Senior Australian army pilots accused of being cowboys

[Tibbsy]

Headline - Defence chief demands end to helicopter 'cowboy' culture


Crikey! That won't help recruiting and retention.:ouch:

Tom Allard National Security Editor
June 30, 2008


A CULTURE of risk-taking and sloppy safety standards exists in the army's elite helicopter squadron, according to a damning report by a military inquiry into the fatal crash of a Black Hawk helicopter off Fiji in 2006.

The scathing assessment of the Sydney-based 171 Squadron was in part based on evidence of a number of similar incidents, including the crash of a Black Hawk in East Timor last year that was kept under wraps by Defence because it was "not newsworthy".


How the :mad: do you hide the crash of a $20 million Black Hawk?

Headed by the former Supreme Court judge David Levine, QC, the board of inquiry was convened last year to examine the crash of Black Hawk 221, which smashed into the deck of HMAS Kanimbla before tumbling into the Pacific Ocean and sinking on November 29, 2006.

The pilot, Captain Mark Bingley, and SAS Trooper Joshua Porter died in the accident.

The final report of the inquiry was handed to the Chief of Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston - a decorated helicopter pilot - six months ago.

He is said to have been appalled by its revelations. The Herald understands that, after reading it, he dubbed senior pilots from 171 Squadron "cowboys" and launched an audit of all of Defence's helicopter fleets to ascertain if the problems were more widespread.

Sources familiar with the report say it finds that senior pilots in 171 Squadron, while highly trained, had a culture of aggressive flying and a tendency to needlessly "push the envelope".

Safety procedures were slack and the reporting of incidents involving engine failures and other safety breaches was haphazard, it says.

Engine failures.....? Hopefully not having too many of those.

The crash on HMAS Kanimbla occurred while Australian troops were stationed off Fiji preparing to remove Australians if the civil unrest there worsened. They undertook training exercises while they waited for a possible call to action.

In a helicopter packed with Special Air Service soldiers, Captain Bingley was attempting a special operations assault drill, flying at high speed before suddenly turning and "flaring" into a hover above the ship, with the helicopter's nose up, so soldiers could descend by rope or fire weapons.

The inquiry concluded that the exercise was highly dangerous, given the tailwind, the heavy cargo, HMAS Kanimbla's drift in the sea and the fact that it had not been rehearsed at a slower pace.

The report finds that Captain Bingley misjudged the strength of the tailwind.

The crash resulted from an overstressed engine losing power, leading to catastrophic "main rotor droop", a dramatic slowing of the rotor's blades.

However, the inquiry found that Australia's Black Hawks did not contain a "digital electronic control unit" that reduced the risk of rotor droop. Moreover, incidents of rotor droop were quite common but not always reported.


What does the digital electronic control unit actually do? Is it a digital FCU?

Why wouldn't you just avoid drooping the rotor in the first place i.e. during a hover to offload pax I reckon Nr would be pretty handy to have? :confused: No idea about special forces tactics but I'm sure someone can enlighten me.

Indeed, late in the inquiry's deliberations it emerged that a Black Hawk undertaking a similar drill to Black Hawk 221 in East Timor had crashed.

No one was seriously injured but the helicopter was badly damaged and has yet to be repaired, the Herald has learned. The accident, which happened on June 21 last year, was never made public, even though it occurred when there was intense interest in helicopter safety.

Not only was the Black Hawk 221 inquiry underway, the damning report into the crash of a Sea King on Nias, Indonesia, in 2005, that killed nine Australian servicemen and women, had been released two days before the crash in East Timor. A Defence spokesman told the Herald the East Timor incident was not publicly announced as it was deemed "not newsworthy".


Anyone hurt?

The Herald understands testimony from the aviation safety officer at the US Army's special operations command, Warrant Officer (5th Class) Charles King, was particularly influential during the inquiry into the Black Hawk 221 crash.

He described its flight plan as "an aggressive approach that had very small margin for error". After reviewing some of the training techniques of 171 Squadron, he said there was poor guidance about when a pilot should pull out of a manoeuvre.

He also said the presence of special forces troops in a helicopter often encouraged pilots to take more risks and regard any joint training exercise as a "no fail" proposition.

Was this guy an exchange pilot or an expert witness for the inquiry?

The inquiry's report and the results of Air Chief Marshal Houston's audit are expected to be published in the next fortnight.

This story was found at: Defence chief demands end to helicopter 'cowboy' culture - National - smh.com.au (http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2008/06/29/1214677850268.html)


Ouch :ooh:

[Lt.Fubar]

Yeah, let them fly straight and level, starch flightsuits, and under any circumstances exceed 85% torque... only when someone gets killed in combat they'll ask what was their training. It's the whole "western" world like that, not only Australia.

[heliduck]

Maybe a few thousand hours of mustering/Ag/Shooting/long-lining instead of ILS approaches would be better training for a pilot who is pushing the envelope of an aircrafts' capabilities in VFR conditions? Just a thought, but it seems from the outside looking in that the root cause of most ADF accidents would get the average bush pilot sacked. As an example, a few years ago a Blackhawk hit a tree near Amberely while conducting low-level training & the vision on the news clearly showed that it was the only tree in a 10 acre paddock!
It's a shame for the mil pilots sake, but I don't think any pilot can get good at his/her profession while flying approx.100hrs/year as one ppruner from Nowra quoted last year. As a tax payer in both Canada & Australia I'd be happy to fork out a bit more to give them more time in the hot seat. Maybe an exchange program with commercial operators could help? Maybe, like any other operator in the world, have minimum experience levels which must be met before they are let loose in a multimillion dollar helicopter which belongs to the tax payer? Although mil pilots will no doubt be offended by my post, I don't mean to be patronising, just looking for ideas. After all, lots of "bush pilots" have flown into the ground in the dark, but I don't think the mil boys have for a while!!

[TwinHueyMan]

"What does the digital electronic control unit actually do? Is it a digital FCU?

Why wouldn't you just avoid drooping the rotor in the first place i.e. during a hover to offload pax I reckon Nr would be pretty handy to have? No idea about special forces tactics but I'm sure someone can enlighten me."

A model blackhawks, and the Aussie blackhawks, use an ECU instead of a DEC on the -700 series engines. L models and others with the -701C engines have the DEC. The ECU relies much more on mechanical means to control engine power than the DEC does... and the biggest nasty that bites back is the dreaded transient rotor droop that was a factor in the Fiji accident. It's not hard to avoid getting transient droop, but when you fly to the capabilities of the aircraft, such as in combat operations, its very easy to find. When the collective is on the floor and the engines are at a very low power setting, pulling in power in anything but a very gradual pace will cause the engines to "lag" coming back on-line and RPM to drop. The -700 engines have a mechanical "anticipator" linkage that tries to keep the engines ahead of the game, but it does a sorry job when it comes to rapid power changes. US Army guys are taught to "lead with power" when in a low torque situation, but I've seen it many many times where it's just too slow catching up and rotor droop is the result. Bam, there goes the buckets of power a -60 pilot is so used to having, and thats when a tailwind or high gross situation will really bite you in the arse.

As for being cowboys... Those kind of manuvers are REQUIRED at times when in combat, and thinking that the only time they should be performed is during an actual guns-a-blazing situation is rediculous. It's sad when accidents happen, but insinuating that the ceasing of aggressive training will lower accident rates is absolutley wrong... the crashes will happen more frequently, and during the real thing, which will have far larger ramifications.

Mike

[gulliBell]

As for being cowboys...if (as reported) the Chief of the Australian Defence Force has said that, and bearing in mind he is a distinguished military fast jet pilot, is quite a remarkable statement. Given he has the investigation report and full resources of the Defence Force available to him, his opinion here must carry considerable weight. Who's to say otherwise?

From the outside looking in, and being someone who was once on the inside looking in, I can't see the point of entering into a training regime that is so likely to result in an accident simply because you might have to do that on operations. No training is so important that a safe way to do it can't be found.

I think it is agreed that a mistake was made here, compounded by systematic deficiencies, and an accident resulted. Certainly the pilot didn't set out that day to have a prang or imperil the aircraft.

[PPRuNeUser0212]

Macchi and Strikemaster not quite "fast" jet, think you will find Angus more Helicopter driver than anything else.
Chief of the Defence Force (http://www.defence.gov.au/cdf/)

[Blackhawk9]

Angus was one of the first pilots to be endorsed on the Black hawk in Australia , he was my boss as CO of 9 sqn RAAF and OC A Sqn 5Avn Regt (yep Airforce boss of an Army unit) , he was the Boss in the early days of the Black hawk and was involved in assault and spec ops work if he calls someone a cowboy in particular a helo pilot i'd believe him ,he would not come out with a statement like that lightly, if he was a fastjet pilot his coments may have been taken lightly but his whole career has been in the Army support tactical role, Huey's, Blackhawks,C-130's etc.

And when i've talked to US Army exchange pilots with 160th experiance they have even been amazed as to why the Australian Army pushed there Black hawks so hard when there was no real need to,

or Sikorsky tech reps who said the same thing, our Black hawks had structural cracks at almost half the hours other operators got them.

of the 39 Black hawks delivered 7 have been crashed ,2 in crashes near Oakey ,2 in the High Range accident near Townsville, the Fiji accident and the Timor incident , 6 right offs and 1 cat 4 crash and all pilot error.

[topendtorque]

The gentleman seems to have some credentials in the helicoper and instructional areas.

Why then as big chief number one, he who has had ample opportunity to review the selection, training and recurrency training standards of his helicopter pilots for so long is he now coming out and making grandiose statements like that?

IMO, not an incredibly intelligent thing to do. Politically speaking, I reckon his boss needs to fire him.

[Homers_love_child]

Heliduck,

I would avoid making sweeping statements about an accident that you probably do not know about - have the read the accident report? There was a lot more involved than just hitting the only tree in the field.

HLC

[zalt]

Reread:
The Herald understands that, after reading it, he dubbed senior pilots from 171 Squadron "cowboys"
So thats 'allegedly he dubbed them cowboys'. I thought no one on PPRuNe believed what a journo writes!

Having said that if there is a safety culture problem - its down to the leadership of the people at the top surely. This is a good read:http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/849892B2-D6D2-4DFD-B5BD-9A4F288A9B18/0/DASCJournal2008.pdf, especially the Target Zero article.

[Tibbsy]

Topendtorque, I'm not sure that it's fair to say that the Chief of the Defence Force should have to be responsible for the selection, training and recurrency training of a squadron of pilots. He is, after all, responsible for the Army, Navy and Air Force (about 85000 people) and has a bunch of other people who actually have the hands-on responsibility.

He probably has responsibility though to take action once he discovers a problem which it sounds as though he is doing, having apparently commissioned an inquiry into his helicopter operations following his receipt of the BOI report.

[zalt]

Can the big cheese be responsible for anything that justifies their wages and rank if they have to wait for an accident or two to find out there is a problem? Surely that puts him on no better par than his fellow ozzie tax payers? Ooops the other taxpayers weren't told about one of the accidents!

[Trojan1981]

All the Army people on this forum probably know that there have been many more unreported incidents and accidents over the years. Sometimes 'cowboy' flying has been to blame (eg. CAPT "Death" from many years ago) and sometimes operational requirements have pushed personell beyond their limits (both air and gnd crew).
There is a tendency to push the envolope in all areas of the Army, not just aviation. How many LR110s and Mogs have been rolled, injuring and killing people because the drivers wanted to show off their 'skill'. How many UDs and NDs occur due to gung-ho weapons handling in peace time and how many maintenence mistakes have been made on helicopters due to fatigue or other pressures on peacetime EX or non-warlike operations.
When completing the old Army Y12 cse, an aviation (maintenence) WO2 told me that they had no duty time/fatigue limitations. He said they could be put in a gun pit all night and then expected to work on helos the next day, without any sleep. I don't know if this is true but this would represent an unnesessary safety risk in peacetime.
Army culture, and an effective aviation safety culture, seem to be at odds with each other. I realise I am about to be rubished by those who believe we should "harden up" and fly into battle with bayonets between our teeth but I am speaking from experience. I have had friends and collegues killed while serving in the Army and Navy, including in helo crashes, none of them due to enemy fire.

[topendtorque]

Once again football tonight was particularly enjoyable with Queensland taking home the State of Origin decider.

Tibbsy, I think i am saying that this guy has as his field of expertise, training and helicopters. Surely he must have been taking a keen interest in watching his main support group, or more bluntly, defence, I.E. the one line that he knows.
I reckon he took his eye off the ball, and is now trying to scapegoat his actions by criticising his troops.

That is inexcusable.

As big cheese he gets to march at least two paces in the lead, with his sword drawn, and the bayonets behind, usually are at the shoulder.

I think he has tripped.

I've spent a bit of time discussing the selection criteria for the military vs the mustering type, with those that should know. For sure in both areas flair and personal endeavour is a requirement, not to be confused with ego, which like euphoria, doesn't count for much when the chips are down. a fact which crudd is finding out.

Those qualities make excellent pilots with the right mentoring.

Lets not forget that this guy is at the top, and can control. His team are made of people, good people. Any team will be as good as the people in it, saw that tonight at footy.
Does he have the capacity to nurture and cultivate those people, or does he lead by quashing the personal initiative of those behind who may represent competition?

Thus leaving the lead exponents in the field to a lack of direction when they are exposed to something beyond the ability of the big cheese.

I could also say that in private enterprise that many, when they get to the top, usually put their stamp on the "type" of person they want to run their show for them.
At the other end of the scale if you get elected to a position of leader where you have no control over the others elected as your team, you damm well get out there and open the right gates first day before the rest get out of bed.

his promotion lies in the middle of those scenarios, no excuses.

[Igor13]

You lay blind in a perfect world. The reality is that in such a large organisation that intimate knowledge of all goings on is not possible. Nor is it sometimes appropriate. One man can only manage so many moving parts and his competent commanders must take responsibility for the lower echelon. The micro management required to look into the crew rooms of different Squadrons from your office in Canberra would be unwelcome and completely inappropriate.

The fact that an 'all is well message' is too often passed from the lower echelon through to command does not help the situation. Junior commanders are often reticent to send distress signals through to higher as this implies failure on their part.

Too many short sited individuals that are too worried about their next job and not concerned with the one they are in currently. It is all about the right impression and the Army is completely bound by the human condition and our quest for more. (Promotion / Status / Money.)

Houston is doing his level best to better a situation that he was blindsided into. The commanders of the offending Squadron were the largest perpetrators of the 'Cowboy" tendancies. If your commanders give you information you must trust their integrity. If that is in doubt then the game is lost. In this case there was some unthruths and there was some individuals that were blind to the dangers they were putting themselves in.

The culture had shifted within the unit to a point where these factors (droop, close calls, non-reporting to protect mates) had become accepted. The bonds and Esprit de Corp are very solid within this unit, mates looking after mates and this is very important to the job they do. It is risky and they do it well. They work hard for us all, it costs them their time, often their marriages and too often their mates. They are to be respected for that, but a time comes when outside mediation, controls need to be inforced. When you become insular, as they had, you become exposed to a shift in your acceptance of risk.

This cultural shift that was not checked by the commanders, but fuelled, led to accidents and incidents that should not have happened. The grief felt by the family that is this group of people is unmentionable. They are good pilots and good people who work to do their best at a great cost.

It is a shame that there is no one with the time or fortitude to stand up and slow it all down occassionally within the over taxed Army aviation capability. They are over tasked, undermanned, and getting more inexperienced as time goes on. The shift in civil industry is worsening this situation and I for one can't see a way forward for the capability.

[ShyTorque]

Didn't the training of Oz mil helicopter pilots go to the cheapest bidder in the early 90s, only for the system to founder? Then, with it all around their ears, instead of paying more for a better job, did they not re-award the contract to the same institution?

[Homers_love_child]

Trojan1981,

Let us try to be fair and balanced.

"All the Army people on this forum probably know that there have been many more unreported incidents and accidents over the years."
- I bet that all the Air Force people can probably say the same thing. I could real off a number of Air Force issues that either were under reported. And Air Force has its fair share of cowboys (-ve G in a C130 anyone?)...

"When completing the old Army Y12 cse, an aviation (maintenence) WO2 told me that they had no duty time/fatigue limitations."
- I don't know when you did the course, but there are documented limitations. Army is rather progressive when it comes to reporting maintenance human factors issues. And I know that Air Force techos are under significant pressure to support operations overseas that they sometimes bend the rules to get an aircraft in the air.

I have nothing against what you are trying to say, but this is a public forum and bashing one service does no one any good. This is a systemic issue across the ADF, not just Army. CDF does have responsibility. He was CAF when the tri -ervice Directorate of Flying Safety was diluted with the addition of the Directorate of Air Force Safety a few years ago. What should have been a unit that identified risks within the Defence aviation community prior to an accident was sufficiently diluted so that it became a toothless tiger.

Igor13,

I agree with nearly all of your post. Army Aviation is over-taxed and over-tasked. It is also over-scrutinized, more so since this accident. Your comment that no one has the fortitude to stand up is correct, but those that did stand up in the past were quite unceremoniously and sometimes publicly dismissed.

However, the seeds for these types of accidents were sown many years ago. The squadron in question was a second tour posting a few years ago. To be a co-pilot was 1000 hours. Taking pilots straight off course and exposing them to the tempo/flight regimes/pressure was unfair. How is a 300hr pilot sitting next to a very experienced captain express his/her concerns about the flight profile. Yes, CRM/Aviation Team Training should mean that the co-pilot has the opportunity to speak up, but be realistic.

HLC

[Trojan1981]

Fair comment.
I don't intend to single out the Army. I served in the Army so its the service I know best. I haven't seen this type of thing in the RAAF, thats not to say it doesn't happen. An old friend of mine died on Nias so I know it has happened in the RAN as well.
The comment on maintenence duty hours was made to me by an Army WO2 AME about five years ago, he went on to say that the RAAF does have strict limitations on duty hours and stated that he thought they were "soft".
"Might as well be civillians" he said. I am out now and don't know what the directive says so I can't verify wether his comments are valid.

Are there any current or former RAN pilots out there? Is it unusual to approach a Ships helo deck downwind?

This is a systemic issue across the ADF, not just Army. CDF does have responsibility. He was CAF when the tri -ervice Directorate of Flying Safety was diluted with the addition of the Directorate of Air Force Safety a few years ago. What should have been a unit that identified risks within the Defence aviation community prior to an accident was sufficiently diluted so that it became a toothless tiger.

Agreed

[Arm out the window]

Didn't the training of Oz mil helicopter pilots go to the cheapest bidder in the early 90s, only for the system to founder? Then, with it all around their ears, instead of paying more for a better job, did they not re-award the contract to the same institution?

No, not at all. Basic flying training for all services was contracted out to BAe (ie fixed wing flight screening and early flight training) but helicopter training went to ADF Helo School in Canberra, a military establishment, and the School of Army Aviation at Oakey.

[Brian Abraham]

Is it unusual to approach a Ships helo deck downwind?
Sure is.......

[Shell Management]

the tri -ervice Directorate of Flying Safety was diluted with the addition of the Directorate of Air Force Safety a few years ago. What should have been a unit that identified risks within the Defence aviation community prior to an accident was sufficiently diluted so that it became a toothless tiger.

There was a reason for this merger, to make sure the fiasco of the F111 tanks health problems was not repeated. At the time non-flight safety issues were not being properly managed in comparison to flight safety. Go read Andrew Hopkins case study on RAAF safety.

Safety, Culture and Risk. The Organisational Causes of Disasters - Health Sociology Review (http://hsr.e-contentmanagement.com/book-reviews/review/136/safety-culture-and-risk-the-organisational)

...examines the problems which arose from the ‘deseal/reseal' program for repairing the fuel tanks of F111 fighters in the RAAF. The solvents used in this program caused extensive neuro-psychological harm to many ground-crew and resulted in a major Board of Inquiry of which Hopkins was a member. The proximate causes of the injuries could be attributed to failure to use personal protective equipment; however the equipment sometimes dissolved in the solvents and was very difficult to wear in the space and heat inside the fuel tanks.


Hopkins identifies several factors operating in the RAAF which contributed to the injuries. These included a lack of attention by medical personnel to complaints from the workers over many years; the priority placed on operational flying over the supporting logistics; the lack of authority for those involved with health and safety of ground crew compared to aircrew; and inadequate systems for reporting incidents in ground crew compared to aircrew.
The point is well made that the same organisation can have a very good record for flight safety but a poor one regarding safety of other workers such as ground crew. The analysis of reasons for this imbalance is instructive. The key is the focus of senior management, which in turn depends on comprehensive safety reporting systems and organisational structures to effectively implement decisions about safety. These factors were present for flight safety but defective for the OHS of ground crew.

Now if a dilutation occurred that implies the new organsation simply does not have an effective hazard & effects management process and they are not letting the risks direct where they pay attention.

[sox6]

http://www.pprune.org/forums/military-aircrew/333429-senior-officer-takes-responsibility.html

At least French officers do the decent thing.

[Homers_love_child]

To totally understand the reason for the merger of DFS and DAFS, but I do not agree. DFS-ADF is responsible to the ADF for flight safety and accident/incident investigation across the ADF. DAFS is responsible for Air Force Safety for one service only. Incorporating the two under one Group Captain with at time conflicting requirements is difficult.

DFS-ADF gained significant resources after the ADF flight safety system was found lacking post Black Hawk accident 1996. In my opinion, the merger has created an organization that cannot meet its mission.

The US military system has it merits. At service level, ground safety and aviation safety are two separate units that report to a one star general. Each unit is commanded by a GPCAPT(E), with separate resources.

Anyway, this is thread creep.

[Code3]

Does anyone have details on last weeks Chinook hard landing or is this another "not newsworthy" event?

[ricardian]

Surely not a cowboy, merely high spirits?

[Tibbsy]

Why then as big chief number one, he who has had ample opportunity to review the selection, training and recurrency training standards of his helicopter pilots for so long is he now coming out and making grandiose statements like that?.

Perhaps he should have been there during the planning phase, maybe had a look at their maps? Certainly should have checked them on their way out to the aircraft to make sure they had all of their gear. Actually, maybe he should've been in the left seat to keep on eye on 'em.

Might've been difficult for him though, after all as CDF, he's probably also responsible for the selection, training and recurrency training standards of tank drivers, ship drivers, truck drivers, plumbers, carpenters, LAME's, clerks, radar operators.....

C'mon Topendtorque.... :cool:

His boss is the Minister of Defence - perhaps he should resign too?

If he's making 'grandiose' statements, it's because he's seen investigation findings that have caused him to make that assessment, with insight based on many years experience as a pilot. Make no mistake, he's not a pilot any more - he's the military CEO of Australia's largest employer (except for the Coles/Myer group).

The responsibility for 'selection, training and recurrency training standards' of his helicopter pilots lays squarely at the feet of the others in the chain of command, not the CDF.

[reducing_Nr]

"Are there any current or former RAN pilots out there? Is it unusual to approach a Ships helo deck downwind?"


The Navy, certainly in my time there, made a very controlled approach to the ship within the SHOL (Ship's Helicopter Operating Limits) being for an approach to land, VERTREP or transfer to any part of the ship designated for such an evolution.

I would have never contemplated making a tactical approach to any part of the ship, even for fast roping practice to the helo deck, let alone an approach downwind.

[bigdog1971]

I would have never contemplated making a tactical approach to any part of the ship, even for fast roping practice to the helo deck, let alone an approach downwind.

Perhaps that's why your were in the Navy!:E:ouch:

[onemore]

"Are there any current or former RAN pilots out there? Is it unusual to approach a Ships helo deck downwind?"


Normally the flying course used in launch/recovery is one that provides 20-40 knots wind over the deck within an envelope. The envelope varies around the ship, based on aircraft type, night day ect. The most common would be within 40 degrees either side of the direction a ship is heading with relative wind of 20-40 knots.

As you are using a relative wind to find a flying course you can end up with an approach that has a downwind component and still be within the envelope (shol) Not preferred by too many aircraft at night though

[topendtorque]

now now Tibbsy,
you know as well as i do that "his minister" is now in opposition.

a quirk of a changed government in a democracy is that the new boys get to bad mouth the old gaurd, without pain to themselves.
I hope that you didn't vote for this pole tortoise, now known as krudd.

The new minister should have been out of bed a bit earlier than big cheese and said -'now listen up big cheese, any more o'these cowboy attacks an you're out, savvy?'

big cheese, being the luckiest person to hold his job, (and I say caustically - still alive-) must by then have worked out that all he needs do is to say to the training and selection chiefs, "this is what I want, and this is what I get or you're out, dah de dah".

simple, probably he won't because he didn't work it out first time around.

as far as reading maps or more particularly, changing the oil, well I think that question may also be embarrassing.
tet

[Pandalet]

*stuff*

So how's that Australian to English dictionary coming along, then?

[topendtorque]

Now pandalet, which "stuff" do you mean? If its the fencepost turtle, I'm glad you asked, here it is;-

While stitching up the hand of a 75 year old Queensland farmer, who got cut on a gate while working cattle, the rural doctor struck up a conversation with the old man. Eventually the topic got around to Kevin 07 and his appointment to Prime Minister of Australia.

"Well, ya know," drawled the old farmer, "this Rudd fella is what they call a fencepost turtle."

Not being familiar with the term, the doctor asked him what a fencepost turtle was.

The old farmer said, "when you're driving along a country road and you come across a fence post with a turtle balanced on top, that's called a fencepost turtle."

The old farmer saw a puzzled look on the doctor's face, so he continued to explain, "You know he didn't get up there by himself, he definitely doesn't belong up there, he doesn't know what to do while he is up there, and you just gotta wonder what kind of dill put him up there in the first place!''

Savvy?

[Elan Head]

The report was released this morning:

Pilot error 'main cause in Black Hawk crash' - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) (http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/07/15/2303778.htm)

[eagle 86]

No matter how "hot" a pilot you (think) are, the laws of physics cannot be overcome.
GAGS
E86

[ECB4]

Collective down.
Flaring.
Wind up the chuff.
Heavy load.
All the bells and whistles, DECU, anticipators and power in the world wont overcome gravity.
Watch the wind, its your best friend to your face but very quick to stab you in the back.

[thekite]

Angus houston's comment that the pilots are cowboys is hardly fair. Yes the pilot executed a flairing turn into a downwind position and apparently just fell through the resulting vortex ring. But was the ship stationary or underway?

And if it was underway, could the skipper have turned sharply to simulate evasive action, thus placing the Blackhawk down wind?:uhoh:

[Elan Head]

According to the report, the “serials on 29 November 2006 were planned to be conducted to a static target to overcome the perceived lack of recency in such approaches. Accordingly, at 1403 KANIMBLA’s engines were declutched and at 1412 her shaft brakes were engaged. The evidence of LCDR Collins indicated that KANIMBLA had drifted 600 yards in a westerly direction from the time BLACK 1 launched to the time of the accident at 1611.”

One of the reports findings is that: “It does not appear to have been appreciated by 171 Avn Sqn how KANIMBLA would lie in the water relative to the wind while drifting. Not knowing this compromised 171 Avn Sqn’s ability to best brief how the wind on 29 November 2006 would most likely be coming around the ship as the target.”

[bladebanger]

It was not that long ago we called all the mustering pilots cowboys.

How things have changed.

Banger

[TalkSpike]

Three quick points:

1. It wasn't VR it was rotor droop (decaying Nr);
2. When flying in an anti terrorist role wouldn't it be a dead giveaway to assault a target into wind every time? I know where I would be looking if I were a terrorist; and,
3. When training for such a role mistakes are going to happen, we all make them.

[helmet fire]

All this criticism is just so well founded.
Hands up all the Black Hawk pilots???
Hands up all those who still think it was vortex ring???
Hands up all those who still think power does not overcome gravity???
I am positive someone some one here was about to mention LTE....

Alongside the death of a highly skilled professional soldier, this accident also resulted in the death of a fine aviator, trained by one of the better training organisations in the world. Wouldn't it be helpful to debate the accident causes so that there may be some lessons we can take home to protect us from the same fate?

The personal attacks on attitudes and actions are misplaced and emotive. IMHO. The "big cheese" was one of my instructors, and a man I looked up to then and continue to admire now. The criticisms mentioned in this thread are entirely inconsistent with the 18 years I have known him - 2 of which were spent as one of his direct subordinates.

On the "cowboy report", is it public? I have not found it anywhere beyond these incredibly convenient and emotive "cowboy" quotes everyone seems to be latched onto. Does anyone have the report? What is the context of the comments? What was the report terms of reference, and who was the expert who compiled the report?

That said, I do believe another strong debate that we need to open up is how realistic does war role training need to be? It is said that a sword needs to be kept sharp to be useful in combat: these fine men died keeping that sword sharp and I respect the fact that they lost their lives serving Australia.

How sharp and how many cuts are acceptable to keep it that way? This question will have a direct bearing on acceptable attitudes and can-do cultures that perhaps we NEED to have in certain combat arms. The level of acceptability will always be highly divisive, but that is the reason to keep having the debate: that we may find a cultural acceptable level of risk V readiness. Whilst we search for that line, I believe such emotive criticism of the current practitioners as expressed in this thread is unreasonable, and should be / could be kept out of the debate.

[Delta Torque]

Yes, I agree re Angus...a fine aviator and leader..

BOIs have to come up with a tangible target, be it supervisors, pilots or whatever...the fact that Special Ops is just bloody dangerous is slightly unpalatable. It is unfortunate that this Squadron has been branded 'cowboys'....

My two cents worth?

A combination of:

High Rate of closure,

High ROD,

Transient NP droop (due to those crappy analog ECUs) leading to a decrease in RRPM at the critical point,

A component of 'mission creep', and

Bad luck on the day.

And yes, all those latent causal factors which set the scene for the mission....

And as you know Helmet Fire, the BOI recommendations will probably give birth to a whole new opportunity for the industry to flog something to the military.....Remember 96 BH crash = aviation risk assessment/management? A new component of the annual recat perhaps? Bah!..My High Cynicism caution light is flashing...

Cheers...

[sunnywa]

My two cents worth as a former naval pilot who has done this fast roping thing to a lot of decks, all the things said below by delta torque did indeed happen except the one about bad luck. Bad luck is where the helo was doing the approach and a bird flies into the tail rotor (been done before).
The aircraft was placed in a situation where it was unrecoverable and the inevitable happened with the sad loss of life.
Yes, they were practising for the real event, but one thing I have learnt over my years is that there is never an excuse to push training beyond safety. Don't solely blame the pilot (we have all F**ked up at some stage and somehow gotten away from it), the Sqn bosses should be held accountable for not showing more control. A lesson to learn for all aviators.

Clint Eastwood said 'A man's gotta know his limitations' and I live by that rule.

[topendtorque]

All this criticism is just so well founded.
Hands up all the Black Hawk pilots???
Hands up all those who still think it was vortex ring???
Hands up all those who still think power does not overcome gravity???

Whoa there, old dawgs, tis not a time to be rattling cages.
No I guess not everyone has drove a Blackhawk,
I will stick my hand up and say that vortex ring played a significant part, to wit the accelerating ROD. Also like many others, I know that power can beat gravity, if you aren’t fiercely involved in a close relationship with that hot little Sheila, vortex ring.

But really we have all dissected the ‘final flight path’ on another thread previously; rehashing it too much won’t do any of us any good, its yesterday’s news.

For my money as I said before and I’ll not back away from it and I’m not saying it just to console the wife of a reportedly very fine man, but I reckon the final stages of the A/C tape portrayed a decision of excellence on the part of the pilot. Another twenty feet and he might just have got it over the side, not saying he would have pulled it up before the water at all. His actions are all there on the A/C tape for anyone who wants to review it.

Had he made the classic pilot error mistake of pulling aft on the cyclic at about five to three seconds before impact, then almost certainly his ROD would have been monumental and the deck impact far more catastrophic than it was.

How he got the A/C to its position where he had to attempt recovery, well the BOI has covered that aspect fairly well I think. I.E. Systemic chain of command problems that need rectifying.

Re the wind moving around the ship, there was another famous video of a helicopter slamming into a helideck, I think it was a sea-king. RN? I can’t remember. There was all sorts of conjecture about T/R failure etc.

What was evident after watching the video about twenty times was the M/R blades tips flapping down and up very swiftly, independently of any pitch change two or three times just before it developed a fast rate of descent, then impact.

VRS? Yep I reckon. Wind moving around the ships superstructure interfering with the A/C approach path? Yep I reckon.

One thing I will take issue with in the Fiji incident is the expression “can do pilots”.

Well “hello” says Mrs TET as I read it out to her, “Aren’t these pilots who have, ‘to do’ in times of war and safely too, who cannot have, ‘a can’t do’ attitude.”

What a load of frogs-twaddle. Mr big cheese shot hisself well in the foot there, and needs a severe attitude change on that issue, why have a military if it going to be staffed with ‘can’t do’ derelicts. What an insult, we need the can do people and I would think that they are.

I’m not knocking anyone’s respect for one’s peers, that is to be expected and respected, but that doesn’t mean that the big cheese is adept in some of the wider aspects of many helicopters potential flight regimes with their inherent dangers. There is possibly not much reason as to why he should be, if he has never had to chase belligerent cattle out of tall trees and cane grass.

If the pilots had the luxury of practicing in some of these wider aspects they would find that all this stuff about taking risks is just clap trap. As for approaching a target from the upwind position if you wish to surprise them , bloody hell, you quickly find the fallacy of that when not working the wind properly with cattle, which by the way have a very sensitive hearing.

I know mustering drivers were oft referred to as cowboys. I don’t know if it counts but I was once told that I was a “blasted hillbilly’ by a certain Mr Reg Trewenick, bless him. Our one and only civilian examiner of airmen for a long time.

Well how was I to know back then in ’74 when he came to do my brand new mustering endorsement test, that a helicopter was supposed to be grounded if the bloody old radios were broken, as usually were those valves and steam pipe things? Any way, he got over as I’m sure the squadron will after a tough day yesterday.
All the best
tet

[Delta Torque]

Fine words from an experienced operator TET, and I tip my hat to your expertise...but we are really talking apples and oranges..:)

Cattle, however belligerent, do not employ small arms or heavy weapons,

nor do they take and hold hostages....

Mustering has it's own set of advanced skills but the risk matrix pans out quite differently to Special Ops, which has an unlimited array of scenarios and threats.

Cheers....

[Trojan1981]

I have been told (Not confirmed) that AAvn will not implement the recomendation to fit Blackhawks with emergency flotation devices for maratime ops. This seems to be one of the most important recomendations as it may have saved the lives of the two who died.

Does anyone know why they would make this decision?

[Elan Head]

The report talks quite a bit about the issue of flotation devices. One of its findings is: “The Board finds that there is insufficient evidence rationally to conclude that the fitting of flotation devices to Black Hawk 221 would have improved its survivability in the circumstances of the events of 29 November 2006.” Primarily that’s because of the catastrophic nature of the crash, which might have rendered the devices inoperable.

The actual recommendations are: “15(a) A detailed and comprehensive review be conducted into the fitting of the current fleet of Army Black Hawk helicopters flotation devices and cognate issues”; and “15(b) Defence considers the priority allocation to 171 Avn Sqn of MRH 90 aircraft upon their acquisition by reason of the operations known to be performed by 171 Avn Sqn over water.”

[helmet fire]

Hi TET, well said.
I think we can agree to disagree on the VRS bit, however I would urge you to research VRS through the prune in relation to explanations by Nick Lappos. Even the Sea King accident is discussed. I am just keen to see this accident not labelled by something that will detract from the very real learning outcomes presented here at the cost of two very fine soldiers.

The reference to power was directed both here and to the thread that discussed the causes previously, as was the Black Hawk pilot comment. No, you do not have to be a Black Hawk pilot to examine/comment on the accident. But, when so many Black Hawk pilots are trying to communicate the issue here and are getting shot down with "VRS" and "lack of power" and "downwind caused it" and "hot shot attitude caused it" and "I wouldn't approach a ship that way" etc etc etc, then I think it is time to point out that the Black Hawk has unique characteristics. This is true of many types, and that those who are not familiar with that particular type may just want to entertain the possibility that it has a unique characteristic rather than assume the only probable causes are limited to the commentators experience and background. Examples would include the R22 collective/RRPM coupling, Squirrel JacK Stall, Jetranger LTE, and Huey LTA. Just to name some.

For those still willing to accept the possibility of unique characteristics (that still comply to the law of physics despite previous statements) the Black Hawk in the S70A-9 model has a transient droop problem. I contend that if that approach had been flown exactly the same in a Squirrel, BK117, A109, B412, etc, etc, with the exact same power margins, then they would NOT have hit the ship. I have personally seen and experienced transient droop in S70 ops (as would a vast majority of Black Hawk pilots) and I can tell you they have nothing to do with wind direction and little to do with power margin. They certainly are not confined to CT operations or even special forces. Hiding behind other causes detracts significantly from the opportunity to engineer the problem out.

Before the emotive take me out of context: the Black Hawk is the finest combat helicopter I know of, and transient droop is a tiny blemish in an amazing helicopter that I would choose 10 out of 10 times for the role it performs. I certainly would NOT choose the Squirrel, BK117, A109, B412, etc in preference.

I have not read the report in full Elan, however I would be reasonably sure that a report of this calibre would also consider the following somewhere: floatation devices versus a DECU. One (floats) reduces but does not remove the consequences of the problem IF it occurs during the tiny percentage of the aircraft's operational profile , the other (DECU) removes the problem over the entire profile thus also removing the argument that the problem needs permanent fitment of floats with a drag and power penalty throughout life of type.

I ask again...Does anyone have "cowboy report"? What is the context of the comments? What was the report terms of reference, and who was the expert who compiled the report?

Delta Torque has hit the nail on the head. :D

[Elan Head]

The report does indeed look at DECUs. Apparently when the flight was recreated in a DECU-equipped simulator, the pilot flying was "unable to replicate rotor droop in the simulator". The report says there have been reasonable grounds in the past for NOT adopting DECUs (the high cost of fitting the fleet – $60 to $100 million – especially in the context of the eventual phase-out of Black Hawks) but recommends that the subject be revisited...

[Ned-Air2Air]

especially in the context of the eventual phase-out of Black Hawks

Wouldnt be too sure of that just yet, heard that LM are making an unsolicited bid to the OZ Defence Forces for a bunch of R model Hawks :ok:

[Freewheel]

Ned,

If they're R models, they'll have the DECU as standard.

Bids may be bids, but with the purchase of the MRH90 and delivery ensuing, the horse has bolted.

If anything, given the desire for reducing the number of types, there may be more 90s.

[Ned-Air2Air]

Freewheel,

The rumours I have heard is that the Navy doesnt want the MRH90 and are in the process of lobbying for the R models to either replace or supplement the Seahawks they have now.

I also heard that GL who used to be in the Navy is now working for AusAero and pushing the option for the Navy to get the 90.

Is it too late to get the R models do you think.

Ned

[mechchick]

As to the call about that particular pilot being a cowboy, having flown with him when I was a maintainer I too was amazed at such comments, and during my time at Oakey when he was also posted to SAA, he was one of the 'better' pilots out there I can say, very very professional, sad loss for the whole of the ADF..sad to see that said about Army pilots in general as well, very professional group to work with.

He actually managed to fill in the EE360 correctly and I never had to chase him about it, compared to a few other Army pilots!...lol

I think the Navy can probably 'lobby' all it likes for newer Seahawk/Blackhawk variants..however they also have to meet the requirements of AIR9000...something about being few types of platforms and more commonality across the ADF..looks promising for the Naval MRH90 variant. Their current delivery of MRH90's is a replacement for the Seaking.

-from another ex-Blackhawk type now a darn AA MRH90 employee...:p

[Tibbsy]

Chaps - how about a wee bit of perspective regarding the CDF's comments. :=

What was reported in the SMH was

He is said to have been appalled by its revelations. The Herald understands that, after reading it, he dubbed senior pilots from 171 Squadron "cowboys" and launched an audit of all of Defence's helicopter fleets to ascertain if the problems were more widespread.

Helmet Fire,

I ask again...Does anyone have "cowboy report"? What is the context of the comments? What was the report terms of reference, and who was the expert who compiled the report?

There is no report labelling the pilots cowboys, it is only reportedly what was said by the CDF at the moment he finished reading the BOI report, which is I guess the one you should read if you're interested. The terms of reference etc will be on the BOI website.

mechchick As to the call about that particular pilot being a cowboy and thekite Angus Houston's comment that the pilots are cowboys is hardly fair....

I also don't think he labelled the accident pilot(s) a cowboy. He was commenting on the senior pilots of the squadron, in the context of the culture that was found to exist at the squadron, not about the accident itself. :ugh: