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Data-Lynx
12th Nov 2008, 07:45
Has anyone come across an Unclassified and apparently discarded draft amendment to Chapter 5 of JAP 100A-01 (http://www.jap100a-01.mod.uk/Jap(d)/engpolhtml.htm) (Military Aviation, Engineering Policy and Regulation)? If not, a valuable opportunity has been missed to enourage morale with some solid military direction. I mourn its passing but offer some extracts:
1.1 Introduction. Morale is the capacity of a unit to work together persistently and consistently in pursuit of a common purpose. It is therefore totally inappropriate in the Military Air Environment (MAE). Investigations by highly paid consultants have further revealed the presence of morale can result in accelerated aircraft corrosion and a worryingly low PVR rate. These consultants have since been contracted to monitor control of morale policy. Morale manifests itself in many ways in the MAE, most commonly displayed via humour, high spirits or even banter.
2.1 Control of morale. No single act will provide sufficient control of morale and a suite of measures are therefore required.

Constant rearrangement of organisations and working practices disrupt the formation of team spirit and slow the spread of effective bonding between co-workers. The regular posting of officers provides and ideal opportunity for this. On arrival at a new unit, officers are to undertake an immediate and fundamental change to the working practices of the unit. This is to be done within 10 working days of arrival, and the key element of surprise must not be squandered by discussing changes beforehand with personnel of the unit.

Information technology is to be exploited as far as possible to suppress the growth of morale. Microsoft PowerPoint has proved to be extremely effective in this respect. Presentations in excess of 1 hour delivered on a sufficiently regular basis can sap the morale from even the most determined team. If the subject of the presentation is of little or no relevance to the viewer than this method will prove doubly effective.
3. Supporting policies. The activities described at paragraph 2.1 are proven methods of controlling infestations of morale. This paragraph describes the actions taken by the MoD to support Front Line Command control of morale activity.

By removing those elements that exist to support workers in the MAE, feelings of team membership can be discretely eroded. The advent of JPA has been invaluable for its contribution in this respect. Problems that could once be solved quickly by visiting PSF can now be spun out over months as the individual can be passed between anonymous telephone voices almost indefinitely. This provides a background level of stress that will slowly crush the spirit.

On its own, JPA would prove insufficient. However DII will enhance JPA’s impact dramatically. By denying access to the start point for solving pay and administrative problems, the computer can say ‘no’ forever. The reduced levels of team bonding due to time spent trying to self-administer instead of in tea bars or playing flight sports provide a firm foundation for the effective control of morale.

4. Authority. This chapter is to be displayed publicly to certify that the Stn/Ship/Unit has recognised the threat posed by the presence of morale in the MAE.
In rejecting the draft, a senior officer (late of the AAC) noted: On a positive note I see that DE&S ISS have fully embraced this ethos with the formation of the SPOC and that they have taken the JPA helpdesk model and further improved on it to ensure that no morale is present within any organisation that uses CIS systems.

Pontius Navigator
12th Nov 2008, 08:23
ROTFLOL,

I love the footnote.

Unlike CCIS there seems no military input so when we had a security violation who do we talk to? The SPOC. Who caused the violation? Atlas.

Who investigates? Atlas.

Yeah right.