78 Sqn Chinook Crash (20 years ago)

[taxydual]

I am attempting to lay to rest a personal demon.

20 odd years ago a Chinook helicopter, of 78 Sqn RAF Mount Pleasant, crashed on an airtest/rotortune. Three crew and the rotortune team were all killed.

I was the (new) Opsy on the Squadron and responded in the best way I could to the events that happened that day.

Throughout the rest of my service, I never really discovered what the BoI uncovered (I was a witness).

Can any of my fellow Ppruners point me/supply me with an answer?

Taxydual

[November4]

I was in MPN at the time as well. Remember seeing the Chinook fly over as the TriStar was taxying out. Went back into the hangar to sort out the inbound and heard the T* taxi back in. Was told it was because the fire cover had gone and the T* might be needed to take any casualties backt to the UK.

Loaded the coffins instead.

BOI was inconclusive IIRC

[taxydual]

The crash vehicles couldn't get near the crash site, the ground was too boggy. We scrambled a Seaking to pick up the crash crew and some fire bottles.

I well remember the Timmy taxying back and behind, it in the distance, the rising pall of smoke.

OC Eng instantly grounded everything, thinking 'contaminated' fuel.

[Tandemrotor]

No positive cause was ever identified. The a/c simply departed from controlled flight. From an altitude (I think) of around 800', the aircraft gently entered a vertical dive. The only transmission made was thought to be the middle portion of £@cking he!!

Could have been a manufacturing fault. Could have been hydraulic contamination, could have been undocumented major engineering.

Exceptional guys, every single one.

Just fortunate there were witnesses, otherwise we could be looking at another case of 'Gross Negligence', as in the tragedy on the Mull of Kintyre.

Never forgotten.

[taxydual]

There was some talk of the forward rotor actuator extending out of it's cylinder causing the tilt, then the dive.

I heard 'garble' on the Ops VHF radio at the supposed crash time.

I don't know what's triggered this post request, I've seen crashes before and survived one, but............it doesn't 'haunt' me, but I'd like to know if there was a conclusion.

I had a tinny thrown to me by the crewman (who's name I cannot remember, aaaargh) the evening before the crash as we 'handbagged' a landrover for a lift back to the accommodation.

That 'tinny' meant I was accepted on the squadron.

[FlightTester]

Tandemrotor is right - the cause was never positively determined. I was on the Sqn at the time (in fact I was supposed to be in the aircraft but we had a shift change and I went back to the accomodation complex). If I recall correctly the BoI initially went after DASH actuator runaway as a possible cause, but this was later discounted.

As a very young JNCO at the time, standing in front of the BoI president and giving testimony was one of the most haunting things I have ever done.

Great guys, fondly remembered, sadly missed.http://www.pprune.org/forums/images/icons/mpangel.gif

FlightTester aka Roger Ramjet

[FlightTester]

Andy Johns I believe

[taxydual]

Andy Johns. Thank you.

[davejb]

Also known as 'cornish', at he was least when we were at 6FTS together, he started out as an AEOp. A good mate.

[Tandemrotor]

He was a top man indeed!

As were the two pilots. All members of the 18 Sqn flight crew football team. I believe I am correct in saying, we lost over half that team in 3 fatal accidents in the space of 2 years. Sad times indeed. (The fast jet Sqns also suffered over a similar period)

I hope things are are different now. Not least that military flight safety is better developed. But sadly I am not unfamiliar with recent cases! :sad:

[John Blakeley]

Taxydual,

If you have not seen it the official Military Air Accident Summary is at:

http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/BED68A4D-44B2-4754-AA76-93C08C86892C/0/maas87_05_chinook_hc1_ZA721_27feb87.pdf

Sadly the recommendation on fitting a CVR and ADR had not been actioned by June 1994 or we might not be having such a fight for justice for the crew of ZD 576.

JB

[taxydual]

JB

Thanks for the link. I never did get to see the final report. It was a long time ago, but that 'itch' about the crash never went away.

I knew two of the pax in the Mull Crash and still have an 'itch' about that too.

Occasionally, it's good to scratch an 'itch'. It brings back good memories that far outweigh the bad.

Stay safe and thanks again.

Taxydual

[travilad]

Hi all my name is Steve Travis but I was born Steve Johns, its somewhat surreal to read about an event that happened 26 years ago and changed mine and my family's life forever. I wish to say thank you for the link to the crash investigation and to the people that talked about my dad and hold his memory with you. I am trying to get to Mount Pleasant to lay a wreath at the monument that is at the crash site.

A colleague former Squadron leader Dyson is helping me and I hope in time I will able to post that I have succeeded in my aim.

Steve

[Rigga]

Crumbs. 26 years.
I visited the memorial and cleaned it each time I went to MPA. I fine weather day is required. I stopped going in 1996. I'm sure it's not forgotten.

At Odiham, I worked with two of the RotorTuners Dave and Karl. Both of them really good guys who knew their stuff and were easy people to work with.

[Wander00]

Co-pilot was husband of a flt cdr I worked with at Cranwell. I was a guest at their wedding. - Audrey? Anyone know what happened to her? Crash was only a few weeks after I left MPA (I left 9 May 86) and I think I flew in that aircraft.

[Cows getting bigger]

Audrey Moffat?

[tucumseh]

Without going into all the detail, I understand the cause was identified by AAIB and the Odiham test pilot (the unpublished photographs are both compelling and conclusive) but it was decreed that nothing would be said officially about Boeing's Quality Control (or MoD's Quality Assurance). This general point was later made by a witness during the Mull of Kintyre inquiries.

[Wander00]

CGB - that is she. I am reminded of them driving off from the wedding in their 3-abreast French sports car every time I drive past my village square, where there is a similar car parked.

[Wander00]

Just took my shoes off so I could use my toes as well - not 20 years - more than 26 years ago!

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

I stopped going in 1996. I'm sure it's not forgotten.


Certainly not forgotten. I have flown to the memorial twice in the last 10 years to lay wreaths. Haven't been to the Falklands for nearly five years now but I doubt much has changed in that respect.

[teeteringhead]

Crash was only a few weeks after I left MPA (I left 9 May 86) bit later than that mate - end of Feb 87 - 26th or 27th :( I was in the gozome Tristar and saw it out the window before we taxied back.

And I know I just got back in time for my Anniversary on the 28th. Another reason for getting Timmy back was SOP in case fuel contam had been an issue - so all aircraft grounded until all fuel sources checked (I'd just finished a tour as Hels and CFSO in HQ BFFI).

[Wander00]

TH - Thanks, I had worked that out - memory plays funny tricks - see posts 14 and 19. Odd seeing that car locally every day though.

[ShyTorque]

RIP Steve Newman and his crew.

I spoke to Steve just before he left for his final detachment; he was obviously on the Chinook flight of the OCU, myself on Pumas. He was one of many friends and colleagues killed in flying accidents during the couple of decades I flew in the mob. However, this was the one which made me determined, as the father of three young kids, to do everything I could to avoid a Chinook posting. It had a very poor reputation at the time and this unexplained accident made it worse.

I did manage to avoid it, thankfully.

I know that the crews now love it, but then they did not.

[WASALOADIE]

Definitely the 27th Feb 1987.
Sadly I was down there on 78 at the time and knew the guys well. I was on R&R on West Falkland at the time of the crash and was picked up the following morning. The remaining Chinook at the time was called back from task to deal pick up the crash ISO and deal with the post crash work. I take my hat off to the Chinook crew who dealt with this, they flew quite a few hours that day no doubt in shock at what had occurred.

Travilad (Stephen) I knew your dad (Andy) well, we went through Loadie training together at Brize where he was affectionately know as "Pastie" and we were both on 7 Sqn together at the time. I will never forget his Cornish drawl and the laughs we shared and the pranks we played. Andy and I were on the same flight just before the fateful day when we "relocated the infamous Lot 22"

It was a very sombre time down south as we said goodbye to 7 friends. I will always remember Padre Clive Parnell-Hopkinson who was the SH Padre and happened to be there at the time, He ran with the repatriation service, what a gent.

Every 27th Feb I still have a quiet moment remembering these guys and raise a glass in their memory.

[Alex Whittingham]

Certainly not forgotten. I was the co-pilot in the Tristar that day, we stopped at the holding point, I saw the chinook at around 1500ft, looked in to change a radio frequency and when I looked up saw the column of smoke just starting to rise. A very sad day. We didn't consider fuel contamination - probably should have - we went back to the ramp in case we were needed, the next TriStar wouldn't have been in for five days or so.

[tucumseh]

Mull of Kintyre Fatal Accident Inquiry (March 1996), Witness J;

"Boeing Vertol have a vested interest in deterring any report which leaves them liable. This company is well funded and has shown a determination in the past to influence the outcome of inquiries. When Wg Cdr M Pledger took command of 78 Sqn in the Falkland Islands in Feb 88 I asked him to brief the Chinook Flight on the findings of the BOI for the fatal crash which killed Flt Lts Moffat, Newman, Sgt Johns and a number of engineering personnel, as this had not then been published. As Chairman of the board of inquiry he briefed 2 findings: the first his own most probable cause (failure of a hydraulic jack due to poor quality control at Boeing Vertol) and then that which would actually be published due to the failure of MOD to face pressure brought to bear by Boeing Vertol (cause unknown)."


Clearly, the BoI had to use the phrase "most probable cause", but anyone reading the AAIB Annex to the BoI report, and in particular the separate report by the AAIB inspector (same one as ZD576), would be left in no doubt why Wg Cdr Pledger came to this conclusion.

[SASless]

Boeing is not alone in that bit of effort.....seems I recall the RAF AirShips do more than some of that too when it comes to Chinook Crashes. Just saying!

[Distant Voice]

Just to show how much MoD protects Boeing the follow is a reply I received last year regarding loose connectors on the Chinook's DECUs. An SI stated that the issue was the subject of a Boeing Investigation. I asked, what was the outcome? if there was a report, could I have a copy?
"The MOD does hold information related to your request for a copy of the Boeing Report. A Public Interest Test has been conducted which sets out the factors that are weighed for and against release. This concluded that the balance of the public interest lies in withholding the information requested. In summary, it was considered that there is a public interest in providing accountability for decisions taken, illustrating that fair procedures have been undertaken, achieving transparency about issues which may be of interest to the public and bringing to light information which may reassure the public that health and safety factors have been taken into consideration by the MoD. However these were outweighed by factors against disclosure such as the possible prejudice to relations between the UK and the US Governments if such information were to be released. The information requested is covered by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)"

Distant Voice

[SASless]

In 1968, my unit lost a CH-47A model at Diggers Rest FSB near Nui Dat, Vietnam. The Aircraft was carrying an underslung load of 105MM Howitzer Ammo. The aircraft was seen to pitch up....go inverted....and impact the ground with the underslung load landing atop the wreckage which was mostly consumed by fire. There were no survivors.

The Accident investigation had two theories....one was a Separation of the Forward Swash Plate.....the other was FOD in the form of a US Army Mess Hall Plastic Coffee Cup that had become lodged in the Flight Controls in the area of the SAS Closet.

Sadly, when you get that much metal hitting the ground with horrific force followed by a hot burning fire with plenty of jet fuel to feed the blaze....finding the exact cause of the crash becomes problematic especially when there is no CVR or Data Recording system.

The loss of good Men (and now Women) in these tragedies, as sad as they are, are part of the risk we all take when we put on the Wings and go flying.

Accident Boards should restrain themselves to making statements based upon definitive evidence....even if it means there is not "Cause" provable. Improving the Aircraft monitoring systems, engineering procedures, and quality assurance procedures by everyone in in the system from forging or the stock to inserting the last split pin.....should be the goal for us all.

That requires Leadership of the highest order starting at the very Top and working its way down the ladder.

Otherwise....we will keep on losing our friends.

I stood at the point of impact for that aircraft in 1968 and again in 2011....and it wasn't any easier the second time than it was the first.

[Rigga]

Although I know how much this will annoy a lot of people, I feel the need to state this reaction...

"Accident Boards should restrain themselves to making statements based upon definitive evidence...."

And therin lies the rub - If any investigative Board is laid open to influence from internal (and indeed, external) politicking there never will be a guarantee of that fully evidential reporting situation.

[SASless]

Sadly.....every Board is subject to both influences.

The extent of those influences is what matters.

[tucumseh]

Extracts from AAIB Report

"Evidence of a number of pre-impact defects (in actuators) was found. A number of rig tests were conducted in the assessment of the cause and effect of the defects. Co-operation from Boeing Vertol was generally good, but little in-depth knowledge of the actuators was apparent in the responsible Design Groups.


Forward Swivelling Upper Boost Actuator

No upper roll pin or locking were was present and the clevis attaching rod had not been drilled to accept the pin. These were clearly assembly omissions.

Relatively deep witness marks were found on the rod, indicative of it having been carelessly clamped in a vice or grips prior to final assembly.


Aft Pivoting Upper Boost Actuator

Strip examination revealed that some of the seals in the head housing assembly had been incorrectly installed. One head housing back-up ring on System 1 and two on System 2 were found with bevelled ends crossed over.

In addition, it was found that incorrect back-up rings had been fitted in the 1.5" diameter seal between the piston bearing sleeve and the outer cylinder in both Systems 1 and 2. Continuous back-rings should have been used, but scarf cut rings were fitted.

(This same defect was discovered in the Aft Swivelling Upper Boost Actuator). Additionally, it was found that the outer seal in System 2 between the core of the head housing assembly and the piston assembly was incorrectly assembled and had suffered a gross failure. The inner back-up ring was missing, and the evidence clearly indicated it had not been installed at assembly. A 0.5" circumferential length of the O-Ring and the outer back-up ring was missing, providing a large overboard leakage path for System 2 fluid."



And so on and on, depressingly so. You don't have to be an engineer to grasp something was VERY wrong here. Also, out of interest, very similar language used in the Challenger report.

[Cows getting bigger]

The sort of thing you would have expected from 1970s British Leyland, not an aircraft manufacturer. You do wonder whether such endemic, corporate negligence could still be pursued.

[SASless]

Tuc,

Following the crash and discovery of the actuator issues....was there a follow-up to determine the source of the problems, whether other Actuators were in such a condition, and were there any other defective Actuators found installed on operational aircraft or in the Spares Inventory?

[Cows getting bigger]

Don't know about that but I do know that two RAF Chinooks subsequently thrashed themselves to bits on 24 & 25 July 1989 after newly replaced aft drive transmission input thrust bearings failed, these having been fitted the wrong way round during manufacture. Very expensive (both never flew again) but fortunately no loss of life.

My recollection of the HC1s during the 80s were of unreliable aircraft that many were reticent to fly-in.

[Chugalug2]

SASless:-
Sadly.....every Board is subject to both influences.
The extent of those influences is what matters.
Then the obvious answer is to remove Boards (ie Air Accident Investigation Boards) from such malevolent influence. In the case of UK Military Aviation that requires that the MAAIB be made independent of, and separate from, the MOD and the MAA (which should also be separated from the MOD).
If that had been the case for this accident then perhaps a cause might have been found, no matter how politically delicate it be. That might then have ensured the airworthiness of the HC1 and that the HC2 was given a legal RTS into the Royal Air Force. That might then have saved many lives....
Sadly, we'll never know because none of the accident investigations including this one were free of such "influences".

[November4]

Is this the right Sgt Johns in the course photo?

http://www.rafmams.co.uk/images/Courses/ALM%20Course/images/atsb00012.jpg

If it is, let me know and I can supply an copy without watermark

[travilad]

This is indeed the right Sgt Johns, the tash I am assured was very fashionable back then. I would love a copy if you don't mind.

[WASALOADIE]

It is indeed our course photo!

Andy with his tache and curly dark locks.

[tucumseh]

SASless

Tuc,

Following the crash and discovery of the actuator issues....was there a follow-up to determine the source of the problems, whether other Actuators were in such a condition, and were there any other defective Actuators found installed on operational aircraft or in the Spares Inventory?


Forgive me if I'm a little tardy with responses at the moment.

The papers I quoted from were obtained during my Mull of Kintyre inquiries because it was patently obvious that the AAIB investigator regarded ZA721 (Feb 87) as the starting point for ZD576 (Jun 94). When you look at the systemic failures there are many common factors.

The answer to your question, in general terms, therefore has to be no, MoD did very little to address these failures. In 1994, and even today, many still existed. You may recall MoD did everything in its power to prevent linkages being drawn to past events, claiming anything that occurred on ZD576 was unique to that aircraft tail number. In fact, almost every failure, fault and defect had a precedent, both in the Chinook Fleet and across MoD.

If MoD simply looked at these and other Chinook actuators, that would be an entirely typical, compartmentalised MoD response. As DV said above, MoD's reaction was entirely focused on protecting relationships between USA/BV and UK/MoD. Aircrew lives are regarded as a minor factor. The evidence of Witness J to the ZD576 FAI (above) was widely ignored, and certainly not followed up, but it is actually fundamental to the whole airworthiness debate, providing an insight into the systemic failures and systematic rundown of the process. It is key evidence that provides a date.

This wasn't the only Freedom of Information request MoD refused to answer. Another, arising from this BoI report, was on Hazard Analysis.

My personal opinion of this has been aired often. MoD investigations never dig and ask the next obvious question. In this case, a thorough overhaul of an obviously unfit for purpose QA/QC system would have provided a fighting chance of preventing recurrence. In Aug 1992 the CHART report by the RAF's own Inspector of Flight Safety cited ZA721 as an airworthiness related accident. That speaks volumes, given the official line was Cause Unknown. Was this an oversight or IFS making a point to the Chief Engineer and ACAS? Given the rest of the report, the latter. MoD's reaction? Withhold CHART from all concerned. My point is that there is a clear and unbroken chain of evidence from these 1980s failures to Haddon-Cave and then Lord Philip.

One small example - in 1998 new Chinooks were being delivered with similar serious assembly defects. At Boscombe a starboard avionics rack (about 6 feet high, 3 feet wide and crammed with black boxes) came loose and fell on a contractor, just after the aircraft had landed upon initial delivery. (On the pan outside RWTS hangar). The fixing bolts had been over-torqued and crushed the honeycomb bulkhead so that something weighing hundreds of pounds was literally hanging by a thread. In control runs, split pins had not been split. One part fell off and hit the pilot on the head as he was walking out the back. It had secondary bonding that consisted of a rolled up ball of 24awg equipment wire stuffed behind Nav systems. Nav problems? Always check bonding first. It matters not that these were not actuator problems - they were serious QC failures and indicative of a very poor ethos. MoD's reaction was exactly the same. Boeing are a protected species and nothing was done, except each defect (not fault) was quietly fixed as and when it was spotted. Except, the problem is that a defect (as opposed to a fault) indicates contractor liability arising from a poor design. That is, we were content to fire fight instead of getting to the root cause.

Haddon-Cave agreed that there were savings at the expense of safety, but what of pandering to a contractor on the basis of preserving relations, but knowing this places aircrew lives at risk? The next question would be who benefited from this.

[November4]

This is indeed the right Sgt Johns, the tash I am assured was very fashionable back then. I would love a copy if you don't mind.

If you PM me your e-mail address will send it to you.

[Wander00]

Anyone still in touch with Audrey Moffatt, I would like to forward my regards

W

[Airborne Aircrew]

I believe I said this in the Mull thread but I'll say it again:-

I was in the Swamp, (Crewman's accommodation at Airport Camp), when the phone call came telling us of the crash. I had flown with Steve on many occasions when he was on 33 and he was always a fine pilot and it was always a pleasure to fly with. I knew Andy, (he was also nicknamed "Wally" IIRC), from the Sgt's Mess at Odiham and had flown innumerable Track and Vibros with Dave Chitty and Karl Minshull. I forget the name of the third tech but I believe I had flown Air Tests with him too. It was a very sad day.

There was much speculation about the cause and eventually the rumours all began to fall into line that it was a DASH runaway. It was about this time that a conversation was had where, while no explicit orders were given, it was made quite clear to us that the "possible" cause of the crash was not to be discussed with the families of the victims, period!

Not long after this the HC1 backed into the aircraft steps at an Air Show somewhere in Germany and the fuel tanks failed to separate as they were supposed causing three(?) deaths. I knew the young crewman who was burned to death in that accident too, though not well.

Subsequently I was posted to 240 OCU for conversion to the HC1 and, despite me asking to be sent anywhere but Chinooks on compassionate grounds, (wife had a dangerous heart condition that was worsened by stress), the RAF insisted they wanted me there. I completed the ground phase but refused to board the aircraft for the famil flight on the grounds that the things aren't airworthy and to fly on them risked the life of my wife. Funnily enough the RAF somehow thought I might be a little imbalanced and sent me to a high priced psychiatrist in London only to be told that I am, indeed, perfectly sane. :eek: The RAF and I parted ways.

I believe much of what has been said in the Mull thread confirms my thoughts that the airworthiness system in the RAF in the 80's and 90's was broken and, with regard to the Chinook at the time, was quite probably criminal.

[SASless]

Tuc,

Are you aware of similar issues being experienced by the US Army on their Chinooks during the same time period?

I know of one infamous incident where a candy bar wrapper was found inside a Transmission. The investigation revealed open cases were stored next to an employee break area and that it appeared someone threw the wrapper into the gearbox while it was stashed there during the manufacturing process.


A Power Point Presentation you might find interesting.

http://www.chinook-helicopter.com/maintenance/Safety_Classes/CH-47D_SOF_Review.ppt

[tucumseh]

SASless

Two examples involving the same general design area;


“Safety of Flight Message – All US Army CH-47D, MH-47D and MH-47E Aircraft 6th December 1994


Summary of Problem


A 1992 accident in Alaska was caused by a screw in the Upper Boost Actuator Control Valve failing from Hydrogen Embrittlement. The failed screw restricted the travel of the pilot valve in the actuator resulting in reduced controllability of the aircraft.”

And

Accident involving US Army CH-47D near Tulia, Texas on 11th April 1997.

“During aft swivelling boost removal, maintenance personnel discovered that the plain press bushing.....was not installed. Installation procedures show the requirement for two washer and not the required bushing. Without this bushing installed, uneven loading is placed on the bolt and clevis. Uneven loading and missing bushings have proven in the past to be directly related to fatigue failure.



The upper boost actuators and ILCAs deserve immediate and positive action, since these two areas are CRITICAL TO FLIGHT SAFETY, PERSONNEL SAFETY, AND EQUIPMENT SAFETY.”

(Upper case emphasis in original report).

[SASless]

Tuc,

I was referring to more substantive complaints....my memory tells me there was an investigation into Boeing's QC/QA performance by the US Army as part of Contract Performance issues. I cannot remember the details or the time period it took place and thus far have not found any information that would report the outcome of the investigation.

It was quite a while ago all this happened.

One Question that is begged.....is how the "Operator" figures into the equation?

If the Tech Manuals are not detailed enough....and there is scant experience amongst the Engineering crews....are we seeing mishaps that occurred due to the lack of "corporate knowledge"?

In the past I criticized the RAF and UK Civvie Operators for refusing to embrace the notion of leaning upon more experienced operators of the Chinook during the early years of the machines introduction into service. Without assessing motive to that failure......I cannot help but wonder if it might have worked out better for all if that had been done with more enthusiasm.

In light of the complaints heard from the UK side of the Pond....about the RAF system of procurement and certification....if compounded by the lack of experience on a particular aircraft design.....even a dull third grader can see plenty of room for errors being made.

[tucumseh]

SASLess

I’m not sure what would constitute “more substantive”. You gave me a link to a .ppt presentation on Safety of Flight messages, and I quoted from a real example. Similarly, from the US equivalent of a Board of Inquiry report. From a US viewpoint, these would be “substantive”.

Nevertheless, you ask good questions. As a result of ZA721 (Falklands 1987) the BoI recommended the Hazard Analysis be updated. If you read the comments of the Reviewing Officers, one rather misses the point that the Hazard Analysis already exists. Also, the ROs show no understanding whatsoever of how such a thing would be funded or progressed. And they shared Haddon-Cave’s later ignorance of the fact such contracting must be continuous - that is, you don’t just start a “Hazard Analysis” task when something goes wrong. It is a continuous process designed to stop things going wrong. A few years later the recommendation was rendered academic, as in 1991 the RAF Chief Engineer began his rundown of airworthiness by chopping the funding for such (mandated) contracts.

As you say, this raises the question of how much blame can be apportioned at Operator/Maintainer level, be it US or UK. The ZA721 BoI report makes severe criticism of short 4 month tours of key personnel, pointing out that few were trained for the post they were given. The “solution” was to extend this to 6 month tours, which doesn’t address the basic training. Notably, when all the evidence of equipment failure pointed to Boeing QC problems, 5 RAF Maintenance personnel were named by the BoI. Any reasonable person reading the report would ask why this vindictiveness, when not matched by more robust criticism of, and action against, Boeing. The Senior RO, ACM Sir Peter Harding, comes close to apologising for this, and their time spent under QR 1269 action. Clearly, there was a political imperative, and subsequent papers confirm this.
Years later (1993) when our (UK) Trainers went to Boeing to prepare the Engineering Training syllabus for FADEC in what was to become Mk2, Boeing could offer no help whatsoever, actually expecting OUR staff to train THEM. In 1999, almost 20 years after the UK ISD, our Chief of Defence Procurement admitted to our Public Accounts Committee that basic pre-requisites for airworthiness were STILL not in place.



You may recall this was at a time when RAF maintainers were forced to use captured Argentinian pubs to maintain our Chinooks, as our pubs were not to the required standard. The US Tulia report makes the same criticism, so one cannot point the finger at our (UK) Tech Pubs people; the failure would seem to be earlier in the process at Boeing.

This, indeed, describes a critical lack of Corporate Knowledge. But what caused that? The major cause was the conscious decision of these senior RAF staffs to waste astronomical sums of money, in turn prompting them to make savings at the expense of safety. I cannot comment on what was happening in the US Military, but on Chinook this was clearly compounded by severe shortcomings at Boeing. I can sympathise with Boeing up to a point, as for many years they would be without the necessary funded and mandated contracts from the UK; but that doesn’t excuse the likes of holes not drilled in Actuators, screws not heat treated (or the wrong screws specified), wrongly fitted seals and gross errors in documentation.



We have plenty of dull 3rd graders over here – they’re called VSOs.

[taxydual]

Also over here we have an incredibly meticulous AAIB inspector (Tony Noble) who investigated the engineering aspects of 721 and 576, who's reports (even to me, a non engineer or Chinook operator) seem glaringly obvious that the airframes were not fit to fly.

Were fleetwide inspection carried out following his input? Were other manufacturing faults found? Or did 'politics' rear it's head?

It seems to me Mr Nobles' efforts were ignored.

Oh what a tangled web we weave when first we practice to deceive

[SASless]

While instructing Libyan Air Force crews on the care, feeding, and operation of the Chinook, done in Italy for Agusta....I had the occasion to be visited by several Agusta Engineers (the kinds that design things....) and some Agusta Techs, and two Quality Control guys just as I was finishing a preflight inspection on Libyan Bird number 2.

They asked if I minded their taking a look at the Synch Shaft and I quite happily granted Permisso.

Out came the Calipers, Micrometers, Yard Sticks and Chalk Lines....followed by a lengthy Chinese Parliament done in Italian complete with lots of Arm waving.

Following a Consensus being found in said meeting.....the Lead Engineer came over and suggested we not fly that day as they had confirmed a Machinist had misread the Blue Prints and had mis-machined the Thomas Couplings.....leaving them a bit short of Spec....literally.

As the Synch Shaft is about the most important gizmo on the Chinook....the significance of one of those couplings failing....does not bear thinking about if one is engaged in flying the Chinook.

Point of all that.....Helicopters are complex machines and ensuring they are safe and reliable is very much a complex process with many potential points of failure.

I flew the Chinook back when it and I were new and the design had a long way to go before maturing to the point the major defects had been worked out. I can tell horror stories of Engine Gear boxes, Push Pull Tube Rod Ends, Rotor Blades rotating in the Cuff, and a few other minor glitches that turned some machines into trash taking the crews with them. But....it is still the best helicopter I ever flew and continues to prove itself a real workhorse.

It sounds as though you folks in the RAF had far more problems than we did particularly in light of how late into the life of the Chinook you folks got involved.

Re Maintenance Manuals.....any particular reason you could not have taken the US Army TM Series of Manuals for the Chinook and modify them for use?

Surely, despite the language difficulties....the content of the Manuals would be useful once translated into "English English".

(Split Pin = Cotter Pin for example)

[Rigga]

"Re Maintenance Manuals.....any particular reason you could not have taken the US Army TM Series of Manuals for the Chinook and modify them for use?

Surely, despite the language difficulties....the content of the Manuals would be useful once translated into "English English"."

Brilliant!

The struggles we had to find info for the Mk1 & 2 - The Mk 1 was backed up by an Argentine MM found in the Falklands and I (well, me and Mel) got a set of US -47D manuals for 18Sqn as Gutersloh closed.

Each was far better than the tripe rolled out as a RAF manual that didn't include Rotor Heads.

[SASless]

At Agusta....the Manuals they produced were just that....copies of the Army TM series for the "C" Model as what they were building were very pretty renditions of the standard "C" models right down to the same Spec for Avionics, Engines, and equipment.

[chinook240]

an incredibly meticulous AAIB inspector (Tony Noble) who investigated the engineering aspects of 721 and 576

Not Tony Cable?

[tucumseh]

A Cotter Pin is something different over here!

The question of Tech Pubs policy was addressed in evidence to Lord Philip. There were two main issues.

First, the Chief Engineer's airworthiness cuts had included a directive in 1992 that Tech Pubs would no longer be routinely maintained. (If I recall, the funding was chopped from 4th Quarter 1991/92-on). That is, they would NOT reflect the In Use Standard. Of course, this meant the specialist staffs at Farnborough (and then Glasgow) would have less to do, and they started shipping out. This was the declared intent of AMSO - precisely the same happened to the specialist airworthiness staffs in london - our funding was chopped, we'd sod all to do (or plenty to do, but denied the wherewithal) and we had to seek other jobs. Tech Pubs was transferred from MoD(PE) to AMSO/CE, which made things even worse.

Secondly, the role of the RAF Handling Squadron at Boscombe changed. Hitherto, they'd been lead on certain pubs, but this was rationalised. I'm more ambivalent about this change - with experienced staffs in post, it was managed well either way. CE denuded the system of the experience, which created problems either way.

[taxydual]

Damn. Thank You, Chinook 240.

Yes Tony Cable.

A 'Noble' man.

Freudian slip...........

[SASless]

Columbia Helicopters in Oregon seem to have their fleet sorted out and provide the US Army with support.

Sadly, they did lose one in South America about a year ago but considering the kind of work they do and the sheer number of hours they fly per machine monthly....that is no indictment of their system.

Granted their Leadership Tree is much shorter than any Military but Success should be imitated where possible.

Their engineering practices are what I would focus upon to see how they do things.

Has the RAF ever sent someone for a visit with Columbia?

[tucumseh]

Has the RAF ever sent someone for a visit with Columbia?

Another excellent question.

The issue of "visits" is covered in mandated airworthiness regulations (the ones the Chief Engineer instructed us not to implement from 1992-on, but without which all is lost).

Financial provision must be made for all Design Authorities or Custodians to make annual visits to (in RN terminology) Typed Air Stations. The visit shall address In Service concerns of both Operators and Maintainers. Don't all shout at once if this doesn't happen!

Similarly, the person who makes this financial provision (the nearest thing today is the Requirements Manager, but none do this component of their job) can make provision for visits TO contractors; especially any who can contribute to Operational Effectiveness. In practice, this was managed on an ad hoc basis and would be booked to a suitable contract related to the subject. Each equipment or aircraft PDS contract has a named individual (the Technical Agency) responsible for all airworthiness matters, who would also regard it as his job to help arrange such a thing. Again, the chances of finding anyone in MoD nowadays who does this is next to zero.

[SASless]

Tuc,

A for what its worth.....during a visit to Hunter AAF for a Unit Reunion....we were escorted by a Chinook Pilot.....a very experienced CW5 who had several combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.

When I asked him about his knowledge of the RAF Chinook Operations in Afghanistan.....he said he only knew what he had read in the Newspapers and seen from a distance. He did note that upon the arrival of the RAF in country....his unit contacted the RAF and offered to share "Lessons Learned" data but were quite coldly rebuffed.....and upon receiving that kind of response stepped back and pulled up the lawn chair and water bottle to watch how they got on. His intent was to pass on what the US Army had learned paid for in lives and aircraft and perhaps save the RAF from re-inventing the same old wheel.

I told him I would not find that at all surprising based upon my experiences in the past.

[Cows getting bigger]

SASless, I recollect a similar event. Kosovo 1998 - the war bit was over and we were all jostling to relocate assets from Macedonia into Kosovo. One day the RAF Chinook line chief noticed that there were no US Army Chinooks flying. Having checked that it wasn't 4th July, he took a bimble across to the US dispersal only to find out that the entire US fleet had been grounded (can't remember why).

Anyway, a few hectic signals between our ops and the UK resulted in the grounding of our Chinooks and CGB being sent over to Bosnia to provide replacement cover in the mighty Puma.

I never found out why the Americans had grounded the aircraft and we, initially, had decided not to do the same.

PS. I wouldn't necessarily point the finger completely at the RAF - it could have been lack of information from USA. Quite a few years later I was involved in a significant event which occurred due to poor passage of technical information between coalition states.

[tucumseh]

The mention of "visits" may sound a bit faffy, but I always thought them good value. Like many civil servants, industry could quickly lose sight of what and who they were there to support. Nothing bucked them up better than being planted in front of a dozen hairy arsed servicemen (and women) who were moaning and groaning about what was wrong - and had been pre-briefed that these were the guys who could sort it out. It never failed to work. The beancounters viewed this as a waste of money but in my book prioritising and clearing Operational Constraints and Limitations was money in the bank.

[Hubstrasse]

Was There, and walk rounds on the plastic persuit ship became a a little more careful because: Memory getting dim but both US and if I recall Dutch chinnys were grounded and thought us 'well'ard' to keep-on-truckin' few inquiries later by the boss (Fat Freddy) Boeing had apparently had a rogue assembly worker putting a rather impotant thrunge bearing in upside down resulting in a loss or two Stateside. Boss decides to cease ops and signals MOD - Rather curt reply received WE TELL YOU when not to fly. Hummmm. after 1 or 2 very benign missions ..........cease CH47 ops check for gear box numbers xxxxxx

Result- Boss furious- operators no (even less)confidence in the system and a big sigh of relief . Yes, one of the contaminated, I think rear pylon gear boxes was fitted to an in-theatre ac and was suspect!

[SASless]

Every Military suffers from that kind of Command Structure. I recall during the Vietnam War when Bombs become scarce.....Aircraft were dispatched with a single Bomb to keep the Sortie Count up....thus resulting in the loss of Aircraft and Pilots for no good reason.

[Chugalug2]

Hubstrasse:-
Boeing had apparently had a rogue assembly worker putting a rather impotant thrunge bearing in upside down resulting in a loss or two Stateside.
That's when you expect your airworthiness authority to swing into action on your behalf. Trouble is that the UK Military Airworthiness Authority (aka the MOD) was working on behalf of certain RAF VSOs rather than yours. Result, another hole in the cheese lines up on the first. Happily, your boss was a boss, and acts professionally by going out on a limb. He did his job and ensured that the next slice blocked the way. Good man! A lesson for us all.

[MG]

Remember it well. We were out tasking and were told to off-load our pax at one of the FOBs. We proceeded directly to Skopje with just the crew and the Puma det picked up the job.
Took them hours to complete and we were on our penultimate drop!

I vaguely recall that the grounding happened within the period of a day and that time zone differences didn't help. The US had ground their ac overnight (to us) and we couldn't get any details until later in the day, so we carried on tasking until we got confirmation. Having said that, I do seem to remember that there was an initial difference of opinion and the US crews housed next to us were the ones that alerted us in the first instance, not the UK. A few 'grounded-parties' ensued!

[Rigga]

"Boeing had apparently had a rogue assembly worker putting a rather impotant thrunge bearing in upside down resulting in a loss or two Stateside. "

And, through an assumed lack of drawing control, transferred the same problem to Almondbank, UK.

[Hubstrasse]

MG, Chugalug,

Indeed the info came, I'm fairly sure, directly from the US maintainers who were eager to compare notes. MG, yes some positive leadership, even explaining to those concerned how he (the boss) had been 'ordered' to fly the ac despite strong representation. I recall the boss being speechless when he first read the eventual grounding signal. US crews seemed to do quite a bit of sunbathing in the am...... could have been the 'special' diet Coke passed through the fence since US general order number 1 stipulates a dry regime.

[MG]

Hubstrasse, I guess we know each other. Remember the escape tunnel through the razor wire that we helped the US guys to dig so that they could 'liaise' with us?

[Evalu8ter]

Ah the Kosovo grounding parties.....Effectively the Great Escape in reverse as we smuggled Skopsko beer in (past the guard towers) and steaks and CH47 crews/maintainers out. I seem to recall a particularly enthusiastic game of murder ball at circa 3am...

SASLess,
I agree with what you say; for years I campaigned to get a RAF exchange on the CH47F with the US Army. It was continually rebuffed on the grounds of cost and necessity; the Fast Jet dominated exchange organisation would not give up one of their scores of US exchanges to compensate, nor fund an additional post. When I commented that it was ridiculous we didn't have an exchange I was put firmly back in my box as 'we were never going to buy new CH47s again'. I enjoyed no little schadenfreude when VSOs were scrabbling to gather info on the CH47F, DAFCS and CAAS when ordered to buy new cabs at short notice......we even had to send the AH64 TP (a RN pilot) at Rucker to fly it for background.

The big problem is, as always, money. VSOs control less and less nowadays so travel budgets give them the chance to influence something. Some of the best info and opinion I ever got was at the PM Cargo CHUC which I managed to get to on a few occasions (I do like Huntsville!). I was appalled that the only 2 RAF operators there were me and the RTS airworthiness rep; other countries sent large contingents. Why? Money, and the view that any trip to the US is 'a jolly' unless, of course, your using Air Comd money not JHC/DE&S. I certainly remember being engaged in conversation for most of the conference, as there was a genuine interest from the US in what we did and how. As for Colombia - I spoke to them at the CHUC and heli-expo and gave all the contacts to our engineering fraternity...not sure if it ever came to anything.

[MG]

I was wondering when you'd join the reminiscing, Evalu8tor!

[mole man]

I was Heliops at the time and had lunch with Andy and the Tristar loadmasters. Very sad day but will always remember Andy on the 11th Nov.

Mole Man

[Chinny Crewman]

Whilst I don't doubt your friends recollection SASLess I was at KAF in 2006 when the RAF Chinook force first arrived and attended several liaison meeting with the US and Dutch. We also operated alongside the "Flippers" on many occasions until RC South was split. It was just a shame that KAF is dry and we were all too busy to socialise properly.

[NutLoose]

I can remember a few of the problems when we got the HC1, one was the hyd motors on the APU exploding, several had gone one spraying the unfortunate crewman standing below it.. It turned out the wrong dash number pumps had been fitted.

One arrived at Southampton had the emergency hatch fall out on take off.

All the manuals that came with the aircraft were printed on yellow paper, as we used / worked through sections and we were happy, they were amended or not and changed to white paper.
I walked across the hangar one day and they had folded the blades, had them all secured and were about to put hyd power on.... A recipe for disaster that one.
They also took power off one with the rigging pins installed resulting in a lot of bent pins.

Then there was the intermediate drive problems where the Americans had been installing / phasing the rotors with the aid of a jacking handle. A bolt eventually let go de phasing the rotors and killing a crewman.. The fix was a bigger bolt as they did not then know the reason, seem to remember a Boeing rep reaming the holes out with a windy drill, writing off the boxes.

[SASless]

Ah yes the infamous Phasing Lever and its single bolt!

A certain amount of Trust is required to fly Wokka's!

Cranking an APU with the Blades folded......or shutting off the hydraulics with the Rigging Pins in place.....now who is being the Silly Boy?

I recall one afternoon....after a very long day....without our standard shutdown and maintenance check after four hours of flying or so.....as the blades coasted to a stop.....one of the forward blades kept right on going until it banged into the blade in front of it.

Seems we had lost one end of the Blade Damper in flight. No unusual symptoms noted until the two blades married up in front of us.

How many times did you ever have to hand pump the Utility Hydraulic System Accumulator to enough pressure to start the APU?

[Evalu8ter]

SASLess,
MG and I had that (lag damper failure) happen to us once.....

....I've still never seen him move so fast!!!

[SASless]

Droop Stop failures.....in gusty winds were always good sport too.

Having the Aft Wheel Steering go "Ape" on you can be fun too.....especially if you add a freshly "Oiled" taxiway and parking apron....with rain slicked PSP planking nicely done with a fresh coat of oil.....right as you begin to enter the Revetment that has scant clearance on either side at the best of times. Add Darkness and you get a situation that you would pay good money to experience at an amusement park. (As a Spectator from a safe distance).

[NutLoose]

Cranking an APU with the Blades folded......or shutting off the hydraulics with the Rigging Pins in place.....now who is being the Silly Boy?

They were following the manual to the letter which never mentioned putting hydraulics on with the blades folded was a bad idea.. Pointed it out when asking what they were doing, luckily they decided it made sense and released them first. It was part of the yellow pages to white, we often thought the initial manual was printed in yellow because they were taking the p*ss.. A lot didn't relate to the Seedy* version which the RAF bought, C/D* or HC1

The losing hydraulics with the pins in was due to a power being turned off in the hangar and a rapid attempt was made to remove them, though several were still in when it all settled on them, bending as it went.. If memory serves me correctly..

Ahh the hand pump, could understand the logic, out in field etc, but always thought a secondary electric pump would have been a godsend.

[SASless]

Once you have watched the Blade Jump upon Hydraulic Pressure being applied to the Flight Control systems following the APU Start.....One should tweak to the uniqueness of that evolution.

What really impressed me on the first flight I had in the Chinook was when we slapped the Engine Levers from Ground Idle to Flight Idle......I thought the Rotor Head had come off the machine!

For the unknowing....there be a very sudden....immediate....and dramatic increase in Rotor RPM......something to the tune of "Kowabunga Dude!" kind or RPM increase!


Electric Pump? Why my very dear fellow....that is what the rear cabin crew was for......right up until your finger slipped off the start switch or some other attributable finger error occurred. Odd how there was always one crewman perched in the companionway observed the cockpit antics at that point of the checklist.

[tucumseh]

http://i214.photobucket.com/albums/cc291/exploringtheblue/maas1_zps3f8f74bc.jpg (http://s214.photobucket.com/user/exploringtheblue/media/maas1_zps3f8f74bc.jpg.html)


http://i214.photobucket.com/albums/cc291/exploringtheblue/maas2_zps34434211.jpg (http://s214.photobucket.com/user/exploringtheblue/media/maas2_zps34434211.jpg.html)

[ancientaviator62]

Just to hark back to the 'undue influence' on a BOI, I was the LM on a Herc when an MSP heavy drop platform hit the ducksbill at the back of the a/c as it was extracted. The BOI found that the transfer release cable had been manufactured incorrectly and was slightly too short despite having the correct markings on it, causing the contact with the ducksbill. This cable had been made by a civilian employee. His union would not let him speak to the BOI so a reason for his error was never established. When the report went up the 'system' it was returned with words to the effect that some service personnel must be found culpable. To his credit the President of the BOI refused and sent it back unaltered. The 'system ' then backed off.

[NutLoose]

A lot of Civilian companies will not talk to you on the grounds they can be sued, I had a splitter for a Turbo Charger on a new engine failed, luckily it didn't cause any harm, but it has been known for the gas flow to cut through engine bearers with the subsequent effect.. looking at the part one could immediately identify the fault, they had machined it with a 90 angle instead of a nice gentle curve, instantly causing a stress raiser where it sheared..
I returned the old one under warranty to the Aircraft Engine manufacturer and a new item arrived minus the crisp 90 machining... the only reason you know that they accepted liability is the fact they did not try to charge you for it. they would never tell you the part was faulty or incorrect as they would then be putting themselves in a position opening them up to legal action.

[SASless]

Tuc,

What was the explanation for the "incorrect installation of the Thrust Bearing"?

Did the Techs correctly follow the instructions of an incorrect Tech Document or did they make an incorrect installation ignoring correct data? Did it come from the Factory that way?

[Hummingfrog]

I was the Captain of the SAR Seaking on that dreadful day. We were on standby in the crewroom when the scramble buzzer sounded. We rushed to the Ops room to see what was happening to be told the Chinook had crashed - I could see where as a pall of smoke could be seen through the ops window.

We arrived at the scene to find just burning wreckage. The rearcrew volunteered to leave the Seaking and enter the debris field in the hope of finding somebody.

The MPA fire crews made a vain effort to reach the crash site but became bogged down so we moved as many firemen and portable fire bottles to the crash site as we could..

It was a very sad and emotional day as 78 Sqn was a small tight unit with lots of banter between the Seaking and Chinook flights.

The most emotional part was standing in the Tristar hangar with the Flag drapped coffins while one of the 78 Sqn Chinook crew played the last post just before the coffins were carried to the Tristar for the journey home. I found it very difficult not to breakdown.

May they all be remembered.

HF

[tucumseh]

SASLess

I'm afraid I must rely on Rigga's recall (whom I know, and trust implicitly) when he said (above);

And, through an assumed lack of drawing control, transferred the same problem to Almondbank, UK.

Almondbank was (is) the 3rd line repair facility for Chinook transmissions, from about 1983-on. This doesn't mean they repaired or had even seen the transmission components from the 1989 aircraft. In common with many Chinook components tasked to NARO (Naval Aircraft Repair Organisation) - ignore "Naval", in this context it is all Rotary Wing - there was a complete lack of supporting documentation. On the face of it, one could criticise the London office responsible for ensuring the correct resources were in place before declaring a 3rd line capability, but one must also take into consideration the solid evidence that, as late as 1999, maintained technical publications, drawings and their configuration control were still absolutely verboten and largely unfunded. I can assure you from personal experience that when Chinook was being introduced to service any such tasking at 3rd line received little or no support and staff were told to DIY. Having to reverse engineer and develop your own test procedures was quite common. In some cases, no test rigs were provided (a repair is not complete until verified) and those supplied for other aircraft were adapted locally. This was also a complaint from the AAIB during their 1994 investigations into ZD576. The CHART report of Aug 1992 re-enforces all this.


Hope this helps.

[SASless]

Tuc,

Good men died because of all that.....and no one has gone to Prison?

Words fail me.

Dare I ask......have the problems been corrected so that the spares system is providing air worthy parts and procedures to the Engineers? Is the Training system doing its job to provide fully qualified Engineers?

[Rigga]

Thrust Bearings:
There was no reference in the Aft Transmission Build Manuals/Drawings about which way around the Input Thrust Bearings should be installed. (IIRC it should have been to hide the Ser No's from view) although Boeing had experienced some failures previously and attributed them to that reason.
It is thought that some "old sweats" at Almondbank recognised the issue, figured out the requirement, and jotted down a note to put them the right way around, which they did perhaps for years. Then somebody else was given the job and did not read that particular "hint". The Bearings were installed with no particular favourite setting.
It was a complete fluke that both aircraft flew on consecutive days, 8000 miles apart, as the boxes had been built some time apart. And it was also a complete fluke that no-one was hurt significantly.
From memory, only those two Xmsn's and one other had the bearings incorrectly set. (I may be wrong - it's been a while)
In Almondbank's defence Quality Assurance was in its infancy then and this sort of (one-for-the-notebook) attitude was rife - I did it myself; I saw it happen around me; and learned from it.

[Rigga]

"Dare I ask......have the problems been corrected so that the spares system is providing air worthy parts and procedures to the Engineers? Is the Training system doing its job to provide fully qualified Engineers?"

Spares:
In short: Mainly...yes.

Not necessarily limited to the helicopter fleets; but there is no money in MOD now - and U/S parts are often "retained" as possible future repairable resources -and probably without repair requests to justify keeping them there.
My concern, when I worked for an MOD contract, was that the Cat4/5 U/S parts were retained too close to flight line units that might see them, pick them out of their Bins and use them again.

Training:
In Short: Mainly...yes.

Current training for new guys gives the right information and practices. But as soon as they get to real "Lines" they are re-trained into "How we do it here".
My theory is that those at the Line have not been re-trained with the right information, because of Ops driven requirements, and have spent the last 10-15 years doing it the War Ops way.
I hope that, when the War finishes, the right way will slowly dawn on those riding on the seats and they will want this form of life preservation back under control.

[SASless]

Sounds like lots of "money" laying around in the form of rebuildable spares that might be sold to BV, Columbia, or other Operators of the Chinook.

A smart Contractor might find a way to work a deal with several Operators and provide a centralized pool of spares.....so that each Operator does not have to maintain as large a pool of spares individually.

Someone at Columbia needs to be working this angle as they have all of the Engineering expertise and infrastructure that would be needed.

However....I can see one really huge problem.....the NIH Rule would be firmly applied by the RAF Airships.

[Evalu8ter]

SASLess,
Not just the NIH rule but the increasing reliance upon (some might call subservience to) Boeing under the TLCS contract...

[tucumseh]

It is thought that some "old sweats" at Almondbank recognised the issue, figured out the requirement, and jotted down a note to put them the right way around, which they did perhaps for years.

While past my time, I have no reason to doubt this. What I'd add is this. The proper thing to do is raise a MF765 Unsatisfactory Feature Report on the relevant documentation and drawings. The complete and utter failure of this system to support all lines of servicing was what red flagged the fact Chinook Mk2 could not possibly be airworthy during the ZD576 inquiries. It was noted in 1985 by RAF Support Command, and then regularly by various MoD departments for the next 28 years. As no answer to the MF765 would be forthcoming, one would resort to a QC5 Query Note if anyone was willing to put their name to it.


I've said many times, but it is always worth repeating, in the period 1991-93 AMSO/RAF Chief Engineer set about slashing the necessary funding to the tune of 28% per year, and in 1992 directives were issued that MF765s (and 760s) would NOT be progressed. The mandated procedures are laid down in a single Def Stan, which was cancelled some years ago and not one complete copy remains in MoD. As Rigga says, this bred generations who repaired/tested equipment to handwritten notes, not Aircraft Technical Pubs. Like him, I've had to do this myself. In the case of Chinook, I've been in the position of having developed some of the unofficial tests myself and, to this day, I suspect the only description of some test rigs and their circuit diagrams are in my handwriting. I've still got the original notes. Senior staffs certainly weren't going to waste money on irrelevancies such as test specs and maintenance contracts.

And no, the guilty have not been imprisoned, nor stripped of their knighthoods or CBs.

[tucumseh]

I do apologise. The 1985 notification was not from RAFSC, but OC Eng at RAF Odiham, by letter ODI/774/1/Eng dated 25th June 1985.

The main concerns expressed therein relate to an aircraft being inadvertently de-modified and an incorrect standard of thrust lever being fitted, because the relevant modifications were not in the APs. It describes this as a "Flight Safety Hazard". It finishes "Why are amendments available to Boeing Vertol in October 1984 still not available to the RAF". Pretty damn good question in my opinion.

In 2007 the Minister for the Armed Forces replied to an MP that none of the above was true.

This complaint was flagged in the CHART report of August 1992 by Inspector fo Flight Safety as unresolved. In March 1999 the Chief of Defence Procurement confirmed to the Public Accounts Committee it was still unresolved. ("Confirmed" is perhaps the wrong word. "Boast" would be more appropriate, given his stated objections to maintaining airworthiness and fitness for purpose). All relevant papers were submitted to Lord Philip.

[NutLoose]

Interesting about the spares, several airlines tend to have pool expensive items such as engines etc, or used to, then if they were needed could utilise them.

I am surprised similar couldn't be or isn't done with the Services, I realise a there will be differences between models, but a lot will be common, it would make sense and be cheaper if say the RAF held XYX part, the USA ABC, Holland EFG, etc so when in theatre or say Europe you are cutting down your actual stock holding.

I take it one of the problems with the amount of U/S spares is down to the culture the RAF now operates under, gone are the bays that could overhaul and rebuild components, gone are the likes of the Station Welder that could repair parts like exhausts etc? While nice shiny parts straight out of Boeing might be nice, in a major war if the factory ever got taken out you would be stuffed, as the facility to support parts locally at the front end is no longer there..


..

[tucumseh]

Nutloose

To be fair, this would be fiendishly difficult. Especially if THE key player, the Aircraft Design Authority, is not too concerned about maintaining Configuration Control. And at an equipment level there are very good reasons, many dictated to MoD by the likes of the Home Office, for the UK having different kit to anyone else. (Secure Comms being the obvious one). Every user would have to buy in to this process, which for most of the life of (UK) Chinook would exclude the RAF. Without it, the risk of fitting incorrect parts would be immense, as seen in the above example. And there would be so many exemptions/exclusions, we’d still have to retain our existing supply organisation.

Who would manage it, or be its champion, in MoD? Remember, while undergoing Transition To War in late 1990/early 1991, our supply organisation (AMSO) was actively scrapping War Reserves and ensuring what remained were not maintained serviceable. That mindset is a huge barrier. At a lower level, the experience required, and need to retain it, is simply not catered for by our Personnel policies.

At a political level, who would sign up to the list of allies in this “club”? For example, Argentina is in the Lynx club, which has (had?) an international user group. I recall over 20 years ago this degenerated into an annual bunfight as to where the next meeting would be, participants being more interested in jollies to foreign lands. That’s an interesting question – to what degree did the UK contribute to Argentina’s capability through this pact? The answer is quite a bit, because we were the major user and led the way on most aircraft and equipment modifications, which everyone else simply adopted. Honourable exception – The Netherlands.

However, your question is timely, because the proposed GOCO initiative (sic) offers an opportunity to look at this again, assuming MoD does the sensible thing and sticks with Bernard Gray’s confirmation that he’ll use extant policy and engage Design Authorities. But even this no brainer looks in danger, given the list of consultancies that have expressed an interest. If a non-DA GOCO contractor tried to do this, the likes of Boeing would have them for breakfast.

[Chugalug2]

Can I just say that, as an ex driver airframe, I find this interchange between engineers (past and present?) both instructive and encouraging. Despite the depressing testimony given here of deliberate obstruction and neglect to the extent of Gross Negligence by RAF VSO's, at least these posters are willing to face up to this scandal and call a spade a spade.

In contrast, on another thread, others (of the two winged variety?) talk of "usual suspects" and wish to reserve this forum to serving personnel, leaving we has-beens to gossip amongst ourselves elsewhere. I suspect that they will do the gossiping and little else.

The foundation on which the RAF was built was its engineers, and their foundation were the SNCO's. The engineers alone are the ones that need to regain the standards that preceded the malevolent destruction of Flight Safety procedures described by tuc. It would seem that none of the RAF leadership has a clue and that the MAA is merely the straw man that its designers set out to create.

As tuc says, no-one has been brought to book over this massive hit on UK Airpower, indeed the guilty have been actively protected by their successors, to the extent even of staking out junior scapegoats.

This may all be seen as airing our dirty washing in public, and that we should all join in the cover-up. You only have to remember those who have died thus far in airworthiness related air accidents to realise what a false prospectus that is.

[dervish]

Well said Chug2. I've noticed the penny has dropped with a lot of posters but there are too many who criticise and openly doubt the messenger but never offer an alternative. I notice they don't criticise Odiham's OC Eng for saying exactly the same thing. The Mull and Nimrod threads were the same, with the usual suspects only interested in hiding the facts. What a non-surprise when it turned out one was a 3 Star rent a mouth. I came to the conclusion long ago it is a RAF / Civvy thing. They just don't like the idea of a civvy actually knowing what he's talking about, but can't see how bloody stupid they look criticising someone who wants to keep them safe:ugh:.

[mole man]

Check your PM's

Mole Man

[Rigga]

""Why are amendments available to Boeing Vertol in October 1984 still not available to the RAF."

The same for Puma.
In the late 80's we (Odi-Trans Bay) were getting a huge back-log of Puma Blade Sleeve work (Norway's cold, you know?) and approached Bristow directly - going behind the EA's back - to find how they coped with cold climes in the North Sea.
Bristow had swapped Araldite Resin sealing for the Blade Sleeves for more durable PRC in the 1970's and the Aerospatiale manuals had the Mod added.
We then put in an Amendment request to the EA and got some dosh for our troubles.

[NutLoose]

Thanks for that tucumseh,

I realise a lot of equipment would be user specific that is why I was suggesting spares such as transmission items, rotor blades, wheels, windscreens, doors, panels, uc legs etc, those items that are common to the majority of fleets but expensive and those items likely to be damaged.... For want of a better word it would be like a Boeing Vertol fwd supply depot paid for, operated and maintained by the Countries operating the aircraft in Europe or theater. That way you are reducing your stock holding whilst increasing the availability and amount of stock..

I am totally shocked that the RAF do not appear to be subscribing to manufacturer service bulletiens, AD's and current manuals, Civi wise you would be grounded. It's a recipe for disaster and those withholding them for any reason, financial or otherwise, are nothing more than common murders if someone dies because of it..... I AM accountable Civi wise if anything happens, it's about time that was carried over into the military hierarchy who are responsible.

[tucumseh]

Rigga

A familiar story. If you want to read about the restrictions your Puma EAs were under at this time, read the Chinook Airworthiness Review Team (CHART) report of August 1992, which covered Puma and Wessex as well. It becomes obvious where the root problem lay.

A separate Puma report (PART) was prepared in 1996, which referred back to criticisms in previous ARTs. In paras 197/198 the Inspector of Flight Safety noted the 1992 reports had;

"recognised that there was a gap in the present orders and procedures concerning the amendment of Air Publications".

The "gap" was that the airworthiness regulations were not implemented due to lack of funding and the consequent reduction of trained staffs, as they had nothing to do so had found other jobs.

He went on;

"The problem lay with the question of what the tradesmen did in the meantime. Were they to work to and sign for an activity which was known to be wrong or did they work outside the content of the maintenance document and thus be hostage to fortune should a problem occur?"


And so on. Excellent, and honest. IFS proposes a temporary solution - Local Approved Amendments to drawings and documentation, which Rigga referred to earlier. Trouble is, this "temporary" arrangement had already been common practice for over a decade and continues. And, without access to the Design Authority, and his approval, the Safety Case is progressively compromised. Funding is also required to regress and update.

This report, like its predecessors, was submitted direct to Assistant Chief of the Air Staff and the Chief Engineer. In the period 1991-96 the latter post was held by one man - ACM M Alcock. He has stated publicly that he implemented the recommendations of these ARTs. The PART (above ) of 1996 clearly asserts that previous recommendations in Chinook, Puma, Wessex, Hercules and Tornado ARTs were NOT implemented, so IFS repeats them. The evidence is on IFS's side.

Of course, this doesn't mean Alcock was to blame; clearly he wasn't because he says so. But his official response to the 1992 reports is recorded for posterity - a further 28% cut in relevant funding and, in December 1992, civilian staffs threatened with dismissal by his immediate subordinate (DGSM) for repeating the recommendations of the Inspector of Flight Safety.

[walbut]

Just out of curiosity, having read all the horror stories about RAF Chinook support, was there no 'sister design firm' set up to support the aircraft as the UK Design Authority? In the case of the RAF and RN Phantoms, HSA Brough, (later BAE Systems) were given that role (and very interesting it was too). However I can't remember getting a lot of in service support information from McDonnell Douglas or feedback through them from other F4 customers.

[tucumseh]

walbut

The term is "Design Custodian" - whereby they hold a set of secondary masters, maintain the Build Standard (main output - the Safety Case), but have an ongoing contractual relationship with the Design Authority which is directed by MoD.

The situation has changed over time, but for most of my career Boeing flatly refused to act as a sub-contractor or secondary party to anyone, and MoD permitted this. In practice, MoD's position would be dictated at a political level.

In contrast, Westland had no such hang ups, and nor would they be permitted any. This worked both ways for them. They didn't operate on a level playing field, but it gained them much work as a sub (or even sub-sub) contractor. However, it also meant they were associated with, but not responsible for, many projects that went wrong. Puma Nav Update is the one they always harped on about to me. Sea King ASaC Mk7 is another. In both cases they hauled the Prime (and MoD) out of the mire big style. In both cases, I think you'll find MoD didn't include the aircraft/airframe work in the tender, so Westland didn't bid. But after the event, whoever "won" the bid was awarded the aircraft work without having to demonstrate competence. It usually starts with the Service stating they'll modify the aircraft themsleves, so PE/DPA/DE&S aren't given the necessary funding. This is a common weakness in MoD and explains delays to many aircraft upgrade programmes. Not thread drift by any means, especially on Chinook! But at the the end of the day it is the Prime who writes the press release and Westland were never mentioned. The "Wasteland" nonsense you hear is just that - utter rubbish. Any mistakes they've made are more than offset by the help they've given us. Without them, both the above programmes would be "another Chinook Mk3" and Boscombe wouldn't have enough hangarage to store the aircraft.

[NutLoose]

I can totally agree with Boeings stance, they are the design authority for the Chinook, to circumnavigate that both undermines their authority and then allows things to be embodied on the aircraft that they have no say or control over.. And let's face it, that would have been know when purchased.

Having said that at contracts being signed the MOD accepted that Boeing were the design authority, they are the people they should be working with on all aspects of Airworthiness, to simply say "ouch we are not paying that' would get your EASA Approvals withdrawn in the Civil world...

One does wonder the legal ramifications if a Chinook crew is killed due to MOD negligence under failing to comply with Airworthiness requirements laid down by the manufacturer.

Incidentally wasn't one of the major advantages of the Jaguar that the design authority had transferred to the MOD, thus allowing upgrades to be carried out both cheaply and quickly?


..

[SASless]

There is something "Quick" about the Jag?:E

[tucumseh]

Nutloose

I know what you’re saying and admire Boeing’s stance. My viewpoint is one of someone who had to explain to other contractors why MoD’s mandated policy of competition didn’t apply to certain contractors. For example, in the late 90s our Chief of Defence Procurement upheld criticism in an annual report when a project manager was castigated for not cancelling a successful project, on the point of completion ahead of time, under cost and to a better spec, and starting all over against with a single tender contract on Thales. There have always been a favoured few.

In the case of Chinook, I imagine Boeing would most certainly point to the serial abuse of the Service Engineered Mod and Special Trials Fit processes that, in the 80s and 90s contributed much to its lack of airworthiness. I also said on the MoK thread that before passing judgement on Boeing I’d want to look at their contracts (or, more accurately, lack of contracts). The FADEC arrangement was ludicrous, breaching every mandated contracting rule in MoD. Not to mention a certain two IPTs in the 90s and 00s handing out Chinook airworthiness delegation to infantry soldiers and graduates who’d never been near an aircraft. Much to the annoyance of the Chinook IPT, who were blameless and toothless. The sheer shambles this creates means it is little wonder upgrade programmes experience delays.

One does wonder the legal ramifications if a Chinook crew is killed due to MOD negligence under failing to comply with Airworthiness requirements laid down by the manufacturer.

Not only Boeing’s requirements, but MoD’s own! We know the answer. MoD didn’t comply, and staffs were actually under direct orders NOT to comply. We know the names and they have been published. Nothing was done!

Incidentally wasn't one of the major advantages of the Jaguar that the design authority had transferred to the MOD, thus allowing upgrades to be carried out both cheaply and quickly?

I’m less enamoured with the thought of this. I’ve heard this proposal many times from beancounters and, especially, suppliers. There are very few in MoD who know what being a Design Authority entails, especially if they are also the PDSC. But I’ll absolutely guarantee you MoD did not maintain the Build Standard or, by definition, the Safety Case. MoD has never in my time had the experience or knowledge to be DA on a whole aircraft. They have done it on engines, but with varying success, but this was more of a paper appointment – Rolls Royce was still under significant contract to provide the expertise and support. In simple terms, MoD relied on RR but signed documents that normally the contractor would. MoD being DA wouldn’t make upgrades quicker or cheaper; it is circumventing the regulations that does that. In particular, those governing SEMs.

[NutLoose]

Although I do slag the leaf blower off, the thing it had going for it was cheap to operate in respect to the other fleets, was cheap to upgrade towards the end and was not manpower intensive to maintain compared to the other fleets..

Which made it a cost effective and capable platform in its latter years, or maybe I'm wrong..

(That was in response to SASless)

[NutLoose]

graduates who’d never been near an aircraft.

That sadly is how the world is going, the CAA is now riddled with them, even the head of the CAA..


Dame Deirdre Hutton (Chair)

Dame Deirdre Hutton was appointed to the CAA Board as a Non-Executive Board Member in April 2009 and took up the position of Chair of the CAA in August 2009. Dame Deirdre was previously Chair of the Food Standards Agency, Honorary Vice-President of the Institute of Food Science and Technology, Honorary Vice-President of the Trading Standards Institute, and serves as a Non-Executive member of the HM Treasury Board. She has been Vice-Chair of the European Food Safety Authority Management Board, Deputy Chair of the Financial Services Authority, Chair of the National Consumer Council, Chair of the Scottish Consumer Council, and a member of the Better Regulation Task Force. She has also held a number of positions on a variety of bodies dealing with food issues.

Read the letter from the Secretary of State for Transport to Dame Deirdre stating the CAA's priorities

Great, probably got the best canteen in the CAA, but not exactly aviation savvy.

The junk you get published by them is unreal, they did a licence guidance booklet and the two examples listed for a multi piston engine pressurised aircraft group were a turboprop and a biz jet ! :ugh:

And you get surveyors coming out to look at aircraft that have degrees but have never worked or operated one... Nice to see we are in the same boat.


..

[Chugalug2]

Points well made and taken, Nutloose, but AFAIK the CAA has not yet got round to deliberately suborning its own airworthiness regulations. That distinction goes to the MOD, which upholds such malevolent subversion (including the giving of direct orders to that effect to juniors) to this day. The MAA of course has nothing to say about it...

[kintyred]

I'm a bit behind with this post but I was in the crew room at Odiham when the first Chinook desynchronised. A shocking bang! A few days later my flight commander brought in the offending bearing that had been fitted the wrong way round allowing the sync shaft to part company with the gearbox. The only indication as to which way to assemble it was a small faint arrow less than 1cm in length etched lightly onto the bearing. It seemed to me that the designer had placed a great deal of faith in his fellow human beings...he'd clearly never heard of Murphy's Law! It set me thinking about what other possible banana skins were hidden in the mighty Wokka.
Notwithstanding some of the technical problems that the aircraft has had, they are greatly outweighed by the sheer strength and power of the machine that have, on many many occasions saved the crew and pax from inept handling by us stick monkeys!

[Chugalug2]

Kintyred,
You put your finger unerringly on the nub of things. Many, many, many years ago I visited the AIB black museum in Shell-Mex House. Among the exhibits was a very ancient NRV with a luggage label attached. Our guide explained that it had been fitted to a Vickers Valencia (or some such) and crashed in the desert due fuel starvation.
The resulting inquiry found that this valve had been fitted the wrong way round, for the simple reason that it could be. As a result, all NRVs were made with different diameter inlet/outlet pipes thereafter so that it would not happen again.
Classic Flight Safety parable, which was just as well for we were all on a course for prospective FSO's. When that link was broken between cause, effect and cure we were sent back to the aviation stone age. It seems from the threads on this forum relating to airworthiness affected fatal military air accidents that we are still there.
Anyone got some flint?

[tucumseh]

Good post kintyred and well said chug.

These threads should, at most, have posts such as kintyred's, so that others can learn from these experiences and prevent recurrence; and someone knowledgeable simply pointing out the solution(s). If you're not interested professionally in the solution, fine, no need to store it away or comment. By all means propose different solutions, but don't criticise those who do need to know, and have to sign for it next time. What we have here on pprune and in MoD is people who rubbish the idea that the problem should be fixed at all. You really do have to wonder at their motive.

One solution to that bearing problem is correct implementation of the hitherto mandated Design Review process. On 4.6.98 the MoD Project Director responsible for (inter alia.) Chinook was formally notified that it had become practice to completely waive Design Reviews, make a false declaration that they had been conducted properly and successfully, and had been fully paid off. He did not reply. This was then elevated to his 2 Star and 4 Star, both of whom formally ruled that such fraud was acceptable. This general principle, and its applicability to airworthiness declarations in particular, has been upheld regularly, most recently in July this year by DE&S, in a letter to which the MAA were party to. That is the "Stone Age" that the MAA refuse to address, and which so many here advocate. It is why I post here.

[Chugalug2]

It seems that the Wg Cdr Spry thread is not to be sullied with posts such as are on this thread, tuc. You know, ones about Flight Safety. Instead we should stay away, unless we have some helpful hints about desk-top publishing.

I'm afraid that we might be doing stone-age man a disservice though. At least he realised that sound freshly produced flints (flintworthy?) were vital to the successful outcome of a hunt, indeed to his very survival.

In contrast there seems to be an attitude in the RAF that the survival of one's career prospects supersede the possible survival of oneself, or more importantly others, from Flight Safety related risks. That is a concept that is utterly at variance to that which prevailed in my RAF. That is why I post here...

[Rigga]

Another good set of posts. However, I feel I must give some credence to Boeing's designers and techniques:

"The only indication as to which way to assemble it was a small faint arrow less than 1cm in length etched lightly onto the bearing."

You have to bear in mind that "Bearings" (such as SKF or Timken) are very seldom made for a single purpose and can be individually purchased and used in a plethora of devices - such as an Aft Xmsn or a Power Station Generator. Designers will almost always use commerciall y available items that they dont have to make. And Bearings have most often been designed to match a specification, e.g. for Axial Thrust - not just to fit in a specific gearbox.

So; to etch a preferred orientation is not an easy task and can only be done for the purpose for which it has be procured - not designed. Also, the depth of etching can ruin the Bearing Race's structural integrity.
A dirty great crevice in a Race is not a desired effect - and those of us who were aware of the tiny markings knew exactly what to look for as we built and repaired the Rotorheads, Swashplates, Drive Shafts and Control Rods & Levers.

As for the official "Unofficial" forums (or is it the unofficial "Official" Forums) that won't entertain posts of misdeeds in their Baileywick- that's exactly what Denial is!

[mole man]

I would like to make contact with Travilad as I may be able to help him with his quest.

Please PM me his details if possible.

Mole Man

[NutLoose]

I have sent him an email through the site, hopefully he will get in contact.

[mole man]

I am on my way to the Falklands soon, has anyone got any contact details for Travilad please.

Many Thanks

Mole Man :ok:

[Bimbly453]

I worked with Dave and Karl in the bay and had worked with Pete. On r&r when I got the news, very sad day.

[roundyuk]

Hi there,

I am not a pilot, nor ex RAF or anything like that, but my mum was close friends with David Chitty's wife, and I grew up with his son Richard as a close friend. I was talking to Sue on the phone two days ago as she called the house because my mum has been staying this week - David would have been celebrating his 60th birthday on the 27th April this year.

I can't remember David as I was so young at the time, but from what I've heard about him he was a special guy/father/husband. Sue and her two boys (Mark & Richard) will be coming down from north Wales to visit his grave in Hartley Wintney in April, I'll be meeting them and would like (if possible) to share some memories with them from the RAF side of the fence.

I'd be grateful if anyone that knew or worked with David could drop me a line, and something I am really hopeful of is if anyone has some pictures that they may not have seen before of him?

Thanks ever so much in advance :-)

[DunWinching]

I was on the IoT Flt with here husband, Tony. Illness stopped me going to their wedding which I was always sad about. I think she was a lawyer after leaving the Service.

[mole man]

I was the Heliops guy at the time of the crash, and new most of them, I still remember the day of the crash and the mate I lost. RIP Andy


Mole Man

[Wander00]

I was a flt cdr on IOT "B" Sqn with Audrey, and went to their wedding. They went off on honeymoon in a 3-abreast French sports coupe. Most days I see a similar car in the village, always brings back the memory.

RiP. If anyone in touch with Audrey, please giver my best. W

[roundyuk]

Thanks for the replies so far, I did some more research on David and it would seem he was on the 225 Entry at RAF Halton - managed to find a website on it.

From what I know David was a RotoTuner (or however you spell it) - my mum recalls that David had been offered a job in civi street which he turned down shortly before the crash.

Managed to find a photo of the memorial on the island too, do they keep them maintained??

[Old-Duffer]

Just to confirm, Audrey is a very successful barrister and a google for audrey campbell-moffatt will throw up plenty of information regarding her professional career in UK and Hong Kong.

IIRC her first husband was a Phantom navigator.

O-D

[Wander00]

OD, many thanks. Audrey and I have exchanged e-mails


W

[WASALOADIE]

This Friday will be the 28th Anniversary of this sad day.

I was down there on 78 at the time and always remember them, a glass will be raised in their memory.

[b5a46b1835ec92c2f1ad]

In 1987 I was a LCpl in the R SIGNALS employed at the JOC Radio Hut now RADCON. I was 19 at the time and remember the 27 Feb as a hot sunny day; I was sat outside catching the sun and waiting for the Tristar to depart. The Chinook which I saw the previous day being repaired flew over me and then departed South.
Today, I am a Major in the R SIGNALS aged 47 and led a small commemorative party to the crash site to pay my respects. The memorial is now well maintained, we cleaned the brass plate and signed the new visitors book. We held a short service and then departed. The RAF Seaking managed a flypast which was great. I did this, because the crash for me had a lasting memory and not many in the Falklands today are aware of the tragedy. I wanted to make sure that the day was not forgotten. I have some photographs if anyone wishes to see them.
Best regards and they have been remembered in 2015.
Nick Wood

[Teamchief]

Pete, Jerry, Dave and Andy, RIP boys, remembering 7 Sqn and previous down south tours.
Was on the Minor team at 78Sqn prior to Dave and crew. We went home a bit early as 721 wasn't due in on a Minor. There for the grace....Per Diem Per Noctem.

[Cows getting bigger]

b5a46b1835ec92c2f1ad, thanks.

Photos would be nice.

[taxydual]

b5a46b1835ec92c2f1ad

My thanks too.

[ShyTorque]

Thank you, much appreciated, Nick.

[b5a46b1835ec92c2f1ad]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dN-7srLAf18&feature=youtu.be

[roundyuk]

Would be very grateful if you could post the pictures Nick, or some links.

Thanks and kind regards.

[taxydual]

Well done, Nick and team.

Again, Thank You.

[Hilife]

Heavens, is it really 28 years?

"There but for the grace....." indeed, as my replacement was one of the seven.

Sadly gone, but most certainly not forgotten.

[roundyuk]

Thanks for posting the video Nick, would it be possible for you to share to pictures (Dropbox or something), I'd like to print a couple if OK with you to show to Sue Chitty when I see her next month.

[bollidear]

Sorry to jump on this thread, but I spend around a year in the Falklands around this time as part of the Henlow Fitting Party - often flying between the mountain tops with 78 Sqn and the Erics.

I cam across some photos today of me sitting on the ramp as we flew fast and low across West Falkland, but also came across a photo of a crashed Chinook that I understood had only recently gone down. Something in my mind tells me the location was Mount Helen on West Falkland and I think the Pilot mentioned over the radio that it had only just gone down. What I can't tell you is when this was exactly - but I'm guessing around 1985/6?? I've a photo of it here (not very good I'm afraid), but as it was really remote - I'm guessing there aren't alot of images of this one around?

Just curious really if anyone knows anything about this incident. Also an opportunity to the 78 Sqn guys at the time that we really appreciated the "lifts" we requested at a time when most would have chosen not to have flown in them......

We were flying ZA709 BTW if that helps screw down a date? I note this also crashed, but may years later in Sangin.

http://i1341.photobucket.com/albums/o751/bollidear/Chinook%20-%20Mount%20Helen.ppt_zpsqfs1vetd.jpg (http://s1341.photobucket.com/user/bollidear/media/Chinook%20-%20Mount%20Helen.ppt_zpsqfs1vetd.jpg.html)

[Hilife]

It is ZA715.

As I recall the accident occurred on West Falklands on 13th May 1986, during white-out conditions, whilst trying to climb over the top of the ridge. Sadly with the loss of three lives.

[November4]

Chinook HC1 ZA715

David Vincent BROWNING
Wayne John HOPSON
Toyabahadur Gurung

From Key publishing forum (http://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?98531-ZA715-Chinook-HC1-crash-Falklands-1986)

[Stn120]

715 crashed on the top of Mount Young

[teeteringhead]

And the Captain went back to flying eventually - instructing on the Gazelle (no footbrakes, no problem!) IIRC.

[P6 Driver]

And the Captain went back to flying eventually - instructing on the Gazelle

I flew with him at RAF Shawbury for an hour on 30th May 1990. As we walked out to the Gazelle, he remarked that the ******'s had given him the furthest aircraft from the hangar again. A couple of minutes later, he apologised for the noise as we walked out.

It took a while to realise that he was referring to the fact that he had a missing limb and the replacement made a noise. It didn't make any difference to his flying, as we went through GH and PFL's at Tern Hill and Chetwynd before some confined area ops and a PAR back into Shawbury.

[kintyred]

The Captain also went back to Chinooks....which most definitely does have toebrakes! I flew many hours with him and learned much as a result!

[Teamchief]

I remember as a Cpl. being dropped off at the crash site with a Jnr. Tech to see if any parts that were other wise in short supply could be salvaged from the wreck. Very remote and desolate place. The two of us spent the best part of a day there removing a few parts and were more than grateful when the Wokka picked us up again.

I believe the wreck was eventually under slung and 'buried at sea'.

[roundyuk]

Pulling up an old thread but I am seeing Sue Chitty and her son Richard today. They are down this way to visit David's headstone...30 yes on Monday, wow.

I shall make sure at some point I raise a glass.

[Chugalug2]

ZA 721 was a terrible loss 30 years ago, taking 10 lives with it. It was also a terrible harbinger of even worse to come some 7 years later, when ZD 576 took 29 lives on the slopes of the Mull of Kintyre. All these years later the similarities are striking; inconclusive BoIs that were severely throttled from above, a hamstrung AAIB input, and a cover up of now well known scandals. As we pay tribute on Monday in memory of those who died whilst doing their duty, perhaps we might dwell upon the need to ensure that Military Air Accident Investigation is not so compromised in future by being made independent of the Operator (the MOD) and the Regulator (the MAA), which in turn must be similarly independent of the other two. Of all his posts on this thread, I choose tucumseh's #40 as a summary of the problems posed by the events of 27th February 1987:-

MoD investigations never dig and ask the next obvious question. In this case, a thorough overhaul of an obviously unfit for purpose QA/QC system would have provided a fighting chance of preventing recurrence. In Aug 1992 the CHART report by the RAF's own Inspector of Flight Safety cited ZA721 as an airworthiness related accident. That speaks volumes, given the official line was Cause Unknown. Was this an oversight or IFS making a point to the Chief Engineer and ACAS? Given the rest of the report, the latter. MoD's reaction? Withhold CHART from all concerned. My point is that there is a clear and unbroken chain of evidence from these 1980s failures to Haddon-Cave and then Lord Philip.

One small example - in 1998 new Chinooks were being delivered with similar serious assembly defects. At Boscombe a starboard avionics rack (about 6 feet high, 3 feet wide and crammed with black boxes) came loose and fell on a contractor, just after the aircraft had landed upon initial delivery. (On the pan outside RWTS hangar). The fixing bolts had been over-torqued and crushed the honeycomb bulkhead so that something weighing hundreds of pounds was literally hanging by a thread. In control runs, split pins had not been split. One part fell off and hit the pilot on the head as he was walking out the back. It had secondary bonding that consisted of a rolled up ball of 24awg equipment wire stuffed behind Nav systems. Nav problems? Always check bonding first. It matters not that these were not actuator problems - they were serious QC failures and indicative of a very poor ethos. MoD's reaction was exactly the same. Boeing are a protected species and nothing was done, except each defect (not fault) was quietly fixed as and when it was spotted. Except, the problem is that a defect (as opposed to a fault) indicates contractor liability arising from a poor design. That is, we were content to fire fight instead of getting to the root cause.

Haddon-Cave agreed that there were savings at the expense of safety, but what of pandering to a contractor on the basis of preserving relations, but knowing this places aircrew lives at risk? The next question would be who benefited from this.

[Katie Browning]

Pulling up an old thread but I am seeing Sue Chitty and her son Richard today. They are down this way to visit David's headstone...30 years on Monday, wow.

I shall make sure at some point I raise a glass.

My uncle David Vincent browning xx

[ShyTorque]

I remember your uncle Dave. He was a student at Shawbury when I was there instructing on the Gazelle.

[Cornish Jack]

Way back in the early posts, mention was made of Malcolm Pledger. We shared a lot of Whirlwind time in Cyprus, including 'collecting' a vast amount of kite string on main and t/r hubs and a rapid 'arrival' on Ladies Mile !. I saw, somewhere, that he had become 'Staish' at Shawbury but that was some time ago.

[oldbeefer]

I lifted Malcom Pledgers Whirlwind back to base in Cyprus after an engine failure (we were there with Pumas after the Turks invaded the north). He was Staish at Sy in the nineties.

[mole man]

Will be remembering Andy Johns and the other 6 guys as I march past the Cenotaph Sunday.
RIP
Mole Man

[Clare Ryan]

Does anyone know if there is a memorial stone in the Falklands for the crew of ZA721, i know there’s a blade memorial fro ZA715 which crashed in 1986. I am currently on 78Sqn at Swanwick and looking to put something together to remember the crews that lost their lives, and hopefully the current 78Sqn can remember them in some way. Any help would be appreciated.

[esa-aardvark]

There is stuff on Pprune. By coincidence I will be in the
Falklands Jan next year.

https://www.pprune.org/archive/index.php/t-329162.html

[Scamp]

I took a number of pics in 2005 of the memorial, as a new member & cannot post up until i do 10 posts, if no-one else post up, check back.

[Scamp]

Does anyone know if there is a memorial stone in the Falklands for the crew of ZA721, i know there’s a blade memorial fro ZA715 which crashed in 1986. I am currently on 78Sqn at Swanwick and looking to put something together to remember the crews that lost their lives, and hopefully the current 78Sqn can remember them in some way. Any help would be appreciated.

Clare this is my 10th post .... i should now be able to post a picture up for you........ hopefully.

[Scamp]

To the South east of Mount Pleasant Complex.
https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1504/falklands_042_84b5cfe975112d25fd17cb3116b20455f05761ce.jpg

[Scamp]

Timmy shed just visible from the site.
https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1504/falklands_043_4cdfd0c48e4e47835d2f0c23b87715c8cc209237.jpg

[Scamp]

The whole DET made the trip, general clean up & paying of respects.
https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1504/falklands_049_b855ac65bdc1cc1ba0c4070e462cff5faadf96a8.jpg

[Scamp]

Not forgotten.
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/488x606/falklands_152_e7fefc95c3ae33fcd3a965157a495587f3dc312d.jpg

[Bimbly453]

RiP all.

[OKOC]

My uncle David Vincent browning xx
Hi Katie,
I was on 18 Sqn with Dave Browning and he was a terrific bloke, great fun and great company. I miss him and the whole crew that died that fateful day. I had just finished my tour in The Falklands, and had air-tested that very same Chinook about a week before the crash, it still makes me think that we are all here by the grace of God.

Regarding the cause, my dim memory seems to remember (and it was widely believed by all the operators (modern speak for pilots) that it was a DASH (Differential Air Speed Hold) runaway; a very insidious causal factor and widely practiced thereafter in the sim at Aberdeen. If the runaway was not caught almost immediately it was impossible to stop it as there physically wasn't enough "back stick authority". As far as I am aware, even though we knew that sometime during the sim sortie the instructor (Dave Ryall) would introduce this snag, No-one caught it in time-the result was obvious. Please forgive my aging memory if some of my words are not absolutely text book but they are true.

RIP old friends both from MPA and the Mull.

[Hilife]

I think it fair to suggest we will never be 100% certain of the exact cause, but was it not considered 'most likely' an engineering quality issue (not FI associated) relating to the fwd SUBA controlling spool valve, with the aft LCTA clutch failure being a contributing factor.

Gone, but never forgotten.

[TJ Martin]

Hi Katie,
I was on 18 Sqn with Dave Browning and he was a terrific bloke, great fun and great company. I miss him and the whole crew that died that fateful day. I had just finished my tour in The Falklands, and had air-tested that very same Chinook about a week before the crash, it still makes me think that we are all here by the grace of God.

Regarding the cause, my dim memory seems to remember (and it was widely believed by all the operators (modern speak for pilots) that it was a DASH (Differential Air Speed Hold) runaway; a very insidious causal factor and widely practiced thereafter in the sim at Aberdeen. If the runaway was not caught almost immediately it was impossible to stop it as there physically wasn't enough "back stick authority". As far as I am aware, even though we knew that sometime during the sim sortie the instructor (Dave Ryall) would introduce this snag, No-one caught it in time-the result was obvious. Please forgive my aging memory if some of my words are not absolutely text book but they are true.

RIP old friends both from MPA and the Mull.

Hello. I have just stumbled across this thread. I thought you might like to know that I visited David Browning’s grave today as a volunteer for the Commonwealth War Graves Commission to carry out our regular check on the state of the headstone. If anyone is interested in paying a visit David is buried in the Great Cornard cemetery (what3words SPEEDING:UNDERTOOK:GREW for the gate, and he is beneath the 3rd cherry tree on the left of the central path) and his headstone is in fine condition. If I can work out how to post a picture I will do so. All best.

[tucumseh]

I think it fair to suggest we will never be 100% certain of the exact cause, but was it not considered 'most likely' an engineering quality issue (not FI associated) relating to the fwd SUBA controlling spool valve, with the aft LCTA clutch failure being a contributing factor.
.

But perhaps 99%!

The AAIB images of the Fwd SUBA were not included in MoD's report. They show that a hole was not drilled to take a roll pin. I've seen them, and they are utterly damning.

The Aft PUBA had seals fitted incorrectly, incorrect back-up rings fitted, back-up rings were not fitted at all, and the system had suffered a 'gross failure'.

Flt Lt Carl Scott, later Air Cdre, gave evidence under oath in 1996 about how the Board of Inquiry was 'directed' in order to protect Boeing; and in 2012 MoD finally conceded in writing that it would not 'prejudice relations between the UK and US'.

[Thud_and_Blunder]

Every day's a school day, tuc - I was on the same Sqn as Carl at the time and never knew he'd done that. Top bloke who in my experience was never one to hesitate over doing the right thing. For him to continue to operate the 47 after knowing what had happened must have been a fascinating thought process. He finished up with quite a CV too. Thank goodness for the RAF that people like him exist to counterbalance the self-interested 'others'.