Blackpool 3/2/07 [Archive]

vanHorck

13th Apr 2008, 12:24

The question i guess is whether in a chain of faults the first one (asking a non current pilot to..... etc) should always be the major one and the secondary being only secondary in the true gist only....

If we steer away from the assumption of P1 being P1 we will all end up in grey mist..... It is a bitterly hard lesson for all of us.

This has nothing to do with the liability of people pressing/suggesting other people to do things they should not do.... That is in my view horrible and seems to have happened here. Those people too should learn a lesson but has nothing to do with P1 being P1

The bitterly hard lesson is of course in your role as P1 (in taking P1 seat you suggest you are taking the p1 role) you always have to assume you ARE p1 and therefore the buck stops with you, even if you get yourself a safety pilot.

The only exception in my view is a training flight with an instructor which commences with a briefing depicting the object of the training flight and ending with a debrief.

Any other flight P1 is P1

Loosing a family member or a good friend is (too) hard, and my condoleances to those involved. I hope those involved will be able to live with the outcome of the coroners court, however it ends up and will be able to pick up their lives.

Portnacroish

13th Apr 2008, 12:43

I would have thought that the most experienced and qualified pilot would always be P1 assuming they are both sitting at the controls.

vanHorck

13th Apr 2008, 13:19

huh?

surely you must be joking!

mark147

13th Apr 2008, 13:20

I would have thought that the most experienced and qualified pilot would always be P1 assuming they are both sitting at the controls.On a private flight, absolutely not. Leaving out the special case of instruction, at any point in time there is one commander and everyone else is a passenger, whether or not they have a pilots licence, regardless of any flying experience they might have and regardless of whether their seat happens to be fitted with flying controls.

Mark

vanHorck

13th Apr 2008, 13:28

having control is taught from lesson 1. Even under instruction, the student will have control unless the instructor TAKES control after saying : I have control!

All pilots are taught to be clear about who has control at any time during the flight.

Any sensible pilot would also do the same towards who is P1 prior to the flight. It is called human resources management and is as important as choosing the correct runway. Any pilot (in any control seat) participating in any flight whilst leaving the P1 issue unclear is actively encouraging a dangerous situation.

Even when pilots "share activities of a flight (one the controls, the other navigation or radio), the fact that P1 relinquished radio or nav to a secondary pilot does not relieve him from total responsibility as P1

No Country Members

13th Apr 2008, 14:27

Pprune Radar

Pure speculation on my part: I think it unlikely the "campaign", as you put it is in the direction you suggest. My guess would be that it is directed at the flying school and at the person at the flying school who, according to the AAIB report, persuaded the pilot, who initially refused the flight, to fly the route, in spite of being outside of the 90 day currency requirement. He did so with passengers, on the outbound flight, and one passenger on the fatal return leg. Used as part of this persuasion was the suggestion to fly with a more experienced NPPL holder in the right seat, according to the report. However the report does not go as far as to suggest that the rules were intended to be ignored, or that anyone suggested that they should be, merely that the facts are that they were ingnored, and that during the communication about the flight that it was something which was overlooked. This is not the only fact of course discussed in the report, but it is clear that without the involvement of the person from the school, the pilot had refused the flight.

Ominously the flying school representative is very careful how he described his role in the incident to the AAIB, which is perhaps where the family feel they need to pursue justice.

I make no comment or speculation on the rights or wrongs of what went ultimately wrong, as that is for the court and the AAIB with full knowledge of all facts available. However I would reiterate condolences to the family of those involved in this tragedy.

Portnacroish

13th Apr 2008, 15:26

Maybe this should be on a new thread.
I think it would be rather difficult to persuade the CAA and the court that my 500hrs and private ticket allowed the ATPL with 10k hrs sitting next to me to walk free because he was a "passenger"

PPRuNe Radar

13th Apr 2008, 16:13

I think it would be rather difficult to persuade the CAA and the court that my 500hrs and private ticket allowed the ATPL with 10k hrs sitting next to me to walk free because he was a "passenger"

Then you don't understand what being designated as Commander of an aircraft actually means. The CAA are very clear what it means, and that is that there is only one Commander of the aircraft at any given time.

It is not based on any seniority or experience gradient, it is based on who accepted responsibility before the flight to be the Commander. It is of course possible to share a flight and be Commander for a portion of it, but you would need to agree this between the pilots involved beforehand, and also complete any pre flight documentation to show this to be the case. In the abscence of that, whoever signed for the aircraft is the legal Commander. (This is in a flying club environment with a PPL flying the aircraft). The legal Commander has responsibilities placed upon him or her for the safe conduct of the flight, which can include refusing to fly if unhappy with anything.

Of course, whether this is actually explained to everyone who gets their licence is another thing, but alas ignorance of the law is never seen as a defence.

vanHorck

13th Apr 2008, 17:07

As I stated before, the decision as to who IS P1, is a critical one, and all of us PPLs should make it an item on our pre flight check list.

I for one have experienced in a mild way the complications of this when many moons ago i flew (P1) with a friend (P2) who wanted to check out his new handheld GPS and took on the "responsibility" for the navigation, getting us into Luton airpsace without clearance..... I was P1 and got (rightly) the flack from the controller over the phone (no prosecution).

I knew i was P1 and didn t check P2's actions... My fault.

Portnacroish

13th Apr 2008, 17:56

S-Works

13th Apr 2008, 18:03

Then you don't understand what being designated as Commander of an aircraft actually means.

Actually I do.

Yes there can be only one commander at any one time. However I suspect the more senior might find themselves culpable if they did not assume control when faced with a breach of the law.

Rubbish. The commander is the commander full stop. Any passenger is just a passenger pure and simple. Christ, I would never be able to fly as a passenger with another pilot for fear of being prosecuted for their mistakes. When I am teaching I am responsible, when I am a passenger I am there to look out the window.

Reminds me of the Instructor who tried to convince everyone he flew with that he must be P1 because he is an Instructor. God complex......

mark147

13th Apr 2008, 18:06

However I suspect the more senior might find themselves culpable if they did not assume control when faced with a breach of the law.You suspect wrongly. Indeed, I would suggest that anyone 'assuming control' of an aeroplane, taking control away from its commander without permission, would be in quite serious trouble with the law...

Contacttower

13th Apr 2008, 18:37

Rubbish. The commander is the commander full stop. Any passenger is just a passenger pure and simple. Christ, I would never be able to fly as a passenger with another pilot for fear of being prosecuted for their mistakes. When I am teaching I am responsible, when I am a passenger I am there to look out the window.

Haven't we have been here before with the P1 thing in relation to the 28 day check etc?

frontlefthamster

13th Apr 2008, 18:40

fisbangwollop

13th Apr 2008, 19:50

I have followed this case with interest since the day of the accident,mainly because I spent most of my youth messing around Blackpool airport, indeed it is because of a famous old SATCO, JK that I find myself in the job I am now in.

I feel rather than debate the whys or why not's Andrew took command on that day we should rather be exploring the errors that lead to the accident!.....with all the help available from ATC service's enroute, why at no stage of the flight did he try to obtain any updated weather information from the London FIR sector???? thats what the guys are there to do, if that had happened an early diversion may have been the course of action and we would not be here today debating the rights or wrongs!

PPRuNe Radar

13th Apr 2008, 20:17

It's not for me to speak for Mr Walker.

I fear that the debate above about 'command' is unhelpful. Perhaps Mr Walker might comment, if he is visiting here.

To be fair to Mr Walker, it was not he who introduced any of the hints and talks of missions, etc. He merely advised us of the date of the coroner's court, which I sincerely hope is something which will help him cope with his own personal tragedy, understanding more about his son's tragic passing.

It was the subsequent posters with their talk of 'justice', 'goals' and 'progress in the right directions', but not actually stating what these things actually meant in respect of this accident, that have set hares running.

If you don't clearly state what you are talking about, then people on here will debate what they think you might be talking about. Lack of clarity helps no one and might indeed cause distress to those who lost loved ones in the accident.

stickandrudderman

13th Apr 2008, 20:33

I think it would be rather difficult to persuade the CAA and the court that my 500hrs and private ticket allowed the ATPL with 10k hrs sitting next to me to walk free because he was a "passenger"

Are you sure you've got a "ticket"?

The plain and simple fact is that when you assume command you do just that. It is not a command that may be relinquished at a convenient moment just because the guy sitting next to you happens to hold qualifications equal to or superior to your own, unless you ask him to do so and he agrees.:ugh:
You must accept the responsibility that goes with that command, full stop.
Apologies for digressing from the original posters topic, you have my utmost sympathy Sir.

Supersport

13th Apr 2008, 21:11

It's not for me to speak for Mr Walker.

I fear that the debate above about 'command' is unhelpful. Perhaps Mr Walker might comment, if he is visiting here.

My perspective is that there is much more to be gained for the public good from an examination of the activities of an individual who was not on board the aircraft, but who was already 'known to' various organisations, and whose reputation precedes him.

I trust that HM Coroner will be adequately briefed. I also hope that he exercises his considerable powers to their full.

I personally think that the debate about command is very relevant with regards to this incident. I am PPL holder with no additional ratings, would I take off and fly into IMC? No I wouldn't, regardless of who was sat next to me, if I am P1, then I am P1, there should be NO confusion, I will exercise the privelages of my licence, no one else's. There is also the issue of currency which I'm sure we all know about, so lets not go there, hindsight is a wonderful thing. Finally, if someone had 'attempted' to 'pressurise' me into going, the answer would have been a short and sweet Foxtrot Oscar.

Basically, what I am trying to say is we are all, or should all be aware of our ability and what our licences & ratings entitle us to do, it is our awareness of this fact that should be the main factor when we are deciding to fly in less than favourable conditions. I am sorry to say this, but I cannot see why the 'activities' and 'reputation' of this 'individual' who is 'known to various organisations' has any relevance whatsoever to the tragic incident that unfolded in Blackpool 03/02/2007.

In my opinion it would be much more 'constructive' for those organisations to which this individual is known to, to call for enquiry independent from the accident at Blackpool.

Portnacroish

13th Apr 2008, 21:15

Are you sure you've got a "ticket"?

Yes

However having a "ticket" will not predict what a court may do.

vanHorck

13th Apr 2008, 21:16

There are always contributory factors to such an accident, and I hope for Mr Walker that those people on the ground who confused the P1 in taking the decisions which were solely his will be pointed at in no unclear terms so that if need be the right prosecutions can follow. But let it be for the confusion not the go/no go decision taking because this was the P1's only task.

However, the question is what would the P1 think of all this were he here? Perhaps he would not wish anyone else to be blamed? Perhaps he was a true pilot like many of us who would never wish anyone else to be blamed for his own mistakes, and exchange these strong views constantly when on the ground due to bad weather?

I dont know those "people on the ground" with their history, nor do i know the pilot.

But i am aware of those concerned in another fatal air accident who, at the instigation of no cure no pay lawyers, have sued others where those that knew him simply know he would have never wished this to happen as the ultimate mistake on the flight was clearly his own.

So let us be clear... Whichever pilot rents a plane (and is checked out on it) is the P1 unless explicitly agreed otherwise on beforehand and noted down) and that person alone is ultimately responsible for all actions regarding the flight, all actions from others can only be considered contributory factors.

The drama meanwhile remains the same... Many people have lost a loved one, due to our hobby/passion and that remains such a sad thing.... But both pilots were part of our community, dying doing what they loved so much

frontlefthamster

13th Apr 2008, 21:32

Radar,

I think that Mr Walker has a very accurate understanding of all the factors behind the accident.

I hope that the Coroner will be in a similar position, and will investigate, thoroughly, the circumstances of the flight.

In my opinion, there is little benefit in examining who was 'in command' (whether on paper or de facto). Of greater interest are the background to the flight (the reason why the aircraft would fly to its destination and back), the development of the plan for the flight to take place, the motivation both felt by and placed upon those involved, and the promise and delivery of favour then and in the future.

Supersport, if you are as immune to normal human response to motivation as you claim, then you are unique indeed...

foxmoth

13th Apr 2008, 21:33

Any passenger is just a passenger pure and simple.
I have not read the accident report deliberately so this reply is not biased by that - Yes the pilot in command is at the end of the day the person in charge - even if he is a new PPL and the passenger is a 20,000 hour Instructor/ATPL, but I would not go along with the above quote - any pilot who is flying as a passenger and sees something not right must make his concerns known, this can even be as an airline passenger alerting the flight deck via the cabin crew that there is for example a build up of ice on the wings. In the case of sitting next to a PPL in a deteriorating situation I would be raising questions such as "are you sure you are happy with this situation" or a statement of " I am not happy with what is happening - are you sure you would not like me to take control", As the situation gets worse I may eventually get to the stage where I would try to take control - but that would only be when I reached the stage where I was convinced the pilot flying was going to kill me if I did not! At the end of the day though, it is the designated pilot in command who is responsible for what happens.

Supersport

13th Apr 2008, 21:47

Supersport, if you are as immune to normal human response to motivation as you claim, then you are unique indeed...

No no, not unique, I just have the ability to say no. Infallible however, no.

mad_jock

13th Apr 2008, 22:36

Its going to be interesting the result. It might have some far reaching effects on some of the old school CFI's. Similar to the BAe Prestwick's instructors case.

I think most instructors have seen certain flights be launched in conditions which they wouldn't go themselves. Or have launched when they would have prefered not to.

Most have also seen unacceptable peer pressure bordering on bullying occuring and the blackmail which also sometimes occurs.

I wish Mr Walker all the best for the next few weeks it isn't going to be pleasant as no doudt certain parties are going to be very critical of his sons actions some of which will be valid.

I think some forget what it was like being twenty odd. The pressure that someone significantly older, more experenced and more qualified than you can apply is immense. I have also been told in the past that qualified pax don't count for the 90 day rule. So it is quite a common bull**** by individuals who should and do know better.

foxmoth

13th Apr 2008, 22:52

I have also been told in the past that qualified pax don't count for the 90 day rule. If not an instructor then certainly does not count!Also interesting that the CFI says he was not in post at the time apart from as de facto CFI - if so, why did he make the phone calls arranging the trip - seems he certainly has questions to answer!

mad_jock

13th Apr 2008, 23:08

It doesn't matter if its an instructor or not.

You cannot be PIC with anyone else onboard if outside 90 days unless you are an instructor yourself (and there are a heap of technical issues you need to make sure about before thats even legal) It basically has to be a training flight with all the restrictions that they have. And the other person is counted as Flight crew not pax. And you can't have anyone else onboard eg 2 pax in the back on a trial flight.

If the instructor is PIC and legal and you are DUAL everything is fine.

Rightbase

13th Apr 2008, 23:24

Sincere condolences to Mr Walker.

I am selfishly concerned to learn how I can prevent such a tragic end to one of my flights.

Landing count currency per se does not seem to be an explicit issue on this occasion.
Weight and balance did not directly contribute.
Fuel planning does seem to be contributory.
Met awareness does.
Get-home-itis does.
Cockpit drill does (altimeter setting)
Reliance on P2 and GPS for Nav does.

So confronted with low cloud base, no fuel for an alternate with better weather, neither nav kit nor rating for IMC, and P2+GPS not performing, is there an RVA service available? Having flown one as part of the instrument hours in my PPL course, it would be my ultimate safety net. I need a compass, a gyro and an altimeter setting. And whilst they are currently unlicensed, I need to keep my PPL instrument skills current.

I thank pprune for an opportunity to think this all through in the safety of my home.

But I have read through a lot of extraneous 'who is to blame?' stuff. We are all human, we all make mistakes. Working out whose mistake was the one that matters, or what the legal situation is, is fascinating but for me, much less important. We don't need to work out whose fault it was if we can avoid an accident.

My PPL course also told me about skill, knowledge, wisdom, judgement and experience. Looking at what went wrong is not just hindsight, it is potential foresight. Speculating about what could have gone wrong (but didn't, or might not have) is also potential foresight. These second hand real and imagined experiences are where I get most value from pprune.

And where, sadly, we are looking at a fatal accident, the sincerity of our condolences is demonstrated by a determination to do everything possible to prevent the same thing happening again. Working out who is to blame for what doesn't help.

foxmoth

14th Apr 2008, 00:30

You cannot be PIC with anyone else onboard if outside 90 days unless you are an instructor yourself I think even as an instructor you still have to be inside the 90 day currency

And you can't have anyone else onboard eg 2 pax in the back on a trial flight.

I think this is another of those that has been done to death on other threads and never properly resolved!

mad_jock

14th Apr 2008, 13:56

Know what you mean by done to death. I don't think this is thread thread to be debating the issue. :ok:

S-Works

14th Apr 2008, 14:09

Quote:
Any passenger is just a passenger pure and simple.
I have not read the accident report deliberately so this reply is not biased by that - Yes the pilot in command is at the end of the day the person in charge - even if he is a new PPL and the passenger is a 20,000 hour Instructor/ATPL, but I would not go along with the above quote - any pilot who is flying as a passenger and sees something not right must make his concerns known, this can even be as an airline passenger alerting the flight deck via the cabin crew that there is for example a build up of ice on the wings. In the case of sitting next to a PPL in a deteriorating situation I would be raising questions such as "are you sure you are happy with this situation" or a statement of " I am not happy with what is happening - are you sure you would not like me to take control", As the situation gets worse I may eventually get to the stage where I would try to take control - but that would only be when I reached the stage where I was convinced the pilot flying was going to kill me if I did not! At the end of the day though, it is the designated pilot in command who is responsible for what happens.
Last edited by foxmoth : Yesterday at 14:53.

Which is still my point, the PIC is the PIC. A more experienced passenger may provide an opinion but unless the PIC relinquishes control or is relieved of control forcibly they are still PIC. Simple.

As it stand the PIC on this flight appears to have remained PIC. He may well have succumbed to peer pressure due to the presence of a more experienced pilot but that did not relieve him of the ability to say NO.

I suspect the bending of the rules that went on to facilitate the flight require scrutiny, but at the end of the day it was still down to the PIC to make the go no go decision. It is called freedom of choice.

The same freedom of choice that drive them to continue on when it was known the weather was deteriorating and not to refuel. All mistakes made that spiraled into the incident pit that cost the crew there lives.

Hindsight always gives us 20/20 vision......

Supersport

14th Apr 2008, 15:19

I suspect the bending of the rules that went on to facilitate the flight require scrutiny, but at the end of the day it was still down to the PIC to make the go no go decision. It is called freedom of choice.

I couldn't agree more.

The way I see it is that the CFI (or 'de facto' CFI) shouldn't have asked for the flight to go ahead in those conditions. BUT, at the end of the day he only asked, as bose-x said it us freedom of choice, the old saying springs to mind, 'Would you jump into the fire if I asked you too?'
I cannot understand why delving into the working practice's of this 'certain individual' regardless of their nature, which has be insinuated on here, bares any relevance as to why this accident happened.

Maybe I blind or naive, but to me, from reading the report, the chain of events that occurred that day make it obvious why it happened and I think that an awful lot of Students and existing Private Pilots can learn from what happened.

mm_flynn

14th Apr 2008, 16:03

'Would you jump into the fire if I asked you too?'

No, BUT - If three or four 'leaders' (i.e. older, more qualified, louder, more authoritative, cooler, etc.) convince someone to jump into a fire, they are frequently held to account for contributing to the incident.

The AAIB report has the aviation facts but is a bit thin on the human interactions that may have lead to the decisions taken. Hopefully, the Coroner will establish these broader facts.

I think the lessons from this incident are much more general life skills than specifically related to aviation. Group think/peer pressure/ etc. can lead to catastrophically bad decisions in sport, driving, drinking, life in general - not just aviation.

No Country Members

14th Apr 2008, 16:26

Frontlefthamster

Hear! Hear! Interesting though the debate about command is, I don't think it is relevant to Mr Walker's reason for initialising this thread. The AAIB report does not allude to command being in dispute, nor does it suggest that it should have been.

I think what FLH has to say here is far more pertinent to the case in point and to this thread in particular, although I think Radar is right as to the reasons the thread has drifted.

Supersport

14th Apr 2008, 17:05

I don't think it is relevant to Mr Walker's reason for initialising this thread

Any idea what the reason for starting the thread was?

horsebox

14th Apr 2008, 18:48

There is alot of interest (local at Blackpool and further a-field) in the circumstances surrounding this crash. The PIC/P1 aspect has been well discussed in public. Further aspects - specifically the big picture, what went on before and after the flight, has not.

David Walker was not inviting speculation or comment, but just letting interested parties know when the inquest starts. Further information about the case will then become a matter of public record.....

sunday driver

14th Apr 2008, 20:11

'Would you jump into the fire if I asked you too?'

Have you seen those corporate team building sessions which involve walking a bed of red hot coals? :eek:

Peer pressure is an amazing thing

SD

PompeyPaul

14th Apr 2008, 20:32

Mr Walker

I understand your grief and sympathise completely. I also knew Roy, who died with your son.

I'm not so sure this public site is somewhere you may want to attempt to try and highlight your mission.

The AAIB report is quite codemning in regards to some poor judgements and operations outside of the priviledges of the licenses held by those involved.

I hope you are able to accept some realities and mourn successfully rather than become some Al Fayed character.

Both Andy and Roy are sadly missed. There is not one father who does not understand your loss.A truly disgusting post...

S-Works

14th Apr 2008, 20:58

A truly disgusting post...

Why? Seems quite a reasonable one to me.

boy entrant

16th Apr 2008, 06:48

The 10k ATPL “passenger” was also the CFI’s business partner and joint CFI for the FTO. When Andy Walker did his training both took money from Andy in return for their professional training, expertise and advice. It is not surprising to me that Andy (120 hrs) felt assured everything would be OK as he was informed that one CFI had organised the flight and the other CFI would be going with him, another instructor (who turned out to be an NPPL)would be along for the return trip.
It beggars the question:- on his PPL coarse did their jointly owned FTO give him all the information concerning flight safety and license privileges .
What are the odds on finding a CFI that that would encourage a trip like that? unbelievably Andy found two to sanction this nightmare scenario?
Sadly Andy’s’ bonus for accepting the offer was, he could book some P1 and according to the experts that makes him to blame

bookworm

16th Apr 2008, 07:18

The AAIB claim is that Mr Walker was the commander of the aircraft, ...

Do we know what the evidence is behind the AAIB's assertion?

Supersport

16th Apr 2008, 11:11

However the last person that the crew talked to on that dreadful night was a controller, who after being asked have you any suggestions, his reply 'get an aircraft with some equipment in' not what the poor lads wanted to hear, and mysteriously all recorded information has been pushed under the mat in all AAIB publications and comments on here and the Flyer thread.

Have to agree, know it was said, know who said it, very unprofessional to say the least, didn't add much to an already dire situation for the chaps in the air :sad:.

Mentioning the guys name though Aztec Driver especially on here, might be a bit rough though :=.

S-Works

16th Apr 2008, 11:43

I am closer to this than any one dares to mention, for reasons that will be brought to light later, I am advised not to quote or respond to this RUMOUR Network.

What, like that you may have been flying the other aircraft?

As much as this was a sad event and a needless death I can't see why all the usual cloak and dagger and conspiracies are floating around.

The young man keen for hours took the opportunity of some free/cheap flying. He succumbed to peer pressure and did not fulfill diligently his duties as pilot in command. He undertook an illegal flight. They then fell to poor planning and 'get home itus' rather than diverting when they had the opportunity.

Any other discussion is just trying to find someone to blame. Now if you can provide evidence that Mr Walker was being held hostage and forced to fly the aircraft then I would be interested to see it. But it seems clear to me that simple pilot error and poor preparation on the part of the crew cost them their lives.

Lurking123

16th Apr 2008, 11:46

S-Works

16th Apr 2008, 11:57

Edited - Bose is correct. Ultimately the responsibility lies with P1. However, if P1 doesn't know any better because that is the environment he has grown up in, then there is still a need for some soul searching.

Indeed and I would bet that anyone who survived and applied peer pressure consciously or otherwise should indeed be soul searching.

But there is a big difference between soul searching and a full blown witch hunt.

As I said unless the pilot was forced to make the flight under duress then the responsibility for legality and planning lay with him. As did the ability to divert. There is no evidence that he was forced not to divert by the other pilot when they knew the conditions were deteriorating so again poor judgement.

This just boils down to poor judgement, pure and simple.

As for the comments of the controller unfortunate, but I suspect that they have beaten themselves up about an ill timed comment. But once again how does a controllers inappropriate comment change the fact that the flight was illegal and badly planned?

Supersport

16th Apr 2008, 13:09

I find this last bit interesting. 'Professionalism' aside, is such a comment indicative of some wider issues at Blackpool. For example, was it common practice for people to make approaches around when the weather was well below Cat 1 minima? Had ATC seen (encouraged) similar occurrences in the past without reporting them? Was/is there an endemic press-on-itis?

No not common practice at Blackpool. One thing that was widely known / thought / felt, was the serviceability and general condition of this particular FTO's aeroplanes, which is why I think this particular comment was made by the controller.

But once again how does a controllers inappropriate comment change the fact that the flight was illegal and badly planned?

It doesn't at all, I agree with you completely. One thing though, it was certainly unnecessary and could have well added to what must have been mega stress levels which were already being experienced by the persons onboard.

vanHorck

16th Apr 2008, 16:33

looking back the comments of the controller may sound harsh. But if the pilots had not declared an emergency, the comments could be seen not as a joke but a "wink" to perhaps attempt at relaxing the pilots.

I agree with Bose-X. P1 is P1 and there are no exceptions. Executing an illegal flight and failing to take the right and timely (diversion) decisions is his responsibility.

On the subject of (only) having flown 120 hours, that still represents perhaps a year or more of many flight as P1, so although relatively low hours, it is plenty of hours to appreciate what P1 means.

Closure for the Walker family I hope will consist of the acceptance their son died because he took the wrong decisions doing what he loved doing, with contributary factors letting himself being influenced by irresponsible outsiders and deteriorating weather

It remains a very sad story

frontlefthamster

16th Apr 2008, 21:15

van Horck, you miss the point with all the inaccuracy of a GW1 Scud missile. Think, man, think... It's what your brain is for.

vanHorck

16th Apr 2008, 22:17

Frontlefthamster

I have read your posts and respect your views. Maybe you ll respect mine also.

I understand what you hope for. But from a pilots perspective (and that s what this forum is for) there is one issue more important than all others that should be learned from this thread.

It is that as the pilot in command designate (irrespective of pressures put on you from others) you ARE pilot in command and the buck stops with you. I ve seen postings of people on this thread which seem to doubt this and it is a receipe for disaster.

And i wish Mr Walker and all the family and friends of the pilot strength and hope they will find closure to their grief insofar possible.

mm_flynn

17th Apr 2008, 10:09

Frontlefthamster
It is that as the pilot in command designate (irrespective of pressures put on you from others) you ARE pilot in command and the buck stops with you. I ve seen postings of people on this thread which seem to doubt this and it is a receipe for disaster.

I think that has missed the real lesson. Getting in the plane on that mission was a bad idea - PIC and PAX equally crash into the ground. Any pilot should have been able to judge that risk and many non-pilots could as well. Just because someone else can do something (The ATPL guys in an ILS equipped twin) doesn't mean what you are going to do (either as leader or follower) is sensible.

There are important issues on the understanding of who is PIC and what is PIC accountable for. However, equally, reducing the issues to solely PIC decision making doesn't address the very real issues alleged. Specifically, that the two 'CFIs' who trained Mr Walker encouraged the flight, arranged for a further 'pilot/instructor' to accompany Mr Walker on his return flight, and one of the 'CFIs' accompanied Mr Walker outbound - in a context implying that the accompanying 'pilots' addressed the known lack of currency for Mr Walker. (summarised from boy entrant's post and comments in the AAIB report)

S-Works

17th Apr 2008, 12:15

All valid points. But Mr Walker was still in Command and had the opportunity to say no. He succumbed to peer pressure from more experienced people.

Their actions in encouraging him were wrong and there are moral issues around it. But the PIC could have just said no. At 120hrs he should have known the rules and abided by them. The PIC could have quite easily flown 3 circuits before departure and the flight would have been legal. As a licensed pilot he knew the requirements and should have insisted that he did this. He could have done these with the CFI who was onboard for the outbound leg. That covers the legality of the flight.

The next is the poor decision making displayed by the crew, they did not lift enough fuel and they did not divert, that was poor planning and poor command decision. They did not die on the outbound flight they died on the return. They could have diverted at any time, why did they not do so? Was the CFI involved in that decision making process? Hardly when he was not on board. The crew choose to push on and it cost them their lives.

The CFI's should not have encouraged him to bend the rules, that was just stupid, but what was more stupid was the subsequent poor decision making.

bookworm

17th Apr 2008, 18:10

But Mr Walker was still in Command and had the opportunity to say no.

He did say no once.

The pilot responded by leaving a message to say that
he could not carry out the flight because he was out of
current practice. However, the CFI called him again
clarifying that he did not mean for him to fly solo but
that a more experienced pilot would accompany him.
It was not established whether the pilot understood this
to mean that the ‘experienced pilot’ was an instructor.
However, the pilot agreed to this arrangement and shortly
afterwards went to the airport.

I'm still keen to hear what evidence, other than the testimony of the CFI, exists to demonstrate that Mr Walker was aware that he was in command.

maxdrypower

17th Apr 2008, 18:44

The booking out sheet at the home of the aircraft has two clear entries , one for captain and another for pax. This would have been available to the AAIB .
As an aside , with regards to the "wink" to put the pilots at ease , Hogwash ! I have spent a lot of time flying at Bpool and the attitude of some of the controllers towards GA is at times despicable . Flippant sarcastic comments are more of the norm than a rarety . If you wish to experience a somewhat megolomaniacal attitude and at times downright rude service fly into blackpool .

Rightbase

17th Apr 2008, 18:54

I have flown into Blackpool - only once, admittedly. The controllers and ground staff all made a good first impression on me (belated thank you, guys) and I will happily fly in again.

Perhaps they reserve the banter for their regulars.

horsebox

17th Apr 2008, 19:18

Certainly the 2 on board made mistakes, planning and judgement were non existant and they have paid a high price, they are not in a position to answer any flak that we throw at them on this forum.

Controllers remarks maybe judged as flippant/unhelpful, but I would bet none of us would wish to swap seats with him on that dreadful night.

The actions of others will be examined at the inquest, points that are touched on in the aaib report (such as maint records for the aircraft, judgement of experienced instructors/examiners, who actually owned the aircraft, whether the flight was conducted in or outside of the FTO's remit etc etc ), indeed some of these issues have already been scrutinised by the CAA.

I instruct at Blackpool, I know the background to the whole sorry saga well, but have no axe to grind with any of the parties involved, however it bothers me when I see no soul searching, no lessons learned, and opportunity for this all to occur again...

Lurking123

17th Apr 2008, 19:51

Hear hear. It is not for us 'outsiders' to judge as most of us do not have access to all the info. However, there is a very long list of lessons that we should learn.

I also wonder how many PPLs tune into either the airfield ATIS or appropriate VOLMET (although Blackpool itself isn't on VOLMET) whilst en-route. Did these chaps? I guess we will never know.

Supersport

17th Apr 2008, 20:50

I also wonder how many PPLs tune into either the airfield ATIS or appropriate VOLMET (although Blackpool itself isn't on VOLMET) whilst en-route.

I fly regularly out of Blackpool, depending on my altitude I have been able to get Blackpool's ATIS when positioned South of Hawarden and maybe even Sleap (although haven't been there for a while so will try again next time). I think it would be fair to say that they had sufficient opportunity to get weather info for Blackpool well before their arrival.
I believe on the day in question it was only fogged in on the west coast as far south as Liverpool and maybe down the Dee towards Hawarden, 30-40nm South of Blackpool, plenty of possible alternates from that area with that range, hindsight again I know.

S-Works

17th Apr 2008, 21:53

I'm still keen to hear what evidence, other than the testimony of the CFI, exists to demonstrate that Mr Walker was aware that he was in command.

Would you get into the left hand seat of an aircraft without verifying the circumstances of the flight?

bookworm

18th Apr 2008, 07:43

Would you get into the left hand seat of an aircraft without verifying the circumstances of the flight?

No, personally, I wouldn't. But I don't recall a recent occasion when evidence confirming my verification of those circumstances has been left on the ground, either. So far, I've always returned to tell my side of the story.

If I were in the position of the "CFI", I would be a great deal happier if I had evidence that supported my account that a pilot who had once refused to make a particular flight as P1, had subsequently changed his mind and agreed to make the flight which was, at least with hindsight, patently illegal.

vanHorck

18th Apr 2008, 08:11

The AAIB report is mainly there for us to learn from and we should do this. I have no idea if the coroner's report will be a public record, if so, i hope someone will post it here, also for us to learn from.

I am assuming the AAIB concentrates on the aviation aspects and the coroner may have a different view as he is more "mainstream" in his evaluation.

The two combined may well end up teaching us all a good lesson on both the responsibilities of being PIC (including what decides whether you are P1 or not) as well as the effects and consequences of outside influence.

If the coroner is able to engulf himself sufficiently in the GA aviation and it does not become a "rogue" verdict, at least Mr Walkers death will have served some purpose in making flying a little safer and this may help the closure for his family and friends.

long final

18th Apr 2008, 11:00

There certainly is one controller at Blackpool who can be, IMO, very unprofessional at times. I have felt on several occasions that the PPL who has just had a right royal bollocking over the radio must be feeling very stressed by the experience. Not good practice.

Never had any problem with any other controllers at BPL though, all very helpful.

Lurking123

18th Apr 2008, 13:11

So long final, have you done anything about it or is this forum the first time you have brought the subject up? I ask because it is exactly the scenario you quote that should be reported and followed through. An awful lot of money is spent on training aviation professionals about human factors. If someone isn't applying that training, then they need guidance. It is all well and good for us (and I include myself) to whinge on proone but it doesn't address the problem.

long final

18th Apr 2008, 19:00

Lurking,

No I haven’t done anything about it. I suppose that I don’t have the belief in the system to think changes will happen. Maybe I should.

LF

fisbangwollop

18th Apr 2008, 19:32

LURKING 123...."Quote..I also wonder how many PPLs tune into either the airfield ATIS or appropriate VOLMET (although Blackpool itself isn't on VOLMET) whilst en-route. Did these chaps? I guess we will never know.

As a serving Area FISO (Scottish) I feel that using the AFIS in this instant would have been too late.....a quick call to London Information would have given the full weather picture at destination and an early diversion could have been made.....We guys sit there awaiting the call, the service is free so please guys use it!!! one day it could save your life!!

2close

18th Apr 2008, 19:40

"Training aviation professionals about Human Factors".

Now there's a novel concept.

The regulatory authorities preach at us ad nauseam about open reporting within a no-blame culture in order that data can be fed into the human factors melting pot so that lessons can be learned and similar mistakes avoided.

I regret that my personal experience has been that, as soon as those who suffer with power-pi**ed small-man syndrome get a whisper of a mistake they immediately start hunting for breaches of regulations and set out to 'hang' the 'offender', punishing him with totally disproportionate fines and/or loss of licence.

This develops mistrust of the regulator and a tendency for individuals to try to hide errors, which has the totally opposite effect that the system was designed to create.

I'm not suggesting that blatantly malicious or reckless negligence should go unpunished - of course the offence should receive an appropriate penalty - but genuine human errors caused by factors that the system is supposed to identify and prevent should be treated with proportional response, not an over the top lust for punitive action.

I'll fetch me coat....................gone!!!

horsebox

18th Apr 2008, 19:54

From what I know, the CAA have already intimated that this accident will become a text book example used in future training material.

For those reading who are instructors - you may have noticed the latest instructor newsletter from the uk Chief Flight Examiner - Patrick Lander - he states that pre flight planning (including wx and fuel etc) will be an area for close scrutiny during instructor/examiner testing in the coming year. It is no coincidence that he picks this subject after a dreadful and needless accident like this.

As the moderator says early in this thread - alot is not being said, and given the pending coroners court, this is wise. Suffice to say there is alot of anger and disgust over this accident within the aviation community at Blackpool, and as more information comes into the public domain, people will begin to understand why.

Duchess_Driver

18th Apr 2008, 20:32

Second fisbangs comment about London INFORMATION.....

Give them a quick call and ask for Wx at EGXX. Works all the time and thanks guys (and gals!) Not looking clever then re-plan early.

Lots of lessons here - just a shame it takes these circumstances to get us all talking about them.

S-Works

18th Apr 2008, 21:12

frontlefthamster

18th Apr 2008, 21:15

I thought you were a great deal more intelligent than that remark would suggest, bose.

A very great deal.

I also get the strong feeling that you're not aware of much of the information which is at the heart of this matter...

long final

18th Apr 2008, 21:31

Well said frontlefthamster

S-Works

18th Apr 2008, 21:40

Thats exactly my point. All this 'secret' information being alluded to and not talked about. The AIB report was pretty clear on the situation. An intelligent person reading the report and being a pilot can understand that they had the opportunity to divert. They crew showed poor airmanship.

Now if you want to come out provide evidence that they were FORCED into breaking the rules. Making an illegal flight and not making good command decisions then I am sorry but my view stands.

I have no doubt that there was a lot of peer pressure went on, young guy keen to be a commercial pilot, CFI tells him it will all be OK, even arranges for a 'more experienced' pilot to come along to bolster his confidence so thinks it all must be OK because the CFI says so. Off they go, outbound leg is illegal even though with the CFI on board 3 circuits and it would have been legal. They get to Exeter, the first aircraft departs and 'get home itus' kicks in. Marginal weather is known to exist at destination but they still go. Enroute they know weather is marginal but still they carry on. They get to destination weather is crap so they try and let down over the sea because they are unable to do an approach. Controller makes a crass comment. They crash into the sea and die.

All I see as an impartial 3rd party with no emotional involvement is a whole number of poor crew decisions that lead to the incident pit. Poor crew decisions that start with a QUALIFIED pilot not sticking to his guns and saying no, continues with TWO crew, one of whom allegedly very experienced who perform poor pre flight planning and continue onwards with poor inflight management that ultimately leads to their death.

All I see here is a witch hunt, presumably against the CFI who said they should go and some aspect towards the controller that made the crass comments but still a witch hunt. What I do not see is evidence of a gun being pointed at the pilots head to make him go.

If you know different then I am perfectly happy to look at the evidence and reevaluate my position.

I am sorry if I sound harsh, but I have no emotional involvement in this and look at the situation with a dispassionate eye and with a view to learning from others unfortunate mistakes.

If I were in the same situation I would have said no right at the point where I knew the first leg of the flight would have been illegal.

wsmempson

18th Apr 2008, 21:54

Technically, of course Bose-X is right.

But I do wonder at the CFI who thinks it right to encourage a low hour, out of currency, PPL to take off into IMC with 4 adults and full fuel loaded into a PA28 140 - with almost no functioning nav. equipment. Surely he must have signed him out for the flight, so there is no question of ignorance on his part?

At best, it begs the question "what was he thinking?". At worst, what he was thinking was very bad indeed.

Of course it is right to say that, as PIC, you need to make the decisions and the buck stops with you. In this sort of instance, common sense and humanity should dictate a different outcome from the outset.

DFC

18th Apr 2008, 22:02

An important issue to be looked at is not the PIC. It is operational control.

Who had operational control over the days operations - the ferry flight to deliver pilots and the subsequent flights - both of the accident flight and of the other flight.

Everyone debating this accident should read the report into the Citation that ended up on the motorway at Southampton some years back.

The major issue in that was not who was the handling pilot it was not who was pilot in command - it was the person who effectively had operational control and their (knowing or unknowing) application of peer (junior to senior pilot but opposite in management terms) pressure............without having to utter a word.

If you know you are going to be rewarded for doing something or if you know that you are going to loose out by not doing something then there is a lot of pressure on you to do whatever that is. The person who delivers the reward or not as the case may be has effective control (operational control) of the situation............as soon as they make the prize available.

Regards,

DFC

Rightbase

18th Apr 2008, 22:34

I am a comparatively low hour PPL. My licence is indeed a licence to learn, and I am keen to do so (and to stay alive). One of my major learning resources is the advice I get from more experienced pilots.

I will often ask for, and take advice. I believe I am responsibly discharging my PIC responsibilities by doing so. I will not fly against advice, and when the advice is the other way, I will fly with an instructor as P1. It is on such occasions that I explore my personal envelope, and develop a real respect for conditions near my personal minima.

So without in any way diluting my responsibility for my own flights, I do rely on advice from more experienced pilots to inform my decisions. It would be misleading to refer to such a process as peer pressure.

I am lucky to fly with a club that does not cut corners, and would not allow me to fly outside legal or club currency requirements. There is also a clear written ops records of who is P1 - at least on departure.

But the serious issue raised by this episode is not about legality. It is about other aspects of airmanship. And yes - if I am P1, I make the decisions, and I alone am answerable for them. But the way I make them is more complex, and can involve decisions about who I trust and respect.

mm_flynn

19th Apr 2008, 07:31

I have no doubt that there was a lot of peer pressure went on, young guy keen to be a commercial pilot, CFI tells him it will all be OK, even arranges for a 'more experienced' pilot to come along to bolster his confidence so thinks it all must be OK because the CFI says so. Off they go, outbound leg is illegal even though with the CFI on board 3 circuits and it would have been legal.
The lack of currency for carrying passengers is probably the least material illegality. You would need to be a sky god to do '3 quick VFR circuits' on a day that from the report seems to have been R28/0400 BKN002.

Having your CFI not comment about decision making (and ride in the plane with you!) when taking off into weather that is unambiguously illegal for a PPL to operate in, is forecast to remain so for the rest of the day, and to do so in a clearly over gross aircraft, with no equipment that would allow you to get back in (i.e. ILS), and 1.3 hours of IMC time is bizarre.

gooneydog

19th Apr 2008, 12:20

Perhaps the "desperation" of the CFI to get "multi time" in the Aztec was a factor in turning a blind eye to the weather at take off However would YOU sit in the rear of a totally VFR Cherrytree in obvious IMC KNOWING the pic was illegal and the "safety pilot" had no licence ? Also Did the PIC KNOW his safety pilot had no licence and that he was PIC by default?

Ken Wells

19th Apr 2008, 17:56

Actually I do.

Yes there can be only one commander at any one time. However I suspect the more senior might find themselves culpable if they did not assume control when faced with a breach of the law.

The disgnated PI is responsible.

Expereinced passengers are not.

I have flown with ATPL's that could not solo a Cessna 172. Experience on type is can be more valid than total flying experience.

I think those trying to blame the non designated P1 miss the point.

frontlefthamster

19th Apr 2008, 18:16

On the contrary Ken, I think you miss the point, as you are unaware of much of the relevant information. Those of us who are aware of it are very hopeful that the Coroner will ensure it's all heard, and will make appropriate recommendations as a result. This is not a matter of the 'designated P1' on board the aircraft being in doubt or under scrutiny.

Horsebox's remarks in his final paragraph above are worth taking to heart, for those of you who are not intimately acquainted with the evidence, one way or another, yet wish to stand forward with your opinions.

Contacttower

19th Apr 2008, 19:31

As the moderator says early in this thread - alot is not being said, and given the pending coroners court, this is wise. Suffice to say there is alot of anger and disgust over this accident within the aviation community at Blackpool, and as more information comes into the public domain, people will begin to understand why.

Horsebox's remarks in his final paragraph above are worth taking to heart, for those of you who are not intimately acquainted with the evidence, one way or another, yet wish to stand forward with your opinions.

We had a long debate when the AAIB report first came out and for those (like myself) who don't know any more than what was in the report there doesn't seem to be much more to be said on the subject.

Hopefully the information alluded to by the above posters will come to light at some point, but if they don't think it appropriate to post it yet then we just have to be patient I think.

horsebox

19th Apr 2008, 20:42

There has already been a regulation 6 hearing in connection with this case. For those who are unfamiliar with reg 6 of the ANO it is the mechanism that an individual can use to challenge a CAA decision to remove/revoke licences and ratings from a pilot.

I understand discussions on this crash from a thread on the flyer forum were submitted as part of a "defence" case.

Like I have said the P1 aspect is well debated and discussed, I agree with many of the posts, including Bose x, they cocked up, they paid heavily. I maintain that there is alot still to be learned from this crash. Patience is needed.

maxdrypower

20th Apr 2008, 14:34

I too agree with Bose , he has it spot on . It is an horredous tragedy and I feel greatly for the family . It is due to this widely held emotion that most people refuse to say exactly how it is . Bose X has said it with the caveat that he is a dispassionate and neutral outsider looking in. What he says makes sense . It is a crying shame what happended but it happened for many varying H,P and L factors , but unfortunately with no gun present in the cockpit the decision to go and decision to continue was made by two people and not three or four as intimated . The CFI did not force anyone to go , the crass controller did not force anyone to go , and Im pretty sure neither of the pilots forced the other into anything . What I can not believe is that either pilot did not talk at length with other and the decision to carry on would have been made in concert and not as a unilateral decision. I think common sense has to prevail with the P1 situation , the flight was being made by the younger and the lesser experienced pilot , the other pilot went as "back up" if you will. I cannot believe that either of the pilots just sat there and allowed the other to fly the aircraft into the sea. I would like to think that the Cross Cockpit authority gradient was a thing of the past .It is covered in detail in both PPL and ATPL syllabuses .
The other factor to consider is if the wx was as stated in the above post as 28 bkn 200 then (I dont have the plates to hand) but this would have been a go around for an Ir pilot or IMC let alone a PPL .
If the CFI in question is to be held accountable for for this then as a CFI would you sign out a PPL for solo hire of the aircraft for a flight knowing that if he decided to make a bad decision on his return that you would be held accountable ????? I personally would find it very hard to sign people off for even a qual x country .
Holding a PPL assumes that a person has the training , knowledge and decsion making ability to decide what is and isnt safe . This return flight was clearly never going to be safe , the wx and condition of the aircraft were there for both pilot to see .I fail to see how the end result can be the respoinsibilty of someone 200 odd miles away , who even if consulted may well have said well heres the wx make your own mind up .
May they RIP

wsmempson

20th Apr 2008, 15:00

MDP, I so agree with the sentiment of what you are saying - once you are PIC, the buck stops there. If you make a series of errors, it's your fault, not anyone else's. In fact, in today's litigeous world, it does irritate me to read of people trying to fix the liability for their mistakes upon innocent third parties.

And yet, and yet, there is more to this particular tale than that, as there is another dimension which does need more discussion and investigation; according to the aaib report, the young pilot concerned was contacted by the CFI who offered him the opportunity to act as PIC on this flight flight, in order to give the pilots of the twin a lift down to Exeter, with the benefit of a more experienced pilot sitting P2. He would pay only the price of the fuel to so do.

That CFI must have had chapter and verse on the W&B limitations of a PA28 140; anyone who has owned one knows that 4 adults plus fuel - even to tabs (128l therefore 3hrs flying time, plus diversion) - will result in an aircraft which is out of W&B and CofG by quite some margin. You don't need to work the detailed calculations - you know that it won't work - period.

Whatever the reasons, that flight should not have taken off for three reasons that were well known to the CFI;

1. W&B
2. Currency
3. The aircraft was not equipped for the prevailing IMC conditions

I can't think of a flying club that I have flown from where a renter would have been allowed to depart under these circumstances, so I'd love to hear what the coroners court has to say as why this flight, this club and this CFI was so different.

vanHorck

20th Apr 2008, 15:17

On the return trip the plane was not suitable for the IMC condition. This is critical. Was the P1 aware of this? Did he check his instruments on departure (of flight one and/or two). Was this perhaps discussed with/by the passengers who were to fly the twin?

W&B did not play a part on the return fatal trip. It is only there to show how curious it was that the first flight took place at all.

Currency of P1 made the flight(s) illegal but not necessarily lethal.

So the return trip which was the fatal one is the flight to look at.

I too am curious as to what outside factors were so forceful that they should override the P1's responsibilities and more important the P1's authority which prevented him from taking a no-go decision.

S-Works

20th Apr 2008, 15:29

That CFI must have had chapter and verse on the W&B limitations of a PA28 140; anyone who has owned one knows that 4 adults plus fuel - even to tabs (128l therefore 3hrs flying time, plus diversion) - will result in an aircraft which is out of W&B and CofG by quite some margin. You don't need to work the detailed calculations - you know that it won't work - period.

Whatever the reasons, that flight should not have taken off for three reasons that were well known to the CFI;

1. W&B
2. Currency
3. The aircraft was not equipped for the prevailing IMC conditions

Apart from point 3 everything else you have pointed out is irrelevant. The accident occurred on the flight home which was inside W&B. Currency, well the outbound flight would have covered currency if not legality with regards to the number of take of and landing.

The final point is the valid one, the aircraft was not equipped for IMC conditions yet the crew chose to take off and fly back knowing the conditions. They chose not to divert at anytime on the return despite having a number of FULLY VFR options to choose from.

I agree with vanHorck, I can't see any outside factors that applied to the accident flight other than crew error as a result of pushing on when a correct command decision would have been to divert.

But as I have said, I am open minded and happy to see direct evidence that that the crew were coerced into the flight to such a level that they were prepared to risk and ultimately pay with their lives.

wsmempson

20th Apr 2008, 15:59

"That CFI must have had chapter and verse on the W&B limitations of a PA28 140; anyone who has owned one knows that 4 adults plus fuel - even to tabs (128l therefore 3hrs flying time, plus diversion) - will result in an aircraft which is out of W&B and CofG by quite some margin. You don't need to work the detailed calculations - you know that it won't work - period.

Whatever the reasons, that flight should not have taken off for three reasons that were well known to the CFI;

1. W&B
2. Currency
3. The aircraft was not equipped for the prevailing IMC conditions

Apart from point 3 everything else you have pointed out is irrelevant. The accident occurred on the flight home which was inside W&B. Currency, well the outbound flight would have covered currency if not legality with regards to the number of take of and landing."

Thanks BoseX

But if you read my post again, you'll see that I say "that flight should not have taken off for three reasons". I refer to the 1st flight on these points and both of these points were properly the concern of the CFI concerned; the third was the responsibilty of the PIC, it was also the responsability of the CFI to only authorise a VFR flight; these are the conditions according to the AAIB report.

"The arcraft took off from Runway 252 at 225 hrs and,
on climbing through 200 ft to 300 ft, entered cloud. At
around ,000 ft aal, the arcraft came out on top and
continued to climb to its cruise altitude. The flight
contnued above a sold overcast layer of cloud untl
the arcraft was south of the Lverpool area, where t
was clear. The weather conditions were clear for the
remainder of the flight and an uneventful landing was
made at Exeter at 1431 hrs."

I agree that the 1st two points, paradoxically, weren't involved in the accident itself - other than tangentially.

For instance, if the pilot had followed the rules - which the CFI should have enforced - the accident would not have happende at all as the flight would not have taken place.

If the aircraft had not departed fuelled to the gunwales (by the CFI before the pilot arrived), then the pilot would have had to have refuelled at the end of the 1st leg, and probably would have had sufficient fuel for the second leg, plus the diversion that was ultimately necessary.

As ever, I suspect that there are multiple layers of swiss cheese involved here and, unluckily for the two people who died, the holes all lined up.

It just does seem to me as if, when the pilot concerned was presented with these figurative 'slices of cheese' at the start of the flight, it must have been blindingly obvious to an experienced hand like the CFI that this was a very bad idea indeed - even if the young pilot concerned couldn't see it. It doesn't sound as if I'm alone in this view.

S-Works

20th Apr 2008, 16:14

It just does seem to me as if, when the pilot concerned was presented with these figurative 'slices of cheese' at the start of the flight, it must have been blindingly obvious to an experienced hand like the CFI that this was a very bad idea indeed - even if the young pilot concerned couldn't see it. It doesn't sound as if I'm alone in this view.

I don't disagree with you at all. However the comments about the outbound flight are still irrelevant as it was nothing to do with the accident flight. There is a major difference between the morality of the CFI's actions by encouraging the flight. But there still has been no evidence that the return flight was outside the control of the crew.

There is way to much emotion and moral indignation being applied to this. Too many people emotionally raw trying to apportion blame.

The fact still stands that the crew were responsible for the flight and did not make the right decisions. The AIB report indicates the same conclusions. The ethical issues around other parties behavior does not change the facts.

vanHorck

20th Apr 2008, 17:59

WS you seem to suggest that if the first flight had not taken place then they would not have crashed....

But this is condoning get-home-itis. Avoiding get-home-itis is just as much part of a P1's responsibility as all other responsibilities

Whilst it can be more than useful for all of us to know what happened before and during the first flight, in reality terms this flight has little or nothing to do with the second one, other than explaining they were away from home and wanted to get home so much they died due to get-home-itis...

Just like the weather can be a killer, ESPECIALLY flying into it without the necessary equipment, get-home-itis is a killer too.

I dislike this idea that both flights are linked. Any pilot should always look at every flight as an individual one, simply because whenever you are on the ground you have the opportunity to re-check your decisions.

modelman

20th Apr 2008, 18:20

For the return flight,the P1 only made one mistake (leaving aside all the legal/currency stuff)-he did not depart with enough fuel,not really a 'pilot' type error,just plain common sense and all further decisions seemed predicated on this.Even if the wx at Blackpool was cavok,he seemed to have very little reserve for diversion.
With only 2 POB,I can't understand why the a/c wasn't refuelled to the top.I wonder as he was paying for the fuel,cost was a factor.
Very sad event.
MM

frontlefthamster

20th Apr 2008, 18:21

bose, I don't intend to get dragged into a detailed discussion here, but I do wish to respond to some of your points:

There is a major difference between the morality of the CFI's actions by encouraging the flight. But there still has been no evidence that the return flight was outside the control of the crew.

This does not make sense, unless you are suggesting that the CFI was content for the PA28, having arrived at its destination, to remain there. This most definitely was not the plan he had proposed to those involved, so I fear that the out and back legs come as a package, as it were.

There is way to much emotion and moral indignation being applied to this. Too many people emotionally raw trying to apportion blame.

Certainly not from me.

The fact still stands that the crew were responsible for the flight and did not make the right decisions.

They behaved as humans do, when subjected to motivation, presented with goals, and given guidance and encouragement by those they trust and respect. To my mind the difference here is that the dawning realisation of the horrible situation they were in, arrived just as the oppportunities to avoid it disappeared.

The AIB report indicates the same conclusions.

The AAIB have a remit limited by their own desire to delve; in this case, they clearly did not wish to publish more information than they did. I fear this is to the detriment of the flying community at Blackpoool, in particular, though we may note that they are not the only people investigating this event.

The ethical issues around other parties behavior does not change the facts.

The facts, as analysed by someone who wishes to understand why the occupants of the aircraft died, most definitely encompass the behaviour of those on the ground who arranged, commissioned, and advised, the pilots involved. It is this matter, that the coroner must pursue if he is to hold an effective inquest.

vanHorck

20th Apr 2008, 18:31

Dear Frontlefthamster

No one disputes that there have been influences and that if a death must in part be linked to actions of others in the greater scope of things, through a coroner, so be it.

However i feel Bose-X is completely right in concentrating in this PILOT forum on what matters to us, the surviving pilots, and this is to clarify the roles we play, as P1 of any plane and to analyze the mistakes the poor pilots made, so we can learn to fear our own judgement, so we increase our chances of surviving our great passion.

This is certainly not a place to conduct a debate for the sole purpose of helping to put the blame on third parties (even in case they were also to blame) at the expense of the clarity we all need to help ourselves survive

S-Works

20th Apr 2008, 18:41

frontlefthamster. I am sorry but your interpretation just smacks of a need to place blame at the door of someone else. The crew made an error and died for it. Trying to lay the blame at the door of what I assume is the CFI in this case does not excuse the fact that the crew did not use the power of free thought and the skills that they had gained through training to make a command decision and either not even do the outbound leg and certainly not do the return leg.

As I have said a number of times I am fully prepared to consider any evidence you have that suggests the flight was carried under duress. If you cant' then this in my mind remains a sad case of poor planning and execution. Pilot error.

They behaved as humans do, when subjected to motivation, presented with goals, and given guidance and encouragement by those they trust and respect. To my mind the difference here is that the dawning realisation of the horrible situation they were in, arrived just as the oppportunities to avoid it disappeared.

Exactly, but still a result of pilot error. Unless they were under some duress/threat then they still had the power of free thinking.

Whatever the involvement of those on the ground, the crew still had the capacity to say no. They chose to carry on and it cost them their lives.

A very sad situation, but one that we can all learn from with respect to him factors.

VFE

20th Apr 2008, 19:01

It is not often I find myself in agreement with Bose-X but when one removes the (at this point) implied suggestion that there was a 'green light' from the acting CFI before this ferry flight set out it does come down to pilot error.

The debate surely must lie with what responsibility an FTO should and shall have in such situations whereby a junior club member is stitched up with a wolf dressed as a sheep type offer of free flying. Ultimately the pilot in command is to blame but there are other factors affecting this accident that as yet mean it could quite easily occur again.

In my opinion FTO's have a certain moral and unwritten(?) responsibility to ensure they do not place requests on club members that are well and truly beyond their abilities. Maybe this is something which will come out in the wash and change the present rather inadequate regulations which bundle all blame on the PIC on the premise that they're street wise experienced commanders capable of overriding their superiors. It is just unrealistic in some club circles.

VFE.

frontlefthamster

20th Apr 2008, 19:38

To suggest that duress may have been a factor is to miss, completely, the manner in which the pilot(s) was/were thinking.

I've said my piece here, and shall not do so again. I'm sorry to see the cognoscenti here so keen to blame an inexperienced and arguably impressionable pilot, with considerable favour at stake, and motivated by the advice and clear intent of someone he regarded as 'superior', for his own demise, when that demise, in the circumstances, was so far outside his own making.

Don't forget, if we simply blame accidents on 'pilot error' (apparently bose's favourite phrase at the moment, though one with which I have significant argument on several levels), they will keep happening, again and again.

With luck, those of us who deal in the real world where human behaviour interfaces with flight operations, might bypass this fatalist approach and prevent the odd accident, perhaps even in the non-professional flying world.

S-Works

20th Apr 2008, 20:19

I am sorry mate, but there is no fatalist approach. I clearly state that there are lessons to be learnt from this incident on the human factors front. But it does not change the situation as far as the accident is concerned. The crew were capable of making their own decisions regardless of what 'considerable favours' may have been on offer.

Just as I would not jump into a pit of rattlesnakes to grab a bag of diamonds not matter how many times somebody more experienced and wiser assured I would be OK. I know my limitations, snake charming is not one of my skills so I know when to say no.

The crew were in the same position, they were old enough and experienced enough to hold pilot licences. Self responsibility comes with this.

But I stand to be educated as to why pilot error is not to blame?

This now just smacks of a witch hunt.

vanHorck

20th Apr 2008, 20:30

or smacks of bitterness over a sensless loss which at all cost must be justified by blaming someone else. Somebody mentioned Mr Al Fayed's loss....

There are simply two levels of this (if not more) and this forum is about what matters to pilots.

If you want to convince CFI s to be more responsible do so under that heading. We are doing our fellow pilots no favours by suggesting you re only P1 insofar you have not been influenced by others.....

Duchess_Driver

20th Apr 2008, 20:51

"In my opinion FTO's have a certain moral and unwritten(?) responsibility to ensure they do not place requests on club members that are well and truly beyond their abilities. Maybe this is something which will come out in the wash and change the present rather inadequate regulations which bundle all blame on the PIC on the premise that they're street wise experienced commanders capable of overriding their superiors. It is just unrealistic in some club circles.

VFE." - my bolds

Sorry, but I have a problem with this statement. Our Ops desk, as a representative of club management and/or CFI does not allow pilots to fly into situations which are knowingly beyond their experience or abilities. As instructors we will often question decisions made at the ops desk and advise where appropriate. However, that is all it is advice – until the Ops desk exercises their ultimate sanction and takes their toys away and say no.

Once more, as has already been said what the pilot does once the flight has been authorised and departed cannot be at the blame of anyone other than P1. If the P1 can’t/won’t/doesn’t read a TAF and make a Wx decision – or can’t/won’t/doesn’t fuel then those decisions lie with them – and unfortunately, them alone. It’s all very well saying someone held a gun to their head – but how long do we need to keep making decisions for pilots – and how are they supposed to grow as pilots if we do? We give them the information they need and guide them through the interpretation of the data so that they can make the (safe) decisions for themselves. And we do it so they can do it in front of an examiner who is a representative of the rule makers no less. Somewhere, somehow they have to have the strength of character to say ‘This is outside my comfort zone and it isn’t happening’

Any change in that status-quo will be very bad for the everyone concerned.

I’m sorry if this offends some of you, but there were umpteen places in which the chain of events here could be broken by the crew. They were not. Sad, so sad.

vanHorck

20th Apr 2008, 20:55

Dutchess driver

I ve just attempted to open a thread for the flight instructors/CFI/examiners on this moral subject so that they may discuss amongst themselves these external factors.

We here as you rightly say, should concentrate on using the authorities that belong to the P1 in executing his responsibilities

G-SPOTs Lost

20th Apr 2008, 21:13

Its a very great shame, the elephant in the room is the previous behaviour of this outfit. From the dispatching of aircraft without cowlings, bankruptcy, grounding by the CAA for non compliance (same management before anybody shouts) wheels up landings generally shoddy aircraft, some would say the only way reason this outfit made any money was the fact that they were the only club on the field that had a bar.

There is no smoke without fire, sadly I fear that the coroner will not look at the past behaviour simply quote the ANO as other have done in this thread and hang this poor lad out to dry.

Ask anybody at Blackpool which outfit this was most likely to happen to and I would suggest the answers would be common throughout. In this case the loveable rogues or the outfit everybody loved to hate that would never say die were responsible morally for this tragedy.

Good luck with the inquest, I hope it goes some way to giving some closure.

Duchess_Driver

20th Apr 2008, 21:20

VH

With respect, I know a lot of instructors read the Private Flying Forum and most are 'private flyers' as well as professional pilots.

There is much to learn form this tragedy and I believe that for a balanced discussion the two sides of this arguement are inseparable and contributors from all walks of 'aviation' should be encouraged.

Where does the moral obligation stop? Does it stop with the CFI, or the Senior instructor, or the junior instructor or ops desk clerk? The Fireman perhaps...Air Traffic....or the PPL who just drives into the carpark as the overloaded aeroplane starts taxiing. We all have an obligation to raise our concerns - but what the P1 does about that is his decision. Again, strength of character on all parts.

Supersport

20th Apr 2008, 21:21

I've said my piece here, and shall not do so again. I'm sorry to see the cognoscenti here so keen to blame an inexperienced and arguably impressionable pilot, with considerable favour at stake, and motivated by the advice and clear intent of someone he regarded as 'superior', for his own demise, when that demise, in the circumstances, was so far outside his own making.Rubbish, utter rubbish. This tragic story can be summed up pretty easily really, both from common knowledge at Blackpool, the AAIB Report & from reading this thread:

1> CFI shouldn't have asked him / them to go, due to weather and knowledge of licence currency issues.

2> Mr Walker should not have agreed to go, CFI shouldn't have encouraged the flight to go ahead.

3> Aircraft should have been refuelled for return leg, wasn't due to reasons unknown, possibly financial.

4> Aircraft crashed due to weather conditions / lack of fuel / lack of adequate navigation equipment, poor decision making on behalf of the P1 / P2.

5> CFI that encouraged the flight, over the passed decade or so p*ssed off a lot of people / organisations resident at Blackpool Airport, p*ssed off a lot of other people / organisations elsewhere around the country, p*ssed off the CAA. The reasons why these people / organisations are p*ssed off, is most probably justified.

6> Due to nature of the accident and the circumstances in which the flight went ahead, perfect opportunity to nail the CFI to the wall to rid the system of them forever. The AAIB have already determined the causes of the accident, they didn't leave anything aviation related out, they did their job.

To me, it is obvious, and others posting on this thread have already started see this with a similar perspective to me, something doesn't add up, to me it seems that these certain p*ssed off individuals with a score to settle may have stirred the pot to aggrivate an already extremely raw wound and are avidly awaiting the outcome. Witch hunt indeed.

Edit: G-Spot hit the nail on the head.

vanHorck

20th Apr 2008, 21:23

G spot's loss

the elephant in the room is the previous behaviour of this outfit.

Sorry i m not a native speaker. What does this sentence mean?

VFE

20th Apr 2008, 21:36

Duchess Driver,

It appears you may have misunderstood my posting as you seem to be singing from the same hymn sheet as me. My hope is that something comes from this inquest that will make FTO's more culpable in a case whereby an experienced instructor in a position of authority can give his blessing and encouragement to dangerous flying (it is my understanding that weather for take off was below VFR minima) to those pilots registered as flying club members at the FTO where he is employed. If this is indeed the case here then the CFI should've known better but the lads who went obviously didn't. If he didn't know any better then he should not be in the position he was. Either way there should be some accountability. If the letter of the law does not necessarily back this up at present I hope it will change. Doubtful but hopeful. It should never get to a stage whereby ops staff have to refuse the keys.

VFE.

stickandrudderman

20th Apr 2008, 21:52

It seems to me, and my knowledge is limited to what I've read here, that P1 is P1 is in command has ultimate authority accepts responsibility etc etc....
However, in criminal law there are various offences for incitement.

Am I wrong in thinking then that a possible outcome is that Mr Walker will be deemed responsible for his actions, but those who influenced his decision making might rightly be held accountable in the same way that one can be prosecuted for incitement to (insert your own description)?

If so it doesn't sound unreasonable to me.

172driver

20th Apr 2008, 22:00

Been reading this thread with interest, but, not being even remotely familiar with Blackpool, have so far not felt it right to post.

However, this is getting a bit galling, where some posters here clamour for some sort of legal responsibility of the dispatcher (CFI, ops desk, whatever you wish to call it).

Sorry guys - which part of Pilot In Command don't you understand :ugh:

Not wanting to condone this CFIs behaviour (he has to live with his conscience), but this whole scenario is, to my mind, utter madness.

If someone who is out of currency, has no IR, even attempts to start a P28-140 with 4 adults to launch into a 200ft overcast, he/she is either mad or not fit to hold a pilot's license. Del mortuis nihil nisi bene, I know, but this simply beggars belief. The buck stops somewhere - and this somewhere is called PIC.

I'm sure he was under all sort of pressure/persuasion/whatever. But would you jump off a tall building just because someone told you it was safe? Probably not, because you know about gravity. One could come up with many more analogies.....

A sad loss of life, for sure, but I'm not so convinced there's much to learn here - the blatant disregard for safety and common sense by all involved is simply off the scale.

It is ultimately the PIC who has to say STOP if a situation like this develops. Unfortunately he didn't.

RIP

Duchess_Driver

20th Apr 2008, 22:02

Perhaps we sing from the same book, maybe not the same song.

It should always be that Ops staff refuse the keys if the flight is not legal, and good clubs will do this. Morally so. My problem with your argument (and that of others) is the definition of where your FTO/RTF/Club stops being responsible. This wasn't a training flight after all. I'm touring in France and five days into the trip I float too far and, landing long, run through the fence at the end of the strip. My FTO is responsible because I didn't make the decision to go around? Nah.....

Let's say, for arguments sake, this was a syndicate aircraft not controlled by a 'Duly Authorised' or 'booking out' process? Who is responsible for go/no-go decisions then? The Group Trustee on holiday in sunny Florida? Nope, P1 all the time.

What cannot change is the ultimate decision to proceed into IMC when the aeroplane is not equipped, the crew is not current or competant and overweight or where there is insufficient fuel rests with the P1.

Islander2

20th Apr 2008, 22:59

It is ultimately the PIC who has to say STOP if a situation like this develops. Unfortunately he didn't.I see nothing in the AAIB report that convinces me that Andrew Walker thought he was PIC.

1. He hadn't flown for more than three months, and had only flown 3hr 45mins in the last thirteen months. He had planned that day to fly with the club as P/UT carrying out refresher training when the CFI asked him instead to fly to Exeter. He correctly responded that he was unqualified to undertake that flight, but was told by the CFI he would be accompanied by a more experienced pilot. We are not told who signed the aeroplane out, and the AAIB were unable to establish whether Mr Walker knew that the accompanying pilot was not an instructor ... but I could well believe that he considered this to be an alternative sortie for his refresher training.

2. The only evidence the AAIB advance for considering him to be PIC is: "The relatively inexperienced pilot was paying for the fuel for the two flights, the purpose of which was for him to build up his flight hours. He was seated in the left seat and he was almost certainly handling the controls throughout the accident flight. Thus he should be considered the pilot-in-command ...." Well sorry, AAIB, but that rationale is nonsense ... on that basis every student pilot would be PIC on every flight!

3. We are being asked to believe that a young pilot sufficiently committed to be working towards an ATPL carried out this flight believing he was PIC whilst showing no evidence whatsoever of command decision making - the accompanying pilot appears alone (or in conjunction with others but not Mr Walker) to have decided on fuel (and therefore W&B) at both Blackpool and Exeter. We are also asked to believe that, despite demonstrating he was conscientious about his lack of currency, and with 1.3 hours of total instrument flying experience, he took off from Blackpool into a 200 ft overcast on the outward journey, and departed Exeter on the return flight knowing he would arrive in poor weather and fading daylight, all whilst believing he was PIC.

A tragic and entirely avoidable accident - certainly. But we may never know whether Andrew Walker believed he was the pilot in command and was therefore guilty of causing the accident through his poor decision making. Or whether, as seems at least as likely to me, he was merely guilty of not establishing that his assumed P/UT status was factual. If the latter, his 'offence' is one that is regularly repeated around the country by pilots, student and qualified, when undertaking training flights.

ShyTorque

21st Apr 2008, 01:04

Having read the accident report, I sadly think it was a case of not so much a case of "would" an accident occur, but WHEN?

I once watched an overloaded PA28 (4 POB plus too much fuel) fail to take off/climb and finish up in a farmer's field, fortunately with no loss of life.

Someone asked "Who was flying that?"

The best answer? "Looks like nobody was"!

long final

21st Apr 2008, 07:04

Shy Torque, Islander,

I think you both sum up well. I dont think either of them were aware who was P1 that day. Sadly, unless there is complete honesty from the club we will probably never know.

Lurking123

21st Apr 2008, 07:21

There has already been a regulation 6 hearing in connection with this case.

I don't think many people have picked-up on this. My understanding of a Regulation 6 is that someone is appealing against a regulatory course of action that the Authority has already taken. Therefore, regardless of this thread, it appears to me that the CAA have taken action against an individual or set of individuals for failing to comply with the terms of their license or, in the wider sense, the ANO. They obviously feel that the events of the day were not solely orchestrated by the two deceased pilots.

DFC

21st Apr 2008, 07:39

There is no doubt that the PIC has final responsiblity for the safety of a flight.

However, every other human element in the system also have certain responsibilities.

Incident and accident investigations are supposed to establish the facts and lead us towards a position where the probability of such an incident / accident happening again are reduced.

The PIC is this case is not going to have the chance to make decisions that kill others as well as themselves again.

However, the peole who had operational control of the flights are still round. One should not seek to simply blame people for tragic outcomes but should seek to ensure that they receive further training, testing and if necessary sanction to ensure that they do not contribute to another incident / accident.

To fail to do so would be to simply say that encouraging another PIC to make the same error is acceptable. - Is it?

Regards,

DFC

VFE

21st Apr 2008, 08:08

long final

21st Apr 2008, 08:52

VFE,

Interesting point. I guess with the equipment the aircraft had, the flight must have been booked out as VFR. Would any ATC'ers care to add thier opinion?

LF

S-Works

21st Apr 2008, 09:02

There are lots of external factors here that with the gift of hindsight need looking at to help prevent a similar situation from an operational perspective.

But it still stands that the accident flight was the responsibility of the crew. They had the option to refuel in Exeter and the option to divert many times on the way back. They chose to push on and died. That part is simple enough to ascertain.

Alluding to who might have been PIC on the way back is a waster of time. Andrew Walker should have clearly established the operating status of the other guy if he believed the flight to be Instructional but it still did not change the fact that between them as crew they had plenty of opportunity to avoid the circumstances that cost them their lives. Or are we now trying to say the the other guy who died was PIC and shift the blame? As far as I see it they were both to blame and paid the ultimate price.

corsair

21st Apr 2008, 09:08

Years ago as a young inexperienced pilot with about the same hours as Andrew Walker. I found myself in a situation which could easily have ended the same way.
I flew to an airfield and found the weather deteriorating. It was unforecast cloud down to 200 feet. I made the decision to stay on the ground. I was alone so no pressure from accompanying pilots. But what followed surprised and dismayed me. Well, the phone lines ran red hot with the CFI demanding to know why I didn't fly out. Then I had the owner call me. The airport manage even got in on the act and suggested I could go. The pressure was intense but luckily for me there was no reassuring 'experienced pilot' to encourage me to fly. Besides the nearby mountain being encased in cloud and my utter lack of instrument time made the decision easy.

In the end they needed the aircraft back so another was despatched, flown by an experienced airline pilot accompanied by another private pilot. He flew out to sea descended to 200 feet before they broke cloud and got in. When they arrived I was treated with utter contempt by the two other pilots. I felt like s***. I was dumped in the back of my aircraft and we took off, entered cloud at 200 feet and didn't emerge until we hit 5000 feet.

Later I was hauled before the CFI accused (falsely) of continued flight into IMC and failing to check the weather and I was grounded. I felt I must be a terrible pilot.

Later of course, I realised I was the only one who had acted properly that day. The CFI and owner put pressure on an inexperienced pilot to fly into IMC. The 'rescue' pilot also flew illegally below an MDA and again into IMC on a VFR flight plan.

So I understand the pressure Andrew Walker was under. If I'd had some instrument time. I might well have taken off and I might well have got away with it or I might have ended up embedded in the side of a nearby hill or in a smoking hole after spinning out of cloud. Believe me I was sorely tempted to take off and take a chance. If another experienced pilot was with me. I undoubtedly would have taken off.

When you are a young low time pilot, you do defer to more experienced pilots expecially if they are sitting beside you. It's all very well saying he was PIC and therefore he must take responsibility for his actions. In a way he did. He died. But the accident sequence started when the CFI and three other pilots decided to fly in poor weather in an aircraft not equipped to do so and ask an inexperienced pilot lacking currency to fly the thing. So there's plenty of blame to share around.

So you can blame Andrew Walker and say he was PIC and must take responsibilty. In bald terms that's true. But this is a world of greys not black and white. On another day. They might all have got away with it. But the luck runs out eventually.

long final

21st Apr 2008, 09:24

Bose,

You have made your point many times. I don’t think I hear many people arguing with you on the technical or legal side. Someone in that aircraft was P1 of some fashion. They made terrible mistakes. They paid for them. That is not in question.

I can only try to express what others have said about the outfit and the CFI that let that first leg depart. There are questions that have either not been answered, regarding, at least moral culpability, at worst operational legality of the training organisation or have been kept from the investigations report.

I will totally agree that P1 is responsible and that should remain so, but I do have issues about that first flight, its subsequent impact on the return and the seemingly non-existent actions against the operators of the aircraft.

LF

PPRuNe Radar

21st Apr 2008, 09:39

Can't speak for the ATC on duty at Blackpool at the time, but generally ATC are not policeman, and are limited in what they can do to restrict flight.

They may have information on the Flight Rules being followed, or might not especially if no Flight Plan is filed and the aircraft 'freecalls'. With no Controlled Airspace at Blackpool, the pilot has more leeway in deciding which rules to fly under.

A pure PPL holder can of course fly under IFR outside CAS if they so wish, the rules are not dependent on IMC or VMC conditions. Only the pilot knows his qualifications and the aircraft equipment fit. Only the pilot knows if he is legal to make an approach. Only the pilot knows the actual VMC/IMC conditions he is currently flying through.ATC do not and have no remit to question the pilot.

There are of course 'aerodrome operating minima' rules in the ANO. In ANO terms, there is a limitation on visual range. If the RVR is below that specified for the airfield, then the pilot cannot descend below a height of 1000'. Minimum descent altitudes (which are relevant to the cloudbase) are also part of the ANO article, and appear in the published Instrument Approach plate. The pilot must not descend below these published heights (or altitudes) unless the visual reference altitude is obtained. Whilst ATC can certainly advise that the first minima is not being met (RVR), they have no way of making any judgement on the second, even if the reported cloudbase is below the published minima. Only the pilot in the air can see the visual reference ... or can't.

The ANO also states that

A flight shall not be continued towards the aerodrome of intended landing unless the latest available information indicates that conditions at that aerodrome, or at least one alternate aerodrome, will, at the estimated time of arrival, be at or above the specified aerodrome operating minima.

Yet another failing of the PIC on this fatal flight, whichever pilot that might have been.

Some posts talk of the ''crew'' failing, assuming that it was a multi crew operation, but this cannot be the position legally. The PA28 is a single crew aircraft. There is no P2 and thus no P2 responsibility. Whilst the 2nd person on board might have been assisting with tasks and helping with any decision making processes, in law they had no crew responsibilities. That is solely down to the designated P1.

Thanks for your story Corsair. Lots of good human factors issues in there and I am glad you made the sensible and correct decision.

Islander2

21st Apr 2008, 09:53

Andrew Walker should have clearly established the operating status of the other guy if he believed the flight to be InstructionalIn the light of subsequent events, it's difficult to argue against that.

However, the background to this flight is surely vital in understanding Mr Walker's mindset. Two key factors:

1) Andrew Walker had planned with the club to undertake refresher training that day.

2) The particular flight was initiated at the request of the club CFI after, we are told, he had been informed by Andrew Walker that he lacked the legally required currency to carry passengers and was therefore unable to act as PIC.

In those circumstances, I wonder how many pilots (especially those with only 110 hours spread over twelve years), would have queried whether the pilot arranged by the CFI to accompany him was legally qualified to, and intent on, carrying out an instructional flight? And how many would have simply made the reasonable assumption that they were?

Based only on the information available to us in the AAIB report, I'm near certain camp I would have been in.

S-Works

21st Apr 2008, 09:54

I have used the term crew to refer to the fact that their were two qualified pilots onboard and therefore there should have been twice the capacity to make good calls. As it turns out it was twice the capacity to make bad calls.

Long final, I have had to make the point several times because we seem to be drifting towards a witch hunt towards holding the CFI/School responsible because they encouraged the flight. There is also a lot of vitrolic and emotion surrounding the allegedly dodgy antics of this organisation and their are people trying to push the responsibility from the 'crew' to other people when to my mind the crew were responsible for their own actions.

I am therefore trying to separate the emotion and bad blood from what should be a sober learning experience for us all.

So what have I learnt from the death of fellow aviators?

Legality - Always ensure that I am fully legal and current for the flight in question.
Peer Pressure - I am pilot in command, my decision is full and final. If that means I end up in a hotel stranded then so be it, it is the nature of private aviation.
Aircraft suitability - Is the aircraft suitable for the planned mission? If not then as pilot in command I will refuse the flight regardless of how many more experienced people tell me it will be fine.
Command decisions - Did I preflight plan correctly? Is the weather suitable for the planned nature of the flight. Do I have sufficient fuel for destination and diversion? Have I carried out a proper weight and balance.

I am not interested in the rest of the blackpool politics that seem to surround this because I am not looking to transfer blame through emotional involvement.

vanHorck

21st Apr 2008, 09:57

Corsair

Very impressive.
The difference between you and the Blackpool pilot is that you resisted. Of course peer pressure is hard to resist. Thats why we must all, as pilots, be aware of this pressure and teach ourselves to resist it when our little angel tells us to do so.

It keeps coming back to the same issue. Being PIC is more than flying an aeroplane. It also means understanding what PIC means.

I am sure many pilots who have read this thread will have thought hard about this and i hope we all will continue to do so, so that hopefully we can be Corsairs and not Blackpool statistics.

Perhaps we should all also wonder what will happen if, god forbid, something happens to US. Do we want our relatives to involve others in case the AAIB reports it as being our fault? How do we as pilots stand versus the no cure no pay lawyers? Can we legally prevent anything should we so wish in our wills?

I for one would not like anyone else to be sued for my death unless the AAIB found i had no part in my demise.

just trying to break the taboo.......

charliegolf

21st Apr 2008, 09:59

I've followed the thread as it has developed, and am full of sympathy for those who have had loss.

It seems to me that captaincy is the underdeveloped skill in this (and perhaps in GA?) episode.

I once witnessed (as a lowly sergeant crewman) a freshly minted Flying Officer Puma pilot refuse to take off in the face of serious pressure from an Air Commodore. The weather was poor. The FO reminded the Air Comm that he was the aircraft captain; and that he would wait an hour before making a decision. The other guy was livid- but here's the thing- he stopped pushing.

The green suited sky God thing wears thin in the RAF sometimes, but one thing that was up front in big letters was 'YOU ARE THE CAPTAIN, NO-ONE OVERRULES YOU'.

That didn't always stop idiots pressing on and killing themselves, but it always gave the aircraft commander a legal position from which to say 'No!'.

That might be the lesson worth learning here- whilst noting that most student pilots see air law as a chore. This bit is important.

CG

horsebox

21st Apr 2008, 10:11

The further lessons to be learned do indeed concern the elephant in the room. The FTO is no more. But the head elephant lives on.

Several have commented on the FTO aspect.

The "de facto" CFI moved quickly to place this flight outside of the remit of his FTO. If he hadn't it would have placed the flight squarely under the rules of the flying order book, which sets out clear limitations for flight and places responsibilities on post holders. The aaib comments that the aircraft only had a private cat cofA, another reason why it couldn't be operated by an FTO. The paperwork for the aircraft was missing when the aaib went looking - maintainence books, tech logs etc..

An incident at Blackpool just a few weeks ago involved an aircraft taxying with some force into a fuel bowser. Look out for it in the GASIL MOR summary in coming months. A simple and stupid mistake by the PIC - yes. No prizes for guessing who handed the keys to them. This incident is now been investigated in depth by the CAA, again there are conflicting reports of who was in the aircraft, who was manipulating the controls and who was PIC. This time no one was hurt , but history is free to repeat itself..

VFE

21st Apr 2008, 10:22

Good post Corsair.

VFE.

Supersport

21st Apr 2008, 10:45

An incident at Blackpool just a few weeks ago involved an aircraft taxying with some force into a fuel bowser. Look out for it in the GASIL MOR summary in coming months. A simple and stupid mistake by the PIC - yes. No prizes for guessing who handed the keys to them. This incident is now been investigated in depth by the CAA, again there are conflicting reports of who was in the aircraft, who was manipulating the controls and who was PIC. This time no one was hurt , but history is free to repeat itself..

Yeah, heard about that, from speaking to people who witnessed the event, very near to being a disaster, taxiing at quite a swift pace I am lead to believe, apparently its all on camera so the CAA should easily be able to see both who and what happened.

As for the CFI that handed them the keys (to his aeroplane I might add), IMO no one at Blackpool has tried harder, a combination of terrible luck and severely bad judgement will and has been his undoing.

S-Works

21st Apr 2008, 10:47

So perhaps we should separate the witch hunt from the accident in question?

It is clear that their are issues real or perceived with this organisation that need to be addressed.

mm_flynn

21st Apr 2008, 10:48

Point taken Duchess Driver. Those sort of scenarios should and will always fall down to the PIC. One thing that hasn't been mentioned is that with a cloud base of 200ft might ATC have said something too?

VFE.
One assumes, though it is not clear, that the flight departed IFR. Or atleast the ATC believed it was IFR.

mad_jock

21st Apr 2008, 10:54

Seconded very good post and unfotunatly not unique.

Its funny though isn't it. All these GA CFI guru's on flying tend to stay being big fish in puddles. And the guy's that move on generally realise quite quickly that thier respect for said guru was sadly miss placed.

172driver

21st Apr 2008, 11:02

CORSAIR well done :ok::ok:

vanHorck

21st Apr 2008, 11:12

so Horebox, surely the CFI must be prosecuted for handing the keys to his own plane to somebody who drives it into a bowser!

Come on guys! Lets separate bad luck from wilfull illegal activities.

The guy has a bad name, perhaps rightly so. I dont know him.

Perhaps the CFI was not smart enough to make his business work in the decent way and thats why he bent the rules.

Perhaps he bent the rules wilfully out of bad character.

Perhaps he was in the s**t to his neck or perhaps he just didn t care or perhaps, just perhaps he did tell the pilot of the fatal flight that he would be P1 and it was his call.... How do we know?

All we know is on the second flight that day 2 pilots died from fuel exhaustion/nil visibility/wrong altimeter setting. One of those was PIC. The AAIB claims it was Mr Walker.

That flight should never have taken off
The previous flight should never have taken off either, but thats an entirely different story

Till he has been prosecuted he is not guilty.

long final

21st Apr 2008, 11:12

Bose,

I would agree splitting the subject, and indeed there is a thread on the instructor’s forum now. My fear would be the characters involved are still around, still unchanged in their practices and methods. A ‘witch hunt’, depending on your personal definition, would not correctly describe what most of the informed Blackpool people are involved in pursuing.

LF

Islander2

21st Apr 2008, 11:26

All we know is on the second flight that day 2 pilots died from fuel exhaustion/nil visibility/wrong altimeter setting. One of those was PIC. The AAIB claims it was Mr Walker.Not quite. We know why the AAIB claim it was Mr Walker.

They say it's because: a) he was paying for the flight; b) he was seated in the left seat; and c) he was almost certainly handling the controls throughout the flight.

They give no other evidence to support their conclusion and, since the issue of who was pilot-in-command gets its own section in their report, it would be surprising if there were other considerations they had withheld.

Somebody needs to point out to them that those three conditions also apply in almost all cases to a PU/T.

corsair

21st Apr 2008, 11:34

Don't give me too much credit. I do believe that if another 'experienced' pilot was with me. I might well have deferred to him. I was lucky in one sense that the pressures such as they were. were at the end of a phone. Plus I was an avid reader of FLYING magazine's aftermath articles so was well scared of thought of CFIT! Nevertheless at one point I sat in the left seat with the key in my hand ready to go.

If you look at with a critical eye, in fact I eventually did get in the back of the aircraft knowing full well conditions were IMC and the flight was illegal, admittedly with highly experienced pilot. But was sufficiently cowed by then that the possibility of catching the train home never entered my head.

So my sympathies are with Andrew in this case. All the other individuals involved knew better. For all we know, he did too but I know what I was like at that level of experience. In exactly the same situation that would have been me.

Islander2

21st Apr 2008, 11:36

perhaps, just perhaps he did tell the pilot of the fatal flight that he would be P1 and it was his call.Since Andrew Walker had told the CFI that he couldn't undertake a flight with passengers because he hadn't flown for more than ninety days, how could the CFI tell him that nonetheless: "he would be P1 and it was his call"?

S-Works

21st Apr 2008, 12:02

So from Islanders point, Andrew Walker could have assumed that the outbound flight was an Instructional flight as it had the CFI in the RHS, presumably this could explain how a departure into 200ft took place.

This still does not explain the accident flight which was the return flight. We have to be careful to make sure that we are discussing the accident flight and not the out bound flight.

Andrew Walker could have refused that flight but instead he took the left hand seat, did not refuel and the 2 crew set off in an aircraft that did not have the correct equipment or the fuel for the trip. That was clearly a planning issue and showed poor airmanship on the part of both of the pilots on board. He would have known his passenger was no longer an Instructor so he knew that hew was still one landing short of legal yet they still took off.

Islander2

21st Apr 2008, 12:12

He would have known his passenger was no longer an Instructor so he knew that hew was still one landing short of legal yet they still took off.The AAIB say they were unable to establish whether or not he knew the other pilot was not an instructor. On what basis are you able to make that claim? Oh, and my reading of the AAIB suggests it was the same pilot in the right hand seat for both flights, making it more likely that Andrew thought he was PU/T throughout - not known, not definite, but well possible!

long final

21st Apr 2008, 12:15

Bose,

Again agreed. The facts of bad decision-making are very clear and undisputed. But if that first flight was sold as an instructional flight and that was a lie does this not need looking into also? If this happens can the same not happen again unless the people involved change their ways or have their privileges removed?

I struggle with the fact that you don’t seem to want to discuss the issue as a whole, including the initial flight, and consider that, although the guy made mistakes, under the pressure and influence that he was placed under, many low houred PPL’s in his position may have done the same, and this situation may happen again because nothing has changed in the culture.

S-Works

21st Apr 2008, 12:32

LF, I am perfectly happy to discuss the situation as a whole. But at the moment all I can see is attempts at moving the blame from the two pilots on board the aircraft to elsewhere.

Islander may well be right, that Andrew Walker was under the impression that the whole flight was Instructional. If this was the case then I would like to see the evidence that the AIB were not party to.

I am perfectly happy to have it proved to me that this was an illegal instructional flight by an instructor with a lapsed qualification in a private cat aircraft.

What I see at the moment is the peer pressure that says, we need to do this flight, you can have the flying for free, x (other victim) was an Instructor in the past and will see you right. Out they go without problem. On the ground at Exeter, they have the opportunity to refuel and and check the weather and carry out proper flight planning, none of which seems to have happened. Did they just 'blag it' because X was with him? At what point does the failure of the 2 qualified pilots on board to carry out adequate planning becomes someone else's fault?

Being a low hours PPL or not having a strong enough character to over ride the more experienced pilots does not give room for the shift of blame in my mind. Not to mention that fact that the guy had 120hrs of 3.5 years and was in the middle of studying for his ATPL exams. Talking about him like he was some naive kid does him no justice either.

Lurking123

21st Apr 2008, 12:34

Of course, if the flight had successfully landed at Blackpool, Mr Walker would still have had to do another, third landing before legally carrying a passenger. Considering it is not disputed that he pointed-out his lack of currency from the outset, you have to ask what, exactly, made him change his mind. Arguably, he either believed he was going to be legal (ie flying with an instructor or not P1) or he changed his stance and made a conscious decision to fly anyway. Is that not the crux of this whole discussion?

PS. Whenever I fly with another pilot, I ensure we know exactly who is acting as the aircraft commander.

S-Works

21st Apr 2008, 12:37

So the focus then moves to the passenger. Did he hold himself out as being a current Instructor fraudulently? If he indeed was the pilot in command, why did he not refuel, flight plan and ultimately divert? Why did TWO pilots not make good command decisions?

Lurking123

21st Apr 2008, 12:38

Dunno. It is doubtful that anyone will ever get to the bottom of that one.

Contacttower

21st Apr 2008, 12:41

Did he hold himself out as being a current Instructor fraudulently?

Perhaps that is something that will come to light at a later date?

S-Works

21st Apr 2008, 12:48

I suspect that the answer to that one was taken to the grave.

long final

21st Apr 2008, 13:00

Bose

Whoever was P1 (aware of it or not) that day was responsible. We can all look at that and learn and use it to help educate our students and fellow pilots. I personally have not tried to move the blame to anyone else. I have said that the actions of others may well have affected the pilot’s decision making. I also hope I haven’t described him as naive and childlike, I actually tried to do the opposite – maybe that didn’t translate.

Students and low houred PPL’s are often very influenced by pilots who they feel have much more experience than themselves. It does create a false sense of security sometimes. I have seen this, with very well educated professional people I have flown with. In the flying school community there is a fear often to confront people regarding their experience. Again, it shouldn’t be this way but it is. Take the club fly out when one aircraft is crewed by people who don’t know each other. It can go well, but equally I have seen near disastrous outcomes because human beings were involved and the limited experience of the individuals created communication problems.

Again, I reiterate, the crew were to blame whoever was P1 and they paid for that, but, the trail that led to that point involves people who had some responsibility to act in very different ways to the way they did. Making poor decisions themselves is one thing, but knowingly operating a flight (allegedly) illegally does mean they have some responsibility. Not for the return flight but in a professional sense generally. I don’t know if you are an instructor bose, but I do know how people can be influenced by the big fish in the small pond. The whole thing stinks to me.

mm_flynn

21st Apr 2008, 13:53

While the command decisions were clearly poor and those on the accident flight paid the price, collectively 4 pilots set-out on a mission, that as constituted could not be accomplished safely. This speaks to a problem more endemic than poor decisions by a single individual.

As far as I can tell from the AAIB report, there was no relevant information the 4 pilots (plus the de facto CFI) were missing - yet every one of them decided to get into a plane and set off on a mission that would fail.

The Aircraft was over gross
The weather was at IR minimums for an ILS
The aircraft didn't have the navigation equipment to recover into Blackpool in the current and forecast weather
The weather was forecast to be as bad or worse for the rest of the day
The flight time was going to result in the crew returning at dusk (assuming a quick turn in Exeter)

All 5 people should have known that this was going to end, at best, in the aircraft and crew having a night out in some diversion airfield - yet they still set off - why?

Furthermore, depending on who was PIC and what rolls if any others were playing a variety of illegalities may have existed around the flight.

S-Works

21st Apr 2008, 14:44

I think there were plenty of illegalities around the flight all of which are wrapped up in the general display of poor decision making by all concerned.

As an Instructor myself I find the fact that there were at least 2 Instructor or former Instructors involved in this reprehensible. Instructors have a moral duty to set a good example and clearly in this case they did not.

But it is still clear that the return flight was badly planned and executed.

In my minds eye I can see the situation and the pressure that may have been applied for the outbound flight. It strikes me that the return flight was get home itus because as far as the other 2 passengers were concerned they were all right.

But at the end of the day peer pressure is not a criminal offense and whilst we all agree the morals are in question this did not remove the responsibility of the crew to plan properly and fly legally. Which is why I am afraid this still smacks of a witch hunt.

long final

21st Apr 2008, 15:03

Well, it appears we agree on most points, though with a different slant on some issues. My last point Bose, would just be my understanding of witch-hunt. Generally I would liken a witch-hunt to a process to expose subversive activities with a hidden agenda to undermine or undeservedly damage the investigated.

Pedantic I know, but personally that is not my intention. Firstly I know first hand the individuals involved here, I have experience of them and secondly, if that is not to be considered, what has come from this already shows that those involved were culpable and don’t need anyone’s help here to undermine them. Certainly, not in any unjust way. So, IMO, not a witch-hunt.

LF

VFE

21st Apr 2008, 15:10

When is comes to IFR minima (nevermind VFR!) the UK AIP states that, for non-public transport flights, the minimum weather conditions for take-off should never be less than 600ft cloud base (recommended) and 1'800 metres in-flight visibility (mandatory).

It is all to do with the chances of a successful landing following EFATO. The definitions of 'shall' and 'should' are covered by a PPL student studying for their Air Law exam therefore should require no explanation here.

So, where might ATC fit into this when they pass take-off clearences to pilots of non-public transport single-engined aircraft on days when the weather is clearly below the above minima? Maybe some recommended practices, if not already in existance, might be of use in the future? Just a suggestion.

Please be aware that my suggestion is not some veiled attempt at suggesting some culpability may lie with the ATC team working that fateful day but as another possible positive step forward following the outcome of this forthcoming inquest, if indeed such reasons are behind an inquest of this nature.

ATC instructions for pilots to check their imimum decent height on SAR procedures are common - why not certain take-offs?

VFE.

S-Works

21st Apr 2008, 15:14

culpable..... See thats where we wont agree. The only people culpable were the crew and it cost them their lives.

There were other outside pressures that existed certainly but culpability would such an element of coercion and that I have not seen.

S-Works

21st Apr 2008, 15:16

VFE

21st Apr 2008, 15:18

There was no 'crew' on this flight Bose-X. Only a PIC. It is misplaced use of these types of terminology that lead to misunderstandings such as the one which may have occured on Mr.Walker's flight.

VFE.

PS: Re: your question Bose-X; Scrub 'IFR Minima' and insert 'Take off minima'.

S-Works

21st Apr 2008, 15:24

PS: Re: your question Bose-X; Scrub 'IFR Minima' and insert 'Take off minima'.

Thanks, you had me confused for a moment....... ;)

I explained earlier that I was using the term crew as a generic statement for the fact that their were two pilots on board which should have given them twice the capacity for making the right calls.

There is a difference between surmising that the P1 might be other than stated but no evidence to support it. Who do you think the P1 was?

bookworm

21st Apr 2008, 15:33

So, where might ATC fit into this when they pass take-off clearences to pilots of non-public transport single-engined aircraft on days when the weather is clearly below the above minima? Maybe some recommended practices, if not already in existance, might be of use in the future? Just a suggestion.

There's a chance of this tragedy resulting in some positive human factors outcomes, whether in the form of knowledge or regulation. A blurring of the distinction of responsibility between ATC and the aircraft commander would not be one of those positive outcomes. The clearest lesson to be learnt is one about clarity of responsibility.

ATC exists to separate aircraft and manage traffic, with a secondary function of providing information. It does not exist to police the air, nor to provide advice to pilots who have mismanaged their flight.

VFE

21st Apr 2008, 15:42

Who do you think the P1 was?

Not for me to decide altho the AAIB have given their answer it would seem. From the outside there appears to have been an air of misplaced multi-crew operation about this flight. It wouldn't be the first time and it certainly won't be the last either. As you know Bose, the CAA are keen for us instructors not to use the term "we will" when conducting our PPL lessons. "You will" being the prefered term for precisely the reasons highlighted here.

ATC exists to separate aircraft and manage traffic, with a secondary function of providing information. It does not exist to police the air, nor to provide advice to pilots who have mismanaged their flight.

I agree entirely Bookworm. Hence the reason why I stated 'recommended practices'. It just might bring a halt in an error chain. No suggestion that ATC should be tasked with policing the air. Responsibilty must lie with PIC. To request a SEP pilot check their take-off minima when bad weather exists is not exactly an overstretch of juristriction IMHO.

VFE.

Lurking123

21st Apr 2008, 15:53

Military ATC are required to report to the CAA any approach made by a civil aircraft with a visibility of less than 1000m. Don't ask me why, but it is indicative of a (policing?) process which is already in place.

bookworm

21st Apr 2008, 16:27

Fair enough VFE. But do you think that a flight piloted by someone out of legal currency, intending to take off over legal max weight, well beyond legal licence privileges, into a 200 ft ceiling is going to say anything other than "Roger" in response to such a warning?

VFE

21st Apr 2008, 17:05

One must admit, you have a fair point there Bookworm me ole... guess it would only help satisfy a conscience or two when you get cases like this.

VFE.

PPRuNe Radar

21st Apr 2008, 19:27

When is comes to IFR minima (nevermind VFR!) the UK AIP states that, for non-public transport flights, the minimum weather conditions for take-off should never be less than 600ft cloud base (recommended) and 1'800 metres in-flight visibility (mandatory).

It is all to do with the chances of a successful landing following EFATO. The definitions of 'shall' and 'should' are covered by a PPL student studying for their Air Law exam therefore should require no explanation here.

So, where might ATC fit into this when they pass take-off clearences to pilots of non-public transport single-engined aircraft on days when the weather is clearly below the above minima? Maybe some recommended practices, if not already in existance, might be of use in the future? Just a suggestion.

But irrelevant to the accident flight, unless the weather at their 2nd departure airfield was as bad as the limits above. When it arrived at Blackpool it was an arrival and not a departure. Different minima are on the approach charts for arrivals. The minima can only be determined by the pilot and only he can determine whether he has to carry out a missed approach or continue the approach and land.

VFE

21st Apr 2008, 19:49

Very true PPrRadar, the departure was not directly connected to the return flight. I was kinda jumping the gun in supposing that had they not got airbourne from Blackpool then the fateful return flight would not have occured - you can't have a return leg without the initial departure. I understand your point tho.

VFE.

PPRuNe Radar

21st Apr 2008, 19:54

Your point is kind of like the custom in some Arabic States where a Westerner will be blamed for a crash in a taxi and be liable for any costs, because if the Westerner had not hired it, the crash would not have occurred !! :)

VFE

21st Apr 2008, 20:02

:}
Yes you could look at it like that PPrRadar, however, my point in raising this originally was not to attribute any blame following an accident, but merely to enquire whether or not an ATC prompted "check take-off minima" along the lines of "check 3 greens" would be possible prior to SEP departures in known bad weather conditions? I would imagine airports have a vested interest in not seeing SEP's plough into neighbouring housing estates as a result of EFATO below recommended take off minima? Yes it is the PIC responsibility but clearly, following this accident, people are still doing it and sadly for GA, the general public are becoming wise to it too these days.

VFE.

Knight Paladin

21st Apr 2008, 20:06

Either way - they got airborne from a seriously clagged in airfield intending to return to that airfield the same day, when the weather was forecast to remain poor. And not only that, but they did so without fuel reserves to reach a suitable diversion. To put it bluntly, it was horrendously bad planning. Even in a suitably equipped aircraft, with a suitably rated (not just an IMC) pilot, a 200ft cloudbase is right on the limit for light aircraft operation. At the very least you should carry enough fuel to reach an airfield with better forecast weather. Carrying fuel for a suitable diversion is one of the absolute basics in aviation, and for failing to respect that these two individuals paid the ultimate price.

To be perfectly honest, I feel that all this discussion of who is to blame is missing the point. Everyone concerned in the whole sorry saga should have been in no doubt that the decision to go was very, very wrong - all are culpable. In my book even someone witnessing the planning would have had a moral obligation to voice their concerns.

long final

21st Apr 2008, 20:34

My argument with Bose. Semantics maybe, but I believe culpable to be true. Had an illegal flight (allegedly – again!) not been endorsed by the CFI they would never have been in the position to make the bad error judgements they did. They are to blame, but I still do not believe totally in a moral sense. Maybe a tenuous argument, I guess the legal action will make its own conclusions.

DFC

21st Apr 2008, 21:13

ATC can not spend time checking every pilot's qualifications.

An IR holder can depart from Blackpool perfectly legally VFR in a PA28 with Overcast 200 and 1500m visibility and provided that they remain clear of cloud and in sight of the surface with the 1500m visibility they remain legal in Class G airspace.

Perhaps a tightening of VMC criteria in the vicinity of aerodromes and a requirement for the pilot to record VFR or IFR as part of the booking out procedure would help.

---------

If Joe walks into a flying club and explains that he is out of currency and needs a check flight. The response is - yes no problem Bob here will fly with you. How many people will question Bob's qualifications? Most Bob's would be insulted if the average Joe looking for a checkout asked to see their licence, medical and logbook before flying. If the club propose Bob then the club has the responsibility to sensure that Bob is fit for purpose.

It was asked how this person would regain currency on such an outing. Well such outings are very common in cases of lack of currency - 1 landing away and on arrival back at base, a touch and go followed by a full stop.

-----------

It always has amazed me how many CFIs/ clubs cry foul at the few airports that refuse to honour the no landing fee for weather diversion scheme.

However, take advantage of that free landing fee at some far away field and do not expect the Club to do anything other than a) Charge you some daily rate for loss of use of the aircraft while you wait for suitable weather or b) charge you the cost of recovering the aircraft. For many the free landing fee is spent several times over in club fees that will never be waived.

-----------

Radar,

Your quote from the ANO is very appropriate. More appropriate is the requirement that a VFR flight shall not depart unless the actual and forecast weather indicates that the VFR flight can be completed safely.

Far too many VFR flights end up being part VFR and part IFR and until this practice is more frowned upon rather than encouraged people will have scant regard for safe operating practice.

The reason why a VFR flight can not depart unless it is VMC to destination is that there is no requirement for a VFR flight to have an alternate. Thus in this case taking the flight as being a VFR flight there was no requirment for an alternate. However, the flight could not depart because without doubt at least part of it was going to be IFR in IMC.

In terms of fuel, the flight being a VFR one should have arrived over Blackpool with a minimum of 45 minutes flight time at holding (best endurance) power. Thus the aircraft should have been able to divert some 45 minutes flying time from Blackpool.

However, since the flight could not have departed Exeter on a VFR flight to Blackpool (it would have to have been an IFR or an "Z" flight -VFR then IFR) one has to not simply question the planning but once again that like the first flight which was obvously an IFR flight from the start that the second flight was either an IFR or VFR to IFR flight from the very start.

--------

As an aside, those that advocate the changing of PIC mid-flight should read and understand how the AAIB will establish PIC after an accident.

However, saying that all the AAIB's thinking can also be applie to a training flight does not work because for a legal training flight, the instructor would be qualified and would be operating as part of an FTO or an RTF.

I do not think that was the case here.

Regards,

DFC

bookworm

22nd Apr 2008, 12:15

More appropriate is the requirement that a VFR flight shall not depart unless the actual and forecast weather indicates that the VFR flight can be completed safely.

And where precisely would I find this requirement, DFC?

There is a requirement in Art 52 that the commander "take all reasonable steps to satisfy himself before the aircraft takes off ... that the flight can safely be made," but that makes no distinction between VFR and IFR. Otherwise, provided an alternate ("an aerodrome to which an aircraft may proceed when it becomes either impossible or inadvisable to proceed to or to land at the aerodrome of intended landing") is available, there is no such restriction on a VFR departure.

boy entrant

22nd Apr 2008, 12:37

Not wanting to condone this CFIs behaviour (he has to live with his conscience),

two months after the accident his father received an invoice for £320 from the FTO for the ill fated trip there is also a claim on Andy's estate for £20,000 for the loss of G-BBBKs' hull as it was not insured

mad_jock

22nd Apr 2008, 13:14

If true.

I was undecided about this one after reading the accident report and have experenced some of the bullying that some CFI's think is acceptable.

As far as I am concerned now I hope the current legal enquiry hang the bastard out to dry. And even if the legal teams manage to hang everything on those who arn't there to defend themselves. A good public airing should let folk know what sort of person they are dealing with.

And I think the CFI is perfectly happy with his consciencene if he has the cheak to issue a invoice for the trip.

corsair

22nd Apr 2008, 14:31

two months after the accident his father received an invoice for £320 from the FTO for the ill fated trip there is also a claim on Andy's estate for £20,000 for the loss of G-BBBKs' hull as it was not insured

Well that takes the biscuit. Why am I not surprised? You have to wonder at the mentality of people who sit down and issue an invoice like that. Reminds me of the time a fireman was docked pay because he didn't finish his shift. Or at least his widow was because of course he had died in a fire during that shift.

Supersport

22nd Apr 2008, 14:34

two months after the accident his father received an invoice for £320 from the FTO for the ill fated trip there is also a claim on Andy's estate for £20,000 for the loss of G-BBBKs' hull as it was not insured

If that is infact true... it beggars belief. I mean jeez, talk about kicking someone when they are way way down. Absolutely ***:mad:*** disgusting.

Initially, from reading the AAIB report and from talking to people at Blackpool I did feel like the CFI was getting a slightly heavy slap, people keep mentioning his conscience, it is now my opinion that he really doesn't have one if the above statement is true. Hang the bastard out to dry indeed.

mad_jock

22nd Apr 2008, 14:45

Unfortunately the docking of ones pay after death or accident has a long established history. I believe they were going to try it on after Piper Alpha.

Thankfully the Aberdeen oxy exec's realised the chances of them making it to the supermarket and back without some toolpusher breaking thier legs was pretty slim.

I discovered it while reading about the titianic. All pay was stopped from the moment she sank.

vanHorck

22nd Apr 2008, 15:49

And what if the CFI's legal advisers strongly recommended the CFI to issue both the invoice as well as the claim for the hull simply because not doing so could constitute an acceptance of guilt?

It may not be nice if these things happen, but this does not mean somebody does not have a morality.

Once a tragedy like this happens the lawyers call the shots.

I have heard on this forum that this CFI has been condemned by the CAA (and i assume subsequently paid his dues for that?), that he was bad because he let his own plane crash into a bowser during a rental and everything in between....

It is obvious this man is disliked by the Blackpool flying community (or part of it). This does not make that person (whom I don't know) a criminal being hung out to dry even before the coroner's verdict .

I ve also heard the story that he suffers from bad luck and poor management skills (perhaps combined with a love for flying?) combined and that this has resulted in his bad name.

Lets try to be level headed about this and await whatever new FACTS will emerge during the coroner's hearings and concentrate for now on what we can learn from this tragedy

gasax

22nd Apr 2008, 19:21

"And what if the CFI's legal advisers strongly recommended the CFI to issue both the invoice as well as the claim for the hull simply because not doing so could constitute an acceptance of guilt?

It may not be nice if these things happen, but this does not mean somebody does not have a morality."

Well that I think is the view of a weak and feeble person who actually has no morality! At the end of the day that sort of advice come from risk adverse people who are desperately trying to cover their ar:mad:ses. Eiterh you have a sense of morality - and will declare it and act in accordance with it - or you will not - and you';; try and hide behind 'advice'.

I watched and read all of these related threads and find the wole situation very sad. I'm quite long in the tooth and have a reasonable level of experience. The pilot had neither of those and I've put myself in the same situation as him and to be honest I could have been in at least half the trouble he was - if not more.

But ~I was never in the position of a CFI pushing me into making stupid decisions when I did not know much better. But at one point I did have a CFI showing me how to do circuits at an unlicenced airstrip (strangely it was before I took my air law exam...............). Unfortunately I suspect that many illegal practices are quite common in flying clubs that scratch a living.

But back to the point - you stand and fall by your personal reputation - advice is just that - if you are naturally a fair and decent person that will shine through your actions, if you are not................

bjornhall

22nd Apr 2008, 19:23

concentrate for now on what we can learn from this tragedy

Excellent idea. Answer: Nothing whatsoever. It is already well understood how to avoid accidents like this one. Namely, to fly as we are taught to fly. If you get your PPL, and learn absolutely nothing afterwards, you will not have this type of accident.

Those in this thread and elsewhere who try to "put part of the blame" on someone other than the PIC (why in all the world does anyone have to be blamed???), argue that it was outside influences that made the pilot perform this flight. "He did not make the decisions; someone else made them for him." As a solution to this it is suggested, bizarrely, that further outside influences are required; a new PPL holder should not make any and all decisions regarding the flight, but somebody else (CFI etc) should make part of them for him. "He should be better supervised".

Yet had this pilot been entirely unsupervised, the accident would not have happened. When unsupervised low-hour PPLs are left to their own devises and decision making skills, some of them might occasionally run off the far end at Nethertorpe. But they don't launch VFR into a 200 ft overcast, unless they unlearn part of their PPL training, or are under the impression that they are not responsible for their actions.

Even the lowest level of supervision will risk similar effects. "The CFI didn't stop me, so it must be ok to fly today." Guidance, advice when asked for (or unsolicited in extreme cases), education and training made available; all great! Rules and regulations (both official and club rules; how about proper planning minima?) work well, since it is the PIC who determines whether or not conditions are inside the rules, thus avoiding the "I wasn't stopped so its fine"-trap. But supervision, in the GA/PPL world, is highly undesireable and downright dangerous.

Unless one would want to take the supervision to the level used in airliner or military operations. That is entirely impractical for the GA world; thank gods!

DFC

22nd Apr 2008, 19:47

There is a requirement in Art 52 that the commander "take all reasonable steps to satisfy himself before the aircraft takes off ... that the flight can safely be made," but that makes no distinction between VFR and IFR. Otherwise, provided an alternate ("an aerodrome to which an aircraft may proceed when it becomes either impossible or inadvisable to proceed to or to land at the aerodrome of intended landing") is available, there is no such restriction on a VFR departure.

It does not have to make a distinction between VFR and IFR since it is obvious.

You can not depart on a VFR flight from A to B unless the actual and forecast weather indicate that the flight can be made VFR.

You can not depart on a VFR flight from A to B when the actual and forecast weather at B is less than VMC even if you have a VMC alternate C. What you are doing in that case is departing VFR from A to C with the posibility of changing the destination later to B if the weather improves.

You can however depart on a flight that is planned to be VFR first and then IFR later or the other way round if the IMC bity is at the departure end. You can even plan to be VFR then IFR and then VFR again.

Or of course you can plan IFR for the whole flight.

Too many pilots depart on what they call VFR flights knowing full well that at some stage they will probably have to fly IFR.

If at the planning stage you can not show that the flight will be VFR to destination then quite simply it will not be a VFR flight to that destination. How hard is that for the PPL to understand.

Regards,

DFC

PS as well as the ANO you should check the ICAO annex and UK AIP (for differences).

long final

22nd Apr 2008, 19:56

bjornhall,

I hope to hell you never make a bad decision in your future flying days. I think you should take time out with your holier than thou attitude. You have a lot to learn.

bjornhall

22nd Apr 2008, 20:08

And this comes from someone learning to fly :sad:

Two people lost their lives because of poor decisions made on that day. I happen to think that some people (and I include myself in that) will take something away from the sad circumstances that led to that accident

Excellent comment, since it shows that you have missed my point entirely! ;) So thanks for pointing out that I should have expressed myself more clearly.

There is something tremendously important to take with us from this accident, but it is not something we didn't already know. It is a reaffirmation of what we already knew. It is the same thing we can "learn", in a way, from a whole lot of other accidents, similar to this one in that almost unfathomably poor decisions were made, for one reason or another.

But it is not the particular reasons for why those decisions were made in each particular case, that are worth focusing our attention on and learning from. Rather, it is the fact that basic rules were not followed, and that the most fundamental aspects of the PPL training was overlooked. When one looks at the circumstances of serious GA accidents, one finds deliberate violations in a huge number of them (as opposed to professional flying, where errors and mistakes are far more common and violations feature more rarely in the causal factors).

What one should take away from this tragedy, IMHO, is the following:
a) Keep it simple, fly as we are taught, and follow the rules.
b) Whenever something appears complicated, see a).

But we knew that already. And that is what I meant with there being nothing to learn from this accident: There is nothing new to learn, but perhaps a very useful reminder of what it would prevent a huge part of fatal GA accidents. It is something we all learned, or are learning, during our PPL training. So let's not unlearn it.

bjornhall

22nd Apr 2008, 20:14

I hope to hell you never make a bad decision in your future flying days. I think you should take time out with your holier than thou attitude. You have a lot to learn.

Are you just trying to be insulting, or do you have anything you wish to say?

Aztec Driver

22nd Apr 2008, 20:20

Knight Paladin

22nd Apr 2008, 20:26

Bjorn - I couldn't disagree more about supervision of low hour PPLs. Some flying clubs use a system of "authorisers", notably military flying clubs, as it is clearly based on the military authorisation system. Under this system, someone other than the PIC must authorise each flight, after first satisfying themselves that the flight in question is within the capabilities of the pilot in question and that sufficient planning and preparation has occurred, and that nothing has been overlooked. After more experience has been gained, PPL holders will become "self-authorising", sometimes only in stages - being self authorising for foreign landaways could be a further qualification, for example. Yes, I appreciate that it may seem like extra red tape, and that someone can quite happily buy their own aircraft or rent from a club without such restrictions, but I would strongly suggest that clubs with such a system have a better safety record than those without. Besides the obvious benefits of supervision, it also provides a means of mentoring and developing the abilities of newly qualified PPLs - 45 hours really really isn't very much experience!

vanHorck

22nd Apr 2008, 21:22

Aztec driver

i read with interest your emotions. I guess you were involved in some way either at the FBO or as a relative/friend of someone at the FBO

thanks for explaining the issue regarding the invoice

Perhaps you d like to comment a bit more on the position of the CFI who has been accused here of many things, all of which had nothing to do directly with the flight itself

There are many emotions on this thread, good or bad, but it can help all of us if the CFI s environments view was expressed as well

I just hope people will remain civilised. Not much chance of it 100% but there are level headed balanced people here too

G-SPOTs Lost

22nd Apr 2008, 23:27

Bollocks, Bollocks and Bollocks !!!
You all summise and no nothing !!!
The father of the deceased requested an invoice to be raised, so Bollocks, Bollocks , and more Bollocks
This is a witch Hunt by the father of the deceased to gain some cultrubility to thoes that now have to take the flack for the bad airmanship deployed by the people who are not here to defend themselves
Bollocks, Bollocks and by the way more Bollocks !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Ok Father requested invoice for one of two reasons:

1. He's a stand up chap - thought it was the right thing to do
2. It is for another legal reason and he has been reccomended to do so.

Notwithstanding that.............

Case 1, he should have been told "dont be so f*ckin daft after your tragic loss we dont want a penny"

Case 2 he should have been sent an invoice with a credit note attached so taht the appropiate pieces of paper could have been waved around at each other.

To invoice this guy is shocking but somehow i'm not shocked - why?

There has been a lot of discussion about P1 PIC who was responsible and other aspects, the simple fact is that if this lad had gone to any other school on the field he would probably be doing an IR right now

Be a bit more respectful you knob - he's lost his son

Islander2

23rd Apr 2008, 01:17

Aztec Driver

You seem to have joined the small number here who believe that Andrew Walker and/or the accompanying pilot were exclusively culpable for this tragic accident.

Just for clarification, if you'd been an experienced pilot who was to be carried in that aeroplane to collect a twin from Exeter, what if any words of advice would you have given to a pilot proposing to take off, overweight, into a 200ft-base overcast when the TAF for their return was no better, when the pilot had 106 hours total time gained over 12 years and of which only 3.8 were in the previous 13 months, when the pilot's experience on instruments had totalled 1.3 hours, and when the aeroplane had no functioning radio navigation equipment?

boy entrant

23rd Apr 2008, 07:00

bookworm

23rd Apr 2008, 07:42

You can not depart on a VFR flight from A to B unless the actual and forecast weather indicate that the flight can be made VFR.

You can not depart on a VFR flight from A to B when the actual and forecast weather at B is less than VMC even if you have a VMC alternate C. What you are doing in that case is departing VFR from A to C with the posibility of changing the destination later to B if the weather improves.

You're making it up as you go along, once again DFC. This is in your imagination, not in the legislation. In the same way that an IFR flight may depart with its destination below minima provided it has a suitable alternate, so too may a VFR flight. Article 49 does not even distinguish between a "VFR flight" and an "IFR flight". Its provisions refer to flight rules only in the context of anticipating IFR at the destination.

Too many pilots depart on what they call VFR flights knowing full well that at some stage they will probably have to fly IFR.

And your point is well made, and relevant here. You don't need to invent regulation to support it.

S-Works

23rd Apr 2008, 09:10

Well no prizes for guessing who “Aztec Driver” could be on an ill fated trip to pick up an Aztec I feel I owe him a thank you for giving us all an insight into the loud mouthed, know it all, bullying character that Andy was dealing with, and of course his ability to spell Bollocks

Don't know him or any of the characters and don't care about the politics.

But it does strike me that you have just lowered yourself to the very level you were criticizing. Kettle and pot?

DFC

23rd Apr 2008, 09:10

Bookworm,

It is so simple I can not understand why PPLs fail to understand the principle.

You can not expect to safely fly from A to B unless the weather at A, at B and on the proposed route is good enough to permit VFR flight. That is it. Simple.

Please read ICAO Annex 6, Part 2, Chapter 4, 4.6.1 This deals with VFR flights and is the UK standard in this regard.

VFR flights are not required to have alternates and are not required to have fuel to divert at the destination.

They are required to have a final reserve which in this case would have been 45 minutes.

Regards,

DFC

PS You are also wrong about the IFR flight - An IFR flight can only depart for a destination which is below minima when it has two suitable alternates above alternate minima

S-Works

23rd Apr 2008, 09:12

And your point is well made, and relevant here. You don't need to invent regulation to support it.

It's his way.......

G-ROAR

23rd Apr 2008, 09:12

Well said Islander 2.

I fly from Blackpool and have done so for the past 30 years. There is no way I would have undertaken that flight since the forecast for the return trip showed no improvement. The aerodrome operating minima for runway 28 is 200ft QFE and I use 250ft.
For runway 10 the minima is 380ft QFE for a NDB/DME approach and for an aircraft with no navaids an SRA approach is a 870ft.

However to attempt this approach I would insist on 3 things:-
1) Suitably equipped aircraft with all navaids required for a precision approach working.
2) IR rated pilot.
3) Pilot is current, having flown frequently in last few weeks in IFR conditions and is comfortable flying an approach down to minima.

If I cannot satisfy myself that all of the above are in place I do not go. Many a time I have been out of practice, having not flown for a few weeks, and I have binned a trip yet on paper I have the IR, have the right equipment on the aircraft but not current enough to satisfy myself that I am 100%.

Would I have let my son, who is a PPL, or anyone under my care attempt a flight like that? Not in a million years. What a tragic accident which shows how a young man can be shoved in a direction he didn't want to go.

S-Works

23rd Apr 2008, 09:17

What a tragic accident which shows how a young man can be shoved in a direction he didn't want to go.

Where is the evidence that he was shoved and where is the evidence that he did not want to go?

Once again there is a suggestion of forceful coercion here rather than what seems to be a naive young man being encouraged to operate outside of his ability. It is a fine line but nonetheless a line.

Supersport

23rd Apr 2008, 10:32

Once again there is a suggestion of forceful coercion here rather than what seems to be a naive young man being encouraged to operate outside of his ability. It is a fine line but nonetheless a line.

I think the word shoved is representative of the encouragement / persuasion that Andrew Walker recieved from the CFI.

We are all well aware that at the end of the day, that encouraged or not, Andrew could have said no. I am well aware that the 'blame' for the accident cannot be shifted to the CFI, ultimately the 2 occupants of the aircraft are to blame with the extensive chain of poor decision making / planning.

Tell me this though Bose-X, put yourself in the CFI's position, had you been there on that day, would you have actively encouraged a plain PPL holder to take on a flight of this nature, knowing full well that he was out of currency? More to the point, if you had been the CFI would you have even asked in the first place? I know what my answer would be.

The fact that he even asked, knowing full well the currency / experience level, smacks of desperation. The fact that he had to ask twice makes it even clearer.

bookworm

23rd Apr 2008, 10:40

Please read ICAO Annex 6, Part 2, Chapter 4, 4.6.1 This deals with VFR flights and is the UK standard in this regard.

Annex 6 part 2 does not regulate private flights within the UK. The flight that is relevant to this thread was Blackpool to Exeter, to Blackpool. It was regulated by the ANO.

PS You are also wrong about the IFR flight - An IFR flight can only depart for a destination which is below minima when it has two suitable alternates above alternate minima

And again you quote an inappropriate regulation. That's a JAR-OPS1 requirement (1.295). It doesn't apply to private flights in the UK.

Art 49 (6B) A flight shall not be continued towards the aerodrome of intended landing unless the latest available information indicates that conditions at that aerodrome, or at least one alternate aerodrome, will, at the estimated time of arrival, be at or above the specified aerodrome operating minima. (My bold).

S-Works

23rd Apr 2008, 10:43

supersport, read the whole thread. At no time have I condoned the immoral behavior exhibited by all parties. What I am trying to do is make the point that I see no FORCE or COERCION in this, just bad advice and bad decision making.

Supersport

23rd Apr 2008, 10:56

It taking 2 attempts (phone calls) to persuade Andrew Walker to go ahead with the flight, seems like coercion to me, forceful maybe not but I would take that as coercion.

Persuade / Coerce - another fine line.

S-Works

23rd Apr 2008, 11:06

Persuade / Coerce - another fine line.

Maybe in your mind, take a look at the dictionary and legal definition.

persuade |pərˈswād|
verb [ trans. ]
cause (someone) to do something through reasoning or argument : it wasn't easy, but I persuaded him to do the right thing.
• [ trans. ] cause (someone) to believe something, esp. after a sustained effort; convince : they must often be persuaded of the potential severity of their drinking problems | [ trans. ] he did everything he could to persuade the police that he was the robber.
• (of a situation or event) provide a sound reason for (someone) to do something : the cost of the manor's restoration persuaded them to take in guests.

coerce |kōˈərs|
verb [ trans. ]
persuade (an unwilling person) to do something by using force or threats : they were coerced into silence. See note at compel .
• obtain (something) by such means : their confessions were allegedly coerced by torture.

Now prove coercion and I will consider a change of stance.

172driver

23rd Apr 2008, 11:14

You are debating the wrong flight here. The first flight, coerced, illegal or otherwise, landed uneventfully at the intended destination.

What beggars belief is that having already completed a flight that was marginal (to put it very, very charitably), none of the two pilots bothered to check the wx back in Blackpool or to uplift fuel. No matter who the PIC was (and the AAIB report is quite clear here, contrary to what some posters claim), this is madness of the highest order.

One wonders how these two guys got their licenses in the first place. :ugh:

Supersport

23rd Apr 2008, 12:10

coerce |kōˈərs|
verb [ trans. ]
persuade (an unwilling person) to do something by using force or threats : they were coerced into silence. See note at compel .
• obtain (something) by such means : their confessions were allegedly coerced by torture.

Now prove coercion and I will consider a change of stance.

:D:D:D:D:D

I've underlined the relevent word from your dictionary extract. I am well aware of the difference.

So basically what you're saying is that because he wasn't beaten into submission or by the CFI, this renders the CFI exempt from from any responsibility? Maybe true from an Aviation perspective (e.g. the AAIB Report) but from an outsiders perspective definately a bad call, especially coming from an authoritative figure. IMHO with regards to this scenario, persuade, coerce, both equally as bad as each other, as the eventuality would have still been the same.

You are debating the wrong flight here. The first flight, coerced, illegal or otherwise, landed uneventfully at the intended destination.

What beggars belief is that having already completed a flight that was marginal (to put it very, very charitably), none of the two pilots bothered to check the wx back in Blackpool or to uplift fuel. No matter who the PIC was (and the AAIB report is quite clear here, contrary to what some posters claim), this is madness of the highest order.

One wonders how these two guys got their licenses in the first place. :ugh:

I couldn't agree more, point is though, if the CFI hadn't have been persistent i.e. if he'd have taken no for an answer first time around, neither flight wouldn't have taken place.

S-Works

23rd Apr 2008, 12:26

I am merely pointing out that persuading someone is very different from coercion as per the dictionary explanation. I gave the full meaning of the two words rather than trying to extract bits to twist into something else......

So let me be clear: As far as I can see Mr Walker was persuaded to go flying by someone (CFI)?), as a pilot who was doing his ATPL exams and would need hours to do the CPL and IR he was naturally keen to gain hours and agreed. This made him a willing participant albeit naive.

At no time has anyone proven that he was coerced by use of force or threats to undertake the flight and was therefore he was not an unwilling participant.

Further to this as 172driver points out, the first flight which was quite clearly illegal in a number of aspects was successful. The second flight showed the poor airmanship and planning that killed them. So once again I have yet to see evidence of coercion (or even persuasion) for the return leg.

There is however VERY clear proof that their are personal and political issues amongst posters on here with the CFI of the establishment and this sad event is being used as a vehicle for attack.

So as I still see it, the actual cause of the accident was down to the poor preparation and planning by those on board. From a purely human factors perspective there is a lot to be learnt.

I couldn't agree more, point is though, if the CFI hadn't have been persistent i.e. if he'd have taken no for an answer first time around, neither flight wouldn't have taken place.

Hindsight is 20/20 vision. If the weather had been different, if the aircraft had better equipment, if they had more fuel. All things that would have influenced the outcome. Making 'what if' type statements is just emotional sentiment rather than taking a cold logical view.

Supersport

23rd Apr 2008, 14:12

Hindsight is 20/20 vision. If the weather had been different, if the aircraft had better equipment, if they had more fuel. All things that would have influenced the outcome. Making 'what if' type statements is just emotional sentiment rather than taking a cold logical view.

Bose-X, yes hindsight is wonderful, I know. I will drone on again: I think anyone reading this thread or anyone who has read the AAIB Report will have it quite clear in their mind why the accident happened at what the contributing factors were.

Was this thread started to begin discussing this accident again? Nope. It was started by the Andrew Walker's father, most probably for information purposes. All I am trying to do is possibly highlight the reasoning behind the 'mission' for want of a better word, for those who still think justice has not been done.

S-Works

23rd Apr 2008, 14:26

All I am trying to do is possibly highlight the reasoning behind the 'mission' for want of a better word, for those who still think justice has not been done.

I guess that is what I have an issue with.

There is no justice to be done. The ACCIDENT was the result of a number of bad decisions pure and simple. Those that made the bad decisions paid the ultimate price. I assume that if the CFI who was involved in the whole debacle had been killed as well you would consider justice to have been served? In which case I refer back to my original comments about pointless emotion.

ford cortina

23rd Apr 2008, 14:26

I had some flights from this Club and had some dealings with the CFI.

There were no facilities to get the latest weather, no pc avaialble.
So I would check NOTAMS and WX at home, over an hour before I would arrive, I never found information on W&B at the club, although I only ever took one pax, no luggage and was very careful..
The aircraft were not in the best of state and only the complex single seemed to have any working Nav aids, I think a ADF. Although it's gear could be a bit difficult in getting down.

This young lad, had 100 hours, most of that I am sure was training. So he did not have much PIC under his belt. The aircraft was preped and ready to go, further making it look like he was under instruction and therefore not in charge, also the telephone call from a friendly CFI (who on the face of it was doing this lad a favour of letting him hour build cheaply) must have weighed towards him making this decision.

I met Roy, a few times, he was a nice old gentleman and it never occured to me to believe he was anything but an instructor. I did not ask, but then again I never flew with him.

As a fAPTL holder, current on the 737, I would would not have got in that aircraft as Pax, hell I would have took the lad to one side and explained why I was not going and offered him a bit of advise,( Okay so I can be a bit opinionated.) Why the other more qualified pilots going down as Pax did not, we don't know.

We know that the flight should never have operated, but there has to be some blame with the CFI, he must have known the situation and still he sanctioned the flight.

I remember at 100 hours on a 172 I felt invincible, I am sure most of us have.
The prospect of having a good cross country flight, with more experenced pilot in case of encountering a bit of cloud, for little money, sounds very good, to a hour builder it must be mouth watering.

Why the did not get fuel for the return trip, we will never know. Maybe they did not have any cash on them, or believed there to be enough in the tanks and as they got out in bad wx then they will be okay getting back in.

We all make mistakes in our flying career, most of the time we get away with them, sadly two men that day did not. They paid a very heavy price for that. It should not have happened and was avoidable, not just by the two of them, but by the club, other pilots and the CFI.

Supersport

23rd Apr 2008, 14:53

I assume that if the CFI who was involved in the whole debacle had been killed as well you would consider justice to have been served?

Just to clarify, I am not one of the individuals who thinks that justice still hasn't been served and I am in no way emotionally involved with this incident. I agree with you, I feel the reasons for the accident are clear, everything else is incidental / side issue indirectly related to the accident. I was just trying to shed a bit of light on the 'other side' of the subject / accident and reasoning as to why this thread was initiated in the first place.

HappyFran

23rd Apr 2008, 15:38

I almost accidentlly fell over this thread at the very beginning and have followed it through. I can honestly say that it has probably, at this moment, been the single most important aviation lesson I have learnt.

I have a nice new PPL, half a ATPL theory and 60 hours, therefore obviously have read the books, and acknowledge the relevance of human factors and what PIC means.

But to have read such a ‘case history’ (no disrespect intended) and be able to so clearly see the AAIB facts and the other influences that came to together so tragically I hope will serve as a lasting and very positive influence on new pilots like myself.

Special thanks to corsair and bose –x (You are right but I think you protest a little to much)

VFE

23rd Apr 2008, 15:54

As time goes by one finds ones self in the curious position of actually agreeing with Bose-X. Yes, it would appear other elements of this accident need addressing but the bottom line is: those guys flew the aircraft and *someone* at some point accepted responsibility by signing the tech log. Under law, that one person is deemed PIC, however, IMHO the other 'elements' should be examined here, and in law, with the hope that we all might move forward in a positive direction and avoid a similar rare accident occuring - starting with the training standards that led a young inexperienced pilot to become PIC on a flight that was obviously illegal in so many respects it makes me feel quite ill.

VFE.

Mixed Up

23rd Apr 2008, 16:13

As I recall, the child was not a minor. His age and level of maturity should therefore not be a factor. The case should be judged irrespectively of his age. I run a business and cannot by law, and do not in practice, differentiate between 18 year olds and 64 year olds.

Perhaps the best way to judge who was P1 is to consider which of those on board would reasonably have expected to have logged the flight as P1 had the flight been successful and uneventful. That person should be most accountable for the accident. A pilot's licence will otherwise be worth nothing. The flip side of control is responsibility. (This determination has ramifications when instructors suggest that the person they are checking out can log the time as P1.)

I have friends who have lost children both from natural and accidental causes and it is very difficult for them to cope. I therefore have much empathy with the father who initiated this thread, but I'm not sure I want ANYONE to be wrongly blamed for this tragedy.

bjornhall

23rd Apr 2008, 17:44

Bjorn - I couldn't disagree more about supervision of low hour PPLs.

Fair enough! :ok: And I can certainly see how your arguments are valid as well. I just think the arguments in the other direction carry more weight.

But probably, the best way is to go both ways. There are some clubs that use such supervision and make it work well, there are others that don't and make that work equally well. Trying to implement the formers' methods to the latter might not work out well at all. And as a pilot, you have a choice of which type of club to fly in. Everybody happy!

I would be very interested in some figures to support the idea that clubs using CFI supervision have a better record regarding fatal accidents.

Knight Paladin

23rd Apr 2008, 19:48

Bjorn - Steady on mate, two people agreeing to disagree on PPRuNe, that's unheard of! Take care buddy.

421C

23rd Apr 2008, 20:14

So basically what you're saying is that because he wasn't beaten into submission or by the CFI, this renders the CFI exempt from from any responsibility? Maybe true from an Aviation perspective (e.g. the AAIB Report) but from an outsiders perspective definately a bad call, especially coming from an authoritative figure. IMHO with regards to this scenario, persuade, coerce, both equally as bad as each other, as the eventuality would have still been the same.

Supersport,
Forgive me, but the "aviaiton perspective" is the one that matters most to the people on an aviation forum. It may sound harsh, but I think the culture of dispassionately discussing accidents from an aviation safety perspective is a good thing - in fact an essential thing.

I am with Bose-X on this. The principle of the responsibility and accountability of the pilot in command is a vital one. It has no grey zones. Admitting it has any grey zones is a safety issue in of itself, in case some pilot in the future, in analogous circumstances, is tempted to think that some of the responsibility of the PIC is sort of shared by some other senior figure(s). Bose's emphasis is also important because it may help a pilot, especially a less experienced one, feel less intimidated by the very real perception of "seniority gradient" in a private flying or training environment and challenge anything that doesn't 100% satisfy them when taking on the responsibility of PIC; exactly the lesson HappyFran was referring to.

You mention an outsiders' perspecitve. I understand that. The principle of the duties/responsibilities of a PIC is very 'absolute' and black and white, perhaps more so than is typical in modern culture and therefore not obvious to the outsider. Nevertheless, it is the principle that is relevant here. Based on the AAIB facts, there is nothing more to it. There may be a whole set of private thoughts and issues and "what ifs", but I hope you'll see why some people would want them firmly distanced from the accident causes and responsibility.

rgds
421C

frontlefthamster

23rd Apr 2008, 21:25

the accident causes and responsibility

go on, then, list them, for this accident. Make sure you know the true facts.

In doing so, you will utterly disprove that

The principle of the responsibility and accountability of the pilot in command is a vital one. It has no grey zones.

frontlefthamster

23rd Apr 2008, 21:28

I assume that if the CFI who was involved in the whole debacle had been killed as well you would consider justice to have been served?

No.

and some characters to keep the stupid software happy.

mm_flynn

23rd Apr 2008, 21:37

... You mention an outsiders' perspecitve. I understand that. The principle of the duties/responsibilities of a PIC is very 'absolute' and black and white, perhaps more so than is typical in modern culture and therefore not obvious to the outsider. Nevertheless, it is the principle that is relevant here. Based on the AAIB facts, there is nothing more to it. While I agree totally with the first part of your comments re PIC, to say 'there is nothing more to it', I think ignores a very material part of the accident chain. I remain staggered to think that 5 pilots (with at least an ATPL, a CFI and an ex. CPL holder in the mix) together all thought the mission was a good idea. Adding in the very real probability that the nature of how the group came together created ambiguity of the roles each individual was playing is a recipe for the disaster that occurred. There are some very important lessons to learn beyond PIC decision making.

I think it is pretty likely that no one thought they were PIC on either the outbound or return flight and not a one of the involved people seems to have raised any questions about the decisions made or tried to qualify who was making these decisions - despite what in hindsight seems to be a bonkers set of decision right from the start.

There may be an isolated set of conditions as some have implied, however, until that is established definitively, it seems prudent to consider the broad question of why a group of people with a range of qualifications in aviation all concluded that the mission was sensible.

--------
My view of the 'mission' they all had in mind was -
1 - Set out from a clagged in field in an aircraft with minimal nav kit
2 - Drop off two people to collect an aircraft
3 - Both aircraft return before night fall to said clagged in field with forecast conditions to get worse.
4 - Have no expectation of a possible diversion (i.e. call to mom is to drop money off not to let her know you might not be home tonight because weather may cause diversion)

DFC

23rd Apr 2008, 22:10

I remain staggered to think that 5 pilots (with at least an ATPL, a CFI and an ex. CPL holder in the mix) together all thought the mission was a good idea.

I am not unfortunately.

The deaths of those two people did not happen because of poor planning, who was PIC, lack of fuel, out of limits weight and balance, etc.

It happened because at least 1 but probably 5 people were willing to operate illegally.

How many people on here think that "the first flight was successful and therefore not an issue"?

How many on here think that if the second flight had managed to land at Blackpool then we would not be debating the issues?

How many people on here reguluarly condone illegal flying - saying you are VFR when actually IFR being the best example?

There are far to many people in UK aviation who can be divided neatly into the following groups;

Those that intentionally break the law when flying

Those that condone such actions but do not think that they have the balls to do it themselves

Those that disagree with illegal flying but will never do anything or say anything against it.

Far too many FI's, CFI's and CAA Examminers fall into the third group.

One can wax lyrically about human factors, decision making etc etc but it is the breaking of the law that killed them.

Regards,

DFC

mcgoo

23rd Apr 2008, 22:28

I've read this thread with interest, and I agree with Bosex, one only has to look at the CAA safety sense leaflet, page 2, to see why!

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/SRG_GAD_WEBSSL23.PDF

Look under "peer pressure"

englishal

23rd Apr 2008, 23:03

I am very sorry about the death of this young lad, and the other guy.

Part of being a licenced pilot is knowing "when to say no"....regardless of what other people say. In the past I have accepted "free" flights and I remember one in particular which scared me. I now have a very good appreciation of what I'm getting involved with and will say no if I think the risk is too high. If I go then I accept any consequences.

Unfortunately it takes some time to learn this, usually through the mistakes of others and BBS's like Pprune which is a great asset. Peer pressure can play a part too, but again it goes back to the first line of paragraph 2.

421C

24th Apr 2008, 06:40

go on, then, list them, for this accident. Make sure you know the true facts

It would be laborious to repeat the AAIB report. But it reads to me that the accident causes were within the domain of planning and conduct of the flight that the PIC was accountable for. It's difficult to conjecture what kind of fact, not in the AAIB report, would change that.

mm_flynn: I do agree that there may be other lessons to be learned from the accident, the wording of my post above was in reply to Supersport's post's and concerned the "line" Bose-X referred to about PIC responsibility.

DFC: the "waxing lyrical" about accident causes has a useful purpose in learning safety lessons, otherwise the subject of aviation safety could have been frozen in 1903 with a law that prohibited crashing. I also don't agree with your comments on the prevalence of law-breaking tendency or turning a blind eye. Clearly it is not zero, as it should be, and to that exent anything non-zero is too many. But I think the standard of instructors and examiners in the UK is very high. It's also sometimes more illuminating to discuss things in terms of good decision-making, planning and airmanship than seeking the legal angle every time. Aviation law doesn't form an instruction manual for safe flight, it sets some boundaries which must be observed but doesn't prescribe for every eventuality.

S-Works

24th Apr 2008, 07:17

One can wax lyrically about human factors, decision making etc etc but it is the breaking of the law that killed them.

Rubbish, you are obsessed with the law and if you cant find one you make it up.

The fact that they break the law is incidental to the poor decision making and poor planning, peer pressure etc. The law breaking was a long way down the scale of this particular incident pit.

Supersport

24th Apr 2008, 08:30

421C, Let me reply to the points you raised, you obviously do not understand my point:

421C Posted:

Supersport,
Forgive me, but the "aviaiton perspective" is the one that matters most to the people on an aviation forum. It may sound harsh, but I think the culture of dispassionately discussing accidents from an aviation safety perspective is a good thing - in fact an essential thing.

Thanks for stating the obvious. Could you please point out where I have said anything to the contrary.

421C Posted:
I am with Bose-X on this. The principle of the responsibility and accountability of the pilot in command is a vital one. It has no grey zones. Admitting it has any grey zones is a safety issue in of itself, in case some pilot in the future, in analogous circumstances, is tempted to think that some of the responsibility of the PIC is sort of shared by some other senior figure(s). Bose's emphasis is also important because it may help a pilot, especially a less experienced one, feel less intimidated by the very real perception of "seniority gradient" in a private flying or training environment and challenge anything that doesn't 100% satisfy them when taking on the responsibility of PIC; exactly the lesson HappyFran was referring to.

Yes, there are no grey zones on paper, but in reality there can be especially when people start making assumptions, and if you have fully read the AAIB Report I can't believe you can come out with a statement like this, here are some extracts from the AAIB Report, I saved the best one until last:

From AAIB Report:

However, the CFI called him again clarifying that he did not mean for him to fly solo but that a more experienced pilot would accompany him. It was not established whether the pilot understood this to mean that the ‘experienced pilot’ was an instructor. However, the pilot agreed to this arrangement and shortly afterwards went to the airport.

The confusion over PIC and manner in which the flight was to be carried out begins.

From AAIB Report:

One went directly to the Aztec aircraft which was to be collected, the other had a conversation with the accompanying pilot. This included a discussion about the amount of fuel on board and a visual inspection of
the fuel quantity in the tanks. The accompanying pilot apparently decided it was not necessary to refuel at Exeter and was heard to comment that “they could drop in somewhere on the way back if it became necessary”.

***

It was not established whether the pilot himself was involved in these discussions.

PIC possibly not involved in a discussion about fuel. The accompanying pilot apparently making the decisions about fuel. Confusion over who is PIC gets even worse.

Finally.....

From AAIB Report:

The relatively inexperienced pilot was paying for the fuel for the two flights, the purpose of which was for him to build up his flight hours. He was seated in the left seat and he was almost certainly handling the controls throughout the accident flight. Thus, he should be considered the pilot-in-command even though he may have called upon the experienced accompanying pilot for help and advice.

Pretty big assumption, and that is all it can ever be, nothing on paper.

No Grey in reality 421C? You sure? With a lack of FACT it is always going to be 'grey'.

421C Posted:

You mention an outsiders' perspecitve. I understand that. The principle of the duties/responsibilities of a PIC is very 'absolute' and black and white, perhaps more so than is typical in modern culture and therefore not obvious to the outsider. Nevertheless, it is the principle that is relevant here. Based on the AAIB facts, there is nothing more to it. There may be a whole set of private thoughts and issues and "what ifs", but I hope you'll see why some people would want them firmly distanced from the accident causes and responsibility.

rgds
421C

Black and White on paper again indeed, but there are no hard facts regarding PIC in the AAIB Report, references to PIC are assumed, not proven.

Yes, I can understand why people would want the "what ifs" distanced from the accident causes and responsibilty as you put it, BUT there is a lot more to this accident (obviously only an outsider would be able to see this as you and some other fellow aviators can't) than just the assumed PIC, which is why the "what ifs" will remain firmly attached to this incident. A lot of unanswered questions will be raised at the Coroner's Court, some aviation related, some not. If I was in David Walkers position I'd definately want more answers than what is contained in the AAIB Report, I would want to know more about the circumstance's surrounding the demise of my son.

When it comes to Rules, Regulations, Laws etc, in reality there is plenty of grey, if you can't see it you are blind.

Whoa... Long one that one.

DFC

24th Apr 2008, 09:04

The fact that they break the law is incidental to the poor decision making and poor planning, peer pressure etc. The law breaking was a long way down the scale of this particular incident pit.

Do you not believe that if they had stayed legal i.e. not departed on the first flight the accident would not have happened?

Please explain how the accident would have happened if they had been IR qualified in an appropriately equipped aircraft and had completed the required pre-flight planning for both flights as well as complying with the approach ban requirements?

They broke the law, their deaths were as a direct result of that. The other issues are relevant but I can not believe that people think that if the second flight had more fuel and diverted to a landing at some other airfield that everything would be rosy.

No point in planning an illegal flight.

Regards,

DFC

S-Works

24th Apr 2008, 09:18

Oh come on. Sometimes........

Your own post highlights the poor planning, lack of properly equipped aircraft etc. Even if the legalities of the flight had been correct there were plenty of other things on your own list that contributed towards the incident pit. The legal aspect was just one part of it.

You really are obsessed with the law and making up a whole raft of your own to fit every argument.

VFE

24th Apr 2008, 10:02

And you, Bose-X, are equally annoying in trying to turn every debate on this website into a vehicle to show how loud your voice is. One day you will just sit back and listen to yourself before making the whole world privvy to your ego, but sadly you appear to take pride in your arrogance and joy in using these sorts of threads to poke your head above the 'incident pit' (your word of the day perchance?!) to look a bit more pompous. Why do we bother when you obviously know everything there is to know about GA flying mate? Another useful thread spirals down the plughole.......

VFE.

S-Works

24th Apr 2008, 10:40

I think you will find it was you that flushed it down the pan with the personal attack......

vanHorck

24th Apr 2008, 11:35

hehehe

cool down!

Some feel it was the lawbreaking that did it

Some feel it was principally the fault of the CFI

Some feel it was poor airmanship of whoever was PIC

Some feel the alleged P1 (Walker) is the culprit, others feel he should be considered as a PU/T and he became a victim (all be it that as a licensed pilot and to-be ATPL in whatever circumstance he could have decided not to fly along

Why can we not be allowed to have different opinions!?

1.In my view (but my view only) i will continue to assume the AAIB are a serious bunch of good people intent on making aviation more safe and therefore Walker was P1 for me until proven otherwise. The coroner could change this but I am not going to give in to peer pressure (!) on this forum, i will not change my mind until the coroner comes up with new evidence
2. I accept there was external pressure on him and i know we are all vulnerable to this, but it can not be a justification after the fact for whoever was PIC
3. In my view flight one has nothing to do with flight two, simply because we are taught to plan per flight, make decisions per flight. After all it is not uncommon for people flying together to change PIC at point B.
4. if there was peer pressure it was about flight one, which left outside the law and outside the frame of safety with 4 pilots on board, the P1 being responsible but the other 3 being outright fools!
5. The only pressure on the return flight was get-home-itis for whatever (always unacceptable) reasons. We are all trained to see this and we ll read about it regularly in flying magazines.

So till after the coroners verdict for me Walker died being P1 having made mistakes before starting, on the first flight and crucially mortal mistakes on the second flight.

That does not mean i cannot live with other people venting their opinions and hopefully in the course of our exchange of views all of us learning something. But jesus Christ!, lets control our emotions here....

Rational expressions are what made aviation safe, expressions of feelings is a natural thing, but expressions of (extreme) emotions on the subject of other s opinions has no place in aviation and does not contribute to a good debate.

172driver

24th Apr 2008, 12:05

vanHorck

AMEN to your post :ok:

G-ROAR

24th Apr 2008, 12:29

. In my view flight one has nothing to do with flight two, simply because we are taught to plan per flight, make decisions per flight

If Andrew is to be labelled as PIC, why was he not consulted regarding the fuelling of the aircraft on the first flight? Someone else (CFI) filled up the aircraft to take it above weight. This part of "planning the flight" was out of his hands. Did the CFI assume responsibility at this point then hand the poisoned chalice to Andrew? Flight one has a great deal to do with flght two. Once they were in Exeter they were under more pressure to get home but this time without the CFI in the right hand seat. The CFI thought it appropriate to fill the aircraft at Blackpool but not at Exeter.

DFC

24th Apr 2008, 12:57

You're making it up as you go along, once again DFC. This is in your imagination, not in the legislation.

Bookworm,

Try this one;

Weather reports and forecasts
7.—(1) Subject to paragraph (2), immediately before an aircraft flies the commander of the aircraft shall examine the current reports and forecasts of the weather conditions on the proposed flight path, in order to determine whether Instrument Meteorological Conditions prevail, or are likely to prevail, during any part of the flight.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall only apply if it is reasonably practicable for the commander to obtain current reports and forecasts of the weather conditions on the proposed flight path.

Now please explain how you can depart on a VFR flight from A to B if in accordance with 7(1) you have determined that at some stage you will encounter IMC?

The saying goes that rules are for the obedience of idiots and the guidance of wise men. Well what can we do to force idiots to obey the rules so that they may live to become wise men?

Perhaps it is time that people who act anti-socially in the aviation community by breaking the law i.e. those that will fly IFR, IMC and declare themselves to be VFR, do not plan properly, use non-approved approach aids for IMC approaches, those that use inappropriate minima on IFR flights - and VFR flights and so on are treated with the same contempt that we treat the local yobs on the street corner harassing old people.

Lets reverse the peer pressure to flout the law and push the limits and disregard CAA and other authority safety information (which is often seen on here for example) and put more effort into peer presure to do things legally and safely.

Regards,

DFC

FullyFlapped

24th Apr 2008, 13:08

I will admit to not really understanding Mr. Walker's motivation in making the very first post of this thread. I can make a guess why he did it, but that's all it would be.

But I really wish he hadn't done it : he's opened the door for the usual round of ill-informed, self-opinionated, self-righteous bull**** which makes up the majority of the rest of this thread, masquerading as "important lessons we must all learn". All we know is in the AAIB report. Anyone who actually knows anything else will hopefully be at the hearing. The rest of us have nothing new to add.

To those intimately involved, matters such as whether there was coercion or simply temptation, who was PIC, who bears the ultimate responsibility etc will be burningly important. To the rest of us, we just need to know that two people died because someone somewhere took some stupid decisions, and that if we take similar ones - and we all know what they were - then we run the risk of a similar fate.

It doesn't matter a toss if this accident was caused because someone broke the law, or if the law is secondary to personal responsibility (Bose, old Desperate For Controversy is just a dangerous idiot but you really should know better), and to bang on ad nauseum when it's very possible that the families of the deceased will be reading this thread, and feeling the knife every time some pompous prat makes the same point over again, just smacks of rubber-necking at a traffic accident.

Give it a rest, for pity's sake.

bookworm

24th Apr 2008, 16:26

Now please explain how you can depart on a VFR flight from A to B if in accordance with 7(1) you have determined that at some stage you will encounter IMC?

The same way that I would depart on an IFR flight from A to B with B below IFR minima: with a clear alternate plan if the reports are unchanged and/or the forecasts are correct.

... and put more effort into peer presure to do things legally and safely

Unfortunately I have little confidence in the current regulator in its ability and commitment to align legal and safe. To do so requires the courage to take unnecessary regulation away and to delegate safety management to those in the best position to manage it.

The crew of the flight from Exeter to Blackpool took off having flouted the laws of the land in at least three respects on the outbound flight, without apparent adverse consequences. Perhaps they felt they could also flout the laws of physics?

GASH !

24th Apr 2008, 17:41

Having first hand experience of this organisation involved in this tragedy I'd say that the flight was going to Exeter and returning that day whether Mr Walker was onboard or not. The fact that he was along to pay for the fuel was merely convenient for the organisation. All the pre flight planning decisions had been done in his absence. On the ground at Exeter his companion remarked that they could " always 'drop in' somewhere on the way back to refuel'. On the RT back at Blackpool when the proverbial really hit the fan, it was his companion liasing with ATC. Yes legally Mr Walker may have been the PIC but he was no more the Captain that day than any of us were, unfortunately he's paid for this with his life.

Let's be honest, do any one of you know of any plain vanilla 100 hour ppl holder that would launch into that weather in a knackered VFR only cherokee?

scooter boy

24th Apr 2008, 18:17

GASH,

I have seen an old cherokee land in OVC 0100 at a non instrument airfield (in very hilly terrain) and take off with 4 big blokes in it into OVC 0050 and winds 25G35 after (believe it or not rather ironically) attending a funeral.

The "captain" was no more than 21 years old - I think the plane was at least 20 years older than him.

The airfield manager (non-pilot) saw no problem with it and was pleased to have the custom, personally I thought the 3 passengers were f&ckin stupid to get into the aircraft at all (probably ignorant of the level of risk - they were after all being flown by a qualified "pilot") and the pilot suicidal as it was winter, the poor weather was widespread and they were likely to be in it all the way home (2hrs or so). They got away with it though and most do.

It is when we stop being horrified by such appauling decision making and risk-taking and start to accept crazy scud running and home made sub-ILS-minima instrument approaches in dreadful weather as the norm that we really need to start worrying about our own safety and that of our passengers.

Inexperience brings with it blissful ignorance of the potentially fatal consequences of underestimating the weather.

RIP

SB

Lurking123

24th Apr 2008, 19:22

i always thought that aviating was meant to be representative of calm, professional and mature behaviour. All we seem to be doing right now is proving what a bunch of arrogant fools we can be.

vanHorck

24th Apr 2008, 20:21

Fully flapped

I too have been wondering about the initial post. I can only assume Mr Walker s son had many flying fans and he wanted them to be informed about the coroner.

Perhaps here it is a good time to give my sincere condoleances to Mr Walker, the family and all of pilot Walker s friends.....

Mr Walker s son has, through his death, brought deep awareness to many readers on this forum on how close death can be, and perhaps in the course of things helped prevent some in the future, let this be a warm thought for those bereaved people.

I disagree with a post earlier on this page about this thread being nonsensical. We are all human and just reading the report of the AAIB does not generally give us the insight into what can be learned.

The phrase to check the weather, in itself, means nothing. It is through discussions and opinions that we focus our minds, the Brits are good at debating (pardon my english) and you should understand that me, a bl**dy foreigner, i have learned a lot through the debate about respect for the weather (i am a relatively novice IMC pilot), about get-home-itis and about PIC and finally not least about peer pressure.

I think Mr Walker is an intelligent man and he will have learned in these past months that the aviation community WANTS to learn from mistakes, to prevent future ones. He will also understand the vast majority of us join him in his sadness over his loss and that this has nothing to do with the lessons we try to learn....

Finally i wish Aztec Driver would contribute more on the sensitive or rational level, but perhaps this will come after the coroner s verdict. I hope we will hear from him

DFC

24th Apr 2008, 20:46

The same way that I would depart on an IFR flight from A to B with B below IFR minima: with a clear alternate plan if the reports are unchanged and/or the forecasts are correct.

No. In that case on a VFR flight you are departing on a flight from A to C or from A to A with the posibility of an in-flight diversion to B should the weather be better than expected.

To say that you were flying from A to B is to say that you are departing VFR knowing that there is IMC on the chosen route.

Would you recomend that people do that?

---------

Scooter boy,

Did you speak with the pilot......perhaps provide some "feedback"?

More importantly, did you report the pilot?

No?

Then you assisted them by covering up their illegal operation.

It is time that pilots started taking a stand against the anti-social law breakers and those that encourage such flying because they are the ones who are going to ruin it for the rest.

Put Blackpool in the USA. Does anyone believe that the flight that departed "VFR" into a 200ft cloud base would not be met by the feds at the destination or do you not think that if they had managed to get back safely that they would not have received a visit from the feds with some serioud questions about their flying?

Never mind the Feds, the local CFI would be having a sharp word in the earhole of those who locally flout the regs.

There is a big difference between in the first case people who make a mistake or mis-judge or make a planning error and through that mistake / error end up breaking the law and in the second case, people that knowingly break the law.

Regards,

DFC

Supersport

24th Apr 2008, 22:02

Then you assisted them by covering up their illegal operation.

Come for f*cks sake, saying we should take a stance against 'anti social law breakers' is one thing, accusing someone of criminal activity is just plain wrong, I couldn't disagree more with that comment.

Helen49

25th Apr 2008, 07:55

Having read the AAIB report and spent the past two hours trawling through this thread a number of points occur to me......
1. Sadly this accident was almost a repetition of so many preceding GA accidents over the years, ie. aircraft being operated in weather conditions below the capability of the pilot and or aircraft. Safety improvement process not working very well!
2. Yes the the ANO clearly defines the responsibilities and privileges of the PPL. More emphasis must be placed on the realities of these responsibilities and privileges during training ie. not just learning them by rote.
3. Yes the pilot i/c is responsible but as in life generally, his/her decision[s] will be based on information collected. Inevitably the views/advice of others will influence the decision making process. Therefore a variety of reasons why wrong decisions may be made. The lower your own experience, the more you are likely to heed the opinions of others particularly those whom you expect to be offering sound advice
4. Flying training organisations must spend more time emphasising why NOT to fly in adverse weather conditions [below the competence of the pilot] rather than encouraging it either for the benefit of hour building instructors or the club coffers. Many ATC people will relate their tales of flying instructors who must fly despite having been told about the low ceiling/visibility etc etc.
5. The VMC requirements for VFR flight must be emphasised during training, again not just learning by rote. Again the ATC world could relate many occasions when the VFR departure climbs straight into cloud [or asks for a 'special VFR clearance thinking that this is a magic wand entitling them to climb straight into cloud!]
6. Procedures whether law/aircraft/club or whatever are there to be followed. They have invariably been designed by experienced people. Follow them whether you are the CFI or the student PPL!
7. ATC must never reprimand pilots on the RTF, unprofessional, inappropriate and potentially downright dangerous.
8. The reading of aircraft accident reports [particularly the GA variety] should be a mandatory part of pilot training.
9. The system must continue to be one whereby ATC provide the information [weather etc] and the pilot makes the decisions ie. operates within the licence privileges.

I am aware that many training organisations will be doing most of the above for their customers, no offence intended to them. Sadly there remain cowboy flying organisations and cowboy pilots out there.

Sincere condolences to the families and friends of the bereaved.
H49

Whirlybird

25th Apr 2008, 07:55

I will admit to not really understanding Mr. Walker's motivation in making the very first post of this thread. I can make a guess why he did it, but that's all it would be.

If I were in that position, I'd firstly want to inform people on here, who from the earlier thread appeared to care. But most of all I'd want information, information, and yet more information. I'd wonder if I could find out more about my son's death than I had from the AAIB report, and what better place than this!

Except that it seems to be going round in circles and degenerating into name-calling etc. That's PPRuNe for you, but on a thread such as this, it seems...inappropriate, to say the least.

I haven't read every post on here and I'm not going to. I don't think we'll ever all agree, or even come to any sort of acceptance of each others' point of view.

All I know is that once, some years ago, I was a very new PPL. And despite my training, I found it very hard to distinguish between sensible backing out of a flight, and wimpishness. I wanted to stretch myself, but didn't know how much would be sensible. I dreaded being the sort of pilot who never flew if there was a cloud in the sky. I didn't really have the experience, especially with weather, to ever feel absolutely sure, so I listened to those with more experience than me. That seemed to make sense.

As a result, I got lost in marginal vis, stranded overnight by thunderstorms that I barely beat to the airport, narrowly made it out of a shortish wet grass runway with obstacles in nil wind, and ended up as a passenger with a (to me, very experienced) 180 hour IMC rated pilot who flew in circles round a VOR. I survived...but I might not have done. I wasn't that young, and I wasn't reckless or a risk-taker, or stupid. And I've gathered, many, many, many times since then, that I was far from unique.

So I can't help thinking, concerning this sad accident, that there, but for the Grace Of God, go many of us.

bookworm

25th Apr 2008, 07:56

No. In that case on a VFR flight you are departing on a flight from A to C or from A to A with the posibility of an in-flight diversion to B should the weather be better than expected.

No. Not an "in-flight diversion to B". That's where your way of looking at it starts getting risky, because by the time you've reached B on the "diversion", you may have used up your diversion fuel. There is, as I have pointed out to you a number of times now, nothing in UK regulation to stop the flight departing for B with C (or A) as an alternate.

To say that you were flying from A to B is to say that you are departing VFR knowing that there is IMC on the chosen route.

Would you recomend that people do that?

We haven't been debating what I would recommend. We've been debating what is legal. That said, provided an alternate is properly planned, and moreover that the pilot is prepared to make the decision to divert to it, I can see nothing wrong with departing in those circumstances. Operators do the analogous thing of departing with destination below AOM under IFR every day. Weather is not something that can be predicted with 100% certainty. I'm not going to scratch a perfectly reasonable flight for a "PROB30 TEMPO ...", but I am going to make a contingency plan that leaves me a sensible and safe option if that happens to be the weather I encounter.

I recall a few occasions when I have departed under VFR knowing that there was a good chance that the destination, or some point enroute, would be below VFR. On some of them, I diverted as planned, on others I completed the trip to the intended destination uneventfully.

But this is peripheral. The Exeter to Blackpool flight under discussion was not a marginal case, not one where the crew got caught on the wrong side of a grey line. The reason why it has provoked so much discussion is that to make the flight to an airport that was in fog all day with no suitable navigational equipment and insufficient fuel to divert was not simply "a bad call". It was utter folly. And many of us would like to understand how it happened.

PompeyPaul

25th Apr 2008, 08:41

That's PPRuNe for you, but on a thread such as this, it seems...inappropriate
It's utterly disgusting. really this thread should be locked and anything apart from the OP should be deleted, imho.

HappyFran

25th Apr 2008, 08:46

Perhaps it is because I can identify with David Walker, that I have had this nagging discomfort about the PIC conclusion of the AAIB.

As earlier posters pointed out, the facts that lead the AAIB to conclude David was PIC are equally true for PUT.

Trying to stay with the facts:

David told the CFI that he was not current and could not be PIC. CFI told him he would have an accompanying pilot and so would be OK.
It is a very small assumption that David would conclude if not actually told that he would be PUT. Why else would he go? He had already said no once!

David arrives at the airfield; there is a fuelled aircraft, 2 passengers and a 3rd person (the accompanying pilot). Is it not unreasonable that David would believe him to be the Instructor designate…? Why not why else would he be there….clearly they did not need the ballast.

I admit there is a little assumption in that prognosis but very little.

Now maybe the ‘accompanying pilot’ thought that David was current and PIC, but it does seem a bit odd not to have at least discussed with the David who was last to arrive, and therefore his pre-flight activity was observable, some aspects of the flight planning must have been discussed?. I would be concerned if the PIC arrived late, jumped in the aircraft without kicking the tyres and peering in the tanks. The ‘Accompanying Pilot’ was not a newbee he had years of experience!.

At the very least there must have been a lack of clarity as to who was PIC between the 2 of them.

The only thing that is clear is that the CFI knew that David was not legal as PIC and the ‘Accompanying Pilot’ was not legally an instructor and yet he authorised the flight. He did not crash the aircraft but he did dispatch it, knowing it was illegal, and assuming he looked out the window he knew it was illegal on met grounds also. At the very least he was negligent in his capacity as CFI on that day.

OK so the flight arrived at Exeter.

At Exeter the fuel situation was discussed by the ‘Accompanying Pilot’ I draw 2 observations from this;

If David believed he was PIC, even if perceiving some seniority slope would he not have at least wanted to listen in on the conversation?

If either the ‘Accompanying Pilot’ or the other passenger / pilot thought David as PIC would it have not been extremely unprofessional / discourteous not to at least involve him.
In conclusion I would disagree with the AAIB report (only regarding PIC) and tend to feel it ‘more likely’ that the ‘Accompanying Pilot’ was actually the PIC. I would also be more firmly of the opinion that David thought he was PUT.

The remaining troubling factors are why the CFI wanted David to go anyway?
Initially he may have thought he was doing David a favour. But when he knew he was not current, why still encourage him?. Could the ‘Accompanying Pilot’ not make the trip without a 2nd pilot ?. Nice to have but not essential.

There are lessons here for me as a new pilot, experienced pilots and but also lessons for FTO’s / clubs which should not be dismissed / ignored because of the strict interpretation of the air law.

Excellent post Helen49.....echo's my feelings

radicalrabit

25th Apr 2008, 08:55

Firstly, Mr Walker, as a father myself, I have the deepest sympathy for you and would like to add my name to those who sent their condolences already, We should never have to bury our children but sadly it does happen and has to several of my friends.

As for the accident in question, as someone else put it, "there but for the grace of god"..as the saying goes, but I beleive many of us have had a wake up call and hopefully learned something that may in future keep us alive.

Their is little point airing my personal views on here as someone will try to respond with law v common sense as would those who have more information and direct knowledge of the organisation from where your son flew.

I know from this thread and others like it, that it is courting disaster to ever fly and I mean "ever" where circumstances are heavily stacked against a happy uneventful trip, within the the skills of the man (or woman) at the controls and of the design of and equipment within, the aircraft being flown.

20/20 hind sight? No I think it is just common sense and reinforced by this tragic event. It has shown many of us new pilots that those who should know better, and on whom we may have placed trust in their experience, are not infallible and infact some clearly show an outrageously cavalier approach to the safety of the people they advise,instruct, fly with and other aviators they meet in the air and on the ground.

No matter whos' view point you agree with, and there are many on here, diverse in their opinions of the cause and contributing factors, The end result was a needless loss of life.

I hope I never become the topic of conversation on the forum because I have killed or been killed by someone flying. I will certainly have a greater understanding of the PPL and the responsibility and liability it places on the owner and the need for the pilot to be the only one ever to decide where, when and how to fly and how the aircraft is oaded and configured. In my case in future, "The buck stops here!"

I hope when this investigation and coroners hearing have all been concluded, and all the facts and influences are taken on board by we aviators, how ever low time student or "god like" captain we see ourselves, that none of us contribute to such a thing happening again.

Lurking123

25th Apr 2008, 10:23

From the initial AAIB report into the Biggin Hill Citation crash

Some doubt currently exists as to the status of each pilot, so for the purpose of this report, the pilot sitting in the left seat is referred to as the commander.

Confused:\

Supersport

25th Apr 2008, 10:36

From the initial AAIB report into the Biggin Hill Citation crash

Quote:
Some doubt currently exists as to the status of each pilot, so for the purpose of this report, the pilot sitting in the left seat is referred to as the commander.

Confused:\

Confused indeed, seems to me like more regulation or clarity is required for PIC designation. Far too many assumptions across the board IMO.

rojread

25th Apr 2008, 13:17

Anyone who has been in the aviation industry for any length of time will have come across people who have a rather cavalier attitude to rules and regs. They range from 'he's a bit of a lad', 'Old So-and-so - he's a character', via 'bloody cowboy' and 'what a villain'. But what do we do?

In this thread much reference has been made to the CFI who initiated the process and which of those categories he falls into is anyone's guess. Maybe the coroner will winkle that out. I presume that is Mr Walker Snr's hope and the reason for alerting us to the inquest date.

The young Mr Walker was a victim of the enthusiasm and circumstances that most of us had at that age. (My first flying instructor, Rex Larsen of Skegness) drummed it into us that the most dangerous part of our flying careers would be between 100 and 300 hrs on our new PPLs! How right he was.

I took took off in a PA 28 with three ATPLs, (in my 100-300 band) well over max and was rather surprised at it's reluctance to lift off and how large the Thruxton club house windows appeared as we skimmed the roof.

For a couple of years I flew as Co- with a pilot who was regarded as 'an accident looking for somewhere to happen'. In a couple of engine failures (one EFATO) he was quite competent, but the number of mini-crises he created. was legion. One night, listening to a radio news report of a twin-turbo prop that had ditched offshore near an island, two of us at the crew room table, in chorus, said the same name! The next evening TV news showed him being toasted by holidaymakers at a holiday cottage - as the hero.
(You've guessed it, fuel starvation, but the enquiry was months away)

There will always be people like this and I suppose we should all speak up before other people like young Mr Walker get suckered in to dangerous situations.

One positive outcome of this thread is that 'Fran' the 19 yr old PPL has learned something from the sometimes heated comments.

Contacttower

25th Apr 2008, 21:02

I make this comment only half in jest; perhaps we should have the mandatory wearing of gold bars in the cockpit...at least then there would be no confusion about PIC.

mad_jock

25th Apr 2008, 22:07

Being a scottish lad. And only being involved in scottish fatal accident enquiry's as an engineer for one of the interested partys.

What are the powers of a coroner what are they?

I was under the impression they were a Doctor type person with a bit of legal training.

And what can be the outcome from Blackpool?

In scotland the enquiry can referer things back to the proc fiscal for future shall we say disscusion.

Just interested not looking for detail relating to this case just a laymans veiw of the coroners court.

mark147

26th Apr 2008, 08:53

I believe the coroner's job is simply to determine who died, where they died and what caused their death. The hearing won't determine who is to blame but will consider whether someone was. In this case, possible verdicts could be accidental death, death by misadventure, unlawful killing or an open verdict.

DFC

26th Apr 2008, 14:35

Bookworm,

No. Not an "in-flight diversion to B". That's where your way of looking at it starts getting risky, because by the time you've reached B on the "diversion", you may have used up your diversion fuel.

The minimum fuel at the diversion aerodrome is final reserve or do you plan a destination with an alternate and another alternate for the alternate and another alternate for that alternate?

VFR flights do not need alternates (but it may be a good idea).

Perhaps you need to take some lessons in flight planning. There are many IFR flights that do not need an alternate also.

----------

Operators do the analogous thing of departing with destination below AOM under IFR every day.

They may depart when the destination is below minima however, the combination of actual and forecast weather will be indicating an improvement.........otherwise they are simply idiots wasting fuel.

IFR flight procedures are not applicable to VFR flying and here I think is where you are having a problem - you are mixing up IFR and VFR operations. Unlike a VFR flight, for IFR flying in the most part enroute ceiling and visibility do not matter.........if it is more IMC than was expected then so what?

Weather is not something that can be predicted with 100% certainty.

No that is why according to the rule you have to combine both actual and forecast weather when deciding if your proposed flight will remain in VMC.

The correct answer must be that if based on the actual and forecast weather it will not be VMC then do not depart VFR.

Anything else is simply get-there-itis.

Regards,

DFC