air superiority/Strike 24 (o/o) Peace Carvin V

Lockheed Martin F-16C Block 52 Fighting Falcon United States Interceptor 8 Peace Carvin II

Lockheed Martin F-16C Block 52 Fighting Falcon United States Interceptor 4 Lease and Buy

Lockheed Martin F-16C Block 52 Fighting Falcon United States Interceptor 10 Peace Carvin III

Lockheed Martin F-16D Block 52 Fighting Falcon United States Strike 10 Peace Carvin II

Lockheed Martin F-16D Block 52 Fighting Falcon United States Strike 8 Lease and Buy

Lockheed Martin F-16D Block 52 Fighting Falcon United States Strike 2 Peace Carvin III

Lockheed Martin F-16D Block 52+ Fighting Falcon United States Strike 20 Peace Carvin IV

Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Block 52 Fighting Falcon United States Interceptor/Strike 12 Lease(US based)

Northrop F-5S Tiger II United States Interceptor 36
?
Northrop F-5T Tiger II United States Interceptor/Trainer 9 ?


Helicopters 78

Boeing CH-47SD Chinook United States Heavy Transport 18 Peace Prairie

Eurocopter AS-332M Super Puma France Medium transport/Search And Rescue 22 ?

Eurocopter AS-532UL Cougar France Medium Transport 12
?
Boeing AH-64D Apache Longbow United States Attack 20 Peace Vanguard

Sikorsky S-70B Seahawk United States ASW/ASuW 6 (o/o) ?

Transport Aircraft 14


Lockheed C-130 Hercules United States Heavy Transport 10 ?

Fokker 50UTL Netherlands Medium Transport/VIP 4 ?

Support Aircraft 17

Boeing KC-135R Stratotanker United States Aerial Refuelling/Transport 4 ?

Grumman E-2C Hawkeye United States AEW & C 4 ?

Fokker F50ME2 Netherlands Maritime Patrol 5
?
Gulfstream G550 with the EL/M-2075 Phalcon AESA AEW radar[28].

United States / Israel AEW & C 4 (o/o) ?

Trainer Aircraft 42
Pilatus PC-21 Switzerland Trainer 19 ?

ST Aerospace A-4SU/TA-4SU Super Skyhawk Singapore Advanced/Lead-in Jet Trainer[29] 18 ?

Eurocopter EC-120 Colibri France / Singapore / China Trainer 5 total 10 ordered

UAV ~40
IAI Searcher Mk 2 Israel Reconnaissance 40 ?

Elbit Hermes 450 UAV Israel Reconnaissance ? ?

Stored Aircraft 69

ST Aerospace A-4SU Super Skyhawk Singapore Fighter-bomber 30 ?
ST Aerospace TA-4SU Super Skyhawk Singapore Trainer 10 ?

Bell UH-1H United States Light Transport 19 ?

Eurocopter AS-550A2 Fennec France Trainer 3 ?

Eurocopter AS-550C2 Fennec France Scout 7 ?

Air Defense Artillery/Surface-to-Air Missiles/Radar

MIM-23B I-Hawk United States SAM ? ?

Mistral France SAM - MANPADS ? ?

Rapier Mk II United Kingdom SAM ? ?

9K38 Igla Russia SAM - MANPADS ? ?

M113A2 Ultra Mechanised Igla Singapore Mobile SAM (SHORAD) ? ?
RBS 70 Sweden SAM - MANPADS ? ?

Cadillac Gage V-200 RBS 70 Singapore Mobile SAM (SHORAD) ? ?

Oerlikon 35 mm twin cannon Switzerland AA Gun ? ?
Ericsson GIRAFFE Radar S

The F111 was used as an argument for technological patience versus pragmatic defence procurement.

An airplane, that by accident became a niche capability for the RAAF in the 70's and 80's. Yet prior to that it was 10 years late, required the RAAF to maintain an obsolete bomber force against a credible Indonesian threat; as well as deploying the same obsolete aircraft ( Canberra ) to Vietnam where one was lost to a SAM. Though it did fair well as a bomber in the relatively benign south of the country. Then, a desperate capability gap emerged ( ring a bell ) and the Phantom was leased where its multi-role capacity wasn't fully utilized.

If F111 could not be delivered, a re-structured RAAF was getting 48 F4's at the expense of a Mirage squadron. Coming with that 8 tankers. A Multi-role capability that would have skipped the generation of the low-level F111 niche. When this capability needed replacing in the early 90's say- there was a plethora of options available including the Strike Eagle.

A pragmatic approach would have had, in hindsight, a balanced set of capabilities without the capability gap technology seems to always present.

In the case of the army, proven American solutions and capabilities would provide just that. Proven, low-risk solutions that allow for an eventual comfortable transition to higher levels of technology....

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

If F111 could not be delivered, a re-structured RAAF was getting 48 F4's at the expense of a Mirage squadron. Coming with that 8 tankers. A Multi-role capability that would have skipped the generation of the low-level F111 niche. When this capability needed replacing in the early 90's say- there was a plethora of options available including the Strike Eagle.

A pragmatic approach would have had, in hindsight, a balanced set of capabilities without the capability gap technology seems to always present.

A purchase of 24-36 Strike Eagles in the early 90s to replace the Pig would have meant no AUP, and possibly no F/A-18 HUG either as the F-15Es could have been upgraded with APG-63(V)3 AESAs and other improvements, and possibly supplemented with additional new build F-15s (which were being marketed as at the time) from 2002. There were even some who were pushing, as far back as 1998, for a buy of F/A-18E/F Block Is instead of doing HUG...:uhoh:

If we had gone down this road, this would have put the F-15Es into the sweet spot for replacement from late next decade or into the early 2020s, with no chance of a capability gap opening up, and with the follow on F-15s or F/A-18E/Fs being rolled over in the late 2020s.:ok:

But then again, everyone can be a genius with 2020 hindsight! :8

[Bushranger 71]

Some clarification is offered re this thread from AFGAN and multiple responses thereto, but first some credentials. I flew mainly Dakotas, Sabres, Iroquois with the RAAF including Vietnam War stints in 1968, 1969, 1971 and was Project Officer for development and operational introduction of the unique Iroquois ‘Bushranger’ gunship. Post-Air Force, I was involved in airline flight training around the world for a decade.

A few facts to counter inaccurate folklore that has emerged over the past 40 years. During 5.5 years (2,000 days) of Vietnam War operations, No. 9 Squadron RAAF with about 170 personnel flew 58,768 hours which was the highest effort for any Australian Air Force unit in any campaign since inception of that armed force in 1921. Aircraft on-line availability averaged about 83 percent or 13 of 16 aircraft with all major servicing being conducted internally within the squadron. The unit was directly involved in hundreds of enemy engagement situations embracing numerous ammunition resupplies, 4,357 casevacs/medevacs and 900 days of gunship operations. Near 16 million rounds of 7.62mm ammunition and over 29,000 2.75inch rockets were expended. 7 aircraft were lost due to multiple causes and another 23 suffered mostly minor battle damage. 6 aircrew were killed and 8 wounded.

Basing of 9SQN at Vung Tau where substantial aircraft engineering and supply facilities existed has often been criticized; but the proceedings of the Chief of Army History Conference 2002 belatedly admitted that the decision to base 1ATF at Nui Dat instead of Vung Tau (just 25 kilometres south-west) was a major planning error.

Lets talk aircraft utilization, characteristics and approximate costings hoping that a lengthy discourse will be palatable for forum administrators and contributors.

On an average day of operations with 2 battalions and supporting arms deployed within the Phuoc Tuy Province Vietnam area of operations, a single Iroquois could handle most of the routine logistic support for Army elements in about 6 to 8 hours of flying. Payloads for routine unit ‘hash and trash’ were usually pretty small embracing maybe water, clothing, ammunition, radio batteries, hot meals, etcetera and a Kiowa would have been adequate for some of this work. Large quantities of externally loaded stores such as artillery ammunition, bladders of diesel fuel, barbed wire, star pickets, galvanized iron, etcetera were usually delivered by US Army Chinook. In practice, multiple 9SQN Iroquois were deployed to Nui Dat daily (just 10 minutes flight time from Vung Tau) to cope with trooplifting, special operations, casevac, logistic support and gunship roles with 13 or more on-line aircraft often being involved.

Neither the Boeing or Sikorsky UTTAS designs adequately replaced the Iroquois in my view which has superior all round crew visibility, better cabin design features and gun station positioning enabling wide fields of fire behind and beneath the aircraft in particular. This is a major advantage in combat as utility helos have to be intimately involved in close quarters fighting to effectively perform ammunition resupply and casevac roles especially. Operated sensibly, the Huey has proven to be very battle damage resistant with quite modest operating costs whereas the more technologically complex Blackhawk is a much heavier aircraft with stronger rotor downwash and is comparatively very costly to operate.

Methinks the Hotel model Iroquois when first acquired by 9SQN in Vietnam in 1968 cost about $250K per aircraft (cannot recall whether AUD or USD). The now retired Project Officer for the Blackhawk believes unit cost of that aircraft was about AUD8million when first ordered by the RAAF in 1985 with the project cost per aircraft near doubling largely due to comprehensive spares support inclusion which was based on longstanding Air Force provisioning practices. Post-Army takeover of the Blackhawk in 1989, support budgeting for the project was substantially reduced leading to virtual grounding of the fleet in 1992. Army Aviation often operated the Blackhawk at low level with drop tanks fitted against Air Force engineering advice that this practice would quickly degrade the airframe and supportability problems for the Blackhawk have since been exacerbated by over-utilizing the aircraft for functions that would have been much more cost-effectively performed by Iroquois, a la the RNZAF in East Timor.

The Iroquois gunship role was prematurely curtailed mid-2004 and the ADF has now been sans any helo fire support capability for near 5 years. Project Air 87 was driven by Army acquiring the unproven Tiger attack helicopter supposedly to replace the reconnaissance capability of the Kiowa and the gunship role of the RAAF-designed ‘Bushranger’ version of the Iroquois. The reality is it can do neither satisfactorily due to:

a. comparatively very poor visibility from an enclosed tandem seat cockpit limiting visual scanning and the ability to see and hear ground-fire,
b. reliance on a single turreted cannon which can only deliver HE fire support with reasonable safety about 35 metres from friendly forces in very close quarters combat situations such as casualty evacuation and ammunition resupply,
c. the single high recoil cannon has no gun weapon redundancy, will inevitably degrade the airframe and has a quite restrictive cooling cycle limiting repetitive firing (the Germans were smarter and are fitting a better Mauser low recoil weapon); and
d. the Tiger has been accepted into service despite not meeting performance specifications and apparently without prior rigorous trialling in northern tropic environs.

Most tandem seat so-called attack helicopters were designed principally for delivery of highly expensive stand-off weaponry. They are generally not well-suited to the intimate close support role of the gunship wherein multiple gun weaponry is essential for reliable accurate delivery of high volume ball ammunition fire as close as 10 metres from friendly forces. Apache, Tiger, Hueycobra, etcetera are all comparatively technologically more complex and thus not cost-effectively supportable for remote area operations in our neighbouring harsh tropical environs whereas the simplicity and reliability of Iroquois versions has been well proven regionally over 40 plus years. The single engine Huey II is able to hover at maximum operating weight in ground effect at about 10,000 feet at ISA plus 20. Bell Helicopter - The Bell UH-1H (Huey II) (http://www.bellhelicopter.com/en/aircraft/military/bellHueyII.cfm)

70mm rockets are a poor close air support weapon requiring large safety distances and were only fitted to the Iroquois ‘Bushranger’ because they were a component of the XM-21 system then acquirable from US sources – they are also a logistic headache. More accurate low recoil NC621 fixed forward firing 20mm cannon pods specifically designed for helos and each carrying up to 250 rounds of HE could be easily fitted to a Huey II ‘Bushranger’ in lieu of rocket launchers creating a pretty formidable and versatile weapon system (like the Beaufighter) with twin cannon, twin minigun and four doorguns. This conceptual Huey II ‘Bushranger’ version could be refuelled and reamed within 15 minutes by ground and aircrew working together.

Project Air 9000 supposedly aims at rationalizing the proliferation of helicopter types operated by the ADF but this has proved a farce with 2 additional training types for Army and Navy being recently sanctioned that were not previously heralded. The Defence Material Organization refuses to provide the actual costs being incurred for various helicopter projects, but just crunching numbers bandied about on the web gives an estimated unit project cost for the MRH-90 somewhere near $54million per helicopter and the inadequate Tiger perhaps around $68 million or more! This is inexcusable reckless spending considering the cost of alternative proven types.

The failed Seasprite project forfeited around $1billion and the inferior Tiger perhaps beyond $1.5billion. Seemingly, the MRH-90 program may cost near $2.5billion. Costs for other helo training types unexpectedly introduced, a megabucks aviation industry subsidy for Australian Helicopters (now owned by multi-national EADS) and some arguably unnecessary mission flight simulators plus construction of new facilities might en toto reach $1billion. So; the overall cost of helo related projects for a decade or so of the defence program may approximate a staggering $6billion!

Except for some special operations capabilities, battlefield support helicopters generally perform pretty basic functions and versions of well-proven types such as the Chinook, Iroquois, Kiowa are being utilized in front-line operational service around the world to enable cost-effective military operations wherein some combat losses are always likely and need to be affordable. Some Australian Blackhawks could be upgraded to USAF special operations configurations to offset a non-existent ADF capability for long range covert special operations, submarine support and international search and rescue obligations although a complementary RAAF C130 special operations capability embracing flight refuelling would also be essential.

The hugely expensive Tiger and MRH-90 are both quite unsuited to performing basic battlefield support functions cost-effectively for which the single-engined Huey II would be ideal, also as a substitute for the Seahawk, Seasprite and in other fleet support roles. There are no significant performance benefits in the alternative twin-engined UH-1N which has increased technical complexity, is heavier and has higher operating costs. Numerous bolt-on weapons systems are available to adapt the Huey II for naval support roles (Iroquois versions are operated by multiple other navies) and it could also conceivably be easily fitted with a dunking sonar for ASW which is presently a serious shortcoming in ADF capability – the Seahawk has never been adequately operational in the ASW role.

Refurbished Hotel model Iroquois upgraded to Huey II status (and with multiple enhancement options) are available from Bell Helicopter converted from several hundred UH-1H in US stored reserves for around USD2million per aircraft. UNIFLIGHT Huey II Modernization (http://www.uniflight.com/huey.html) At Year 2007, over 5,000 Hotel model Hueys remained in service worldwide and long term supportability of the Huey II is envisaged due to common usage of Bell commercial aircraft components. Direct operating costs are reduced by over 30 percent and the USAF ordered 24 Huey II in 2005 with a glass cockpit option The ADF fleet of 25 Iroquois (or whatever are left) could thus be expanded to say 50 aircraft improved to Huey II status at an estimated very modest overall project cost below AUD300million - including all weaponry and support provisioning - approximating just 12 percent of the projected outlay for 46 x MRH-90.

There is much emotive comment in many forums about supposed vulnerability of aircraft in combat zones considering weaponry advancements, but this relates moreso to how they are operated than any significant presence of advanced counter-air weaponry - consider the flawed concept of helo combat assault that generated huge US Army aircraft helo losses and casualties during the Vietnam War compared with the very low figures for RAAF operations. Much war-fighting inevitably involves close quarters engagements with pretty basic weaponry and there will always be some risk of losses in combat if operational tasks are to be satisfactorily accomplished – this is just the reality for warrior aviator roles. I would be quite happy to go back to war in Iraq, Afghanistan or wherever in optimized Huey II versions which can perform very capably.

Changing tack; Network Centric Warfare (NCW) originated conceptually within the US Pentagon and embraces extensive transfer of data via multiple sensors and IT communication networks to create presumed advantages in military tactical information applications. This doctrine is termed Network Enabled Operations (NEO) in the ADF Force 2020 document which envisages a ‘seamless’ networked ADF that seems a very dubious operating concept. The US military of course has comprehensive satellite and other technological resources to facilitate this concept of operations whereas Australia is much more limited in this regard.

The Wedgetail project epitomizes much that is wrong with Australian defence capabilities planning and procurement; this being yet another unique hybrid platform (like Collins submarine and Seasprite) - inspired somewhat by the defence scientific community - with Australia becoming a launch customer for an ambitious concept that is being overtaken by counter-weapon and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology like Global Hawk. Hitherto, the Wedgetail has proven technologically unworkable and would best be cancelled in favour of progressing acquisition of the operationally proven Global Hawk for which versatile multi-function options are being developed.

The Air Force was deskilled through forced disbandment of its very capable Engineering Branch and the majority of aircraft maintenance is now outsourced to civilian contract generally resulting in lessened regular availability of expensive aircraft resources. Minimal procurements of particular aircraft types – 6 x Chinook, 4 x C-17, 5 x MRTT, 6 x Wedgetail – may yield only around half of those small fleets continuously available for operations thus not providing credible military capacities. About 12 x Chinook and 12 x C-17 (in addition to existing C-130s) are essential fleet complements to enable sufficient aircraft availability for rapid deployment of troops and light armour in Australia’s regional military environment where most airfields are pretty basic.

Considering the parlous state of the world economy (especially the US), there will doubtless be further optimizations of existing military hardware (like A-10, B-52, F-15, F-16, KC-135) to sustain adequate military capabilities so some of the highly expensive sophisticated projects of the worldwide defence industry and the unrealistic ambitions of many political and military leaders will have to be curtailed with significant rationalizations of force structures necessary. Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon rightly expresses concern that Australia’s defence planners are too obsessed with futuristic war-fighting notions rather than ensuring existing hardware is progressively optimized (where feasible) to provide adequate present day capabilities and our armed forces are structured to sustain operations within manning availability.

Both Howard and Rudd Governments have rashly committed to spending 3 percent of Australia’s GDP on defence whereas around 2 percent is what is really affordable and about the average worldwide. It will simply not be justifiable to spend an extra $10billion per annum on defence when crisis in health, aged care, etcetera are rapidly mounting.

The virtual last act of the Howard Government before Election 2007 was to approve acquisition of 46 x MRH-90 and 2 x LHD (in reality, a smallish aircraft carrier) and the dots are easily connected between former politicians and major ‘arms bazaar’ players. The military is actively involved in DMO driving dubious merit projects so the ADF is also culpable in irresponsible spending. Clearly, reckless defence spending has to cease but few are held accountable in Australia these days for controversial actions although there are some at the highest levels in Defence and the ADF who really should be fired. The whole shameful scenario is very deserving of a Royal Commission with unlimited terms of reference which of course would never happen as both of the major political parties have been complicit.

[emergov]

I am truly impressed by the ignorance shown by AFGAN on his many posts. His numerous assertions that the MRH 90 will NEVER be able to conduct door gunnery and trooping are false. His assertions that the NH 90 is a civilian helicopter are also false. His statements about ingress and egress are false.

As for his requirements, ably refuted by Freewheel, let me reprise with more specific information:

1. payload and range. MRH 90 has more of both.
2. proven simplicity and reliability... Must have a rugged build and be able to withstand climatic extremes (hot, cold, dust, sand, humidity, tropical rainfall,salt etc). The MRH 90 is made of Carbon Fibre Composites. It does not rust. It has better hot/high performance than Black Hawk. It is not proven. Huey, a truly reliable helo, is proven.
3. Ability to rapid egress and emplane troops (via rope or direct). There is a Ramp.
4. Survivability. Airframe must have key components protected including crew and pax...redundancy where ever possible. Threat (missile/radar) early warning ... equipment. The MRH 90 has an integrated EWSP system. It has better redundancy than Black Hawk. It has been bought with removeable cabin armour. All seats are crashworthy, fully stroking and certified.
5. Self protection for unsecured LZ's. Normally GPMG's or mini guns from both side gunners stations provides this. The MRH 90 is, by this definition, normal. It mounts 2 x GPMG offset in the doors, leaving the ramp clear, and room to egress through the doors. Not as big a door hole as a Black Hawk. But there is a ramp.
6. Ability to operate by day/night, preferably in poor weather. WX Radar, FLIR, HUD, 4-axis digital autopilot, Flat screen displays, 2 x GPS/Doppler/INS/ILS/etc.
7. Good cargo hook load capacity. Better than Black Hawk
8. Large and proven spare parts supply chain. Supplies and spares are a big issue, but improving. Black Hawk serviceability rates are nothing to brag about in Australian service.

MRH 90 is a new aircraft, and it has a long road - 25 years at least - in front of it. All the issues identified by AFGAN are known, and are being worked on. There are solutions available for all of his problems. It is still premature to declare the aircraft a lemon, and unfair in comparison with the development of almost any other brand-new acft type (except the Mustang).

If you define your requirement as "I want a Blackhawk or deriviative", then you will only be satisfied with a Blackhawk. Oh, I should mention, the assertion that Army did not want MRH 90 - False.

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Freewheel]

"it has had its problems, however, many are to do with the fact as I have already stated, that it is an orphan variant, not US Army spec and that the spare parts program has always been underfunded."

You've partly contradicted yourself there, but more significantly, see Bushranger 71's post.



"Remember this thing is just a truck. A pilot would list ILS, INS, HUD, FLIR 3 axis A/P as great stuff, a soldier would just say it's more stuff that will break down, that doesn't add much to the fight and needs to be supported by the log chain."


I suggest you look at the level of sophistication in your average truck. The army's next trucks will probably be more sophisticated than the helicopters you yearn for.

Nobody has stated that the Blackhawk is a bad thing (bushranger's comments notwithstanding) but as was stated as early as page 2 of this thread, change needs management.

As the battlefield evolves (the VC didn't have stingers, for example) there is a need for evolution. Modern kevlar helmets have replaced the steel bed pan models of the past, but aren't nearly as good for shaving in....

Electronics are as much a part of the modern battlefield as grit has always been. The infantry's night fighting equipment is a good example of where going away from the American Way (such as the employment of Iroquois) has brought a tangible advantage.


BTW - running down the ramp has the grunts in the firing position on the move AND they can now cover 3 sides including the rear. It also, by necessity, puts the tail rotor up clear of obstructions and people.

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Wiley]

I really hope we see some reasoned discussion, both for and against, on Bushranger71's post.

Great 'handle', BTW, BD, (I'm assuming from the first paragraph that it is BD), with all sorts of memories for ex RAAF helo drivers "of a certain age", and perhaps more importantly, nice to see it being used by someone you could say is more entitled than most to be using it.

[Dragon79]

I don't post much, becuase winning an argument on the internet.... well some of you might know that quote.

No matter what airframe is chosen a start would be providing support were we are committed (excluding ET and relief efforts) and to date with all the different helos we have, only the CH-47 has been sent OS into battle. With the $6billion that Bushranger71s figure we will be spending, as a tax payer, I certainly hope that we see a little more value for money. Of course this all may change if the BH is deployed.

Me gets the feeling I may have read a book that features Bushranger71's exploits ( a top read if I am correct, up there with Trackers), not even being a twinkle in my dads eye back then, much respect and thanks.

[MTOW]

I can't help but think that most land commanders would prefer to have some sort of helo support available to as many units as possible, even if it isn't 'cutting edge' high technology (which or 80 to 90% of such work is usually not necessary). The SuperHuey idea, if we bought the stock standard US model, would seem to provide to provide something like that, and most importantly, at an affordable price.

But why do I think that if they did follow Bushranger71's suggestion and bought lots of SuperHueys, true to form, they'd "tweak" it to the point with so many Australia-only highly complex mods it would end up another Seasprite, and probably almost as costly?

[Flyingblind]

Did read somethat the Canadians were unhappy with their Grippens in hot, high sandy places, not exactly sure how that machine relates to the Super Huey but would we not face the same H&H performance and internal space constraints.

Having tried to get out of the back end of a BH a few times in a bit of a hurry, and walking around the back end of a NH90 i know which one i'd prefer, especially when i stand 6,3' minus Kelvar,boots and associated gear.

BH is great, but its internal space is surprisingly cramped, NH90 with ramp looks like a great step up to the mighty Chook.

[Trojan1981]

Did read somethat the Canadians were unhappy with their Grippens in hot, high sandy places
Shouldn't have that problem in Canada. :ok:

Great post by bushranger.

[Freewheel]

Afgan,

Good to see you took the bait.


I can't bring myself to suggest Bushranger is wrong. The US experience in (for example) the horn of africa is that the application of substantial rifle calibre machine gun fire from a fixed installation is still an extremely effective method of containing non-formal units in most theatres.


Does, or perhaps will, the Tiger have this capability? Probably. I'm a fan of the Cobra (and Viper) for a variety of reasons, but ultimately that wasn't chosen.

[scran]

Afghan,

From a source with the US 4th Combat Avn Brigade (who are or about to or deploy to Iraq again)

"The latest Chinook model to enter service is the CH-47F, an advanced multi-mission helicopter featuring a Rockwell Collins Common Architecture System (CAAS) cockpit that brings crews better situational awareness. Incorporated is an advanced digital map display plus a new data transfer system and other improvements. Additionally, the BAE designed Digital Advanced Flight Control System (DAFCS) has bought better flight control capabilities that make the aircraft not only more efficient but easier and safer to handle under extreme conditions".

Also, the "new" UH-60L fields the heavy duty flight control system developed for the USN Sea Hawk.


Seems the US don't mind electronics for electronics sake. Seriously - in the modern battlefield, without some serious EWSP kit, survival times for helo's is limited. Granted the main threat in Afghanistan is RPG being fired at you(sometimes down onto you).

Also, I seem to remember that the first deployment of our Chooks was delayed while we fitted some "kit' to make our operations compatible with the US/Allied birds there.

I'd also argue about the recommendation to Government Afghan. All the paperwork I ever saw when I was in Defence indicated that the NH90 was the preferred option (granted UH-60L was suitable). "Army" as you stated would not have made (via the normal process) a recommendation to Government - the CABSUB would have been generated by Defence (not DMO - one of the areas that worked under Head of Capability Systems) rather than just Army.

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[scran]

Afghan -

Yes, I know about the "late" bid by Sikorsky. However, I would be very surprised that the recommendation changed. HOWEVER, as I left that part of Defence in early 04, I can't definatively say that the recommendation changed, but seeing that AIR 5046 Phase 2 (from memory) had by that stage recommended the first buy of up to 12 NH-90's, I find it hard to believe the change did occur. And I'm sure that the civilian who headed up the area that prepared the Cabsub's (Ralph) would NOT have allowed the change to occur!!! And given that AIR 9000 (at that stage) was aiming at reducing the number of types, accepting that NH-90 would be acquired for AIR 5046 Phase 2, it is highly unlikely that a mixed buy would have been considered. DCA at the DCC meeting that discussed the initial 12 purchase also spoke about likely fleet numbers if NH-90 was selected and how many would be required in the "follow-on" phase (and I was in the room during this discussion). And certainly, when the follow-on buy went to DCC (or DCSC as it had become then) in early 2006 - the recommendation was NH-90 - the major points for discussion (IIRC) being what blade folding capability if any on the follow on birds and total numbers (and how that number was arrived at).

I'd argue about the availability of the latest threat libraries from the US always being available. There is also the danger that the US library MAY NOT hold details of all the weapon systems that may be faced. No definative info here, but it is an issue. I'd not die in a ditch about this, but an issue nevertheless. As to the avionics etc on birds in the battlefield - I didn't get a good look at the avionics fit of the US birds I travelled on in Bahgdad early last year, but they did seem pretty well equipped.............

Oh - and to whoever asked about blade folding - the recommendation for the first 12 NH-90's DID include manual (as against auto) blade folding, as these birds were earmarked to be used off the LPA's. Auto-blade folding is not only expensive, but also adds weight.

Bell UH1-Y's were considered (Bell was the first place the assessment team visited) but could not meet the ARMY requirement to carry an entire infantry section in crash-proof seats in one airframe and had limited growth potential. In fact, I understand that BH struggles to meet the requirement (from memory - being able to lift a section in partrol order all in crash-proof seats), and that the NH-90 only just meets it - I'll stand corrected here - it's been 4 years since I was invovled.

A GCA? Mate - where have you been? Precision Approach Radar (PAR - the radar you require to do a GCA) was phased out of ADF Military service in the mid 90's.........................

[Konev]

just to throw something in the mix, i recall reading that when external munitions and/or droptanks are carried on the blackhawk, it restricts the door gunners ability to operate.

can anyone confirm this?

the NH90 however, has 'low mounted' munitions so the door gunners can still operate while the NH90 carries external munitions.

[Wiley]

Maybe the thread should be renamed “ADF buys another Lamborghini to do a Kingswood’s Job”.

It seems to me the really big problem with the NH90 and perhaps even moreso, the Tiger, is they their high unit cost means the ADF simply can't afford enough of them to provide support to all the units that need it.

[SawThe Light]

It seems that we BH and SK followers appear to be meeting some opposition with our dislike of the MRH/NH 90 and Tiger. I just can't understand why we can't keep the UH-1's and the Kiowas, they're within our budget too.

OK you dis-believers, you've asked for it! C'mon AFGAN, hit them right between the eyes! Post the list of MRH/NH 90 operators (Make sure that you include the operators of the civil NH 90's you mentioned too) complete with the comprehensive list of the faults/discrepancies/can't do's/ won't do's/too expensive/etc's that the operators have ammassed and are complaining about. Don't limit it to the ADF though, show them the real picture.

That ought to finally make the MRH/NH 90 followers see the truth. It might also make them see that we should never operate anything later than the 60's. (Come to think of it, the Bristols were a great bit of kit weren't they, and didn't cost that much.) Go to it AFGAN!

[Point0Five]

STL, love your work :ok:

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[emergov]

AFGAN, you know as well as anyone that the ADF rules for public comment will limit comment from current serving members. I am assuming you are a civilian with ties to a serving member? Fora like these which have a tendency to become fodder for lazy journalists, like just after Indy in 2004.

But, as someone who is close to the project, I will refute your claims that 'those at the coal face' have no faith in the machine, and that noone involved will defend the machine. I can only assume you have been talking to the few lower-level operators who would just rather we had a Black Hawk. MRH 90 has not flown as much as planned. The spares support has not been as good as expected. The type certification (none of which is being conducted by the ADF) has not gone as smoothly as we would have liked. The machine will have some limitations in service. These are all true statements.

Statements like 'this aircraft is a lemon' and 'this is a civilian helicopter' are neither true nor helpful. The reason the NH 90 is certified to a common, european civilian specification is because there are so many countries involved as partners in the project. They chose a civilian spec to allow the thing to be flown in the airspace where all military hardware spends 90% of its time. Do not confuse this with the design, crashworthiness or utility of the aircraft.

Some of the US MILSPEC stuff we put so much faith in is not all it's cracked up to be anyway. The AH1Z blades were 'certified' to take a 23mm strike based on computer modelling, and failed at 20mm. They were MILSPEC. The US military helmet protection standard has been revised many times, but is based on a 1/2 inch blade striking the helmet at a certain force. The European spec (used to certify the TOP OWL) uses a spike with a 0.5mm tip at the same force. Just because the NH 90 doesn't meet MILSPEC, doesn't mean it's inferior. In any case, there is nothing to hit your helmet on in the MRH 90 - not so the UH 60.

Look, if someone in Army did get a sudden visit from the good idea fairy after Sikorsky decided to actually compete for the contract, that's great. But A$2.5BN projects do not get turned around just because some brave staff officer shouts 'stop the presses!'. You are absolutely correct that there are political and national considerations involved in big ticket items like AIR 9000, and it has ever been so. There is a mandatory minimum level of Australian industry involvement in every major acquisition, for very solid national strategic reasons. Usually this means the up front cost and complexity of the project is increased. These are political decisions. Defence is a political business. Get used to it.

Crying about the shoulda/coulda is fabulous fun, and allows every retired pilot and engineer to sit back and mumble self righteously to themselves. But if we do have a Royal Commission into these projects, and they are scrapped, and we all cry 'too right' as we drink dollar pots down the RSL, then in 10 years we will be another Billion dollars in the hole, and we still will not have fielded a capability. With the GWOT on, there is not a whole load of spare capacity over at Sikorsky. And let's not kid ourselves about the similarities between our red-headed bastard UH60/S70s and the current versions.

We will have 46 MRH 90s for about 30 years. The Black Hawk has lasted us 20, and was around for 10 before that. The Huey was retired, about 10 years overdue, at 40. The ADF, for better or for worse, has a commitment to buy the best technology and most modern equipment available. The MRH 90 happens to be that aircraft in the utility world. Noone wants to be tooling around in a 60-year old design (Caribou pilots excepted).

There is no Irony in AIR 9000, it just hasn't really started yet. We will end up with Tiger, MRH 90, either NFH 90 or a newer Seahawk, Chinook and a training helicopter. This will take a few years, so just cool your jets a bit. It's certainly better than the 9 types we had a while back.

There. Someone who is close to the project who is prepared to stand up for both the Project, and the aircraft. The tactical mission is not the only consideration when buying military aircraft, just the main one. MRH 90 happens to do it better, with a bigger cabin than the Black Hawk variant Sikorsky was offering. In 10 years, when the next uber Hawk appears, this conversation will be just as unproductive, because we have already bought our utility helicopter.

[Winnie]

Norway ordered quite a few of those NH-90's as frigate helicopters, they were supposed to be operational by 2005, but the Lynx have now been upgraded to be operational until 2012...

In norway the other squadrons that operate helicopters (Sea King, 412 and Lynx) call the NH-90 "Jesus". Everybody knows about it, nobody's seen it...

[emergov]

The Naval Frigate Helicopter, NFH 90 has experienced some pretty big delays. All the more reason not to fit auto blade fold to our fleet.

The MRH 90, our version of the NH 90 is a troop transport helicopter. It shares all the piloting avionics, and the same fuselage, and drivetrain except for the Auto blade fold. The major hold ups with NFH 90 have been integration issues with the weapons systems and radar.

Our MRH 90 only has a weather radar, which works fine.

[Going Boeing]

emergov, I appreciate the balance that you have given to this discussion. I posed the question earlier in this thread that I understand that the MRH-90 requires a smaller cleared LZ than the Blackhawk (due to the BH's very long tailboom/rotor) - can you confirm? GB

[emergov]

The two aircraft have almost exactly the same footprint, despite the visual difference - MRH 90 looks a bit bigger.

They need the same size LZ.

[Homers_love_child]

NH90 length: 52'11" rotor dia: 53'6"
S70 length: 64'10" rotor dia: 53'8" (love wikipedia!)

Pad size is not only dependent on physical dimensions, but also down wash generated and aircraft performance.

Nice thread. Good to always air the laundry about 3 years after the decision has been made. I'm still pissed that they retired the .303 and used the SLR. If the .303 was OK for our boys in ww1 and ww2, I see no need for anything else.

[scran]

Afghan - I'm tired of the discussion as well. Again I'm skeptical about your source - now you are admitting it is all hearsay (basically).

I can't be bothered checking, but I think your "source" has a few other things wrong.

In 2001 when discussing a possible buy with Sikorsky the offer was for UH-60M - new build birds. UH-60L are (IIRC) rebuilt older birds (this was at the time the US had a "thing" about new buys - thats why the Huey "Yankee" is not a "new aircraft" - you have to have part of the roof of an old Huey to build one - and I didn't get that from a source - that is directly from the briefings/discussions at Bell in Sept 2001 - I was there.)

So - you come on here - throw words around about how bad the aircraft is when it hasn't reached IOC yet (confirm if required Ermergov), have a few of us punch holes in some of your discussion, and now throw a hump and don't want to play anymore?

Oh - and how would a UH-60L meet the requirement to operate off the LPA's - after all, there is NO UH-60 unit that I know of operating a bird with folding blades - you see, the folding blade rotor head is off a Sea Hawk - and in 2001 during discussions with Sikorsky the company indicated we (the ADF) could get UH-60M's with folding rotor blades, if we (ADF) paid for the certification of said configuration. Same problem with the UH-1Y. And 60L's being the same as Sea Hawk for corrosion? Only if you treat it with the same sealants and anti-corrosive treatments etc during the build, becasue basically the aircraft is still metal, where as a large part of the NH-90 is carbon fibre composite (that doesn't rust). I doubt if most or all of the US 60L's you lust after are so treated. Emergov will back that up I'm sure.

Oh, and around 2003 when AIR 9000 was on trtack the decision to buy NH-90 was in line with the aims of the project - if followed through the ADF would operate Tiger, NH-90, Chinook (army) and the Navy Seasprite and Sea Hawk (although there was some discussion about considering the Naval version of the NH-90 for the RAN is a complete changeover/dropping of ALL Sikorsky product, but I'm prety sure the NFH - Nato Frigate Helo is it's title I believe - was about half a metre too big for the ANZAC's hanger............)

Emergov - well said. I was once close to the project in the early stages, participating in the 2001 visit to Bell, Boeing, Sikorsky, Westland and Eurocopter (should be able to work out who I am from that) - and everything you have said here aligns pretty closely with what I recall/know.

[Trojan1981]

Oh - and to whoever asked about blade folding - the recommendation for the first 12 NH-90's DID include manual (as against auto) blade folding, as these birds were earmarked to be used off the LPA's. Auto-blade folding is not only expensive, but also adds weight.


Scran- That was me. I didn't realise they had manual blade fold. I believed they were auto fold or nothing - just what I had been told as I have nothing to do with the project.

Thankyou for the clarification.:ok:

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[emergov]

HLC - thanks. I should have opened a book or two.

Scran - you are right, IOC is the Navy' first embarked flight planned mid 2010. First Army capability milestone is a troop ready in Apr 2011.

AFGAN - the NFH has suffered delays, and I'm sure the guys in Marignane know much more about it than I do. Last time I visited, we only discussed the TTH variant.

The ADF is trying as hard as it can to not make the same mistakes. Yes the MRH 90 is specifically configured for Australian service, but in this instance we have deliberately not ordered bespoke Australian mods. Every one of the options we have specified for the MRH 90 is from an available list of certifiable configurations offered by NHI, and every one of them was specified by at least one other country at the beginning of the design life of the aircraft. This has been a deliberate approach to manage risk with the project.

We have not fitted Seahawk engines to the NH90, we haven't put a Super Puma stab on, or Home Brand avionics; we don't have to struggle through certification for an Aussie mongrel. We have bought an aircraft with options certified by the manufacturer, removing risk from our program.

If we did go with NFH 90 in the future, it would be a good decision - there is genuine commonality between the MRH and the NFH 90. Maybe the NFH will be 'proven' by the time the Seahawks are all tuckered out. After all, the first MRH 90 squadron capability will only be on line in 2012. "What? 2012? In my day we would have a squadron stood up by morning tea!" Well we've been pretty busy over the past few years, and will be for a few more. This is what we can do.

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[baffler15]

On a positive note, big decision is due to be made this week which as a byproduct could see some much needed funds injected into BH.

And what "big decision" might that be?

[emergov]

I am under no illusions that everything will just right itself. There is a great team of hard working engineers, aircrew and project managers going hammer and tongs to hold the manufacturer to account and deliver the best capability possible, as soon as possible. But there's the rub. How to balance the added delay that will come from a hard-line no-exceptions approach against having something to work with sooner?

Weather radar was added to the aircraft specifically for 171's mission; their requirements are one of the highest priorities for the Project. Black Hawk can not be retained indefinitely. It will not be one of our battlefield helicopters under AIR 9000.

If I am optimistic, it's because I have faith in the people who are working hard to see this project through. It is easy, and quite unfair to dismiss the work they are doing on this aircraft just because the timeframes and complexity are difficult to neatly encapsulate in an email on a public forum.

[emergov]

AFGAN, I just re-read your last post.

It's a shame Army lost someone as impassioned and switched on as you. I'm sure the project could use your previous experience. Why don't you offer up some time as a reservist and help out? Hell, you'd even get paid.

You might just be the one to bravely turn it all around.

131901. Give it a call.

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Modern Elmo]

... consider the flawed concept of helo combat assault ...


Please explain that opinion.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

And what "big decision" might that be?

Are they finally going to send some BHs to A'stan for CASEVAC work? :ok:

[Bushranger 71]

Hello again Men. The forum moderators graciously allowed my lengthy initial contribution this thread so herewith some more input that may benefit the debate.

Sorry AFGAN; I inadvertently only mentioned Chinook, Iroquois, Kiowa (missed Blackhawk) in this observation from my preceding bit:

'Except for some special operations capabilities, battlefield support helicopters generally perform pretty basic functions and versions of well-proven types such as the Chinook, Iroquois, Kiowa are being utilized in front-line operational service around the world to enable cost-effective military operations wherein some combat losses are always likely and need to be affordable.'

I perhaps did not make the point well enough that military hardware should be progressively optimized to ensure its continued adequacy for operations and to capitalize on the initial taxpayer investment so a bit more history in that regard.

Post-Vietnam, joint capabilities planning aimed to establish 1 x MLH and 3 x utility helo squadrons. Most in the RAAF preferred the versatile Sikorsky HH-53/CH-53 but Air Force chiefs sided with Army and ordered 12 x CH-47C Chinook. More Iroquois were progressively acquired to equip 3 utility squadrons. Army pushed hard for the Hueycobra to replace the ‘Bushranger’ gunship but Air Force preferred the more versatile version of the UH-1H which had performed very creditably in combat.

The Charlie model Chinook was a technical nightmare and sans engine rebuild and testing equipments so the RAAF ultimately considered that model not operationally viable. Army Aviation did not want the CH-47C post-1989 arguing that the external load capability of the Blackhawk would suffice. Shortly thereafter, Army had a change of heart and acquired 4 Charlie model Chinooks from the 11 ex-Air Force aircraft awaiting disposal (1 of the original 12 was lost in an accident). Those 4 were rebuilt to CH-47D and another 2 Delta models acquired making 6 en toto; but 12 optimized aircraft are really necessary to provide a credible military capacity for that capability.

Comparing aircraft capabilities is akin to considering horses for courses so contemplate this scenario which was pretty common during 9SQN RAAF Iroquois operations in the Vietnam conflict. An ammunition resupply for an infantry company engaged in a brawl in jungle up to 150 feet high. About 10 metres between the adversaries with friendlies being unable to move about due to the fierceness of the contest so need to drop ammunition virtually over their gun muzzles. Doorgun suppression essential almost vertically downwards while dropping ammo and the din of continuous gunfire on the ground very loud causing raised voices on intercom. ‘Thanks Albatross, right where we want it, can you take out casualties?’ ‘Sure’. More careful manoeuvring needed with doorgun suppression during extended winching.

Point of the anecdote? We had modified the standard UH-1H XM-23 sub-system doorgun mounts by straightening a bend in the pintle post and fitting a rotating 600 round 7.62mm ammunition bin to eliminate M60 doorgun stoppages due to ammunition chute flexing, both mods optimizing the field of fire to enable near vertically downwards and rearwards firing just clearing the stabilizer. The external doorgun stations of the Iroquois allow gunners to stand somewhat outside the cabin enhancing their field of view and arcs of firing. Compare this gun station design with the internally mounted situations of Chinook, Puma, MRH-90, Blackhawk or whatever. Some special operations versions of Blackhawk have alternative weaponry mounted elsewhere in an open cabin configuration to improve fields of view and firing.

A bit more re supposed helo vulnerability.

So-called ‘nap-of-the-earth’ helo ops derived from belief it is essential to operate down in the weeds to enhance survivability but this is not really valid in all warfare scenarios and was the cause of numerous incidents/accidents for Army Aviation post-1989. If you tied a helo to a pole and had it fly around at a constant height and airspeed, the weapon aiming picture to hit the aircraft would remain unchanged; but the sighting solution is never constant in reality so it is actually quite difficult to hit a moving aircraft with non-radar predicting gunfire as statistics for previous conflicts (properly analysed) reveal. Anti-aircraft missilery also has acquisition and tracking limitations albeit such weapons will doubtless become more sophisticated over time. Getting on the ground with the grunts in Vietnam proved just how difficult it is in jungle to determine from which direction a helo may be approaching and to acquire sufficient visual contact to engage.

Operating around 1,500 feet AGL to avoid 7.62mm or 3,500 feet plus for 12.7mm ground-fire risk of course increases potential exposure to guided anti-aircraft missilery where such a threat might exist. During Vietnam ops, it was safer in my view to mostly operate at low level which for me was about 50 to 100 feet above ground or treetops. Having sufficient height above obstacles to quickly diminish forward speed in the event of power loss is imperative for enhancing survival prospects in a helo prang; also being adequately above treetops to avoid protruding large dead trees that are often difficult to see in murky weather conditions. If ground tracking over open terrain is slightly varied, the risk of being hit by ground-fire is pretty low, even at 100 feet above ground level.

In the Vietnam scenario, navigation was by Mark 1 eyeball during daylight utilizing excellent pictomaps with prudent operators usually varying routing to track over vegetation as much as practicable. A different story at night where it was mainly dead reckoning over the inky blackness of jungle often with a complete absence of any recognizable fixed lighting features. Enhancement of the Iroquois or whatever type with a GPS-based nav system of course makes low level ops a whole lot easier.

A couple of lessons from war-fighting to illustrate these points.

One fine day, we made a gentle straight-in approach to the edge of a 100 metre wide clearing to insert a SAS patrol. When virtually stationary and just touching down, 4 of the opposition stood up from behind fallen timber in the middle of the clearing and began engaging us with automatic weapons. Swift reactions and good teamwork from our Crewman with his M60, our SAS friends on board and supporting US Army Charlie model gunships dealt with the threat within 3 or 4 seconds, but not before the enemy had collectively got away up to 100 rounds at a stationary Iroquois side-on and in clear view at less than 50 metres range. Not a single round hit the aircraft.

Another day, we were awaiting US Army Charlie model gunships for a SAS job but only one aircraft belatedly arrived. They had been transiting from their nearby base Blackhorse to Nui Dat at low level and overflew a large clearing on a steady heading. One gunship was able to be tracked from dead astern by opposition in the treeline who fired an RPG that by fluke impacted in the tailpipe of the Huey which crashed at forward speed killing all 4 crew including 2 RAN. The possibility of an aircraft being downed by unguided missilery is very remote although it happened in that instance - arguably because they flew a steady track over an open area - but they were extremely unlucky.

Some may ask why a gentle approach as mentioned for the first incident? All aircrew and troops on board should focus on the landing area surrounds as they approach to detect any signs of opposition activity. They cannot do this effectively if apprehensive about the manner in which the helo is being operated and are just hanging on with concern about their survival in the event of a prang. Better to just operate the aircraft sedately while giving any opposition present opportunity to engage before putting troops on the ground so a more controlled abort and/or a measured reaction can be effected, as happened in the outlined action. Both the Townsville and HMAS Kanimbla accidents painfully demonstrated the folly of abnormal aircraft operating practices and extreme manoeuvring during special operations activities.

Some other perspectives to be offered soon in Part 3.

[Wiley]

Nice to see you back joining the debate, BD.

If I can use a fixed wing analogy, the RAAF these days employs the Hawk as a 'lead in' fighter, i.e., aspiring F18 drivers do a tour learning the skills they will require on the F18 on a 'cheap and cheerful' aircraft with lesser capabilities than an F18 before they move on to the 'top shelf', or front line aircraft.

If the RAAF ever went to war in northern Australia, by necessity, I'd be guessing that the Hawk be be pressed into active service, quite obviously with limitations, like F18 support if enemy air was a factor. (I hear horrified cries of 'shades of the Wirraway' from some quarters.) It would probably prove to be quite an asset in that, if pressed, it could operate from forward bases with minimum support (or at least a lot less ground support than an F18) and offer some air support to land units that would otherwise receive none, as they were too far down the 'food chain' to warrant F18 support.

Can anyone see where I'm going with this analogy? At the cost of another type in service, surely there's an argument for a cheap, 'second line' helicopter - one we could afford to buy and operate in large numbers - like the Super Huey? Such an aircraft would be able to do probably 90% of the mundane tasks land units demand of helicopters and at a far cheaper price, allowing the F18-equivalent NH-90 to be used (when we eventually get them!!) for the relatively few tasks that demand the high tech kit.

It's been said by others in this thread that the Army considers the helo an airborne truck. From my time flying Army support, a very high percentage of such trips could be considered just that - mundane transport ops. Having only a very high tech (and very expensive, and very hard to maintain in the field) single type available to do all these 'bread and butter' ops is a bit like putting a flatbed ute tray on the squatter's Roller.

...and hoping the Roller continues to work.

[scran]

Wiley - good post. I tend to agree a little in that there is now no aircraft to be the "General's" fast transport (like Kiowa could be).

HOWEVER - balancing your point, having several squadrons of other Helo's means additional logistic support (spares etc), fuel etc on or around the battlefield. Also, you need to consider the FIC (Fundamental Inputs to Capability) issues associated with having all these extra aircraft - that is, the true cost in operating them (extra pilots, maintainers, facilities and the costs associated with all these extra things). In other words - great idea but VERY expensive. Note now that Army is having problems manning both Tiger and NH90 (despite having notice of the need for additional aircrew etc as far back as 2003).


Another example, previously in Pprune there was a lot of discussion about the F-18's and the fact that the ADF could only field 3 squadrons (54 aircraft) on line - and how could this be if we had 71 of the things. Well, the answer was that the RAAF was funded for that level of warfighting aircraft (three squadrons) and kept enough pilots opersational to meet that need. The RAAF had many more than 54 Hornet pilots - and if the Goverment wanted (we argued) - we could give you more - but that meant extra costs - such as flying hours for those extra guys to keep them current, costs associated with that (fuel etc) and of course the increased maintenance costs for the increased utilisation of the jets, therefore increasing fatigue accummulations etc etc etc.

It's very easy to say lets have 50 Hueys to run around the battlefield - making it happen considering the FULL cost of doing that is another matter.

Afghan - I bet the aircraft operating off the LPA's will also enjoy having WX Radar - you see, ADF trooplift operations are not just around the battlefield.............................


Trojan - not having a dig at you earlier - happy to answer your question.

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Trojan1981]

HOWEVER - balancing your point, having several squadrons of other Helo's means additional logistic support (spares etc), fuel etc on or around the battlefield. Also, you need to consider the FIC (Fundamental Inputs to Capability) issues associated with having all these extra aircraft - that is, the true cost in operating them (extra pilots, maintainers, facilities and the costs associated with all these extra things). In other words - great idea but VERY expensive

What if this was a reserve capabilty, providing a surge capacity when required but comparitively cheap to maintain in peacetime. Still a large demand on resouces in the field I know, but such a situation would rarely occur.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi MODERN ELMO; will get back soon with more stuff on trooplifting now that I have learned how to get some imagery up on the forum.

[scran]

Trojan - I'd argue about the "relatively" cheap comment - If we follow Afghan's point of the battlefield being a dangerous place requiring specialist skills - you just can't turn it on at a moments notice. :=

AFGHAN - I'm not going ot bother trying to explain it to you. No point really. You bang on about the battlefield requirement - well, if we were a large defence force and constantly getting into that kind of op - fine, but the ADF is not. The ADF can't afford to have very specialised aircraft in a number of roles - by that I mean 7 types that can only do 7 roles (AEW&C is probably one of the few). Even the new tankers are multi-role. You come across as the typical narrow minded individual who can't see the big picture. Prove me wrong and fess up to your qualifications here (PM if you need to) or give up. :ugh:

If you just want to do battlefield support in a Black Hawk - go join the US Army.....................................:ok:

NH90 was purchased as a multi-role aircraft - needing to be capable of doing several roles - NOT just carting troops around the battlefield. The last time the ADF did that was Vietnam - ask Bushranger about it.


Oh - and if you are wondering who put in the requirement for Weather Radar - it would have come from the guys in Capability Development, and at least one (if not two) of the guys who worked there when I was on FASCIR's staff were EX Black Hawk - and the definitive one I know who was there was an ex Black Hawk Captain. Also of interest, around the time of the overseas visit in 2001, the LTCOL who headed the team of Army guys in Capability Development had the initials AD - is he still Commander 16 BDE?

[AFGAN]

Deleted by Afgan

[scran]

No - not getting emotional.

You are the one who called the aircraft a lemon - and thats your opinion (to which you are entitled) so good luck to you.

The guys in CAPDEV were a Major and (from memory) Captain - IIRC the Major came to us direct from 5AVN.

No, I'll not ring 5AVN - not my place.


No idea who COMD 16 BDE is - am neither ex-army or particularly interested.

OPSEC - yeah - right. Am I the one who plastered the supposed shortcomings of the aircraft on here? :mad::mad:

And finally - not in Black hawk's they ain't - the Chinooks are doing that...............................:=


Goodbye

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[scran]

I know what BF means. Oh...and you want 60M's now? What happened to the L love affair.

No, not Army

over 30 years Air Force

4 years on FASCIR staff

Your experience? No, don't bother :oh:

First you talk down the aircraft, no you turn on your own (Army) because you with 20/20 hindsight are so much smarter and could do a better job (in YOUR opinion).

CA better watch his back - you are headed places!!!!!!


Bye


:rolleyes:

[emergov]

There are several things MRH 90 does better:

More range (650NM on internals)

18 seats

More cabin capacity

Faster

More fuel efficient

When more mature, it will be more reliable

At the beginning of its developmental and service life

Full-spectrum HUMS

Ramp

Crashworthiness

Climate controlled cabin

Ballistic Protection

EWSP

FLIR

Manual Blade Folding

New engines with FADEC - better responsiveness and Hot & High performance

Marinised

13 years of parts and spares support in the contract

Fully integrated Ground mission planning and management system

Rotor tip lights

Fully configurable MFDs for both pilots

Auto hover, auto approach, (auto land and take-off if you want)

There is no 'problem' with the ramp. You just have a weight limitation while it is in transit or fixed half-way up. It's not a Chinook.

There is a FRRD system purchased with the aircraft. Let's actually try using it before we say 'never'.

The aircraft is not a Black Hawk. We will have to do some things differently. But no matter which specific, yet-to-be-overcome issues you might focus on, the MRH 90 is in most areas a significant step up from our current aircraft, and is better than the alternative. In support of scran, the vast majority of an aircraft's service life is not spent being filled full of holes by bad guys, and I'm sure you are well aware that Hueys, Chinooks and Kiowas have soaked up many many more rounds than Black Hawks in Australian service. Making an argument based on the Black Hawk's assumed supreriority when there are RPGs flying around ignores the years of work that went into defining our requirements.

It would be nice to operate 9 aircraft types, but we can't afford it. It would be great to have a stack of Super/ Ultra / Huey II's in our back pocket, but we can't afford it. It would be lovely to keep Black Hawks, but we bought a better aircraft for our needs. It will be great.

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[emergov]

Dude, I can only tell you what I know so many times. Some of your information is not correct, or is viewed from the perspective that Black Hawk is the only answer

The Black Hawk can not carry same full mission equipment as MRH 90 and even if it did, would still be limited by seats. MRH 90 carries 50% more in combat order, and up to 18 pax with less kit.

It can be expected to be more reliable because it is a 4th gen rotorcraft. The reason our Black Hawks didn't fly and US Black Hawks do is the size of the maintenance budget. NB my point about 13 years of sustainment.

The ramp is only weight limited when moving or when half-way down. You can drive a light vehicle into the acft using the ramp on the ground. It's like saying the seatbelts are useless as tourniquets. Technically true, but it's not what the seatbelts are for.

Crashworthiness is far more complex than big tyres and big suspension. Flail space, stroking seats, emergency exits, cabin integrity all play a part. If it was all wheels and tyres, the Southern Cross would be the Paragon of crashworthiness.

Aircrew fatigue has always, and always will cause more crashes than enemy fire over the life of an acft - even in an operational theatre. That's why climate control is a good idea.

Who says the HMDs can't be used in a dusty environment? The HMD will get dusty, but that doesn't make it unuseable. In any case, FLIR can be displayed on any of the MFD. I have no idea why you would want to look at something 10M away with FLIR. If you are mixing it up with the IITs, then maybe you are confused about Hyperstereopsis. This is a known issue, no worse than the laundry list of visual illusions we learn about when using NVGs for the first time.

When you say 'on our own' in rference to maintenance and spares, do you mean like in Timor, Bougainville, Solomons, Aceh and every deployment we have made without US Army parts and maintenance support?

If you don't see any benefit in tip lights, MFD's and auto hover, you are either:
a. a day only pilot, and you should be quiet now, or
b. you can not see any other role for Army aircraft than land-based day Airmobile, and, well, you should be quiet now.

I am posting to refute your claims because they are one-sided and mainly incorrect. As I have said before, the aircraft will be part of a great capability in time, and no-one is denying there are issues to resolve. Nothing you have posted is news, except for the stuff you have assumed or misinterpreted.

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[scran]

Afghan:

My final offering.

NH-90 was NOT purchased as a Battlefield Support Helo - is was acquirred as a MULTI-ROLE Helicopter.


I remember having an argument with an Army type (who had only ever flown Kiowa) about the need for two doors when going into contested LZ's - another Army flyer nearby chirped up and stated that Air Assault is NOT an AAAVN role - airmobile is yes.

I'm starting to side with some of EmerGov's thoughts.

You stated in your post your loyalties: you mentioned your friends - well - your comments about supposed lack of understanding about requirements etc in the selection of the NH-90 is (in my opinion) a direct attack against some of my friends.

I would still doubt your version of the Cabinet consideration - Finance "rolling" Defence for a more expensive option - never happened in my 4 years!!!!!!!!! What's that quote from Topgun? "BULL****".

If you are a serving officer (and you indicate you are), in my opinion you are beneath contempt for these "attacks" on officers/staff who worked in the project (and I didn't work in the project office).:yuk:

That is my opinion - and as you have stated so well and so clearly - we are ALL entitled to our OWN opinions.

Goodbye

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Hempy]

AFGHAN,

While I have spent time in green it was not in AAVN, so I am looking at all of this from an almost layman point of view. The problem, as I see it, is this;

You will not convince people who work on the project, it's paying their bills. I appreciate your view 'from the coalface' and admire your passion. I can't speak knowledgeably about the merits of the BH v MRH so I won't even try, but if what you say about it's limitations are correct (and unlike other posters in this thread, I have no reason to believe they aren't) it would seem that the magical process that is Defence Procurement has fallen for the sales pitch once again. Of course an all expenses paid trip to France sounds very nice..

I take it all AAVN potential pilots will now do the full 2FTS course to gain the neccessary instrument training?

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[sagy34]

Been watching this thread for a while, and can't believe some of the dribble that is being posted.

Get over Vietnam, it was 40 years ago, things have changed.:ugh:

NH90 anyone tried to put troops into the seats:uhoh:

Run down a ramp straight at the tail rotor:D Don't start on how high it is, we all know about slopes etc:D

Door guns are useless if they can't be employed:ugh:

Great display helicopter, but replace a Black Hawk, me thinks not.

Right behind you Afghan, keep up the good work:E

[emergov]

Quick answers:

True,
Yes,
Turn left or right,
(sigh) They can be employed,
It will replace Black Hawk, that's life.

[scran]

Afghan,

Tell you what. PM me with your source about the Cabinet decision. If what he says is true, he can show me documented evidence of same. If not - it's a myth!!!! Stop trying to divert discussion by bringing up Collins. NH-90 vs UH-60L (or was it M - you changed tack half way thru) is the issue - prove what you and your source claim..........

If he can prove to me that it happened like he told you - I'll publish an unreserved apology to you here, under my real name (and it should be pretty easy for anyone to work out who I am given the details i have already put here).

No, I'll not ask the Brigadier, have YOUR source prove it to me.

Oh - and if he can't - YOU publish the apology here, under YOUR real name (proven of course by your source naming you and me verifying it by you providing your PM Keys number)..............:ok:

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[baffler15]

Deleted by AFGAN

Awwwwww, come on Ganny! Where's the fun in deleting all of your previous posts? You nervous or something?

[scran]

The Defence rests Your Honour

[Wiley]

Shame to see the debate descend into a personal slanging match with one party taking his bat and ball and walking off the field in a huff.

What most of the rest of us would like to be assured of is whether AAVN will be able to provide a credible ongoing helicopter presence in the field and in sufficient numbers should push ever come to shove on a large scale (or even a small scale!) one day in the foreseeable future.

What I've read here doesn't fill me with any confidence that it will be able to do so, even after the new, (in many people's opinion too) high-tech (for its role) system has "matured".

I can't help but think the end users of the AAVN product, the down and dirty green machine, just want a helicopter that works, and continues to work, (as well as being available to many if not most of the units that will be demainding it) in very the basic conditions they will encounter in the field.

How many people out there think the Tiger and the NH-90 are going to do this?

Even after they've "matured"?

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[scran]

Wiley - there will NEVER be enough Airlift (or more correctly, the ADF will never be able to afford enough to satisfy requirements). A few of us believe the answer to you first question is yes (given my caveat above that more would always be useful).

Afghan did have some valid points. I'm not a huge fan of Tiger, but then again, I was not involved in that selection and don't know the situation well enough to definatively comment - so never have. I was involved in the first buy of NH-90, and wrote the committee meeting comments for a senior defence member for the second/follow-on buy. I stand by and can prove my points - I'm still here, as is Ermagov. I have nothing to hide from my involvement.


Oh - and Army were intimately involved in the selection process for both Tiger and NH90 (including the numbers for NH-90. The first time is was mentioned in the Defence Capability Committee - the major committee headed by VCDF that considered these issues- the numbers were drawn from a paper/advice written by the then head of AAAvn...........)


I'm sorry I got personal. But if a good friend of yours was called incompetent by someone, how would you react?

Afghan - I'm sorry for the "beneath contempt" comment. It was uncalled for. Please accept my unreserved apologies.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Guys, the bottom line is that 6 CH47 and a couple of dozen ARH and MRH are not enough to support the groundpounders. If we think that the ADF can defend our nation against a serious aggressor, we are kidding ourselves. We couldn't even get a Sapper Regt and a couple of CH47 to help repair roads and deliver aid to entrapped flood victims in N.QLD.

IMHO, we should just focus on humanitarian, SAR and SO tasks.

HPT

[Like This - Do That]

... there will NEVER be enough Airlift ...

There will never be enough Airlift, agreed; there will never be enough artillery; there will never be enough supply of potable water; there will never be enough POL; there will never be enough RAEME; it's even unlikely there will ever be enough crunchies; there will never be enough fast air; and when push comes to shove there will never be enough GBAD. And the Good Lord knows, there will never be enough ARMOUR.

What most of the rest of us would like to be assured of is whether AAVN will be able to provide a credible ongoing helicopter presence in the field and in sufficient numbers should push ever come to shove on a large scale (or even a small scale!) one day in the foreseeable future.

I don't really have an immediate dog in the fight, but I can't help thinking that having a LOT of cheap, 'under-utilised-in-peacetime' aircraft is a good insurance policy. When an uncontested AME is required will the soldier DIE or will there be a cheap'n'cheerful way of getting him/her out of the oloo and into the care of the medicos? If the quick airborne delivery of several thousand rounds of ball and some bombs will save an FOB that night, is it worth having airframes sitting in a hangar most of the previous 5 years, just in case, or do we mourn the loss of forty or fifty digs?

The RW system isn't an end in and of itself; it's a means to an end.

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[scran]

Afghan - see my PM

You might not believe it - but my goal was EXACTLY the same as yours, and that is EXACTLY the same goal that anyone who works in Capability Development....................................

[Bushranger 71]

Many thanks to Wiley for his assistance while I was under probation on the forum (chuckle). Parts 3 & 4 were belatedly posted by a moderator on Pages 7 & 8 and thus had been somewhat bypassed by ongoing dialogue. I will now bring them forward to the latest page for ease of reference and delete the previous insertions.

[Bushranger 71]

Long time now since I was involved in projects. About 30 years back, there was a mindset in Canberra that supposedly obsolescent military equipments had to be sold to reduce the project cost of replacement gear. In reality, they were usually shed for peanuts or even given away for historical display or whatever. Seemingly, this same wasteful practice is continuing today albeit the taxpayer has substantial investment in military hardware that would be better stored for contingency purposes as has been happening in the US for decades. There are of course costs involved in storing anything but these could be minimized by more flexible use of retired fossils to run aircraft engines or whatever.

The following self-explanatory extracts are from a letter I wrote to MinDef Joel Fitzgibbon in 2008, but I never received any response from his Canberra or Hunter offices:

'Except for some special operations capabilities, battlefield support helicopters generally perform pretty basic functions and well proven types such as the Chinook, Blackhawk, Iroquois, Kiowa are being upgraded for front-line operational service around the world to enable cost-effective military operations wherein some combat losses are always likely and need to be affordable. For example, Hotel model Iroquois can be upgraded to Huey II status – including glass cockpit and avionics/datalink upgrade options – for around $2million per aircraft and additional Hueys are available from US stored reserves. The ADF fleet of Iroquois could thus be expanded to say 50 aircraft improved to Huey II status at an approximate modest cost of about $100million (plus support costs). This Iroquois version has very low operating costs and high supportability for the foreseeable future.

Over decades, Australia has very foolishly forfeited replaced military assets (particularly aircraft) that would have been more wisely stored as reserve equipments, a la in the US, for potential refurbishment/upgrading and reactivation. While there would be overhead costs involved for dry climate storage of aircraft at say Woomera, these would be trifling compared with the prospective benefits of retaining wholly-owned usable military hardware at least until technically unsupportable.

I respectfully urge you Minister to curtail disposal of the Iroquois fleet in particular and to have these aircraft placed in reserve storage pending an objective cost-benefit analysis of their potential for re-activation in an upgraded helicopter gunship role and as an alternative to the hugely expensive MRH-90 if it is possible to back out of that non-justifiable $2.5billion contract with acceptable penalties – conceivably, a saving of $2billion might be achievable. The hugely costly MRH-90 is simply quite unsuited to performing basic battlefield support functions cost-effectively for which the Huey II would be ideal, also as a substitute for the Seasprite and in other fleet support roles.'

The figures quoted for Huey II are a bit elastic due to exchange rate variations and scope of desired options. The estimated unit project cost (terminology?) for MRH-90 has not been publicly revealed by Defence or DMO to my knowledge but may be around AUD54million per aircraft. Perhaps a forum participant will bravely provide this data!

[Bushranger 71]

Sagy 34; your comment re the irrelevance of Vietnam war-fighting experience is concerning and perhaps central to much that is wrong with Australian military capabilities planning and procurement. The lessons of war are timeless and should always be heeded – much of what was (or should have been) learned during the Vietnam War is applicable in Iraq, Afghanistan or wherever. Our defence planners need to be thinking closer to home and operations in our regional tropical jungle archipelago environment are likely to be quite similar in many respects to the Vietnam scenario.

Former Prime Minister John Howard approved MRH-90 and LPD (smallish aircraft carrier) acquisitions as a final act before Election 2007 and the connections between a former Minister for Defence in his government (who latterly worked for Tenix) and these projects are obvious. If our defence planners had objectively analyzed the lessons of warfare from amphibious operations during WW2, the Falklands War, aircraft carrier operations by the US Navy and RAN (particularly regarding the resources, operating costs and escort penalties involved), the acquisition of 2 x LPD could not have been justified for the small ADF. More about that in another part when I address combat air assault/airmobile operations.

The MRH-90 and LPD decisions seemed to me irrational so I did some probing in the capabilities area of Defence. I managed to make contact with a civilian officer - he might be termed a ‘military theorist’- who has a university degree, perhaps done a course or 2 at military training institutions but has nil military background and particularly no war-fighting experience. Many involved in so-called ‘think tanks’ patronized by Defence, also the Air Combat Capability Review and White Paper formulation teams, have similar qualifications.

First up, I queried the suitability of Tiger for intimate close air support activities in regional jungle scenarios, also mentioning the strong criticism of the project by the Australian National Audit Office which he ignored. When I outlined what is often necessary in casevac and ammo resupply situations in very high wet and dense jungle, he was emphatic that such accurate close quarters fire support could be provided with stand-off missilery and cannon. I disagreed explaining why and he told me I did not know what I was talking about although I had made him aware of my background.

The conversation moved to the MRH-90 and I pointed out the relatively small payloads frequently carried by utility helos in routine battlefield support for which the Iroquois is very cost-effective. The goose agreed that the MRH-90 will be too expensive to use at the coal-face of combat then flippantly advised that Defence had in mind to buy yet another type to replace the Iroquois!

Australian military capacity has declined significantly from 1974 and so has ADF helo operational effectiveness since 1989. Significant overspending on aviation by Army over the past 2 decades has disadvantaged the other fighting arms of that force and expenditure on the Fleet Air Arm has also been misdirected (Seahawk has never been adequately operational in ASW for which acquired and Seasprite failed).

Emergov defends the supposed aim of Project Air 9000 to rationalize the ADF helo force but it has hitherto proved farcical with 2 additional types being recently introduced that were not in the program. The burning question is just who determined that optimized Chinook, Blackhawk, Iroquois (Huey II), Kiowa versions would not be adequate for Australia’s helicopter needs for the foreseeable future? It seems to me that those 4 types (suitably equipped) would be quite adequate and supportable for all ADF needs, including gunship, recce, training and fleet support roles, perhaps to 2030 and beyond. The Navy really does not need anything more than the Huey II suitably adapted for particular roles. My gut feeling is the senior echelons of Army Aviation and the Fleet Air Arm will eventually further diminish their air arm capabilities through profligate spending on high tech expensive gear not well suited for combat roles.

Much mention is made of ‘risk management’ in capabilities planning and procurement discussion but virtually nil reference is made to ‘cost-benefit analysis’ or operating the ADF ‘cost-effectively’. If rigorous cost-benefit analysis had been applied to the following projects when they were first mooted, most might never have emerged: Collins submarine, Seasprite, Abrams tanks, Wedgetail, F/A-18A refurbishment, Super Hornet, MRTT, Tiger, MRH-90, LPD (and perhaps others).

The Howard Government pledged to increase the defence vote to 3 percent of GDP over the next decade and this was echoed by the Rudd Government. In my view, this was a very foolish commitment which has only encouraged ill-conceived projects and reckless spending. Realistically, Australia can only afford about 2 percent of GDP spent on defence which is closer to the worldwide average and we could have a pretty capable ADF for that money if it was spent wisely.

It behoves the Service Chiefs to maintain their respective force operational capabilities and to operate cost-effectively; yet invaluable Kiowa, Iroquois and eventually Blackhawk capabilities are being prematurely forsaken and similarly the B707 tanker! If it is acceptable to military leaders to shed an operational capability for a few years pending introduction of a replacement, then is the replacement capability really justifiable? Operational commitments can emerge at very short notice so any existing capabilities should be continually optimized and maintained until envisaged replacement equipments are of adequate operational status before being introduced into service, temporarily putting the new stuff into storage if necessary so manning can be transferred when appropriate.

A reality check: Australia is entering a likely protracted economic decline with critical social needs fast escalating so unfettered defence spending cannot be condoned. Lots of expensive hardware is really useless if unable to be manned to operational levels and operated cost-effectively so it seems probable that all 3 Australian armed forces will be forced into rationalizing their capabilities. The mindset of our defence planners therefore needs to change pretty quickly.

A few more bits to follow soon (with imagery) relating to lessons of warfare which may be of interest to forum contributors.

[Andu]

I like the maths for the Super Huey, Bushranger 71, but after their recent experience with attempting to modernise another 40 year old airframe (Seasprite), I think you'd have a hard time selling the Super Huey to the pollies in Canberra - (and to Alan Jones!!).

I agree though that it would be the ideal airframe in many ways for a very large proportion of bread and butter Army support ops.

- and far more likely to be both available and still operational after two weeks in the field than the NH-90.

[Bushranger 71]

Hello Andu. The Seasprite in its original form as manufactured for the US Navy was a pretty good weapon system but quite expensive to operate so was therefore withdrawn from frontline service and operated by 2 Navy reserve squadrons.The original Seasprite version was also acquired by the Kiwis and operated satisfactorily.

Refurbishing most metal airframes is generally not a problem but a different story with more advanced aircraft that have composite material components - the life of the B-52 is being extended for a few more decades and many of the KC-135 (B707) tanker fleet have been given a significant upgrade and life extension. The re-engined C-47 Dakota is still flying around the world and simple airframes like Iroquois and Kiowa are routinely continually rebuilt and are virtually lifeless so long as adequate spares can be accessed or manufactured economically. The simplicity of the Huey II refurbishment/upgrade is explained on the Bell Helicopter and related websites and the USAF ordered 24 of them in 2005 with a glass cockpit option.

The problem Australia created for itself with the Seasprite was totally gutting the cockpit and avionics believing Australian defence science and industry had the capacity to develop a completely original flight management and weapons control system which was unique in the world - a similar story with the Collins submarine for which the entire dysfunctional weapons control system had to be recently replaced at huge cost. It took both Boeing and Airbus about 10 years to get the bugs out of computerized glass cockpit flight management systems even with the huge resources available to those companies. The problems with the Seasprite project were abundantly clear when I was invited to visit the complex at Nowra in the 1990s by a retired Navy friend who was involved in the project team but he resigned soon after due to cover-up issues.

Perhaps easier for Defence to kill the idea of refurbishing airframes by propagating spin re the Seasprite to cover up their own incompetence in attempting to build a unique flight control and weapons management system. Had Bell Helicopter been smart enough to offer good deals on the Huey II when replacement of the Iroquois and Blackhawk was being contemplated, the case for the MRH-90 might have been harder to justify. The big arms manufacturers will of course always lobby very hard to sell us highly expensive new hardware and talk us out of optimizing existing gear.

Kindly direct me to what Alan Jones might have had to say this topic so I can put him straight if he has an incorrect perspective.

[Andu]

Kindly direct me to what Alan Jones might have had to say this topic so I can put him straight if he has an incorrect perspective.If you managed to do that, I think you'd be the first man to ever do so, Bushranger. I don't believe he's ever said anything about it. I was just imagining one of his shock-jock early morning 'editorials' on old fart radio about the ADF buying a fifty year old design.

[Turkeyslapper]

The Navy really does not need anything more than the Huey II suitably adapted for particular roles


Bushranger 71...I appreciate your affection for the old Huey but pleeeaase. Yes, put a couple of torpedoes, a radar, a sonar of some description and the rest on a Huey.....maybe some wheels as well! And while we are at it why don't we get some Wasps out of retirement and 'suitably adapt' them as well.

Yes I think the Huey II would be great for some things but certainly won't do for Naval ops.

Turkey

[Willoz269]

People, we tend to forget...WE ARE NOT AT WAR!!! a Multirole helicopter will do us for the foreseeable future...we need to get soldiers to an excercise zone? I see them flying Qantas all the time, no big deal.

If we break out in all out war, yes, we will probably source cheap battlefield helos quick smart and send them out, but to equip our whole force with helicopters that their own country of origin no longer wants to fly because there are safer, more efficient models out there, is not the answer.

Yes, the Huey is a good machine, I have been in and out of it, very cramped, with gear on you can't even sneeze without knocking someone out, and its performace in hot humid conditions fully loaded is not the best. Plus, the original Vietnam Huey had a lot of vulnerabilities to small arms fire...the newer versions I believe are heavier to address this....an evolution, God Help us all!

[eagle 86]

Willo,
You better ask my son who has just returned from his third tour of Afghanistan, or Trooper Donaldson VC or the relatives of those who did not return from A'gan whether we are at war or not!!
GAGS
E86

[Wiley]

Willoz, tell me you're not serious. "If we break out in all out war, yes, we will probably source cheap battlefield helos quick smart and send them out," Words fail me. Angus’ replacement will just drop down to Bunnings at Fyshwick and magically "source (love that word) cheap battlefield helos quick smart", and while he's at it, pick up TRAINED aircrews, groundcrew, spares, infrastructure, a training organisation - and all the innumerable other things required to operate an effective force.

What blows my mind is that your attitude is not without precedent in Canberra. In 1938 (? - it may have been earlier), Lawrence Wackett, against huge opposition from Canberra politicans who "knew" we could always rely on Britain, (translation: who were in the pockets of British manufacturers), finally got an order to build a small number of Wirraways for the RAAF. (I think it was for 80 aircraft.)

In the last days of August 1939, with that small production run almost complete, when the proverbial Blind Freddie could see there was a very real chance that the Empire would soon go to war, he caught the train to Canberra to see a the appropriate Minister, a Mr Casey - (the post WW2 Governor General) - to try to get an order for more aircraft, for he had literally hundreds of specialist employees he would have to let go if he could not extend the production run.

He was told that the decision to tool up and create an aircraft industry in Australia from scratch (as Wackett had just done) had been a commercial decision and there would be no further orders.

Within days, Germany invaded Poland - and Wackett received a call from Casey asking him for 400 more Wirraways poste haste. (My source for this tale is “Aircraft Pioneer” the biography of Lawrence Wackett, a highly recommended and very good read. Few would know that he was the man who virtually invented - and implemented - battlefield aerial resupply - in 1918.)

My big fear is that we don't seem to make Lawrence Wacketts in Australia any more, and in these days of Globalisation, where it has been decided by someone that we in Australia don't need a manufacturing industry, even if we had someone with Wackett's drive and vision, he'd have no factories or a trained workforce to draw on.

[Rakshasa]

I'd wouldn't dismiss the Huey just yet. Sure, refurbs might not be a selling point given the Seasprite fiasco but the USMC seem rather pleased with their shiny new UH-1Y Venoms.

[Willoz269]

Eagle, I meant no disrespect, I have done a tour myself, I know if bullets fly by, it is a friendly reception! What I meant is we are not in an all out war, we are co-participants in limited contained conflicts, where we are fortunate enough to be able to choose and time the introduction of battlefield equipment. Iraq, Afghanistan or even the Balkans did not see/do not see the need for Vietnam style helo resupply, the face of warfare is changing.
Wiley, what I meant was sourcing either more blackhawks or NH90s form surplus stocks, nothing out of this world in that!

[scran]

Willoz - source aircraft from spare stocks?

Dream on buddy!!!!!


There has been some PM discussion between myself and Afghan. We have reached (I think) agreement. Afghan is a passionate officer who sees shortcomings with "the system". I'm an old head (who worked in the system) and agree with him in many aspects.

Bushranger - with respect - you lost me when you talked about cost effectiveness and then mentioned maintaining the B707 tankers.

Oh - and I said to Afghan - I have a personal friend who is probably unique in RAN cirlces in the he commanded both an O boat and a Collins - and I have never heard him say a bad word about the boats. So who do I believe about Collins? Guess.....

The B707 refuellers were NEVER an operational capability (despite us deploying them to support ops in Afghanistan) and cost the ADF an arm and a leg to continue operating. Same same F-111. The bird is still capable of flying. Can it survive in the modern battlespace? Questionable. The cost of being the ONLY operator of the type? Astronomical.

Sorry - but (with respect) you are a few years out of date.............

[Andu]

So if (huge 'if') we could find readily-available surplus NH-90s, they'd be incompatible with much of the kit on board the (incredibly expensive to achieve) 'Australianised' aircraft already in the inventory. Blackhawks? Possibly. A damn sight more likely than NH-90s anyway.

Bushranger, having landed a Huey on a ship at sea, I'd have to agree with the earlier poster's comment - skids with no oleos might be OK on really big carriers and the USN Marine assault carriers, but they're far from ideal if working of the small helideck of most RAN ships if there's any sort of sea running.

Having said that, I do like the idea of a relatively simple, affordable 'second tier' helo, which your Super Huey seems to go close to fitting.

[Modern Elmo]

I'd have to agree with the earlier poster's comment - skids with no oleos might be OK on really big carriers and the USN Marine assault carriers, but they're far from ideal if working of the small helideck of most RAN ships if there's any sort of sea running.

Huey II = stupid USMC mistake.

[turboshaft]

I'd wouldn't dismiss the Huey just yet. Sure, refurbs might not be a selling point given the Seasprite fiasco but the USMC seem rather pleased with their shiny new UH-1Y Venoms

I wouldn't say the UH-1Y has been much more successful than Europe's efforts: simpler technology, yet several years late (between 3 and 5, depending which yardstick you use) and about to suffer a second Nunn-McCurdy cost breach.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi Turkeyslapper (#168-23Jan09). The message I am trying to convey in all of the debate this thread is spending on military hardware will have to be constrained and we just have to accept a number of adequate capabilities rather than spend recklessly on the highly expensive stuff peddled by the major arms manufacturers.

Simple proven modular systems can be fitted to a number of different platforms to enhance multi-role versatility. I have done the research and number crunching on weapons systems and payload capabilities and there are feasible naval options for the Huey II considering the UH-1N is already in widespread service with multiple other navies. The Lynx of course can carry lightweight torpedoes or other bolt on weaponry.

Both the RN and RAN removed the ASW capability from Sea Kings but the dunking sonar was very speedily reinstalled by the RN when the Falklands War emerged. The Australian Seahawk has a very complicated ASW weapons system fit embracing a sonobuoy based detection system, acoustic processor, datalinking, magnetic anomaly detector, radar and an integrated navigation system; but it has never functioned adequately for ASW and like the Sea King, the Seahawk has been utilized primarily in other support roles.

The intended $350-400million upgrade for just 16 RAN Seahawks is aimed at refurbishment of the aircraft to improve reliability and apparently to restore yet another ill-conceived hybrid weapons system more toward the manufacturer's configuration. Whether it will then do an adequate job in the ASW role remains to be seen and (alarmingly) if Defence even bothers with an ASW capability. Consider these recent messages from the Minister for Defence, Joel Fitzgibbon:

DEFENCE Minister Joel Fitzgibbon has dumped a $300 million plan to fit anti-submarine torpedoes to the navy's Seahawk helicopters and the RAAF's AP3 Orion surveillance aircraft.

The European MU90 lightweight torpedo is being fitted to the navy's Anzac and FFG-class frigates, but the airborne phase of the $616 million project is now considered a high-risk integration challenge by the Government.

"I am pleased that we have been able to make the MU90 work off the navy's warships," Mr Fitzgibbon said. "However, I was not prepared to follow the previous government's practice of gambling with taxpayers' money by proceeding with the allocation of $300million to fit the torpedo to various aircraft while doubt remained that it would work properly in that role."

The Defence Department had planned to fit the torpedo to up to five separate platforms starting with the Anzac frigates, adding to the overall risk of the project.

Mr Fitzgibbon said the Government would need to be reassured via the upcoming defence white paper that an upgraded air-launched lightweight torpedo was essential for the defence force.

"A complicated systems-integration task involving old aircraft sets off several bright-red warning lights for me, especially when Australia would have been the only country attempting to make that aircraft and weapon combination," he said.

Note the continued spin regarding supposed old airframes whereas the main problem with many of the projects that have foundered has really been Australian defence science and industry generating costly hybrid on-board systems that have not been workable. We are going to see a lot more refurbishing/upgrading of aircraft worldwide to extend their life in the emerging economic climate.

[Turkeyslapper]

Hey There BR71. I agree in full that tax payers dollars should be spent more wisely on proven, lower risk capabilities and I do understand that our Seahawk is certainly not the best ASW ship around - It is a pretty good Jack of all trades which as you said is what it is used for. All I was trying to convey is that the Seahawk family (or Lynx, NH 90, EH101 etc etc) is a far more suitable helicopter/weapons system for operating off small ships when compared to any of the Bell UH1 family. I did have a look at an Italian ASW version of the 212/UH1N once and there is no way that frame could perform the variety of tasks with the minimal reconfiguration that our Seahawk can (but yes it is a dipper).

I do also agree that a cheaper and relatively simple helicopter like the Huey II does have its place (AME, light utility and so forth) but I still stand by my earlier comment being that it isn't a suitable for what we need in a Naval helicopter.

Cheers

Turkey

[Bushranger 71]

Hello Willoz269; you are a bit astray in your #169 of 23Jan09 (P9).

The US military fly what they are given being those equipments manufactured by the huge military industrial complex which of course revels in producing some overly sophisticated products for sale at inflated prices whereas much of the superseded gear wisely placed in reserve storage still does an adequate job if suitably enhanced.

Re aircraft performance; 9SQN RAAF carried 7 fully equipped troops in the Hotel model Iroquois - 5 across on the bench seat and 2 back to back on the floor - whereas the US Army only carried 6 troops. We also modified the aircraft to fit roof mounted hand rails either side for the outboard troops to hold and fitted emplaning steps either side. Never heard any complaints from troops re emplaning/deplaning difficulty.

Apart from sustained high temperature ops in Vietnam, we also operated the Hotel model Huey supporting all the major Army survey operations throughout PNG and Indonesia which embraced appreciable higher altitude operations. The Huey II of course does have markedly improved performance which is why the civil version is operated extensively in hot and high scenarios around the world.

Re supposed Huey vulnerability; see my #93 of 13Jan09 (P5) and just number crunch the statistics in para 2 for a rough idea on probabilities of battle damage. Survivability has a lot more to do with how aircraft are operated in combat than their characteristics. We did lose 1 aircraft when hovering among very large boulders during a firefight in mountains to extract casualties. An opposition soldier popped out from behind a rock and fired a burst into the engine at very close range causing it to quit and the aircraft fell on 2 advisors on the ground before bursting into flame. A medic got trapped and also perished in the inferno but all 4 crew escaped with some burns and minor injuries.

2 gunships did precautionary landings after taking hits in the transmission and fuel tank and another 2 aircraft were peppered by shrapnel when mines were detonated at landing sites but were able to be flown from the sceneof action for recovery by Chinook. No aircrew were injured in those incidents and I would call that pretty good battlefield survivability. Some armour plating around the engine and transmission would of course have been nice to have and the addition of armour is an option in the upgrade of Hotel model Iroquois to Huey II.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi Scran; re your #174 of 23Jan09 (P9). Yes, I am somewhat fossilized at 71 which is why I use bigger font. But a few years out of date! - Hmmm.

I have a long military lineage with 3 family lost in WW1 and another survived after being badly gassed. Family members were involved in all Australian active operations ever since to the current day, except Korea. I can remember much about WW2, was involved in Confrontation, Vietnam (3 stints) and appreciable regional archipelago activities. Lived in Kuwait just after the Gulf War, have visited many other battlefields around the world and have always been a bit bent toward researching military history.

Being on the planet for beyond the biblical 3 score years plus 10 inclines you to become more objective than subjective and question many of the actions of governments; which may be the reason I was privileged to be invited in 2007 to joint a group comprising former Air Force pilots, engineers and a scientist addressing air combat capabilities. The group includes mainly 1 and 2 Star rankers with military service spanning from the 1950s until recently (but I did not reach their dizzy heights). We are well across what has been happening in Canberra and through defence industry contacts worldwide are arguably more abreast of aircraft technology and weaponry developments than most, particularly regarding Russian and Chinese hardware.

Re aerial refuelling tankers. Somewhere on the web is a USAF statistical summary for a few months of offensive air support in Iraq and Afghanstan during 2008 indicating about 10,000 hours flown requiring a staggering 4,000 or so hours of tanker support The USAF has near 500(?) mainly re-engined glass cockpit KC-135 as the core of their tanker fleet with airframe life of type potential to about 2040 although maintenance costs will progressively increase (see: KC-135 Stratotanker - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KC-135)).

As for most of the other aircraft types operated by the ADF, the RAAF B707s were not progressively optimized so did not have the capabilities of the KC-135R preceding their premature retirement from Air Force service. Our B707 were pretty low time airframes and had the aircraft been upgraded, operating costs would have been substantially reduced.

Yet again, Australia jumped in as a launch customer for an unproven type in the MRTT and I challenge the wisdom of this decision. 5 x MRTT may arguably only allow 3 available continuously for operations which is really a piddling capacity for activities that might require sustained tankering. While the MRTT can offload more fuel than the KC-135R, I feel it was acquired moreso as a people and freight transporter.

Years back when Qantas was government-owned, provision existed to sequester QF aircraft at short notice for auxiliary transportation of personnel in particular. Defence spending on airlift assets was then more wisely directed toward aircraft that could be utilized to quickly move personnel and equipment (including light armour) into the rudimentary airfields throughout the regional archipelago with C-130 and C-17 being the aircraft most suited for such needs today. Tanker/cargo aircraft are of course limited to airfields that can handle large airliners.

Had the RAAF B707 been upgraded to KC-135R standard, an adequate (albeit token) tanker capability - and a lesser pax/cargo function - could have been maintained pending downstream emergence and proving of a USAF tanker replacement with spending on the MRTT perhaps more sensibly diverted to additional C-17. The USAF tanker replacement project has been controversial and may yet become a US designed aircraft leaving Australia with more European sourced equipment.

Thorough fatigue testing proved the F-111 could have easily been sustained in service until around 2030 utilizing spares availability from stored assets in the US. Its systems could have also been optimized to make it extremely capable as a very long range maritime strike (and electronic warfare) deterrent against interference with Australia's trade routes and offshore assets. Although the airframe is not stealth technology, it has supersonic cruise capability and can deliver stand-off weaponry designed for internal carriage on the F-22 - the RAAF did some of the supersonic small diameter bomb flight testing for the USAF. The Super Hornet does not have comparable airframe performance and would require significant tanker support when laden with external weaponry - see the following link for a January 2008 cost comparison for acquiring the Super Hornet versus keeping the F-111 in service - NOTAMS and Media Releases (http://www.ausairpower.net/notams.html). The former Chief Defence Scientist and Service Chiefs misinformed the Parliament in this regard which is all recorded in Hansard.

With respect Mate, I think you might be a victim of the 'group think' culture that prevails in Defence. The Minister has already publicly expressed his concern that our defence planners are too obsessed with futuristic notions for conduct of war-fighting rather than maintaining the operational capabilities of the ADF as they have existed. Hitherto, nobody has been held accountable for reckless defence spending but some heads might yet roll at the highest levels if a couple more of the ill-conceived projects fall over.

This link can provide you with months of very interesting reading on topical military issues: Air Power Australia - Home Page (http://www.ausairpower.net/index.html)

[AFGAN]

Like a rabid dog, I am back again.

The problem Bushranger, is that the Minister will not find out until the game is absolutely up. DMO and the Senior serving officers on the respective project will find ways to bury any problems for as long as possible or until they muddle through with some half-baked capability (or they get posted and it becomes someone elses problem). Propping up bankrupt contractors and fudging contract benchmarks appears to be the norm these days (I could give examples but don't want to go near the line again). Guys at LtCol and Maj level push up the information but ultimately, little or nothing is done to hold the contractors to account as it may reveal another bad buy by defence procurement and dump ones mate or worse still, mentor, in the cow poop (what did Roy call it?). The reasoning is that if the supplier goes under than everyone is worse off. I disagree with this but even if it holds some water, why wasn't this forseen at the contract stage and safegaurds written into the contract to ensure that the supplier can deliver and is appropriately resourced? We allow the ultimate supplier eg EADS/Eurocopter, to have legal seperation from the entity set up in Oz, so that if required, it can be cut loose from the parent financially. Why?

WillOz,

if you have served, then you know the old saying: "We train as we fight". To suggest we set up for peacetime is absurd, especially so when we have troops in combat.

I thought the ADF had learnt its' lessons and would, whenever possible, buy proven aircraft and ones with a standard fit according to a military that operates a significant number of the type. We did this with Chinook but we have gone off the reservation with MRH, Tiger, and JSF.

MRH and Tiger are sucking the Army dry and the existing capabilities are hurting immensely. Unfortunately, we need the capability now. It needs to be proven and reliable, and it needs to be supportable in the field with our existing resources. Not in 10 years when it is mature. Either that, or more money needs to allocated to refurbish the BH capability and obtain a decent resupply of spares so that BH can continue to operate for some time to come

For heavens sake, we are not talking about stealth fighters here but a battlefield truck (I know I have used this line many times). There hasn't been any great technological breakthrough in helicopters that I am aware of in the last 20 years (except some stealth work which MRH doesn't have). This should have been the easiest aircraft replacement project the ADF has run in 20+ years!

EmerGov asked me what I want out of this thread (apart from a good bleat). Well, what I want may not be possible to achieve (and not from this thread), and even if it is, then it will take time and involve a lot of pain for the ADF and DMO as the dirty laundry is put out on the clothesline. But I hope that we can finally recognise that we are a small defence force. With few exceptions, we should never be involved in developing and proving new technology (and no, 650 aircraft on order, new to service, is not proven. 650 with 5 to 10 years in service in the exact config we have ordered, proven able to perform its intended roles, probably would be). We can't afford it and it is quite often a waste of taxpayer money. It is not the ADF's role to keep DSTO in business. In my opinion, we need to stick with buying proven capabilities that we know we can afford to maintain and operate properly. Sometimes, the cheapest option at the tender stage is not really the cheapest or best option. Contractors know the game and will promise the world. We need to see that as well and act accordingly. As I said to Scran, technology is seductive, especially to a Pilot. I know I love to have all the technology possible in my aircraft. But the people that are responsible for spending large amounts of taxpayers money need to see through this seduction and spend wisely. As you mentioned BR-71, a thorough cost benefit analysis should take care of this.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi AFGAN; good stuff your #182 (P10).

Pre-Tange, the 3 Services had their own junior Minister and there was also one for Supply. These arrangements were shed when the military came under defacto public service control but a Minister for Defence Science & Personnel was created which gave DSTO much more clout and also took the prerogative for recruiting and manning away from the respective Service Chiefs.

When the Rudd Government came to power, 2 Parliamentary Secretaries were appointed unheralded, one for Defence Support who immediately began spending like a drunken sailor especially on helo related projects and the other PS appears to function more as a ministerial representative for the Army. The PS for Defence Support seems intimately tied to DMO approving projects expenditure which should really be the sole responsibility of the Minister for Defence.

The Service Chiefs now have lessened control over manpower and recruiting matters with these functions seemingly having been added to the Defence Science ministry to boost the strength of that department. I have a few friends who were involved in recruiting years back when it was under individual armed forces control - they really loved their job and managed to get good standard people onboard. Now we have a civilian mob in Canberra more or less deciding what types are suitable for military service!

We really need to get back to something like the pre-Tange framework to return some standing to the respective armed forces. Abolishing the Ministry for Defence Science & Personnel and the 2 recently created Parliamentary Secretary positions would seem a reasonable solution substituting PS appointments for each of the Services. DSTO and DMO should answer directly to the Minister for Defence. Not likely to happen though with a Prime Minister who was a bureaucrat.

[What Red Line?]

I've been following this thread with interest.

I vividly recall my father roundly and soundly criticising the Government's stupid mistake dropping perfectly good piston engined warplanes to replace them with those incredibly expensive jets. His reasoning was that with regular upgrades to the powerplants and weaponry, we could be damned sure that we could defend ourselves because we had proven equipment.

If I accept the wisdom being posted here, then my Pop's plan is beginning to make damned good sense. He also spent an extraordinary time complaining about the folks in DC not knowing Jack Sh*t about what the military really needed. Man, if he coulda got elected we would still have the skies filled with P47's, P51's, B29's and those fine Bell 47s fresh off their 95th upgrade would still be an affordable BF tool just like they were in the good ole days.

[Gundog01]

I have been reading this thread with interest, particularly BR71's and AFGAN's most informed posts. However, BR71, had i known your love (posibble affiliation) with airpower australia website and the Kopp, Goon show i would have read your posts with more than a grain of salt. I do visit the site occasionally when i need a laugh and some anti-ADF rhetoric.

You mention the F111 as being able to fly to 2030, but fail to mention just how futuristic this technologly was for it's time, and the amount of money if soked up during development. Perhaps we will see the same tech leap and sound operating system from MRH and Tiger. Like most defence purchases (and even wars) their relative value is often only evident in hindsight.

[Point0Five]

Sorry BR71, but most Carlo fans are 12 year old boys with wild imaginations.

Sadly, your credibility has now evaporated.

[Lost Again..]

Been watching this thread for a while. Nearly responded to AFGHAN's dig at DSTO 3 pages ago but sat on it. It's been deleted now anyway.

The following statement has to be a classic.

Our B707 were pretty low time airframes and had the aircraft been upgraded, operating costs would have been substantially reduced

One of the aircraft was ~39k hours but all the rest were 50,000+ by 2005. This info is avail open source at the DSTO online reports into B707 wing fatigue. Our B707 were at end of life.

[scran]

Bushranger - me in the group-think category? I proved AFGHAN wrong on that point in PM's. Not at all. I'm still on record as not agreeing with the JSF program when we did. Still on record as saying the RAAF needed to walk away from the Squadron concept (ie - is 24 C-130 too many for our needs?) and go with the total lift capability study (which has happened now - but only because C-130E's started to break). Operate the F-111 till 2030? Do you have ANY idea the costs associated with being the ONLY operator of a type? You even argue against it later when you discuss KC30 (A330 as against B767 Tankers).

Oh - and didn't A330 win the US competition? It's only political interference (the type you argue so strongly against) that is the issue in the US now.


Time to take your meds again.

Someone else has proven your B707 claims false. If you are indeed one of Carlos Kopps crew...........


Don't turn the 707 discussion around. In fact, I agree with you - the ADF should have gotten Tankers a LONG time ago.

I agree with you about the Parlimentary Secretaries - god help us when Kelly starts to interfere.....


Believe whatever you want.

I'm here to tell you right now - your beloved Huey's little son the UH1Y could not fulfill one of the most basic requirements the Army had - the ability to lift a section in patrol order in one aircraft. Why was that a requirement? Ask Afghan.


Oh - and for the record (not that it matters) my father served in WW2 - and I hope one day soon to visit the grave of my uncle in the Alexandria Commonwealth Wargraves Cemetery where he has laid since being killed in WW2..................

[grusome]

FWIIW, my grandfather joined the Victorian Engineers (Submarine Mining) in 1890 or thereabouts, was a foundation member of the Australian Corps of Signals just after Federation, kilted up for the Vic Scottish, was commissioned in the 52nd Bn and retired in 1923, but what the H... has that to do with this discussion?

I just want to place a couple of facts about the B707 in RAAF service into the argument. Firstly, when acquired, the initial aircraft had a very low cycle to hours relationship - about half if memory serves. Unfortunately, despite repeated attempts by the operators to enlighten the hierarchy, RAAF (Malcolm Fraser?) refused to consider a simulator as part of the program. Further, the then hierarchy from time to time refused to pay for travel to overseas simulators. So, circuit bashing became the norm. In very short order, the cycles count caught up with the hours, in the face of Boeing recommendations. This unfortunate situation was exacerbated by the "cheapest is best" decision to buy the Israeli wing tips. The simulator indecision was reversed by the absolutely unnecessary Sale event, but still took a couple of years to install. Result - the airframes were b-ggered. Replacing the centre section wing carry-through frames (cracking) would probably have cost a fortune, even if possible. The total hours are not the issue. Cycle numbers are.

So far as "upgrading" to KC135R, what is BR71 (I'm about the same age!) on about? The fundamental "upgrade' would be fitment of boom capability - and I'm writing with the advice of someone near and dear to me who spent a couple of years with USAF on just that model, refuelling Blackbirds and other interesting airplanes. We looked at booms when I was writing staff papers about tankers in the 70s. To retrofit a boom to a used 707 requires a rebuild of the back half of the airframe - and expert advice is that in the absence of the original jigs it would be hugely difficult and expensive to mate a brand new rear to an old front due to the in-service twisting and accommodations that all airframes go through.

The interesting aspect to all this is that had the hierarchy listened to the operators and brought a sim on line with the aircraft 25+ years ago, it might have been possible to re-engine and upgrade to modern glass with zoom zoom defensive kits and keep the old girls going for a while. But who listens to the operators?

I would also like to point out to Scran: "The B707 refuellers were NEVER an operational capability (despite us deploying them to support ops in Afghanistan)" that not only were they operational out of Kyrgyzstan, but also out of Kuwait (although the latter service was sadly never recognised as operational (warlike) due to some unfortunate politicking by SASR whom I otherwise admire). I suggest you ask Angus whether they were operational!

May I suggest that the next war is the one we should be equipping for. I spent half a lifetime (adult) working with the relics of the previous one or two wars. The one time I fell on my feet was to fly the 'Bou when it was brand new - and a new capability for RAAF and Army. I didn't believe in '64 that it would last ten years. God knows I was wrong then! But I don't think I'm wrong in saying that the best advice we can take is from those operators who served in the front line last week. Go figure.

Edited to add that I never figured out why RAAF refused to consider the USAF offer of 2nd hand KC135s during the 70s.

[Wiley]

gruesome, your excellent last post brought back all sorts of memories and frustrations for me.. reminding why I "walked the walk" and left Ron.

But back to the subject of the thread: is there anyone out there who doesn't believe that AAVN needs a "second tier", cheap to operate, simple to maintain in the field light helicopter to do the myriad mundane tasks it would be just plain stupid to employ a 54 million dollar very high tech airframe on?

While I accept the very valid arguments about the problems of yet another type in the ADF's rotary wing inventory, I just can't see the N-90, (and the Tiger, but let's not go there), in the limited numbers Australia will be able to afford both to buy and to operate**, providing even a small fraction of the air support that will be demanded of them.

**This, I believe, (cost), will be an increasingly important factor in Defence when you look at what's currently happening in the world, and if, like me, you don't believe this financail crisis will be short-lived.

[herkman]

Firstly I should say, that we the public owe a great deal to people like Bushranger, who have the experience and know what they are looking at.

The introduction of the UH1B and later models into war conditions, was done only several years after we received them into service, bearing in mind that previously the RAAF had no real large scale helicopter operational experience.

Partly understanding the limitations of all of the helicopters introduced since then, it appears except for the Blackhawk, that they have been a compromise of sorts, which may or may not be a problem in the future. This I am not qualified to say.

However the government has over the years, to put it bluntly has done too little and too late in regard to aircraft replacements, or upgrades.

Let us look into some of them.

In 1966 the USAF badly wanted to get their hands on our A model gunships, and offered a great deal if we traded them on E models. Nothing came of that (they wanted them to turn into gunships) and so they continued in service, long after their use by date. Yes we did have the E model on order and they arrived on time and gave good service. However once again we repeated the mistakes of the A model, and did not keep them up too scratch in regard to mod states and centre section replacements, until in the end it would be hard to justify the money to do so.

This buy the is the same reason, that most of the pre J model aircraft, are flying with restrictions with particularly every Air Force but especially the USAF.

Where are we and the RAF travelling, the same route as before, with fatique becoming a long term issue with both of these Air Forces aircraft, the J seeming to roll this problem forward, because of the increased HP.

Replacing the centre section I am informed is not a 5 minute job, and the lead time is likewise. Can old air frames be brought back again I am not able to say, but the fact that 6 of our E models are now front line aircraft with the PAF should indicate that planed correctly, upgrades can and should be succesfull.

The Caribou is another one in case, as long ago proposals have been made to re engine this aircraft and until the recent structual failure, the engine were considered to be the shortfall of the aircraft. None of the RAAF aircraft came with new engines, and the cost and difficulty of maintaining these old and tired engines has steadily increased. Whilst understanding the Army did not want to carry JP1 into the field at the time, today it is the 100 octane which is the problem to cart.

The 707 good aircraft as it was, received the attention of the bean counters and we had to loose good men, in an accident that should never have happened, before out polital masters did what should have been from day one bought a simulator. As result of penny pinching, the 707 was taken out of service, long before its replacement will be operational.

However in the meantime we no longer have an air to air refueling capacaity. My understanding is that in spite of the French and Singapore Air forces buying the KC135R, the decision was that we did not want to buy second hand. Boeing could have kept both the 707 and the KC135R in the air for a considerable time, but even after we have bought 5 KC30 we find our polital masters, lacking the guts to run the gaunlet of the press, have pinched and are going to convert at a cost of A$45M two of our tankers, so they can ride in comfort and carry all their hangers on and baggage.

About the only thing we can shout success at, is the C17 purchase, a great purchase and an even greater task of getting them into service quickly. However once again we have failed to understand, that just like the RAF, four are not enough, and knowing our politcal people, the line will be shut before we understand this. Four C17's do not make 12 C130J's.

What I am saying is that the government should keep out of the selection process, and should have confidence that the armed forces can make the right selection, or have to live with it. Why we have to Australianise every thing we buy almost I will never know.

The UH1 series, C130A, Caribou, C130E, C130H, Blackhawk have all performed well and were virtually standard military aircraft when they entered service.

Rant off

Regards

Col

[Magoodotcom]

But back to the subject of the thread: is there anyone out there who doesn't believe that AAVN needs a "second tier", cheap to operate, simple to maintain in the field light helicopter to do the myriad mundane tasks it would be just plain stupid to employ a 54 million dollar very high tech airframe on?

Isn't there a Phase 9 of Air 9000 that is being spun up to provide a light utility helicopter (LUH) for Army? All depends on the White Paper and Air Lift Study I guess, but looks possible once Phase 7 is done and dusted.

[scran]

Gruesome:

I'm not arguing that the B707's did a great job when they deployed - and it was (INHO) operational stuff.

HOWEVER, the AAR capability was developed for the birds as a training capability (officially) until the new tankers were acquired.

Subtle I know, but important in places like the Defence Capability Committee (arguing is it a REPLACEMENT capability or NEW capability) and Pink Book priorities/considerations etc.

Oh - and to whoever said it - Herkyman was it? - I'd argue about the S70A9's the ADF acquired being standard. I'm told that these aircraft have the best anti-icing system of ANY sub-type of Black Hawk. Correct me if I'm wrong AFGHAN. Oh - and how many times have you used it?

[Bushranger 71]

Some of the recent dialogue this thread - since it was suggested to me I participate - has been constructive and enjoyable but the derogatory stuff from a few quite disappointing.

Longevity is not a bar to researching military stuff and questioning the worsening situation on the Australian defence scene since the Tange Re-organization in 1974. When my ability in this regard was challenged, I perhaps unwisely outlined my family military lineage and participation with Air Power Australia just to demonstrate that I do endeavour to stay in touch.

I was invited to participate in the APA forum and am somewhat a wild card challenging a fair bit of their thinking. Their mooting how the air combat components of the RAAF should be structured somewhat dilutes the effect of some of their fine analysis work regarding aircraft performance and weaponry that is very difficult to ascertain from other sources. But is it not good to have another think tank that functions somewhat outside the square than just be brainwashed by the plethora of such institutions that are patronized by Defence and the arms industry?

So I had duff gen on RAAF B707 airframe hours; but my point was there are abundant KC-135R that will probably be operating in the USAF for decades which could have perhaps provided an adequate upgraded capability in lieu of introducing yet another somewhat unique type!. Going down the MRTT track could mean it will now be very difficult to get funding for any more C-17 before the production line ends.

The Australian defence capabilities determination and procurement system has become progressively more broken necessitating significant organizational restructuring and this problem is hugely compounded by the influence peddling that goes on in Canberra. A colleague who retired a couple of decades back as a 1 Star gets a package around $500K per annum just to haunt offices and fete politicians and senior military personnel around the country. Nice work if you can get it so imagine what might be offered to former Ministers for Defence who take positions with major ‘arms bazaar’ players!

Little bundles of assets like 4 x C17, 5 x MRTT, 6 x Wedgetail will not be credible military capacities considering the likely continuous availability of about only half on line. The whole structure of the small ADF warrants rethinking to provide more viable functions and so hard decisions to shed (or place in reserve storage) equipments that cannot presently provide adequate operational capabilities due to supportability or manning considerations.

Some positives from the debate this forum seem to have been recognition that equipments in service should be progressively optimized to maintain credible operational status until replacement is justifiable; also, some ‘adequate’ modest cost capabilities that can be sustainably supported in harsh operating environments are essential in the military hardware mix.

Australia simply cannot afford the 50 percent increase in defence spending over the next decade that has been supported by both major political parties so ADF capabilities rationalization may be an outcome of the emerging Defence White Paper.

I prefer to exit now and will give contributing some historical stuff a miss which dedicated warriors may have found interesting as it would have embraced so-called airmobile operations and the mythical requirement for carriage of an infantry squad/section.

[scran]

Bushranger - (hey, here is a turn-up!!)

I agree with you! :ok:

Not arguing about the KC-135R's - yes the ADF SHOULD have acquired a truely operational AAR capability well before now. Probably as or even before we introduced the Hornet. Hell, I don't think we ever should have given the F4's back!!!!!!

Sorry, but your introduction of your linage did nothing to support your argument.........

You have some very good points that I agree with, some that I am quite opposed to (and not because I suffer from group think). For example, in your last post you discuss "equipments in service should be progressively optimized to maintain credible operational status" yet elsewhere you were critical of the Hornet Upgrade program. So, which is it?

I seem to remember seeing an argument by a 1 star (aircrew) in early 2002/03 that indicated in some ways it might be cheaper to replace an aircraft type every 10 years that upgrade an aircraft over a 30 year period. For example, buy 20 brand new F15E's in 2000, flog then hard till 2009 then replace them with 20 brand new F15E's in 2010 (assuming the production line was still open) and flog them till 2020 when a mature JSF or something was operational and proven. Oh - and one of his caveats - NEVER BUY THE A MODEL OF ANYTHING!!!! It was only early days in his research - but quite interesting.

A small defence force like the ADF cannot do everything. It's time we either dropped some capabilites (sorry - like the F-111) and concentrated on only doing a few roles really well, or took a leaf out of the Israeli/Singaporean book and became really tigerish in our acquisition policies.

Until we do - debates like this thread will continue and SOLVE NOTHING......


It's interesting. AFGHAN came on here and we discussed the need for utilising the experience of guys with current operational experience to help determine our requirements - yet you would have us believe that we need to listen to old heads who have studied history for years and can identify all the errors we made in the last 30 years........... :eek:

Who is right? :confused:

[BEagle]

Regarding the KC-30A, my analysis was as follows:
http://i14.photobucket.com/albums/a341/nw969/Internet/zxzxz.jpg

1. RAAF requirement for 65.4 tonne offload in 90 min at 400 nm from base:

Aircraft capabilities:

A310MRTT 51.3 tonnes (Non compliant)
A330MRTT 83.7 tonnes (Compliant)
KC-767A 61.8 tonnes (Non compliant)


2. RAAF requirement for 54.5 tonne offload in 90 min at 900 nm from base:

Aircraft capabilities:

A310MRTT 39.1 tonnes (Non compliant)
A330MRTT 71.1 tonnes (Compliant)
KC-767A 49.8 tonnes (Non compliant)


So, only the excellent KC-30A meets the specification needs of the RAAF and you can forget politics.

[Gundog01]

The Caribou is another one in case, as long ago proposals have been made to re engine this aircraft and until the recent structual failure, the engine were considered to be the shortfall of the aircraft.

Herkman, can still confirm that the engines are the biggest, but by no means the only, problem with the Caribou. Efogi findings are that there was no evidence of structural failure due to fatigue. It appears it was a 1 in a million set of circumstances that actually happened...s*$t bad luck.

Well summed up of the tanker side of things Beagle

I think to many people get wrapped up in how th ADF operates. Small regional conflicts eg Timor and as part of large coalitions (Iraq and the Gan). Can't see us needing a massive fleet of C17's when civil contracting is far easier and cheaper. And having more than an AEWC and a tanker airborne for a 24 hour ops is bordering on impossible. think of the number of frames required to provide protection to said force multipliers. You would quickly run out of knuck aircrew and frames to be available to provide any meaning sort of offensive or defensive air.

Lets face it if the Indo's ever come tearing across the straight in their 3 SU35s and launch an attack on Aus soil, ANZUS will be enacted so quick you'll wonder how a carrier can sail from Hawaii to Aus, before you can say "Here come the Indons". Might be narrow minded and extremely short sighted but i reckon there is a fair few Aus Pollies and ADF hierarchy hedging their bets that the yanks will save the day.

Personally, the more new kit brought on line the better, it should be fun to try them all out.....

[Wiley]

Well, Gundog, you have history on your side...

Your attitude was shared by "the Great and the Good" in Australia right up to... when was it? 1942? (Maybe some changed their opinion a tad earlier) - where they "knew" the Royal Navy could be relied upon to come steaming to Australia's defence should it ever be needed.

Believe it or not, back in those halycon days of Empire, the Mother Country appeared to many if not most to be even more all-powerful (and gurannteed to be relied upon) than the increasingly stretched USA does to many today.

[Going Boeing]

The Magic of Merlin Helicopters
http://www.asd-network.com/data_news/ID19231_600.jpg
(January 29, 2009) -- Having proved itself in Bosnia, the latest addition to the RAF's helicopter family continues to shine in Iraq. The aircraft of choice when flying in low to pick up casualties in confined areas, Merlin is also used for moving troops and to supply the front line. Report by Neale Adams.

It is described as an aircraft for the 21st century and when you sit in the cockpit you can understand why.

In a way you feel like a goldfish in a bowl when sitting in the pilot's seat - with near all-round visibility and protection in the form of Kevlar. And with more computer screens and technical wizardry than you would find in most business IT (Information Technology) departments, Merlin is equipped to succeed.

Merlin packs a mean punch when it comes to protection - two 7.62mm General Purpose Machine Guns as standard, with a five-gun fit available. Self-protection is even better with a whole host of defensive aids including missile and laser warning systems and infrared jammers.

And to prove the Merlin's capabilities on operations even further, only last year, the first female to be awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, Flight Lieutenant Michelle Goodman, was the pilot of a Merlin carrying an Immediate Response Team (IRT) which flew in low over rooftops at night and under heavy fire to save the life of a critically injured soldier in Basra City.

Based on the military utility version of the Anglo-Italian EH101, the Merlins Mk3 and Mk3a can operate by day and night, in hot, high or freezing conditions.

Powered by three Rolls-Royce Turbomeca RTM322 engines, the aircraft can carry three or four crew members and 24 fully-equipped troops at a range of over 1,000km and at a maximum speed of 167 knots.

Alternatively, under-slung loads of up to 4.2 tonnes can be moved. Squadron Leader Pip Harding, Second-in-Command of 78 Squadron, based at RAF Benson, said:

"As soon as Merlin went into theatre people realised how beneficial they would be for that climate and style of operations.

"They coped very well with the dust and sand, coped well with picking up troops, and taking them at speed from one place to another. They handled the IRT role with precision."

With anti-vibration mechanisms fitted, air-cooling and safe and comfortable seating in which troops can sit in their webbing, the helicopters can move troops, or the injured, in a greater degree of comfort. And with everything but the kitchen sink up the front, it is described as a pilot's aircraft.

Sqn Ldr Harding said: "Merlin is the next generation of helicopters - it's a 21st century aircraft. The cockpit is phenomenal."

MOD plans to move the Merlins to Afghanistan once they have completed their mission in Iraq.

Source : UK MoD

[Bushranger 71]

Viewers of this thread might also be interested in posting #29 of 03Feb09 (P2) on the new thread: 'A military pilot's view...utility or dedicated attack...'

[Tibbsy]

Much MRH-90 flying going on yet?

[Super 64]

Iraq - Three engine fires on start up in a week; limited to ops in the morning and evening, when temps were cooler; had to get several US Navy Seahawks (that could continue to fly up to 62C OAT) to support helo ops through out the rest of the day.

Sounds like a resounding success to me.

S64

[Trackmaster]

Merlins -- Mrhs 90's?
A bit of confusion here?

[TheWizard]

Iraq - Three engine fires on start up in a week; limited to ops in the morning and evening, when temps were cooler; had to get several US Navy Seahawks (that could continue to fly up to 62C OAT) to support helo ops through out the rest of the day.

Sounds like a resounding success to me.

S64

Care to reveal your source on that one?

[Super 64]

Trackmaster - go back a page to see why I made the comment.

Wizard - now if I did that it wouldn't be an anonymous forum would it. I'm sure if you asked the question at the Toucan you'd get a simialr answer.

Cheers

S64

[Code3]

Since it is now 4+ years since the ARH Tiger was handed over to the Army, how many operational pilots have they trained?

[Flyingblind]

Ouch.....!

[Trojan1981]

Since it is now 4+ years since the ARH Tiger was handed over to the Army, how many operational pilots have they trained?

Umm....

Defence 'to buy hunter-killer drones' | National News | News.com.au (http://www.news.com.au/story/0,27574,25127706-421,00.html)


Defence 'to buy hunter-killer drones'
By Ian McPhedran
The Daily Telegraph
March 03, 2009 12:00am
Text size
+ - Print Email Share Add to MySpace Add to Digg Add to del.icio.us Add to Fark Post to Facebook Add to Kwoff What are these? Hunter ... one of the unmanned attack helicopters Defence is looking at / Image supplied
Choppers fire guided missiles, bombs
Would allow SAS to call in strikes
But have been blamed for civilian deaths
AUSTRALIA is set to buy a number of missile-equipped unmanned "hunter-killer" aircraft to attack insurgent targets in Afghanistan.

The drones, or unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), will carry guided missiles and bombs and will provide a major capability boost to Australian forces.

Special forces troops will be able to identify targets and call in their own remote controlled UCAV to fire Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, or precision laser guided bombs, against insurgent strongholds.

At present the troops have to call up coalition manned or unmanned aircraft to conduct such attacks.

Unmanned aircraft have been used extensively by US forces since 9/11 and in 2002 a Predator killed Osama Bin laden's top man in Yemen. The son of Predator, known as Reaper, is one of the main contenders for the Australian contract.

But the remote-controlled aircraft have also been involved in a number of accidental civilian deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Related Coverage
Billions in arms spending shelved
The Australian, 3 Mar 2009
Fitzgibbon scraps hi-tech plane purchase
NEWS.com.au, 2 Mar 2009
$3.8bn early warning system 'failing'
The Australian, 14 Feb 2009
RAAF's $3.5bn hi-tech fizzers
Adelaide Now, 30 Jan 2009
Drone takes out al-Qa'ida kingpin
The Australian, 10 Jan 2009 Unmanned technology is leaping ahead and pilotless helicopters such as Northrop Grumman's Fire Scout are already operating from US warships. The first unmanned fighter jet will soon take off and land on a US aircraft carrier and this year the US Air Force will buy more unmanned than manned aircraft.

Meanwhile, the Federal Government has angered the US Navy with a decision, taken last week by the National Security Committee of Cabinet, to abandon plans to join a program to develop the world's first strategic "national security" UAV.

Instead of buying the Northrop Grumman Global Hawk it will opt for the much smaller UCAV that can fire missiles and undertake surveillance.

Leading contenders would be the US-built General Atomics Reaper and the newly launched twin-engine Mantis, from the British firm BAE Systems. Well-placed sources say the US Navy is bitterly disappointed that the Rudd Government has decided against investing $300 million to join the development phase of the so-called Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Aircraft (BAMS) project.

The US has been waiting for years for a decision from Canberra and the Global Hawk has made 11 demonstration flights to Edinburgh in South Australia to show off its wares.

The aircraft was put to good use during California's bushfires last year and it has become the most cost-effective method of keeping watch over vast areas of ocean.

The future of our unmanned aircraft program is uncertain following a decision last December to cancel another program to buy tracking and targeting UAVs. That contract was won by US giant Boeing, but was complicated by the army's decision to modify the system.

It is understood a new tender will be released at next week's Australian International Air Show at Avalon near Melbourne. Boeing has been leasing small Scan Eagle spy drones to Australian forces in Iraq and Afghanistan under a $40 million deal.
Email Print Share: Add to MySpace Add to Digg Add to del.icio.us Add to Fark Post to Facebook

[L J R]

Pleeease dont buy BAE systems..........

[DHC4]

http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/infopop/icons/icon13.gif The ADF buys another Lemon
Deleted by AFGAN.

Last edited by AFGAN : 20th January 2009 at 17:09.

Anyone know why this guy deleted all his posts.