Flying at Night

[Special 25]

I started a thread about 3 years ago, discussing the perceived increased dangers of flying at night and did other forum users consider those risks to be acceptable for revenue passenger flights offshore. I would say that the general opinion was 'Yes' if done correctly, and with a well trained crew, night flying was no different to flying by day, just an extra level of care to be taken.

As I say, 3 years later and we seem to be having a spate of offshore accidents, all of which (and I'm afraid I don't have any statistics on front of me to back this up) seem to have an night time element. Within a year of my original discussion we had the tragic Morcombe Bay crash, then the Jigsaw SAR machine ditched in Den Helder. I believe there was a mysterious ditching in Nigeria with the loss of those on board, then recently we have had Abu Dahbi (OK, some well recognised problems there) and the Dubai 212 incident, both in the last month or so.

None of these accident reports have so far been released so I know I'm going to get jumped on, but Morcombe Bay looks like a good, competent crew losing visual references at night. Jigsaw has not been fully explained but I certainly heard that a few fingers were being unfairly pointed at the crew quite early on, and I wonder if it being night time added an element of confusion and was a factor in their decision to ditch - Obviously not many of us would make a conscious decision to ditch at night, so I've no doubt that the crew felt they had a real problem and had little choice. The two Middle East accidents , one looks like an inexperienced pilot and the other is so far without explanation but if there is any early hypothesis, it would be that the aircraft drifted backwards and clipped its tail rotor on a crane - Yes, hypothesis and assumption I know.

Couple all of these with the high profile onshore accidents. The Russian Oil Exec down in Bournemouth, Mathew Harding (OK, both quite a few years ago now), Philip Carter and family last year - All of which were headline news, all at night, with the aircraft seemingly perfectly serviceable. The last report not officially released yet. I know there is a thread running about Medevac operations in the States at night after the S-76 crash last month.

No doubt, someone will blow my argument away with statistics, but I measure these against a backdrop of other accidents and I really don't know of many accidents by day. Yes onshore, Colin McRae's terrible accident made headline news and is unexplained. Offshore, I know of a couple of fatal accidents at night going back, but I can't really think of many by day at all, and if you think of incidents like the Bristow Helicopter that got struck by lightning and made a successful autorotative ditching, the odds of that being so successful by night are practically zero.

I wish I had some accurate statistics to back up my argument here, but it seems to me that night flying accounts for less than 5% of annual flying hours, but at that same time seems to play a large part in over 70% of offshore accidents. Surely we can't keep pretending that we are offering our clients and passengers the same level of safety by night that they get during the day ???

[Um... lifting...]

Certainly no expert on the topic, but as regarding flying passengers at night, I guess my first question would have to be... why? What competitive advantage is to be gained? I guess in the N. Sea it may be because the daytime is so very short in the winter.
There are a lot of factors which probably would weigh the accident statistics, whatever those happen to be. A couple off the top of my head include:
1) Proficiency. Since, as you point out, we don't fly that much at night, whether we like it or not, we're not that good at it, at least not when compared to day abilities. When instructing regularly at night back in a former life and flying a substantial percentage of my hours after dark, my proficiency level was quite high, but I was never under the illusion that there were not things out there ready to bite if it all went pear-shaped. This argument has two sides, really. Since, as you point out, we don't fly that much at night, we're probably not that proficient. However, if we did it more, we'd probably become more so. Current percentages would probably skew the statistics toward a higher accident rate and higher ones would probably move the rate lower, but again the operative question is why do you want to do it in the first place?
2) Fatigue, Circadian rhythms, and Reverse Cycle Operations. See FedEx. They have an entirely different crewing model than an operator who mostly flies during the day. This issue almost nipped FedEx in the bud before it ever started... nobody would insure them with a standard airline crewing model.
3) Emergencies. While the crew may be capable of ditching the machine day or night, the elephant in the room is what about the pax? The after-landing part of the ditching is probably going to be messy.
4) For what little it may be worth, the U.S. Navy prohibits overwater passenger transport flights in helicopters at night.

[Mel Effluent]

Special 25,

The statistics that I have seen indicate that the accident rate for offshore flying at night is about 5 times greater than that during the day, so it makes sense to avoid night passenger transport whenever possible. That said, this is likely to be very difficult to achieve during the winter at high latitudes.

I suggest that it is inappropriate to make a direct comparison with fixed wing operations, as there are fewer variables (typically instrument approaches to a well-lit runway) than in offshore rotary wing flights. I believe that good training and SOPs can be very effective in reducing the risk, but not enough to equate with day flying.

[Special 25]

In response to the above, yes experience does count for a lot. I seem to remember that one of the oil companies insisted that we carry out 3 take-offs and landings at night every 90 days, until we pointed out that just couldn't be done from April through September in Scotland, and they backed down !! Crews used to shuttle in the Brent many years ago and found they became far more confident and proficient at night flying - Still that 1st flight after 2 weeks off or the first week when the nights came in in October were still a bit of a shock !!

I agree that high latitudes do present a problem, but not a huge one. Even at the very worst part of winter, there is daylight from about 08:00 to 16:00, slightly less way up north in the Shetlands (if I remember rightly, its about 08:30 to 15:30) and is only this bad for about 3 weeks. I've always felt that flying at night is fine, it is the deck operations, shuttling etc that pose the greatest risk. Imposing a curfew on night decks still provides that additional 30 minutes (minimum) either side of night to allow the aircraft to take off at night and arrive at dawn, or depart the deck at dusk and arrive back at the airport at night. So, even in those shortest days in December, there are at least 8 good flying hours to get the work done - Yes, you miss probably a whole rotation in the afternoon, but this is public transport we're talking about, you don't need those flights - For 2 months in the winter, you could easily put on more flights at the weekend and I think safety would be improved.

Interesting to note the US Navy do not allow pax flights at night over water. I worked in Africa for a while where a number of oil companies there seemed to have recognised the risk and will not allow helicopter flights at night, whilst we here in the UK don't seem to have made the connection. Perhaps it is because at least 2 of the helicopter operators (certainly historically and I assume still) offer cheaper slots later in the day.

[topendtorque]

It's all about to become old hat, well in 2016 anyway.
That is when the helicopter accidents are going to be reduced by 80%.

This is according to some an article in our latest Flight Safety digest. it's a dialouge of motherhood statements, mouthed by some procative flight, er, international helicopter saftey team to be precise.

There's a whole new set of acromyns to feast on, JHSIT, JHSAT and IHST to start with. Gees i thought that I was reading an article on global warming there for a while. It remeinds me of one fruitloop prime minister we had out here, who once said that No child will live in Povrty by sometime before now.????????

[Shawn Coyle]

Night flying (outside of flying over built up areas with lights) has to be considered to be instrument flying.
There is no way to orient the helicopter's attitude, height or position with respect to references on the ground.
The problem then becomes comparing instrument flying as we've come to know it with helicopter instrument flying. In most instrument flying, the purpose is to maneuver yourself to a position where you can transition to visual references to land, and the landing is going to be to a well defined piece of turf, typically a lit runway.
Once we realize that, we'll think more carefully about helicopter flying at night, especially to places like oil rigs in the middle of nowhere with a confusion of lights, most of which have little to do with the helicopter.
As for the other places where there have been problems with flying at night - just consider a fixed wing airplane in the same situation and consider the differences.
Sorry for the general nature of the discussion, but it would take too much room to discuss each accident (and I don't have all the details either).

[Pullharder]

Love this one....every year I still can't believe we fly to rigs at night!!!:ugh:
I am curious that if they found oil/gas today and not 30+ years ago, would the CAA authorize night offshore flying nowdays with everything we know/risk assessment etc??
Flying a S76 with it's limited visibility makes landing on rigs difficult, add in the fact that the southern North sea NUI's are very small,limited lighting, very low to the ocean, no wind, S76 power margin and hover OGE capability when heavy: NIL.... then throw in poor vis at night and hey presto:{ (what the hell are we doing here)!!! Chances for pilot error with all the above factors thrown in, well, you know the answer to that....and the outcome...Are the CAA asleep when it comes to regulating the N.Sea???? How many Morecombe Bays do they need(I know the OFFICIAL report isn't out yet but I think we all know what happened, may those people rest in peace).
As some above said, why can't we fly during daylight and the workers just have to have slightly shorter days??:confused: Why can't we as pilots organize against this? We know whats best when it comes to flying and how difficult it can be.
Fly safe everyone.
PH.

[spinwing]

Mmmmm ....

"Hear Hear" absolutely agree!

:D

[John Eacott]

Crews used to shuttle in the Brent many years ago and found they became far more confident and proficient at night flying - Still that 1st flight after 2 weeks off or the first week when the nights came in in October were still a bit of a shock !!

I don't recall it that way: we were mostly a bunch of ex RN types, and didn't have the good sense to be concerned :p Mid winter shuttles when there was 70 hours in the logbook for the fortnight, and not a day entry among them, were nearly all inter rig/platform with less than a few hundred yards transit. You led back into night flying after summer, but there was plenty of spare light around the platforms to help keep good orientation. Lots of landings per hour, plenty of opportunity to maintain currency and proficiency :ok:

I understand the 'risk assessment' attitude has changed over the years, but do the requirements of operating in the northern NS with only 7 hours of daylight mid winter not call for a higher standard of currency training, rather than the apparent call to mitigate risk by banning altogether?

[Special 25]

John, I see what you're saying, and agree that times just seemed to be different back then - But don't forget, there was an accident during that time, where a 212 flew into the water when the viz came down. Regulations just weren't that important, and the rule book was written as we went along.

Now safety is paramount, we are 'Public Air Transport' and that in turn denotes a certain high standard. It isn't a question of whether we can improve the training, there just aren't enough night decks available for crews to be current enough to be safe and it isn't like the shuttling on the Brent where, as you say, you could do hundreds of night deck landings in a 2 week period.

The questions are, is it safe enough to fly at night, and secondly, do we actually need to take those risks, or can the passenger transports be accomplished in a safer manner - ie. during daylight hours.

[Um... lifting...]

The old risk-management model I once taught and had a hand in developing back in the old (but not too old) days had five ways by which you could deal with risk (it was SAR mostly, but you can come up with other means of mitigation in other type operations).
Avoid
Spread Out
Transfer
Accept
Reduce

Handily, the acronym is ASTAR... I wanted RASTA, but the powers-that-be had no sense of fun at all and I was dealt a crushing defeat.

My organization's prior risk-management model was somewhat simpler...
Accept

John... sounds a lot like how you came up!:eek:

[Shawn Coyle]

I often wonder what ever happened to Richard Walker's Firefly approach lighting system - seemed like a good idea over 10 years ago.
For those who don't know what it was - a VASIS like system that was adjustable for azimuth and elevation (using a radio code) that would give you the flashing green (high) green (on appropriate approach angle), red (slightly below) and flashing red (too low), just like a runway VASIS / PAPI.

[Gomer Pylot]

I agree with Shawn, you have to accept the fact that it's all instrument flying at night offshore, from hover to skids down. It can be done, and is being done, but it's not nearly as safe as daylight flying. I've had SICs try to fly into the water on downwind to an isolated rig, and I've had them unable to complete an approach to landing, even after several tries. The approach and landing are as demanding as anything I've ever done. I enjoyed the challenge when I was doing it, but I was very careful during every flight, right up to engine shutdown. As to why, there is one reason, and it's the standard one. Money. Money drives everything.

[SASless]

Special25,

Interesting question pertaining to night flight and the increased accident rate....exactly the debate American helicopter EMS operators are having....or having thrust upon them by the media, insurance companies, and the FAA.

Flying in the dark over unlighted areas is more hazardous than doing the same thing in the day light...that is no surprise.

The Brent may have had plenty of lights...but the Ninian when it was being built certainly did not. Shuttling about that place in the Winter was a real treat.

But...as John states....with exposure....one gains a certain level of comfort and it does not seem as difficult as when called upon to do the odd night flight.

The thought of a forced uncontrolled night ditching (read crash)....has got to be the worst experience we face....throw in cold water, total darkness, rough seas....and the old paycheck looks mighty skimpy sometimes.

[TheVelvetGlove]

I agree that flying approaches to structures, rigs and vessels off-shore at night is considerably more harrowing- and it is definitely not a piece of cake in the S-76. But night flying in the USA in the GOM is generally limited to patient transport and cargo (at least with my company)- we rarely ever transport personnel off-shore at night.

The SAR factor has always bothered me as well, especially when going out deep.

I do not see a valid reason why personnel need to be moved at night. Seems ridiculous to me.

[Shawn Coyle]

On the other hand, if we had great instrument guidance to a 5' hover (equivalent to a FW doing a Category II ILS) that might reduce the accident rate.
I remember doing Differential GPS approaches in an S-76 in 1998 to a 50' hover. Where are these now???

[Special 25]

So there seems to be general agreement, that flying at night is more difficult and therefore riskier than flying by day, and this would presumably account for the considerably higher accident rate that we seem to have for flights in the hours of darkness.

As above, I have always considered night flights as instrument approaches and you can usually get in pretty close to a rig as a 'numbers exercise' and then hopefully it is a case of looking up when you have a fair amount of visual reference with a well trimmed aircraft. Still not easy though, prone to error, making that switch from IFR to VFR, and I pity the poor guys in the S-76. I remember in the late 70's we had single pilot at night in the S-76, trying to do cross-deck landings with the nose 10' up in the air !! I never did that and was quite happy not to have done, but at that time, there was a general shrugging of shoulders and acceptance of 'well, thats what we do'. It took a while for enough grumblings to change the situation and common sense to prevail.

As with this. Anyone who shuts down offshore now is made clearly aware of the safety culture and how safety is now coming first in everything we are doing in this industry. I'm pretty confident that the Oil management that call up these flights have no real concept of the difference between daylight and night flying, they assume it is just a bus service and we as helicopter operators give them that confidence that you can have a helicopter shuttle any time of day - "we'll even make it cheaper for you at night" !! Sadly, when we had this thread a couple of years ago we said that there is going to be an inevitable accident doing this, and then sure enough, within 15 months there was. But still very few questions were asked, no questioning why a good, well trained crew could find an approach so difficult that 9 people lost there lives, or asking, if this had been daylight would the accident have happened ?? I'll have to bite my lip slightly as I am aware we still don't have the full report even after 2 years.

It seems to me that as helicopter operators we used to carry out about 3 rotations with everything back in the hanger by 4pm, before we sold these later slots at a knocked down price. I accept that these later flights provide for a more efficient use of aircraft, but at the same time ......

You now have aircraft routinely flying at night from Sept to April
There is less time for engineers to inspect aircraft
There is considerably less availability of aircraft for training
We are bringing passengers back at 21:30 or later which obviously disrupts their onward travel and time off.

There seem to be many downsides, it clearly isn't as safe as we would like our service to be and as far as positives go, there seems to be just one - As someone said above - Money, Money, Money

[wobble2plank]

Just an aside,

In the RN we were only allowed to transfer passengers at night, over water if they had completed dunker training for underwater escape. Fairly sensible approach considering the only people to get out of the Scilliy Islands S61 were dunker trained.

As to rig approaches at night then I, personally, don't see the problem. As long as the flight is well briefed and one of the pilots is experienced there is no difference in a rig approach than to, say, a tricky confined area landing or a night deck landing.

Experience is the key here, as the airlines soak up the experienced pilots due to better T&C's (hard to imagine but alas true, me included), better working hours and a more stable roster then the guys/gals left flying the line will suffer from the loss of experienced pilots. With the current down turn in the aviation industry it will be interesting to see if people will move or 'ride it out' with their current employer.

W2P

(2000+ deck and rig landings :} )

[Horror box]

This promotes a very good debate on the safety of operating at night, and I have to agree in general with most of the points that have been made. Whilst over the years many good steps have been made in the area of flight safety by operators, especially in the North Sea, night flying is not one of them. This is an area that must be addressed to the customer though, as they are the driving force behind the scheduling, and if they do not understand the risks, they should be educated. A good example being the S92 flying around without the Sea State 6 floats wired up, yet it will regularly fly over waters considerably greater than Sea State 6. What really are the chances of the oil companies pax all making it home alive in the event of a ditching/sinking aircraft. Risk mitigation or complacency driven by commercial pressure? Who is at fault here - the customer or the operator or both? Flying around knowing that you have very little chance of survival in the event of a ditching strikes me as incredibly naive, and I am amazed it can be certified. There are certain areas of the North Sea where there are still shuttle aircraft every night, making up to 15 landings or more, and this is actually increasing, all driven by a customer who has little regard for real safety considerations. Whilst flight safety is now becoming very organised and prominent amongst aviation companies, the same cannot be said for all of our customers, and now is the time to open the doors to dialogue. Invariably when an incident or accident occurs, the customer is the first to start pointing fingers at pilots, and calling for sackings but perhaps they should start looking inward as well.

[Horror box]

As to rig approaches at night then I, personally, don't see the problem. As long as the flight is well briefed and one of the pilots is experienced there is no difference in a rig approach than to, say, a tricky confined area landing or a night deck landing.


The main problem is that briefing 15-18 landings 6 hours before is not always particularly effective. Secondly in certain aircraft - it doesnt matter how experienced you are, if you are sitting in the opposite side to landing, there is nothing you can see at all as to what reference the other pilot has to the deck. With a 60kt wind, a x-deck landing is not an option!

[wobble2plank]

Horror Box,

I see the problem but that is, surely, where the experience of the Captain comes into play. If the visual cues are not good enough for the Captain to judge if the approach and landing is viable, from either seat, then throw it away.

[Horror box]

I see the problem but that is, surely, where the experience of the Captain comes into play. If the visual cues are not good enough for the Captain to judge if the approach and landing is viable, from either seat, then throw it away.

I hear what you are saying, and that should be the case, but unfortunately it is not always like that. In the S92 for example, 95% of the time the NHP cannot see anything of the final approach to land on a deck due to the set-up of the cockpit windows and spars etc.. It is an unfortunate design for rig landings, but it is the aircraft more and more of us use now. The customer has demanded it! If the captain was to only allow a landing when he had good visual cues then he would be the only one landing!

[Special 25]

I'd agree with Horror Box. Not flown the 92 but certainly the S-61 and AS332 have limited viz across the cockpit. Obviously 50% of the night time landings would be mine, of the other 50% I'd say I would have 'satisfactory' visual cues only about half of them - So (not scientific I know) but I guess we'd have to throw away about a quarter of all landings, and I often feel when landing offshore that I would like to throw at least that many - Not to mention my own cock-ups !!

In summary, even as an experienced Captain, I am placing a lot of faith in a potentially new, perfectly well trained but inexperienced co-pilot. Whilst I may be able to assess ground speed and rates of descent to see when it has really gone pear-shaped, when they are looking good, that still only gives me a guide that he or she has got it in hand and is making a safe approach to the deck - They could be headed for a crane for all I know, I'm unlikely to be able to see it.

[wobble2plank]

Sorry, I think you missed the fact that I was talking about difficult approaches in difficult conditions.

Allowing the Co Pilot to land in normal conditions where the various hazards and obstacles can, initially, be view from the approach gives me no cause for concern. Trying to do such an approach and landing at night with a howling cross wind, precipitation and a moving deck would give me concerns!

I found the S61 quite good for cross cockpit, but then I'm quite tall so I could look well across the seat!

Judgment, as always, is a quality that we must all hone as without practice there will be no experience.

[Shawn Coyle]

How many transport category fixed wing landings are done where only one pilot has a view of the runway...
Another difference we often forget!

[Gomer Pylot]

W2P, how many of those 2000 landings were at night? It's an entirely different world in the dark. I did 2000 offshore landings in 2 months once, but they were all in the daytime. I have a couple of thousand or so in the dark, and I can assure you that it's far more difficult at night. Easy enough to say throw it away, but you either do the job or quit. I'm currently flying night EMS approaches to unprepared scenes, single pilot, and IMO it's far easier to do this than to do 2 pilot rig approaches at night. YMMV.

[wobble2plank]

Gomer,

A large amount of those deck landings (40% or so) were at night to moving single spot ships flying single pilot operations and often having to use cross cockpit references in bad weather, so I think I'm up to speed on that one.

I have also flown as a SAR commander in both Scotland in the highlands and other places around Europe also using unprepared, unlit landing sites often in mountainous terrain and not using NVG or night sun.

I am well aware of the 'press on itis' that our professional pride causes us. But I have also had to throw away approaches or, in the case of SAR ops, opt for a more difficult approach and hover based upon tighter limits as the co-pilot expressed that the situation was out of his comfort zone. Fair call on them but the pressing needs of SAR required lateral thinking.

The responsibility for the aircraft, passengers and crew lies solely on the shoulders of the aircraft Captain. If the weather factors preclude a safely conducted landing then chuck it away. Better than swimming back to the board of inquiry.

W2P

PS, fixed wing flying is a doddle compared to SAR ops and the auto land thingy is great, the runways don't move, pitch or roll and are, generally, very long. Not really a snag and if the cross wind is out of limits, don't land. The book they throw if it goes wrong is very, very heavy.

[Horror box]

I think we have diverged a little from the original debate into a bit of a dick swinging contest, and whilst I still agree with a great deal W2P has to say, I do think that reality these days can be a bit different, and CRM must be that much better when flying at night. In the old days when I flew Lynx, it really wasnt much of a problem to land x-cockpit, and actually it was also possible in a (but difficult) Puma, but definitely not in an S92, difficult in a 76, and I am guessing also very challenging in a 139. Here is where the problem begins. In an aircraft with good vis, it is a lot easier for the NHP to spot when things are going wrong. As we all know, it can go wrong very quickly, especially with disorientation, and it can happen anywhere, including very close to the deck. It can also take some time for the pilot to recognise this, and in certain circumstances, that can be the fatal factor. Now, if the captain cant see what is going on, the co-pilot (or other way round) is slow to recognise the problem then things get a lot worse, very quickly. I have experienced disorientation myself at night, during an approach, so I know how quickly the picture can go from perfect to completely wrong. The worst one was on relatively short finals to a deck, marginal (certainly not bad) weather, with fairly good viz. I have done 1000's night decks/CA's/mountains. I was lucky enough to spot it fairly quickly and didnt press on, and went around. This is definitely not always the case. I have never been disorientated the same way during the day, in any conditions.

The simple law of averages will lead you to the conclusion that after x number of SD occurrences sooner or later one will go wrong. Can you train for this? Yes - maybe to a certain degree. Will it happen again? Yes definitely. Will it cause another crash? Yes very likely. How do we avoid it in future? Improved technology (approach systems), better CRM procedures, SD training, better cockpit design, better deck design, finally - dont fly at night. All cost money - fact. Which is the cheapest? I dont know, but if nothing is done I suspect we will see more aircraft crash whilst flying to decks at night.

[wobble2plank]

Horror Box,

I totally agree, I think the perspective has gone away from landing at night to landing in atrocious conditions. If that's thread creep then sorry, I am probably guilty as charged.

Night ops in benign or marginal weather is no problem. Things only start to get my neck hairs up when the weather deteriorates to such a degree that aircraft physical limitations are being put to the test. Would I let the Co-Pilot land in those conditions when I couldn't judge the landing site suitability, hazards or movement? Probably not, but that's a personal thing.

No dick waving intended, I think we just got a little cross wired in our discussion.

:)

W2P

[Special 25]

OK, so we're back on thread !!

Hats off to Gomer flying EMS at night - Not something I think we do much in the UK and probably for good reason. I guess in well lit areas it probably doesn't pose too much of a problem, but most of those areas have a hospital within a short enough drive anyway !! Anyway, fly safe.

As to offshore, agreed, i've flown on some really great nights. Nice still air, not too many other aircraft about, ATC giving you whatever you want. Trouble is, as nights set in, so does the winter weather. Some people I've discussed this with have suggested different limits for public transport night flying, ie 10km viz and cloud base 1000 ft, but I can see us unable to fly on so many nights it would make it unworkable.

I'd personally like to see a ban on offshore deck operations at night - Permitting the transit of aircraft to and from offshore during darkness, but actual landings and take-offs prohibited due to the fact I just don't feel that the safety margins are there. There seems to be quite a bit of support for the idea that flying offshore at night isn't really safe enough, but there doesn't seem to be much feedback from the other camp. Are there pilots who feel it can be done with the level of safety we have managed to achieve with daylight flying ?? Last time this thread was raised, I seem to remember there were quite a few pilots who seemed to enjoy the challenge of a night deck, but then that thread really did become a testosterone fueled debate !!

[Horror box]

Some good points there 25. I enjoy flying nights and 99% of the time feel in my comfort zone. The problem comes in that 1%. I do a lot of night decks, so as winter moves on become more comfortable (complacent??). I 100% agree with you on the statement about margins though. Whilst most of us are happy at night 99% of the time, what about that time when something goes wrong as you are departing into the black. Daytime - no problem, but a dark night, even a fairly small problem can be enough to tip the balance, especially if maybe you are a bit heavy, no wind, and the radios are busy. We have all been there. Add some more regular distraction, and the margins are very thin indeed. So if we can agree on this, and get the customers to agree, or at least understand, where do we go from here? I think the idea about increasing the minima for night flying is a good way of starting to increase the margin. 10k / 1000' - maybe. at least heading in the right direction. Shuttling at night with over 10 stops, in marginal weather is a good example of where perhaps more control with the use of minima and or number of stops (not necessarily no. of hours) could be effective. Fatigue is certainly a big factor here, and serves to greatly reduce the ability of pilots. I still catch myself thinking on occasion, on dark, stormy nights, we really are in the sh1t if it goes pear here!
Good debate though - keep it coming.

[JohnDixson]

I assume the accident statistics are accurate, and was thinking that some decades ago, the same could have probably been said within the fixed wing community.

So, what could the Helicopter Industry do to drive the safety performance to equality for day and night?

The fixed wing people have used:

Technology
Crew Training/Certificationto great success.

I'd offer that this is a solvable problem awaiting action.

John Dixson

[Horror box]

So, what could the Helicopter Industry do to drive the safety performance to equality for day and night?

The fixed wing people have used:
Technology
Crew Training/Certification
to great success.

Totally agree. Not flying at night is a non-starter IMO. We would be hugely limiting ourselves, and our usefulness to the customer. It can and is being done safely in some ops. As stated in a previous post - technology, training, CRM are probably the way ahead. Now lets just smash the piggy banks and find some cash!

[Um... lifting...]

There are a few nuts to be cracked here, but the cross-cockpit thingie is a fairly major one I should think. If you're headed to a fixed platform with significant structure (which would be most of 'em) and it's blowing substantially, at the current state of the art there's really only one seat who can safely land with sufficient cues and able to clear obstacles (regardless of pilot height... "Hello love, I'm not really this tall, I'm just sitting on my wallet..."), unless somebody starts redesigning offshore platforms. By the time the copilot is good enough at conning the captain in for a landing including closure rates and obstacles, the copilot is probably good enough to be making the landing.
As was pointed out above, with a runway in front, the captain pretty much has the choice of making the landing virtually always.
Instrumentation and approaches, the technology is certainly there, but what do you do if the captain doesn't trust the copilot to make the actual landing but yet due to conditions can't make it him or herself?

I fly offshore at night on the odd medevac, but not so much as once did in a previous life... but in that life, the ship took up the heading you wanted so the wind was where you wanted it.

For the sake of arguments, let's say that this is a nut that should be cracked (there are plenty who would go the other way... and I may be one of them). Regardless of any value judgment of should or shouldn't... it seems apparent to me simply by the existence of this thread that this nut WILL be cracked, so might as well get on with it.

I would think the next step would be to precisely define the problem and the flight regimes that need to be addressed. Once that's been done, then you look to the hows.

What you fellows need is a performance technologist... happily... somewhere around here is a piece of paper that probably says I are one. What a performance technologist will normally do is engage experts on the subject matter to precisely define the scope of the problem, then from there determine the needs that have shortfalls (it is not necessary that the technologist be a subject matter expert him or herself... often it's better if not, actually... keeps 'em out of the weeds...). From there develop objectives and potential solutions, be those solutions engineering solutions (hardware), job aids (checklists or other such), administrative (regulation or policy... "no cojos without X program offshore at night" or whatever), or training (development and implementation of new techniques and procedures). It's really not that difficult, but it is a structured way of viewing and solving complex operational problems. Pretty much most militaries and companies worth their salt use it these days.

As just one example, we can probably all say that cruising at altitude offshore isn't really much of an issue these days... but some point or points during the letdown/approach/transition/touchdown phases... is/are. Then start breaking the problem into manageable chunks... pretty soon it becomes fairly obvious where the weaknesses are that need to be addressed. Then it simply becomes a matter of how, selling it to the boss... and getting the money!

[Special 25]

Wow, I knew I should have taken that management course when it was offered to me - I've been bamboozled by science !!!

All I know is, I need to convince the oil companies that flying by night is not the same as flying by day. That no matter how good my co-pilot is, that is not relevant, because even if its my landing, I as an experienced Captain with thousands of North Sea hours, can't guaranty the safety of passengers by night with anywhere near the confidence that I can by day.

We need to ask if flying by night will ever really be safe enough for public air transport ?? I think there is some figure for the 'acceptable accident rate' acknowledging the fact that there will always be accidents, but that with the correct proceedures in place, they should fall somewhere in the 1 accident in 10 million flying hours (or something like that), and I think we've seen over the last two years that while daylight flying accounts for the majority of hours flown, night flights account for the vast majority of accidents and fatalities.

Can this be improved with technology - Probably improved, yes.

Will training and CRM help ? - I doubt it, only because I think this is at a pretty high standard already.

Will policy help ? - Well I'd certainly welcome a reduction in deck shuttles, only because statistically, flying to 1 or maybe 2 decks then back home is clearly going to reduce the risk period offshore.

Is flying at night really that necessary ? - I would argue "Not really". As I said early on, even in the darkest weeks of winter, the whole of the North Sea would still get 8 - 9 usable daylight hours offshore. In terms of emergencies offshore, we now have Jigsaw and SAR units available with the equipment, crews and training to do just this.

We're talking of flying fare paying passengers here. Public Air Transport, and so I want to be able to say that my passengers have the same level of safety whenever they fly with me. I've taken my children on jump seat rides to show them what I do for a living, but I wouldn't dream of taking them at night - Not that I could take a jump-seat at night, the company doesn't allow it - Not safe enough !!!

[Pullharder]

"Not flying at night is a non-starter IMO. We would be hugely limiting ourselves, and our usefulness to the customer".

Hey Horror box, why non-starter?? If all offshore helicopter operators agreed to stop flying at night due to safety,what will the customers do??? Stop flying to rigs??? :rolleyes:
Number one issue is safety,and as special 25 said, and I agree, I can't offer the same level off safety at night as in the daytime...S76 off an NUI at max gross,night,ltd viz:yuk: Not a good outcome if things go wrong... Gas rigs on the S.North sea can be de-manned just 2 hours earlier and stay in daylight...would that really be a problem for them considering the safety risks? There is really no need or justification for it anymore.....Just because "we have always done it," doesn't mean it's right or cannot be changed...
Fly safe
PH

[Um... lifting...]

Special 25-

Good for you. Somebody paid for the course and who was I to say no? I don't work in the latitudes you do, but even without a table of statistics in front of me I tend to agree with you. I can't imagine (outside a medevac) what risk v. gain model is satisfied by not waiting until first light or by making night transport a matter of routine. I foresee more ground incidents as well as flight incidents, but I'm probably just an old woman.

Trouble is, nobody cares what you or I think just because we think it. It's my thought that since you originated this thread (and your previous one, I suppose) that you're probably of the opinion that you believe this is a bad idea and you maybe aren't sure how to convey that to people who see flying at night as adding something to the bottom line. There may be a couple oblique ways of getting at it. One might be the insurance angle. Maintaining a night medevac standby is one thing, blotting out the moon with dozens of machines is quite another to your average actuary, I should think. It may be that I don't understand how rigs operate in the N. Sea, as I seem to be getting the impression from a couple of these posts that they all experience a significant crew reduction at the end of the day, which is different from my experience, where the crew manning remains more or less constant around the clock, it's just different guys from time to time. It's also possible I misinterpret... it wouldn't be the first time.

From the technology angle, I quite imagine that the current state of the art is good enough to deposit the helicopter in a position to make a landing. However, it's that last bit that concerns me. It's a different situation than military flying on night vision where the ship is on board with the fact that you need the lights dim, it's a transition from utter darkness to an insane amount of lighting (and vice-versa) with all the opportunities for disorientation that can come from that. While I suppose an argument can be made that "but Gomer Pilot does it..." I submit his situation in EMS is different in terms of urgency, so I don't think any direct comparison can be made, though some schmuck will try it, of course.

Ultimately, the upper management of both the customer and the helicopter company need to get their arms around the risk assessment. Risk is always a function of severity and exposure time... if you can demonstrate that night offshore flying has a higher severity (and I think you can), you can justify a reduction in exposure time and THAT will positively affect the bottom line... you have to beat these people at their own game. There are plenty of risk assessment and CRM models available and plenty of people who are much more clued up on them than I will ever be.

[OffshoreHeli]

Flying at night is trickier than by day but that is our bread and butter during the Winter months. It takes alot more concentration and I am not sure the new green deck lights are better than
floodlit decks. The final parts of the approach need to be flown by numbers so that you do not arrive too fast and too high with constant calls from non handling pilot for height, groundspeed, etc. I tend to talk new do-pilots onto decks at night and have not had any problems even when unsighted. The more interested part of the flight is lifting off the front deck of a ship at night in bad visiblity, now that takes concentration.


Would it not be possible to have some sort of 360 degree angle of approach indicator. I realise that a pitching and rolling ship would require some sort of stabilization device.


In my old age I am begining to think that if it is not going to be possible due to strong winds, high seas, to remain upright in event of ditching or get dinghies deployed safely maybe we should not be flying. Drifting slightly off track what do others feel.

[check]

Outside of training, I cannot remember doing a cross deck landing in more than 30 years offshore flying. In that time the other pilot has had experience from brand new to captain, so broad range of experience. Yes night flying requires more time, slower approach, at least one good brief so both are in tune. Many, but not all by any means, give a short commentary on the way down i.e. "good sight picture, clear of obstacles, coming/crossing the deck edge." This works for me as I have a mental picture of the approach and the delivery gives me an idea of their state of mind. If I'm relaxed then there's a good chance the other guy is too.

I appreciate that this may not appeal to many, but it keeps my stress levels down.

[Special 25]

Check, I too like the constant commentary from the handling pilot whether I'm sighted or not. Just gives you a good idea as to how the approach is going and you can tell from their voice, how they are coping with it, whether all is well or if they are having difficulty.

The problem is (if you can call it that) I've never had to go around from a night time approach or had a major problem landing at night. But I'm aware that when it does happen, it'll happen quickly, I may not be aware that it has gone wrong until it has become too late.

I was interested in this report from Australia of a 332 that flew into the water at night whilst approaching a boat and entered vortex ring. Both successfully exited the ditched aircraft and were rescued

...... Both pilots were focussing their attention both inside and outside the cockpit rather than having one pilot assigned to look outside and fly the approach and the other to monitor the instruments; neither pilot had experience with visual illusions and both had a high comfort level with the operation being conducted. Both pilots were Training Captains .........

It just this feeling, it can happen to anyone. Will happen quickly and the onset of problems won't be immediately recognisable, as it would be with the visual cues available during the day.

I've been passed a few reports and websites regarding analysis of offshore accidents. It is certainly making for some very interesting reading - I'm trying to collate some facts and figures and will report back. The quick summary is that accidents used to be largely mechanical failures, but these seem to be reducing dramatically, I guess to due improvements in aircraft design. Also, flying sectors have reduced over the years and so, as we are flying less now you would expect less accidents. Combine these together and you get the situation we are in now where our safety record is really very good, but those accidents we have are proportionally more likely to be pilot error.

More to come !!

[Horror box]

Hey Horror box, why non-starter?? If all offshore helicopter operators agreed to stop flying at night due to safety,what will the customers do??? Stop flying to rigs???
Number one issue is safety,and as special 25 said, and I agree, I can't offer the same level off safety at night as in the daytime...S76 off an NUI at max gross,night,ltd viz

First - I don not believe for one second all operators would ever agree to this!
Second - we can and do fly safely at night. We CAN remain Perf Class 1 throughout. We CAN train for SD. We CAN improve technology to increase our margins. We CAN operate to realistic minima.

I feel the idea of not being able to offer the same degree of safety at night must be examined, and is not as straight forwards as it appears. I would agree, in certain circumstances the margins are greatly reduced, but not all.

A clear moonlit night with 15kts, and low AUW, good horizon is not a huge problem. Nor is flying in the cruise day or night. I would argue that this situation is better than day, 1.5k viz, in fog/heavy mist or drizzle, no wind, cloud 200', and heavy - yet we are not arguing that we shouldn't fly in these conditions with an ARA down to minima and we do it regularly. I can clearly not GUARANTEE the same safety in this situation as day vmc, nor good night vmc for that matter. The point I am trying to make is that we fly in different conditions all the time - some times it is more difficult than others, and therefore more dangerous. We cannot just make one statement about the level of safety all the time. We take risk, and we accept risk all the time, the key is where is the border - when is it unacceptable and make a statement about that level. That is the line, and we do not cross it. Yes night flying can be more dangerous - therefore identify the highest risk areas compared with all other phases of flight, and put controls in place to mitigate or reduce that risk. Weather is probably the greatest factor here so increasing the wx minima or currency reqs may be a way forward, but just abandoning night flying all together is too simplistic an approach IMO.

[Special 25]

Well, this is a list of 20 accidents in the North Sea over the last 35 years. It may not be complete, so I apologise if there are errors, but nothing has been deliberately left out or put in to skew the figures !!

What does it tell us ? Well firstly, quite a pat on the back to all the pilots and engineers who have contributed to this list being as short as it is. Given what we do, what we do it with, and the environment we do it in, its quite remarkable that when trying to get this list together, I felt like I had a personal knowledge of most of these accidents, either through experience or CRM debriefs. I thought I'd probably find many that I had never heard of, but it is true to say that in the past 18 years we have only had 6 accidents in the UK aircraft, which is probably less than I would have expected, and three of those everyone walked (or swam) away.

As you can see, most of the early incidents are mechanical, and I guess I want to focus on post Chinook disaster, 1990 and beyond, being my experience on the North Sea when most of the rules we live under today were in place. In those 18 years we've had about 8 offshore aircraft accidents / ditchings. Only 2 of those have been put down to mechanical failure, and one to weather. I guess we have to praise the huge advances in aircraft design and engineering practices.

Of the other five, two have no formal explanation. The first was where the crew were forced to ditch at night due to a perceived engine / control problem that to my knowledge has not been identified. The final one was the tragic loss of the Dauphin in Morcambe Bay with 9 on board which would appear to be a disorientation at night.

I have appended the incidents that were not mechanical failure with Day or Night, and all except the Den Helder incident occurred in or around a rig, most often on approach. In the case of the Cormorant Alpha, during a shuttle and the 212 accident in 1991 was during heli work on the Ekofisk, so was outwith the normal passenger flight proceedures.




1 Sikorsky S61 1973 Near Stavanger, Norway Tail rotor failure and ditch
2 Sikorsky S61 1974 North Sea, Netherlands Main rotor failure and crash
3 Sikorsky S58 1976 Forties Field Tail rotor/gearbox failure and crash
4 Sikorsky S61 1977 Near Stavanger, Norway Main rotor gearbox failure and crash
5 Sikorsky S61 1978 Near Bergen, Norway Main rotor gearbox failure and crash
6 Westland Wessex Mk 60 1981 Off Bacton, UK Main rotor gearbox power loss and crash
7 Bell 212 1981 Near Dunlin, UK Pilot disorientation and crash --- IMC
8 Sikorsky S76 1981 Near Peterhead, UK Rotor failure and aircraft break-up
9 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1982 Aberdeen Airport, UK Engine failure and crash
10 Bell 212 1984 Humber, UK Cause of crash unknown --- Night
11 Bell 212 1984 Dan Field, Denmark Tail rotor/gearbox failure and crash
12 Boeing BV234 (Chinook) 1986 Near Sumburgh, UK Main rotor/gearbox failure and crash
13 Sikorsky S61 1990 Brent Spar Helideck Collision and crash --- Day
14 Bell 212 1991 Ekofisk Main rotor struck flare --- Day
15 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1992 Near Cormorant 'A', UK Stall and crash --- Night
16 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1995 Near Brae Platform Lightning Strike, Tail Rotor Loss, Ditched
17 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1997 Near Norne FPU, Norway Engine failure and loss of control
18 Sikorsky S76A (Modified) 2002 Leman Field, UK Main rotor failure and crash
19 Eurocopter AS332L2 2006 Den helder Aircraft Ditched - Under Investigation --- Night
20 Eurocopter SA365N (Dauphin) 2006 Morecambe Bay, UK Under investigation --- Night



So, in conclusion, whilst as I guessed would be the case, there are no clear cut answers here, I suppose these figures broadly support my belief that night flying does account for a disproportionate amount of offshore accidents, and how while we have made large safety improvements in other areas, night flying has not been addressed. It is also clear that as mechanical failures have become improved dramatically, the pilot errors stand out more than previously.

Of the 20 accidents, 13 were due to mechanical failure or mechanical failure following lightning. Of the remaining 7, which would not appear to be mechanical (Den Helder incident unsure), 4 of those occured at night, 1 in poor viz at 04:35 in the morning (summer time so officially daylight) and 2 in daylight. Of those two, one was heli-lifting so could perhaps be explained as unusual flying and the other is the Brent Spar incident - The only one I can find that defies usual reasoning. The only occasion we have where a serviceable helicopter was crashed during daylight operations - This alone speaks volumes for the quality of training and operational professionalism.

So, when night flying only makes up about 5% of offshore hours, surely those 4 out of 7 accidents are disproportionate ??

[zalt]

Shows the value in the introduction of HUMS (1991 on).

[Pullharder]

"Second - we can and do fly safely at night. We CAN remain Perf Class 1 throughout".

Hmmmm...you have never flown a S76 then horror box....class 2 offshore...only class one when we are empty, it's -20 degrees blowing gale force 8:eek:.....
Fly safe..
PH.

[John Eacott]

S25,

Which of those was the shuttle flight into the water that you referred to on page 1? I left the Brent in 79, so all were well after my time.

Re the Bristow Oz Puma accident, ISTR that Paddy was being checked, and there was quite some concern from him about the requirement for a steep approach to the platform, which of course resulted in VR. A long time ago, so I'm not 100% on the details, but having objected to the approach and been overruled, Paddy was able to take the High Ground at the subsequent BOE ;) Not quite as simple as it seems, I believe.

Going through the responses, and allowing for the modern safety analysis culture, I tend to agree with Horror box: there is little or Buckley's chance of banning night pax flights, but a more thorough regime whereby weather, currency, deck standards and crew proficiency (not the same as currency) must all be factored into a go/no go decision.

ps S25, are you really 35? Your references almost imply that you have been in the NS that long :p

[Special 25]

John,

In answer to the above, there were two accidents (I think) during the period we were shuttling offshore - One in 1981 near the Dunlin where one passenger died, and another in 1982 where 6 crew members were killed near the Murchison when the aircraft flew into the water at night. I left this one out of the statistics as although it was the regular Offshore shuttle aircraft, they were engaged on a Search & Rescue call out, so I didn't want to skew the figures. So, the one I was referring to was the Dunlin accident, very early in the morning, just about daylight, poor viz.

Regarding the Oz accident, I didn't know the details or even the company involved. I saw it mentioned in an offshore safety report and I was just using it as an example of a bad approach the wasn't picked up at night, even by an experienced training captain. Also the idea that 'both pilots were 'comfortable' with this sort of approach' which I am sure is not talking about over-confidence or complacency, but about crew that have made lots of night landings without incident, but are as likely as anyone else to be caught out when it suddenly goes wrong. I'm sure you are right that there were all sorts of issues involved, but my only point is 'Things will happen' and its no point saying "he was a bad pilot", "they flew a bad approach", "the helideck lighting was bad" - We need to regulate as tightly as possible to ensure that when these inevitable things happen, we can pick them up, correct or fly away safely. Fortunately in that incident, both pilots were OK.

Could we ever ban night flying - I don't see why not. As argued above, there is no real necessity for offshore operations at night. According to the HSE report of offshore flying (from which most of my 'facts' were gleaned) this covers UK flying from 1977 to 2006 and suggests that while offshore sectors peaked in 1990 at about 360,000 flight sectors per year, by 2002 that figure had dwindled to about 160,000 sectors - A figure that remained fairly constant through until 2006.

The Chinook accident in 1986 throws all the figures out as horrendously 45 people were killed in one accident, but it was the catalyst for a lot of change in the industry. Looking at our operations since that time, we have had just 4 fatal accidents resulting in 35 deaths.

11 - Result of Mechanical failure ( 1 Accident - S76 Norwich)
6 - Accident on landing in daylight ( 1 Accident - S-61 Brent Spar)
18 - Flown into the water at night (2 Accidents, 332 Cormorant, Dauphin Morcambe Bay)

Obviously statistics can read whatever you want them to read, but sadly those are the facts - Half of all fatalities in UK Offshore operations would not have happened (in my oh so humble opinion) during daylight ops. It makes no direct mention of night flying, but is an interesting report, so don't take my word for it - Have a look

http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/issues/health/docs/Helicopter_Report_1976-2006.pdf

[Horror box]

"Second - we can and do fly safely at night. We CAN remain Perf Class 1 throughout".

Hmmmm...you have never flown a S76 then horror box....class 2 offshore...only class one when we are empty, it's -20 degrees blowing gale force 8.....
Fly safe..
PH.

I don't believe I mentioned any aircraft type in this statement - S76 or otherwise. My implication is that we CAN and DO fly Perf Class 1 in some operations, with certain types. There is more than one type out there capable of this (S76 clearly not in that group). Therefore, if it can be done - it should be done. Further implication - if an aircraft cannot achieve this, then consideration should be made to either replacing it or adding further restriction, IAW JAR OPS regulation. If this needs to be amended to increase safety then so be it. I am quite familiar with the perf limitations of the S76, and would certainly agree that it is not suitable for all types of ops, especially night.

[Shell Management]

The Den Helder & Morecombe Bay reports can be expected between October & Christmas.

I believe HOMP has the potential to do for operational issues what HUMS has done for mechanical failures.

On the VRS Puma in Australia:
Puma SA 330J Helicopter VH-WOF, Mermaid Sound WA, 12 May 1991
199100126 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/1991/AAIR/aair199100126.aspx)

ATSB Abstract:

The aircraft was tasked to carry out a marine pilot pick-up from a departing tanker. The flight was conducted by two pilots operating under night visual flight rules. Conditions were a moonless night with no defined horizon, no outside lighting other than from the ship, and a surface wind that was light and variable. The ship was steaming in a northerly direction at 12.5 kts. The flight proceeded normally until the aircraft was established on final approach to the helideck. As the aircraft descended through 500 ft the rate of descent had increased to about 1,000 ft/min. Although the pilot in command increased main rotor pitch, the aircraft's rate of descent continued to increase until just prior to impact with the water. Both occupants were rescued approximately 1 h after they evacuated the helicopter. The report concludes that the standard approach technique used by the pilots, coupled with the prevailing weather conditions, caused the aircraft to enter a high rate of descent shortly after the aircraft started its normal final approach to the deck. The high rate of descent was probably the result of entry to the incipient stage of Vortex-ring state'. A lack of visual cues and inadequate management of cockpit resources prevented the crew from recognising the abnormal situation until the aircraft was well into the descent. Recovery action was commenced too late to prevent impact with the water.

[helmet fire]

Though we have been around this bush many times, and I am not offshore qualified......
Why do we not fit or mandate an Enhanced Vision System "EVS" (uncooled IR)?

Less than $20K USD. Sees what is there, not what some computer modeler thinks.

Seems ideally suited to offshore work that requires forward viz above all else - where say EMS need things like NVG so they can look around the place and recce the HLS.

[[email protected]]

Interesting conclusion of VRS for that accident when it was more likely that the pilots let the speed drop below ETL and didn't have the visual cues to respond to the increased RoD. RNF approaches over water with no rate of closure information are notorious for ending up in high hover or hover-taxi conditions - this sounds like just such an incident.

[Nigel Osborn]

Ref the Bristow accident, although both pilots were very experienced check pilots, Paddy was not under check. I'm told most of the pilots did not do the so called standard company approach as it was considered a bad procedure. Because there were 2 check pilots flying, Paddy thought it prudent to follow company procedures with subsequent disasterous results. I was also told it took about 16 seconds from 500 ft to ditching. It took the best part of 2 years to clear their name as it was considered the company procedure was at fault.

[Shawn Coyle]

At the risk of being branded a reactionary - look at FW instrument approaches. All of them are now 'ILS like' so that every approach is flown the same way. Lots of good information about closure rates (thanks to having to maintain an airspeed to avoid stalling), knowing where the runway is, and so on.

What we need is a consistent approach methodology (with rate of descent and closure rate information coming from something other than visual cues) that will take us down to some very low height above the landing zone (50'? 100'?) so that then we can take over and land comfortably all the time. Repeat - all the time!
Differential GPS? WAAS GPS in the USA? Something out there will work.
Let's start pressuring for it.

[verticalhold]

I remember shuttling at night on the Southern North Sea, low decks, often no horizon and slack winds. Not only were the decks low, but small as well and we were in a S61. It used to scare me to death. Non-handler was completely unsighted for most of the approach and this was where young P2s were sent to built deck landing practise. Speed control was utterly vital. Setting yourself off at 500' with the correct speed could avoid no end of problems caused by ridiculous flaring at the bottom.

Nowadays the winter brings the joys of the same conditions landing in a field on a T on Exmoor. Often the only lights are the T so there is nothing else to give a relative movement reference. Sometimes you may be able to see a village in the distance, normally too far away to be of help and despite a ground visit in daylight perceptions play tricks on your senses. The T appears in the screen in the right place, the speed is right, but there is nothing else to see. The "leans" are a distinct possibility. A huge level of trust is placed in the hands of the man who sets the T up (he really earns his money) The passengers tend to be of the ilk where a broken nail will get them in the papers, get the approach wrong and go splat into something and you are going to be briefly (and probably posthumously) very famous.

Those nights I hate with a passion.

VH

[Gomer Pylot]

Fixed-wing aircraft can fly identical approaches because they always land to a prepared, lighted runway already surveyed for obstacles. Helicopters don't have that luxury.

[helmet fire]

I am with Shawn here (again!).

Our little BK117 and A109 does a cracking hands off ILS down to a level off at 50ft! Everytime. Day/night/wind independant.

Is it REALLY that hard to design a GPS approach with WAAS and make the autopilot level off at say 100ft? Have the entire finals as a straight line after the IAF and add the EVS so you can see what is actually in front of you.

That way you get around several off shore issues that seem to be frustrating you all with standard minimums and EGPWS, etc.

How about these ideas for a standard GPS approach (with vertical guidance/glide path):


Must be straight in from the IAF.
Slow the helicopter to 50 or 60 before he FAF.
Have the weather actual minimum higher than the 100 or 150 ft to cope with transient shipping and other temporary and permanent obstacles, say at 250 ft or so, and 400ft or more for no WAAS.
Ensure that descent below that point must be accompanied by visual conditions and a clear EVS picture, and a serviceable autopilot level off.
Autopilot levels off at designated hight with clear EVS image and visual met conditions, all coupled up.
At missed approach point that would be in a standard position from the rig each time: say at the 1:30 at 1000m a warning flshes. Action here is either press go-around mode OR hand fly deceleration and finals.


For approaches to ships at sea (i.e. that do not have a permanent approach set up as they are on the move, it would already be possible to design an overwater approach in the same manner as described above. You could simply select the "Overwater" approach on the GPS, then it might ask for a destination lat/long and the wind direction as the only two inputs, but I think it would not be hard to also program boat speed and direction for better FAF to MAPWPt calculations and guidance. It can then construct the approach (including vertical guidance) IAW a standard design. It should even be able to compare the ground speed Vs IAS to tell you before the FAF if you have selected the incorrect wind (perhaps not allowing descent past the FAF if there is too much of an anomaly).

In the same manner as the rig approach above, the minima could be set to XXX ft after which a clear EVS image and visual met conditions are required. The approach could always aim to bring you out to the portside approach point at 1000m or so and again you get the warning with option for go-around or hand fly decel and approach.

These calculations should be able to made with today's technology. We have all the data collection points needed already. We have autopilots that are reliable enough to do it.

then again, maybe we should just keep spending money on PC1 and CatA performance!!:ugh:

[Shawn Coyle]

Helmet fire - thanks for the support. We have the technology, but seem to lack the political will to demand it.
What about the large oil companies? Shell, etc.? Might they be interested?

[helmet fire]

You are right - we, as a group lack the will to fix such things, and I believe that will is as a direct consequence of the market forces that surround most of our thinking.

Very rarely does the appearance of a new technology get implemented without some regulatory requirement or some contractors requirement. Very rarely to we go into the bidding process with a much more expensive model due to the improved technologies fitted on board our aircraft knowing that the competitor will be cheaper and thus significantly more likely to win the contract. These are the issues that emerge as a feeling that we lack the will as a group to implement the solutions. There is NO better example than the American EMS industry.

Pprune is a very good place to share ideas, but so many people take it emotively and demonstrate quite easily that the "industry" is not a group per se, it is a fractured and competitive set of tribal groups based on background or company - and rarely can we gain a quorum - indeed I have yet to see one!

10 pilots = 11 opinions, all emotively defended!

But..at least if people keep sharing the info and discussing the issues we can edge toward a safer future. Look at NVG as an example. All the emotive arguments were played out time and time again on the prune, but the technology is inevitably seeping into our futures to make it considerably safer to fly at night. Despite all the arguments and ill-feeling. Even though an international panel of SME established the basis for safe civilian NVG flight in 1996 (see the RTCO SC-96 reports DO 275, & 268), few if any countries have adopted this standard. Many are still arguing over it. That is unfortunately as close as we seem to get! But we are getting there...:ok:

[VeeAny]

Helmet fire,

Firstly before anyone says it I know bugger all about landing on boats or rigs.

However I do know a bit about designing computerised things. Your suggestions seem very sensible to me, but in this day and age why should the pilots even by be worried about inputing lat longs and wind. A little bit of electronic communication between the vessel and the gubbins in the aircraft and you have sent to you the vessels GPS position and then fly your overwater approach with the GPS onboard calculating the wind for you [if you need it during the automatic phase of the approach]. Sounds easy to do, harder to achieve and certify in practice but surely something like this could save some hassles (perhaps even lives)

You could even couple up obstacle or terrain aware databases to help prevent you from running into known obstructions (of which I am told there are a few).

With regards to NVGs they'd make my life easier but how does a non exmil type like me get trained in the use (particularly in the UK ?). I am sure there may :rolleyes: even be people using them now in the UK , who perhaps not with approval of the authority have made their own jobs a bit safer.

I get the impresson that most of this comes down to cost and its impact on profits.

Just my early morning Wednesday thoughts.

GS

[John Eacott]

Shell Management and Nigel Osborn,

Thanks for straightening out my 5th hand description of events ;)

[Horror box]

That way you get around several off shore issues that seem to be frustrating you all with standard minimums and EGPWS, etc.

How about these ideas for a standard GPS approach (with vertical guidance/glide path):
Must be straight in from the IAF.
Slow the helicopter to 50 or 60 before he FAF.
Have the weather actual minimum higher than the 100 or 150 ft to cope with transient shipping and other temporary and permanent obstacles, say at 250 ft or so, and 400ft or more for no WAAS.
Ensure that descent below that point must be accompanied by visual conditions and a clear EVS picture, and a serviceable autopilot level off.
Autopilot levels off at designated hight with clear EVS image and visual met conditions, all coupled up.
At missed approach point that would be in a standard position from the rig each time: say at the 1:30 at 1000m a warning flshes. Action here is either press go-around mode OR hand fly deceleration and finals.

Pretty much exactly what we do already! Radar Approach with GPS overlay, fully coupled to MApt at 0.75nm. Nothing new here.

[Shawn Coyle]

Horror Box:
What appears to be missing is instrument information on rate of closure / deceleration with the rig for the last segment. The issue is that the visual information isn't particularly reliable / repeatable and that's what should be made better.

[Special 25]

I can't help but think we're missing the enormous ' Elephant in the Room' here. So, we can see from the stats, that half of the accidents and just over half the casualties in the UK Offshore market in the past 20 years have been during night flights. Just a quick glance through the latest accidents reported on here, there are titles such as '212 Accident Dubai', '139 Down Abu Dhabi', and 'GOM Air Log & EEL Crash'. These are the latest offshore accidents, all of them night flights.

Yet when we think of solutions, people talk about technology, new proceedures, training, NVG's etc. For the military, police and HEMS maybe because there is an added pressure and need to get the job done, but this is just public transport. There is no real need to put aircraft and passengers at risk ??? Just do it during the daytime.

We seem to spend a fortune sending people on courses to learn how to lift a box correctly and sit correctly at a computer terminal. The oil companies proudly state that safety comes first and who amongst us would dare not to hold the handrail when descending a flight of stairs - Heaven knows what could happen !!! And yet, lets stick 19 people in a helicopter and have effectively a single pilot making an approach in the dark with limited visual cues as to descent and closure - Hey no problem !!

The oil companies seem to be for ever looking at miniscule ways to reinvent the wheel and eek out that last ounce of safety. Well I could flick a switch and statistically cut the number of deaths on the North Sea by 50% - Just stop flying at night. QED !

[Pullharder]

No need to invent different types of approaches...get more technology etc etc..as horror box stated, standard ARA MAP @ 0.75nm, 300' at night is close enough for me...A set procedure to arrive at that point, difficult enough some nights but then it's that last bit flown manually with marginal vis,(especially in a S76)! no horizon, rain on the windscreen, extremely difficult to judge closure rate/ROD....max gross no wind....oops...messed that up ...going around now with NO visual cues..IFR at 300ft or less......What are we doing here... :ugh: we are as Special 25 stated.....just bloody public transport...not SAR..
Someone(or two) stated than they couldn't see night flying disappear??????
Why not? What small minds we have!!!!! Good job people thought differently when it came to that small thing called the civil rights movement!!!!!!!!!!!!
and all some want to do is ban night flying offshore as it (as statistics prove) is way more dangerous than day flying!!!!!!!!
Fly safe
PH

[helmet fire]

Great that you guys do that already - as I said, I am not an offshore pilot.
You are saying that you have an autolevel system coupled to the GPS approach, or does it level at a pre set rad-alt? How does it calculate approaches to ships? Are the ships on the move, or do you get them to stop?

I am with Shawn on the closure issue, and you seem to indicate that you have a "visual" picture from the radar image. So why the unusual accident rate at night? What are the possible solutions?

In throwing out some ideas, I mentioned that the EVS was a critical component to descent or decel past the MAPt. It seems that this would be such a simple and cheap addition to the visual issues, but I dont know how the IR image of the actual area and obstacles compares to the radar image.

If we could make the end of the night approach include a display that gives you the actual picture of the situation, it seems that would be the ideal way to go. Thats why I threw the EVS in.

[Um... lifting...]

Some of the accident rate can be likened to pulling your car into your garage, but it's actually not your garage at all... it's a bit different, someone changed the length of the drive, rearranged the gardening equipment, unscrewed the light bulb, and changed the intervals between those little pink flamingos or garden gnomes you use to gauge your speed into the garage. But until close to the garage itself... you still think it IS your garage. And probably some other colorful metaphors (or are those similes... no matter...)

I've no intention of taking a position on whether night flying in the offshore environment should or shouldn't happen (and I've done enough of it to have at least a passing acquaintance with most forms of visual illusions), but every risk management model I'm familiar with includes 'avoid' as a possible method of mitigating risk. It should at the least be considered, so while folks are pushing forward to develop capabilities to fly around the clock (which development is probably positive) it will indeed, at times, be in everybody's best interest to stay in bed. To spring load to 'accept' as a risk mitigation method is to lose the big picture, methinks.

There needs to be a balanced view between training, technology, administrative controls, risk management, and commercial pressure, or it's going to end badly.

[Horror box]

Why not? What small minds we have!!!!! Good job people thought differently when it came to that small thing called the civil rights movement!!!!!!!!!!!!
and all some want to do is ban night flying offshore as it (as statistics prove) is way more dangerous than day flying!!!!!!!!

Off topic - Oh that is good!!!:D I cannot quite see the correlation here between the black civil rights movement and night flying!! I am sure they were fighting for the advancement of rights and improving opportunity - not banning things! Gave me a grin anyway!

On topic - if we want to be narrow minded then we ban night flying. Is this the correct approach? We can all have opinions on this. We can also accept that our job involves night flying - our customer relies on it. I have done over 30 night decks already this week, and I am quite sure the banning of night flying would have a fairly severe impact on the industry in which we work. We SUPPORT the oil and gas industry, not the other way round. They have a list of requirements and our companies must try and achieve in the safest manner. The oil companies can accept the risk - FACT. Money talks.
Secondly - if we ban night flying, I think many of us will be looking for new jobs, and it certainly will not be good for the industry in general.
Thirdly - where do you draw the line? Do we only fly around day vfr. As mentioned before - 200' cloud base, 1nm viz, no wind is far worse than a good night. So do we ban this as well?
If you dont like flying at night, and you think your operation is unsafe, then speak to the CP, FSO, training manager and try and get things changed. You may have already done this. All of people I work with are happy with our operation and flying at night and we do a lot of it. There are plenty of ways to make night flying safe. I will completely agree that it is more dangerous than day flying, and needs to be more regulated, but I also think it can be done safely with the right aircraft types, and good procedures and the correct limitations. Flying an ARA to a deck at night is not too different to flying one in really ****ty weather, especially with a good AP with level off at mdh. It could be, for example, that we should reduce the number of decks landings in a night, and make each one an ARA when the viz is less than 10k if that helps standardize.
Both the oil companies and our own organizations do need to commit to new equipment though and fork up the cash to enhance our safety.
So - if we want to talk about being open minded, we need to really look outside at the big picture, and not just look at one option. Sure consider it, but look at all others as well. If we cannot get the required technology/aircraft types/safety equipment, then perhaps night flying should be re-examined. See how other operators deal with the problem.

[Special 25]

Some good points HB, and it is excellent to get some view point from the other side of the fence. In response, I'd say, I don't think there is any need to ban night flying, but I would be of the opinion that night deck operations are not safe enough to be justifiable. Whether it be anecdotal, or statistical, landing and to a lesser extent taking-off offshore at night is probably the most dangerous thing we do and has resulted in the greatest number of accidents.

Could I ever see a situation where the oil companies felt that the risks outweighed the value ?? I'm not sure - I certainly don't see why not. I don't think the oil companies get that much value out of night flights, and I think if there was availability of aircraft, they would rather get their crew changes done by mid-afternoon - That was certainly the way it used to work. Unfortunately this then leaves the helicopter operators with a hanger full of aircraft that are being paid off, and insurance costs, just sitting there not earning. I don't think it would change operations significantly to adjust flights for the peak winter months to cover routine crew changes - Shuttles and offshore works programs that typically crew 6am - 6pm - 6am, might be more of an issue.

I think a general ban on offshore night flying (deck ops) might actually be good for crewing levels. We would still need to accomplish these same flights, but would need a 3 or 4 more airframes on the North Sea and the crews to fly them. or just a few extra flights at the weekend. Yes, this will cost money, but against the backdrop of the budgets involved and the investment in safety generally, it isn't a ridiculous suggestion.

Where would I draw the line ? Well, I think we have honed the rules of aviation fantastically over the life of the North Sea, and I think they are generally pitched pretty well. I don't share your opinion regarding IMC approaches to minima although I accept that they can be exciting !! Even going around at 200ft in less than 1km viz, you tend to be able to see the surface, have a well trimmed aircraft and the pilot flying goes from an IFR approach into an IFR go-around. There has not been an accident in this area to my knowledge and I've never felt a high risk factor. I think it is the nature of semi-IFR / VFR flying at night and the changeover between the two that probably accounts for the accident rate.

Where to go from here ??? Yes I have brought up my doubts on a number of occasions but generally fallen on deaf ears. I fear I may not be talking loud enough !! I certainly doubt that the oil companies have ever been consulted and I'm pretty sure they call up 7 stop night shuttles much as they would by day with little consideration as to the added risk - Why should they unless they had been educated so ??

I think the investment in new aircraft should really improve things particularly with the S-92 and EC225. Not sure the S-76C is really going to help too much but at least the power is there even if the view is not significantly improved !!

Is there some compromise - From my opinion, I'm not sure there is. Are things improving ? - Yes. But will they ever be safe enough ?? I don't think so. Not unless I can guarantee to my passengers that subject to no 'extraordinary' event, I can get them to work and home safe. Flying into the water in the dark isn't extraordinary, it would appear to be a statistical happening based simply on the amount of night flying conducted, and whilst based purely on opinion (and some fact) I can't see procedure, training or technology changing that.

[Horror box]

Yep - some good points there, and I hear what you are saying. Oil companies should certainly be the target audience here if you really want to effect change. They will always want the cheapest option, not necessarily the safest unfortunately. However I hear that some of their unions are actually trying to clamp down on the amount of time their employees spend in a heli at night. Ironically this could actually end up increasing the amount of night flying and decks we do. I suppose they see it as reducing the odds of an accident per person, per flight! Changing crewing patterns for the oil companies may be an option, but they will take a hell of a lot of convincing. The main problem will be, as they see it, that at the moment you have a day shift and a night shift. If you change the handover to midday, then everyone is effectively working day and night. Either midday till mid-night or vice-versa. There are rules against this I suspect. There are only so many nights you can work in a set period, sleep patterns etc etc, hence the current handover times. Unions would kick up a huge fuss if this was changed.
However all that being said - it is certainly a topic worth addressing to the oil companies. The S92 and 225 have made huge advancements in safety, especially at night and in poor weather. A good 4 axis AP allows you to fly all the way to MAPt and beyond fully coupled or do a fully coupled go-around (single engine if necessary), with a "go-around" button on the cyclic to activate if all starts going wrong. The aircraft still wont land itself though, but it can get you to a HOGE hover coupled pretty bloody close to the deck if need be.

[killabeez]

Quote,::Shuttles and offshore works programs that typically crew 6am - 6pm - 6am, might be more of an issue.::
Crewing may start at these times but more often then not by the time shuttles are finished its 3 hours later, and well into the 'Dark hours'

[John Eacott]

Not only do they start/finish at those times, the shuttles involve night ops for a good 3-4 months of the year, IIRC.

[tistisnot]

Let me get this right then; you asked us for the all singing all dancing machine which we've now procured for you, given you half the year off, and now you want to stay at home all night as well. Sure, but here's a third of your salary pay cut as you no longer need to face that 'special' dangerous helicopter exposure thing you were always blathering on about .....

Always thought that and foul weather approaches were the joy of being a driver ....

By the way, outside of Europe many oil companies do discourage night ops ....

[Pullharder]

Horror Box..

"Off topic - Oh that is good!!! I cannot quite see the correlation here between the black civil rights movement and night flying!! I am sure they were fighting for the advancement of rights and improving opportunity - not banning things! Gave me a grin anyway!"

"On topic - if we want to be narrow minded then we ban night flying. Is this the correct approach?"

Well, off topic, I think you know what I meant...the people fighting for improvement in the civil rights movement were fighting the Government,public and private institutions,the Law etc etc..a massive uphill struggle..but didn't give up...
All we are trying to do is fight to ban a totally unsafe practise for public transport, mainly on the North sea as Tistisnot states that outside of Europe it is actually discouraged!!! Not really a big deal or a huge uphill struggle if we put our minds to it....narrow minded or sensible??? :confused: Trying to improve safety isn't narrow minded, and you can have all the equipment in the world, all the bells and whistles,but human error at night offshore will beat it everytime...the accident at Morcombe bay(I know the final report isn't yet published) but do you think some new type of gps guided approach with some sort of vasi or lighting system system on a rig, or anything else would have helped that night on the GA????
Human error rules, Bottom Line, and at night in poor vis,our senses just do not work well enough...

Fly safe
PH.

[Horror box]

the accident at Morcombe bay(I know the final report isn't yet published) but do you think some new type of gps guided approach with some sort of vasi or lighting system system on a rig, or anything else would have helped that night on the GA????

In a word - yes.

On an S92 you can fly the entire approach coupled, with FMS and Radar if you wish, and also a go-around if you wish. There is actually no-need for the pilot to touch the controls until he is happy to land. He can set the RADALT hold to maintain MDHor whatever height you wish to fly, fly coupled flt at 60kts, with NAV hold on the programmed cse, or HDG hold. in If not happy hit the go-around button, and let the AP fly the go around procedure, with either NAV or HDG. The AP coupled to FMS will also fly a perfect, wind corrected race track if you wish, setting you up on finals, into wind. There are many options, and I have to say I dont use that much, but on bad nights certainly it means you can be more "monitoring" than flying until the later stage.
I am starting to get the impression that your views are based on a limited number of aircraft, most likely the S76. I dont mean to sound patronizing, but I maintain my standpoint, that with more modern aircraft and systems the safety factor at night is greatly increased. Do you also want to ban flying DAY IFR ARA's? Not a huge difference from a good night as I have stated many times already, and you still have no response to that. Night flying can be done safely, and is being done safely. Sorry if that is not the case in your operation.

[Shawn Coyle]

Horror Box:
the problem with any system (even the S-92's) is that you have to know what it is that it's actually doing.
It will fly a wind corrected race track pattern - but for the wind it knows exists at the time the race track was asked for (or some other time). We know there are significant wind shifts from as low as 500' to the surface - wind shifts that can be of great significance for a helicopter coming in to the hover, or trying to land on a deck.
Without some other precision guidance with respect to closure rate to the thing you're landing on, this system could come up and really bite you.
Wouldn't it be nice to have precision (i.e. ILS quality) guidance to touchdown, and also have an airspeed system that worked under 40 KIAS to tell you the real wind???

[Horror box]

Shawn, I totally agree. No real comeback from me there on the idea of ILS like guidance or some sort of PAPI like setup. That would certainly be great.
As far as the system in the 92 regarding racetrack patterns - it was probably not the best example for me to use and detracted somewhat from the debate. It is something really only applicable for holding, but may have use elsewhere. The system can however calculate and update the wind constantly itself, therefore correcting. So in NAV mode it automatically flies track corrected for wind. That is not to say however, that it is always 100% but it is pretty damn good. The track is very easily monitored using the NDB on the rig and the GPS. My personal preference is to use HDG or NAV though, and I have only used the holding patterns for training. One could, without too much difficulty, devise a standard night poor weather approach procedure, which could be flown entirely coupled until a MAPt if required. A modified ARA, with a track straight to a FAP 3-5 miles d/w, allowing you to fly fully coupled with NAV to that point, then letting down to mdh, inbound at 60kts. Coupled with IAS, NAV/HDG, RALT/ALT, and the go-around track briefed, with ALTP set to climb away ht. Time consuming, but a variation of this may work. This in conjunction with some form of better approach guidance for the latter stages would be a good combination. This would have implications on those of us flying 15 night decks in one shuttle though.

[Shawn Coyle]

Horror box:
thanks for the correction / update.

[Um... lifting...]

Could always put a 'meatball' on the rigs... of course, the cost might be excruciating, and of course, you'd need competency on the rigs to determine the wind (more difficult in practice than one might think) appropriate approach heading (and are you willing to leave that to the rig) and redirect the thing (with all that entails) accordingly... and operating/maintaining it (or any other rig-based aviation equipment) in the 3rd world... well, that's all I'm saying... and that's only for glideslope in visual conditions... and doesn't assist in the management of closure rate...

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/05/Optical_Landing_System%2C_night%2C_aboard_USS_Dwight_D._Eise nhower_%28CVN-69%29.jpg/180px-Optical_Landing_System%2C_night%2C_aboard_USS_Dwight_D._Eise nhower_%28CVN-69%29.jpg

Shawn-
Surely something out there for hover/low speed wind info is at least as accurate as the OADS (Omnidirectional Air Data System) we had in the HH-65A.

[Shawn Coyle]

Un ...Lifting
Glad to see someone else liked that piece of equipment. And it was out 20+ years ago...
Used to be able to hover at 5,000' AGL with the thing (zero airspeed hover at that).

[Special 25]

Air Accidents Investigation: G-BLUN Report Sections (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/7_2008_g_blun/g_blun_report_sections.cfm)

The report into the Morcambe Bay tragedy has been published - See the other thread for responses regarding that incident.

But it does prove a lot of what we have talked about on this thread. Namely, experience doesn't count for much, anyone can be caught out. Night flying isn't a science, what can work for one approach one night, won't work for another. Visual cues are not there and disorientation can happen quickly with the other crew member not necessarily aware of your problem and potentially not able to establish safe control.

This report makes for very sad reading as many reading this thread are North Sea pilots who feel they have been close to that situation - But this is more than just a statistic, you can read their words, see their thought process, and who amongst us can say "that could never happen to me" ?

[rotorfossil]

This thread has covered the problems of big helicopter night flying very well. My worry is that night training for PPL & CPL night ratings is almost invariably carried out to airfields and mostly to lit runways because these are the only places approved for night training. The navigation is inevitably done on good nights when there is a high probability of a visible horizon. Combine all this with the fact that instrument flying training is carried out using hoods or foggles without the cockpit being screened, means that people at the low experience end of the market have never been truly exposed to the realities of night flying when circumstances apply pressure to go as opposed to when you have the ability to choose your night.

[ShyTorque]

I have long since come to realise that helicopter VFR is safe. Helicopter IFR is safe. It's the "iffy" bit in between that catches people out.

I never tire of having to explain to my customer's PA that one just cannot safely do the same things after sunset, such as arbitrarily land at an unrecce'd, unlit remote site, such as a back garden or small paddock.

Actually, it grips me every time they ask, like twice this week, same PA, but I'm sure you get the drift...

[jetA1pilot]

Great thread Special 25.

Coming from a co-jo only recently trained on night decks and sitting on the "tell me again why we are doing this" side of the fence - another question to throw into the mix:

Has anybody done (or even thought about) doing their next HUET or underwater escape session with a blindfold over their eyes?? Coz that's what you got at night right? upside down, pitch black. Just doesn't sound like a Good Idea

[Um... lifting...]

U.S. Navy does it that way in the full dunker. A couple rides visually, then the lovely swimming goggles that are blacked out. Done it personally numerous times. It's really no worse... except you have to have your procedures down and know where things are and what they feel like, and you must retain your reference point... and it can play with your head if you've never done it.
Even if you hit the water (heaven forbid) in broad daylight, you still may not be able to see due to lots of reasons. It is best to assume that your vision will be unusable to aid in your escape.
You are quite right that it's a good idea to do it blind for practice.

[jetA1pilot]

that sounds pretty intense but I guess that highlights a serious distinction between civvy air transport ops and the navy way - our training seems like a once a year 'tick the box' and cross off the checklist affair. I don't think 2 escapes a year in the pool in a well lit environment could be considered adequate preparation for an actual survivable night ditching & rollover.

i shudder to think what would happen in reality - speaking from just Persian Gulf experience i know that most of the rig workers i was on HUET with couldn't swim! The fear in the pool was tangible. Imagine the absolute terror and pandemonium in the back with 13 pax thrashing around in the dark clamoring for the exits.

As you say, a daytime ditching may not be much better but the perception must certainly be aweful at night for those passengers in the back who don't have the luxury, like us up front, of having the door right next to us :sad:

[Special 25]

OK, so I know I sound like a broken record ..............

I started a thread in Nov 2005 about the statistical risks of flying offshore at night and the high number of accidents that seem to result. We then had Morcombe Bay a year later. Began this thread in 2008 and seemed to get a fair bit of agreement that operations offshore at night pose a high, perhaps even unacceptable risk.

I just wanted to update the table for accidents in UK North Sea aircraft over the last 20 years, while the subject is fresh in everyone's minds.




Daylight

Sikorsky S61 1990 Brent Spar Helideck - Collision and crash - Human Factors
Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1995 Near Brae Platform - Lightning Strike, Tail Rotor Loss, Ditched - Weather
Sikorsky S76A (Modified) 2002 Leman Field, UK - Main rotor failure and crash - Mechanical


Night

Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1992 Near Cormorant 'A', UK - Stall and crash - Human Factors
Eurocopter AS332L2 2006 Den helder Aircraft Ditched - Under Investigation
Eurocopter SA365N (Dauphin) 2006 Morecambe Bay, UK - Disorientation & Crash - Human Factors
Eurocopter EC225 2009 Etap Platform, UK - Aircraft Ditched on approach offshore - Human Factors




Together with this list, I would venture an opinion that 2 out of the 3 daylight accidents would have occurred day or night, and the 1995 Lightning Strike incident was achieved without any loss of life by the crew autorotating into the sea - A task that would unlikely be successful at night.

So this list shows that over half of North Sea accidents in the last 20 years have been at night, when night operations (in my log book) account for less than 8% of the flying.

[Pullharder]

Hey Special 25...I am still with you as I was after Morcombe bay......Now this accident at night as well.....Thank god the sea wasn't rough as I think with the puma almost certainly turning over we would now be looking at 18 fatalities instead.....Just sheer luck it was a calm night....
Either ban night flying totally from the N.sea,(other operations round the world seem to manage quite well flying day only, it's just a case of here that we've always done it so it's a culture change) OR AT LEAST up the limits significantly for night ops, and adopt say way higher minima (as was suggested by DB on the Puma thread)....Either way, enough is enough, the caa need to get on board here with the operators and do something significant before we right the same bloody thing a year from now!!!!!!!!!!:ugh: