Never do something stupid fast.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

These discussions on in flight emergencies such as engine failures and failures of other components in airplanes has brought me to sharing what I have learned over the years about PDM and how to handle these issues.

My first advice is when something goes wrong don't do anything until your brain recognizes what is happening and then act.

An airplane has inertia...be it either in motion or standing still.

The heavier the airplane the more inertia will either help or hinder you.

So lets look at a failure I had many decades ago in a PBY water bomber carrying long term retardant off a gravel forestry strip.

During a take off with a very strong X/wind fully loaded with long term retardant just as we were almost at VR the left hand throttle broke off, with the result being I was about to get airborne with an engine at full power and no throttle control.

In this case inertia was working against me as it was increasing very fast.

I took the few split seconds to identify the problem and make the correct decision on how to handle the problem...and that was to abort the take off as there was enough room ahead of me to stop before I went outside the boundaries of the airstrip.

.....my training over the years had been that to reject a take off you closed the throttles first.....but in this case I would have lost control because if I closed the throttles one of them was not connected to the quadrant anymore and I would have been riding in a 1200 HP tree cutter as the airplane tore its way through the trees alongside the runway with one engine at full take off power.

That short time I did nothing except think, gave me the opportunity to make the correct decision which was to turn all the mags off with the emergency cut off pull button and at the same time select idle cut off on both mixture controls.

With both engines dead I then punched the emergency retardant drop button and got rid of ten thousand pounds of long term retardant and applied full braking...we ended up about two hundred feet past the end of the runway on the grass and fortunately not in the trees.

That moment of doing nothing until my brain got in gear allowed us to live to fly another day.

So the lesson to be learned is never do something stupid fast.

By the way the airport was real easy to identify after that with almost half the runway bright red from the load of retardant we dumped down it. :E

[IO540]

Why didn't you get airborne, and then you'd have lots of time to think.

Shut down the uncontrollable engine with its mag switch or mixture (or use the mixture alone to reduce its power to something manageable - if one pulls the lever back fast one doesn't spend more than a second in the detonation region, which is typically only above 75% power), and then do an assymetric landing?

[BroomstickPilot]

Hi Chuck,

I seem to recall that one of the famous American test pilots involved in flight testing the Bell X series, (I forget who it was, probably Crossfield or Everest,) said exactly the same thing. Namely, that it was best not to respond to an emergency instantly but to take just a second to get your brain into gear and then assess the situation first.

Broomstick.

[SNS3Guppy]

A high speed rejected takeoff is one of the worst places to find ones self. Based on the limited information available, which resulted in a runway overrun with most of the stopping distance already behind you, getting airborne with the load may well have been a better choice.

As you know, dumping retardant during a rejected takeoff means that often the brakes are coated with retardant, reducing brake friction to nearly zero, as well as creating a very slick surface for the aircraft. This is one reason that tanker pilots are strongly advised not to jettison during a rejected takeoff...plus the fact that as the weight leaves the aircraft, the effectiveness of the brakes is further reduced (the exact opposite reason of why ground spoilers are employed in some airplanes, or why we often raise flaps right after touchdown in tankers).

Doing nothing fast would have meant getting airborne, climbing clear of obstacles, jettisoning the load at that point over a safe area, and returning to land at your leisure. Rushing into a high speed rejected takeoff instead puts one in a very dangerous position.

[airborne_artist]

Not only can you land at your leisure, but you can also choose to where to land in many cases, and that might well be a better equipped field than the one you are flying from, with more space and plenty of fire trucks....

[SNS3Guppy]

A rejected takeoff is more appropriate to a situation in which going airborne is unsafe; an engine fire, an engine failure, loss of directional control or other situations which affect safety of flight.

Two functioning engines at takeoff power don't create an unsafe takeoff condition, but certainly do create an unsafe stopping condition. If you wish to reject the takeoff, even at lower speeds, there should generally be a very good reason. As one is approaching Vr with a stuck (or in this case broken) throttle/power lever and two good, functioning engines, it's the time to get airborne, safely dispose of the load, and then return.

I've flown a variety of air tanker equipment, and universally we always remind pilots that dumping retardant during a rejected takeoff can create far more problems than it usually solves, for reasons previously mentioned. This is particularly true on older airplanes with less than effective expander-tube brakes.

We had a propeller roll back to about 1,200 RPM at takeoff power in Florida on an active fire, once. It turned out to be a short in the wiring in the stephead motor for the old hamilton standard hydromatic prop. During the roll, as I saw it roll back, I attempted to push it up with the prop switch, no effect. I attempted to move the switch the other way, to no avail. As we crossed the departure end and slightly airborne we then jettisoned the load and shortly thereafter shut down and feathered the #1 engine. With that accomplished, we were able to enter a low downwind and perform an engine-out landing...something for which we all train regularly, and which permits a full runway ahead on which to stop.

[corsair]

This is a very interesting discussion. On the point of go, no go. I would have thought that Chuck made the right decision because it worked. 20, 30, 40 feet further it might not have. But the real lesson is exactly as he said 'Never do something stupid fast'.

But why is this topic in the private flying forum? Why isn't there a generic catch all flying forum for stuff like this. Rumours and News is for 'real airline pilot' stuff. Jet Blast is a place where mentioning aircraft can get you killed. Then there's all the specialised flying forums. What we really need is, I suppose a 'Hangar flying' forum. about anything as long it's about flying!

How about it moderators, surely there's room for a generic flying forum?

[airborne_artist]

Corsair - did you try to read the LHR 777 glider thread? - a total nightmare....

[Chuck Ellsworth]

To come in on the other side of the discussion than a couple of later posters, it is surely better to run off the end of the runway at 20 kts than to crash at flying speed doing a difficult asymmetric circuit.

Thank you cjboy, that is exactly why I chose to reject the take off, there was sufficient smooth grass remaining at the end of the runway to allow for the over run and I had enough years flying that type of airplane to know beyond any doubt that the reject could be done safely......getting a PBY fully loaded airborne with that problem to deal with can quickly turn into a far more difficult task should any other factor enter the equation once airborne.

I chose to post this story on the private pilot forum because I feel that private pilots are as capable of a cognitive thought process and thus capable of learning through example as the most experienced high time pilots in aviation.

That is why all the sim courses I have been on emphasize the decision making process as a rigorourous rule, problem below V1 reject, above V1 take off. That rule is based on the premise that you stop if you can, and avoid flying round in a faulty aeroplane if at all possible!

I appreciate that there probably wasn't a V1 calculation in the almost bush flying situation described, but the outcome illustrates a good decision to me.

The PBY on land fully loaded has the most fool proof V speed recognition you could hope to have....no need to look at the airspeed because if the nose wheel has not left the ground it ain't gonna fly......

I would like to add just one more comment to this post, I am very aware of the propensity of pilots to second guess any decision made by other pilots and have no problem with that as that is fair comment and through discussion we can learn.

But to those of you who for some unfathomable reason just have to " one up " every other pilot who posts here I personally am not all that impressed with your poweress as top guns because you do not have the self confidence to post using your real names.....you could be the lost village idiot that some village wants back for all I know.

[SNS3Guppy]

Chuck,

Clearly you walked away. That says something. However, for whatever reason you picked the private pilot forum to post a glory days story which appears to have the sole purpose of strutting your stuff. Whether you did it for that purpose, you certainly did open yourself up to observation by posting it (even if it's not the best choice of places to post). Don't whine when others comment on your post. Nobody's one-upping you here...you don't need to feel so competitive. Nobody's diminishing what you did, or did not accomplish. You laid out the details as much as you deemed necessary, and those details did and do merit comment.

Deal with it.

[Mike Cross]

as the weight leaves the aircraft, the effectiveness of the brakes is further reduced

SNS3G can you elaborate on the reasoning?

I can understand that dumping the weight reduces the downforce on the tyres but by the same token it greatly reduces the amount of energy that has to be converted to heat by the brakes. Chuck will probably be able to tell us what happens to brake effectiveness on a PBY when they get very hot.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Mike the brakes on a PBY are very powerful and need to be applied very carefully or you will rip the tires right off the thing.

The laws of physics dictate that to stop an object in motion requires less force as the weight of said object is reduced....my decision to dump ten thousand pounds of fire retardant was based on that simple law of physics.

The following was not my most pressing worry at that point in time....


as the weight leaves the aircraft, the effectiveness of the brakes is further reduced

Maximum braking is achieved just prior to the wheels locking up.....I had enough experience on type to ensure I did not lock up the wheels during the time I was bringing the thing to a complete stop, therefore an empty airplane will stop in a shorter distance than a fully loaded one.

Empirical evidence would indicate that the decision to reject the take off was sound.

Ergo my advice to think before acting is also sound advice.

[LH2]

Second-guessing someone's actions not having been there and with only a minimum of information is not a nice thing to do.

At any rate, something I was taught on my day job is that there are situations when the important thing to do is to make a decision. It does not have to be the best decision, but if freezing and doing nothing will get you killed, any decision you make can only improve the situation (it's not going to get you more dead than dead). In those circumstances, being able to say afterwards "I screwed up, I should have done this or that instead", is a truly wonderful thing. I know this might not be directly relevant here, but hopefully you get the idea.

Having said that, and without questioning in any way Chuck's decision, from my very meager experience I think that faced with a similar failure and for discussion purposes not taking into account any specifics as regards aircraft type, location, etc., if everything else looked normal and I was already near Vr I like to think I would have attempted a lift-off rather than cutting the engines, the reason being I wouldn't know if they are both going to cut off at roughly the same time. If they decide not to, then we're back to square one as regards asymmetric thrust--bad news, especially if below Vmcg.

Again, I'm not saying that's the right thing to do or questioning in any way anyone else's point of view, just sharing what I think my reaction would be, FWIW.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Hi LH2:

Let me clarify why I rejected at that point in the take off roll....remember I was still on the runway and not at VR with sufficient room ahead of me to stop safely before I would reach the airport boundary.


the reason being I wouldn't know if they are both going to cut off at roughly the same time.

The PBY has a dead man switch on the mag selector that kills the magnetos on both engines.

If one engine had quit and the other had not it would have been instantly evident and I could have pushed the push pull switch back to the live position. Furthermore if you read my post again you will note that I also selected ICO ( idle cut off ) on both engine mixture controls......the odds of either engine not stopping in the above scenario are remote to say the least.


If they decide not to, then we're back to square one as regards asymmetric thrust--bad news, especially if below Vmcg.

Had I been unable to shut down both engines I would still have had the option of continuing the take off.......

Remember each of these situations are airplane specific and we react based on knowledge of the airplane systems and performance, then make decisions based on what we decide will give the safest outcome.....


The not doing something stupid part of this story was meant to point out had I acted by rote which is to close both throttles to reject a take off I deffinately would have had a directional control problem on my hands.

Therefore it is advisable to think before acting was my message. :ok:

[RatherBeFlying]

My so far worst flying moment was my third flight in my third single seat glider and my first one in that glider behind a Pawnee.

The trim setting (as recommended in the manual) that worked fine behind a Citabria had me way above the Pawnee in the blink of an eye and I very quickly got my nose down. Yes, a little bit too much correction as I bounced off the ground. Doing nothing was not an option as there was a distinct danger that I would pull up the Pawnee's tail and cause a propstrike. I could have released, but that comes with its own set of problems, especially establishing sufficient airspeed from low altitude and not much airspeed.

After the bounce I was established in the proper position without further oscillation. The glider did not feel right and I discovered that the spoilers had come unlocked, likely from the bounce.

Put the spoilers back, continued the tow and parked in a thermal to let the adrenaline come down.

So while in most cases, doing nothing and thinking for the first few moments is the best option when faced with bad news, sometimes you have to be quick.

And these days, I err on the side of forward trim.

[LH2]

Let me clarify

That's fine, as I said I was not questioning your actions. For all my stupidity, I like to think I know better than telling someone with orders of magnitude more experience than I have how to fly a plane. Much more so when I wasn't there (when did this happen, btw? chances are I wasn't even born then).

That said, cheers for the additional details on the Catalina. How I would love to fly one someday! :8

it is advisable to think before acting was my message

Yep, I understood that, just got sidetracked as usual. :p

[Chuck Ellsworth]

(when did this happen, btw?

Jeeses you had to ask.:E

I think it was in 1975 or 76, it is a lot easier to remember the details than it is to remember the date......just take a minute and remember one of your more exciting sexual encounters and I bet the details will be easy to remember but just try and put a date to it.:E

Anyhow I'm pleased you are interested ...if you want to fly a PBY the Dutch are still flying theirs and money will do wonders for making that wish come true.:}

[frontlefthamster]

Hmmm,

One of the few circumstances in which a very rapid assessment and action is essential, is near rotation speed on take-off.

I hesitate to criticise any action with a safe outcome, but fundamentally, the decision to reject - above - was wrong.

Yes, reject for an engine malfunction, of course. But this was not an engine malfunction, it was an engine control malfunction, leaving the engine running at takeoff power. There are too many takeoff accidents, often involving an unnecessary high speed reject. This was very nearly another one.

Chuck's fundamental message is very valid. A highly respected TRE of my acquaintance has a favourite question about emergencies in general. He uses it to introduce a discussion on decision-making...

"What should you do when something goes wrong?"

He then allows the gathered trainees to hold forth with their opinions, before stating the correct response:

"Absolutely nothing at all, for very much longer than you might think".

He goes on to discuss gathering the required information, and confirming the correct course of action, before acting. Crucially, he also talks about the circumstances in which this is not relevant, namely, during takeoff at high speed, during approach near the ground, and anytime you have a TCAS, windshear, or GPWS warning (there are others, but these are the principal ones).

Well done to Chuck for not crashing, but I hope others would have taken the problem where it belonged: in the air.

[Whirlybird]

The point Chuck was primarily making is Never do something stupid fast.

I'm quoting that in case it's got lost in the discussion of what he should have done in this particular situation. It doesn't really matter in this case: it's a subject for another thread.

I said something similar in an article I wrote a bit back on dealing with emergencies. My version was that we say you should 'aviate, navigate, communicate', but we miss out the bit before 'aviate', which is to deal with what's going on in your brain and then make a correct decision. Chuck said it far better than I did, in far fewer words. I hope anyone who needed it was listening.

Years ago, low hours pilots were crashing R22s by throwing them into autorotation and messing it up, and investigation was showing that an auto wasn't required. The Robinson Safety Course now teaches that if the low rotor RPM warning horn goes off, you open the throttle and make sure you have an engine failure before you throw the machine into auto in a panic.

Now, don't turn this thread into a discussion of how long you've got to do that in an R22; start another thread. The point is, even in a situation like that, you have a fraction of a second to think what to do, and make the correct decision, and to not 'do something stupid fast'.

I spend a lot of my working life teaching students to respond quickly to emergencies. It never hurts to be reminded of what they should do first. Thanks, Chuck. :ok:

[modelman]

I am not really qualified to offer advice as a low hours single spamcan pilot but I guess I can make a reasoned comment ref the rejected take-off.
I was always taught to keep a hand on the throttle during climb out to prevent it backing off uncommanded.
Having no lever would have presented this possibility and I suppose assymetric thrust at low alt could be a major problem,so maybe keeping it on the ground was the best option.

Comments that the OP was starting this thread as a 'shop window' for his personal flying skills add nothing to this debate.:ugh:

Let's hear more about peoples' (successful) handling of difficult situations.You generally only read about the unsuccessful ones on the AAIB/NTSB sites.

MM

[SNS3Guppy]

Modelman,

You were taught correctly. What keeping your hand on the throttle really does for you is not only keeps the throttle forward, but gives you immediate tactile or feel feedback if you have a problem. If the engine does fail on you, you know it's not because the throttle backed off...it's in your hand. You're "in the loop" with what's going on with the airplane.

In multi engine airplanes, other factors come into play. One of the things chuck referred to was directional control. If one engine quits, you lose not only power, but you have some powerful forces trying to turn the airplane. If it gets too slow while still on the ground, the ability to keep the airplane going straight is lost, and as a result, control is lost. In flight, if there's not enough rudder authority available to fight that turning, the airplane can roll over and control will be lost. Multi engine pilots learn from very early in their training that in some cases the only choice may be to pull back or reduce power on the good engine(s) when one fails. that's one consideration.

Another consideration, especially as airplanes get heavier and heavier, is both the amount of runway required to take off, and what to do with the airplane if that takeoff needs to be stopped. Unlike a single engine Cessna, for example, one may be nearly out of runway by the time one rejects the takeoff, and one may need a lot to get stopped. Certain additional calculations are needed, then, when planning a takeoff in a larger multi engine airplane. One doesn't just need to know one's takeoff roll, but other numbers too, such as the accelerate-stop distance, balanced field length, etc. Other numbers such as the engine-out climb gradient are very important, as are the minimum speeds with a failed engine at a given weight, for directional control.

As weight increases, the ability of the brakes to stop the airplane decreases. Brake energy, the ability of the brakes to absort heat before they fail, is an important issue. Many larger airplanes have brake energy charts, but the fact is that if you have to reject a takeoff, you can have brake fires, directional control issues, a host of different potential problems...including tires that explode or burst because of skidding, temperature, etc. Having tires burst or go flat on a rejected takeoff in a large airplane isn't uncommon, nor are brake fires.

In older large airplanes such as what chuck is describing, a lot of this data just isn't available. I also flew WWII era bombers doing firefighting, and while it would be nice to have data like accelerate-stop and climb gradient information, it wasn't available. Add to that the fact that one is often departing from less than ideal runways...many tanker bases used to be located at airports with only a few thousand feet of runway, and often we used every foot of it before the wheels left the ground...the decision to reject a takeoff is a critical one.

Certain speeds come into play. In large airplanes, one of those speeds, generally the first one reached, is refusal, or decision speed. This is commonly just called V1. As a very generic rule, anything that occurs prior to V1, you can reject the takeoff, anything after you can't...you MUST go fly. However, due to the high risk involved in a high-speed rejected takeoff, nearly universally the wisdom is broken down a little more fully. One can reject for anything at a lower speed, but at a higher speed one may reject only for very critical items such as engine fire, engine failure, or loss of directional control.

The speed usually chosen for that line is about 80 knots. When a takeoff is briefed in most large airplanes these days, ranging from business jets to airliners to air tankers, usually it's briefed as any problems that present a safety of flight issue upto 80 knots, we will reject. After 80 knots, we will reject only for the previously mentioned engine fire, failure, or loss of directional control. It's just too dangerous to reject the takeoff otherwise.

To give you an idea of how dangerous it is, the FAA used to require a high speed rejected takeoff as part of the demonstration a pilot must show when taking the checkride for his multi engine rating. However, due to the number of training accidents and fatalities, even in light twins, the FAA doesn't authorize their examiners or inspectors to allow it above 40 knots, now. Keep it slow, because even in a light twin, a high speed rejected takeoff can be very dangerous. Statistically it's one of the most dangerous things you can do in a multi engine airplane (especially a large airplane)...high speed, low control, close to or on the ground, high potential for loss of directional control, max brake energy and temperatures, your stopping distance largely behind you, obstacles ahead...you're better off taking it flying and bringing it back around under control to land.

In a single engine airplane, you don't have any choice; if the engine fails then you're coming down. You're often taught to land straight ahead or keep the airplane going straight ahead and accept what's there (or make slight turns to avoid obstacles, if you can). In a large airplane, there are other options and other considerations. Chuck's point that simply pulling one engine back in a reaction to the problem would have been a very bad choice, is a valid one. He uses that as an example to show that he didn't just pull one engine back as a knee jerk reaction; he considered the effects and shut down both engines. He did so with the added benifit that the engines were stopped, further reducing their hazard.

The reason I responded as I did, and do so again, is that while clearly he made a successful stop, rejecting a takeoff for two functioning engines at takeoff power is a bad choice. Why reject the takeoff when things are functioning as they should? You don't.

This is particularly true in an air tanker. I've spent a number of years flying air tankers doing firefighting in older WWII airplanes, turbine equipment such as the C-130, and even in single engine air tankers such as the 800 gallon Air Tractor AT-802F. When carrying retardant more than any other load (foam, water, etc), punching off the load during a rejected takeoff can do several bad things for you...one is that it can coat your brakes. It's very slick, reducing brake effectiveness. It's one of the things we teach not to do in the fire schools every year. It also coats the ground and can make directional controlan and braking difficult by reducing the coefficient of friction with the surface. If this occurs during an overrun onto grass, it's like operating on oil or ice. Very slick, possibly even no braking. Moreover, braking effectiveness is a function of speed, the brakes, and the weight on the wheels. Effectiveness is reduced when the weight is lost.

Older airplanes used what are called expander tube brakes. Unlike what's on your car or Cessna, these used a rubber-impregnated canvas bladder full of hydraulic fluid to expand and compress the brake assembly. These are susceptible to catching fire and with heat, the canvas and rubber breaks down and can fail. I've seen them burning and smoking on several occasions as a result of too much use on landing or a rejected takeoff. They lose efficiency much faster than most modern large airplanes, and have their own limitations. Once they warm up, they're done...unlike carbon fibre brakes found in say, a typical airliner today...which get more efficient the hotter they get.

In a tanker, during a takeoff emergency about the only time you'll be jettisoning the load is if you intend to take it airborne and need to get rid of the weight to do it. We strongly counsel pilots every year not to lose the load if they intend to remain on the ground and stop, especially if it's retardant. It's always a judgement call, and chuck made his judgement call. However, if you were to post that scenario in the tech forum and have it evaluated by professional pilots who understand the real significance of rejecting a takeoff with two functioning engines...you're going to get nearly universally the same response as I've provided here. Yes, he made it, yes, he made a good decision to kill both engines instead of just one...but he shouldn't have done it in the first place. With two good engines, rejecting the takeoff with two good operating engines and the runway behind, is the wrong choice...and he ended up off the runway as a result. It could have been much worse. Runway overruns and high speed rejected takeoffs, especially for fully functioning engines...are ill advised and have resulted in a lot of tragedy over the years. Lucky doesn't make it right.

Chuck's example so far as not moving a control before you think about it, is valid. His example of what occured, is not...and put that scenario before the many professionals who frequent the board and you'll get the same response. That it's not recognized in the private pilot forum is to be expected; it's not part of your training, and you're not expected to know that. Chuck knows that, too.

I fully agree that fast hands kill. I've seen pilots shut down the wrong engine. I've seen pilots panic and do things they really ought not. This may be such an occasion. Directional control wasn't lost, but the takeoff really shouldn't have been rejected, either...statistically speaking, and speaking in terms of proper training and procedure. My grip is the decision to post it in the private pilot forum and hide a good decision in a bad one, specifically chosen before a group that probably wouldn't recognize the fact...and then to defend that bad decision.

Chuck is right regarding acting too quickly. I've always taught that the first thing you should do in nearly all emergency situations is sit on your hands and count to ten. Not always literally, of course, but there are very few things that happen in an airplane which demand you act NOW...and whereas pilot error is the cause of the majority of mishaps, getting the pilot to slow down a little before he does something stupid (like reject a takeoff for two fully functioning engines) is a very wise thing to do.

[Fuji Abound]

Interesting discussion.

Fast hands may frequently be dangerous.

However, equally are there occasions when fast hands can save the day?

How fast do you hands have to be to get the collective down in a light helicopter with little inertia in the blades following a catastrophic engine failure?

How fast do your hands need to be when the engines fails at max climb after departure?

Perhaps some other cases come to mind.

When one of my engines failed recently however I was very glad to take some time to assess what had happened and what I should do next. Time on your side is always good.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

I would like to take the opportunity to apologize to all the private pilots here on Pprune for making a post regarding PDM that was beyond your ability to comprehend due to your not having either the neurons to examine my message or the vast experience of some of your other contributers here to understand said message.

I do however find it rather strange that someone would criticize me for talking above your heads regarding how airplanes work then launch into a long lecture about how airplanes work.

I do not need total strangers insulting me because I wrote something for the express purpose of suggesting that it is better to take the time to make a good decision rather than act like one of Pavlovs dogs and do something stupid because you learned to react by rote.

Therefore I shall try and refrain from insulting all you unwashed peons with a lowly PPL in the future and leave it to the experts to keep you from harm.

Now I would like to take the opportunity to respond to you experts who have flatly stated I made the wrong decision.

Here are the facts.

(1) Before take off I always have a plan regarding where I will reject should something go wrong.

(2) I had been flying off that runway for some time and " KNEW " that the over run past the gravel runway was smooth grass and there was at least a thousand feet from the end of the runway and the airport boundry.

(3) I do not need you to explain what V1 is nor do I need you to tell me how I should have handled that situation.

(4) As I explained I rejected before the nose wheel lifted off the runway, which means I was below 65 knots with sufficient " SAFE " runway and grass over run to stop.

(5) I have been flying for just short of 55 years and my career has included most every type of flying machine from light and heavy helicopters to
heavy transport catgory piston and jet engine powered airplanes.

(6) I have never had an accident nor a violation of the regulations during my time in aviation.....

....oh by the way I was chief pilot for not only a water bombing company but also for an airline.

.....oh and I worked with Airbus Industries who taught me a few things about CRM and PDM and V1 and all those things ........


Once again....sorry for trying to relate a story where thinking trumped acting by rote.

Now back to the experts.....

[airborne_artist]

So basically what you are saying is Chuck "I'm the best pilot out there. The emergency I'm telling you about shows how great I am. You, the Pprune audience, should only post your messages of admiration, as there's nothing else that needs to be discussed about this situation".

Or have I got it wrong?

[Zorst]

artist,

I'd have disagreed with you very heartily until Chuck's last post. Now, sorry to say, I think you've got a very valid point. His decision to reject was wrong, but his decision to post the nonsense in his last contribution knocks it into a cocked hat.

[Fuji Abound]

Chuck is relating an incident as illustrative of why taking time to think is a good idea and a discussion worth commenting on (see my post above).

Clearly he was not looking for a critique of his specific decision making process in respect of this incident.

A critique he has got and it is not the first nor the last time a thread drifts from the posters original intention.

Chuck - I think everyone agrees with your sentitments that taking time to think is vital. Other than to post "I agree", I suspect that is partly why the thread has "drifted" becasue other wise there was not a whole lot to add.

That said it would be interesting to drag the debate back to occasions when quick hands might be a good idea.

[Whirlybird]

it would be interesting to drag the debate back to occasions when quick hands might be a good idea.

Yes, like how fast you have to be.... to get the collective down in a light helicopter with little inertia in the blades following a catastrophic engine failure?

ie about 2 seconds in an R22, or 7 seconds if you flare as well, if I remember correctly. But, as I state earlier on this thread.... Years ago, low hours pilots were crashing R22s by throwing them into autorotation and messing it up, and investigation was showing that an auto wasn't required. The Robinson Safety Course now teaches that if the low rotor RPM warning horn goes off, you open the throttle and make sure you have an engine failure before you throw the machine into auto in a panic.


Personally, I think they're wrong (oooo, arguing with the experts who have gazillions more hours than me; I'm bad!!!!). I think you should put the helicopter into autorotation, but do your thinking on the way down.

Think first. Don't do something stupid by acting too fast. BUT there are different ways of doing that, and depending on your emergency, you have different amounts of time in which to do it.

Enough food for thought there?

[skyfiend]

Strange... I got completely the other end of the stick, Artist.

There's only one person that looks like a chestbeater (or another word beginning with C) everytime Chuck posts. And it's not Chuck.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

His decision to reject was wrong, but his decision to post the nonsense in his last contribution knocks it into a cocked hat.

Zorst, would you be kind enough to clarify for me why my decision to safely reject a take off at the point in time that I rejected was wrong?

Are you suggesting that with sufficient room to stop ahead of me I should have kept accelerating to lift off speed and chanced flying a very heavy low performance airplane with an uncontrollable engine?

By the way regardless of my personality and or flying skills.... or in your opinion the lack thereof ....at least I have the self worth to post using my real name so when you see me walking around an airport you can say there goes that as.hole who posts on Pprune.

However I don't have that privilege with you because there is that problem of figuring out who Zorst is.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Just to clear something up here, my referring to PPL's as somehow to stupid to understand these PDM issues was meant to be tounge in cheek and not to belittle PPL's .:ok:

[Supersport]

Just to clear something up here, my referring to PPL's as somehow to stupid to understand these PDM issues was meant to be tounge in cheek and not to belittle PPL's .:ok:

Nevermind hey Chuck, I'm pretty sure most people who browse this thread will know what you were getting at, I know I do. :)

Right decision if you ask me, you obviously know or knew the aircraft and location you were in very well and took time and made decent decision and walked away. I definately think that 'doing it by the book' isn't always the best idea, no two situations are ever the same and hence the book cannot always be right. Talking or reading about something is very different to actually doing it.

[Final 3 Greens]

It seems to me that we have two schools of thought here.

Follow SOP
Make experience based decision


I don't have anywhere near enough experience to contribute by critiquing Chuck's decision, although I thank him for sharing it.

Likewise, I can't begin to challenge Guppy's view either.

However, even with a few hours only, it seems to me that there is a paradox illstrated by


The DC10 at O'Hare that augured in when the crew followed SOPS
Many other events where following rigorous SOPS saved the day


Given this data, I think that Chuck argues one case (and is here to tell the tale after taking that action) and Guppy argues another (which has logic and rationality.)

I am wondering if there is a bush flying pragmatism versus line operation desire for consistency perspective to their positions?

Before either Chuck or SNS beats me up here, I am not taking sides, just trying to understand what is driving the argument.

[Captain Smithy]

Interesting thread folks, although unfortunately it seems to have been spoiled somewhat by the usual PPRuNE Egoism.

I think it's a good idea to discuss these things and share experiences, good and bad. Perhaps we should consider making a dedicated thread, e.g. an "ILAFFT thread", perhaps made as a sticky, where we could all share these sorts of experiences and learn from each other?

Smithy

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Excellent idea Smithy:

We can always wade through the " ego " thing because it is part of the DNA of most pilots.

My position on these issues is to discuss the way we do things in aviation.

I am of course getting past the time in my life where I can be a part of the segment of aviation that sits behind the controls of commercial aircraft due to being time expired by age.

However I have been fortunate to have started in an era when aviation was just really beginning to evolve into the concept of multi crew SOP's we now have in the airline end of flying.

Remember SOP's were put into place by trial and error and designed to enable crews to fly with each other in specific aircraft and specific flight regimes.

These SOP's are designed to take advantage of the machinery they are written for and to achieve the best all around end result.....

.....they are not however written stone nor are they always the best actions to take, because occassionally one must be creative and do something that will save your day that are not written in the SOP's.

I may be old fashioned and even wrong in many of my methods and my decisions regarding how to fly aircraft, but for me it has worked well enough for me to have survived without wrecking any flying devices for a long time.

What does bother me is the mindset that is molded into doing everything by the book with no room for using common sense when it is required.

Anyhow I am willing to discuss these issues and maybe, just maybe pass on something that may save some poor souls ass some day.

Don't worry about hurting my feelings because I am not that old yet that I have become unable to defend myself.....you know that saying...

...I'm to old a cat to be screwed by a kitten? :E

[frontlefthamster]

Chuck,

My difficulty with this is that you made a very good point, but you illustrated it with a poor example.

Without knowing quite a lot more about the aircraft you were flying (means of powerplant control, the manner of the failure to the throttle, VMCG, etc), further critique is difficult, but the point remains that rejecting a takeoff without good cause is a regular killer. I think it's important to get that message across to some of those here who find this perhaps, in your words, beyond [their] ability to comprehend. I am also of the opinion that this should not be 'up for discussion'.

I would also agree this was the wrong forum to post that in. It might have gone down a lot better in Tech Log, or better still, why not join a proper grown up, but invitation-only, forum. PM me for details if you wish.

[Duchess_Driver]

Two schools.....


1. Below VR reject regardless.

2. 0 to xkts, stop for everything. xKts to the mark, stop for fires and failures. VR and above, take the problem into the air.

My reading, this falls into both camps. The aircraft was below reject. It then had a control function failure.

Chuck walked away. What's more, used the aeroplane again. Bonus.

As an aside, I try not to do anything stupid slowly either.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

frontlefthamster:

We , you and I can sort this out because your response is civil and polite.

In fact it will be to everyones benefit to sort this out and make it easy for everyone here to understand what my message was meant to be and why I feel the private pilot forum is just fine to discuss these issues.

So please allow me to respond to each part of your concerns.

Chuck,

My difficulty with this is that you made a very good point, but you illustrated it with a poor example.

Fair enough the example may seem to be poor because I related the story in to brief a manner for most here to really understand.......

......the main point that I was attempting to make was had I reacted in the manner all pilots are programmed to react when rejecting a take off is that to reduce power from take off power to zero power you move both throttles to idle at the same time in a twin engine aircraft......

When the throttle broke off it was still in my hand and therefore when the decision to reject was made habit and training would dictate that I would move both throttles to the idle position.......which would have resulted in one engine going from take off power to idle immediately and the one with no throttle attached to it would have still been at full power which would have resulted in immediate yaw into the dead engine with full power on the engine with no throttle control.

Taking that very short time to recognize that fact allowed me to shut down both engines together by using a combination of ignition off and idle cut off basically together.

Without knowing quite a lot more about the aircraft you were flying (means of powerplant control, the manner of the failure to the throttle, VMCG, etc), further critique is difficult, but the point remains that rejecting a takeoff without good cause is a regular killer.

With all due respect it would not really have made any difference what kind of engine it was, when you shut off ignition and fuel it quits and that was what I wanted those two engines to do.

I had good cause to reject that take off and I was also in a speed range that dictated to reject was the best course of action.

But lets have a look at what I would have had to deal with had I chosen to accelerate to flying speed and become airborne.

First you must remember I was not flying an Airbus where all I had to do was step on the icon on the PFD to control yaw and fly the airplane by the numbers for an engine out take off and climb.

The PBY has a time limit of four minutes at full power and considering the x/wind and the climb profile I would have had to contend with to get enough altitude to safely deal with how to shut down and feather an engine that had no throttle connected to it my decision to reject that take off was correct.


I think it's important to get that message across to some of those here who find this perhaps, in your words, beyond [their] ability to comprehend.

You have a valid point and by us continuing this discussion I'm betting there are not many here who are unable to understand the physics and the reason why the take off was rejected. Most here are pilots and most are smart enough to grasp basic airplane handling procedures and understand that doing things by rote without first trying to examine what is really happening can sometimes be a risky way to act.

Therefore I will once again suggest that had I acted by instinct and pulled both throttles back it would have been doing something stupid in that particular case.


I am also of the opinion that this should not be 'up for discussion'.


You may well be correct....but we are into it now and it's to late to wish I had not started this.





I would also agree this was the wrong forum to post that in. It might have gone down a lot better in Tech Log, or better still, why not join a proper grown up, but invitation-only, forum. PM me for details if you wish.


I do not quite know how to respond to this as I am not sure what a " grown up, by invitation only, forum " is.

No offence meant, but I need time to think about your offer .

[QDMQDMQDM]

http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/sites/aaib/cms_resources/3-2001%20G-OJEM.pdf

See section 1.1 of this well known crash. You can't second guess a non-standard action which turns out well. Or put it another way:

Being wrong and alive beats being right and dead.

[RatherBeFlying]

V1, Vr and V2 were developed as part of the certification basis for civil transport category aircraft. The main factors behind this triad were accelerate/stop distance and some guarantee of a reasonable climb gradient with one engine failing at or after V1.

The Canso/Catalina is a military aircraft. While quite capable, anybody who imagines that its engine out climb gradient meets civil transport certification criteria needs to have another look at the paperwork.

As far as I'm concerned, not quite enough runway/stopway to complete a reject is not nearly as bad as finding out in the air that you can't make it back to the runway.

[Piper.Classique]

Usual caveats here- not a multi engine pilot, don't fly heavies. However I do work with a crew when I fly a balloon and yes we do have something like SOPs at least for the take-off. After that it's solo pilot until the retrieve.

Remember SOP's were put into place by trial and error and designed to enable crews to fly with each other in specific aircraft and specific flight regimes.

These SOP's are designed to take advantage of the machinery they are written for and to achieve the best all around end result.....

.....they are not however written stone nor are they always the best actions to take, because occassionally one must be creative and do something that will save your day that are not written in the SOP's.

I may be old fashioned and even wrong in many of my methods and my decisions regarding how to fly aircraft, but for me it has worked well enough for me to have survived without wrecking any flying devices for a long time.

What does bother me is the mindset that is molded into doing everything by the book with no room for using common sense when it is required.I don't want to comment on whether the decision was right or wrong. I just want to say how strongly I agree that common sense has a huge place (or should have a huge place) in flying. How many people let themselves make stupid decisions because they have been hammered into doing it by the book? And to get back to the poster's original point - how often do you need to do anything in a hurry? If the aeroplane, or glider, or ballon or whatever is ahead of you and you are reacting instantly then you are not far short of panicking, and that is what will kill you. Like he says, slow down! Take a deep breath and THINK before you move. And if the decision you make enables you to be around later to argue about it, then it was probably the right one :)

[paulc]

SNS3,

the pby (well the ones i helped with) had a rotor / stator brake pack rather than a blader brake (ala DC3) - very effective and no chance of a bladder bursting and spraying hydraulic fluid over what maybe a hot assembly.

Chuck, your decision to reject was, in my book, the right one because you were below safe flying speed regardless of the failure.

[LateFinals]

I thank Chuck for starting an interesting thread. I'm not able to understand and comment on the technicalities of his situation but I like the wider decision making scenario's that he's adressing that we as all pilots are called into making very rarely in critical situations where making the wrong decision can kill us and our passengers.

I'd like to share the worst experience I have had from which I learnt a lot.

A couple of years ago I popped down to Bembridge from Elstree in my shared 172 for a boating festival. Only problem was there was no wind and it was unbearably hot. The following morning we decided to return to Elstree. The outside air temperature at 3000ft was 34 degrees C. My passenger who was a non-pilot said "what a great day for a flight", needless to say we bumped back to Elstree in unpleasant turbulence and haze !


Coming into land I knew she would want to float because of the heat, had 30 degrees of flap and came in (08 runway), a bit of sink near the trees by the lake, needed a bit of power and we floated, and floated, and floated. Half-way down I threw it away and attempted to climb away. Except nothing happened, I even looked at the throttle as I wasn't sure I'd fully advanced it, except I had. I was inching the flaps up as the stall warner was going off 30 feet above the runway and was forced to lower the nose. The trees at the other end were fast approaching. Put too much flap up too quickly we would drop like a stone, not enough and we wouldn't climb. Decision time.

Options a) cut power and hope to keep the wings level when we hit something hopefully slowly, b) keep the nose down while trying to get the flaps carefully up and at the last moment climb above the trees.

I don't know whether I made a deliberate choice but I went for b), we did I think brush the leaves but I'm here to tell the story. Second time round came in much lower to drag myself in, chopped power much earlier and made a good landing.

Sadly another pilot that day damaged their plane while landing, and the airfield was closed for a few hours at the hottest part of the day due to the excessive heat and the relatively short runway for understandable safety reasons.

This shook me up as anyone can imagine and I tried to analyse what went wrong, at an airfield I know like the back of my hand:

1. Flying in unusually very hot conditions.
2. Not making a decision to go round early enough.
3.Totally underestimating the dreadful climb performance of a 172 with 30 degree flaps from a very late go around on such a hot day.

Now as part of my pre-landing checks I always glance at the temp guage, and pay more attention to temperature in weather reports. In the UK, most pilots don't consider the effect of temperature on take off and landing distance as it very rarely causes problems.

I agree totally with Chuck that a moment considering the options when the dice are rolling against you can contribute to a safer outcome rather than an instinctive action.

LF

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Good morning fellow aviators I see this thread is progressing as I had hoped it would and we are still focused on the desire to hopefully learn form the experiences of others.

Contrary to what some have been suggesting my use of the private pilot forum to discuss PDM by using real life flying in the professional world has been a winner as evident by the responses of the less experienced here.

Piper.Classique has shown that the message is not really that difficult to grasp...thinking trumps acting without thinking.

Piper. C, just to touch on your post again:

How many people let themselves make stupid decisions because they have been hammered into doing it by the book? And to get back to the poster's original point - how often do you need to do anything in a hurry? If the aeroplane, or glider, or ballon or whatever is ahead of you and you are reacting instantly then you are not far short of panicking, and that is what will kill you. Like he says, slow down! Take a deep breath and THINK before you move.



I was the training pilot for The Flying Fireman in B.C. for 12 years that operated nine PBY water bombers and one of the most important lessons that I taught the crews was your best friend is inertia and you should always strive to have your friend on your side to assist you in an emergency condition. It is simple and free to have inertia helping you, all you have to do is insure you have enough speed avaliable to give you those vital moments to do nothing except think and evaluate.

To reinforce this simple fact I would have them practice engine failures just after liftoff from the water after picking up a full load of water.

I had them accelerate to five knots above the normal climb speed after liftoff and at that point close the throttle on the critical engine and do three things.

(1) Maintain the pitch attitude and keep straight with rudder.
(2) Count to ten before making taking any further actions.

(3) Check the airspeed to determine how much airspeed you have lost during during that count to ten.

The airspeed loss would have been three knots maximum.

Safety wise they were still ahead of the normal climb out airspeed because they still had two more knots than the normal climb out airspeed even though they had lost an engine and did nothing for the count of ten.

Paulc:

you are correct...the brakes on the PBY were built to stop the Titanic and your description of their working parts is correct.

I can't be bothered arguing about these side issues that de rail the intent of what I am attempting to relate....even with people who go into great detail to explain something that has no relevance to the issue being discussed.

Anyhow gang .....if nothing else we seem to be having fun here and hopefully someone will benefit from all this.


Late finals:

:ok::ok::ok::ok::ok:

[Big Pistons Forever]

I think it is time to go back to the thread title "fast hands" which is applicable to [U]any [U] size of aircraft and is something that is generally IMO poorly handled at training schools. A lot of PPL training is done in a vary cookbook fashion. The (insert bad thing here) happens and the student leaps into action to carry out what ever the vital action is and then it on to the next exercise. Yes there are a few things that demand instant action like an incipent groundloop or being suddenly subjected to heavy wake turbulance but most emergencies are not like that.

Take an engine failure in a single engine aircraft. Other than setting a slightly nose low pitch attitude there will always be a few seconds to gather your thoughts and.... after vocalizing the mandatory OH SH**.... ask the big questons

1)where should I point the airplane and

2)why did the engine stop ?

PPL's the next time you are practising emergencies make a deliberate effort to put a slow 3 count before doing anything, I think you will be surprised at how much better things go:ok:

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

LF - aeroplanes don't 'float for ever' because it's hot - they do so because the approach was 'too hot'.... too fast, in other words. Nail the speed (A of A) to what it should be for that approach and there'll be minimal float, regardless of air density.

[davidd]

Thanks chuck, and thanks Big Pistons Forever for this I will do that 3 seconds next time we practice.

[cirruscrystal]

I am a lowely PPL, with MEIR and around 200 hours and have greatly enjoyed reading this post and benefiting from the experience of other peoples' hairy situations described within the thread.

It is interesting always to see certain people trying to snipe down what was a bloody interesting thread opener in true British aviator arrogance.

I have flown in the US and UK and there is a distinct difference in mentality between US pilots/instructors and UK Pilots/instructors. UK there is ingrained arrogance amongst FTOs towards students whereby, we are pretty much lucky to learn and throw good money at schools. US, instructors generally love flying, thats why we all do it and often want to enthuse students with trying manouvers and situations you might otherwise not.

Thankyou chuck for posting and dont feel the need to defend yourself against likes of Airborne Artist, leave him to play with his animals in the cellar.

I often wonder about an engine failiuyr at low level and whether or not to apply flap as a matter of course if landing ahead. Things like those stories above, i can imagine vividly and when/if they happen to me, my reaction will hopefully have benefited from that.:ok:

[Lister Noble]

Dear Cirruscrystal,
I am a low hours UK pilot and have never been treated with contempt or disrespect by any FI, at the three schools I have used.
I had a trial flight at one school but then decided to use another as it was closer and also had a good reputation.

The CFI who gave me most of my lessons has over 50 years profesional aviation including everything from EE Lightnings to Harriers plus 20 years as an instructor and is a great chap.

The people who carried out my tailwheel training at another club were also excellent.

I've not been flying that long but have not come across people that you describe,maybe you were unlucky!
I am of a certain age and have learned that if you show respect then it is usually returned.
Yours respectfully
Lister:)

[Captain Smithy]

cirruscrystal, I think you are being very unfair towards UK FIs.

The 5 FIs at my club (I have flown with all of them, a couple of whom occasionally lurk around here on PPRuNE) are all excellent teachers, experienced pilots and also happen to be good friends. I have never ever experienced anything approaching "arrogance". My instructors also love flying, after all that is why they give up so much of their time to instruct, and from where I'm standing it shows.

I'd agree though that the thread has unfortunately been spoiled by a few individuals with some fairly acerbic comments.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Please stop this back and forth non constructive sniping at each other.

I did not start this thread to have it disintegrate into arguing over issues that are not relevant to the subject.

So here is more advice, " Never say something stupid fast. " :ok:

[SNS3Guppy]

I often wonder about an engine failiuyr at low level and whether or not to apply flap as a matter of course if landing ahead.


What you need to do at such a time depends on a number of factors; each circumstance is different. Remember that during an engine failure in a single engine airplane at low level, you're not looking to extend your glide distance, necessarily. You're looking to decrease your touchdown speed and energy, and reduce your impact energy.

I've previously relayed the circumstances of an engine failure I had two years ago at low altitude (150' inside a narrow canyon) in a single engine airplane. I elected to continue my approach to the forced landing site with flaps up to achieve the best glide (I needed all of it), and just prior to touching down on the mountainside, I applied full flaps. I did so to allow surface contact with minimum energy, and also to put more material down to absorb the impact. The Dromader M18T I was flying has large flaps which hang down below the airplane, and I wanted that extra metal out there not just to slow me down in flight with drag, but to absorb energy should surface objects be struck. (Much like putting the fuselage between trees to let the wings absorb the impact energy, when going down in a heavily wooded area).

You need to consider your circumstance. Applying flaps earlier wouldn't have permitted me to clear the powerline I did, just before touchdown. It ran along a fence line that bordered the area in which I touched down. Know your airplane and what it can do. Making a configuration change close to the ground means you're not stabilized; this can be a control issue for you. It may also provided a needed stall margin. It will certainly affect your descent rate and angle, and particularly at low level once you've applied them, you're fairly committed to continuing with flaps...your options have become limited. Nothing is written in stone that says you must have a long stable approach into an emergency landing site...but you also want to make sure you can remain in control. Look at it this way; how often do you practice power off approaches to a forced landing while applying flaps at the last moment?

Not saying you shouldn't do it. I will say that you should practice doing it first until you're comfortable with it and I suggest you do it at first with an instructor.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Excellent post SNS3Guppy. :ok:

[SNS3Guppy]

Chuck,

I think that supports your original premise of never acting too quickly. I've always phrased it as "fast hands kill," but it's the same thing.

One of my pet peeves, if you will, is hearing someone say "but that's the way I was taught." It makes one wonder if they were taught to jump off the proverbial bridge, would they do it? My inevitable response is "But, what have you learned?"

Simple things...in an engine-out situation, for example, will a student attempt to fly a downwind, base, and final to the forced landing site simply because the student's never done anything else? Or will the student act to do whatever is necessary to put the airplane down safely? I've seen too many who feel that they can only act within the "box" that they were taught, never thinking outside the box.

Over the years I've had to grab pilot's hands when they attempted to shut down the wrong engine, following a failure. Once, in a heavily loaded PB4Y on the way out to a fire...bad time to be shutting down a second engine. Fast hands kill...acting out of instinct rather than thinking...there just aren't that many things that need to be done quickly in an airplane. In the C-130, when we had an engine fire indication (which occasionally happened), we sat on our hands for a ten count, made a 90 degree turn, then waited another ten or so before evaluating. Optical sensors in the nacelles would pick up sun reflections and give false warnings. No sense shutting down something unnecessarily or rushing to create a problem when one didn't exist. And so it goes.

Students are taught after an engine failure to land straight ahead if they haven't reached a target altitude. This is common sense and proper, to a point. Attempting to turn back to the runway too low can result on focusing on the runway and a control loss. However, I've talked to more than a few pilots who felt they couldn't turn a few degrees this way or that, even 90 degrees, to miss a building, tree, or other obstacle, or to reach a nice open field to one side of the departure end of the runway. The student was so focused on doing only what was taught that the student was shackled into thinking only along that track. Anything else would be inconceivable. This isn't right.

During a parachute jump some years ago I had a total malfunction involving the main bridle and pilot chute entangled around my arm. I had few jumps at the time, and training involving a malfunction was straight-forward. Cut away the main and deploy the reserve parachute. However, while my parachute had started to deploy, the actual parachute wasn't off my back yet; it was still in the pack tray. Cutting away would have meant even more material floating around above my back (loose risers) as I attempted to deploy the reserve. I automatically reached for the cutaway handle, but stopped to think, realized it not only wouldn't help but could hurt, and simply deployed the reserve, instead.

On another occasion, I experienced a stuck pilot chute. The pilot chute must be removed from a pouch and hand thrown, and it deploys the main parachute. A new pocket had been sewn for it by a rigger, and the pocket was fine on the ground, but pulled tight and trapped the pilot chute When the rig was worn during the jump. I was unable to remove the pilot chute. I was already low when I discovered this fact, and as I pulled on it, I made one more effort at a good tug on the handle, and tumbled over onto my back. Altimeters don't read correctly on your back, and fall rate changes. I arched and returned face to earth, to find myself very rapidly closing on the ground. I still had the pilot chute handle in one hand, and suddenly had a very clear recollection of the fatality reports I've read over the years...so many cases of witnesses seeing a jumper go all the way to his death desperately tugging on a stuck handle or even part of his jump harness. I realized I was becoming that person, abandoned the handle, and deployed the reserve...and hit the ground shortly thereafter. Taking the time to think, to choose the right decision, may save one's life. Being too quick to make the wrong choice can kill, but the decision as to which path to take always rests with the one in in the hotseat.

[Final 3 Greens]

SNS

I don't know much about flying (only a few hundred hours in VMC), but I know quite a lot about human behaviour and learning.

I can understand why the ab initio training focuses on operant conditioning (that is teaching a response to an event), since I guess the logic is that people with little experience will likely freeze under stress unless there is a clear, programmed response to the stimulus.

No doubt in the early days, if one takes a hard pragmatic view, fewer people die that way.

I can also completely relate to your view that the same conditioning can kill people.

Perhaps the challenge is how to handle the crossover stage, e.g. the point at which the pilot has enough experience to start to think clearly as you decribe.

My impression is that, post PPL, there is little support to encourage that decision making and the only contact most PPLs have with an instructor is for a biennial, where they are taken back to the PPL 'learning by rote' responses.

Therefore, I think that we owe Chuck a vote of thanks for raising this subject and also to the other contributors who have shared their greater experience to help the many on here expand there horizons :ok:

[SNS3Guppy]

I guess the logic is that people with little experience will likely freeze under stress unless there is a clear, programmed response to the stimulus.



You're absolutely right. There's an old saying that "how you train is how you fight," meaning what's done on the training ground is replicated under stress in the field. Police officers who are used to picking up their spent brass on the shooting range have been known to inexplicably do the same thing in the middle of a gunfight, and get shot in the process. It falls back to what's known as the law of primacy; what's first learned is first remembered, and it's also where we go when we are under stress. It reinforces teaching things properly the first time.

I fall back on that in primary instruction when in an airplane such as a Cessna 152, my initial instruction involves one airspeed; climb at one airspeed, approach to land at one airspeed, and use that same airspeed in the event of an engine-out. We later begin to expand on that and explore different ways of configuring, climbing, approaching to land, etc...just as a student expands into learning soft and short field takeoffs and landings, slips to landing, no flap landings, etc...but everyone has to start somewhere, and learning habits that are crucial to survival in an emergency are important.

That said, many pilots today aren't properly taught that there are two important glide speeds; one is best glide distance, but the other is minimum sink...many students are never taught about minimum sink, and their instructors probably aren't familiar, either. These in turn are important in understanding the drag and power curves, which help explain performance throughout the flight range. Understanding these and how they apply to your airplane help understand what's going on and maintaining situational awareness in unusual or emergency situations.

Perhaps the challenge is how to handle the crossover stage, e.g. the point at which the pilot has enough experience to start to think clearly as you decribe.


There's an old zen philosophy that when one undertakes the study of a flower, it's just a flower, As one's study progresses, the flower becomes more than just a flower. When one has mastered the flower, it's just a flower again.

The "crossover stage" is really an on going evolution in which we are all a student. How we understand it changes with time. A wise man once said that the best part of growing older is that we get to experience the same things from a different perspective.

I would submit that while the goal is always mastery, and therefore making the flower just a flower again, one can never let go of the concept that there is more to be learned, and more way to learn it. It's a process that can't be rushed, but should be approached with caution, always remembering that the flower is more complex than one may realize. It's with that in mind that one can really come to appreciate the beauty of what we do, which is to perfect flight. It's a job which is never finished.

http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k286/avbug/OakCityCanyon48.jpg

The perspective is a little hard to see in this picture, but the bottom of the side canopy door hanging down sits about six feet of the ground. The hilltop behind the airplane is about 9,000', and the elevation of the resting site is about 5,000' above sea level. The aircraft was actually stopped by the wood piling up between the main landing gear, and other than a collapsed tailwheel assembly, no other damage occured (beside the toasted engine, which was done before the aircraft ever reached the ground).

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Teaching people to be aviators is the highest position in aviation that one can aspire to.

Teaching can not be learned from books.

The best teachers instill confidence in the student by the manner in which the teacher demonstrates, explains and then allows the student to mimic the exercise.

The best teachers endeavor to be certain the student really does understand the exercise before going on to another.

The best teachers endeavour to keep things simple until the student is ready to be taught more advanced exercises.

Confidence is best instilled in the student by speaking in a normal voice and never showing displeasure with the students efforts.

[Piper.Classique]

Chuck said
Teaching people to be aviators is the highest position in aviation that one can aspire to.
Thank you Chuck, for a relevant and interesting post (well, you did start the thread, so it would be , wouldn't it? :) )

I now want to ask you and other posters what you think of allowing instructing to degenerate into a way of building hours towards a commercial licence. If you feel this is too far from the original thread, why don't we move my question to a new thread? I saw students suffering from hour builders when I was instructing in UK, and hated seeing it. While instructing is a route to the airlines it takes a very strong minded person to focus on the goal of helping a student pilot become an airman. Right now I am learing to instruct on microlights here in France, after not teaching for fifteen years, and one of the joys is that none of my students are learning for any reason other than the pleasure of being in the air. We get to do so much fun stuff, and can take the time to really explore the aeroplane and its capacities.

[Whirlybird]

Don't let's discuss something new on this thread! We haven't covered all the important points of the original topic yet!!!!

I know from experience that in an emergency, even a minor one, your brain can freeze. Your mind feels like cotton wool, thinking slows down, and decision-making is incredibly difficult. I haven't got time to give examples; I have to go to work, and anyway I don't want to cloud the issue with details. Trust me, this is true, and it's not just me; it's pretty common. You can also go into denial...this can't be happening!!!

In this sort of situation a conditioned response is incredibly useful, simply because it doesn't require thought; you do what you've practised. But as discussed above, conditioned responses can get in the way too. So what do we do, and how should we teach? Chuck???? Anyone????

[SNS3Guppy]

Sensory overload is a common reaction to a situation in which disbelief supplants the ability to think. It's a sign of unpreparedness. That is, one who encounters a situation in which one is either too frightened to act or unable to do so for reasons of disbelief, should never have gone there. One who flies and airplane and is unprepared to handle an engine failure, fire, loss of directional control, communications loss, etc, shouldn't be flying that airplane.

An instructor who lets a student out on their own who hasn't prepared a student has failed the student. A student who encounters an emergency for the first time on their own has been failed by the instructor. The student should have already been there with the instructor, and the student shouldn't see it as an emergency, but an abnormal situation which has been made routine. Expect the engine to fail. Expect a fire. Expect an electrical failure. Never assume these things are a matter of if, but when. Not if they will happen, but merely a matter of when. Be prepared for the when.

You should never be aloft without having a place picked out, moment by moment, where you'll go in an emergency. A place to divert, a place to make a forced landing, a decision made. We refer to this as being ahead of the airplane. Sometimes pilots fly so far behind their airplane that they'll never be hurt by a crash...they'll arrive 30 minutes later. It's said that one the airplane should never go where your mind hasn't been 30 seconds earlier.

Dealing with the unexpected events which arise is largely a matter of letting go. Don't be tied to what was, several second ago. That's ancient history. Own what is now. Abandon the past, abandon your need for security by asking how this can be happening or why, and simply deal with the airplane in the moment. Work with what you've got. How you've been trained is how you'll fly; train often, review often, and be prepared.

During an emergency is not the time to figure things out...that should have been done before you ever left the ground.

[Final 3 Greens]

Whirly

IMO, not "what", but "when" and "how."

The PPL syllabus pretty much ends at PPL - where is the follow on syllabus for more experienced PPLs?

Airline pilots have recurrent training in a sim environment, lots of learning there (I'm lucky I had 15 hours with a TRE in a sim and learned a huge amount about flying, even though I will never be competent to fly the arcraft type the sim was simming)

[Piper.Classique]

Final 3 greens said

The PPL syllabus pretty much ends at PPL - where is the follow on syllabus for more experienced PPLs?You write your own......New types, new places, different sorts of flying machine, new ways of doing your circuit, and above all thinking and practising. Expect things to go wrong, plan for them, practice them. Find out how your aircraft behaves when it's heavy, when it's hot, off grass, off tarmac on a hot day, at altitude, flying slowly, flying fast, spinning, learning aerobatics. Try flying a glider, a microlight, why not a balloon?
Learn from new types, see what transfers across and what doesn't.
Use your brains, discard half of what you hear in the bar, and find out either on your own if you feel happy about that, or with an instructor.
Don't always accept the received wisdom, find out! Read books, look at films, and FLY.

[Fuji Abound]

The starting point for more commonly encountered emergencies would seem to be rehearsed reaction. For example, the newly minted PPL who suffers and EFATO will gain very little from an assessment of the situation that takes him outside of his training. Deciding to turn back to the runway at 700 feet because he thinks there are good reasons to do so is far more likely to land him in a whole heap of trouble (pun excused).

However, every student and every pilot is different.

The PPL syllabus has to cope with the eager and quick to learn 22 year old and 50 year old dog trying to learn a new trick or two.

There is ample opportunity with the former to look at different emergencies and to explore the ways with which these might be dealt than with the old dog where it is as well to feed them with the rote solutions to common emergencies.

Many of the rote responses to a given emergency exist because experience tells us that they work (in the vast majority of cases).
Chucks example I think illustrates the point. Perceived wisdom would probably have been to take the problem into the air as others have said. On this occasion that was the wrong decision. The time taken to consider the options was valuable, but perhaps the value only came with considerable experience. In other words would a less experienced pilot on average have been better going with the perceived wisdom.

The ability to deal with an emergency "comfortably" and well comes with experience. With time and by flying regularly you start from an awareness that your basic handling skills are sound. Moreover you are comfortable handling the aircraft in most configurations and have a pretty good idea of how it will perform.

There is no doubt gathering that experience can be hastened by taking every opportunity to fly with others who are able to confront you with different situations and allow you to explore the handling limits of the aircraft. Instructors should take every opportunity to do so at the renewals and pilots should take every opportunity to fly with instructors and more experienced pilots.

Post PPL there are a number of things you can do. An aerobatics course is a good idea. It will improve your handling skills, your reactions and your knowledge of the envelope of the aircraft immeasurably.

I think flying more complex types is another excellent idea. Having done a MEP course when you fly usually much slower and less complex SEPs you will find that you are so much further ahead of the aircraft.

Personally, I am not convinced that flying a great number of different types achieves a great deal. On the whole a tailwheel is just like a tricycle - except on the ground, a balloon is so totally different that the skill sets will rarely converge etc.