BackPacker
6th Nov 2008, 07:16
I hijacked a thread about aeros in general a few weeks ago, asking some questions about the CAP 10B/C. There were some comments on the wing there too, plus a reference to a really useful document.
As I remember, all aircraft with the "B" wing now suffer from a mandatory AD which adds a fatigue index to the aircraft leading to mandatory inspection if a threshold has been reached, and a first-time mandatory inspection in any case because of the past. Every time the g's exceed (as I remember) +5 or -3, this adds a point. When the point total becomes 60, an inspection is required, and it's a fairly complex and costly inspection to perform, requiring that the wing/undercarriage structure is taken off the airframe.
The same AD however specifies an alternative too... Fit the "C" wing. So apparently the "C" wing does not suffer from this.
I know the search function of PPRuNe is not all that great. Why limit the search to four characters minimum in a world full of three-letter acronyms? But with the info above, you might be able to dig out that original thread and link to the AD anyway.
Edited - it's this thread: http://www.pprune.org/private-flying/345489-aerobatic-pilot.html
AeroAdz
20th Nov 2009, 10:50
Below is a letter from the CAPTEN team (a French Connection tribute act) to Apex. In summary it sounds like they were pushing B owners to buy the C wing to cover up some shoddy manufacturing...yet they couldn't even get the C wing manufactured and fitted right. While you're still technically G-restricted in with the B model, if your aircraft is properly inspected and has aviation-grade wood you don't have to worry so much.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Biographical Note
Marianne Shaw
7-time National French aerobatic champion.
On the French international squad for 15 years (World champion team).
Breitling Masters ex- pilot and airshow coordinator
Instructor-Pilot, Designated Examiner (France)
Ex-Chief Pilot various Aeroclubs.
Author of JEUDI 12 "Une Vie a L'Envers" Choucas Press, Thones,1995
Adam Shaw
Ex-UPI Foreign Correspondent and Washington Post reporter
Ex-Asst. Chief Flt. Instr. U. of N. Dakota CAS (Taillwheel/Aerobatics)
Project Pilot Sabreliner Enhanced Flight Screener (Sia Marchetti SF 260)
Mudry Aviation (French Connection) Instructor.
CFIMEI/ 48441741 SEL, SES, Helicopter, Glider Aerobatic.
Author of SOUND OF IMPACT "The Legacy of TWA # 514" Viking Press New York 1977.
Guy Pelissier
Echarvines CEO
74290 Talloires, France APEX Aircraft
1, Route de Troyes
Darois, France
3 November 2006
VIA REGISTERED LETTER
Dear Mr. Pelissier:
As aerobatic Instructor-pilots, jointly totaling more 6000 (six thousand) hours of CAP 10 time in both France and the United States, and as successive owners of five CAP 10s (B # 43 F-BUDA, B # 85 F-BXHV, B # 196 N-270CA and B # 22 become B/C F-GNFE, and B # 122 F-GOUM now based in Annecy) and one CAP 231 (N3434F/F-GGYR), we feel it our duty to react to Service Bulletin Nº 060307 dated October 6, 2006 entitled “CAP 10 C- Wing - Main Spar - Central Spar Cap.” found posted on France Voltige’s website, not on APEX’s which remains astonishingly discreet on the subject...
Since this SB has not, to our knowledge, yet been made available to the United States’ FAA , or Great Britain’s CAA, though the problem has, we’ve been told, been known to APEX for at least 6 months, the translation below is therefore ours, and not official.
TIME OF COMPLIANCE
This SB must be applied within 50 hours of receipt of the SB. No snap rolls allowed until this SB has been applied. Yearly. (I month allowance): Inspection of Central Spar cap.
REASON
Discovery of “cracks” during central spar caps manufacturing/production process. These cracks are due to the wood’s drying.
For wings already in service, Apex Aircraft is putting into effect a solution to reinforce the spar caps and allow for inspection. The reinforcement is aimed at counteracting the cap’s shearing properties, and the inspection is to verify that the cracks to not propagate into the heart of the spar. Filling the cracks with epoxy glue will also be required to forestall humidity exchanges and slow the drying process.
Original French version
DELAI D'APPLICATION
Application de ce BS dans les 50 heures qui suivent la réception. Pas de déclenchés jusqu'à l'application du BS.
Tous les ans (tolérance 1 mois) : surveillance des criques de la cale centrale.
RAISON
Découverte en production de cales centrales de longeron de voilure criquées. Ces criques sont dues au séchage du bois.
Pour les voilures déjà en service, Apex Aircraft met en place une solution de renforcement et de
Having acquired the manufacturing rights, and the responsibility for continued airworthiness of Avion Mudry CAP aircraft, your company has done everything to entice CAP 10B owner/operators to change their wooden wings for “C” wings, a change we made, at great cost, for CAP10B SN # 22 F-GNFE in July 2002.
The aircraft was returned to service with its new wing by your Darois factory-- after long and unaccounted-for delays -- in, what proved to be, a grossly unsafe condition. With the work signed off by your factory, two flight were then performed by your test pilot, Mr. Muller. For reasons best known to him, during neither did he perform any “push-up” negative maneuvers. This lapse of test flight protocol for an aerobatic aircraft with design limitations of +6/-4.5 may have saved his life... Following a ferry flight back to Annecy in marginal weather, we discovered an APEX mechanic’s Phillips-head screwdriver nestled in the spar under the right seat control stick. Photographs of the screwdriver being extracted, and then examined by a stupefied airport commandant, representing the DGAC, are available.
The modifications and performance due to the new “C” wing then proved interesting: non-operative electric flap circuit breaker... loose wing farings... trim wheel rubbing on the elevator actuator rod... and unstable behavior, with a tendency to snaproll, during inverted pushes past vertical.
Your subsequent Communiqués, became a source of amazement. For example:
APEX 06.10.2003 Website Communiqué
Clearly no two wings behave exactly alike, but pilots have advised us of certain difficulties in completing certain (Negative-G) inverted maneuvers.... Apex’s research has shown that small variations in leading edges were of a nature to provoke these difficulties...”
- Communiqué d’APEX du 06.10.2003
"Il est clair que chaque aile n'a pas un comportement strictement identique mais des pilotes nous ont signalé des difficultés à passer certaines figures en négatif.... Les recherches menées chez Apex ont montré qu'une petite variation dans la réalisation du bord d'attaque était de nature à provoquer ces dificultés."
3.10 2003: Dominique Rolland ‘s (at the time an APEX executive and one of its two production test pilots) e.mailed answer to Adam’s questions about the leading edges:
“ From a strictly technical point of view, the certification process requires conformity in a certain number of areas which need not cover an aerobatic aircraft’s entire flight envelope. I am therefore not surprised that aircraft of the same type (make and model) can show slightly different in-flight characteristics. In the case which concerns us, it has to do with inverted flight and there, JAR 23 has no requirements!!! It can seem extraordinary, but that’s the way it is...
The case you mention is different: it is no longer the type certificate which is at issue, but only a few aircraft, and this due to differences provoked by a poorly-mastered production process. It is thus a production, and not a certification problem...”
“D'un point de vue strictement technique, la certification impose la conformité à un certain nombre d'exigences, qui sont loin de couvrir l'exhaustivité du domaine de vol d'un avion de voltige. Je ne suis donc pas étonné que des avions du même type puissent présenter des caractéristiques un peu différentes, en terme de qualités de vol. Dans le cas qui nous occupe, il s'agit de vol inversé et, la, la JAR 23 n'a aucune exigence !!! Cela peut paraitre énorme, mais c'est comme cela. ...
Le cas que tu évoques est encore différent : ce n'est pas le type certifié qui est en cause, mais quelques rares avions seulement, et du fait d'écarts provoqués par un procédé de fabrication mal maitrisé. Il s'agit donc d'un problème de production, et non de certification.”
APEX 15.04.2004 Web site Communiqué - CAP 10C Inverted Push-ups
“The SFACT has just approved modifications conceived by Apex Aircraft to eliminate the poor inverted flight performance of some carbon wings.
These modifications have to do with the bonding of the skin to the spar. Tooling and assembly process now allow to measurably improve the skin quality of the leading edge.
They are already in production.
The fleet will be brought up to standard in the following way:
The seven owners who have already advised us of this problem on their aircraft shall receive offers to have these modifications effected, in our workshops under warranty at the earliest possible convenience.
Seven our of Nine ( 7 out of 9) of the first CAP 10 C wings had non-standard leading edges. “Poorly mastered-production process” indeed...
COMMUNICATION SUR LE SITE WEB D’APEX- 15.05.04 REMONTEES DOS CAP10C
“Le SFACT vient d'approuver les modifications conçues par Apex Aircraft pour éliminer le manque de performance du comportement en vol dos de certaines ailes bois carbone (voir pour plus de détails le site de France Voltige).
Ces modifications concernent le retreint de collage du revêtement sur le longeron, les outillages et le process d'assemblage et permettent d'améliorer sensiblement la qualité du revêtement du bord d'attaque.
Elles sont déjà opérationnelles en production.
La mise à niveau de la flotte se fera de la manière suivante :
Les 7 propriétaires qui ont déjà signalés avoir constaté ce problème sur leur avion se verront proposer une application de ces modifications en garantie dans nos ateliers et dans les meilleurs délais.
Regarding CAP 10Cs, or Bs with “C” wings, two Airthworthiness Directives --F2004-144 and F2004-108-- (FAA version below because the Americans, as opposed to APEX, provide them online free of charge ) evoke potential manufacturing deficiencies, that is to say-- once again --”quality control” problems. To which you now add SB Nº 060307
Having closely monitored the history of all Avions Mudry CAPs, including incidents and accidents involving them, we are skeptical about the reasons behind the recent G-limitations your firm managed to have imposed on CAP 10B’s: .... +5/-3.5 in solo flight or +4.5/-3.5 with two aboard.
Reviewing the circumstances which you claim justified this, we are astonished- and we choose our words carefully-- that APEX ‘s communiques make no causal connection between the deadly wing separation accidents of CAP 10B sn # 275 registered as D-EXXY and CAP 10 B sn # 277 registered as F-GRIT. On May 6, 2006, when you could not have ignored the content of the report the NTSB would publish a month later on a third crash -- Texas, 2003-- you sent out an email to CAP 10 owners which simply said:
Accident Reports:
“ Final report not yet posted as of December 15, 2004 for the Texas accident of June 14, 2003. It should appear someday at the following link: NTSB June 2003 Prel <-link to Preliminary report Gladewater, TX Avions Mudry et Cie Cap 10B N80DD Fatal(1)
CAP10B #275, D-EXXY , 17 July 2001 German only: download large PDF 3X160, published December 2003 Found spar wood grain alignment variation more than 3.8%, suggested micro-cracking.1 4413 landings in 1099 hours. LBA restricted flight to Normal Category, and limited operations to paved, or very smooth runways. Later raised to 5g positive maneuvers.
French accident with no direct relation, but often mentioned for discussion: Mudry Cap 10, 14 mai 1999 à Chevru (77) au CAP 10B immatriculé F-GRIT. This airplane had previously seen 6.6 G, also heavy use in landing practice: 400 landings in 100 hours. PDF Chevru Francais”
Rapport final non encore diffusé au 15 décembre 2004, concernant l’accident au Texas le 14 juin 2003. Il devrait apparaître un jour sous le lien suivant : NTSB June 2003 Prel <-link to Preliminary report Gladewater, TX Avions Mudry et Cie Cap 10B N80DD Fatal(1)
CAP10B #275, D-EXXY , 17 Juillet 2001 Allemand uniquement : download large PDF 3X160, publié en décembre 2003
Report here (PDF 1,6 Mo)
Découverte de variation supérieure à 3,8% dans l’alignement des fibres, suggérant des micro-criques. 4413 atterrissages en 1099 heures.
LBA a limité le vol à la Catégorie Normal, et l’emploi à des pistes en dur, ou avec un revêtement de bonne qualité. Evolutions positives ramenées à 5G ultérieurement.
Accident en France sans relation directe, mais souvent mentionné lors des discussions/débats :
Mudry Cap 10, 14 mai 1999 à Chevru (77) au CAP 10B immatriculé F-GRIT. Cet avion avait auparavant atteint 6,6 G, et avait également été beaucoup utilisé pourl’entraînement aux atterrissages : 400 atterrissages en 100 heures. PDF Chevru Francais
A few comments:
* “No direct relation” between the accidents of sn # 275 and sn # 277 ?
*The conclusions in the two accident reports, and particularly the German one, are perfectly clear: both aircraft’s spars, or spar caps, included wood deemed unacceptable for aeronautical purposes.
* The BEA’s French accident report on CAP10B sn # 277 # F-GRIT which crashed on 14-05-1999 stated: “... it was noted that rupture of the lower spar cap preceeded that of the upper spar cap.... three out of five samples of the lower spar cap did not, in dynamic flex test, meet with the ( NF L17-996) standard.”
* Released in December 2003, the Accident Report on CAP10B sn # 275 D-EXXY, (crashed on 17-07-2001) by Germany’s BFU-- equivalent of the French Bureau Enquete d’Accident, (BEA), or the American NTSB --expressly states, under the paragraph Luftfahrzeug: “Analysis by the specialized WKI laboratory determined that the manufacturing quality of the samples found did not meet aeronautical standards.”
* The Geman report then repeatedly mentions samples of wood fibers whose angles of 8º (eight degrees) largely exceeded the authorized 4.3º (four point three degrees) stipulated by NF L 170996 standards.
* Belying Apex’ communiqué stating “the aircraft was used for intensive landing training on a runway of mediocre quality,” the German report specifically mentions that the aircraft’s was based at an airport (EDRT) with a concrete runway.” Hard landings, or excessive speed in entering flick rolls, were not the issue.
Given the proximity of the serial numbers (# 275 and # 277) of two aircraft which suffered wing-separations, the first, and obvious, question should be: were the Korean Air Force (CAP 10b sn # 273 and sn # 274) and the owner/operators of CAP 10B sn# 276 G-RIFN and CAP 10 B sn # 278 N73AE ex F-GNVN , made aware by APEX, of a potential manufacturing and quality-control problem? And if so, on what date(s)?
By your own admission (26 September 2003 APEX Communiqué below) an insufficiently explicit Service Bulletin # 16 was partly responsible for the deadly crash of CAP 10B N80DD in Texas. This SB has now- finally -been made explicit. Problem solved. The other cause, according to the NTSB, was the poor execution of SB 16, with damage made to the spar cap while opening the inspection area on that aircraft.
(In retrospect, the directions in the SB 16 did not address the serious implication of mistakenly gouging the spar cap when exposing the inspection area. The fatal Texas left wing failure originated at an old crack which passed through two of the five laminates of the top spar cap. The crack occurred at the outboard edge of the inspection area, where the router made a slight cut, less than 2 mm deep, into the spar. When over stressed, the spar cracked at this spot, which was hidden and slightly displaced from the expected area.
Rétrospectivement, les directives insérées dans le BS 16 n'ont pas insisté sur les implications graves d’une détérioration involontaire de la semelle de longeron lors de la réalisation de l’ouverture d’inspection. La rupture de l’aile gauche au Texas a eu pour origine une crique ancienne qui a traversé deux des cinq lames de bois constituant la semelle extrados de longeron. La crique est apparu sur le bord extérieur de la zone d’inspection, à l’endroit ou la défonceuse a fait une légère entaille, de moins de 2mm de profondeur, dans le longeron. )
Three questions beg answers:
1) Why have accidents or incidents clearly caused by defective material used in manufacturing the spar, or spar cap, and/or accidents clearly resulting from defective inspection and/or repairs on a handfull of aircraft, resulted in limiting the flight envelope of all CAP 10Bs, even those (1) constructed of aeronautically sound materials that are (2) properly inspected and maintained?
2) Having tried to prove that wooden wings were not reliable-- if safety is indeed your primary concern-- how could/can you allow APEX to manufacture “C” wings which do not meet quality control specifications ? Are you truly interested in properly producing this aircraft?
3) Why has it taken you six months to issue Service Bulletin Nº 060307 when production and quality control problems (... once again...) apparently existed since March? What suddenly, in October, prompted APEX to forbid snaprolls in all “C” winged CAPs?
We were also surprised that a pilot, Mr. Regis Alajouanine-- and not APEX-- had to commission and assume financial responsibility for the engineering study, testing, and validation of the modification which allowed CAP 232s to regain their airworthiness certificates?
Well aware of CAP history from Beynes to Bernay -- from the first CAP 10s through the 20s, 230, 231s and 232s, and on to the mysterious blaze which ravaged the factory in December 1995, followed by your subsequent “fire-sale” purchase of all the type certificates and parts, the ensuing “loss” of many of qualified workers, and your various well-documented financial and judicial reorganizations -- we now wonder what surprises the future has in store for the CAP 10.
Not being an airman, it must be difficult for you to grasp what an extraordinary aircraft Auguste Mudry and Jean-Marie Klinka created out of Claude Piel’s Emeraude... Some airplanes have, over time, proven to be exceptional; the Breguet XIV, DC-3, B-707, Caravelle, Concorde, C-172 , D-140, and the J3 APEX p.6
Cub spring to mind. The CAP 10B has a place in such a list. Current and future pilots deserve that it keep flying. Safely. To the edges of its envelope.
Sincerely yours,
Adam Shaw Marianne Shaw
ps: Do not be surprised to find government agencies and pilots copied below. Of the Certifying Authorities we ask the following two questions:
A) Given the background for the recent CAP 10B limitations described in this letter, is there any technically valid reason to forbid a CAP 10B-- whose wing has been widely and fully opened, inspected and, if need be. repaired, to “original condition” by an approved workshop -- to regain the original DGAC- certified flight envelope ( +6 -4.5)?
B) How can APEX retain its manufacturing type certificate for the CAP 10C if it cannot reliably manufacture a simple, light. two-seat, prop-driven aircaft from aeronautical-standard materials. and to identical specifications?
cc: Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile (France)
EASA
Federal Aviation Administration (USA)
National Transportation Safety Board (USA)
Civil Aviation Authority (GB)
Office Fédéral de l’Air (Switzerland)
France Voltige
AOPA (france) Président Patrick Charrier, also aircraft insurer.
Michel Mudry, Bernard Chabbert
Aero-news.net
Ref:
(a) BFU’s D-EXXY accident report. (In German.) :
www.france-voltige.org/Docs/Rapport_Cap10B_BFU_D_EXXY_17juil01_Bericht_3X160-0.pdf (http://www.france-voltige.org/Docs/Rapport_Cap10B_BFU_D_EXXY_17juil01_Bericht_3X160-0.pdf)
(b) BEA’s F-GRIT accident report (in French)
www.bea-fr.org/docspa/1999/f-it990514/pdf/f-it990514.pdf (http://www.bea-fr.org/docspa/1999/f-it990514/pdf/f-it990514.pdf)
(c) APEX’s website accident discussion (French and English):
www.apexaircraft.fr/cap10bsparwebpage%20cap10bspar%202006%20May%20GB.htm (http://www.apexaircraft.fr/cap10bsparwebpage%20cap10bspar%202006%20May%20GB.htm)
'Chuffer' Dandridge
20th Nov 2009, 12:25
I'd go for the 10C anyday... If it's operated in a club environment, as the Tiger Club's is, then it makes sense, because you never know what the up and coming aerobatic 'aces' do to the machine when away from watchful eyes. I hear that Sherburn Aero Club had a 10B model which was overstressed and had to go back to the factory.... A recording G Meter is mandatory for the C and anyone exceeding club limits should be shot! Skill and empathy with the aeroplane maketh a good aerobatic pilot, not excessive G...
The only downside is that you have to paint the wing upper surface white, or have a white stripe along the top surface of the spar if its any other colour, which kind of ruins any fancy schemes..
But all in all a good all round machine, never gonna win at unlimited or advanced though.. Good tourer as well:ok:
BarnacleBill
5th Jan 2010, 19:25
I came across this thread while researching a new plane for our company.
Normally I'm to be found over on African Aviation.
We have a small AOC in Uganda - C210, PC-12, 2 x Fujis, C188, C401...
We (well, me, actually) are looking for a taildragger for lead into the C188, an aero machine that's a step up from the Fujis, and something me and the Mrs can pop off to Lodges with for the weekend. It must also have a TCDS and ideally a bit nippy so that on routes we can provide the cheapest means of moving a single pax.
So after researching and checking the CAP 10b popped up at the top of the list. Others were Decathlon (bit slow) and Extras (no room for bags and much more money.
Have looked into all the AD issues and mandatory SBs and have found what seems like a good one in France.
So this is a bit like the reading of the bans... does anyone have good reason to say DON'T BUY ONE? :=
Will be grateful for thoughts. :)
Also, anyone have a POH for a wobbly prop Fuji FA-200 180 (wobbly prop)? Ours is in German and the CAA here don't like that.
Zulu Alpha
17th Jun 2011, 08:38
gs, you didn't say what you intend to do with the CAP10C. If you want a nice tourer that you can do gentle aerobatics with, then it is a great machine. It is OK as a regular aerobatic mount, but does have fairly low limits which must be observed rigorously.
The C wing has strips of carbon fibre on the top and bottom of the spar to reinforce it.
The 10B is just wood and some have suffered from stress fractures, particularly when old and overstressed.
The general opinion is that the C wing is OK.
Flick manoeuvres stress the rear of the fuselage and the 10B and 10C are the same here, so its important not to exceed the flick limiting speed. Unfortunately, a recording G meter won't let you know this.
It isn't as strong as a Pitts or Extra and isn't as capable aerobatically, however it is a more comfortable tourer.
So, the decision comes down to what aerobatics you and the other owners perform. If you are all wanting to do flicks and gyroscopic figures and very little other than aeros it might not be the best machine.