Defence Select Committee - Cut Nimrod

[Postman Plod]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/north_east/7315686.stm

Whether Nimrod, Type 45, or Astute, why suggest cutting programmes that are basically a hairs breath away from completion, and are increasingly vital to replace ancient kit that is way way past its sell by date? Why not cut something we haven't even started yet and cut capabilities we dont even have, cant afford, yet seem to want to aspire to and are becoming sacred cows??

Even if they do cut those programmes, we'll still need the capability, so where do we get it from, how long does it take, how much more will it cost, and what the hell do we do in the meantime??

Why has everything and everyone become so dangerously and pathetically short sighted?

[Doha_lad]

MoD urged to consider scrapping Nimrod

Thu Mar 27, 2008 12:02am GMT



LONDON (Reuters) - The Ministry of Defence must decide whether it should "cut its losses" and abandon the Nimrod programme after a delay of some eight years and a near billion-pound overspend, a group of MPs said on Thursday.
The Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft, which has been blighted by development problems, will have racked up a further overrun of 100 million pounds in 2007/8, bringing the total over-budget figure to 800 million pounds.
The aircraft was originally announced in 1992 as a replacement for the Nimrod MR2, but has suffered technical problems.
The Commons Defence Committee said the MoD must "carefully examine whether it should cut its losses and withdraw from this sorry saga".
"The committee calls on the minister for defence equipment and support to assess whether the programme will ever deliver the capability required within the timescale needed and, if not, to withdraw from it," it added in a report.
Nimrod is one of a number of projects criticised by the MPs for overrunning on budget or deadline.
The committee reflected how "disappointing" it was that the first of the Navy's two new aircraft carriers will be without the new Joint Strike Fighter aircraft when they are expected to enter service in 2014 because of delays.
The A400M transport aircraft is also expected to enter service two years late.
The MoD's equipment programme was "unaffordable" and sacrifices needed to be made as part of the Planning Round, the MPs said.



Cutting whole equipment programmes, rather than just delaying orders or making cuts in the number of platforms ordered across a range of equipment programmes, had to be made.
Committee Chairman James Arbuthnot added: "For too long the MoD has had an unaffordable equipment programme and needs to confront the problem rather than giving the usual response of salami-slicing and moving programmes to the right.
"A realistic equipment programme will give confidence to our Armed Forces that the programmes that remain will be delivered in the numbers and to the timescale required, and will also allow industry to make informed investment decisions."
Following the Comprehensive Spending Review, the defence budget in 2008/09 will be about 34 billion pounds.
Baroness Ann Taylor, Minister for Defence Equipment and Support, said in a statement: "We keep spending plans under regular review, as we are doing in the current planning round for both equipment and the wider defence programme, to ensure that we continue to spend money on the right priorities and balance our current commitments with those that may arise in the future."
(Reporting by Avril Ormsby; Editing by Steve Addison)






My thoughts to all still at ISK as they wake up to this.

[Jackonicko]

Now is surely the time to cancel CVF and JSF - which would save real money, and which are programmes on which we've spent very little so far.

[HectorusRex]

MoD should ditch key arms projects, say MPs
• Committee says cutbacks needed to make ends meet
• Report questions need to build new aircraft carriers
• Richard Norton-Taylor
• The Guardian,
• Thursday March 27 2008
• Article history
• http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/mar/27/defence.military
About this article
This article appeared in the Guardian on Thursday March 27 2008 on p2 of the Top stories section. It was last updated at 00:07 on March 27 2008.
Pressures on the defence budget are so great that ministers should consider sacrificing one of its most prestigious projects - the £4bn replacement of two aircraft carriers - rather than simply delaying or cutting back planned new weapons systems, a powerful scrutiny committee will say today.
In a report critical of how the government procures new weapons, the cross-party Commons defence committee will challenge it to explain "what roles the two future carriers will perform ... and what capabilities these ships will give us that could not be provided in other ways".
Two carriers, the largest ships ever built for the navy, are due to be completed in 2014 and 2016 at an estimated cost of £3.9bn. Delays are likely to increase the costs while separate delays in the US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme mean the first carrier will make do with ageing British Harriers, the committee notes.
Many British companies which will provide steel and other products for the ships, as well as BAE and VT, the two companies that would build them, have welcomed the project. However, the plan is questioned within and outside the MoD. Defence sources say it has become "political" rather than based on Britain's defence priorities. The carriers are due to be assembled at Rosyth dockyard in Scotland.
"The MoD needs to take the difficult decisions which will lead to a realistic and affordable equipment programme", the MPs say. They add: "This may well mean cutting whole programme, rather than just delaying orders or making cuts to the number of platforms ordered across a range of equipment programmes".
In a startling admission, General Sir Kevin O'Donoghue, chief of defence materiel, told the committee earlier this year: "I don't think we've had a properly affordable programme for many years."
However, ministers are expected to ignore the committee's advice as they struggle to make ends meet in this year's spending round. They are expected to delay the navy's shipbuilding programme, cut the RAF's order for Eurofighter/Typhoons and the army's delayed order of a new family of armoured vehicles known as Fres (Future Rapid Effects System).
Defence officials say it would be impossible to go ahead with all planned equipment programmes and pay for the basic needs of British soldiers and their families, including accommodation.
The MPs suggest plans to replace the RAF's Lynx helicopter could be vulnerable. They also urge the MoD to consider whether the time has come to "cut its losses" and abandon the updated Nimrod MRA4 maritime reconnaissance aircraft, which is running eight years behind schedule and nearly £800m over budget.
They say senior MoD officials told them problems with the Nimrod were "predictable". They add: "We are deeply concerned that they nevertheless seem to have come as such a surprise to the MoD."
James Arbuthnot, the committee chairman, said: "For too long the MoD has had an unaffordable equipment programme and needs to confront the problem rather than the usual response of salami-slicing and moving programmes to the right."
Baroness Taylor, the minister for defence equipment, said spending plans were kept "under regular review" to ensure priorities were right.

[Jetex Jim]

Full marks to BAE, they have in Nimrod the perfect product line - through AEW to MRA4 - they get paid but they don't need to deliver anything.

Now if only they could find a way to develop it into an export market...


It does make you wonder what sort of Air Force Britain could have if it didn't have to support BAE in the manner to which it has become accustomed.

MoD needs to decided which is the priority, operational capability - or job creation in NW England

[ORAC]

Whether Nimrod, Type 45, or Astute, why suggest cutting programmes that are basically a hairs breath away from completion Sunk Costs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost)

[Finger Poking]

1. There are too Many SENIOR OFFICERS within all 3 services, doing next to nothing, earning a fortune and collecting a pension that is crippling upon retirement.

2. Navalise TYPHOON for Tranche 3!! Cancel JSF, that is nothing short of expensive, incapable and retrogressive compared with a fully-supported TYPHOON. The new Carriers are more than capable of taking Typhoon and what a formidable force they would project- If Funded Correctly!

Done.

[Spanish Waltzer]

The MPs suggest plans to replace the RAF's Lynx helicopter

well that gives confidence that they know what they are talking about....:ugh:

[ZH875]

Pursuade 12 MP's to buy a 'Garden Ornament' from BAES.

Good bye RAF, it was nice knowing you.

[Bob Viking]

After listening to successive Defence Ministers proudly proclaiming the Nimrod replacement for (what seems like the last 20) years, it'd be interesting to see how this one would pass muster!
Have they already forgotten what happened in Afghanistan?!
BV:mad:

[Boldface]

Whether Nimrod, Type 45, or Astute, why suggest cutting programmes that are basically a hairs breath away from completion...

Clearly you are not familiar with the state of the MRA4 project PP.:hmm:

[AHQHI656SQN]

The MPs suggest plans to replace the RAF's Lynx helicopter could be vulnerable. :ugh:

I wonder if they mean Army Lynx as the RAF don't operate Lynx. If the Army Lynx replacement is vulnerable, what about the Royal Navy Lynx(?) or is the Army and RN Lynx one and the same?

[SidHolding]

An Island Nation with the worrying prospect of no Maritmie Patrol Aircraft?!? What will it take!?! It's just another sadly obvious outcome of defence spending being the lowest % of GDP since the 1930's!!! :mad:

[Archimedes]

To be fair to the committee, I can't find them referring to an RAF Lynx; it would appear to be the reporter who's got it wrong.

The committee report does make a couple of odd references to a beast called the Nimrod MRA2, though.

[Widger]

Jackonory......:D:D:D:D:D

Managed to get the knife in on the third post....well done...you are so predictable....there was I thinking I wonder how long it will take him to say "scrap CVF" oh......scroll down...there it is!!!:ok:

[Jackonicko]

Predictable, yes.

But also obviously (and to some extent regrettably) the right thing to do.

As the Defence Committee are coming to realise.

"Pressures on the defence budget are so great that ministers should consider sacrificing one of its most prestigious projects - the £4bn replacement of two aircraft carriers - rather than simply delaying or cutting back planned new weapons systems, a powerful scrutiny committee will say today.
In a report critical of how the government procures new weapons, the cross-party Commons defence committee will challenge it to explain "what roles the two future carriers will perform ... and what capabilities these ships will give us that could not be provided in other ways".
Two carriers, the largest ships ever built for the navy, are due to be completed in 2014 and 2016 at an estimated cost of £3.9bn. Delays are likely to increase the costs while separate delays in the US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme mean the first carrier will make do with ageing British Harriers, the committee notes."

The carriers and the JSFs they will carry are a massive funding item, which grossly distort, and will continue to distort, the defence budget, making it impossible to afford the bread and butter items we actually NEED, as opposed to being merely nice to have.

Yes, yes, I've read and understood all of the stuff about land-based and sea-based air power being complementary in an ideal world. But this isn't an ideal world and we can't afford it. Land-based air power can be useful on its own, naval air power isn't. We've needed and used land based air power every time we've been on ops, we've seldom NEEDED sea-based. Naval aviation is a luxury we cannot afford, and keeping the Royal Navy as a gold-plated, Cold War leviathan while the other surfaces become cash-starved tinpot jokes should not be allowed to continue.

JSF costs are increasing exponentially, such that the GAO already predicts that the USA will be paying more per aircraft than we paid for Typhoon. It's time to jettison CVF and JSF, and with them the unrealistic aspirations of grandeur which they represent.

[mutleyfour]

I wonder if they mean Army Lynx as the RAF don't operate Lynx. If the Army Lynx replacement is vulnerable, what about the Royal Navy Lynx(?) or is the Army and RN Lynx one and the same?

As I understand it they are very much dependant on each other financially so to cut one will mean you cut both variants.

As for differences, RN one has additional Radar and FASGW capability along with only one ste of controls whereas the Green version will have no Radar, no FASGW and a set of duals.

[minigundiplomat]

At a stroke, this move would help the procurement and long term budgets. It would also help the manning crisis, particularly across the Eng, GD(P) and NCA problem areas (particularly as many at ISK are eying up NetJets anyway).
It would also help BAE who have effectively squeezed as much as they can out of the project and now should be delivering.

The only people it doesn't help is those requiring the services of a Nimrod, particularly those on the front line- but since did MOD/Nu Labour care about them?

Not an expert (by a long chalk) but could this be linked to recent developments with the King Air?

[Widger]

Jacko,

The Royal Navy is not gold plated...far from it and has been decimated over the last decade, much like the other two services. The issu is that the two conflicts the UK is currently involved in, have skewed defence priorities right over to one end of the spectrum. That does not mean that in 10 years time the "swingometer" will go the other way. As I have said in other posts, which you have read, we only have to look at how Russia is exerting it's influence in the Arctic over resources, to see where the world is going over the next 50 years. Some might say that the whole Iraq thing was about resources.

I would personally (my own opinion) say that cancellation of JSF was the most sensible option. Marinate (sic) Typhoon or buy Rafale. Both could operate on CVF and be much more capable than Dave B. This decision would however, upset the light blue who want a Harrier replacement....so a no win situation there then. In the light of Mr Sarkozy's visit, Mr Brown should announce this immediately and in the spirit of co-operation announce new contracts for French Built Nuclear power stations in return for a cheap bulk buy of Rafale, thereby achieving commonality with the French CVF (stores, spares etc.) It is clear that this is what is needed. :ok::ok:

Keep up the lobbying old chap........I know it is starting to annoy you....much like that irritating little mossie that flies around your head during your BBQ. :}

[mr fish]

oooh, the french hve timed their state visit to perfection, if brown asks nicely we could get hold of some used atlantics:E

[Jackonicko]

Boldface,

"Clearly you are not familiar with the state of the MRA4 project PP."

I hear whispers that all is not well with MRA4, but superficially there is nothing being released or written about to contradict the broad idea that after the early difficulties (those which led to the switch from Bournemouth to Woodford, the consequent delays and disruption, the fit of the new wings), which were presumably solved (or en route to being solved) when the contract was restructured in February 2003, it has all been plain sailing, apart from some minor hiccoughs - like the longitudinal stability issues.

The broad impression being given is that it's much the same as Typhoon was a few years ago - late, having suffered massive cost escalation, but fundamentally back on track (albeit with a much later ISD), and with some real improvements having been made in the intervening years.

I'm starting to hear a VERY different story, however, that MRA4 remains a disaster, and perhaps even that the AEW3 would be a better basis for comparison.

Plenty of folk here must know the truth.

[Not_a_boffin]

Naughty, naughty Jacko. That Grauniad excerpt isn't actually what the DSC recommends, even if it's what you'd like. I expect the journo was briefed by Michael Quillan....

They do express incredulity "that MoD cannot explain the delay in signing the main production contracts" though.

Interestingly, rather than point out that the MoD is not adequately funded to deliver the policy of HMG (namely the capabilities required by SDR), they lapse into "unaffordability" and cancellation of MRA4. They're normally much better than that....

[althenick]

Yes, yes, I've read and understood all of the stuff about land-based and sea-based air power being complementary in an ideal world. But this isn't an ideal world and we can't afford it. Land-based air power can be useful on its own, naval air power isn't

What do you mean by saying we cant afford it Jacko?

In the Falklands we couldn't afford to lose ships to Air attack (and we had a damn sight more capable Air to Air Surface to air capability) How many millions did all they cost to replace? I can go along with the CVF cancelation if there were a couple of decent LHD's on the offing but then again we'd be back to square 1 tendering and all the other crap that goes with it.
What would you suggest for the RN?

BTW I do believe That NAVAL AIR POWER has done its bit in both Afganastan and Iraq and the last time I looked they could be based both ashore and aboard. Try doing that with a Typhoon.

[Tappers Dad]

The MOD are holding a press briefing at 2pm today. maybe we will hear something after that re MRA4.

[Boldface]

I'm starting to hear a VERY different story, however, that MRA4 remains a disaster, and perhaps even that the AEW3 would be a better basis for comparison.

You may think that. I couldn't possibly comment!:mad:

[hulahoop7]

Isn't it the tanker PFI at 2?

[LowObservable]

MRA4 is vulnerable because there is a substitute available - the P-8A, apparently running quite well, IOC 2013, brand-new airframes that will cost less to run than MRA4 ever will, common upgrade program with the US and (almost certainly) Australia.

The question is whether things are worse than they appear from the official dates and money numbers.

[philrigger]

;)

In the Falklands we couldn't afford to lose ships to Air attack (and we had a damn sight more capable Air to Air Surface to air capability) How many millions did all they cost to replace?


Were they ever replaced ? I don't think so.




'We knew how to whinge but we kept it in the NAAFI bar.'

[althenick]

Were they ever replaced ? I don't think so.


Good point philrigger, :suspect:

[Skipness One Echo]

Wow so you can have a new B737 airframe rather than a rebuilt Comet airframe. Only in the UK would we ever have considered the bloody Nimrod fiasco. Curious that the same aircraft type could be a cataclysmic disaster twice (!)

[owe ver chute]

Isn't the AWACS a Nimrod replacement?

I seem to recall in the 80's a Nimrod with radars front and rear eating money like it was going out of fashion. Have we to learn these old lessons time and time again? :ugh:

[pr00ne]

philrigger and althenick,

They were ALL replaced, by much more capable vessels (T22B3) as was all the gear lost in the Falklands.

A long time ago though..............................

[althenick]

Just had a wee scan of the CDS document. They aren't suggesting cutting the capability just the project. So I have a question for anyone out there who is in the know -

- How long could the current Nimrod fleet soldier on?
- To preserve airframes could other aircraft take on some of roles of Nimrod?(I'm thinking of 750 sqn Taking over short range SAR duties for example)
- A cheap and cheeful replacement?

any ideas?

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

The none journo corrupted document is at;
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmdfence/295/295.pdf

It's good to see that the Committee is comprised of well informed experts:

Q98 Chairman: But other countries struggle by
without Nimrods?

Mr Gould: They certainly have struggled. Most
other countries that have this use something called
the P3 which is a Lockheed Orion aircraft. That was
a contender, but it does not have the endurance of
Nimrod. Indeed, the Americans are moving to the
multi-role maritime aircraft and have been
struggling for about 15 years to try to find a way to
move from the P3 design to something more
capable.

Q99 Mr Holloway: It just seems bizarre to be doing
this to a rotting old 1950s aircraft?

Mr Gould: Most of it is new.

Q100 Mr Holloway: Not the one that I went on
recently, although maybe the electronic gizmos are
new.

Mr Gould: The wings, engines and undercarriage
are new.

Q101 Robert Key: The airframe is not.

Mr Gould: The fuselage is not.

[althenick]

*****e

Just googled and true enough they replaced with ships that were predominantly ASW/ASUW platforms. Ironic really you lose Air Defence Ships to Air Attack which they were designed to repel and replace them with something less capable of that role!

FAA got more shars though!

[Jackonicko]

AlltheN, Widger, et al.

The fact that you have to go back to 1982 to illustrate the military need for a carrier tells the story.

In those days, with that budget, I was a huge supporter of carriers.

But today, we live in a different world.

LO,

A P-8 might cost less to operate, though given Boeing's record on the Wedgetail and KC-767, I'd hesitate before viewing it as being low risk. Nor does a twin-fan airliner fill me with confidence for a role which requires the platform to get down and dirty, manoeuvring quite hard as it flies the ASW cloverleafs, prosecuting an attack with torpedoes, etc.

Back to the Nimrod.....

When having information in the public domain would aid an enemy, then plainly, the public’s right to know MUST be subordinate to military secrecy. On this basis, I’d be nervous about seeing in print any detailed information relating to current deployments, tactics, and weapons and sensor system parametrics.

However, a culture of secrecy has grown up that treats all information with equal caution, historic, or current, operational or relating to procurement. That’s something I’m less anguine about.

Often, especially in the procurement field, such secrecy actually serves to damage our armed forces more deeply and more fundamentally than would revealing which squadron is presently based at (say) Kandahar with x number of jets. And I’d suggest that keeping Nimrod MRA4’s problems under wraps is a good example of damaging secrecy – whose only purpose can be to protect the contractor (whose reputation might be damaged by revelations about all the cock-ups), and to protect the reputations of the politicians and senior officers on whose watch these problems have occurred.

There is no doubt that there have been problems!

Air Staff Requirement Number 420 was issued, initially calling for 25 Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft with an In Service Date of 2003.

On 27” July 1996 the decision to award the contract to British Aerospace, was announced. The contract, now for only 21 aircraft and worth just over two billion pounds sterling, was eventually signed with British Aerospace on 2”d December 1996.

When the Nimrod MRA4 contract was let with BAE Systems in December 1996 the In-Service Date (ISD) was still set at April 2003. That ISD was defined as the date when seven aircraft were to be fully operational. The twenty-first and final aircraft was to be delivered to the Royal Air Force in 2006.

(So why did they call it Nimrod 2000?)

BAE Systems advised the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) that they could not meet this date in late 1998, following technical and resource problems.

The Nimrod MRA4 was identified as one of the Smart Procurement Initiative's pilot Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) in November 1998 - led by Air Commodore Barry Thornton, who was succeeded by Mr David King in January 2001 as IPT Leader. This meant that MRA4 became headlined as the flagship of SMART procurement – an irony in view of what was to happen.

The contract was ‘re-baselined’ In May 1999, following extensive negotiations, and a new ISD of March 2005 was set. This represented a delay of 23 months. The new In Service Date (ISD) of March 2005 was defined as being marked by the delivery of the 7th aircraft. The Nimrod MRA4 was due to enter operational service in August 2004 (this was NOT the ISD) and the 21st and final aircraft was due for delivery in December 2008.

A further change to the contract was agreed in 2001/02, including a two-stage capability demonstration prior to ISD. (“To mitigate this risk, MOD and BAE SYSTEMS have agreed to an Incremental Capability Acquisition approach. This comprises the acceptance of aircraft in two steps, an initial capability being demonstrated by the time of first aircraft delivery will full specification compliance being demonstrated by the time of the seventh aircraft delivery and ISD.”) It was then recognised that the ISD might prove to be late 2005.

The number of aircraft required was reduced to 18 in view of the assessed increase in capability and availability of the MRA4 over the MR2, and citing a perceived reduction in the submarine threat – or was the reduced number of aircraft, at the same overall cost, actually intended to compensate industry?

By the end of 2002, it was clear that the overlap of development and production activities was leading to further timescale problems. In February 2003 BAE SYSTEMS and MoD agreed to revise the programme again, aiming to reduce risk in development by delaying production work, allowing the design of the aircraft is proven during the flight trials programme. Once an acceptable level of demonstrated performance was achieved, the series production of the remaining 15 aircraft would recommence. This restructuring of the programme would result in a four year delay to the in-service date to 2009.

The February 2003 Agreement changed the contract from the previous fixed price basis, to a Target Cost Incentive Fee (TCIF) arrangement for Design and Development. A contract amendment to this effect was signed on 23 February 2004. This mechanism was supposed to be the best means of incentivising BAE SYSTEMS to deliver the aircraft without further cost and time slippage. Why has it not done so?

ISD was now defined as the Delivery of the sixth production standard aircraft to the Royal Air Force.

In July 2004, the UK Ministry of Defence announced that this number was to be further reduced to 12 aircraft.

A further review of the programme identified increased production costs and that the In-Service Date for the capability would need to be delayed in order to make the programme affordable within Departmental funding constraints. A business case seeking authorisation of commitment to full production was approved in May 2006, and the contract was amended to re-introduce the production requirements in July 2006.

The UK MOD finally awarded the production contract for 12 Nimrod MRA4 aircraft In July 2006. Delivery of the first production aircraft was by then planned for 2009. The scheduled in-service date had slipped to 2010 and deliveries were scheduled to be completed in 2012. Nimrod MRA4 has an assumed in-service life of 25 years based upon 650 flying hours per year. This results in an out of service date (OSD) of 2035, but a longer life may be feasible.

The MPR07 Definition of ISD is the provision of 5 aircraft (4 deployable) and 6 combat ready crews. It was then scheduled for September 2010 – 89 months late.

The latest information is that MRA4 is now 92 months (7.5 years) late, inferring a December 2010 ISD, and £787 m (28% of the Approved Cost) over budget.

£100 m of this cost growth (“just a little less than three per cent of the total programme cost”) and three months of this delay have been added during the last year alone, giving the lie to any idea that the problems are over. Three months more delay, and £100 m more to the excess costs sounds to me like the programme is still spiraling out of control (albeit perhaps at a slower rotational rate).

David Gould CB, Chief Operating Officer, DE&S told the House of Commons Defence Committee that: “The production, flight trial and mission system programmes are going very well.”

Are they? Was he knowingly lying to Parliament?

The NAO’s Major Projects Report 2007 forecast that all Key User Requirements would be met. Is that true, or were they misled?

The MRA4 KURs are:

01 Maritime Counter Terrorism
02 Search & Detect (UWE)
03 Submarine Attack
04 Search & Detect (AWE)
05 Tactical Interoperability
06 Mission Completion
07 Maritime Presence
08 Operations in Hostile Environment
09 Environmental Operating Conditions

KUR 08 was originally judged as being ‘at risk’, but the NAO judges that the “Technical and financial issues now resolved surrounding procurement of Electronic Warfare Rig thereby allowing aircraft to operate with a self-defence capability. Business Case with Investment Appraisal under compilation. Procurement schedule being determined; anticipate KUR compliance when schedule and risks clearly identified.”

Cost snippet:
1998 - £2 bn order for 21 aircraft = £95 m each

2004 - £3.5 bn for 15 aircraft = £233 m each

2006 - Cost now £3.2 bn for 12 aircraft = £267 m each

2008 – Cost now £3.6 bn for 12 aircraft = £300 m each

[althenick]

The fact that you have to go back to 1982 to illustrate the military need for a carrier tells the story

You'll need to go back to WW2 to justify Typhoon then using that logic :E

[Widger]

Hang on a minute Jackonory, you are tarring me with someone elses brush again. I have not mentioned 1982 once (there you see...he said it again...stone him) I am talking about the future and ensuring that the UK is prepared for the future and not squandering everything on a land war that we are currently in...if you take that line, then ditch Nimrod, ditch Challenger, ditch everything that does not involve fighting a guerilla war!

Read what I post....I am talking about resources and the lack of. I am talking about the growth of Russian, Chinese and Indian etc influence and the inevitable "grab" for land in places far away from fixed airfields, with their associated resources of oil, coal, gas, fish, minerals, diamonds etc. Antarctica is the one place left on earth that has not been exploited but this will not continue forever. Sooner or later, someone will turn around, (much like japanese whaling) and say "We are taking this land and it's resources". Only those with the strength and capability will be able to resist. Why do you think the Falkland Islands are so important?

[Jackonicko]

AlltheNick,

Land based OS FJs are needed (and being used) right now.

The recent 'Bear' activity shows that UK AD FJs are needed right now.


Widger,

The Falklands can now be defended without carriers.

Carriers threaten core capabilities that we need right now.

[Not_a_boffin]

If we're not going to do power projection, we don't need to be in sandy places, we don't need OS (or much else beyond AD & AWACS jets, OPVs and lots of infantry to bo honest).

As per overseas theatres, can't we rely on someone else to do AD for UK (only kidding this time!)

Carriers do not threaten core capabilities. The Treasury does. Endex.

[Widger]

Jacknory.....you no listen...........you no listen....I AM NOT TALKING ABOUT DEFENDING THE FALKLANDS AKA 1982 (there he said it again). Are you suggesting that the UK military prostitutes its total future capability to satisfy a requirement in what is guerilla war? How shortsighted.

If we take you line to it's logical conclusion, the lets bin Typhoon, and everything else that does not DIRECTLY support the Army in Iraqistan. Lets close all those UK bases, bin Trident, bin CVF, bin the CRCs, bin the bunkers, bin Challenger, bin AS90, Bin ASTOR, bin Astute, Bin MR4A, Bin the SAR flights, bin T45, bin Future Rotorcraft, bin every future and current project and spend it all on sniper rifles, Land Rovers, 50 cal machine guns, and helicopters. Air support can be provided by the Yanks and transport by British Airways, Catering by ESS. Your Myopic viewpoint, centred around an absolute drive to defend anything with a roundel on it, does not do your title as a journalist any credit.

I agree that funds are short and unlikely to change but you clearly need to spend a few weeks at the college of knowledge and accept that there are some people in the MOD who are trying their best with limited resource. People who have got to where they are through years of Service, conflict and experience and have the knowledge to back up their decisions. People far more capable than I and more informed and un-biased than you. I will go no further as I am on the verge of being rude, which I have no wish to do. WEBF come back ...all is forgiven.

[ZH875]

transport by British Airways

Just as long as the troops do not need any hold baggage in theatre.:E

[Jackonicko]

Am I suggesting that the UK "prostitutes its total future capability to satisfy a requirement in what is guerilla war?"

No Widger, that's not what I'm suggesting.

What I'm suggesting is that within the AVAILABLE budget we should have balanced forces, concentrating on the most useful and most cost-effective capabilities, and ensuring that we can do routine operations autonomously, while relying on allies to provide the little-used and most expensive capabilities.

I'm suggesting that we need to be able to do another Granby, or another Allied Force, or another Telic. (All of which did not require a UK aircraft carrier). But not necessarily another Corporate.

So I want plenty of frigates to do all the ad hoc stuff that frigates do all the time (Caribbean guardship, drug interdiction, etc.) and I want TLAM-launching submarines. I want plenty of land-based FJs, tankers, recce and SEAD. I want plenty of AT and SH.

But I don't think that carriers and JSF can be justified, any more than we can justify a strategic bomber force. They are simply not useful enough often enough, and not a cost-effective, efficient or agile way of delivering effect.

[hulahoop7]

Carrier Group operations: by facilitating the generation of a combined maritime strike capability when required for national, EU-led or NATO operations. This capability could be expanded to other European countries able and willing to make a contribution.

The joint statement has the above paragraph. The CV's are now clearly as important to France and the UK as their nuclear detterents.

[Magic Mushroom]

David Gould CB, Chief Operating Officer, DE&S told the House of Commons Defence Committee that: “The production, flight trial and mission system programmes are going very well.”

KUR 08 was originally judged as being ‘at risk’, but the NAO judges that the “Technical and financial issues now resolved surrounding procurement of Electronic Warfare Rig thereby allowing aircraft to operate with a self-defence capability. Business Case with Investment Appraisal under compilation. Procurement schedule being determined; anticipate KUR compliance when schedule and risks clearly identified.”

Jacko,

I'd be VERY interested to hear when those statements were made.

Regards,
MM

[Jackonicko]

MM,

The Gould quote comes from:

House of Commons, Defence Committee
Defence Equipment 2008, Tenth Report of Session 2007–08

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmdfence/295/295.pdf

Page Ev11, RH column

Because I have it only from single and dual sources, I can't elaborate, but I can say that I believe this quote to be absolutely untrue, specifically that the flight trial and mission system programmes are not, by any stretch of the imagination, "going very well."

The other comes from:

REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL | HC 98-II Session 2007-2008 | 30 November 2007
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Major Projects Report 2007
Project Summary Sheets

p.102

http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0708/hc00/0098/0098_ii.asp

I believe that outstanding problems with MRA4 are such that it would preclude KURs being judged as being 'met'.

[Mr-AEO]

Why do we always examine the near/medium term projects when we are asked for cuts? Presumably because it is near/medium term overpressure in the Equipment Capability Plan. These sort of cuts are always controversial, because the projects are so mature and have been justified time and again.

Why not take the pain now and make some future plans that do not cause us this pain in the future? Let's take DPOC for a starter - £3.5Bn of money for something that doesn't yet have an agreed requirement. Cut it before it becomes a problem child, not when it is one.

[Jetex Jim]

Am I the only one who finds it astonishing that no matter how badly BAE perform on this they still manage to pocket the full contract price.
They have been compensated for their own failure to deliver by now only being obliged to deliver a 12 aircraft fleet - for the price of the original 21.

Even the poor old RAF carries the can because those original 21 airframes, build by one of BAE's honoured predeccessors, but in contract speak supplied by the RAF, were so inconsistent in build standard that all the new bits had to be reworked.

Considering that all the really tricky stuff, the area where Nimrod AEW f:mad: up, is done for them - the mission equipment is being supplied by Boeing.

The meal they've made of the rest of the job is staggering.

[Jackonicko]

When the contract was changed to a Target Cost Incentive Fee (TCIF) arrangement for Design and Development on 23 February 2004 it was meant to "be the best means of incentivising BAE SYSTEMS to deliver the aircraft without further cost and time slippage."

Can anyone give any evidence that this has happened, or is Jetex Jim correct, and has BAE continued to profit, while continuing to f*** up in spades?

Or is it right that everything's going swimmingly, as Gould avers, and all KURs are a piece of cake?

“The production, flight trial and mission system programmes are going very well.”

http://www.scifidimensions.com/Jun07/pencil_pinnochio.JPG

David Gould.

[Spanish Waltzer]

It wasn't all that long ago (ok perhaps a few years!) that many self professed 'defence gurus' used pprune to complain that the UK acquiring apache was a total waste of money and a cold war type asset that had no role in the modern wargame. I would assume these armchair experts are now relieved of the anonimity of such forums.

My point is that any planned equipment project does not come to fruition for so many years that it is impossible to say for certain what UK plc will be requiring of its military when the goods are actually delivered. Do the new carriers provide flexibilty to deal with the next unimaginable wargame? Does JSF? Does Typhoon?

Who would have imagined 5 years ago that the traditionally very maritime ASaC Sea King community would be contemplating deploying to sandy places to provide overland strategic effect?

I'm not saying I have the answers but I think we all have to be careful of dismissing future projects on the basis of current requirements. My personal view is that we have to accept that the coffers are almost empty and that buying known capability off the shelf must be more cost effective than trying to remain at the forefront of the defence industry by investing in the design and development side of things when we dont have the luxury of being able to throw money at it til it works.

[davejb]

What an amazing thread - page 3 already!
IF the MR4 is actually capable of being completed, and working (unlike AEW) then only an idiot would cancel it. I have no doubt there are lots of bad things about it - many years ago I suggested they provide a disc loading system that allowed somebody in NBC gear to load a disc (Fisher Price controls, is how I phrased it at the time) and I was treated to a display of 'wow, what a strange idea!?' from the nerds I was talking to.
(The same nerds who figured an 8 inch floppy that took 20 attempts to load from was a good thing, I suspect).

If, on the other hand, there are endless delays ahead while BAe eventually admits that it can't deliver the aircraft contracted for, so that it actually performs pretty well as specified, then we should cut our losses - and make sure we don't sign BAe up to anyhting that's at all difficult in future. One can't help but wonder if the company is capable of producing this type of platform any more.

P8 - tell you what, let's have some new MR2s... fix the AAR and other nasty bits that have surfaced, but for maritime patrol the MR2 is still the dog's nadgers. Searchwater is still bloody good, for overall 'protect the island ASW', our traditional and still necessary role, it's a brilliant piece of kit that BAe must have stumbled on by accident. B737's for God's sake? How can anyone complain that the MR4 is a rebadged antique and then suggest we buy a 737? We'd be better off with Shack Mk3's....

As for CV vs MPA arguments - I cannot see the point of having CVs if there are insufficient DDG/FFG in the fleet to protect them so they can go into warzones. Why we need so many admirals is a mystery - there must be two for every vessel larger than a sloop in the RN these days (I suspect Air MArshals v Aircraft is at a similarly ridiculous ratio). We need to be able to protect our local area around the UK, in addition it is nice to have ships to deploy for exercise abroad, and to extend power into distant areas a la Falklands.... but if you can only fund one of these tasks properly then for heaven's sake buy lots of ASW frigates and sod the CV's that you can't afford to lose anyway. Whilst 1982 is a significant date in this argument, a squadron of F4's on the FI and a decent garrison, coupled with some sense in the foreign office etc at the time, would have prevented the whole debacle.

The CV's were a fix for a situation that should never have arisen, that doesn't mean we should plan future ops around them.

The RN need more ships, personally I think they ought to have a bunch of FFG/DDG rather than 2 CV''s that will be lightly protected, and that - in a conflict - will be considered too expensive to risk. In a world where we don't, really, project power, we should be looking to get bang for our buck in the defensive arena.

[Jetex Jim]

What a delightful piece of NUSPEAK
"be the best means of incentivising BAE SYSTEMS to deliver the aircraft without further cost and time slippage."


The notion of paying only for a delivered, functional bit kit, an idea applied to every other buisiness transaction - aside from defence procurement - must be just too difficult a concept.

[Mr-AEO]

Not really a difficult concept, but not a firm grasp of the reality of defence procurement.

For example, how many other buyers are there for a CVF? They are designing making them for us and the French so we pay the design costs; this is basic acquisition of a unique capability, not popping to the local Vauxhall dealer for a Zafira.

Do you really suggest that we could pay at the till as we walk out the door with a CVF under our arm? :\

[Jetex Jim]

It's clear enough buying military kit is not like buying an iPod, someone has to cover design and development.

But if you buy an iPod and it doesn't work you either get your money back or a new one.

Not so with these jokers, they get to charge full wack if they deliver or not. - See Nimrod AEW saga.

Now at least if you buy from the yanks you are liable to get something that works - as long as BAE are not involved - 'adding value to it'

[davejb]

Well,
we could always send an Admiral along to say 'naaah, don't like the colour - tell you what, knock off the VAT and I'll give you cash'.

It does rather raise the question of what the company would do if we said 'too much' and refused to pay - sue the government? Not really an option, is it? Ultimately the question is 'who has who over the barrel?'*

Dave

* note 'OVER' the barrel, not the Naval version 'IN the barrel'.

[Jetex Jim]

And of course at any sniff of cancellation BAE start whining about all the jobs that will be lost.



Essentially they make you buy the barrel they f:mad:k you in.

[Jackonicko]

Jetex Jim,

"At least if you buy from the yanks you are liable to get something that works - as long as BAE are not involved."

Hmmm.

Care to try that one out on the Aussies (just ask about Seasprite or Wedgetail)?

Or the Italians (KC-767)?

Or even the USAF itself, asking whether the F/A-18E/F's AESA radar has gone on a proper cruise, yet, or whether an F-22 can talk to anyone but his own wingman using the datalink?

Or cast an eye into the recent past and look at the C-130J as an example of "something that works."

And is the MRA4 fiasco (if there is a fiasco?) entirely BAE's fault? Do Boeing bear no responsibility?

And would buying P-8 guarantee working, useful kit? Is the 737 suited to ASW as we practise it?

[Mr-AEO]

Not so with these jokers, they get to charge full wack if they deliver or not. - See Nimrod AEW saga.

Fair point. Whilst I risk antagonising you with a non-Nimrod example once more, it is a closer one than CVF;) Look at ASTOR, has that been satisfactorily delivered & does it meet our requirements, NO, has Industry been paid? YES and lots.

Also:

High-G centrifuge. We kicked this off and then cancelled the programme. We got sued in court and had to paid most of the total costs anyway, yet Industry kept the equipment, which I recall was then sold to Malaysia! Industry profit 2 times, we get stuff all for the money.

What I'm saying is, is this behaviour unique to BAES? I think not.

[Jetex Jim]

It is not hard to find other military projects that are overspent and late, that's military procurement.

No one, apparently, has come up with a satisfactory way to 'incentivise' the suppliers - in the face of the job lobby, the need to maintain technical capability lobby etc. The operational requirement lobby is just way too weak.



While there may be other runners in the overspent and late race - Nimrod is still in a class of its own.

[Ivan Rogov]

The MRA4 will probably be 10 years late and each cost 3 times as much, many believe BAe are responsible. However the project is close (relatively) to completion and a replacement for the MR2 is desperately needed.

Any guesses who responsible for building the Carriers? Based on previous performance can they be expected to deliver within costs and deadlines, I doubt it. If they couldn't measure and fit a new set of wings, how on earth are they going to mate huge sections from different dock yards together?

[Mr-AEO]

how on earth are they going to mate huge sections from different dock yards together?

Very big rivets?:}

[JFZ90]

What is expensive?

Now I don't know any details on Nimrod, nor do I seek to defend BAES and its commercial behaviour, however, when bemoaning cost escalations and what seem like massive costs, it must be bourne in mind that complex engineering is always expensive - this is a harsh reality & not something you can pretend can be avoided.

As a quick comparison, which is a bit rough around the edges, compare some of the costs bourne by Microsoft. It spends $7Bn / £3.5Bn per year on R&D. For the sake of argument, lets guess that say 1/3 of that is spent on their core product - PC operating systems. MS VISTA took 5 years to develop, from 2001 to 2006, hence taking approximately £6Bn to development. It contains 50 million lines of code.

Compare now to Nimrod MRA4, which apparently has 6 millions lines of code - OK not as much as VISTA, but then again each copy of the software comes with quite a large free aeroplane. Total cost is £3.6Bn. Now this is alot of money, but I think this perception is particularly exaggerated when it equates to £300m per copy, when you only buy 12.

By comparison, if Microsoft only sold 12 copies of VISTA, each one would cost £500m - with no aeroplane.

[Safety_Helmut]

A pint of whatever JFZ90 is on please barman ! :confused:

S_H

[minigundiplomat]

Chinook Mk3

[Boldface]

...However the [MRA4] project is close (relatively) to completion...


Too late, Ivan's drunk it all.:hmm:

[ZH875]

MS VISTA took 5 years to develop, from 2001 to 2006, hence taking approximately £6Bn to development. It contains 50 million lines of code.


And how many of those 50 million lines of code are safety critical, which makes them more expensive per line of code. (Clue - ZERO), whereas Nimrod MRA 4 has more than a few.

[buoy15]

How about cutting the size of the House of Commons and the self serving B*stards that occupy it plus their present appeal scam to stop them being exposed to the fraudulent exploitation of taxpayers
If they've nothing to fear, they've nothing to hide
The millions they are defrauding from the system could support many threatened Defence projects

[Ogre]

I just wanted to back up some of what JFZ90 was saying. I've been working for a major defence contractor for a number of years now and have been involved in several projects. While I've never touched Nimrod I know a number of the people who are on the project and the principles are the same on any aircraft.

With ANY aircraft engineering project you always have the same cycle: you design something, the customer looks at it and likes it so you build it. Then the customer sees what you've built and decides he wants to change it. So you have to re-design it or source a stock of a new part that will do waht the customer wants, then amend the drawings to record the change in design, fit the new parts, test them to make sure it works and it's not a hazard or a safety risk, organising manufacture of sufficient spares for the life of the item you've just changed and finally updating the maintenance manuals. Changing just one small part of any aircraft is expensive, purely because of the amount of time and paperwork involved.

The longer a project takes, the more chance the customer has to change his mind or decide he wants something else added. What started off as a simple "Lets update the ASW platform" has snowballed and the customer wants to get more than just something to find submarines. the last time I looked there was no major threat to shipping in the mountains of Afghanistan, so why are they flying there?

Ogre

[tucumseh]

Ogre

Excellent post. But to qualify some of the points you made, as applied to MoD aircraft projects.


“Then the customer sees what you've built and decides he wants to change it”.

This is where firm leadership in the project team and, perhaps more importantly, oversight at Project Director level and above is important. (It’s what they’re paid for). Minigundiplomat made a perceptive post when he simply said “Chinook Mk3”. That project has been slated by the Defence Committee for “poor management oversight”. No attempt is made to actually identify that “management” (as usual), but a cursory glance tells you it’s precisely the same few people as Nimrod MRA4, particularly at 2 Star. You mention the dreaded “Change”. To change requires Configuration Control, a key component of Airworthiness. Same management – “Configuration Control Boards are unnecessary”. “Critical Design Reviews may be waived”. (This should be a criminal offence). A weak project manager or director will permit all and sundry access to the Contractor, and delegate to them authority to demand such changes, regardless of time, cost or performance issues. Control of, in effect the whole project is lost; and so maintaining the correct build standard becomes almost impossible. Same management said this was ok. This is THE fundamental weakness in MoD.


“…. then amend the drawings to record the change in design”

Same management – “not required”. If you insist on doing it, fine, but you’re not getting funds so make a cut somewhere else. Same effect – airworthiness compromised. Increasingly, as MoD’s experience has been diluted, maintaining up-to-date drawings is viewed as a waste of money. Ask BAeS.


“….fit the new parts, test them to make sure it works and it's not a hazard or a safety risk”

You must be joking! Same 2 Star completely rejected this notion. Or, to be precise, he ruled by all means fit them but Integration and Trials are unnecessary, and don’t worry about hazards and safety. If it doesn’t work, and Boscombe reject it as unsafe, ignore it, pay off the contract and run. Led indirectly to Tornado/Patriot.


“…..organising manufacture of sufficient spares for the life of the item you've just changed”

In our dreams. If you want spares, there’s plenty of potential Xmas Trees in the hangars. See Apache.


“….and finally updating the maintenance manuals”. (And I could add training).

Ditto. Read the QQ report, which merely reiterates what we’ve known since 1991, when the policy decision was made to chop this.

I say this often. It is one thing to Attain a standard or airworthiness, but quite a different matter to Maintain it. My opinion is that, if you’ve never done the latter you’re unlikely to be a success at the former; in project management terms. Compare the MoD’s success stories (of which there are many) with the cock-ups and you’ll see what I mean. Trouble is, MoD refused to drink from the well of experience, the same management referring to such people as “an embarrassment to the Department” and “tainted”. The well has run dry and the perpetrators are retired now.

[JFZ90]

A pint of whatever JFZ90 is on please barman !

S_H

OK, my comparison is very rough (VISTA metrics from 30 secs on wiki), but I think demonstrates a valid point. Which bit are you struggling with?

And how many of those 50 million lines of code are safety critical, which makes them more expensive per line of code. (Clue - ZERO), whereas Nimrod MRA 4 has more than a few.

Quite - forget now the cost deltas between high integrity and 'normal' code but figures of 4-10 times more expensive to produce seem to ring a bell (especially so in the UK after certain domestic safety favourites such as semantic analysis have been bolted onto the coding standards the rest of the world seems to agree is sufficient for critical code, n'est pas S_H?).

[Safety_Helmut]

Sorry mate, but your comparison is akin to comparing chalk with cheese. How about making a quick 'wiki' comparison with the cost of a similarly complex commercial aircraft and the MRA4 ? Please don't take this to mean that I agree with what the MoD has done, because I don't.

I'm interested in your cost comparisons for normal versus safety related code. Would you happen to have a reference for that ? I would also be really interested in comparisons of the whole life costs if you have them ?

Cheers

S_H

[South Bound]

The beauty of a thread like this is that it makes it obvious how difficult procurement decisions and priorities are. Everyone has a different opinion, they are all valid and all need to be considered; however, what is missing is the top-level guidance to allow informed decisions to be made.

There is no doubt that all the equipment/capability mentioned previously is important to what we aspire to do, but the problem is with knowing whether or not our aspirations are appropriate. By that I mean are they needed, technologically feasible and affordable.

Need is always subjective and should be defined by a clear statement from Government what effect the MoD must be able to provide in order to support its Foreign & Domestic policies.

Technology moves on, granted, but there must be a balance of simple kit that works when asked (clothing, vehicles, radios ((and arguably SH!!!)) etc) against high-tech kit that is absolutely essential to overcome a potential adversary's capability.

Affordability is, of course, the key to all of this. When I buy a car I can do it 2 ways. I can either; determine what spec of vehicle I require and then see what I can buy with the money (this might lead to me buying something a couple of years older or from the far east, rather than Bavaria), or I can go shopping knowing my budget and balance what it will get me against the less essential items on my wishlist. Presently, the MoD does neither - it walks around with a wishlist of capabilities without a real priority list (that it repeatedly adds to and faffs with) and no real idea of what something should cost and wonders why it gets itself into financial strife.

What is required is a fundamental line in the sand that says - 'MoD, HMG requires you to support policy in this way - please tell me how much it is going to cost and we will decide if it is affordable' or 'MoD, you have this much money, how safe can you keep us?'. With neither clearly defined, the in-fghting, confusion and division within the MoD about what is required will continue to be counter productive and divert more money away from where it is most needed.

I do not argue for or against any capability/platform; rather argue that something has to give and that we should cut capabilities that are nice to have in favour of the essential ones at the top of the non-existant priority list until we match the budget provided. This is unpalatable, definitely, but we must provide to Government a realistic assessment of the effect we can provide with the budget they give us, and we must draw a line in the sand and say 'no more scrimping and saving to deliver more - that is what you funded, that is what you have'. Then we would all know where we stand and be able to move forward.

Not holding my breath...

[tucumseh]

Southbound

I agree in general terms with what you say, but would say that the processes you describe exist. The problem, as seen by those who actually commit the money, is that the decision making process is not transparent. So, if a decision is technologically impossible (the old BOWMAN chestnut of high quality real-time video via an ancient VHF radio is a good one) or unaffordable (I want 20 systems at £1M each, here’s £3M), then it’s difficult to regress. The Gods have pronounced, so get on with it.

I may be an old dinosaur (it’s official, it’s in an annual report) but the old Long Term Costings system worked for me. First Order Assumptions (We need an Army of this size, to do this………). Second Order Assumptions (In effect, the reply; that being so, you need xx tanks, aircraft, ships, and they need to be placed here, there…. And be able to do this….. And be maintained thus….). Third Order Assumptions (The aircraft must have the following kit, spares, test equipment, trained staff, facilities, pubs ….. and it all must be maintained through-life). And this is how much it’ll cost………..

And then the “basket weaving” started………… Basket 1 – Critical requirement, not tradeable at any cost. Basket 2 – We’ll take the hit if you insist, but here’s the unpalatable impact. Sign if you dare. Basket 3 – We think we need it, but we’ll take the hit. In other words, a strict prioritisation process with an opportunity to state your case. In practice (in my day) anything in Basket 3 was at risk. To set this in the current context, these days Basket 1 is constantly at risk.

The golden rule was – if there’s not a Second, there can be no Third. If the Third is not endorsed and approved, resubmit the Second and take the hit. Or go back to the top and have the First amended. That concentrated the mind of what is now DEC. The system was completely transparent to all involved. Responsibilities and authority was well defined. For example, the Thirds could only be amended by an Engineer, who was permitted to do so using engineering judgement; but he had to explain himself and demonstrate the change was cost neutral. If he needed more money, he had the authority to juggle within his remit (say, avionic systems across the RAF). If this didn’t work, he prepared a Business Case (Submission).

If you ask nowadays who is meant to do this, the Requirements Managers have the nearest Terms of Reference. None have the slightest scoobie what I’m talking about; and few are engineers, so are automatically restricted in their role anyway. The reason I know how to do it is because it used to be a junior CS task (broadly equivalent to an SO3), and a stepping stone to promotion into project management. It follows that, if you’ve done this and understand it, you avoid most of the common pitfalls that one encounters in procurement. As ever, I can only speak from experience.

Sorry, long post, but the perfectly good, and still extant (only because they’ve never been cancelled) permanent LTC (EP) instructions explain all this. Best job I’ve ever had. This may seem strange to most here, but to have good teachers, and to understand and have control over what you do, and see the end result is a fine thing.

[South Bound]

Tuc

absolutely spot on. There was a process that was the same for all and there were sufficient people dedicated to the task. With our DECs and IPTs shrunk drastically, the workload on our requirements managers has increased. With funding shrinking in real terms, our teams rely on conflict funds to finance core capability through the back door, but there is so much of this going on that no-one is keeping track of what is/isn't/should be core capability. It is all a mess.

Until someone sorts out what items in basket one are essential, we are condemned to making do, planning blight and sub-optimal solutions for everything (except Typhoon!). God, I 've depressed myself now.

[Magic Mushroom]

Ogre,

In my humble opinion, very few problems with the MRA4 are down to requirement creep. Focus has rightly remained very tightly on ASW/ASuW, not least because it falls under Director Equipment Capability Under Water Effect (DEC UWE) rather than DEC ISTAR.

Regards,
MM

[LowObservable]

MM,
You might find Airpower's comments here (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a474929ad-7521-4e0a-9467-b2d591ff6eb2)of some interest.

Also, Boeing says (Jackonicko notwithstanding) that they are the good guys on MRA4, see page 17 of this document (http://www.defsecatlantic.ca/downloads/pdf/seminars/2007/defsec-07-seminar-boeing.pdf)...

And while there are a few 1960s bits and pieces in the P-8A, the 737's been through a couple of major overhauls since then; and it's not just the age of the design, but the fact that there are 5000 of them flying around.

I'll leave the doubts about twin engines to the professionals except for pointing out that today's engines are far more reliable than the engines of the 1960s... and that the US Navy is no doubt glad that it passed up BAE's proposal to sell them MRA4s for MMA.

[Jackonicko]

While one sometimes asks questions knowing the answer, in the hope of getting a 'bite', my question about Boeing's share of the 'blame' for MRA4's woes (if it has such woes.... :oh:) was quite genuine.

It would be interesting to hear whether those who criticise elements of the MRA4 mission system would agree with Boeing's contention on p.17 that "Boeing’s Nimrod MRA-4 maritime mission system sets the standard - Developed and delivered ahead of schedule and below cost". It may be that it is entirely non-Boeing kit that is causing the problems, though given the reported problems, it's hard to see how Boeing's role (didn't it include some integration?) could be considered to have been completed on MRA4.

It's interesting that on the same page, Boeing touts its "Successful history of developing, integrating, and updating mission systems for numerous large scale programs", and then includes the 737 AEW&C among the examples.

That said, Boeing has a long track record of doing things really well (I'd view Wedgetail and KC-767 as being exceptions to a very respectable rule), and without problems. I'd therefore be quite prepared to believe that the company has a squeaky clean record on MRA4. Indeed, if it were otherwise, I'd have expected to hear bitching about their performance, and I haven't.

I didn't think it was the 737's number of engines that was the problem - rather with the unsuitability of the configuration to do the kind of 'yanking and banking' at low level that is usually associated with ASW ops by P-3s and Nimrods.

As to Bill Sweetman's blog, no-one could be a bigger fan of Bill than I am (if Av Week now hire Nick Cook they will have the triumverate of milavjournogods), but I'm still smarting that he single-handedly convinced me that a KC-330 victory in KC-X was not just unlikely, but impossible, so I'm now taking him with pinches of salt. ;););) And the man clearly needs a holiday, you don't spell it ares :=, bill, it's arse......:ok:

Coat, hat, I know the drill.

[JFZ90]

Sorry mate, but your comparison is akin to comparing chalk with cheese. How about making a quick 'wiki' comparison with the cost of a similarly complex commercial aircraft and the MRA4 ? Please don't take this to mean that I agree with what the MoD has done, because I don't.

I'm interested in your cost comparisons for normal versus safety related code. Would you happen to have a reference for that ? I would also be really interested in comparisons of the whole life costs if you have them ?

Cheers

S_H

My intention was to compare chalk and cheese - the only things in common were the fact they are both technically complex programmes and they both cost several billion pounds. It could be pointed out that "ah but yes Nimrod took alot longer and was therefore less well run" but actually the you could argue the funding profile available for Nimrod was not there to do it any quicker (whereas Microsoft probably threw money at VISTA to get it to market on time which was critical to get the revenue in, hence worth the upfront cost).

I could have compared it to A380 - EUR12 Billion in development, or over twice as much as Nimrod.

I'm not trying to defend Nimrod costs as I genuinely don't know if they are excessive or not, just putting them in some context as it is sometimes all to easy I think to think "mmm several £bn - we must be getting ripped off".

-----------

Re software metrics, its been a long time since I looked at this and my recollections are only anecdotal though the 4-10x estimate sticks in my mind. You could probably do some rundimentary comparative calculations on manhours required from say a given Software Reqt Spec to HW/SW integ test by comparing the mandatory development activities for non-critical and critical code (e.g. those listed in 00-55), though you'd really need to include much of the systems design & analysis that occurs prior to the SRS stage (and which would typically be more complex for aspects of critical systems - e.g flight control laws) to understand the true deltas. All the extra independant reviews, hazard analysis & code assurance activities, coupled with a much typically more rigourous testing / validation / certification etc. approach are the key cost drivers for safety critical code as I expect you well know.

Whole life cost the comparisons of critical and non-critical code would be interesting, as in effect they usually end up having quite different life cycles. The fact that critical code costs much more to develop in the first place typically results in projects trying to leave it alone during a life cycle unless it really really needs to change (e.g. through HW obsolescence or major system change). Non-critical code is typically where a well designed weapon system will have its mission functions, carefully partitioned from any critical code - as a result it will be changed more often to meet evolving operational reqts. Hence you'd probably find non-critical code actually has higher WLCs but this is driven by much higher software change traffic not by any inefficiency in its development process (which will always be cheaper, change for change, than critical code).

There is a theory/argument to say that you can reduce potential rework cycles in non-critical code by adopting the rigour of critical code processes, but I think the consensus of opinion is still that the cost benefit case for this has still not been established. As I say its been a while but I suspect that biggest gains in software productivity still lie in "optimising" the front end reqt engineering phases rather than focussing on the actual software development cycle post SRS (which when I last looked is where critical coding standards still tend to be focussed). I'd be very interested to learn if this emphasis has changed in recent years.

EDIT - on reflection 4-10x seems quite a high delta for sw aspects alone and if you were just to compare software process manhours it probably wouldn't be this much more. 4-10x probably includes all the wider cost impacts of developing/producing/delivering systems with safety cricital functionality.

[Jetex Jim]

JFZ90 This is all jolly interesting ...

and which would typically be more complex for aspects of critical systems - e.g flight control laws)

and it would be pertinent to Nimrod MRA4, if that A/C had a digital flight control system, as per A320, B777 and on.

Comparisons of software costs with aircraft of that class just don't apply here.

[JFZ90]

JFZ90 This is all jolly interesting ...

Quote:
and which would typically be more complex for aspects of critical systems - e.g flight control laws)
and it would be pertinent to Nimrod MRA4, if that A/C had a digital flight control system, as per A320, B777 and on.

Comparisons of software costs with aircraft of that class just don't apply here.

I only mentioned flight control laws as an example. I assume bits of Nimrod are safety critical and include software? Stores management and primary flight reference data displays spring to mind as possible candidates. The rules for critical software development will still apply, hence software development costs are therefore comparable. This is logical because the risks have similar impacts - e.g. potential loss of life.

[Jetex Jim]

I assume bits of Nimrod are safety critical and include software? Stores management and primary flight reference data displays spring to mind as possible candidates.
Yes I think you can assume that Nimrod does have safety critical code and likely in the areas you've mentioned.

But to go back to your intial suggestion:
Compare now to Nimrod MRA4, which apparently has 6 millions lines of code - OK not as much as VISTA, but then again each copy of the software comes with quite a large free aeroplane. Total cost is £3.6Bn. Now this is alot of money, but I think this perception is particularly exaggerated when it equates to £300m per copy, when you only buy 12.


Those primary flight reference data displays being derived from Airbus. The Boeing TCS is a version of the P8 kit and various other bits of existing kit culled from here and there, and might together add up to 6 million lines of code.

But clearly not all that code was developed just for those 12 Nimrods, even if the UK taxpayer is being charged as though it was.

[RAF_Techie101]

For anyone wondering why we wouldn't go and buy the P-8 Poseiden instead of MRA4, the reasoning would be somehting like this - even if it can do it's job, and do it well, it's first flight isn't till next year, and then it goes on to testing. Then the fleet of 108 aircraft for the US Navy will be built. Then the ones for the Australians.


How many years down the line will it be before we get ours then....?


Because unlike Typhoon and the Saudi's, I can't see Boeing giving away some of their machines to us instead of giving them to the Navy...

[JFZ90]

primary flight reference data displays.......being derived from Airbus.

But clearly not all that code was developed just for those 12 Nimrods, even if the UK taxpayer is being charged as though it was.

Bear in mind my point was only being made in big handfuls and I don't doubt that the reuse / adaptation of existing airbus flight deck solutions reduced some of the costs of starting from scratch. However - nothing safety critical is ever cheap as you must always re anaylse the application of existing implementations in new platforms to ensure you understand the relevant risks and failure modes. The Ariane 5 project team learned this the hard way when they took Ariane 4 INS kit "off the shelf" and applied it "on the cheap".

[Jetex Jim]

For anyone wondering why we wouldn't go and buy the P-8 Poseiden instead of MRA4, the reasoning would be somehting like this - even if it can do it's job, and do it well, it's first flight isn't till next year, and then it goes on to testing. Then the fleet of 108 aircraft for the US Navy will be built. Then the ones for the Australians.
How many years down the line will it be before we get ours then....?


Yes the race is definetly on now, which will be finished first, MRA4 or P8...

Because unlike Typhoon and the Saudi's, I can't see Boeing giving away some of their machines to us instead of giving them to the Navy...
Dashed generous of the RAF to let our chums the Saudi's have some of our front line jets, when there is such a pressing need for them.

Of course there are those who believe that the original RAF order was overstated - and thus the UK slice of the action within the workshare is overgenerous - in the full knowledge that those jets WOULD be going to Saudi.

Normally Eurofighter would expect to share the export order equally, so all would get a bit of the gravy, as they did with Austria.

Now this isn't a Eurofighter thread but there are those who believe that parts of the UK industry are out of their depth trying to make some of the parts for THAT mighty machine, did somebody mention the primary radar?

[Da4orce]

According to the Northern Scot flight trials of the MRA4 have swallowing up about 50% of the entire spend!


The majority of the overspend has come about during the flight trials process, which has highlighted the need for modifications. There are problems with the pitch of the aircraft – something which the MoD says is not unusual – and that has accounted for about half the cost growth.


Source: http://www.northern-scot.co.uk/news/fullstory.php/aid/4431/Fears_raised_for_'new_Nimrod'.html

[Tigs2]

If it is to have an in service life of 25-30 years, won't the fuselages be almost 75-80 years old when have done their time:eek::eek:

[FormerFlake]

I can't see Boeing giving away some of their machines to us instead of giving them to the Navy...

Just like they did with the C17 you mean????????:ugh::ugh:

[mary_hinge]

According to the Northern Scot flight trials of the MRA4 have swallowing up about 50% of the entire spend!


Quote:
The majority of the overspend has come about during the flight trials process, which has highlighted the need for modifications. There are problems with the pitch of the aircraft – something which the MoD says is not unusual – and that has accounted for about half the cost growth.
Source: http://www.northern-scot.co.uk/news/...mrod'.html

Is the "porpoising" still a problem, detected at first flight?

[LowObservable]

The Aussies (and possibly Indians) will not have to stand in line behind the USN - they will get jets in parallel. Building another 6 737s in a given year is not exactly a big deal in Renton... from that point on it's a matter of capacity in the modification line.
The program's health right now is mainly a matter of software, which is indeed a big deal but (on the bright side) the Navy and Boeing know that this is where the risks are, and otherwise there is not much new in terms of electronics; it's either OTS, directly borrowed from the P-3 or upgraded P-3 kit.
It's even possible that if the RAF just wanted ASW/ASUW they could get earlier IOC than the USN, but off the top of my head I don't know what extras (SLAMs, ESM capability &c) are included in IOC.

[JFZ90]

From Northern Scot
.....by the additional growth in 2007-08, referring to it as 'just a little less than three per cent of the total programme cost'. The majority of the overspend has come about during the flight trials process, which has highlighted the need for modifications. There are problems with the pitch of the aircraft – something which the MoD says is not unusual – and that has accounted for about half the cost growth.

Its not really clear from this reporting which overspend is being referred to - the massive one from a few years back or the more recent 07-08 increases. It sounds like they are actually being criticised for the recent increases (i.e. ontop of the previous £700m ones) which are it seems more modest in scale. If this is true the flight trials increases would be half of the 3% increase, or 1.5% of the total.
EDIT - just read in an earlier post that the recent overspend is an additional £100m, hence £50m for the additional 'flight test' related problem - whatever that is/was.

Finding problems late on in development programmes is always the most expensive time to find them.

Continuing my chalk and cheese comparison series of posts, another real world example to consider is the Mercedes A Class. Costing $1.5Bn to develop, the fact that they discovered it had a safety flaw (it rolled over during an Elk swerving test) after already having delivered nearly 3000 cars to customers cost them $250m to put right. This effectively represents a 16% increase in the initial development cost - ouch!

[Jackonicko]

Which the customers did not have to pay for.....

[JFZ90]

Which the customers did not have to pay for.....

They would if they'd ordered it specially and only bought 12 A Classes. If they only made 12, each one would have cost $125m. After the elk problem, each one would have ended up costing the customer nearly $150m.

As it happens they sold over a million copies of the original A Class, hence the cost growth would have amounted to less than $250 a unit. This cost may have been passed on, who knows?

The business/finance models between selling 12 and 1,000,000 of a given product are clearly quite different, but the principle point is that late emerging problems in complex engineering programmes are expensive to fix, and can be a significant proportion of the original development estimates. Its not just "evil complacent etc. defence contractors" who regularly face such challenges.

[Jetex Jim]

but the principle point is that late emerging problems in complex engineering programmes are expensive to fix

Yes its big news, - sometimes high volume car manufacturers screw up as well as defence contractors - the main points being when they do
a) It doesn't effect operational capability
b) I as a tax payer don't have to pay for it.

One could go on and mention that if the operators of military kit had a mere fraction of the right of redress of complaint that normal consumers have it would focus the minds enormously - to the extent that risk assessment would probably drive the prudent shareholders of BAE right out of the manned aircraft buisiness.

But that might just be stretching a chalk and cheese comparison too far...

[davejb]

Tigs,
not a problem really - no more than flying BE2's in Gulf 1, for example...

[JimmyTAP]

So a whole thread on MRA4 yet not one poster is involved with the project or knows anything about it!

I was involved with it for nearly 5 years before I managed to escape. It is the most frustrating project I've ever worked on. I'm not sorry to have left it. I do feel sorry for the many talented people working on this project who, once again, have the axe hanging over them. It isn't a great working environment I can assure you.

If you want to know why it has problems check out the flying rate it achieves at Woodford then compare that to its 'home-base' at Warton which is vastly poorer. This is well known in DE&S and MoD

Indeed, so why has PA1 been returned to carry on the flying programme out of Warton?

[EdSet100]

Is the "porpoising" still a problem, detected at first flight?

Yes. The aircraft is inherently unstable. This has been addressed by an Stability Augmentation System, which works very well. But, lets be honest, it ought to be; its only an autopilot at the end of the day. However, in principle, it is only papering over the cracks. No large aircraft should have to use an autopilot to maintain straight and level flight. If the SAS is not working, the continual demand on the pilot becomes unacceptable; hence the need for the system.

[Engines]

EdSet100,

There's quite a difference between an SAS and an Autopilot.

The MRA4 issue is, as I understand it, poor handling qualities in pitch. This is being fixed via a new full authority pitch stab system ( a bit more involved than a traditional SAS). Once that is sorted, the autopilot system has a chance to work.

The issue of how long this was known about is a good one to raise, though. I've been told that it was raised as an issue early on, but pushed to one side as the team struggled to get the project to fit within the (original) price the BAES managers had agreed with the MoD.

This could turn out to be a classic example of saving ten quid up front to spend a few hundred downstream...only add a few noughts on.

Be interesting to see whether this one ever gets fully investigated in public - don't hold your breath...

[MOA]

Ed,

The aircraft is not inherently unstable (ala Typhoon), it is longitudinally stable but at some parts of the envelope that stability is somewhat relaxed which leads to the prblems identified. The aircraft will not fall out of the sky and is still controllable. It is the amount of capacity the pilot has to use to maintain for instance height and or speed that leaves limited capacity to carry out other routine cockpit tasks.

As engines has stated, the SAS is far more than an autopilot. It has varialbe gains for different parts of the envelope and compensaion terms for flaps power airbrake etc. It has been a great success considering the time frame involved.

Engines,

The reduced stability was hinted at in the initial aero work but the magnitude of the effect was not fully realised until flight testing took place. Unfortunately, the envelope was only slowly expanded (as with all test programmes) which resulted in the full extent of the reduced stability only becoming apparent as the programme continued.

Jimmy,

As nan as mentioned, Warton is the home for flying and Woodford the home for production. Far from ideal....

[JFZ90]

Warton is the home for flying and Woodford the home for production

I'm being slow - why does this really matter? Are the actual engineering development / flight test teams split, or are these all at Warton? If Woodford 'just' does the manufacturing, production engineering and assembly (very demanding but not disciplines that are too closely linked to day to day flight test & mission system development activities?) I'm not sure I see the problem.

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

As engines has stated, the SAS is far more than an autopilot. It has varialbe gains for different parts of the envelope and compensaion terms for flaps power airbrake etc.

Variable gains are nothing special in an autopilot; it would be next-to-impossible to have a single set of "inner loop" gains on a modern civil airliner autopilot and be able to use it to achieve both RVSM accuracy in high speed cruise and CAT II/III landing approval. The "aircraft gains" resulting from the very different aerodynamic control effectiveness at such different speeds can only be accurately controlled with system gains that are suitably aligned.

To be frank, what's described (unless it has full control authority, which seems unlikely) is little different to many civil certified systems in use today, and probably not too different to some systems which have been around 20-30 years or more - I believe the L-1011 had/has a system with at least some if not all of those features....

Are the actual engineering development / flight test teams split, or are these all at Warton?

I believe they were split at one point (early on); whether they have been reunited since, I don't know. (But it's not a great idea to have the design teams removed from the final line either - there's a lot of engineering support required during build, especially when the build run is so short that you'll have finished the run before you work the kinks out of the build...)

[MOA]

Mad,

My description of SAS was far too simplistic but all I was trying to convey was that the SAS is not an autopilot. I fully appreciate that there are variable gains within a modern autopilot (I have been trying to find the optimum numbers for MRA4 for a while now!). SAS is not trying to control the aircraft to a pre-determined set of conditions whether they are flight path management, speed management etc. There is no great distinction between inner loop and outer loop functionality. When comparing to the autopilot, SAS is puely inner loop as the pilot's have no means of monitoring the performance. The autopilot outer loop functions can be monitored by the pilot by looking at the flight director or performance instruments, there are no such 'visual' outer loop SAS performance terms.

The SAS has been designed to provide flying qualities of an aircraft with an apparent CG that is forward of the actual CG. It also has aileron position compensation terms (prevents aircraft pitch-up with large aileron deflection), compensation terms for thrust lever movement and flap, gear and undercarrigae selection.

I am not trying to make out that this is new technology (I am unsure of equivalent systems on civil aircraft), what I am trying to convey is the time frame from conception to flight has been excellent.

The split of engineering between Woodford and Warton does not prevent any difficulties with the flight test and engineering aspects of the project. What has been very clear is the few times we have operated the aircraft out of Woodofrd, aircraft generation is far superior at Woodford than Warton.

[davejb]

The clue is in the title:

Defence Select Committee - Cut Nimrod (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=319913)

[XR219]

The SAS has been designed to provide flying qualities of an aircraft with an apparent CG that is forward of the actual CG.

Ah, so the real problem is that the CG is in the wrong place? Isn't that a bit of a "schoolboy error" when it comes to designing aeroplanes? :hmm:

[Jetex Jim]

Isn't that a bit of a "schoolboy error" when it comes to designing aeroplanes?

Too right, a wadge of plasticine (about the size of a pea) on the nose generally works for my designs.

[SidHolding]

So is this the project winding down?

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7328191.stm

[I've_got a traveller]

It would seem that way.

There was also an interesting article in Janes Defence weekly mentioning the overspend of MOD of new projects, highlighting the MRA4 as a contender for the chop.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

BBC

About 134 job cuts are planned at the Woodford operation, near Manchester where the Nimrod surveillance aircraft is made. However, jobs related to that plane are safe.

So it must be those jobs then.

[Jackonicko]

Why did this long range, long endurance MPA have to transit via Lajes and the Bahamas to get to Nashville?

Are we being told everything about the state of the fuel system?

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Ah, so the real problem is that the CG is in the wrong place? Isn't that a bit of a "schoolboy error" when it comes to designing aeroplanes?

Well, yes and no. Getting the cg in the wrong place for a new design is something of a howler and would (or should) result in red faces in your advanced design/configuration design/whatever design bods who do the initial design.

But when faced with a stretch/development/legacy programme, where you're being told that you have to re-use old components and minimize (costly) redesign whereever possible, it's very easy to end up with the cg in the "wrong place" - because the traditional fix at initial design is to move the wing, so that the cg is in the right place, and moving the wing on an existing design is not cheap.

[Jetex Jim]

But when faced with a stretch/development/legacy programme, where you're being told that you have to re-use old components and minimize (costly) redesign whereever possible, it's very easy to end up with the cg in the "wrong place" - because the traditional fix at initial design is to move the wing, so that the cg is in the right place, and moving the wing on an existing design is not cheap.

A competent and honest supplier - having discovered thru analysis the potential problems, would have explained them at the proposal stage.

But this, of course, would have opened the door to the new airframe option, and likely meant a lost order for BAE.

As they evidently didn't explain, they ought to absorb the cost, as they would have to if they dropped the ball in a commercial situation.

[On_The_Top_Bunk]

Well, yes and no. Getting the cg in the wrong place for a new design is something of a howler and would (or should) result in red faces in your advanced design/configuration design/whatever design bods who do the initial design.




Lockhead managed it for the short C130J Mk5 making it too tail heavy so nothing new here.;)

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Could have sworn I saw a couple of Mk 5's flying this week ;)

[tucumseh]

The mathematics may be complex, but the management process is simple and the airworthiness regulations clear.


The weight and moment characteristics of the aircraft are established. The aircraft enters Service at a given build standard and the design is brought Under Ministry Control (UMC).
MoD appoints and contracts an Aircraft Design Authority (ADA) to maintain that build standard, through all changes.
The Weight and Moment information is kept up-to-date, so that a modification programme such as this does not have to regress. But, it makes sense to validate and verify the information, because upon induction the ADA will almost certainly find his data has been invalidated by, for example, Service Engineered Modifications which the MoD has not had properly appraised. That is, there is an ADA design baseline and in all probability a different In-Use baseline. Much time is spent on risk reduction, for example by conducting detailed aircraft surveys. Having got over this right up front, weight (and power) budgets are allocated to each design team. Mainplanes, radar and so on. The top level design team constantly monitors what is, or should be, a significant risk. (And I understand this is a long standing risk on Nimrod, as the original CofG was quite tight). Trading-off is common, but every proposal is accompanied by a W&M impact statement. Therefore, CofG problems do not suddenly appear 12 years later; they are known immediately.
No brainer, right? Wrong. MoD long ago decided not to fund maintaining build standards; at least not to the desired level. See the QinetiQ report on MR2 (which is what we’re talking about). The drawings are wrong. Tech Pubs are outdated. Repair procedures and schemes cannot be adhered to. The Safety Case is not applicable to the In-Use build standard. The usual gross breaches of airworthiness regs. In short, the design baseline is unknown, varies between tail numbers and is a moving feast. Under these circumstances, any ADA may indeed agree a fixed or firm price, but within carefully planned boundaries which most in MoD barely understand. Then there is the cost-plus element, in these contracts termed “emerging work”. The aim is to reduce this through (a) maintaining the build standard and (b) an early risk reduction phase.

Remember, the design is Under Ministry Control, not Contractor. If MoD chooses not to maintain the design, then I’d say the ADA need only state his case. Few would expect him to fund such work himself. Almost certainly BAeS very quickly identified MoD-owned risks. You must take my word for this, but almost every DA is acutely aware of his position of strength caused by MoD’s own failure to apply the above mandated airworthiness regs properly. I can’t comment on implied BAeS failings, but there are always two sides.


Read this from 1999.

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmpubacc/300/30005.htm

The MoD trashed for failure to implement what I’m talking about. Specifically;

a. The time taken to progress modifications

b. The cost of Modification activity, specifically;

·poor configuration control and the effort involved in restoring it (a recurring theme) forcing delays and cost over-runs.

c. The effectiveness of modification management information


None of this is new. It’s a simple question…… What action was taken by the PE/DPA 2 Star in response to this report? None, it would appear. To be fair, having previously stated this was “of no concern to MoD(PE)” you’d hardly expect him to change his mind, would you? That’s the kind of consistency that costs lives.

[davejb]

Yes,
but surely you could see the huge blobs of plasticine on their noses?

[Jetex Jim]

No brainer, right? Wrong. MoD long ago decided not to fund maintaining build standards; at least not to the desired level. See the QinetiQ report on MR2 (which is what we’re talking about).

And you feel that the link you've given, which is about mature completed designs - currently in service equipment;
applies to MRA4 also?

How so?

[tucumseh]

Jetex


Nimrod MR2 is Government Furnished Equipment to the MRA4 programme. It is the design baseline, which is then modified. The contract will (or should) state "Qty x MR2 to be fed in at the following build standard". Initially the latter will have been the current ADA build standard, but as the actual standard of each tail number emerges the contract will change (at MoD cost). The process I describe is designed to minimise these changes and hence reduce cost escalation.

[Jetex Jim]

From the BAE websiteThe Nimrod MRA4 is 94 per cent new build and will give the UK at least 30 years .....



And the design baseline is still the MR2?

That's your trouble right there, I reckon.

[tucumseh]

It may indeed be 94% new build, but many of the CofG issues are determined by retention of (I believe) most of the fuselage, so rather less of it is a new design (in the sense that the basic layout is pre-determined). For example, you must put the mainplanes in the same place (give or take the extravagant tolerances between tail numbers). The underlying configuration control issues are discussed in the other Nimrod thread, but I think someone said that just enough of the MR2 was retained to make it a modification, not new build. This gets round certain MAR regs, but creates other problems – one of which is that the MR2 design baseline must be known and maintained. (In simple terms, the MRA4 build standard could be “MR2 plus mods”). Also, if the airworthiness of the MR2 is now doubt (AVM Loader’s conclusion, accepted by Des Browne) then it follows that this is a major emerging risk to MRA4 achieving MAR. If this is the case, then a non-MoD committee recommending cancellation as a “savings measure” is the MoD’s big “out” to avoid further embarrassment.

BAeS aren’t daft and I’m sure they have an engineering solution. But whether that is sufficient for some multi-Stars to sign MAR and RTS remains to be seen. I’m equally sure these stars will have been reading AVM Loader’s comments, speaking to him privately (and perhaps even reading the warnings going back 20 years!) and keeping an eye on the Nimrod Review developments – which is probably being delayed by political machinations at this level and above.

What worries me is that if MRA4 is cancelled, the Review will be a one-liner – “We’ve cancelled the programme, the problems are in the past and won’t be repeated”. Which would completely ignore the fact that the regulations which were not implemented apply to all aircraft, and management oversight is (meant to be) by the same people.

[LFFC]

BAE confirms it will cut 600 jobs (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7328191.stm)



About 134 job cuts are planned at the Woodford operation, near Manchester where the Nimrod surveillance aircraft is made.

However, jobs related to that plane are safe.

[engineer(retard)]

Is that 94% new build by cost or mass. Seems an easy stat to spin.

regards

retard

[EdSet100]

The underlying configuration control issues are discussed in the other Nimrod thread, but I think someone said that just enough of the MR2 was retained to make it a modification, not new build.

Yes, Tuc, I think that it was I who wrote that. Even though the wings are new, they are, to all intents and purposes, the same shape and size of the ones on the MR2. By keeping to the the original Nimrod wingplan design, with only a few minor changes, the MRA4 is legally a modification that does not require the degree of certification that a new design would need.

No-one has told me what causes the porpoising, so I can only guess. The MR2's CG envelope (to maintain straight and level by trimming the elevators) is huge. The 2 aircraft are the same shape and size and the kit inside the MRA4 cannot be so heavy or displaced (they would have moved it, if it is the cause) to reduce the CG envelope to what it is now. So, I reckon its the engines: they are bigger and heavier and perhaps slightly aft of the Speys. Who knows, but, as someone has already said, this is a schoolboy error.

Regards
Ed

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

LFFC. On the other hand; http://www.lep.co.uk/news/Bosses-at-BAE-rule-out.3949044.jp

The losses are due to the scaling down of work on the Nimrod at Woodford and a slowdown in orders for Hawk trainer jets at Brough.

Out of interest, a similar report in the Stockport Express Website has now disappeared.

[JimmyTAP]

Even though the wings are new, they are, to all intents and purposes, the same shape and size of the ones on the MR2.

The MRA4 wings have around a 20% larger wing area than the MR2. The inner section is thicker to accommodate the BR710 engines as well.
The fuselage length and tailplane area are unchanged from the MR2.

[dogrobber]

rather unfortunately, an announcement was made at kinloss ,to the effect that all personel should not listen to the tittle tattle of any press reports, so all personel didnt and went online and read the report themselves .....verbatim...the rest you know, its at defence reports .mod.co.uk......and its exactly as the media reported:{:{:{

[LowObservable]

<<an announcement was made at kinloss ,to the effect that all personel should not listen to the tittle tattle of any press reports,>>

NOW HEAR THIS. THERE IS NO CAUSE FOR ALARM. WE REPEAT, THERE IS NO CAUSE FOR ALARM

[Jackonicko]

Couldn't find anything on the MoD site, dogrobber.

Where exactly, and what did it say?

[Tappers Dad]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7324964.stm

The expense of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with several major programmes for new equipment, have left the MoD with an estimated shortfall of at least £2bn over the next three years.

We're here to stay after 90 years, and we will be here for 90 years to come

But the crash of a Nimrod surveillance aircraft over Afghanistan in September 2006 - which was probably caused by a fuel leak and killed 14 people - has led to questions about whether the RAF is receiving enough cash to maintain the military requirements of the government.
"We never put the safety of one of our aircraft in jeopardy," says Sir Glenn.
"Older aeroplanes need more work to maintain the same standards we require - that's inevitable.
"We never undermine the safety of our aircraft. I'm not going to fly in an unsafe aeroplane and I'm not going to let my people do that either."

Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy

[tucumseh]

"We never put the safety of one of our aircraft in jeopardy"

"We never undermine the safety of our aircraft".


So, he disagrees with AVM Sir Clive Loader (and other BoI reports)? His testimony to the Inquest and Review will be interesting, given SoS has already sided with Sir Clive. At least he'll have Ainsworth on his side.



"Older aeroplanes need more work to maintain the same standards we require - that's inevitable".

Assuming he actually understands this (and when did the penny drop?), thereby disagreeing with quite a number of more junior officers and beancounters over the years, has he told the Broons of the logical conclusion - more funding is necessary to maintain airworthiness and operational capability?

[Chugalug2]

"......what we're doing on behalf of the government."
Interesting comment. I thought that what the Armed Forces do is on behalf of the country, though at the behest of the Government. Am I being nit picking or is this a Freudian slip? I have no doubt that Sir Glenn fills each waking hour fulfilling the diktats of his political masters, but supposedly in the interests of his country. I wonder though....
As to being around for the next 90, given the rate of contraction one can almost follow the line down to zero. Perhaps Trenchard knew something that we don't when he spoke of a 100 year experiment!

[tucumseh]

Having established the link between MR2 and MRA4 in configuration control terms I think it wise to study the QC’s remit.

It has already been reported that this is confined to “Nimrod MR2” and “RAF”. Clearly, this very constricted boundary is designed to hide the wider problems in MoD.

On the assumption that Mr Hadden-Cave reads this (I’m told he does) may I suggest, sir, that you take advantage of this configuration link and include an assessment of the implications of what has happened on the MR2 for the MRA4. In pure configuration control terms, this would be justified as the General Assembly drawings for MR2 will (should) have (at the very least) “call ups” relating to MRA4. That is, including MRA4 is unavoidable.