Can offshore helicopters become as safe as commercial airlines? [Archive]

Shell Management

14th Jun 2008, 15:20

Report from Rotorhub of an excellent RAeS conference this wek at Hamilton Place. Comments? Does everyone agree this is possible?

Offshore helicopter safety has improved by an order of magnitude in the last decade, but can it become as safe as airline transport. Mark Stevens Director Air Safety at Shell Aircraft International seems to think so. Presenting a paper at the Royal Aeronautical Society’s Maritime Operations of Rotorcraft conference on Wednesday, Stevens referred to air safety performance figures that put offshore transport in third place with 4.5 fatal per one million flying hours compared to 2.0 for commuter airlines and 0.6 for average commercial airlines.

Examining how safety has improved in fixed wing operations over the last 30, Stevens points out that Damage tolerant design; system redundancy; improved reliability/crashworthiness, Safety Management Systems, Flight data monitoring have all played their part. Yet such systems have only really started appearing on helicopter in the last 10 years.

An examination of more than 2,000 helicopter accidents carried out by Shell revealed that most accidents could have been prevented had that aircraft met new FAR 29 airworthiness standards. Others could have been prevented through the installation of HUMS or EGPWS and TCAS.
As this new technology is introduced, it’s clear that safety standards will improve yet further, but the risks are going up too, offshore operations are being extended further out to sea in more extreme environments placing more pressure on pilot and machine.

Tony Osborne - Rotorhub.com Editorial Team

cmwangs

14th Jun 2008, 16:08

The one item missing from your list of installed systems is a properly trained crew - and that which demands yearly recurrent simulator sessions.
All the safety systems in the world commanded by a weak crew remains at zero.
There, in my opinion is the answer.

CH274

14th Jun 2008, 16:47

...... 7/7 :)

helimutt

14th Jun 2008, 18:04

Nick, I think your standpoint is admirable, but until 'new' aircraft are brought into play in the offshore world, the idea of total IFR, GPS 'auto flight to a hover' capability are just not feasible. The aircraft would require much improved hover capability at the weights we carry offshore and with present aircraft operated around the world, some days this just wouldn't allow the customers required payloads.
Unfortunately, not every operator is prepared to invest in the newer technology due to the one thing that affects them all the most, COST!
We're flying 15 yr old S76's offshore with 12 pob. You know how much fun that can be on a hot day with nil wind. I guess that's where the pilot 'skill' comes into it.
I would think the lead time on a new aircraft these days, say a 76 C++ or an EC155 etc, has to be at least 18 months if you ordered one today, and that's a modern day helicopter now. Is there an easy fix?

paco

14th Jun 2008, 18:15

All very valid points, but one thing still remains - 747s, etc don't land on oil rigs and they are also better suited performance-wise for their job! As long as we are landing in such places you won't ever get down to those safety figures overall, although there are companies that have achieved better than the airlines already without Shell's help. That's not to say we shouldn't be trying though!

Proper training, of course, offsets a lot of this disadvantage, as does a proper safety culture

Phil

SASless

14th Jun 2008, 18:44

I viewed Nick's presentation and find that I agree with him.

The techology exists, the concept has been proven by the Flagler Demo.

It would seem oil companies and IFR operators would quickly embrace the situation if they were truly interested in "safety" and put people ahead of "costs".

The major difference between helicopters and airplanes is during instrument operations the airplane lands at airports equipped with all sorts of aids to flight and use standard procedures. Helicopters on the other hand do just the opposite. A couple of bright lights, some dim deck lights, and a windsock really do not compare to rabbits, lead in lights, runway lights, vasi's, and all the rest of the gear that awaits an airplane at the end of an IFR flight.

It stands to reason then that if the rigs and accident scenes do not have the gear we need to bring our own. Add FLIR, NVG's, IR Filters on night suns, and lots of strong lighting and perhaps our safety record will improve noticeably.

windowseatplease

14th Jun 2008, 19:05

I've always wondered why UK offshore oil platforms dont have ILS approaches? Why only NDBs?

helimutt

14th Jun 2008, 19:27

windowseatplease, my thought is because the offshore winds can be much greater than those found onshore on the same day, and of varying directions, you would be flying an ILS type approach to a rig then having the circling manoeuvre at the bottom in bad viz/poor weather/completely out of wind on some days. This would put you at increased risk.
The ARA is used so that you can use any direction, ie go overhead and descending outbound before turning back in getting to minima safely (200', 80kts), or straight in with an en route letdown, to minima so pretty much fool proof. Using the Wx radar and DME and RNAV you don't even need the NDB. (most of which I believe dont always work anyway).

Can you imagine calibrating all of those ILS approaches offshore on a regular basis? A logistical nightmare, especially when the equipment would be rig based, and prone to slight misalignments (rigs are metal and subject to movement and expansion/contraction) A small movement at the rig would cause a big discrepancy over the length of the approach path?? Don't know but just throwing ideas in here now. Aircraft doing calibration flights regularly adding to the airspace traffic.

Horror box

14th Jun 2008, 19:28

The major difference between helicopters and airplanes is during instrument operations the airplane lands at airports equipped with all sorts of aids to flight and use standard procedures. Helicopters on the other hand do just the opposite. A couple of bright lights, some dim deck lights, and a windsock really do not compare to rabbits, lead in lights, runway lights, vasi's, and all the rest of the gear that awaits an airplane at the end of an IFR flight.

I totally agree with the statement above, and will add further, that some of the deck designs are quite frankly appalling. I am sometimes surprised there arent more accidents/incidents. Whilst there are certain criteria involved in the design of a deck and its maintenance, I am sure most of us have landed on decks where this is "stretched" to say the least. Until the oil companies start taking this seriously - nothing will change. How many times have we seen lights not working, cranes/ships/various obstructions blocking overshoots, and all manner or clutter in the supposed clear area under the deck creating extra turbulence? Would this be acceptable on other forms of public transport flights? It all boils down to cost, and the customer must be prepared to pay up first, unfortunately they wont until accidents happen. We have had to collisions with rig structures in the last few months alone, one with 19 fatalities. There are many improvements needed, and my company has made many suggestions for improvement, but it always falls on deaf ears. Where there is an incident though, the customer is the first to call for heads to roll.

Can you imagine calibrating all of those ILS approaches offshore on a regular basis? A logistical nightmare, especially when the equipment would be rig based, and prone to slight misalignments (rigs are metal and subject to movement and expansion/contraction) A small movement at the rig would cause a big discrepancy over the length of the approach path?? Don't know but just throwing ideas in here now. Aircraft doing calibration flights regularly adding to the airspace traffic.

Also - how would the min RVR be calculated and assessed/reported?

Shawn Coyle

14th Jun 2008, 19:41

Am ideal thread to pontificate in...
Why don't we have differential GPS (or WAAS in those areas covered) approaches to oil rigs?
Should be difficult to set up - each rig could have approaches set up every 45° of azimuth without major problems - the visual portion at the bottom shouldn't be difficult to transition to. 8 different possible approach paths to get you down to within 0.5 miles of the rig.
What's stopping us from at least trying this?
And the reason for advocating this is that it would instill the sort of heavily disciplined routine that is standard in the airline industry. (I'm not saying that most helicopter pilots aren't disciplined, but nowhere near as disciplined as the airline industry.)
When 25% of helicopter pilots who have autopilots don't use the autopilot, it says a whole lot about the differences between the RW world and the airlines.
It's nice to see some operators adopting the airlines Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) techniques. It can only help us make things safer.
The question is - why isn't everyone offshore adopting it? Why don't the oil companies demand it?

Gomer Pylot

14th Jun 2008, 19:55

As long as Shell (and the other oil companies) is involved in it, safety won't increase much. There is tremendous financial pressure on the local people to keep costs down, and to make the fewest number of flights possible, thus each aircraft has to carry the maximum amount of weight. Dispatchers simply won't allow dropping passengers and cargo unless forced to. The oil companies are making obscene profits, but it's never, ever enough, there is always pressure for more. Every airline flight is IFR, every time. Reducing the payload of every offshore flight and requiring them to all be IFR is not going to happen. In the GOM, a large percentage of the flights are done in single-engine, single-pilot aircraft, none of which are IFR capable. If Shell and the other companies really want to bring offshore flight safety up to the level of the airlines, they have to put their money where their mouths are, and force it to happen. Get rid of the crappy, poorly-designed offshore platforms, and install helidecks that are actually safe to land on. Require all IFR, multi-pilot helicopters. Get working weather observation equipment on all the platforms. Get reliable ATC communications offshore. ADS-B might be it, but that's still to be seen. It would require a huge investment in infrastructure and aircraft, and I don't see that happening in my lifetime. Money talks and b***t walks.

helimutt

14th Jun 2008, 19:59

Shawn, all of our LPC/OPC's etc have to be handflown without use of the autopilot! If we dont hand fly regularly it makes it more difficult when we do the tests. Even though the ops manual says use AP whenever poss!!!

The oil companies won't cough up!!! It's all down to the beancounters. I would have thought anything to do with safety would be exempt from cost cutting measures.

www.refabs.com
This works well, fly over this deck every week, but the companies are loathe to pay for it.

Here is one of my own gripes:-
We launch offshore knowing the wx is marginal, (i'm beginning to think pressure is on the offshore bods to get us out there so exaggerate wx sometimes???) given to us by standby boat staff looking out of the window. They give horiz viz (easily worked out) but they also give cloud heights which bear no resemblance to the real world. Ok, so we fly for 25 minutes out there, get to the other end, cloud base at 100', viz poor, fly an ARA, no rig seen, decide it's not even worth flying another attempt it's so bad, head back to airport. 1 hour cost to the customer?? $000's surely?
Ok, so what would a cloud height radar cost? I'm sure it would pay for itself very quickly, after even just one week I expect. They don't see it like this though. It's an outlay and not gonna happen.

AKAAB

14th Jun 2008, 20:52

Nick gets my support on this one. Training ad infinitum on poorly designed or outdated technology can only achieve a part of the safety level we should all be demanding. The coupling of improved and innovative technology with better training methods is the ultimate solution. Safety isn't free, though, and as long as pilots are willing to shy away from solutions that engineer down the level of risk, the corporations won't put up a penny.

I was one of the GA/Corporate pilots Nick invited to evaluate the performance of the differential GPS approach system and give feedback on the instrument cues at the Flagler Demo. There were plenty of test pilots lined up to shoot approaches, but Nick wanted to include perspectives from a wider range of experience levels. I can assure anyone with doubts that the proof of concept was resoundingly successful and am surprised the system hasn't been implemented. The approaches to the test helipad proved the concept would greatly improve safety allowing operators to have full instrument approaches to virtually any location. To add one more layer of safety, the engineers even had a programmed yaw that would slew the nose to the left so you could see the pad better as it came into a hover.

The on airport approaches, in my book, were overshadowed by the approaches to the helipad at the Flagler hospital - a hover hole at best with obstacles on all sides. The system was flawless other than a little wag when it switched from low to high sensitivity on the initial approach; something that would be smoothed out if the program went beyond the test phase.

Matthew Parsons

15th Jun 2008, 00:14

I don't disagree with the fact that improved technology will increase safety, decrease cockpit workload, and will subsequently decrease training requirements. However, I'm certain that the technology won't make it into the aircraft until the regulators step in. As long as companies are allowed to fly with 1963 technology, they will. Obviously if you can prove that adding the technology is cheaper than paying liability then a smart company will go that way. Realistically, that proof won't be available because nobody has yet spent the money to install the technology. Instead companies will provide glossy brochures with projected statistics, that may or may not be accurate.

The amazing technology that most are agreeing should be in the cockpits could have been developed and fielded years ago. Most of it has been to some extent.

The 1963 medical technology analogy is only partly valid. Another reason (other than "Quality of Care") for the amount of new technology in medicine is that it uses less manpower and is maintainable (both are true to an extent for the helicopter industry). The side of the argument that seems to work in favour of this discussion does not completely apply because the legal involvement in the medical field is directing their every move. To avoid liability they bring in new equipment. Much of it is just to make it look like they're doing all they can, but it is also due to a real improvement in patient care. Of course, the helicopter industry hasn't been developing this way to the same extent.

If the regulations demanded the new technology, it would have been used. If you don't believe me, look at bicycle helmet laws, airbag equipment requirements, daytime running lights, seatbelt use laws, seatbelt equipment requirements, etc.

Matthew.

busdriver02

15th Jun 2008, 02:30

How are most navigation systems set up in the civi world?

On the Pavehawk, software drives the integration of the various parts (INS,GPS,Doppler blend)so we have a self contained approach ability. Given a set of coords, I can define approach angle and whatnot, so that the indications in the cockpit look like an ILS but I can fly the approach to any point in space. Given how stingy the USAF is with providing money for helos, this can't really be super expensive. If pilot unions decided this was worth it, how hard to get would it really be?

zalt

15th Jun 2008, 02:43

The point about the crap offshore installations - especially in GOM is well founded. I believe Shell theoretically would like to raise the GOM standard to match the norm in most of the the third world (!) but unfortunately / conveniently (?) they can't unless the other operators agree (the FAA are no part of the equation...).

Its funny how the manufacturers home in on selling new technology... or extra gadgets at least.

From an operator's perspective SMS is probably more important but noticably there is now thinking that SMS will only work in organizations that have a good safety culture. See this facinating article:

http://www.flightsafety.org/asw/may08/asw_may08_p12-17.pdf

FlyingHead

15th Jun 2008, 05:00

Like they said, it is a question of perspective. I agree that all the SMS, Safety culture and new standard and equipment have improve the safety record in the offshore industry. But on the other hand their research generally include the whole world, which in my point of view is not standard. If we just compare the GOM and The North Sea, they are at the opposite. One operate as single engine aircraft, single pilot, in marginal condition where the other operate twin engine two pilots in IFR conditions. The North Sea can be see as closer to the airline industry where the GOM is more like a bush operation where minimum standard apply which cause an increase of the average accident ratio for the offshore industry. So if they want to compare the airline with the offshore they should look at an operation who is similar again like the NS.

That my perspective:}
FH

cmwangs

15th Jun 2008, 06:43

Like I said -
All the systems in the world will be zero unless they are managed by properly trained and maintained crews. Assume a ramp filled with the latest and greatest, the fact remains.
Whether or not Shell coughs up, GOM or wherever, whatever it is that is in place demands acceptable pilot standards. Which all leads back to us and acceptable professional attitudes.
The Customer can demand, the Helicopter Company can promise, FAA, JAA, MOT can all procrastinate - the bottom line is: It is up to us to accept or deny and behave accordingly.
Can we be as safe as the airlines? Yes we can.
Money spent talks - B***T walks.

Tailspin Tommy

15th Jun 2008, 10:44

My Two pennies worth;
As one who has flown in the GOM in the mid-70s to late 80s, landing on API-approved non-standardized helidecks (sometimes over 160 times a day), and being able to flee to the fixed-wing side of the business, and having worked in 30-some countries, I believe that change will not happen in the GOM or other similarly regulated locations unless legilation is ceated to require all of the points mentioned in this thread; Shell's 7/7=1 program, Nick's excellent points, and the others who mention the need for training specific to the tasks, etc, etc.

For those that feel it is the fault of the oils companies and their obscene profits (I take it that you mean greed) for past accident rates,to you need to stop reading those 1960 copies of Workers Unite and put the blame on the business culture of the industry of the country we live in.

HSAC made several valient attempts in going to the FAA in 2005, visiting with congressional leaders only to be undermind by a handful of smaller oil companies within API that cut our legs off. Shell, ExxonMobil and other majors puttheir money where their mouths are. Look for the answers with the institutions that control change in this country. It's the same people who believe in Robin Hood's approach. Taxing oil companies will raise theprice of gas for those of us who are becoming more burdened everyday with rising prices. Quit complaining and help us with the solution.

HeliComparator

15th Jun 2008, 11:21

Like almost any system, its the weakest link in the chain that causes the accident. So its important not to get fixated on some areas and ignore others. cmwangs is absolutely right, simulator training is very important and especially in multi-pilot operations where CRM is paramount. You try assessing CRM during a flight test where you (the examiner) are the second pilot. It just doesn't work.

Simulator training is also very important for modern aircraft with complex systems. The clever systems that Nick proposes are all very well but they do break down and its necessary to understand what you have lost and how to operate using "abnormal procedures". Typically these modes are hard to simulate in the actual aircraft. Without simulators, the first time you see the abnormal indications, modes etc is in anger (and by S's Law always on a wild winter night!).

Regarding the other stuff Nick mentions, ACAS is of course especially useful in a non-controlled environment (hopefully less useful inside controlled airspace if ATC are doing their job) but ACAS I is only any use in VMC. To be any use in IMC you need ACAS II - of course Nick doesn't mention this because ACAS II for helicopters was invented in Europe!

EGPWS is pretty useless for offshore (that being in the title of this thread) and whilst offshore flights typically start from onshore, they are often from airfields very near the coast without much terrain factor. We have recently picked up a new EC225 with EGPWS and even though it has the new v26 software version which is much better for offshore than the old v24, there are still plenty of "cry wolf" nuisance warnings. Ironically its better than v24 because it copies the philosophy of AVAD (which is probably a much better concept for offshore than EGPWS) - for example there is a "check height" call triggered from radalt bugs, a "suspend" button on the cyclic etc. And - joy- we even get the voice speaking English not American!

Crashworthiness is obviously a good thing but it does nothing to stop you crashing in the first place. For accidents that are in the band between "never surviveable" and "injury free", it cuts the death and serious injury count. But care has to be taken to ensure that secondary factors such as escapability are not worsened by crashworthiness design. There is no point in surviving a crash landing/ditching offshore only to drown!

Regarding the bits in Nick's presentation on navigation, I agree that IFR is much safer than VFR - most flights out to the Northern North Sea are IFR. However once outside the zone (at 10 nm from Aberdeen) its uncontrolled airspace so the advantages of IFR are lessened.

For offshore approaches, nobody could argue that using the weather radar as the sole means is best practice. We use gps as an additional range and bearing indicator. The UK CAA (with sponsorship from other bodies) are currently conducting a trial into gps-based offshore approaches. The idea is to use SBAS (the generic name for the USA's WAAS) - ie satellite based differential gps - to give lateral and vertical guidance (so-called LPV) for the approach. Current ideas are for a "fly by" approach, ie at the missed approach point you just fly straight ahead in the go-around. The vertical guidance would include a level sector and continue to guide in the go-around. Transitioning from the descent to the level sector is quite difficult manually, so this is probably only a good idea for fully coupled aircraft.

This is all very well but there are a couple of problems:
1) you still need the weather radar to avoid unknown obstacles eg rigs under tow, but the weather radar is not certified, designed nor tested as an obstacle avoidance system
2) The accident rate duing radar approaches up to decision range is pretty low ( I would have said non-existant but I think MHS had one last year?), so is there a problem to be fixed?

The problems typically start after decision range when you have to fly the visual manoeuvre to land.

HC

parabellum

15th Jun 2008, 11:34

Very sad to see that in forty odd years things have hardly changed. By 'things' I mean the driving forces. When I did my off shore stuff it was a case of which helicopter provider could come in with the best quote, that means cheapest. Load the helicopter up with good equipment and the basic operating cost increased which meant the contract price was higher and not competitive.
Move now to the non contract world where passengers are free to choose their carrier and if the pax are aware that one carrier provides a potentially safer service than another, (by virtue of equipment carried), then they vote with their feet and the cheap skate goes out of business through a lack of revenue, not so in the captive passenger load of a contracted offshore helicopter flight. Not much chance of mobilising the passenger element to strike a blow for safety I suppose?
On the subject of Shell, in Nigeria, in the very early seventies I remember they floated the idea of having two operators on site, the call would go out for a flight and the first one in the air got the job, fortunately Bristow said no bloody way.
My post is largely anecdotal in the midst of some very serious stuff but as I said earlier, it is sad to see that the basic mind set of the charterer has not changed over almost two generations and still governs and severely limits the options of the helicopter operator. It is unlikely that the passengers will take a stand, so it is hard to see how anything will change until it is proven that some modern equipment will actually reduce the cost of the operation, is that a possibility?

Shawn Coyle

15th Jun 2008, 12:24

Let's see - what makes airlines so safe??? And I'll leave you to make your own comparisons.... (all this is based on the US airline model and not all comparisons are valid for the rest of the world)

To start - excellent weather reporting at all airports they use. And pretty good predictions.

Next - navigation aids at all airports (most have ILS, and the move is to make all approaches like an ILS). Very rare to have an airliner make a missed approach.

Then - certified, trained dispatchers to set up flights and make decisions on loads, etc. The pilots don't do weight and balance calculations (mostly).

Add- nearly continuous radar coverage, and certainly continuous ATC coverage.

- all large aircraft have significant performance on one engine, and the performance is scheduled for an engine-out situation for the entire flight. (the reliability of FW turbine engines is even better than RW turbines, so why are they bothered by this??? Must be a reason...)

- two pilots, even the small commuter aircraft.

- they have performance charts that are comprehensive and give them the information they need.

- they fly on a scheduled basis (that is, not when there is a full load of passengers)

- facilities that are regularly checked (most airports check the runway and taxiway lighting on a very regular basis, if not daily).

- dedicated fire crews are all airports above a certain size

- excellent knowledge of where any temporary or semi-permanent objects that might affect safety are (i.e. unlit cranes or towers within a certain distance from the runway / airport).

- nearly all pilots belong to a union - a union that believes in active participation in safety (ALPA's largest expense is putting pilots on all the various committees that regulate things like approaches, displays, etc., as well as having a rep on every accident that involves one of their members) (and I'm not slamming PHPA here - I think they're an important first step)

- and a whole host of other minor things that I hope others will bring up.

The point is that there is much more that contributes to safety in the airline business than is first evident. How much of this do we have to bring in to improve helicopter safety?
(having lit fuse, I will now retire to a safe distance and monitor following explosion)

sox6

15th Jun 2008, 13:58

Sean

As I understand it the two largest operators in the GOM are unionised and yet they both have a sorry sting of accidents. I've heard suggestions that they are more cause than solution in some cases because of the control the seniority list has on where new pilots are posted - and the types (i.e. 206 capatains first then 76 co-pilots). So are unions really part of the safety equation in the 21st centuary?

skiddriver

15th Jun 2008, 14:22

Just for cmwangs edification, and because it didn't come through in the first post, pilot experience and training is an integral part or Shell's 7/7=1 program.

http://www.aviationtoday.com/rw/commercial/offshore/1369.html

SASless

15th Jun 2008, 14:34

Sox,

Read Gann's book "Fate is the Hunter" and you will understand just how important "seniority numbers" are in the airline world. The only difference between the GOM and airline pilots is their equipment and seat they occupy are in fully instrumented IFR aircraft. The GOM thrives on Jetrangers and similar VFR aircraft although IFR aircraft are becoming more common.

Pilots bid for their job, aircraft, and bases based upon seniority....same as the airlines.

Troglodita

15th Jun 2008, 16:14

Shawn asks

How much of this do we have to bring in to improve helicopter safety?
(having lit fuse, I will now retire to a safe distance and monitor following explosion)

Tailspin pointed out

HSAC made several valient attempts in going to the FAA in 2005, visiting with congressional leaders only to be undermind by a handful of smaller oil companies within API that cut our legs off. Shell, ExxonMobil and other majors put their money where their mouths are. Look for the answers with the institutions that control change in this country.

I think the reality is that we need to address all the issues raised by Shawn in comparing our Industry to the fixed wing world. As several ppruners have eloquently pointed out - the highest standards in the world are probably to be found in the North Sea with Operators in Norway, UK etc. and the reason for this is that the Oil Companies and Helicopter Operators along with the CAA's and HCA have already addressed the majority of the issues highlighted by Shawn.

In the rest of the world including the USA there is often vast resistance to any change of legislation or even compliance with existing legislation that in my experience comes mainly from the Oil Companies INCLUDING many of the Majors.

The arrogant tendency to suggest that API standards since they are acceptable in the GOM are good enough for the Arabian Gulf or Bight of Benin is something that I have encountered (and still encounter) many times.

I have on several occasions advised a Jack Up Operator that his helideck is too small (i.a.w. ICAO Annexe 14 or CAP 437) for a 212/412/S76 since it only has a true 'D' value of 14 meters or less only to be shown API paperwork indicating that the deck is cleared for S61N - is it any surprise that accident rates for locations using these standards (I use the term loosely!) are substantially higher? - and they are!

I am aware of several of the Majors (including Shell/XOM/Chevron) who still do not even approach minimum recommendations for firefighting facilities, Deck sizes, Deck & Radio Room and Dispatch Staff qualifications on many facilities owned or operated on their behalf. In many cases very well qualified and knowledgable Aviation Advisors are employed by them but they seem to quickly learn that if they wish to stay employed, they will turn a blind eye and not piss off the Big Boys in Drilling/Production/Construction/Logistics etc. etc.

Until the Majors really really put their monies where their mouths are, we are going to be continuing to try to push s:mad:t uphill.

zalt

15th Jun 2008, 16:38

SASless

A bit or arse covering there? 'Seniority' - as in length of service - does not assure wisdom, skill or even experience (in hours or range of circumstances encountered). One reason that CRM had to be invented was to overcome the cockpit gradient created by seniority thinking.

The GOM problem, stated below, is that putting a single newbie straight in as PIC of a 206 is a receipe for disaster. Thats ones reason Exxon Mobile are flying 2 crew in a 206 - to allow safe, rapid building of experience. A 2,000 hour offshore pilot should be many times better than a 200 hour offshore pilot. But is a 20,000 hour pilot 10 times as safe as a 2,000 hour pilot - no.

Thats why as part of 7/7 (yes unfortunate but it was conceived before 2005) Shell are moving from quantity to quality in partnership with forward thinking schools like the Bristow Academy:
http://www.aviationtoday.com/rw/commercial/offshore/16815.html

Overdrive

15th Jun 2008, 17:23

"Can commercial airliners become as versatile as offshore helicopters?"

rufus.t.firefly

15th Jun 2008, 17:29

"Can offshore helicopters become as safe as commercial airlines? "

Probably .......when the charterer (oil and gas companies) stick their heads above the parapet , smell the coffee and stop whining about operating costs for newer types !

If you want to make it safer you need to operate types that are up to date with technology and innovation.

Things need to evolve and unfortunately operators are somewhat tied by the
charterers who are happy to operate "old aircraft" on the cheap ..... you pays your money and takes your choice ......:ugh:

Dont forget the big oil and gas boys dont make any profits do they ?????

paco

15th Jun 2008, 17:50

"If you want to make it safer you need to operate types that are up to date with technology and innovation"

Yes, that does help to a point, but how does one of the companies I mentioned above whose safety record is better than the airlines do it with 30-year-old 212s?

Training, management with a safety culture and most important - picking good crews in the first place. And just to go further against the grain - not a psychometric test in sight.

My point is that it can be done, including daily night flights (if you see what I mean), and as one with my other foot very firmly in the IT world, all the whizzbang technology in the world is no good if it isn't operated properly.

phil

rjsquirrel

15th Jun 2008, 17:57

for zalt and FlyingHead, your Europhile bigotry notwithstanding, the accident rate in the North Sea (flown by your vaulted better aircraft and better crews) is actually a bit worse than the safety record of the Gulf of Mexico (with their American cowboy pilots and dreaded single engine aircraft). I am always amused at the ease with which those who do not know instead assign wonderfullness to themselves, and blame the other guy.

One of the reasons why the GoM flies several times the number of hours is because it is bigger, has more machines, and has lower rates. Typical sad story, just like that for pilot training, where European standards raise cost and do not lower accident rates.

cmwangs

15th Jun 2008, 18:38

Skiddriver,
'Edification'? To what point do I need to be edified? The initial entry into this thread had to deal with the question of safety practices.
Whether or not Shell is the vanguard is inconsequential - they are to be congratulated. This is an industry wide situation, and it is to that my comments are directed.
Shell's requirements in terms of crew standards is indeed commendable. It is a pity there remains companies who fail to follow their lead - therein lies the safety ratios needed to pull us forward alongside the airlines.

skiddriver

15th Jun 2008, 19:23

I'm not certain how I managed to tweak your nose, but I was pointing out that while the first post did not include a mention of properly trained crew, as you pointed out in the second post, it is part of Shell's aviation safety improvement proposal.

To recap, the first post says that Mark Stevens from Shell gave a brief. You pointed out that the description of the briefing in the first post did not contain a mention of a properly trained crew which you feel is truly important. I pointed out that Shell's 7/7=1 includes a properly trained crew as one of the safety mitigations.

So I was merely trying to say that Shell agrees with you.

And thanks for the congratulations, we do our best.

Troglodita

15th Jun 2008, 20:24

How is life on the planet ZOB?

Try 2004 accident stats GOM when 19 helicopters came into contact with objects "on to or adjacent to helidecks" as against ZERO for the rest of the World (The bit that USA News doesn't cover)

Don't tell us you voted for George last time?

p.s. vaulted???

p.s. cmwangs ask someone in Shell how they operate to the "Offshore Platform" out of Warri which shakes like a b:mad:stard if Pilots don't wind back NR - it is a miracle that it has not ecologically reverted to a diving "point of interest" to use TOM Toms' vernacular in the B of B!

rjsquirrel

15th Jun 2008, 21:50

Troglodita:

OGP statistics 2006:

Gulf of Mexico
406,000 Hrs
1,248,000 Flts
1.48 Accidents per 100K Hrs
.48 Accidents per 100K sorties
.25 Fatalities per 100K Hrs
.48 Fatalities per 1M occupants

North Sea
138,000 Hrs
198,000 Flts
1.45 Accidents per 100K Hrs
1.01 Accidents per 100K sorties
.72 Fatalities per 100K Hrs
3.54 Fatalities per 1M occupants

zalt

15th Jun 2008, 22:28

rjsquirrel

Have a look at the HSAC website for 2007 - this shows one little key feature of the stats that they use (which are used in the OGP data) - not every aircraft loss in the Gulf gets counted as such. There were 7 accidents and 3 additional GOM ditchings not recorded as accidents. Call me picky but there is a big difference between 7 and 10.

Now of course the OGP members who fly in the GOM go a long with this little fraud because it suits them.

Funnily enougth one of the two accident in the North Sea in 2006 would conceivably have been a non-accident in US terms (helicopter simply landed at sea, everyone recovered uninjured - hell even the aircraft was on dry land again the same day without outside help).

However the good bit about Europeans, to me as a Canadian, is they don't spend most of their time pathalogically readjusting their safety records to justify why they have their heads in the sand.

SASless

15th Jun 2008, 22:28

RJ,

Your stats are skewed....average pax load for the North Sea is in the teens vice two's and three's for the average GOM 206. I would suggest you are comparing apples and oranges here.

Trog,

Which platform might that be that has the shivers?

Is the burnt out rig still there with all the sphagetti like drill pipe laying on it?

That must have been a real sight to see....proper blow out with the drill string shot skywards and then falling back onto the rig!

Then there is the sunken jack-up down towards between Eket and PHC that flopped over following a blow out. The heli-deck is now on about a 60 degree angle to the horizion.

skiddriver

15th Jun 2008, 23:16

Concur with zalt. It's not only the "safe water landings" that get hidden. Aircraft running into each other and obstacles on GoM platforms with never a mention in the NTSB/FAA records are also not counted, as long as it is only main or tail rotor damage.

I was working on getting money to upgrade our helidecks, and had a senior HSE manager tell me that the GoM had no recent history of helideck design related incidents. It's maddening.

John Eacott

16th Jun 2008, 00:54

Is the burnt out rig still there with all the sphagetti like drill pipe laying on it?

That must have been a real sight to see....proper blow out with the drill string shot skywards and then falling back onto the rig!

This one?

:cool:

http://www.eacott.com.au/gallery/d/2207-1/Rig+blowout+01.jpg

http://www.eacott.com.au/gallery/d/2210-1/Rig+blowout+02.jpg

SASless

16th Jun 2008, 02:37

That's the very one.....the "JuJu Rig" as it is known by the locals.

There was a lot more vegetation growing on it the last time I saw it.

John Eacott

16th Jun 2008, 03:57

There was a lot more vegetation growing on it the last time I saw it.

Those photos were taken in 1976: Kodak Instamatic, IIRC ;) ISTR there were a couple of palm trees growing amongst the sand piled up in odd corners, blown down off the Sahara :ok:

Troglodita

16th Jun 2008, 06:30

Originally posted by SASLess

Which platform might that be that has the shivers?

Just offshore Yokri - the problem has been "solved" to a large extent since introduction of the EC155 which has a much lower "shiver value" than the 212!

The JuJu rig was starting to compete with Kew Gardens last time I looked - lots of foliage and a haven for seabirds!

HeliComparator

16th Jun 2008, 09:05

RJ - you are definitely NL by another name. Once you start posting about old cars we will be certain!

Interesting that you chose the 2006 statistics. Wasn't that the year that the S76 out of Norwich lost a rotor blade? That being the first loss of life accident for some years. Even though you used that data to try to slew things (and as zalt points out, the FAA's idea of an accident is far removed from Europe's), in fact it makes the point that probably no, offshore helicopters will never become as safe as commercial airliners if only because there are so many more single point mechanical failures that can cause a catastrophic accident.

That doesn't mean we shouldn't try though! With the 7/7 items etc, safety can be raised but ultimately you are dealing with an intrinsically much more dangerous flying machine than an airliner.

HC