How do you solve complacency problems

[oicur12]

I fly for an airline with 3 types of aircraft.

The type I fly operates to only about 5 regular destinations frequently.

That is to say we see the same place several times a week.

Complacency is a problem. Pilots are bored because of repetitiveness.

We are starting to see stuffups occur on line that are typical results of being complacent.

Does anybody know where info is available about solving this problem?

Does anybody have any input?

Ideas? Research?

[Chris Scott]

Surprise line-checks, perhaps? :E

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Well, one traditional way to solve complacency issues and errors due to repetitive tasks is, of course, to change things.

But that cuts straight across the idea that standardization, SOPs, etc., is the route to safety.

[alf5071h]

“ … to change things.” Yes, but there is no need to go to the extreme of physical change.
Change your thinking behaviour; treat each flight differently, which it will be if you look at the ‘important’ things. So first think about what is important, what do you know, not know, and why.
The weather, weight, speeds, power setting, people, the environment, situation, and context; look for the differences, or the changes from the norm, these are the areas which breed incidents and accidents.
There are no ‘standard’ briefings; procedures might be standard (SOPs), but the situation and thus the application of the procedure will be different.
Don’t forget to debrief the differences – to remember them - so they become the basis for the next comparison – during the next briefing. What was good, bad, or indifferent? The latter are usually the interesting aspects, and it is interest that fends off complacency.

[Fantome]

Too right alf. Enthusiasm is an antidote to complacency or boredom. To psyche yourself up so that your level of alertness is elevated is not difficult if you have some imagination. You need to call on your own specific well of resources that give colour to your every undertaking. That might sound vague, but it is such an individual, personal exercise that if you can't devise your own method, then you need to find someone who is skilled as a motivator and can imbue the genuine mind states that guarantee a pilot always on the qui vivre.

[Slasher]

I agree with alf507. Its certainley easey to get complasent
but I get out of it by sayin to meself that THIS is the flight
where somethin is gonna go real WRONG, because so far
everythings been goin real RIGHT the past few trips.

If nothin goes real wrong today it only increases the chances
of things goin REAL REAL wrong tomorrow! :uhoh:

[alf5071h]

A couple of examples of ‘changed’ thinking; probably not the best, but they indicate the principle.

During take off there is usually a ‘Power Set’ call. Add to this the value that is expected – e.g. “Power Set, Flex, 88%". The call aids comparison with the expected value (catches a mis set bug). With subsequent review the value can be ‘embedded’ in memory as a ball-park figure for the conditions of the day (wt, alt, temp, flex, etc). This expands personal knowledge of the aircraft and the operation, which again aids error detection in a range of situations (general rules of thumb).
The call also involves the other crew member in the setting / checking process – double check – defenses in depth as s/he might catch an error that you had missed.

In some pedantic operations, the calls above might be seen as a change to SOPs; thus, a change of SOP might be for the better, or it might trigger a review of the operation: – say them to yourself anyway.


Before the approach, the approach and landing speeds are calculated from the weight, which should be checked against the maximum allowed. At this time state the percentage of landing weight or otherwise quantify the margin from the maximum allowed. This is a guide to the level of braking required on the runway (in the existing conditions), and as above, when reviewed in personal debrief for future memory recall they are available for used in ‘unexpected' situations - a process of adding experience.
In addition, it would be good practice to state the next worst case value, i.e. the margin on a wet runway if the landing calculation was for dry, or a contaminated value if the runway was wet. This provides a reminder if a sudden shower is encountered that a different level of braking will be required, or an alternate landing configuration, or even that the landing would be out of limits.

[Caudillo]

There are no ‘standard’ briefings; procedures might be standard (SOPs), but the situation and thus the application of the procedure will be different.

With all respect, I disagree with your above statement because I think it's too sweeping. Assuming you do short-haul hi-frequency operations, for instance a four sector day, perhaps even to the same pair of airfields then a briefing may well be what you call standard - or what I would consider unchanged. Naturally if the weather is inclement or changeable, traffic levels different, or there are notamed items coming into play etc - then yes, this needs to be discussed.

However, simply to parrot verbatim what has been said before, or to impress in detail upon ones colleague the arrival for an airfield into to which he or she may have operated for years can be superfluous. Speaking for myself, today I went to a place I'd never been before. Good, thorough discussion had beforehand - things were thought about, mulled over and re-considered. Well worth it for all involved. However, I am the first to admit that my eyes would simply glaze over were we to repeat the exercise in such depth for say the second time in a day on a fine quiet afternoon at home base. It's unnecessary in my view. This is simply an opinion by the way, and any input is welcomed!

[SkyCamMK]

I do not profess to be at your level but isn't this a classic case of HPL's "environmental capture" that as you rightly predict could lead to an incident. Surely the training manager, chief pilot and rostering system need to be aware and have a brain-storming session to raise awareness and try to engender a team approach to problem solving and innovation or am I being too simplistic? In my former life in the fire service post op debriefs were informal but essential items and often encouraged colleagues to be quite innovative for future similar ops. Vive la differnce between ops!

[alf5071h]

Caudillo, you appear to have misunderstood my point. Fly with an enquiring mind.

A well trained, well practiced crew should not require endless re-briefing of standard procedures (SOPs etc) - aspects of operation that will not change; although there is some merit in repetition (over learning), to aid memory recall and associate procedures with expected situations.
Most aspects of normal flight operations, including the same pair of airfields, same aircraft, wt, etc, etc, will still have differences if you look for them. It is the failure to look (to be aware of the differences), which lead to complacency.

Take any of your ‘standard’ days and write down the aspects of each flight that change; QNH, temperature, wind, en-route weather. Then consider what effect these might have on the flight, how does the aircraft performance change with each of these differences; these might seem insignificant, but they should generate interest and understanding, and the willingness to learn.
Consider how many times that you deviated from the ‘standard’, more importantly how many times did you violate a procedure or rule; when, why? What errors were made, how were they detected and corrected? (Conduct a personal LOSA)
Expand this thinking to the people that you associate with; the crew, different pilot flying, different flying technique, different appreciation of the situation; did you really have the same mental model of the situation, have you discussed it?
Then consider the cabin, the ground staff, ATC; and the wider situation; avoid a narrow laser-beam view of what is happening, take a wide scan of the world at large. Ask questions:
What might a field of burning waste straw mean to you near the airport … wind direction, turbulence, visibility, soot particles in the engine / air-conditioning … ?

With an engine failure after take off, what are the differences in operation or in the situation with either a left or right crosswind; which engine, same SOP, flight path, climb performance, route (hdg vs track) - differences?
Questions provide variety in flying and thus can make it endlessly different – “excitement every day”.

SkyCamMK, :ok: raising awareness advisable, debriefing essential, but implementing action is best of all. If this cannot be done by ‘mandate’, then at least do it by example.

[sailor]

On every flight come up with a "What if............" situation. Seldom will one of these have an answer that does not provoke a few different ideas, and discussion of a different issue each day should help to keep complacency at bay. Any inconclusive results could subsequently be thrown at the pprune experts!

[FlexibleResponse]

Do what sailor says.

If not, then get another job.

If you don't, and you get lucky, you will need another job.

If OTOH you are not lucky, then sadly, you will not need another job.

[Check Airman]

Mind if I ask the type of aircraft and sector lengths that cause the complacency?