UK Apache...this can't be true

[owe ver chute]

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlog/articles/20080310.aspx

March 10, 2008: Cuts in defense spending in Britain led to low stockpiles of spare parts for many major weapons systems. As a result, the hard working British AH-64 helicopter gunships in Afghanistan are suffering a shortage of spare parts. In reaction to this, 251 parts were removed from Britain's AH-64 fleet, over the last twelve months, in order to keep the eight in Afghanistan in working order. Some British officers would like to get more AH-64s to Afghanistan, but the spare parts situation makes that inadvisable (as it would groups a large number of other AH-64s that were cannibalized.)

Britain has been cutting back on defense spending since the end of the Cold War in 1991, as have most other European countries. But operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have put more helicopters into the air, more often, and in very demanding (hot and dusty) conditions. This has used up spare parts stockpiles, causing many helicopters to be sidelined and often cannibalized for parts, to keep other aircraft in the air. The British military had kept details of this quiet, but an opposition member of parliament got the information out of the Ministry of Defence, in an attempt to force the government to buy more spares and technical services.

I had heard on the on the old boys network that the Apache was suffering due to high hours demand in Afgansitan, but the hours flown there are tightly controlled and are nowhere near the levels flown by the US Army AH64's. Buying a Porsche is the cheap bit, driving it like a Porsche and keeping that Porsche on the road is what takes the money. Maybe the Cobra would have been a better choice after all. :(

[Lurking123]

This was always going to be a problem. I herd a rumour that they were even robbing a particular oils and lubricants from aircraft.

[tucumseh]

Read the Nimrod information thread. Same underlying problem.

[ZH875]

In the early days of the C-130J, Navigation Light bulbs were regularly robbed, until robs were stopped, it didn't stop them cannibalising them after that.

When replacement items came, they consisted of the entire mount and bulb, as you could not just demand the bulb. All the DF's did, was put the new bulb in the aircraft and put the new fitting in the bin. No wonder money disappears from the defence kitty.

[formertonkaplum]

How many Typhoon are sat with minimal flying hours and numerous deficiencies because to keep the flying going with no money, you have to ROB !

[Not_a_boffin]

Ask the grey fleet at Culdrose how their flight hours are going (or why they're short of bodies).

Ask why half the RN is either tied up or sailing with serious OPDEFS that would have never been authorised onlya few years ago.

[HEDP]

AH are limited out there because of the spares issue!

And the fact that of the 5 squadrons trained, they are only manned to a little over 40% of crews required, and still not a pinch trade............

[Floater AAC]

Although i'm not an AH driver I have spoken to several people in the loop at both Shawbury and Wallop and they have commented that some of the airframes in storage are unlikely to EVER fly due to the amount of canibalisation that has taken place. This is their comments and not anything I have witnessed but the sources were trustworthy and if this was indeed the case it is significant food for thought.

Hope its not true or it makes our procurement lot look an even bigger bunch of arses that they already do.

As for future Lynx, don't get me started.

[Mikhail Sharpowicz]

It's getting much better, but that's pretty accurate. The parts are often hard to come by, or sometimes non-existent - even for everyday items. :* The system is however slowly getting worked out, and parts are becoming more available all the time... If only people didn't hoard stuff - including the broken things that need to be exchanged!!!!!!!!!!!!!!:ugh:

[jonwilly]

Ah 'Just in time Parts'

OK for a Toyota car production line but not really aplicable to front line operational aircraft.
john

[MightyGem]

Hey jon, where you been? It's taken you long enough to get here!

[South Bound]

No news here, just the same old story that we did not buy enough spares (or write a good enough contact to have Wastelands provide them). Theatre takes priority, ac in the UK get robbed blind, ability to train back in the UK dwindles, no-one says anything about it because it is all too politically sensitive to criticise British 'Industry'...

[helidriver]

Yet again it reinforces my belief that the 3.5% cost of capital charge (cold war legacy to disencourage stock holding) should be abolished. This is the real reason for not holding spares.

[AHQHI656SQN]

There have been some fairly simplistic views about this. Cold War throw backs etc, this aircraft has been the target of budget cuts for as long since it was a twinkle in the AAC eye. An easy target really, given that it was bought to defeat massed armour on the inner German border. A good job that it wasn't a "one pony show".

HEDP, I know you're in the know, but 40% manning! I knew you were a glass half-full man, but 40%!;)

[FrogPrince]

It really galls me that the AH crews I worked for last Summer came back to Blighty and have already been sent back out to AFG again (or out to Iraq for the Lynx crews). This usage rate on aircraft and aircrew is not sustainable.

:uhoh:

[Tigs2]

There is a hanger (belonging to the Brits), full of brand new Apaches that have never been flown. Quite a scandal really. Must be several hundred million worth of christmas trees.

[HEDP]

Tom,

Based on figures from the two Regts, will go up to just short of 60% when CE completes.

All subject to the yellow and black of course!

HEDP

[AHQHI656SQN]

TIGS, maybe you better tell AH IPT where the hanger is. Then they will have more aircraft to rob spares from!

PS. I hope your head is better.:ok:

[Double Zero]

I take it that's like the 'hangers' in Switzerland / maybe Germany, where aircraft were winched up near the roof for storage ?!

I read the other day that the term ' Hangar' ( I think they changed the spelling just to be a step ahead of the Americans, unfortunately our lot can't spell either ) comes from original airship days, when the things had to be suspended / prodded / held in every diection going.

I expect everyone at it was smoking too...

[Scotch Bonnet]

Is this a good time to mention a forum on the Times newspaper website that advocates the use of the Apache in Iraq to protect our soldiers should the chaps with rather ragged headresses kick off again..?:eek:

[Archimedes]

SB - Is that the comment in the 'Have Your Say' bit under the article? I've never understood this bit of the Times online, since it neatly undermines that newspaper's claim to be the home of informed comment.

[Al_Paché]

60% manning sounds pretty good when taken at face value, I would however be very interested to know what percentage of that is now (or soon to be) inexperienced ab-initio Aircrew? The question should perhaps be.. ' where are our highly skilled and combat experienced Aviators going and why? '

Being at the coal-face, I can tell you that it's very hard to maintain the skill levels required of an Attack Pilot post Herrrick tour when you're flying 5-10 hours per month (including the airtesting that I do to provide cabs to feed the hungry mouth of CTR).

[Two's in]

just the same old story that we did not buy enough spares

Southbound, true that we never bought enough spares, but there were spares galore scaled when it was the original 72 AH in the competition. After the Apache had won, the operational numbers were cut to 48, the training was removed entirely and left to the PFI vultures, and guess what - the spares holdings were decimated to accomodate the 5 year Contractors Spares Package (CSP). Easy enough to take a pop at Wastelands, but no-one in Main Building figured on the most capable asset in the Army inventory having to go to war, everyone just figured on the "Pimms on the lawn at Wallop" spares attrition rate. Look on the Nimrod thread for a hint at the culpable negligence within MoD (PE) (as it was then) in mismanaging this acquisition.

[Tigs2]

AHQHI656SQN

I can't tell you where the hangar is mate, we are planning to do a carboot on them:ok:

[FayeDeck]

40% - 60% whatever..................fairly pointless having many aircraft of any sort if you cannot look after the most important asset of getting any aircraft up and active; the people who put it there, engs, pilots etc etc. Until we start to retain quality people in great numbers we are always going to have dramas.

[tucumseh]

Two's In

Southbound, true that we never bought enough spares, but there were spares galore scaled when it was the original 72 AH in the competition. After the Apache had won, the operational numbers were cut to 48, the training was removed entirely and left to the PFI vultures, and guess what - the spares holdings were decimated to accomodate the 5 year Contractors Spares Package (CSP). Easy enough to take a pop at Wastelands, but no-one in Main Building figured on the most capable asset in the Army inventory having to go to war, everyone just figured on the "Pimms on the lawn at Wallop" spares attrition rate. Look on the Nimrod thread for a hint at the culpable negligence within MoD (PE) (as it was then) in mismanaging this acquisition.

Spot on about PFI'ing the training. We were always puzzled at this - it was a quite deliberate decision made in the certain knowledge that the programme would slip many months or even years. Having spent so long on the bidding and selection process, and publishing an ISD, it was a mindless own goal. I know for a fact that the vast majority of MoD(PE) staff were horrified. This was exacerbated by a concurrent programme in the same area requiring, if anything, a more complex training package. PFI was mentioned for all of 5 minutes, the time it took to write the request for waiver and have it approved. It basically said, (a) if we PFI, we miss the published ISD, and (b) there is no overseas sales potential as our build standard is unique. That being so, the question is "Who had most to gain?". Certainly not Westland. Their name was synonymous with a published ISD, which they immediately knew could not be achieved. They were given a contract and, despite attempts to undermine them, they delivered.

I like to think I'm fair-minded, and would not be so quick to blame MoD(PE) for any spares issues. The ILS team were drafted in from MGO. At that time, all 3 Services insisted on doing their own ILS - it coincided with civilian ILS Managers being replaced with Military ILSMs. From the Apache PM's viewpoint (and I knew and worked with him long before that appointment) he would have been concerned over his almost complete lack of control in the support domain, including Training. Not having control over something which will account for 80% of through life costs is ludicrous, and asking for trouble; and breaches every rule in the project management book. I was always secretly glad when "my" MILSMs (they don't actually work for you) invariably said "Don't know how to do this, I'll just take on Social Secretary's job and leave it to you". It meant more work, but I had control of an area which would make or break the project.

You rightly referred to the Nimrod thread, and I'd repeat this - the problem lay with management oversight.

[ericferret]

Again nothing new and nothing learned. In 1976 660 returned from NI via Gutersloh and the outgoing squadron removed all the clutches from our Gazelles which returned to Soest by road.
A visit to Detmold a week later showed that all of 661's aircraft were also minus clutches.

Given that the Russians were "ready" to invade what price aircraft availability.

No one should underestimate the incompetance of the MOD (except the Russians of course).

[serf]

60% sounds a bit overmanned if there are insufficient spares to keep the UK based aircraft flying.

[Two's in]

Tuc,

I like to think I'm fair-minded, and would not be so quick to blame MoD(PE) for any spares issues.

As one of the chosen few who worked 14 hour days in New Oxford Street and then Abbey Wood, I don't blame the team(s) who ended up having to deliver this. It was the complete lack of vision and foresight at 2* level that led to this. Yes, of course there were political considerations, but to spend 5 years on detailed analysis and competition, only to then completely ignore those finding for political expediency is culpable negligence, and we are paying the price for that negligence today (12 years later) in operational capability and availability.

Senior Procurement nebbies all use Apache as the poster child for delivering "On schedule, on performance, within budget". It doesn't take a hard look to see how you achieve that by ripping the guts out the program.

Apache's success is down to the graft and commitment from the people who ended up bringing in to service and operating it, but that's the way it's always been.

[tucumseh]

Twos In


As one of the chosen few who worked 14 hour days in New Oxford Street and then Abbey Wood, I don't blame the team(s) who ended up having to deliver this. It was the complete lack of vision and foresight at 2* level that led to this.


Spot on, and I still have a copy of the instruction that this was to include week-ends as well...... Same 2* as MRA4, Chinook Mk3. Say no more.

[HEDP]

I wouldn't consider 60% manning too much. You require 80% (4 sqns) to maintain a one on three off operational cycle. You might ask how it is being manned currently with 45% manning as we only get to 60%-ish in a month or so's time.

One of the few ways we have of retaining flying experience is to allow the aircrew to do what they want i.e. fly and develop their skills whilst in UK. The training has to be challenging post operations to maintain the arousal and interest levels of the crews. Minimal currency training in the DUA and enforced periods of no flying will certainly not achieve that therefore we will continue to haemorrhage the crews who have built up the minimum levels of experience that we so crave.

Resource appropriately and this includes the correct number of technicians to achieve the flying task!

[AHQHI656SQN]

Two's in.

Oh I am almost sick :yuk: every time I've heard the Apache program being heralded as the leading example of how to do things!
This program has worked thanks to the hard work of of individuals (few who have had formal recognition for their efforts and sacrafice); the likes of 651 Sqn :D 673 Sqn :D and AMTAT :D, all un-sung heroes behind the capability delivered by 656 Atk Sqn and 664 Atk Sqn (AKA Shadows ;)(sorry MM)), passing the batton the 3 Atk Regt, who have continued to produce the goods. :D

These top quality people, all winners, who don't like to even think the word failure have all "dug out blind" to ensure that the guys on the ground get what they need. There now lay the problem.

In the ealy days of HERRICK only 1 battle group with the un-divided attention of a complete Atk Sqn, now many more battle groups, still only one Atk with limited flying hours, meaning more hungry mouths and no more food to give, thank goodness for Bone! :ugh: One of the reasons that 12 Bde have a different opinion about Apache than 3 Cdo Bde and 16 Air Asslt Bde :(

Sadly HEDP hits a raw nerve, we could not up the hours by too many, without upping the manning, both REME and AAC, we are short of both groups. So the infantry go without the type of close in fire support that can only be provided by Apache, so increase risk of Blue on Blue, because unless we get BFT for the ground troops, they will be at risk from our US cousins, who all have it, and count on it heavily. :eek:

Less than 50% manning, not a pinch point trade :ugh:, poor flying rates :ugh:, nothing new on the horizon to imagine that there is a solution to preventing the haemorrhage of experience that we have suffered with the first two attack Squadrons (one of which has 2 squadron members remaining from that which deployed in the summer of 2006 :ouch:). The bucket is half empty, we're trickling in new ab-initio pilots but the hole in the side of the bucket needs fixing dear Liza! :{

[Compressorstall]

This problem is not only that of the Apache - there are many Sqns that are experiencing the lack of spares, the lack of crews, poor flying rates in the UK that could barely be called 'tick-over' training leaving an overall feeling that there is underinvestment. However, we all bang on about the same thing, but can anyone actually recall someone saying that we're unable to fulfill our committments? We have unstintingly met our committments and so there is a continual feeling that we can cope. We can all see the shortages but while we all muddle through people will continue with their fingers in their ears.
Thoughts?

[HEDP]

This may be having an effect on whether or not we are 'muddling through' although that shouldn't be discussed on here for the obvious reason!

HEDP

[dubster]

Gents, this is by no way a new problem-funding -remember when an Atk Sqn had 6 Lynx and 6 Gaz and then they got rid of the Gaz and you only had on a good day maybe 4 servicable aircraft in the whole regiment.The mass panic to get a Regiments worth of aircraft ready for a Div Ex and some Sqns SHARING the aircraft. Not enough bowsers and FFR's or troops to man them.I banged out 4 years ago after having enough of banging my head against a brick wall and the "we have always done it in the past mentality". From the guys i am still in touch with tell me it is still no different and they can see no light at the end of the tunnel either with funding or manning.I just hope this does not have a massive effect on our (your)operational abilities.

[Kick the tyres]

The spares issue on its own misses a point about the requirement for the spares in the first place. Aircraft Ground Engineers are experienced Senior NCOs who fly with the aircraft and have the judgement to be able to keep an aircraft flying around a route or in a theatre to enable it to do its job often by using temporary repairs or accepting some system degradation with the aircrews.
Quite often these aircraft ,which may have been flying continuously for months on detachment while carrying faults, will come back to the home base and then be grounded for weeks while repairs are undertaken and spares awaited to be fitted.
Obviously the problems have to be fixed sometime but experience and judgement can keep aircraft flying when a rigid adhearance to Maintenance manuals will ground them.
Unfortunately many of the people with this judgement continue to walk away to civvy street in their droves due to excessive detachments, JPA etc...

[Brewster Buffalo]

It seems incredible to me that out of 60 Apaches only 8 can be deployed due to spares/crew shortages.

Considering how long we have been fighting in Afganistan/Iraq this is a scandal that the Govt should be brought to book over.

[jayteeto]

Where is the news story here??
We have been Xmas-treeing aircraft for years. Tornadoes, harriers, pumas, tucanos, wessex, chinooks etc etc.
Stocks of ammo were not available for the gulf war, landrovers were in short supply, body armour, flying kit actually ran out for 2 months, NVG were not repaired, Porton liners were impossible to find in GW1, Puma sand filters in GW1. The list goes on and on.
But forget all that, the really good news is............... lots of people managed to get promoted and get OBEs for their fantastic money saving measures before the major conflicts. :ok:

[Gordon Broooon]

Chaps,

Be careful of any comparison with the flying/servicing rates of UK Apache, compared to the flying rates of US AH-64. I understand that they fly them hard and replace them after 10-12 years. Chances of us doing that???

GB

[Two's in]

Where is the news story here??
We have been Xmas-treeing aircraft for years. Tornadoes, harriers, pumas, tucanos, wessex, chinooks etc etc.

Don't disagree Jayteeto, the 'difference is that we usually like to get a few hours on the clock before we start cannibalising the assets. In this case, they have been flown from manufacturer's delivery to the storage facility, placed in long pres and stripped.

The double burden of cannibalisation is a well documented facet of maintenance, for Apache we have not only chosen to ignore the additional servicing costs, but also the deliberate disabling of a GBP 30M asset as it becomes another hangar queen with effectively zero flying hours.

[jayteeto]

We did this with new aircraft!! Tucanos were stored on day one and Tornados were ripped apart for spares when new!! The saddest thing for me, is that when we bought AH, everyone knew that this would happen. We talked about it in crewrooms around the country, this would have happened WITHOUT a war, so the engineers must be doing a brilliant job keeping the frames in the air. Getting aircraft back in the air by using 'experience' is commendable, but if we had a serious accident, guess who would be nailed to the wall. Just look at the Nimrod thread to see how the families feel about the engineers 'cutting corners' to get the aircraft flying. In this libellous world you are presented with a difficult choice, get it done or do it by the book and don't get it done........... which is correct???

[HEDP]

If you can believe 'reliable sources' it is far better than that.

Rumour has it that parts were stripped off delivered aircraft already in storage to enable the subsequent delivery of the latter frames.

Begs the question - Where were all the bits in the first place?

[AHQHI656SQN]

Due to the spares contract being so badly written, HEDP is correct. I was at Shawbs collecting an Apache and could see with my own eyes that gearboxes etc were being removed from aircraft already delivered, when I asked the Westlands Tech's what was going on they told me they were being removed and sent back to Yeovil so that Westlands could comlpete the contract on time and therefore look good on the text book delivery. So, the Army has never had 67 complete Apache.
The problem was, the AAC started flying the aircraft without the spares being available to replace components such as gearboxes etc. In the early days we had a couple of incidents during training which due to being over-cautious resulted in components being changed. Those were delivered from the production line an not replaced. The Army robbed Peter to pay Paul.

Brewster has a point though. Out of the 67 Apache's bought and paid for, we can only supply 8 to combat operations. Is that value for money? Where are the 8 CTT's worth of pilots if we are at less than 50% manning? Why is nothing positive being done?

[HEDP]

AHQHI656SQN,

Shouldn't you be at work now slaving over a hot computer (flying denied of course)? ;)

HEDP

[Wader2]

HEDP,

He's on leave!

[airborne_artist]

Brewster has a point though. Out of the 67 Apache's bought and paid for, we can only supply 8 to combat operations.

Do we know for a fact that only eight can be provided?

[wg13_dummy]

Do we know for a fact that only eight can be provided?


Dont be daft. This is a rumour network!

[ralphmalph]

It is shamefull that we can only supply 8 airframes to Herrick!.

Given the clip the AAC is in I was amazed to discover the output of the AH was so low...

i have it from a reliable source that a squadron in a wet and damp place has more tasklines, utilising a "legacy" aircraft operates more tasklines than the AH fraternity.....

Obviously its a case of horses for courses....but....please.

Are we really becoming that AH centric over a few tasklines in Herrick (Doing a very very valuable job i might add!)....that every single other role of AAvn should become subservient to in all respects??..

There is a bigger picture...Imagine if Afghan had not happened!??

Where would we be?

[HEDP]

Ralph and Peeps,

If Afghan and AH had not happened then might I suggest we as a Corps would have been up the creek without a paddle. As it is, AH happened but we were not really given a funding 'paddle' until Herrick began. The contingency funding has gone a long way to helping but not overcoming the funding gaps in the original plan however.

Dare I say that with the percieved doubt over a Lynx replacement that it is hardly suprising that AH has become something of a Corps and Joint focus. The platform delivers capability that the Corps has aspired to for many years and simply could not replicate with the Lynx TOW platform.

If a Lynx replacement is not forthcoming we are likely to be left with core capability of AH, fixed wing and a disparate collection of periferal capabilities in that order of importance. Which of these capabilities do you suspect that PJHQ will be seeking to contribute to the kinetic as well as ISTAR battle?

By default AH has a longer training requirement than the other platforms and is somewhat more expensive in terms of funding and technical manpower. It is dissapointing that the main frustration to developing more capability in terms of operational task lines is in fact the REME capability to generate training airframes on which to train more crews and sustain UK training. It seems that the AAC's well won reputation on ops is likely to be tarnished by this logistic inability to generate the requirement. The Corps future reputation is in the hands of the REME and out of our own, simple as that.

Given the ability to train to generate more crews and a stronger will to retain those trained in the seats they relinquish on appointment to desks, departing disilussioned with the continued workload and the like it is more likely that we can increase the number of trained aircrew within the units.

My earlier estimate of 60% manning will be frustrated in the coming year not just by routine and premature termination of sevice but also by six appointments on the CCRB of AH officers to non-AH pilot LSNs. We will as a result only slowly generate more crews.

I can assure you however that if we had the manning for a one on three off regime of whatever duration then the aircrew themselves would certainly be up for the extra opportunities to contribute to the kinetic effort that more task lines would bring.

Yours, skill faded,

HEDP

[gaylord]

In 1993 my father, who was at the REME Officer's School at Arborfield at the time, told the senior powers that as the Apache Longbow was as sophisticated as a Tornado F3 then they'd better man the REME AAC LADs to the same level as an RAF F3 Sqn if they wanted the same flying rate. They didn't and therefore no surprise that they now have these problems.

[serf]

Indeed, as is the Tornado F3 Force.

[AHQHI656SQN]

Serf. I'm not sure that back in 1993 your Dad would have had a very good look at a Longbow Apache, (it didn't enter service with the US Army until 1998) but even the AH64A was a quatum leap forward over what we (the AAC) were operating, and they (REME) were servicing. What everyone must realise, that although the Army Air Corps operate this machine, it is an Army capability.

[Occasional Aviator]

I'm afraid I have to disagree with that. It is a JOINT capability, delivered by the Army - who are actually now operating the aircraft in better and more innovative ways, and improving, so although we all have to live within our manning and provisioning limits, I would say that it is out of date to criticise the way the Army operates Apache.

Back to the Joint capability - we have learnt that it is not very effective always to tie really capable assets like these to a particular battle group or bde - the fact that it is operated by the Army and tasked by the Land component (2 different things), doesn't mean that it isn't of use to other components - in the first Gulf War AH64 was employed in the SEAD role, and it can play a similar role in escorting CSAR, which is arguably an air power role.

This is a good aircraft operated by good people. Shame about the poor support and provisioning but let's not keep beating ourselves with that particular stick.

[HEDP]

OA,

I'd say it is an Army capability delivered in a Joint environment and I'd go as far as to say the crews can hold their own in that environment.

It's not a question of how the Army operate the aircraft but more a question of how it is employed that can be questioned at times. Once you get away from 16 AABde then the wider army still needs educating as do some elements of non-army JHF headquarters.

The wider army is still waking up to its contribution in the kinetic battle and discovering the appropriate balance between burning hours on escort and the like against having it able to repond and deliver kinetic effect. Not always, there is a balance to be struck and the customers (HQ's) are becoming more aware.

HEDP

[Occasional Aviator]

Naah - I'd still say it was a joint capability delivered by the Army. A bit like BH provide joint mobility (usually to the land component), delivered by any or all of the 3 services.... but maybe I'm just being a doctrine nerd.

[ericferret]

HEDP

You seem to suggest that maintenance is responsible for the lack of available aircraft.

Is this due to lack of staff, the quality of the staff or lack of spares?

[mutleyfour]

Eric

Putting my banter head back in the cupboard and putting my sensible one on I can answer your 3 part question:

Firstly lack of staff, its fair to say the REME are suffering from a lack of manpower whom are offered much better contracts to do similar work in civillian street and have suffered ever since pay 2000 was introduced.

Secondly, quality of staff is as good as it has ever been and they work extremely hard to provide as much as possible given the circumstances.

Lastly, I will be honest and say that it would seem to me that following a catalogue of errors introducing this aircraft into service and the associated bad press it received during the early years corners were cut to enable the mop up operation by the MOD. Almost every meeting I attend with IPT's mention the need to ensure their project doesn't follow the disasterous lines that the Apache did. Hence the spares and TLMP remain a tad disorderly.

Finally I applaud the manpower involved with keeping this aircraft on duty through all of the difficult times, and only hope that the car crash the MOD is on doesnt preclude such a vital piece of hardware supporting our men and women on the frontline.

[Low Ball]

Well this thread is in the right place, a rumour network. There is more rumour/I have it on good authority/A friend in the know told me/and any other poor excuse for flinging mud than I’ve had hot dinners. Just as plainly there are more experts here than the Army needs, who know didley squat about some of the intricacies of equipment procurement, management of resources, maintenance and project management in the round or the truth of the matter about Apache introduction to service.

Before I start a plethora of WTF does he know about it replies I should declare my hand. I’m outside the programme looking in and also inside looking out, somewhat of a luxury you might say. I also know most of the staff officers who have been on the receiving end of the ill educated comment on this thread. They are good men and true working tirelessly against considerable odds doing the best for you. In fact they are doing jobs that most of the brickbat throwers couldn’t or wouldn’t do but are vital to the success of the programme. I have also been in Operational Requirements in the MoD during a War and been at War with the AAC. So in this thread IMHO there is a lot of pretty offensive manure but hidden, sadly without bands and banners, one or two pearls which the majority of muck spreaders are too blinkered to see.

First, I think what you should be doing is slapping yourselves on the back – all of you; suppliers, maintainers, aircrew, groundcrew, staff and anyone frankly associated with the equipment. You are doing a fantastically successful job given some of the constraints. Stop beating yourselves up, OK some things could be better but all in all it’s a success story.

Second when I spoke at an Attack Dinner some years ago BA (Before Apache or Before Afghanistan whichever is applicable) in this case the latter I made the point to the attendees that if they thought the MoD was going to spend this much money on the Apache it would certainly want to justify the expense by seeing what it could do on operations sooner rather than later. None of us then foresaw that it would be that soon – such is the way of things military. I know now, which I didn’t know at the time, that there had been an estimate of when the MoD thought that the aircraft might be exposed to operations and that this was being used to plan all sorts of things such as manning levels, support holdings and establishments to name but a few. You have to have a plan, it can change and the requirement to change is not an admission of having got it wrong its an evolution of the plan. In fact the aircraft was sent on operations before this date so it isn’t entirely surprising that all the dominoes were not lined up, but they are getting lined up real quick. For those sniping at spares shortages if you think that curing the problem is merely nipping across the Atlantic with a very big wedge and a large truck you are demonstrating a level of ignorance which is beyond comment. Example, not with Apache I grant you but similar examples will apply – some years ago if you wanted a Lynx MRH there was a two year lead time, you could only order them in batches of 20 and they were only made in France.

Third there is much talk of ‘can we only send 8 aircraft’ or can we only manage to send 8 out of 48. This displays a poor understanding of ‘fleets within fleets’ ‘depth servicing cycles’, UOR fits to mention but a few. If you think I’m just tossing words into a pond to keep you quiet do talk to someone who knows the implications of what I’m on about. It would take too long here. So 8 aircraft, as things stand now, can complete the requirement. Note the word requirement, that’s THE requirement NOT your requirement which sounds more akin to Bader’s Big Wings. Eight aircraft at present rates is presumably containable with current support manning levels. The addition of more aircraft will skew the support manning requirement out of all proportion. The example to try and get your heads around follows the premise that the greatest enemy of aircraft availability and serviceability is the Squadron Commanders who through the ages (and I was one once) have traditionally wanted to have all their aircraft out in a line for pictures and flypasts with their names painted on the side of the cockpit. This is appalling use of aircraft and a terrible waste of engineering resource. It is always better to fly 6 hours each off 2 aircraft than one hour each off 12.

Enough I guess. I don’t want to get into repeat tour arguments it’s not productive. Suffice to say the older among us do understand. In the late seventies and early eighties it was not unheard of for pilots to complete 2 four month tours in NI in 12 to 15 month periods. It will not go on forever. Manning levels will improve as will spares holdings and experience, all of which will ease the problem, after all HERRICK is only 2 years old. I also understand the management challenges in keeping returned operational crews fired up and enthused during the period between tours, no one said it would be easy.

Do stick with it, you are all doing a fantastic job and the Army and RAF crews that I talk to would not be without you. We know there is pain but there is terrific gain. I spoke with a young soldier of the Mercian Regiment, currently at Headly Court ,very recently as he visited us in support of our Help for Heroes fundraising. He said ‘I wouldn’t be talking to you now if it wasn’t for the Apache’. Nuff said, I’m proud to play a small part in your efforts and to sit in your reflected glory.

LB

[Front Seater]

As someone that is on the shop floor, feels this pain I totally agree with your post Low Ball.

To me the gain (saving lives) is the biggest reason to keep going and yes, although I would like more hours to train I reckon that if UK plc is that broke and there genuinely is no other option but to run our fleets of AH in the way we do, then I am with you.

But, all I hope is that when/if I or one of my colleagues makes a mistake due to a Human Factors error (aircraft, weapon delivery etc etc) and the associated BoI finds me guilty that the same people that knowingly are having to save money (including training hours) also stand by and accept the blame and protect me.

The moment that I lose faith in the military hierarchy in this area then I no longer become a warrior or a 'gun pilot' - I become a risk averse, safety extreme Apache pilot, which in my opinion (and experience) will not be what the guys on the ground want.

But thank you Low Ball for putting the other side of the case forward - and I know that there are loads of Staff wollers out there that would just love to be flying AH and will never get the chance, but still work long hours to ensure that we have the best support possible in an environment where the politicians want to use the UK military to punch above its weight, but not put any weight or substance into its military.

[Mick Smith]

Good post it might be but it does seem to gloss over the main problem

For those sniping at spares shortages if you think that curing the problem is merely nipping across the Atlantic with a very big wedge and a large truck you are demonstrating a level of ignorance which is beyond comment.

I think actually they probably think that the way to solve the spares problem is to build them into the initial programme instead of the same old, same old cannibalisation process. The way in which the Apache programme was procured was scandalous, as is very well known, too many helicopters bought without the necessary add-ons like training and spares. But then that probably doesnt make it any different from most other UK defence procurement programmes.