Heard a rumour of a Thomson fly 737 stalling in the approach phase, anyone know the story here?

I don't have any real facts and wouldn't like to make any guesses from what i've heard through "Chinese Whispers" - Bournemouth based B737.

I'm suprised if this was as serious as everyone claims why its managed to stay out of here and the press...which makes you think it's all tosh! Who knows, the jungle drums I picked up are:

I understand the UK came very close to losing it's first airframe for years (since Kegworth?)...AAIB treating as an accident...40 degree pitch due to loss of speed, no A/T engaged...G/A comenced selecting Flap 15 from 30 and due low speed situation thus creating instability...But thats it, no facts at all, this is just idle gossip with nothing to back it up...

I understand the UK came very close to losing it's first airframe for years (since Kegworth?)There was G-BYAG at Girona in 1999...

I guess he meant in the UK area, not UK airlines.

nothing like giving the press something to play with eh? Honiley considering you say you have no facts you are still quoting figures that can be used against all of us in this industry.:ugh:

I guess he meant in the UK area, not UK airlines
Except the 747 at Stansted then, and the Loganair ones

Either way, idle speculation is hardly useful - is it under investigation or not? If not, then no more should be said.

Why make a fuss?

Probably bait for a media story?:hmm:

BYAI

Pilotbear:nothing like giving the press something to play with eh?

The best way to avoid giving the press something to write about is not to stall an a/c full of pax.

This is Pprune and the R represents 'rumour' ... that's exactly what Honiley takes the trouble to point out and whether there is any truth underlying the rumour or not, if it raises our consciousness to errors that any of us might one day be guilty of then that at least is a positive outcome.

poorwonderingwun,

I agree with your sentiments - don't have the problem to start with (assuming there was one in this case) ...

But this is the BIG problem with PPRuNe - people with inside expert knowledge seem to be more than happy to dump it into an open public forum.

You can be damn sure that there are no other professional groups that regularly accuse each other of all sorts of negligance on a public bulletin board.

There are an awful lot of 'commercial pilots' out there than need to show some professionalism and stay away from this type of very damaging rumour mongering.

If indeed this incident occurred as advertised, then the AAIB, CAA and other relevant authorities will take the neccessary steps to ensure that lessons get learned. We have one of the best aviation regulators in the world - let them get on with it ...

But this is the BIG problem with PPRuNe - people with inside expert knowledge seem to be more than happy to dump it into an open public forum.

I have no problem with an open honest approach. The moment Joe Public thinks you're hiding things ('cos you don't think they will like them) you lose their trust, never mind respect c.f. most politicians.

PilotBear, ALTFlaps

It's almost as silly as those folks who post just correct peoples spelling and use of English...

If you don't like the concept of PPRuNe - don't bl**dy read it!

Someone asked the question, as it happends, i'd heard a few things in the past week, i'm very curious myself and was hoping someone with more facts could ellaborate or put me right on what i'd heard....thats it!

Read again what I worte, I never claimed it to be facts and made and point of doing so, if a Journo can make a story out of the sentance I wrote then VERY VERY good luck to them and i'm sure they will be hearing from the PR/Legal department at TUI Travel Plc if it makes the news stand!

I have it on good authority that it is true.
Something like 45 degrees nose up with a speed less than 90 kts.
Will obviously be the subject of a full investigation

Not commenting on the alleged incident, but more of a general query regarding the 737 stall protection system with which I am not familiar. Is it actually possible to stall in the 'conventional' sense (ie, not g-stall or shock stall) an a/c fitted with a modern stall protection system.

My understanding of such systems was that they would ensure a minimum airspeed for any given configuration, and limit the a/c in pitch so that if level flight could not be maintained at the required airspeed, a descent would be the result rather than a stall.

:confused:

737 has a stick shaker, but not a stick pusher. So yes, it is very well possible to stall it.

Maude Charle - Wrong

These aircraft are not too far removed from the Wright Flyer. V Basic and will bite back if neglected.

Your comments are forgiveable in light of the bar talk I have heard over the years from people whom should know better.

As regards the BOH speculation, I gather it was not all that special, will see what the investigation unearths.

Yes it did happen, yes it is subject to enquiry which is ongoing at the present time.
Figures given not far from actual.

Is it actually possible to stall in the 'conventional' sense (ie, not g-stall or shock stall) an a/c fitted with a modern stall protection system.


Yes.

Even aircraft fitted with a stall pusher may actually have it set such that it does not trigger until an angle of attack higher than the "natural" stalling angle of the wing. This would be for a case where the natural stall is relatively benign (and basically certifiable) but there is a requirement to prevent excursions into an angle-of-attack regime where a deep stall is possible. This applies to (some) T-tailed designs.

There's no huge difference aerodynamically between what I think you're calling a coventional stall (deceleration in essentially level flight at nominally 1'g') and a "g-stall" (either deceleration at elevated 'g', such as the decelerating turning stall used for civil certification, or a progressive increase in load factor at constant speed, such as used for the buffet boundary penetration tests in civil certification). Provided tha Mach and altitude are similar, it doesn't matter much what the load factor is (allowing for issues such as wing twist induced by load and inertia distribution, of course).

Just as interest, BRITs B737-204 series a/c, might have been the ADV version only, memory not to good, had a stick nudger as well as a shaker.
So you might find other CAA reg B737-200s might have had them as well. :ok:

Alt Flap,

Go to the Professional Doctors forum or the Professional Lawyers forum. It happens all the time.;)

Those Professional are slandering each other all the time. No wonder they don’t get the respect us pilots receive.:}

So nobody actually knows anything. That's why this site is a 'Rumour Network'!:)

JTP,
Please read my previous post. The final part of the investigation takes place tomorrow. The AAIB have been investigating said aircraft for the last week or so. Extensive checks have been carried out under the watchful eye of the AAIB.
Forget,
All equipment removed was delicately handled and totally undamaged!


Edited. Checks on auto throttle and auto pilot

You gotta love this forum!

The Grim EPR - You have to be a Microsoft Flight Sim kinda guy?

"Apparently the crew experienced an auto throttle problem (uncommanded thrust reduction). They tried unsuccessfully to increase thrust, but were unable until the auto pilot and auto throttle were switched off" :confused::confused:

You clearly have zero concept of how basic this aircraft is - Both the flight controls and the thrust levers are mechanically linked, directly to the actuators. ie - Push the throttles forward and the MEC fuel valves on the engine will command more fuel into the cans.

Perhaps we need a closed forum for Pro-pilots.

Dogma
With reference to the "Perhaps we should have a closed forum for Pro -Pilots"
Whilst i have nothing to do with aviation industry as far as employment goes, i read the opinions of all people on these boards with interest(some with far more knowledge of aviation than i will ever have! ), and whilst some forums have to be closed (understandable in some circumstances).making it closed to the likes of me is in my opinion a little unfair.
I find it interesting to read what the aviation fraternity think about things that are happening or have happened to increase my overall knowledge of this industry and to make my travelling experience as pleasurable as possible.
I am not one for commenting on things normally on PPRune but feel it would be a shame for people like me who are not in the industry but are interested in it all the same not being able to read the wealth of knowledge and experience that appear on these boards.


HLXPAX

Difficult to assess what actually happend from these post's but one thing is for sure - the basics weren't happening, i.e no-one was flying the aeroplane!!!

Not meaning to be awkward here, but it was previously mentioned that the a/c was configured with flap 30 at the time, thus making it likely that it was during the last 1200 feet of the approach. Wouldn't that make a full stall recovery a bit unlikely?

Much more probable (if true at all) that the speed got low for whatever reason and the stick-shaker triggered. This in itself isn't that uncommon - my Company used to operate the B737-300 and I can remember at least three occasions when reports were filed for stick-shaker activation: twice due loss of situational awareness when dispatching with A/T u/s, and once due to the A/T being disconnected when a/c was high on glideslope.

Also, this would not be noticeable to the pax... however, a full stall recovery losing so much height, with 45 degrees NU pitch, at 90 knots with overboosted CFM's... I'd say that the pax would find that mildly uneasing. It's not like they would just get off the plane thinking "well that wasn't weird at all, was it?"... I had a pax phone a newspaper once just to report that we had stopped the a/c on the runway, and he'd never noticed that before (?!)...

I am not one for commenting on things normally on PPRune but feel it would be a shame for people like me who are not in the industry but are interested in it all the same not being able to read the wealth of knowledge and experience that appear on these boards.
Fine if people like you in these sections stuck to 'reading' but far too many people with limited knowledge are involving themselves in discourse way beyond their comprehension or knowledge, without letting on. It makes a mockery of any serious discussion by industry people. We've even had aviation armchair hobbyists announcing here how they would have handled a recent emergency (differently to the pilots involved)!

Dogma raised a very valid point, and was quite correct in criticising the post. It is an absurd statement for anyone that knows the 737-300. Perhaps until more information is released, we can refrain from postulating or stabbing in the dark? A lot of what has been written is evidently junk.

Here, here.

Too many are not open about who they are. Fewer fantacist armchair enthusiast comments would be fabulous.

There must be more to this than the 'rumours' reported. I really cannot believe a qualified crew from a major european company have actually stalled a servicable 737? :confused:

I too say leave this one to rest for the full picture to emerge.

I used to fly for TFly and remember we always disconnected A/T to land. At BA we ARM Speed mode by presseing the SPEED button and thus A/T stays in, this gives alpha floor protection. I think that this is a better method in light of this conversation. Doesn't help my landings though!

FlyingTom - you need to re-read your manuals! It does NOT provide 'alpha-floor protection' - it merely applies power if the speed gets too low. Someone in BA has always thought this was 'apha-floor'.

IF you mishandle a low-engined a/c and get the speed too low, with full power you get a lot of nose-up. Have a re-read also of your 'unusual attitude' notes or whatever BA call them.

BA themselves nearly lost a 747 recently at LHR at an extreme attitude and low speed, and I think with stick-shake. It is somewhere on here.

OK, minimum speed reversion is the proper name (with an A symbol in the window, hence it is incorrectly named by people like me).

Power is applied if you let the speed get to low, which is a good thing in my book.

PS. the 747 was TOGA' itus.

NineForks Said
There must be more to this than the 'rumours' reported. I really cannot believe a qualified crew from a major european company have actually stalled a servicable 737?

Don't read any accident/incident reports, or you might get overwhelmed with what some fully qualified crews can do with perfectly serviceable aircraft... :eek:

Don't read any accident/incident reports, or you might get overwhelmed with what some fully qualified crews can do with perfectly serviceable aircraft...


...especially when they rely on automatics day in, day out.:ugh:

I'm afraid we rely on auto thrust so much now it is actually becoming a serious problem whenever you fly with an aeroplane where it is unserviceable. I don't know if that is a factor with this incident. The level of relying on automatics is such now that Airbuses are banned without autothrust in various places now, aren't they? I know when I have flown without A/T, sooner or later it is inevitable the speed does something unexpected through you relying on it so throroughly.

Flight story:

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/11/16/219603/thomsonfly-unstable-bournemouth-approach-under-investigation.html

FOK

Along with the details I picked up I gather it's been tried a few times in the sim as part of the investigation - outcome wasn't good! Which is why the AAIB are considering it an accident.

It never fails to amaze me how ridiculously trusting people are of the results of using a TRAINING simulator to investigate the behaviour of an aircraft operated outside of the training envelope.

@<hidden>

Correct.:)

@<hidden>

If you want to know how an A310 with 88 pitch up and 30 kts reacts, check this:

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19910211-0

As a matter of topical interest we conducted a go-around at runway level in the 737 simulator today and made no correction to the pitch up that occured at GA thrust. The aircraft pitched up quickly and reached 45 degrees nose up and still going up and speed falling back through 90 knots when we "froze" the sim. This is a standard exercise to demonstrate to new crews the importance of containing the pitch up when hand flying and to monitor the pitch up rate if an auto-GA. A picture is worth a thousand words.

It never fails to amaze me how ridiculously trusting people are of the results of using a TRAINING simulator to investigate the behaviour of an aircraft operated outside of the training envelope.

I agree. The sim may be a great tool for researching things like how a pilot will recognize and respond to an unusual attitude but using it to predict what the plane will actually do at unusual attitudes and airspeeds is a bit of a stretch. Still, sim results are often included in accident reports with little caveat.

Rainboe,

Your comments regarding reliance on Auto-throttle is all too true.:D

I spent 16 years on an 'old' tech jet and have recently converted to the high tech type. Having spent over 10 years in the left seat of the old girl with no Auto-throttle and visual approaches everywhere, I now find after just 6 months on the new jet I'm so used to letting the A/C do it that when I do take out the A/P and A/T I'm working very hard indeed.:(

I guess I'm going to have to bite the bullet and do more manual approaches.

As a non pilot and merely an as observer, my understanding is that before an aeroplane ever takes to the skies that most of the predicted flight envelope calculations are proven by computers and simulators and post certification are used to demonstrate and practice unusual attitudes and situations. Was the Washington 737 accident not proven with substantial input from the simulator. So why having input all the parameters into the sim would it not be beneficial?

best analogy I can give a non-pilot is painting by numbers.

All the colours end up in the right place, but the picture isn't nearly the same as the original.

The actual response and feel of the sim is quite a bit different compared to the aircraft.
Real manoeuvers in the plane are easier (and dare I say it, more stable) than in the sim.

Correct Rainboe. We tried to do the DHL Baghdad thing in the SIM (complete loss of HYD, A300).

No way Jose`.

I understand the sim exercises were looking at how the situation developed and not in the handling / performance of the aircraft.
Use of automation is all about using an appropriate level of automation to suit the situation. This can vary from full manual to Cat 3B autoland. Gone are the days when you heard "I've got a Base Check next week so I'm going to do a bit of manual flying". It had got to the stage where we were using the aircraft to practice for the sim, ie, often using an inappropriate level of automation. Has skill fade resulted? Among 200 pilots you will get 400 answers on that one!

Oh, and one of the guys is a mate so when we're all done we could wait for the report and probably even learn something. Well most of us, the experts out there have it all taped right?

We too tried, as did Hetfield, the Baghdad scenario. We initially got control of the basic aircraft parameters, but very soon lost them; a shallow dive, speed building, and the need to apply power to raise the nose, no way possible in the sim, and three of us had a go that day and failed, as the terrifying fugoids developed.
Our sim was one of the better ones regarding similarity to real-time handling, and I guess we will never know whether it was down to us or the sim on the day.
.
Major respect to that Baghdad crew for achieving the theoretically impossible.

How long would it be until the AAIB report on this is published just out of interest?

...for another year. Bye bye!- hear from you next November!

Dont knock him so quickly. a very valid point i think.

Was the Washington 737 accident not proven with substantial input from the simulator.

Do you mean the US Air 427 crash out of PIT?

The Idaho DC10 accident was replicated in the simulator

I think you mean the Iowa crash, UAL 232 at SUX - Sioux City (http://www.flysux.com/).

Regardless of the geography, those crashes are a couple of the first that come to my mind on this topic. Sims were used to test theories about handling with catastrophic system failures.

Gone are the days when you heard "I've got a Base Check next week so I'm going to do a bit of manual flying". It had got to the stage where we were using the aircraft to practice for the sim, ie, often using an inappropriate level of automation.

Those days aren't gone everywhere. I do have mixed feelings when the other pilot hand flies to FL330. It's great that they are maintaining stick and rudder skills but it puts a higher workload on the monitoring pilot and narrows situational awareness. Of course, if we are flying a European SID with noise abatement and a low transition altitude, I'm a little firmer about getting the autopilot on so we can run the store. Also, stick time helps some when you get to the sim, but most of us spend the first hour relearning how to fly the box.

Sorry- you are correct. Knew it was I-something. Idaho is where the lovely baked potatoes come from. The Sioux City accident it was. Wonderful interview with the crew shown in Recurrent training. Respec'!

FOK,
Whether in the sim the event is controllable or not is irrelevant, what is more important is whether it is representative of the aircraft. As most posters have suggested the simulator will not have the data to replicate this scenario. You may as well have a test run on MS Flightsim.

Well the CAA seem to think it is?!

... and they certify the sims

That would be the same CAA who allegedly stopped the old VS classic sim from being certified because of a supposed "errant" instrument flag, until they were told that the aircraft did the same.

Back to the original point, the sim will not represent the aircraft in such extreme attitudes, because the sim will not have the data available to it.

Well the CAA seem to think it is?!
... and they certify the sims
A training simulator is qualified by comparison of its behaviour against a defined range of manoeuvres which are intended to validate that it is sufficiently representative to undertake the training role for which it is intended.

It is not validated for use for manoeuvres outside that envelope, and use of a training device for engineering purposes - whether for investigations such as that suggested, or for certification purposes (such as, say, windshear escape guidance certification) is subject to substantial additional validation testing, often of the same magnitude again as that used for the training validation. All of the certification agencies are well aware of the technical limitations of a basic flight training simulator; they are the ones requiring the additional validation (though I would not propose its use without that validation, even if they did not).

.......which is why you can fly inverted under Sydney Harbour bridge in a 737-400 sim:). Go on - ask me how I know...................

BOAC,
Come on now stop exaggerating. Everyone knows the bridge being in Oz is upside down, so in fact you were the right way up! ;)

Well, jigger my kangaroo, Bruce - you are right!:)

I just hope that the crew involved get a bit of a slap on wrists,

bit more training and then get back in the aircraft.

The slap is for letting the aircraft getting into the state in the first place, the training because we all can do with more of it, I know I can sometimes.

The best end result for all.

We can only wait and see.

259.

It would seem that. if the speed of 90kts was true, they must have been very close to a full stall, certainly past stick shaker I would have thought. If this speed was caused by a sevree pull up then I expect there was quite some g-loading. The more learned bretheren amongst us could elaborate. I'm curious as to whether the elevator would have enough influence to affect a nose over recovery. If so, there must have been 'lots of stuff' floating around the cabin ceiling. If not, would some roll habe been required to recover this beast. I would have expected the elevator to have been as useful as wet fish at this speed.
Were there any eye -witnesses, or were they IMC? I've not read all earlier posts to note the Wx or time of day. If not, the subsequent aeros must have been entertaining to the locals who have their fair share of summer inverted antics along the beach front.

Nose high speed decreasing unusual attitude/upset.

You can use roll to aid lowering the nose if you have a very high nose attitude but only if you have sufficient speed in hand in the first place. Interestingly Boeing advocate up to full nose down elevator and a REDUCTION in thrust to aid recovery. The order is elevator, trim, thrust, roll and the roll has a caution attached as does the use of trim. By using the elevator aggresively your decreasing your angle of attack and making a stall due to roll much less likely (you can't stall at 0G) and reducing power will aid the pitch down initialy.

If your 40 nose up in the stick shaker then I'd reckon you don't have that speed in hand and by rolling your going to increase your angle of attack on one wing so could easily induce the stall you wish to avoid and make your subsequent recovery harder as the stall on one wing could induce even more roll. If you want to see that in action then look at the video of the Nimrod crash during an airshow in Toronto, I imagine its on U tube. Not exactly the same as they were in an established turn with G on but it gets the point of Mvr stall accross in a very tragic and poignent way.

With 40 nose up and stick shake you'd be doing the approach to stall checklist I would imagine. That and praying to whichever God you happen to believe in.

Out of interest in the air force with nose v high, speed low and rapidly reducing we were always taught to go to idle and centralise everything, wait for the aircraft to fall out and once speed was on the way back up effect a recovery using nose low techniques. Not as a technique in the QRH or the FCTM though.

Ashling:

I agree with your assessment that a roll might cause the a wing to come closer to stall. The idea of reducing power on a low wing a/c was with me, but it would not be intuative to the average airline crew, especially not close to the ground. Your military recovery technique will work (I've done it when flicking off the top of a roll and screwing up), but you need lots of height. As the elevator might be 'like a wet fish in a gale' increasing stab trim might work, but you'd have to be very quick to remove that trim during the nose over recovery. Combinations of many things might be needed, but I'd enjoy seeing the FDR put onto an instrument display and learning what happened, why and then learn again from the crew's subsequent actions.

There have been some interesting reconstructions done e.g. about the China Airlines B747 that went into a nose down corkscrew due to engine out and a stall at CRZ level. I didn't yet see one about the Airbus in Paris that went high nose up at the OM. I saw only a still photo. There was the one in the far East that went from Approach mode into G/A and they stalled and did not recover. There must be lots to learn and I hope we have the chance.

"Out of interest in the air force with nose v high, speed low and rapidly reducing we were always taught to go to idle and centralise everything, wait for the aircraft to fall out and once speed was on the way back up effect a recovery using nose low techniques. Not as a technique in the QRH or the FCTM though"

That depends on the particular aircraft. I know of some that would NOT recover using that technique. Also you need lots of altitude if you just let it fall. Not a good technique after or during a go-around.

A lot to be said for Alpha Floor ! :ok:

Sleeper

Your quite right I haven't flown everything in the airforces inventory just a mix of whizz jet and multi.

The nose high speed rapidly blah blah thing was purely out of interest rather than an attempt at a recommended technique for a Boeing. Both you and RAT 5 are quite correct it will take quite some height to recover and quite probably more than this crew had available although it is equally possable it would work depending on trajectory, attitude etc.

In the real case all you can do is follow Boeings recommended stall recovery.

Agree with you RAT 5 it would be very interesting to see the FDR.

Regarding the fidelity of sims to real life, recall the B767 sim in regard to the Lauda Air 767 crash in Thailand. Initially the pilots were criticised for not acting more quickly after the deployment of the thrust reverser, as the re-enactment in the Boeing sim indicated they had plenty of time to act and recover the situation. NTSB suspected all was not right, and did a lot of number-crunching and, to cut a long story short, it turned out in the end that the pilots actually only had five seconds after being thrown this totally unexpected and untrained for situation.

Think that after that B got an certification exemption on having to prove that accidental in-flight thrust-reverser deployment on the 777 was recoverable.

If the above descriptions are accurate, then everyone was very lucky to get back on the deck safely.

No time to be terrified initially but I am sure that the crew concerned have been through the mill so far.

As I have said in the Virgin thread a while ago, the amount of rubbish talk from some posters is embarassing and I'm sure the crew of the above flight really appreciate your comments.

There has been heated debate about a separate forum where professionals can discuss stuff like this without having to deal with the drivvle that some of you have come out with over the past few pages.

Will I have access to this separate forum?
At this stage in my career, definitely not.

From an industry PR point of view, some of the comments made on incidents here in the past put all of us in a really bad light.
In fact, I think that if the powers that be made a separate area and just emailed the professionals the link, none of the others would even notice it was there, and all would trundle on as usual.

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/11/16/219603/thomsonfly-unstable-bournemouth-approach-under-investigation.html

Heard of a similar incident in a previous life: mis-handled G/Around on a 737-200 where the crew recovered from a nose-high attitude by keeping G/A thrust and almost full down elevator. Resulting in a "parabolic" recovery with the minimum speed somewhere approx 10kts below stick-shaker for the config.
At zero "G" the a/c WILL fly without stalling as long as it can be maintained. But there has to come a point where elevator effectiveness and the aircraft energy will be insufficient to continue the recovery manoeuvre. Then only lots of altitude will help..................
Interesting that it still can happen.............

Until the full facts are reported by the AAIB, it is only speculation that the aircraft was 40 degrees nose up and at 90 kts airspeed simultaneously during a go around.

The quote from flight states:

"sources say that incident on 23 September involved a go-around following an uncommanded power reduction that left the aircraft at stalling speed during the approach".
It doesn't say "during the go around"

Flight continues:

"The crew disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle to recover the aircraft successfully to safe flight, but witnesses report that the nose-up attitude during recovery exceeded 40° and the airspeed reduced to approximately 90kt (166km/h) at its lowest point."

This 90 kts may well have been during the initial approach, not during the go around.

"The crew then carried out a safe landing at the airport, the AAIB confirms."


FB

Who could be a witness?

Person or persons observing?? :rolleyes:

How's the investigation going?
Are the crew still employed?

The best way to avoid giving the press something to write about is not to stall an a/c full of pax.

:ok: Yeah, no kidding! Airmanship 101, ladies...

and still nothing, has this plane and its crew just vanished into a hole?

Yep, but someone else's hole.

Alpha Floor etc, has not prevented serious jet upset. The Pilots need to be designed into the flight envelope not OUT of it. Monitor the shop boys, it will take your head off if neglected!

Ever so briefly (I hope) off topic - does anyone have a link to "Children of the Magenta" mentioned earlier in the thread please? PM is fine.

Rainboe & co,

I appreciate your point re. non pilots posting; I don't make much attempt to hide my identity, trust anyone sadly interested knows me.

In fact I ( and a lot of others ) learn a lot from reading such threads - including this one - and I have done a lot of unofficial 'hands-on' with light aircraft - including the true Hollywood scenario of my trusty hungover / maybe drugged pilot passing out on me, it really does happen !

Leaving me to circle until he came round...

He did, so I didn't have to knobble any future career of his with an emergency - always wondered if I should have, but the interviwers seemed to have him sized up anyway. NOT anything to do with Dunsfold BTW.

So while a little learning is a dangerous thing, it seems better than nothing !

BTW I knew a Flight Engineer on Concorde; he reckoned he & his colleagues tried to recreate the Sioux City recovery in a Sim, and anyone who got within 40 miles was doing very well ! Respect indeed ! You may be able to corroborate that.

On reflection I am qualified to 'pilot' anything up to 200 tons, but that's at sea level ( or less if I really screw up ) with an IAS unlikely to exceed 30 knots !

Yours, slightly trained in aeronautics, trials / aerial photographer...

What happened to the posts pointing out WHY an aeroplane stalls? To strong for here? :hmm:

SSD

I recently had the opportunity during a flight test program to actually stall a 400...not an approach to stall but rather a full fledged stall. With a weight of about 95000lbs, we were well under 90 kts when we experienced the buffet etc and the aircraft was fully controllable...just kind of mushy. Provided me with great confidence in the 737, as you have to have a serious lapse of brain matter to get yourself in this situation unintentionally.

I assume that the reason the posts were removed is that whether or not a 'stall' took place is really irrelevant to the incident. Either the reported attitude or speed alone would make this a serious event and one which would be difficult to control.

I am also sure that a thread in Tech Log or Questions on stall 'definitions' would be acceptable.

Fair points BOAC. I am just a tad concerned that some 'professional' pilots don't seem to know why an aeroplane stalls. I find that a tad worrying.

SSD

More to the point, what qualifies these so called "professional" pilots to comment with any authority or integrity, when, on the strength of various comments on this thread.....there doesn't appear to be any grasp of even the most basic concept of aerodynamics 101.
Instead, comments are made and judgements/thoughts are introduced into a thread..that show little in the way of understanding and show a remarkable resemblence to tabloid headlines.
Or am I turning into a grumpy old man?

Altflaps:

You can be damn sure that there are no other professional groups that regularly accuse each other of all sorts of negligance on a public bulletin board.

Oh, really?

Ahem:

http://www.biofind.com/Rumor/

:ooh:

Just out of interest, what would happen in this scenario?

The aircraft is following a CDA with DA set on in the ALT SEL window. G/S capture occurs, but for whatever reason, the Missed Approach Altitude isn't dialled in?

A G/A is required and perfomred with the A/T and A/P engaged. At 1000ft, FLCH or V/S is selected. Would the throttles start to retard?

Total Beginner,

If you engage LVL CHANGE the plane climbs at whatever speed you have dialled in the window on the MCP.

If you engage V/S the plane climbs at the rate of V/S you have selected. If you have selected say 1000ft/min rate of climb and 240kts, the aircraft will climb at 1000ft/min.

The speed of the aircraft is then dependant upon how much thrust is available at that rate of climb. In a 737 a 1000ft/min rate of climb at 240 kts (low altitude) is easily acheivable and there will be an excess of thrust available. Therefore, the throttles will retard until the thrust commanded is being delivered to maintain 240kts.

However, if you selected say a 5000ft/min rate of climb at 240kts, there might not be enough thrust available to reach this speed, at this rate of climb. The speed will then bleed off and if left uncorrected the aircraft will stall.

With the AP engaged the stall protection system kicks in (on the NG anyway, never flown the classic) and you will get a mode reversion to LVL CHANGE

I think he wants to know what would happen if you hit toga with the mcp alt window set to DA and not MAA. Therefore a lower alt than you are already at.

You do not set DA in the MCP window for a start! Why would you? When you hit Level change or FLCH, the aeroplane will climb with GA power at whatever speed is selected (or current speed at switch selection) until it eventually captures selected MCP altitude. If the MCP selected altitude is already below you, it will continue climbing because it cannot think of anything else to do!

I think he wants to know what would happen if you hit toga with the mcp alt window set to DA and not MAA. Therefore a lower alt than you are already at.

Yes, that was my question


You do not set DA in the MCP window for a start! Why would you?

Maybe not DA, but it might be necessary to set an altitude below platform ALT during a CDA if you are intercepting the G/S from above (not advisable I know).

There's nothing wrong with intercepting the GS from above- I did it only today! I don't understand the enormous horror it has for some people. It's something we are going to have to get more used to with CDAs and noise-saving approaches. Once you are cleared for the ILS, all that then matters is you capture the GS before you reach the MCP selected altitude, so be sure to wind it right out of the way or you will find yourself level in seconds and unable to continue the approach. So if you then forget to reset the MCP altitude to GA altitude, and then GA, you will capture that selected altitude, so you must remember to set proper GA altitude after you have captured the GS. There are other complications, for instance, whatever speed you are doing at altitude capture will become then become the captured speed at that altitude. So one must stay well on top of the automatics or disengage them totally (not recommended!). Clear?

So one must stay well on top of the automatics or disengage them totally (not recommended!). Clear? Notso, on the 737 during a single autopilot approach, if you press TOGA, the autopilot disengages, so you HAVE to hand fly the missed approach.

PP

so be sure to wind it right out of the way or you will find yourself level in seconds and unable to continue the approach.

This is what I mean. If you wind the MCP ALT down to something like 700' so that you can continue in V/S, but then forget to set MAA after G/S capture, what happens when you select FLCH to begin the cleanup if you've already passed this altitude in the climb or initated the G/A from above it? Is there a built in safety feature whereby having G/A as the target thrust means that FLCH will ONLY command a climb, or will the aircraft go into: IDLE | HDG | FLCH SPD because the selected altitude is below you?

and can we put this one to rest:
BTW I knew a Flight Engineer on Concorde; he reckoned he & his colleagues tried to recreate the Sioux City recovery in a Sim, and anyone who got within 40 miles was doing very well ! Respect indeed ! You may be able to corroborate that.
By accident or design (usually this), simulators I have handled have borne little resemblance to the real aeroplane in all respects, always most seriously on the adverse side of the real aeroplane. Without denigrating the achievement of that crew in putting the Sioux City aeroplane down on the airfield, a better representation of the event created in the simulator would be more illuminating. Simply...simulators suck. They bear little resemblance to reality. So the above statement is actually doing down all other pilots.

They were just an ordinary crew on the day who were called upon to achieve something sensational, and they preformed superbly. There is no need to do down the rest of the aviation community to talk them up! And they would not have wanted that either!

If it helps.....on the 757/767.......if you have the MCP alt set at a level below your present alt and then hit TOGA you will get a pitch-up to a GA with a 2000fpm climb (or full, which ever is less) until it hits the target alt [ which it will never manage to do in this case]
Think about Palma for runway 06L where the GA alt is 2000 but the approach round the corner is going to be in the region of 2500. If you GA early it will pitch up as the first part of the GA and then climb to FL400-ish unless you stop it.

Simply...simulators suck. They bear little resemblance to reality.

I'd say, more correctly, sims work well within the normal operating environment of the aircraft they represent - that's the spec they're programmed to, and the programmed 'model' is unlikely to be accuarate much beyond that spec (why would the manaufacturer waste money making it so?).

Step outside that envelope, and you are almost certainly outside the mathematical 'model' within the sim's computer. The results will be unpredictable, and almost certainly not what the real aircraft would do (the further away from the 'model' you are, the more likely this is).

SSD

I am guilty of not having read all postings on this thread.

But since the 'event' occurred in November 2007 and still no report from AAIB, doesn't that suggest the whole thing is nonsense?

doesn't that suggest the whole thing is nonsense?

Not quite sure what you mean by this. If you mean nonsense as in 'never happened' then, no. It happened and was close enough to coming unstuck for the AAIB to treat it as an accident.

Yes...it happened
Koi

The date Nov 07, Doesn't mean anything With the AAIB.

The AAIB will get round to investigating the 'stall' wether it be next week or next year, Time is irrelevant.

I'm sure there are other similar 'stall' incidents that don't get reported??

Although not quite the same as your question, worth a read is this extract from:

REPORT 7/2003 - Date: 22 January 2003
serious incident to icelandair BOEING 757-200 at oslo airport gardermoen norway 22 january 2002

At the time, 0946 UTC, the aircraft was cleared by ATC down to 2 500 ft, and this altitude was set on the MCP. This setting was maintained through the aborted approach. The gear was selected down. When the aircraft finally was established on the LLZ, it was at least 1 dot high on the GP. Flaps 20o had been set with appropriate speed selection.The aircraft descended through 1 000 ft AAL (Above Aerodrome Level) in an unstabilized mode without the mandatory “call out”.


At an altitude of approx. 580 ft AAL (Flight Data Recorder (FDR) radio altimeter reading) the Commander decided that he discontinued the unstabilized approach and initiated a missed approach. The time was 09:49:11 UTC. He announced his decision to the First Officer and started a “Go-Around” (GA).

The status of the flight was as follows: The aircraft was above the GP, and the SOP calls for the GA altitude to be set when stabilized on GP, therefore the GA altitude was not set on the MCP. Flaps were not in landing configuration, because landing Check List was not completed. The Commander’s instrument panel indicated intermittent ILS failures of raw data without any flag warnings. The lowest altitude AAL indicated on the FDR was approx 460 ft.

The “pitch over” incident is here described mainly based on the FDR information with the Commander’s and First Officer’s reports incorporated:

When the go-around manoeuvre was started by the use of the auto go-around system, the speed was 182 kt. The aircraft was flown manually. The aircraft pitch was increased to approx. 20o and the aircraft started to climb. Upon initiating the go-around, the A/T automatically engaged and increased the thrust to the EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio) limit. In addition, the application of the under wing engine power also gave pitch up movement. During the climb the landing gear was retracted. The flight director pitch initially targeted a pitch attitude of 15o. The airspeed reached a maximum of 198 kt before it started to decrease.

Because of the aircrafts proximity to the MCP selected altitude of 2 500 ft when the go-around was started; the AFDS transitioned to Altitude Capture almost immediately after a positive rate of climb was achieved. At time 09:49:19 UTC the aircraft climbed rapidly through the MCP altitude of 2 500 ft, The FD continued to give commands targeting the MCP selected altitude. The A/T changed from go-around mode to targeting the MCP selected speed (150 kt). The maximum aircraft pitch (21o) was reached. The thrust remained near maximum because the Commander held the throttles forward. The speed was decelerating and quickly dropped below MCP speed. The pitch flight director continued to give command to lead the pilot back to the MCP altitude.

At time 09:49:34 UTC the aircraft reached a peak altitude of 2895 ft (FDR QNH corrected altitude) and the speed had decreased to 137 kt. (The reference speed for flaps 20o is 131 kt.) Nose down was applied manually by the control column. The First Officer called for “bug up” (for the flap up manoeuvring speed) to set the airspeed indicator, and the Commander pushed on the Flight Level Change Switch (FLCH) button to break the flight director altitude lock on. The speed selected on MCP was changed from 150 kt to 210 kt. During the next seconds, a full nose down input on the control column was made manually. The aircraft pitched over to an attitude of approx. –30o, and for a period of approx. 5 seconds the FDR indicates negative g-values with a maximum load factor of –0.6 g.

The control column was briefly returned to near neutral, and then another abrupt large nose down column input was made. The aircraft pitched over rapidly with the speed increasing excessively. The FDR data show that the Ground Proximity Warning System (GWPS) aural warning of “Pull up” was activated. The aircraft was now in a steep dive and rapidly descending. During the dive the flight director pitch bar gave pitch up commands relative to the pitch attitude. The A/T reduced the trust from 98% N1 to 45% N1. At time 09:49:44 UTC the aircraft pitch attitude had peaked at -49o and was beginning to increase positively.

At this time the First Officer called out “PULL UP!” - “PULL UP!”. The GPWS aural warnings of “TERRAIN” and then “TOO LOW TERRAIN” were activated. Both pilots were active at the control columns and a maximum “up” input was made. A split between left and right elevator was indicated at this time. It appears the split occurred due to both pilots being active at the controls. The pilots did not register the aural warnings. During the dive the airspeed increased to 251 kt and the lowest altitude in the recovery was 321 ft radio altitude with a peaked load factor of +3.59 g’s.

Ouch.......

How is it possible that these things are happening .....

J2 - Because the aircraft are aircraft. Flying is an art, requires skill and dedication, get "unlucky" and/or don't keep and eye on the shop....CHOP ...off with your head :}

I think it has been mentioned before, but AFAIK this does not NEED to be an AAIB investigation and the company can sort it out, as has happened in other 'mishandling' events in other airlines.

Also need to correct some peoples' lack of understanding of 737 systems - there is no 'Alpha-Floor' on the beast. Select full power at low speed and do not control the pitch and those parameters are a doddle.

The United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) is part of the Department for Transport and is responsible for the investigation of civil aircraft accidents and serious incidents within the UK. The Chief Inspector of Air Accidents reports directly to the Secretary of State for Transport.whether they NEED to be involved or not, I think that you will find that they most certainly are/were.

Regardless of the debate above, you all need to remember this:

Statutory Instrument 1996 No. 2798
The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 1996


(4) Subject to paragraphs (5) and (6) below, the Chief Inspector may, when he expects to draw air safety lessons from it, carry out, or cause an Inspector to carry out, an investigation into an incident, other than a serious incident, which occurs—
(a) in or over the United Kingdom;

any update on this event? has the report been released by the AAIB?

Quietly buried me thinks!!....... along with quite a few other skeletons at TOM:rolleyes:

Quietly buried me thinks!!....... along with quite a few other skeletons at TOM

What other skeletons might you be referring to? None come to mind when I turn up for work.

Just exactly what are you implying, PULL THROUGH?

Are there parallels here with the Turkish incident at schiphol ?

Are there parallels here with the Turkish incident at Schiphol ?
Sadly - yes.
The bells and whistles, the honkers and hooters, the flashing lights and disembodied electronic voices, the omniscient computers are all - REPEAT ALL - aids for the Flight Crew to use at their discretion and not to rely upon for all flight operations.
They are not (and never were intended to be) a substitute for good airmanship.
But, increasingly, that is how they are being used. We are breeding flight crews who simply have no idea what 'seat of the pants' flying is all about - something that Captain Sully alluded to in at least one of his interviews after his Hudson River escapade.
Yeah - I'll get flamed here but I've been flying aeroplanes for 30 years. During my training and during all subsequent ratings and renewals I had one mantra drummed into me over and over and over again "AIRSPEED and ATTITUDE" and it is still there, running through the back of my mind, through take-off, climb, cruise and approach.
The most high-tech dials I ever get to use are an ADF and a VOR. For all other purposes the standard 'T' gives me all the information I need to fly the aeroplane correctly and accurately.
Have we really reached the point where those basic skills are beginning to disappear in favour of an MSFS approach to professional aviation?
Because, if there is the slightest indication that this might be true, then I may never set foot aboard a commercial aircraft again.

Are there parallels here with the Turkish incident at Schiphol - and the 320 at PGF. Getting kind of regular?

Xeque - I agree with you.
The B737 is now an entry-level airliner - it is quite often the first aircraft a newly qualified pilot will fly commercially. Yet, it is by no means the easiest jet to fly, and it will bite HARD if mishandled - not exactly the best beast to be consolidating newly learned flying skills. I wonder if anyone has done any statistical analysis on the accident/incident rate for B737 vrs other types, for low time aircrew.
Yes, I know, with the right amount of quality training....etc, etc, etc
It used to be said that there is no subsitiute for experience. Sadly, I hear that said less often these days.

It used to be said that there is no subsitiute for experience. Sadly, I hear that said less often these days.

Yup, so very true.

Agree with all the last posts......

SO WHY HAS IT BEEN BURIED?

When considering the release of an accident report from the AAIB - These investigations take time.

The really big investigations take many years. Even smaller scale accidents take a fair time to complete. Even when the actual investigation is completed there is a period where interested parties are able to review and comment on the report. Only then can the final version be published. The Colin McRae helicopter crash occurred in Sept 07 and the investigation was only released Feb 09. The TOM stall was Nov 07 so the report might still be a few months away. If there are parallels with the Turkish crash at AMS , then the report may be further delayed to incorporate relevant info.

Patience .......... :ok:

Thunderbug,
Completely agree that the reports take some time. But is is now roughly 18 months since an alleged incident occurred that could very well have lost all on board. The CVR/FDR & crew were all available after the incident. Surely accident investigation is mostly about preventing future accidents. At least an interim report should have been released like the Easyjet test dive.

Weary & 411A nah := you have got it all wrong, the mantra today is
" there is no substitute for utilising our crewing requirements as a revenue earning opportunity"
otherwise pray, explain to me why the two biggest lo-co's in Europe recruit exclusively 2-300hr cadets, when the market is awash with F/O's qualified & experienced on type.

Starting a pre recorded pax safety briefing with the words "your safety on board is our primary concern" is hypocritical if your priority in the selection of flight crew is how much money you can take from them & NOT how experienced they are. :hmm:

Are there parallels here with the Turkish incident at Schiphol ?
Sadly - yes.
The bells and whistles, the honkers and hooters, the flashing lights and disembodied electronic voices, the omniscient computers are all - REPEAT ALL - aids for the Flight Crew to use at their discretion and not to rely upon for all flight operations.
They are not (and never were intended to be) a substitute for good airmanship.
But, increasingly, that is how they are being used. We are breeding flight crews who simply have no idea what 'seat of the pants' flying is all about - something that Captain Sully alluded to in at least one of his interviews after his Hudson River escapade.
Yeah - I'll get flamed here but I've been flying aeroplanes for 30 years. During my training and during all subsequent ratings and renewals I had one mantra drummed into me over and over and over again "AIRSPEED and ATTITUDE" and it is still there, running through the back of my mind, through take-off, climb, cruise and approach.
The most high-tech dials I ever get to use are an ADF and a VOR. For all other purposes the standard 'T' gives me all the information I need to fly the aeroplane correctly and accurately.
Have we really reached the point where those basic skills are beginning to disappear in favour of an MSFS approach to professional aviation?
Because, if there is the slightest indication that this might be true, then I may never set foot aboard a commercial aircraft again.

And also the Continental (Colgan Flt3407) Dash8-Q400 crash in Buffalo NY as well.... the only things missing were the dormant auto-throttle and the aberrant RadAlt.

PULL THROUGH,

You're being rather coy! I really think you should reply to Posts 113 and 114.

Don't be shy now!

Scimitar

it goes further than that. Anyone making the sort of allegations that PULL THROUGH has done, ought to be prepared to substantiate them, otherwise we must treat them as throw-away lines, and the moderators delete them?

Which is it PULL THROUGH?

Agree with all the last posts......

SO WHY HAS IT BEEN BURIED?
LAst year, I posted this on the BA038 thread...
I've just crunched the data on published formal reports by the AAIB back to 2006 (as far back as I could be bothered to go). The average length of time from incident to final report publication is 25.6 months, i.e. a little over two years. This does not, and has not, stopped them issuing recommendations, where appropriate, before the final report.

I'm quite happy for AAIB to resist the rabid frothing of the news media for sensational information to fill their 24-hour outpourings, and instead concentrate on trying to work out exactly what happened...

Report's out: Air Accidents Investigation: 3/2009 G-THOF (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/3_2009_g_thof.cfm)

44degs NU pitch, 82KIAS.... wow :eek:

Cue Rainboe? Does he think Laurel and Hardy had been at it again?

Seriously, though, Veeerrrryy similar to Schipol. Approaching stall not 'recognised'. Here we go again.:{

How quickly can the PF on a 737 adjust pitch trim? (realising that the situation would be first having to recognise the trim limiting the control surface authority) and that the aircraft is normally "IN" trim.

thks.

GR

Fairly tame for them (http://www.bournemouthecho.co.uk/news/4385487.Thomsonfly_didn_t_appreciate_seriousness_of_landing_event_say_Air_Accidents_Investigation_Branch/)

The captain is now flying with a different airline.

Speaking as a slightly knowledgable punter, who has flown a small aircraft to the stall several times and (fortunately) recovered, I would think that at least one or two of the pax would have been aware of the situation and having a serious brown trouser moment. :eek: Not to mention the drivers.

I was always aware that an A300 with their humongus "bedsteads" dangling could approach FACT almost as slowly as my "Arrow 200", but it did not stop me from having a "teetering on the edge" feeling whenever I was SLF trash.

I am sure that I would have known that the chips were truly down - am I wrong ?

Imagegear

Bournemouth Airport is in Dorset. Slightly worrying that the AAIB think it is in Hampshire!

"Report No: 3/2009. Report on the serious incident to Boeing 737-3Q8, registration G-THOF, on approach to Runway 26, Bournemouth Airport, Hampshire on 23 September 2007"

Imagegear,

Yes, I'm afraid you are.

Fred.

How quickly can the PF on a 737 adjust pitch trim? (realising that the situation would be first having to recognise the trim limiting the control surface authority) and that the aircraft is normally "IN" trim.

It only takes a few seconds of nose down pitch trim to regain control.

The real danger in these type of 'lost auto-throttle' approaches, seems to be that the auto-pilot carries on happily trimming nose-up below Vref, whilst simultaneously there is no 'SPEED! SPEED!' Annuncaition (@<hidden>|@<hidden>)

Training in loss-of-authority at full fwd stick >===> Re-trim nose down seems NOT to be effective, if it is being taught at all in low-thrust-line a/c type training.

Seems to be a bit of an afterthought, or sideline call-out in Boeings manuals too..

WHY?

The rate of 'manual' tailplane trim change available with flap extended is high but not enough to overcome the enormous pitch up that full power and loads of 'low speed' nose-up trim would generate. 'Lucky' really that the A/T appears to have tripped out otherwise we could have been looking at another Schipol. For me there is gathering pressure for Boeing and possibly all manufacturers to cause A/P disengagement at a much lower nose-up trim setting. Certainly the disconnect warning would be a significant and hard to miss wake-up call.

Hmm......still no 'instant assessment' of 'competence' by our regular summary justice panel? Curious.

Fincastle - any hints?? Might be one to avoid. Anyone know? You'd think it might be time to hand in your 'wings'.

Training in loss-of-authority at full fwd stick >===> Re-trim nose down seems NOT to be effective, if it is being taught at all in low-thrust-line a/c type training.
Seems to be a bit of an afterthought, or sideline call-out in Boeings manuals too..
WHY?I think you make a valid point here HM, about the training being a bit of an afterthought on Boeing's part. And this may be because this kind of situation was thought to be very unlikely, with the advent of aeroplanes with moveable stabilisers, unlike the older recognised phenomenon of "jet upset" on fixed tailplanes.. So recovery from unusual attitudes was required to be addressed perhaps only during initial training.

It seems that the pilots of this subject case, recalled only the very first step of the recovery procedure: Full down elevator but never considered reducing thrust and/or applying significant roll inputs, to get the nose to drop, as the elevators were completely ineffectual at that time.

Having said that, I know that this is definitely practised regularly, in some UK airlines as part of the 3 yearly cycle of items to be covered. But its possible that some trainers, companies and pilots don't really treat it seriously enough, because even they don't see it as really relevant on "modern" aeroplanes. Well, it's evident this is not the case.

It's relatively easy to set up the correct scenario in the simulator and with good briefings beforehand, pilots (and indeed trainers) can get a lot from these exercises and hopefully leave with a lot more confidence.

The other point I would make, is that even when training and practice does occur regularly, there is often no standard methodology and it is left to each individual TRI/TRE to devise the best method of how to achieve the upset or attitude in the first place. The recovery procedures themselves are taught in a standard way. This works ok to a degree but some pilots may miss out on seeing some very interesting situations.

The Boeing procedure for the "approach to stall recovery" - that is, when the stick shaker goes off at very low airspeed - is simply to leave the autopilot engaged and increase the thrust. At low level (as on approach) jet engines have a great deal of excess thrust, and the aircraft will simply motor out of the low speed condition.

The point being that grabbing the controls, disconnecting the autopilot, and attempting to manually fly (and the autopilot is automatically disconnected if you hit TOGA for a go-around) is the wrong thing to do especially if a startled pilot is still struggling to regain situational awareness. For this accident, or the Turkish at Schiphol, all the pilots had to do to save the situation was shove the thrust levers up.

I flew several of these very scenarios, from very low speeds indeed, in various configurations in the sim just four days ago with no problems.

(Note: The Boeing procedure also states that the autopilot should be disconnected if the performance is inadequate.)

The problem until recently has been that upset recovery and stall recovery were considered and trained for separately. During set peice stall training we were taught to stop trimming nose up at a certain point rather than trimming all the way to the stall so that the recovery all worked very smoothly with minimum if any height loss etc etc and with no need to trim out of it. There are two clear problems with this. Firstly Mr Boeing forgot to train his autopilots not to trim all the way to the stall. Secondly and more importantly this training completely hid the fact that in any real life accidental stall you were almost certain to be fully trimmed and thus in a position where the standard recovery actions would put you in a jet upset position.

It is of course not just Boeing at fault here. All stall training right from very basic flying training is pretty much the same. The natural reaction to a stall that a pilot develops right from his very first stall detail is full power and adjust the nose attitude (using the elevator not the trim!) to stop the buffet (stick shaker). It is not surprising that this is exactly what this pilot did only to be faced with a rapid pitch up that took him a while to work out how to deal with.

Jet upset or unusual attitude recovery has never received as much attention in the airlines as it clearly deserves. When it happens you need to know what to do instantly ie it needs to be instinctive. Stall training needs to become much more realistic and integrated with upset recovery on a/c types where one can lead to the other.

I crossed with Checkboard whilst writing. I don't disagree with what you say but don't forget you were ready for what was about to happen.

TC

Thanks Indeed for those last few replies.

I'm of the opnion that 'gross excess thrust' in some new types and variants of older types has blinded some authorities to the need for very careful and accurate handling in these types of situations, a need that was always a prime training focus in the distant past - but for a different reason - 'marginal excess thrust'.

Let's now also include the recent DC-10 landing accident in any reference to control loss as a result of modern aircraft aerodynamic design/thrust line configuration and its potential consequences (as well as Schiphol//Bournemouth/Marseilles & maybe Buffalo)... there are no doubt others, as now we know this one 'got away' from serious incident reporting for a while longer than healthy.

As full fwd stick for more than a couple of seconds is a very unusual pitch command - would that combined with extreme aft-trim (below V-Ref for 1-g flight) not be a combination worth considering for a warning?

Or even simpler, and earlier, a warning when auto-trim moves a set margin below V-Ref for 1-g flight, whilst armed for approach.

I'm surprised you can still get a job with 'another airline' after being involved an event like this. Good news I suppose, for any of us pilots who could make a similar mistake.

Poor buggers. 80 kts and 40 degrees must be unpleasant in a 737.

80 kts and 40 degrees must be unpleasant in a 737.

Certainly would focus your attention..

et upset or unusual attitude recovery has never received as much attention in the airlines as it clearly deserves.

Never a truer word spoken. Despite many excellent flight safety papers available on these manoeuvres, airline operations departments pay lip service to the subject and simulator instructors invariably dismiss unusual attitude recovery and stall recovery training as low priority and merely "fun" exercises thown in at the end of a session if time permits. Seems to me the whole basis of type rating and recurrent simulator training is to get the automatics in as quickly as possible after lift off then everyone can relax and breathe easy..

For this accident, or the Turkish at Schiphol, all the pilots had to do to save the situation was shove the thrust levers up. - NB That is exactly what they did! Problem is that they appear not to have kept them there and in order to apply full nose down stick I suspect the TC (or HP) took his hand off the throttles to use both hands - and they closed.

I have never tried it, but I don't think the autopliot has a cat's chance in hell of controlling the pitch-up from an aft-trimmed situation with full power. Note also that Boeing (in the FCTM) suggest disconnecting the A/P where ground contact is a factor and then using roll and rudder if necessary to get the nose down from the ensuing loop entry. What fails to be stressed, over and over again in run-of-the-mill airline 'training', is that such a recovery will take you STRAIGHT in to a nose-high 'upset' which requires A/P disengaged. Are you saying you flew 4 stick shake recoveries with full power applied - and the A/P coped? You never got more that 25 deg nose up? What Boeing say about this is interesting, and I do not think properly addressed.
" An approach to a stall is a controlled flight maneuver; a stall is an out-of-control, but recoverable, condition. Note: Anytime the airplane enters a fully developed stall, the autopilot and autothrottle should be disconnected.".

I cannot somehow see either Tom or TK as 'a controlled flight maneuver':eek:

It is looking as if Boeing and AB (and others?) need to produce some system to prevent this excessive aft trim occuring below Vref - if we can no longer expect pilots to watch airspeed.

Problem is that they appear not to have kept them there and in order to apply full nose down stick I suspect the TC (or HP) took his hand off the throttles to use both hands - and they closed.

When I said "all they had to do", that's what I meant. That is, they didn't need to "apply full nose down stick".

Are you saying you flew 4 stick shake recoveries with full power applied - and the A/P coped? You never got more that 25 deg nose up?

I'm saying exactly that. Set up on the ILS, autopilot following the glide path, autothrottle disconnected and throttle at idle. Full flap and gear, autopilot trims aft as the aircraft slows to stick shake, wait 2 seconds to make it more "realistic" then simply advance the thrust.

Speed increases slowly at first, with the high drag, autopilot maintains the descent on the glide path. Speed increases back to Vref, as the autopilot re-trims. If you wish , you could simply reduce the thrust and continue the approach from there.

Obviously you are guarding the controls, in case the autopilot disconnects under the trim load.

It would seem the solution is to train pilots in and require demonstrated competence in stall recovery from low altitude, high drag configurations with adverse pitch trim. Or alternatively, restrict AP trimming below a preset AOA by having the AP disconnect and hand the aircraft back to the pilots in a state which it can be recovered without exposure to an adverse trim regime leading to the likes of 80kts IAS and 40 degrees pitch up.

Or is all that too obvious?

I also like Checkboard's solution. Wouldn't have worked without manual intervention in the Buffalo situation though, as the shaker operation disconnects the AP.

autopilot maintains the descent on the glide path. -aha! Yes, it may work there, I think (although I'm surprised the A/P has enough authority to oppose the trim change), but I would not mind betting that 99% of pilots right now would take 'normal' stall recovery action with stick shake at that height with possible 'ground contact' at the back of their minds? Let's have a straw poll - stick shake at around 500'; how many will leave the A/P coupled to the ILS, select full power, not touch TOGA or the trim switch and continue the approach? I would expect most would conduct a g/a since presumably you would anyway, even if you recover. I don't think landing of that sort of approach is 'a good idea'! Maybe a re-emphasis of the footnotes by company training departments is called for.

The effect of power/pitch couple is not uncommon - even BA had a 747 at extreme attitudes and very low speed during a g/a at LHR with this.

I am surprised neither the AAIB nor any of you pros have made any comment of any formal safety recommendation that something should be done to avoid brushing an incident like this under the carpet for as long as it was.

If I read the report correctly, the aircraft and crew flew on for damn near two weeks before the seriousness of the incident surfaced in any regulatory sense :hmm:

I don't think that the "brushed under the carpet" comment is fair. The company reported it, immediately they knew the details and they discovered the details in a timely fashion - that is, they were following their correct procedure.

The AAIB did comment that the original filed ASR didn't quite describe the extent of the event - but without access to the text nothing can be said on how "under reported" it was. The aircraft itself wouldn't have suffered any damage from the underspeed.

Didn't know about that S&T, but I agree. On the face of it a major lack of professionalism from the crew and a surprisingly slow reaction by the airline's safety dept to the ASR - there was one, wasn't there?

But - if the ASR was as vague as has been suggested, how was the company to react? Only when the seriousness of the event became apparent, from the flight data (from the FDM system) was the company able to react properly - which they did.

You guys are on the case;let's just say that there is a lot more to this than you may believe at first instance.A sorry tale that is embroiled with politics and spectacular training management incompetence.Watch this space.

I am surprised neither the AAIB nor any of you pros have made any comment of any formal safety recommendation that something should be done to avoid brushing an incident like this under the carpet for as long as it was.

If I read the report correctly, the aircraft and crew flew on for damn near two weeks before the seriousness of the incident surfaced in any regulatory sense :hmm:

I think the Findings on "Safety Management" in section 3.1 pretty much cover this issue. What I believe has "saved" an SR on the topic is the seventh item in that section:
The operator has undertaken significant changes in their OFDM and safety management system following this event.

I think if that had not been the case, there'd likely be an SR to make it happen.

Interesting to read the latest Flight International editorial comment (26 May- 1 June, page 5). Selected extracts:

"As flight deck automation becomes so reliable it hardly ever fails, it is becoming more of a human factors problem.....pilots familiar with operating older aircraft, which had more variable reliability, are nearing the end of their careers, and there is a generation of pilots whose only experience is of operating aircraft with highly reliable automated systems....is the AAIB implying that younger pilots are less good than the older ones when things go wrong?..It seems so...Maybe that is because the excercises mandated in recurrent training programmes have scarcely changed since the days of the Super Constellation...so training no longer represents what crews are likely to have to deal with today.."

For years, Flight International editorials have made similar comments following automation related accidents and incidents and yet it seems operators and manufacturer's are simply not interested and blind use of automation wins every time.
In Australia, even the smallest turbo prop operators are embracing automation with indecent haste to fly like the big jets do, and this is showing up markedly when pilots of these regionals front up for a basic instrument flying assessment as part of the interview process for a jet job in the domestic airlines.

A surprising number of pilots with hours on the larger turboprops are shown to be frankly incompetent when faced with hand flown non-automatics raw data flight with some unable to stay with legal limits on an ILS. But these pilots renew their instrument ratings each year - not by hand flying but on the autopilot. Despite all this, they are still welcomed by the airlines whose interview technique is aimed almost universally at ticking the boxes of human factors questions. "Tell us about how you resolve conflict on the flight deck?" How would you describe your reaction if the captain was intent on making an unstable approach?" "Do you sometimes get angry with your fellow crew members?" State an example of threat and error management?"

No technical questions any more. Just psycho-analysis of the candidate. Can't fly raw data in the sim, mate? No problem: you won't ever need that again. The automation will just blow you away. Bournemouth, Amsterdam, Adam Air Indonesia, - nah! Just aberrations - nothing to do with automation complacency.

Operators and regulators should heed the Flight International editorials on the seemingly unstoppable tide of automation and start thinking outside the square for a change and before more lives are lost.

Only a 1000% correct ..... children of the magenta line etc (or the Airbus equivalent)

I have been holding off commenting on this subject for some time, but I do think that it is high time that a serious discussion about what actual level of skill really remains on the modern flight deck when the sh*t hits the fan and the FCOM and the automatics don't work any more.

Those of you out there who come from my vintage will remember the old CAA Base Check and Instrument Rating. During the resulting two hours, the entire exercise was hand-flown and the only time that the examiner would allow you to use the auto-pilot was while you made your let-down brief.

I duly left the Royal Air Force after 18 years and joined this civilian way of doing things without too much difficulty.

And so things continued until JARs came along.

As an examiner (by then), I simply could not believe how much the candidate was allowed to resort to auto-flight.

It went like this:

EFATO: Hand fly until clean wing and then allowed auto pilot.

Subsequent Actions and Holding Pattern: Auto Pilot.

Attempted Relight: Auto Pilot.

Traffic Pattern: TCAS event etc to base leg. Auto Pilot.

Three-engine ILS: Arrange failure of automatics resulting in hand-flown ILS

To Go Around: Which invariably was "untidy"

Then: Invariably the call was "Engage the Auto Pilot"

For the next exercise, which was a Non Precision Approach (using the auto-pilot once again).

This could hopefully (inshallah) end up with a manual landing (or G/A) on 3-engines.

Apart from things like renewing the 3-engine ferry take off certificate, a bit of flapless etc etc, that was it.

So why am I worried?

I am very, very, worried that basic handling skills have been removed by the basic JAR renewal tests to the extent that our youngsters could very soon just find themselves doing something for the very first time with a very expensive piece of equipment crammed full of passengers.

Let us hope that EASA is going to be more realistic.

PS I managed to survive for 13 hours and 30 minutes in an aeroplane without a working ar*se end and during which the FCOM was of absolutely no help to me or anyone else around me.

Quote:
I am not one for commenting on things normally on PPRuNe but feel it would be a shame for people like me who are not in the industry but are interested in it all the same not being able to read the wealth of knowledge and experience that appear on these boards.
Fine if people like you in these sections stuck to 'reading' but far too many people with limited knowledge are involving themselves in discourse way beyond their comprehension or knowledge, without letting on. It makes a mockery of any serious discussion by industry people. We've even had aviation armchair hobbyists announcing here how they would have handled a recent emergency (differently to the pilots involved)!

Dogma raised a very valid point, and was quite correct in criticising the post. It is an absurd statement for anyone that knows the 737-300. Perhaps until more information is released, we can refrain from postulating or stabbing in the dark? A lot of what has been written is evidently junk.
Good point.Those of us who are not pilots but enjoy learning more about real day to day aviation should read but not post ill-informed speculation.It just clogs up the thread. Like this post. Sorry, just making a point.

Tee Emm, is it really that bad? Over here in my outfit (which is in JAR or now EU-land) we have to prove every six months that we are able to fly one engine out raw data manual approaches and go-arounds. Raw Data Holdings however are rare and only covered by the 3 year recurring cycle, TCAS RAs are mandatory hand flown, be it in the SIM or outside of it.

I guess a lot depends on training philosophy and local CAA requirements.

prove every six months that we are able to fly one engine out raw data manual approaches and go-arounds

I guess a one engine inoperative manually flown ILS with no doubt with radar vectors plus a go-around would take say fifteen minutes of simulator time at the most. . Some would argue that fifteen minutes of manual flying once every six months is not a serious attempt to maintain competency.

I agree there, however raw data flying is actively encouraged in daily line flying and is actually necessary as we do a lot of visuals (not setting those up in the FMC) and circling approaches. The SIM is usually a OEI approach followed by a GA with FD failure at the same time and standard missed approach procedure which is made a tad more difficult as we cannot use any maps during the GA (EFB is not allowed to be used below 1000ft AGL and no paper map backup). From the missed approach procedure fix either radar vectors are provided to set you up on the subsequent approach or a standard approach procedure has to be flown, if the latter is used the FMC is failed to not have the nice shiny lines on the ND. Unfortunately lately there are usually other problems present at the same time like flight control problems, missing hydraulics, electric problems, a spontanous fire on the APU or remaining engine which really raises the stress level a tad too high.

It seems to me that pilot de-skilling is mostly as a result of the company lawyers dictating policy on the flight deck, I was told recently that in a major UK airline you are no longer allowed to disconnect the auto throttle.

The same person also said that it is most unlikely within that company anyone would do a visual approach on a line check.

If the above is true it would seem that de-skilling is growing in the industry resulting in over reliance on the automatics, it is little wonder the that some airline pilots seem to have less ability to control the speed on approach that is required of a student pilot in an SEP.

The only reason that I can think of for this de-skilling is that the airline lawyers think that in the event of an accident with all the automatics engaged they will be able to shift the blame & liability away from the airline and on to the equipment manufacture/maintenance company's.

I can only thank my luck that I work for a company that lets the pilot management dictate how the aircraft is flown and lets the captain decide the appropriate way fly the aircraft within the SOP's.