Overstretch & Budgets

[blanketstacker]

The United Kingdom National Defence Association (UKNDA) has been researching the effect of overstretch on the armed forces in relation to an ever restricted budget vis-a-vis a decreasing proportion of GDP. Which is why they have called for Sufficient, appropriate and fully funded armed forces with 3% of GDP as a starting point. Many high profile former
service chiefs and politicians have signed up to support this approach.

For my part, as an RAF Adviser to UKNDA, I have been looking at the dreadful state of the RAF procurement and support budget and have become concerned that the helicopter and multi-engine fleets in particular are being financially neglected. This forum, which I found by fortuitous accident, only served to confirm this belief most especially in respect of current operations and difficulties associated with UOR's, SEM's and modifications. Chinook, Nimrod and C130 come immediately to mind.

I should be most interested to hear from anybody, either personally or through this forum, who might like to contribute to the debate and improve my understanding of the current position.

[Chugalug2]

Hi blanketstacker, I in turn stumbled on your post by accident, and was not too surprised to see it go unanswered thus far. There is an inbuilt suspicion of maiden posters wanting info, rather than contributing to an already established thread. The suspicion being that you be one of them newspaper people looking to find some gossip to print in your la de da broadsheets or scandalous rags. Well you'll find nothing here, you ken, nothing I say! On reflection though, and having visited your own site at:
http://www.uknda.org/news.asp?id=19
it is my suspicion that you may be one of us, so just give the secret handshake, mumble the secret password, and we can proceed! The debate as you so succinctly put it is raging on just about every thread of this forum. My advice would be to jump in to any or as many as you choose. I doubt very much if people will want to construct a precis of the financial, supply, administration and operational problems of HM Forces for you. The PPRuNe bandwidth would implode under the strain. So welcome aboard and get stuck in. Oh and a brief explanation of UKNDA might help you on your way!

[blanketstacker]

Chugalug2 thanx for that as they say. Your advice and suspicion noted. However, when you check out my spelling you will know that I am not a journalist.

I am happy to jump right in to other 'threads' but was hoping to start one of my own. What I need is information on the state of the multi-engined fleet, positive or negative, and this is just one place I have gone to get it.

As for AIDU's point. Well I don't know what most people think so I am asking for help. I apologise if my original input did not explain clearly, so I will try again.

On this forum and in the national press I have been hearing that our helicopter force and multi-engined fleets are having the arse kicked out of them in terms of high levels of flying hours and that essential urgent operational requirements are not being implemented, sometimes on the grounds of cost. A Nimrod and a C130 have crashed in theatre over the past 2 years and many lives lost.

The United Kingdom National Defence Association is trying to obtain the extra funding needed to prevent this happening again and as knowledege is power, any assitance with identifying the problem areas would be much appreciated.

[MaroonMan4]

Blanketstacker,

I am pretty convinced that you are genuine and your heart is in the right place, but I would suggest that if you are really looking to be informed and educated on the the varied and wide issues surround both the AT and SH fleets then I think that you should not be looking here.

Most of the stuff contained on here is venting of spleens, disgruntled Servicemen and occasionally - rarely there are some really good informative posts - but that is alot of sifting for you through the Prune threads that probably date back 18 months on both the subjects that you are interested in.

I would go for authoritive and recorded documents/sources. Try the Battlefield Helicopter NAO report and see how many of the recommendations have been taken up or actioned. Look at the recommendations from Post Exercise and Operational reports and see where the common threads are that continue to be repeated year after year. Check the BoIs and see if there is a commin thread in the recommendations in the summary.

It is all out there - the evidence is overwhelming - and we all know that Servicemen/women lives are being lost, notalways due to enemy action but because of the concerns that you and your organisation allude to.

Good luck with your research and more importantly good luck in trying to convince the Govt and the Nation that theses areas require funding - somehow in their cosy little world in the burbs I dont think that they quite get it (BBC CH47 documentary starting to nibble - but it would be interesting to see the viewing figures/market research on who actually watched it).

[Delta Hotel]

Blanketstacker,

I thought that your patrons below would know the relevant contacts and information regarding overstretch and budgets considering they all recently spoke on the subject in the Lords:

Admiral The Lord BOYCE GCB OBE DL
Marshal of the Royal Air Force The Lord CRAIG GCB OBE MA DSc FRAeS
General The Lord GUTHRIE GCB LVO OBE

As mentioned earlier, there are plenty of NAO/HCDC reports covering the current issues on defence - it might be worth trawling these first, so that you can ask specific questions rather than generalisms.

DH

[Jackonicko]

What on earth does the UKNDA think that it's doing appointing someone as "an RAF Adviser to UKNDA" who stumbled on PPRuNe only "by fortuitous accident"?

Surely an adviser should already know about the subject on which he's advising, and should not be starting at the ground floor? He should at least be familiar with the problems and issues.

Anybody familiar with the challenges facing the Royal Air Force today would be aware of PPRuNe, and should really be at least a regular lurker, and should be fairly au fait with the issues you're asking about by reading Craig Hoyle's pieces in Flight, Doug Barrie's in Av Week, by looking at Beedall's Navy site (it includes really good stuff on purple issues like JHC/SABR/FRC, and on JFH and JCA) and by skimming relevant issues of magazines like Air Forces Monthly.

I'm not being deliberately rude, but what qualifications do the UKNDA think you have to be an RAF Adviser?

If the UKNDA were serious about informing itself, then it would already be in touch with those regularly writing about the RAF.

[dallas]

I'm with you Jacko. Why on earth would the UKNDA appoint someone as an RAF advisor who seemingly knows nothing about the subject, let alone tries to research it on an open, anonymous forum that he's just stumbled across? As Delta Hotel suggests, the numerous former CDS' that have affiliated themselves with the UKNDA can undoubtedly open doors to credible contacts who are willing and able to tell it how it is.

I can't put my finger on it blanketstacker, but something isn't right.

[Jackonicko]

MaroonMan

PPRuNe does have gems amid the whingeing and catfights.

Our friend could do a lot worse than to search back and read all posts by particular contributors - Tucumseh, for example, and blokes like the mighty Magic Mushroom and LO. The PPRuNerati, if you will.....

[Chugalug2]

See what I mean blanketstacker? Not exactly falling over ourselves saying; "Thank goodness you're here at last, we were getting worried, now what do you want to know?". As Jacko says it's a case of getting some time in, and new boys are bullied unmercifully. We're trying to stamp it out, but some here think that it is character building! My advice remains, put in your twopenneth on the Nimrod, Hercules, Chinook threads etc as they seem to be your interest. "As yea sow so shalt thou reap", or words to that effect. Apropos your main contention that UKNDA's aim is to increase the Defence Budget, all very good but the common theme through the threads I have already mentioned plus JPA, Defence Estates charging charities, base closures, wearing uniforms in public, etc etc is the MOD. What started in my day as an administrative arrangement in Whitehall has turned into a monster, in my opinion (and that's all you get here, opinions!). The incompetence, wastefulness and utter mendaciousness of that organisation means that it is truly a "Ministry of Waste". My particular hobby horse (well I was bound to get round to it eventually) is Military Airworthiness. The accidents that you have mentioned plus many others point to the suspicion that many of our military airfleets are anything but airworthy. It is my contention that the machinery to correct this serious shortcoming is fatally flawed, as the operating authority and the airworthiness authority are one and the same, ie the MOD. It would not work in civil aviation, nor does it work for the military. Military Aircraft Airworthiness authority must be removed from the MOD and placed in an independent MAA alongside, or jointly with, the CAA. See? All you get is a finger stabbing lecture that you could get just as easily from any London cabbie. And another thing...

[blanketstacker]

chugalug2 and maroonman4 thankyou for your advice which I see from the other bloggs is well made.

I guess I have come to the wrong place and will redirect my efforts as you and others have suggested.

In my own defence I will only say that it was my intention to seek informed comment from the 'coal face' rather than my habitual contacts within the UKNDA, and rarified atmosphere of the house of commons, academia etc.

I do fully understand the problems of overstretch from the defence procurement perspective and the deterious nature of delayed or cancelled UOR's on an ever smaller and over worked fleet. However, because the UKNDA is not permitted to recruit serving personnel we advisers are, by dint of circumstances, former service personnel and do need a reality check from time to time. In my cackhanded way this was all I was really trying to do, get a current perspective.

Boy did I get it! Scepticism, cynicism and suspicion. Shame really, because they are such unproductive emotions.

I encourage all to look at our web site www.uknda.org (http://www.uknda.org)

[Chugalug2]

Boy did I get it! Scepticism, cynicism and suspicion. Shame really, because they are such unproductive emotions.

WADR, blanketstacker, what else could you expect? As the RAF advisor to UKNDA you will be familiar with the gagging order on serving personnel posting on sites such as this, which is over and above the OSA. Basically they post here at their peril, and have to be very circumspect about what they write. If there is an ongoing concern, such as reversing the Messrs Wratton & Day's verdict of Gross Negligence against the Mull of Kintyre pilots, fitting ESF to the Hercules Fleet, Nimrod airworthiness,etc, then they post, with care and discretion, but they post. As a retiree, ex mob and tax payer, I commend and admire them for it. Expecting them to post gratuitous comments re:

current operations and difficulties associated with UOR's, SEM's and modifications. Chinook, Nimrod and C130 come immediately to mind.


is hardly realistic, and as dallas says "isn't quite right". I notice my broadside against the MOD in particular, and its reneging of Military Airworthiness responsibilities in particular, goes unanswered. I wonder why? Are you and UKNDA on a one item agenda, blanketstacker, more money for the MOD? As a taxpayer I would oppose you tooth and nail. A case of good money after bad! The MOD needs total reform including the action re airworthiness that I called for. Scepticism, cynicism and suspicion? They are the least you can expect when faced with the dissipation of the resources for our Armed Forces poured down the MOD drain!

[Torchy]

Well said Chugalug2. I joined the UKNDA after the original publicity over their lordships standing up in the House. If blanketstacker is the best they can do as the "RAF advisor" it does not bode well for the organisation - in fact it just demonstrates that the "advisor" hasn't got any advice to give! I'm off to cancel my membership. How embarrassing for an organisation that seemed to have all the heavyweight patrons and the right ideas.

[Chugalug2]

Thank you for your endorsement, Torchy, it was beginning to become a one man rant! I really must get out more! There seems to have been a rash of probationers posting somewhat controversial posts on various threads recently (even their own!). I tell myself not to bite but, well you know how it is,...I just can't resist. :)

[dallas]

The MOD needs total reform including the action re airworthiness that I called for.
Nice one Chugalug - the quote above is the most insightful bit - when, and I do mean when, something either escalates or pops up unannounced, there will be a mad scramble to chuck money at it, but money isn't everything, as most British servicemen who have worked with US forces will testify.

The MoD is fat, dumb and happy, while their end product is demoralised, poorly equipped and gagged. We need dramatic reform or we're fcuked.

[Chicken Leg]

Most of the stuff contained on here is venting of spleens, disgruntled Servicemen

Yeah, and the Army and Navy sometimes post too! :}

[Chugalug2]

The MoD is fat, dumb and happy, while their end product is demoralised, poorly equipped and gagged. We need dramatic reform or we're fcuked


Many thanks for your kind words, dallas. What you say above is so true but so difficult! It was Mountbatten that masterminded the creation of this monster, just as he did others! It will take someone of real talent in comparison to slay it. One thing that we have to face up to is that a lot of the maladministration that is its hallmark is carried out by serving members of the three services and of all ranks. The easy reaction that it is all down to the CS, from clerk through to Sir Humpfrey, is a cop-out. It seems to corrupt all, or nearly all, who enter its portals. Easy to spot the problem, devilish tricky to find a solution. One thing that can be done though is to start unpicking the centralisation of power that has undermined the forces and enhanced the power of this power hungry beast. Subordinate commanders, ie at squadron, wing and station levels primarily in the RAF, should have their powers restored. Discipline and morale would improve if they could, as they used to, resolve disciplinary and welfare matters summarily. It is the core business of a commander to command. How can he or she do so if everything has to be referred up the CoC? What has that to do with the MOD, well everything IMHO. In my day they decided policy there, but their day to day intrusion into one's life, as seems to happen now, was unknown. The old core values have to be revisited. Fighting for your country is a fairly constant occupation. I'm sure that what counts in Helmand counted at Corunna. The exercise of initiative and leadership at all levels has been the way that the British have fought and won for centuries. Overcentralising and micromanaging is the antithesis of that and can and has led to disaster for many other armies in the past (danke schon, Herr Schicklgruber!). So strip the MOD of every function that is best performed at a lower level and hand the services back to themselves instead of numerous quangos whose idea of danger is departing from the script, only just this once you understand? Of course it will cost more, but far more has to be invested into the forces to prevent the disasters that dallas alludes to. Far less should be spent on the MOD.
Hey blanketstacker, come back, all is forgiven. Lordy, we got us a thread running!

[Epimetheus]

Purely an observation following on from Chugalug's and dallas's posts, but it would be interesting to know what proportion of the Defence budget is now tied up annually in PFI and long term rental arrangements and therefore reduces the balance remaining for new capabilities, improvements, pay etc?

We are contractually bound to the former and seem to crisis manage the latter.

[blanketstacker]

I do not know how much of the budget is tied up with PFI/PPP or rental agreements (I will find out though) but about a third of the defence budget is in procurement.

The truth is that PFI/PPP, medical care, operations, engineering, logistics, accommodation and family welfare, amongst other policies, may all need re-evaluating and that the command and control of the air force along with servicing procedures may require a good shake up.

However, UKNDA was set up to lobby on non-political, tri-service lines for Sustainable, Adequate and Appropriately Funded Armed Forces. With a minimum of 3% of GDP as the base line. (source: UKNDA Founding Document)

A respondent said “throwing money at the problem” is not the answer. Put that way and with no balancing argument the author probably has a point. However, the problem is more complex and the root of it is money or lack thereof.

In 1985 the defence budget was around £33bn or 5.1% of GDP, in 2007 it was around £33bn or 2.2% of GDP. In the intervening period the defence budget fell consistently to a level of around £23bn levelling out in 2001. Defence inflation runs at between 7-10% pa. I.E. The costs double roughly every 7.5 years. To achieve 3% of GDP the defence budget will need to rise by some £12bn this year. (sources: DASA, the late Tim Garden and The University of York Centre for Defence Economics)

At the same time, in an effort to save money for ‘Front Line First’ the number of RAF uniformed personnel has reduced ( 52200 in 1997 to a target of 41000 today.) Supply policy was revamped under the ’Just in Time’ label (just too late being fair comment), depot and unit stocks reduced, deployment FAP’s reduced from 30 to 7 days, repair and manufacturing became largely contractualised/civilianised and some aircraft fleets were taken out of service or reduced in size.

The consequence being higher rates of effort with fewer personnel, spares and aircraft, leading to fatigue and overstretch in all senses of the word.

Having reduced to save, the forces worked on the assumption that only one major war fighting operation would be undertaken at a time (Contingency Level Force (CF)) and then for six months only. Or, one rotating operation (Formation Level Force (FL)), being replace by fresh troops and equipment every 4-6 months. A CF and FL would not be concurrent. Then Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq along with several standing commitments happened, all concurrent operations, the latter 2 at high intensity. In 2002/3 the Government released a new document 'Delivering Security in a Changing World' where these assumptins were amended to ...'support 3 simultaneous small to medium scale operations...one an enduring peace keeping mssion (eg Kosovo). However, how this was to be funded was not made clear.

Government policy dictates the nature and level of HM Forces commitments. Therefore, The Government must fund these commitments or reduce the tasking to a level commensurate with the allocated funding.

MOD, command or engineering reorganisation, whilst always an option, may save cash and lead to more efficiency but cannot overcome the basic principle that to ensure the safety, welfare and effectiveness of our Armed Forces they must first to be properly funded.

UKNDA is committed to this end.


(The source unless otherwise stated is me: In a former life I was tasked to write the RAF/RE/HQ Logistic input for all RAF CONOPS following ’Options for Change’)

[tucumseh]

Blanketstacker


I concur with most of what you say, although I don’t think the 40% on procurement is correct. Much lower than that.

The main thing I’d clarify is the “Just in Time” policy, the effect of which is felt by most here. In a peculiar way, it was actually an improvement. There had been an interim policy (between that of having adequate stock levels and just enough). In 1990 RAF suppliers at Harrogate decided that they would only raise replenishment requisitions (i.e. initiate procurement) when STOCKS RAN OUT. That meant there was nil stock for the procurement lead time (approvals, contracting and production). Bearing in mind companies just don’t hold large stocks of military equipment on the shelf waiting for us to come along, or on the off chance they’ll win the competition, this policy was absolutely barking. The effects would not be felt for 18 months or so – in fact Just in Time for the perpetrators to move onwards and upwards, having been seen to spend little or nothing in a 2 year period. And, once you do that, he beancounters expect it every year, the budget is cut further, so the situation never recovers.

The result? The compromise called “Just in Time”.

And to link to Chug’s theme, the policy / cuts also applied to those charged with maintaining airworthiness.

[Climebear]

blanketstacker

How do you become 'an RAF Adviser to UKNDA' then? I didn't vote for you.


With all due credit to Monty Python and the Holy Grail.

[blanketstacker]

My apologies and you are quite right tucumseh I should have said about a third 32-34% based on last years figures. It has declined from a peak of 46%.

[Bladdered]

Stacker

Just over 12 months ago the NAO were reporting following a study that they had undertaken over a 12 month period on overstretch across the 3 services. Frankly, I lost a degree of interest after leaving the service late last year; however, I am sure that their report has been published, or other posters may be able to lead you to where their report is published (if it ever got into the public domain).

Ed

[Chugalug2]

blanketstacker, thank you for your contribution and for going along with the trend of this thread albeit it is not yet addressing the issues that you hoped for. Dare I say it is a case of woods and trees? You are obviously knowledgeable and speak with authority on these matters, whereas I can only speak from the outside, and very much through a glass darkly! So forgive me if I do not indulge in the usual wallow in acronyms etc, for I have little idea of their meaning. In the generality though it would seem that you and UKNDA call for more Defence spending as a sine qua non whereas I see priorities differently. It appears to me that in the three decades since I left the RAF, and especially after the fall of communism, power has moved inexorably to the centre, ie to the MOD, as the forces contracted and functions became 'purpleised' and centralised. Unless this trend, which I feel is conducive to poor morale and fighting efficiency is tackled, pouring more money back into the existing system will reinforce it rather than reform it. Other threads (Parliamentary Questions, Chinook- Still Hitting Back, Nimrod Information) all give testimony to the bureaucratic waste of precious resource when in the maw of the apparatchiks that inhabit its corridors. Reputations count for more than efficiency and must be protected at ever greater cost! Sort it out or more money means yet more waste. That may be a price that UKNDA is prepared to pay. I am not.

[dallas]

Once again Chug, you're bang on target. Defence has grown primarily into an industry and that is the fatal qualifier. In the last 20ish years we've had the luxury of chosing our opponents, so the majority of our operations have been on our terms. This has made us - the UK - complacent and more reliant on our superpower ally than we perhaps should be. We're holding our own for the most part, but the investment in Defence is not reflected in expenditure on the best kit by any means. Additionally, people are getting more and more fed-up with plugging the gaps in the UK defences (or VC10 fuselage) with their fingers and are leaving, irrespective of market opportunities. So on top of having mediocre, unsuitable or simply late arriving kit, we are in the early stages of suffering dramatic skills and experience fade, which will be great for the high-flyers, but ultimately costly and perhaps dangerous as we re-learn lessons that needn't have been forgotten if we had more vision (an expression hijacked by senior officers that has come to mean little, save the expense of printing it on leaflets, signs and other oddments.)

[Chugalug2]

Thanks again dallas. Your mention of a skills and experience crisis points up the usual beancounter's dilemma. They may well save money by centralising supplies and issuing them only Just in Time, try inflicting that treatment on people and morale collapses and they walk. As I understand it the walking is increasing in tempo and has all the hallmarks of fast becoming a stampede. The cycle of self inflicted destruction of the UK's Armed Forces will then be complete, with scarcely any input from our enemies needed. Pumping more money in will not, per se, change matters IMHO. Morale and esprit de corps take decades (centuries for those who move at a slower pace :)) to build, but mere months to destroy at the stroke of the pen. Politicians with no experience or understanding of the military might be forgiven for thinking that what works in industry should work in the military. Those senior commanders who have connived with them in this process cannot be forgiven. Perhaps some of them are in UKNDA, blanketstacker? The system has to be redesigned to support the military ethos and not as now, vice versa. Someone should have insisted that if it ain't bust don't fix it. Too late now, for it's well and truly broken. Time to fix it then and quick before it disappears up its proverbial.