CAA Paper - Helicopter Flight in Reduced Visibility

[212man]

Just released: http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/Paper200703.pdf

Not read it yet. Maybe of interest to Shawn (I recall a request for info on this subject a year or so a go)

[Shawn Coyle]

Shawn is greatly interested, and has just downloaded it, or so he tells me. (normally reliable....)

[Helinut]

It is nearly 200 pages. These are the recommendations from the Executive Summary as a taster.

Recommendations
a)Introduction of the IFR dynamic stability requirements as a general requirement for
all operations, including VFR.
b) Introduction of appropriate requirements (or guidance) on criteria for DVE
operations based on consideration, but not full adoption, of all IFR requirements
for:
i) night operations; and
ii) operations in visual ranges of less than a ‘specified’ minima, which takes
account of permitted aircraft height and associated view over the nose. Look
down angles associated with heights of greater than 1000 ft (i.e. greater than
15-20 deg) would impose severe restrictions on the available visual cues.
c) Introduction of specific requirements (or guidance) on criteria for FCMCs.
d) Introduction of a requirement for an attitude indicator flight instrument for all
operations, including VFR.
e) Specification and adoption of FODCOM training requirements for all civil helicopter
operations that fall into the DVE category specified at b) above.
f) Raise pilot awareness of the problems associated with operations in the DVE, i.e.
the interaction between vehicle handling qualities and visual cueing conditions.
g) Reduce the probability of pilots encountering DVE conditions by providing
guidance on whether to fly or not in marginal conditions with the potential for DVE
encounters. This could be achieved using a simple probability index based on
consideration of those factors that contribute to a high accident risk scenario,
including:
i) meteorological conditions (precipitation, cloud base etc.),
ii) visual conditions (time of day, fog/mist/haze conditions, visual range, acuity of
the visual horizon etc.),
iii) aircraft configuration (navigation aids, flight instruments, pilot FOV and layout
etc.),
iv) aircraft handling qualities (SAS, FCMCs).
h) Image analysis using the techniques presented in this report should be
investigated as a means of supporting the pilot training in g), using digital images
of typical operating conditions and UCEs.

DVE - Degraded Visual Environment
UCE - Usable Cue Environment

The first recommendation would put the cat amongst the pigeons!
In fairness it is a reasearch paper, but someone needs to have regard to its practicality!
Some of the other ideas are thought provoking on the briefest of reads.

[JimL]

In a recent thread "Heli down in Cumbria" there was a discussion on the merits of using certain strategies when faced with worsening weather and the onset of a degraded visual environment. This paper deals with just that area.


To better understand the paper (for those not willing to plough through it), it is best to show illustrative text rather than Recommendations; firstly some text from the Foreword:While this work was being completed, a new international initiative, the International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST), was launched in 2006 with the goal of reducing helicopter accidents by 80% within 10 years. It is clear from the accident statistics that, if this goal is to be achieved, a large part of the safety improvement will need to be realised in small and medium helicopter operations. Early on in the IHST initiative, helicopter flight in degraded visual conditions emerged as a significant cause of accidents in the USA, Canada and a number of states within Europe. In the UK, it was shown to be the largest single cause of helicopter fatal accidents in a review published by the CAA (HELI-GASIL, December 2002). Small helicopters are particularly vulnerable to the hazards associated with helicopter flight in degraded visual conditions as they are not generally equipped with automatic stabilisation equipment. The UK is participating in IHST via the European Helicopter Safety Team (EHEST), which forms part of the European Strategic Safety Initiative (ESSI). The work reported in this paper will be promoted within the IHST and EHEST which, it is hoped, will result in initiatives on an international basis to reduce and/or mitigate encounters with degraded visual conditions. In the UK, as an initial step, the CAA has already amended the Air Navigation Order (ANO) to introduce a minimum visibility of 1500 m for VFR flight, and a requirement for VFR flight to be conducted "with the surface in sight". The latter requirement is interpreted to mean "…with the flight crew being able to see sufficient surface features or surface illumination to enable the flight crew to maintain the aircraft in a desired attitude without reference to any flight instrument". An Aeronautical Information Circular (AIC) is being produced to underpin the change to the ANO, and to assist pilots towards a better understanding of the problems that can be associated with attempting flight by visual reference in unsuitable conditions. This project has firmly established a direct link between flight safety, visual cueing conditions and helicopter handling characteristics. At the heart of the high accident rate is the inherent instability of many small and some medium helicopters which can rapidly lead to excessive pilot workload when attempting to fly in degraded visual conditions. An obvious step to reduce the accident rate would be to improve the handling qualities of these aircraft, but it is recognised that such a step would likely be impractical for many existing aircraft. Other means must therefore be found, and a number of recommendations are made in Section 9 of this report. One possible form of mitigation, not mentioned in the report, is the provision of a 'headup' attitude reference; devices such as the Malcolm Horizon have previously shown some promise and might be practical to retro-fit to existing aircraft.One immediate gain in this paper is in the parsing of the accidents (all of which could, under a looser categorisation, be regard as CFIT) into three logical sets:Scenario 1 – cases where the primary causal factor was obstacle/terrain strikes in low level flight; Scenario 2 – cases involving controlled flight into terrain (CFIT); Scenario 3 – cases involving spatial disorientation and loss of control. This ensures that the recommendations are not confined to a single solution (such as EGPWS/SVS/EVS) and are targeted at breaking the links in the causal chain in a number of places.

Further the language that is used to describe the problem scenarios is easy to understand:


It is of note that all 7 of the cases identified for more detailed examination took place under VMC and, in many, it seems that the pilot was justified in initiating the flight. Problems occurred because of the background visual conditions encountered en-route, or a sudden and unexpected deterioration in the visibility conditions. Pilots either found themselves suddenly immersed in cloud or fog where VMC flight was no longer possible (i.e. IIMC), or in a DVE condition that rendered flight using only external visual references unsafe. For the IIMC situation, three types of pilot reaction can be identified from the data that could potentially result in a serious accident. Generally, pilots responded to the situation by endeavouring to backtrack, climb above or descend below the visual obstruction. In the first circumstance, unless they have adequate instrument training, are current and refer to instruments to effect a recovery, they can become disorientated very quickly and lose control of the situation. In the second circumstance, it is possible that the pilot will manage to maintain control of the aircraft but, because of poor situational awareness, fly the aircraft into an unsafe condition. In this case, divided attention between flight instruments and the outside visual scene can lead to a situation where the pilot fails to notice a gradual and insidious loss in height and consequently fly dangerously close to the ground. Alternatively, there may be a similar, unintended loss of speed and consequent loss of aircraft attitude stability, ultimately leading to loss of control. Division of attention is particularly relevant to low level flight where the pilot is more reliant on external cues for maintaining a safe flight path, or for maintaining position and attitude stabilisation in the hover. In the third circumstance, the pilot may attempt to establish on instruments but, because of the time needed to effect the transfer of attention, the aircraft may again be placed in a dangerous position. This is also relevant to low level flight in close proximity to the ground and obstacles. In the DVE situation the pilot may be unaware of a loss of visual references, or be drawn into concentrating too much on external references at the expense of flight instruments. Generally speaking, the level of DVE will result from factors such as low levels of light, the presence of atmospheric haze or sun glare, lack of surface texture or features such as buildings, roads and rivers, or poorly delineated sloping or rising ground contours. These factors may combine to have a critical impact on the pilot’s situational awareness through giving misleading or inadequate information regarding the aircraft’s flight condition. For example, they may result in a poorly defined or missing visual horizon which will affect the pilot’s ability to judge and stabilise aircraft attitude, particularly in the hover and at low speeds, or reduce the pilot’s ability to detect changes in height, rate of change of height, or speed and position. Pilots have no way of knowing that they should not be relying solely on external cues, and if the cues are sufficiently degraded they may ultimately lose control of the aircraft, or fly into the ground or sea.It is worth struggling through the 200 pages; but even if consideration is constrained to the 'Phase 1' part of the paper, and the Summaries and Conclusions, it provides an excellent background to the understanding of accidents which are prevalent in the smaller end of the operational spectrum and which have a high number of fatalities.

Jim

[[email protected]]

Some of the report is very hard work but it mostly tells us what we knew already - it is hard to fly an R22 in anything other than good, day VMC and the onset of disorientation is surprisingly quick as visual cues degrade from good enough to not enough.

Not surprisingly a stabilised helicopter with a decent instrument fit is easier to fly when the pilot workload increases.

Maybe the CAA should insist every pilot flys a simulator sortie where cues are gradually degraded so they can see first hand why it is so important to make weather abort decisions early.

[NickLappos]

I made a living developing control systems for UCE 3 environments on the RAH-66 Comanche, and can attest that the basic message of the CAA report is entirely valid, IMHO. That being said, the practical solutions are much less well stated. The best solution for today's helos is to have IFR instrumentation, controls and infrastructure (helo-specific instrument systems to allow operations that helos need to perform.)

The CAA and FAA are very very behind in any development of these infrastructure elements. I mean such things as GPS derived approaches to heliports and hospitals, approaches to defined points in space such as highway intersections and motorway exits. With such fall backs, the typical helicopter would not skirt safety but would rather enter clouds because the instrument procedures would not cost any time/inconvenience, since the procedures would support the precise reason why a helo was flying them. Today's IFR helos are forced to use warmed-over airplane routes and approaches are a poor substitute, as testified by every helo that skunks below clouds rather than use crummy airplane procedures that do not take the helo where it must go.

The reluctance to employ modern nav for helos, in spite of tons of data and thousands of approaches flown in test circumstances, and in spite of eye-watering technology that is available in high end cars is amazing. I have said before, letting Governments develop infrastructure is the problem, since civil servants have no incentive to make things different or better.

If email was developed by the Royal Mail, you would be sticking stamps on your computer screens......

[hihover]

Nick,

I hear what you say about the solutions available but airport approach plates are designed around obstacle clearance data which is constantly updated and is reliable. How do we provide that level of reliability for approaches to points other than surveyed airports?

I can't help but assess that helicopter aviation is evolving down a route where commercial pressure, faster more complex equipment, poor supervision/judgement, more people with access to helicopters thanks to Frank, and lack of regulation enforcement all play a huge part.

Just about all the accidents in Table 1 were judgement issues where a decision not to continue the flight or to vacate a potentially hazardous environment several minutes before the accident would have saved the day. These are not Comanches which had to deliver ordinance in order to win the battle.

I like the Crab's suggestion of a sim flight. I also like the FAA approach with minor penalties awarded without prosecution. But these suggestions are no use unless the authorities enforce them, which seems to be the case.

I agree, improving the infrastructure would be a great step forward but how do we teach judgement? Supervision perhaps?

tam

[Backward Blade]

I'm from Canada and fly DAY VFR only, in the rain, snow, and since it's in the North, there is always deterioting visibility. I have the requisite 10 hrs with the bucket on my head and that taught me one very important detail...I CAN'T FLY IF I CAN"T SEE. And neither can any of you under the same details.

After we've made every student go through every conceivable decision making course (educational and the graphic, scare the pants off you pictorials) we should mandate that each pilot carry a lighter, some weiners , fishing rod and a sleeping bag. That way they have the option of a picnic which they would much rather do than face the ops manager or customer because they decided not to fly due to weather. For those of you in the UK ( which is so small yet similar weather conditions) you should carry a detailed map with all of the better pubs listed. That way you can ask yourselves "do I want to push this, scare the s##t out of myself (and that's only if I make it!) or do I want to go have a nice good mug of barreled beer and ground myself and solve this problem pronto!" Hey I've actually been to the UK and the beer is GOOD!

I've been there...I now carry weiners, and if it was the UK I would carry the map!! Keeps it simple for those of us who have read all that thick reading above but can't translate it in our thick skulls (we are after all wearing helmets right!) when it comes to crunch time.

A rather sarcastic reply but with a hinge truth, take it for what you will.

Fly safe all

BWB

[Helinut]

Down at the bottom end of the market, there is a lot that can be taught to a new pilot, if he wants to learn of course. It forms no part of any syllabus (that I know of) but pilots learning the whole business of how a pilot should approach deteriorating visibility could avoid lots of accidents and even more near misses and scary moments. Most of us learnt by our own mistakes I suspect. I sometimes get the "opportunity" to fly with low-time inexperienced pilots. It is only when you do that in poor vis conditions that you realise how much such pilots miss, and how easily they can get into trouble.
The current JAR PPL(H) (not sure about others) includes a bit of "instrument flying". There have often been debates about the value of that training, and whether it might instil a false sense of confidence. I am not sure about that, but I do think that some dual flying with an experienced pilot in poorish conditions, with some suitable briefing would be a valuable addition. Discussing the options, the decision making and seeing the visual signs would steepen the learning curve somewhat.

Having read BB's post I wonder whether we could include a bad weather situation in a dual flight as part of an initial course. It could be done as formal requirement or perhaps fitted in informally by the instructor when the opportunity arose?

[Backward Blade]

Well Mr "Nuts" I have to agree with you completely. As stated previously I have the 10 requisite hours of IR helmet training and at a cost of 3400 Can $. ( I know it was a while ago) But over the years here are a few situations that have served me very, very well over the years and they regard PDM and common sense. Please note that I am a VFR day pilot only albeit "bush" trained". Still don't know you IFR guys do it.

1. My instuctor told me to go out and get things ready. I knew the weather was marginal just by looking out the window but I only just recently flew solo so being impressionable and willing to please I said OK.
I fired up and when lifting off I noticed the MP was redline and asked "what the hell". He laughed, we landed and called it a day. He showed me the iced up blades and we had a serious de-brief on weather.

2. Instructor and I were trying to go from A-B but with serious low level fog, yet clear sky's above. I aborted, yet said instructor with OTT clearance took us over yonder with a very large increase in altitude. He did ask me what I would have done in case of emergency at a lower altitude. It struck home. But he did show me options.

3. Later on, about 85 hrs or so, and completed my "ride" the weather was SVFR. I called it but the instructor took me out anyways. It was snowing heavy but we had 3/4 mile and clear of cloud, with no icing. After a while I grew tired and scared and he showed me one simple thing...slow down, find a spot, land. He told me to shut down. We did. He asked me if I wanted to fly anymore in this. I said not really. He told me to remember that if I ended up in that same mind set when he wasn't there. Problem solved.

4. I planned a Navigation ride and when I was filling the machine up the instructor told me to go a little light on fuel as he was getting low in the bowser and he didn't want to suck off the bottom. Regardless of my well researched plans that said I couldn't make the trip I said "OK". 10 miles short of home I found myself getting really low on fuel. I brought it up and the instructor kept at me with a number of questions that insinuated I should keep going, or at least to me it did anyways. We ended up landing in a farmers field where he had a hidden stash of fuel for just this type of lesson. He told me on landing that when the light is on your done...no matter what. He missed a trip to teach me that.

These are lesson's I learned that have always stuck with me. And it occurs to me that regardless of the amount of info and knowledge that I have accrued, it only apply's if I APPLY IT. PDM is where it's at, period, regardless of country and regs. Know your limits first, not the job. That way you stay alive one day longer to prove me full of s@#T!

I find regulating authorities very articulate in showing what went wrong, and how it did go wrong, but very long winded in demonstrating how it CAN go wrong. With regards to VFR licenses, lose the Instrument Training and put the trainees in a crappy weather position and I bet in 5 years you will see a difference.

[[email protected]]

BB - I think you have been very fortunate to get such good instruction both before and after licensing, it is a shame that it is not available to all. Many of the lessons you learned in a relatively controlled environment end up being the causes of accidents (insufficient fuel, weather deterioration etc) and your bottom line is correct, it is all about decision making and knowing your limits.

Sadly, many pilots perceive their skill levels to be much higher than they really are.

The reason I suggest a simulator trip is that I took part in a visual cues/handling qualities exercise a few years ago in the RAE sim at Bedford which involved many of the same exercises as in the study - ie flying basic VFR manoeuvres with varying levels of visual cues and aircraft handling qualities. There is nothing like crashing in the sim because you can't control the aircraft to make you realise how vital visual cues are to flying (especially in a non-stab equipped aircraft).

The sortie couldn't be done in an aircraft as part of the PPL course because you would need to guarantee the right weather conditions and require too much of a safety margin to make it realistic.

[zorab64]

This paper may be a long read, and it doesn't appear to come up with any startling new discoveries for anyone who's been around helicopters for more than a few years. It was interesting to note, however, that the study was started just before the G-CFLT accident 11 years ago!

Nick's comments about modern equipment & approaches would surely make sense, so long as the possible problems identified by hihover were addressed by regular (day VMC) checks for obstacle clearance etc - which is likely to happen anyway, given that many of these type of approaches would be to get someone home in a relatively familiar area.

Personally, as an ex-sim instructor, I'd also concur with Crab - whilst BB was lucky to have such a crafty? instructor to teach the lessons the hard (but safe & planned) way, a simulator comes a very good, and affordable, second place.

Every time I start getting towards marginal weather, I ask myself whether I'd rather see my wife & children in the morning, or whether they'd prefer I risked a more terminal option? Even for the experienced, helicopter flying is demanding enough without taking un-necessary risks - sadly "pressonitis" has proved to be a killer more often than not.:\

[hihover]

Unfortunately, no matter how sensible a suggestion is, either the authority or the school or the company has to make it happen.

There is a very good quality, simple, trailer mounted simulator available over here. I am no longer a trainer, I am a commercial operator and a Commercial Licence Examiner, but I could see the benefits of such a simulator in a school.

I discussed with the Authority, the benefits of "flying" a student's cross country solo flights in the sim immediately prior to the xcountry flight. In good weather with all the graphics and the same trip with deteriorating weather.

The suggestion fell very quickly into the "good idea but too difficult" category. And I guess thats the way it is. The big companies flying the large and more complex equipment have simulator sessions where decision making is a high priority and is assesed. They do this for their own benefit as well as the benefit of their clients and they use multi-million dollar sims.

The little helicopter simulator that I saw cost less than $100k, it has 5 different cockpit types (all the small ones) and a very good graphics package. It is ideally suited to the kind of demo that will assist a pilot in exercising judgement, but it would only be used if a school pushes it as it is not a requirement.

tam

[Backward Blade]

And again I agree 100% with the above 2 writs. And a simulator, especially with todays tech, definately has it's place. What it will not do however is point out that once IFR conditions have boxed you in that, you can indeed park it at the nearest available spot and wait it out. It is always easier to say "better to be cold and wet than dead" but you have to point it out to them that HEY this is OK. Nothing pushes a pilots PDM than actually being in a running machine with a tight training schedule to meet. In my world it's all about the money, either mine or the customers, and it's the same in training. Expose the emotion and deal with it. I was lucky to have my instructor, your right.

But I also realise that there is a bit of a legal issue as well. I don't know much about the other side of the pond, but in Canada most instructors are high time and mostly experienced in the bush and the required adhoc, instantanious PDM that it requires. In the States on the other hand, no disrespect intended but the instructors are usually just graduated students, and are doing it to build time. They have a Night ticket/ and probably an IFR ticket that tells them everything must be planned out/certified. Long winded but my point is this: how do you legally protect said instructors to take a trainee out in marginal weather? Or better yet how do you define it in a training sylabus?

CFIT happens to high and low timers alike (don't have the statistics). But is "Controlled" nonetheless. And I don't know the answer. Having said all that I will now proceed to knock on a hefty piece of wood and await your replies

BB

[JimL]

It would be a pity to miss one premise of the paper that Civil Certification does not provide adequate (or any) guidance for establishing dynamic stability for other than flight in instrument conditions. This despite this text in Part 27:

27.141(c) Have any additional characteristics required for night or instrument operation, if certification for that type of operation is requested. Requirements for helicopter instrument flight are contained in Appendix B.
It is argued in the paper that the present guidance considers only VFR flight in a Usable Cue Environment (UCE); this in spite of the fact that the probability of an encounter with a Degraded Visual Environment (DVE) - because of lack of horizon or surface lighting - is extremely high at night. It is also argued - on the basis of accident reports over the period examined - that encounters with DVE by day can be mitigated/tolerated only by improving the handling qualities. This leads to a recommendation for a change in certification so that the anomaly is resolved.

It is accepted that a change in Certification can only provide improvements for new types (but still needs to be done); hence other recommendations that attempt to reduce the probability of an encounter with a DVE.

It is extremely difficult to provide a descriptor of a UCE - by day or night; depending as it does upon: the weather conditions; the stability of the helicopter; the skill of the pilot; Field of View (FOV) etc. In view of this and in spite of the comment by 'Crab' that we are not shown anything new in the paper, it attempts to pull together recommendations that cover the whole range of solutions: Certification; Operational Regulations; Aeronautical Decision Making; Risk Assessment tools; Information; and Training.

It suggests that black and white is adequately covered but all shades of grey have to be dealt with. What this paper does not do is to suggest that the answer is flight on instruments at really low levels or that the problem can be cured with another sophisticated instrument on the panel (in fact part of the problem with IIMC is the inability of most pilots to come into the cockpit and transition to flight with other than visual cues).

Yes, as suggested by 'Nick', PinS procedures are necessary but as explained by 'Hihover' this cannot be done without establishing the obstacle environment both fixed and mobile. At the moment PinS requires 'survey' and 'safeguarding' - which can be done for specific locations and heliports; obstacle clearance for "defined points in space such as highway intersections and motorway exits" might require an add-on to the MDA that would render them impractical.

The reality is that the majority of LOC accidents occur to small and unsophisticated helicopters which are flown VFR in conditions that are, or deteriorate to, DVE. To meet the declared target of a reduction of accidents by 80% in 10 years requires an improvement - for that population - in the understanding of why these accident happen. Hopefully this paper, and discussion that are stimulated by it, might play their part in that education.

Jim

[DennisK]

I always find co-incidences in life interesting ... just this week I have been asked by an aviation newspaper to produce a piece on flight on instruments in light helicopters.

I have a strongly biased view on the subject, since I have lost too many colleagues through loss of control in IMC. Some professionals too. As a long time instructor, I am at the sharp end of dealing with 'ab initio' and newly qualified PPL(H) pilots, and even as an ex RAF' Green' IR fixed wing flier, I still take a different view at my lower level of civil light helicopter aviation. ie mostly beginners.

When the subject is raised on teaching new pilots the CAA's 'five hours' of instrument flying to enable them to 'do a 180 level turn ' to exit the IMC condition, I dis-agree quite strongly, and on a 'frippish' note, when asked how to get safely clear when inadvertantly entering cloud, I invariably use the expression. "Like the Irishman & the bog in trouble ... I wouldn't have started from that position."

On a sidenote, how can an approved syllabus teach any aspect of a flying skill that is illegal. (single engine helis IFR in the UK)

Over the years I have met many 'celebrities' and big business guys/gals who have made their bucks by being very good in their own environment. But that skill seldom rubs off when they learn to fly.

I don't believe we should teach new single engine pilots to fly instruments.

I'm sure the authorities have records that reveal whether the IMC accident rate has changed since the introduction of the 5 hour instrument requirement, and it would be good to see them published on our forum.

Working for an FTO or as a RF, I am required to include the instrument training, but alongside that I spend a massive amount of time with my pilot customers reeling off the list of personally known celebs/names and the gory details of the accident to those who died. Big names and all. We all know the names and I won't list them here, but they start in the 1970s with a world car racing champion in an Aztec. (with an FAA IR) and continue to 2007

My object is to impress on them the 'Irishman/bog' syndrome and just stay clear of the bog to ensure they won't even think about flight in anything that looks faintly marginal. I just repeat ... how can it be legal to teach an area of flying activity that is illegal.

I know there will be differing views, and I'm happy to see an alternative point of view if it will succeed in the unessessary loss of life we have seen over many years.

Ask any of the 200 or so pilots I have taught over thirty years, and I'm fairly sure you won't find any of them who would begin to consider instrument flight.

Can we hear from my colleague instructors/examiners with their views. But caution, I will be quoting you in the commissioned piece.

Safe flying to yiou all out there.

Dennis Kenyon.

[malabo]

DK, same on this side of the pond. Pilots should be taught how to avoid getting into that situation and what the signs are. We have the same 5 hours IFR training with the same 180 degree IMC turn objective, but I would challenge any so-called current IFR pilot to accomplish that in an R22 following a creek-bed in in a valley bottom at 50' and 20 knots that suddenly went IMC.

Doesn't stop the regulators from going bananas though. Look at the equipment they want to install into basic VFR trainers. I had a look at an EVS option < http://www.aviataircraft.com/news/whatsnew.htm> for light aircraft and cringe at the thought of well-meaning regulator deciding it should become mandatory.

On a differences note between the two sides of the Atlantic, on this side a flight into deteriorating weather can stop at any time with little or no consequence - park by a diner, at a road stop, any field, have a coffee and wait. My sense is that in the UK and Europe, any landing not at an airport or destination becomes a major issue with sanctions against the pilot. Could this be why many there might be pressing on when they shouldn't?

malabo

[Bravo73]

My sense is that in the UK and Europe, any landing not at an airport or destination becomes a major issue with sanctions against the pilot.

That's not really the case in the UK , malabo. Or it certainly hasn't been the case when I've had to put down due to deteriorating conditions.

As long as you don't scare anyone's cattle or squash any crops, I usually find that there's a nice cup of tea (or something a bit stronger) waiting for you. :ok:

[malabo]

Bravo73

So much for the sanctions theory, my next theory would be a weakness in the JAA training curriculum compared to the typical 100 hour Canadian curriculum. May also be one of the drawbacks of training in Florida and then being unprepared to deal with that dreadful English weather.

On the pleasure side of what's waiting for you when you make that precautionary landing, in one area I flew there was a spot rumored by pilots to be beside a home for wayward girls. I guess the farmer's daughter myth is still alive.

malabo

[Bravo73]

May also be one of the drawbacks of training in Florida and then being unprepared to deal with that dreadful English weather.


I wouldn't dispute that. Although it would be interesting to see what effect Florida training is actually having on the UK market (in terms of safety and decision making.) Although there is much talk of training in the US, the majority of UK pilots that I know have trained in the UK.

I would personally put the reluctance to land in poor conditions down to 2 further factors: bloody-minded 'pressonitis' and the increasing use of GPS navigation (which can obviously get you through far worse conditions than traditional map & compass navigation can.) Combine these two together and one can quite quickly back oneself into a corner that might be very hard to get out of.



On the pleasure side of what's waiting for you when you make that precautionary landing, in one area I flew there was a spot rumored by pilots to be beside a home for wayward girls. I guess the farmer's daughter myth is still alive.

Is it just a myth? Ah, rats. :(

[hihover]

Bravo 73 you make a very valid point. Navigation has never ever been easier and has never been so available. Very few pilots launch today without GPS on board. It is a great aid and certainly eases the workload when the weather gets bad.

I would be interested to know how many of these aircraft were equipped with GPS.

I just read Table 1 again and the question that jumps out at me for most of these accidents is "Why were they there in the first place?" Here we go back to Dennis's comment about the Irishman and the bog.

Regardless of the availability of modern equipment for stability and navigation/approaches, there has to be a point in any DVE where the pilot/crew address the question above. At the same time, the decision to continue/postpone/abort has to be addressed.

What I read from most, though not all, of the accidents listed, is that the decision to turn around or vacate the environment was not addressed soon enough. It was left right up until there was no option, I think this is where the solution lies. Sure, lets get the best infrastructure that is practical and affordable, lets put the right equipment on board, but we as pilots have to address this most basic decision to continue in deteriorating weather.

I have to go and fly - at least its sunny here.

tam

[hihover]

Malabo,

"May also be one of the drawbacks of training in Florida and then being unprepared to deal with that dreadful English weather."

I am not aware of any evidence that supports this and without evidence, I would be very reluctant to take that one any further.

You are, however, quite right about the British weather. It is the interaction between the pilots and the weather that is the common denominator in most of these accidents and that has to be where we focus the required improvement.

The term - Clear of cloud with the surface in sight - IMHO is a very poor term when it comes to flight safety. It seems to conjure the impression that provided you maintain it, you will come to no harm. Of course, that should be the way but it isn't.

Whilst I would not want to see unneccessary restrictions applied as a reaction to the paper, perhaps there is room for the introduction of DVE phase awareness. Probably something most do sub-consciously.

This could be introduced at company level or school level without any major effort. Many organisations already have something similar, the military certainly do.

I'm suggesting a countdown something like -

CAVOK - No DVE response required
Visibility/cloud lower than 10km or 1500 ft agl - VFR Flt Plan required
Visibility/cloud lower than 3km or 700 ft agl - positively address options of diversion, reduce speed, call ATC to inform of poor weather encounter and your plan.
Visibility/cloud lower than 1km or 500 ft agl - inform ATC of intentions, if unable, divert or land.

OK OK, before you all lash me to death, I'm not suggesting the above as regulation, I'm just trying to identify specific points as DVE is entered and the need for a positive response at each point. Maybe that way, we'll increase the conspicuity of DVE and realistically, if everyone did that, the term IIMC would all but go away.

We have to do something to ensure pilots stop flying to the limit of "Clear of cloud with the surface in sight." I would like to see a conscious countdown to that limit. Most pilots have an alert/awareness system, for those that don't, maybe it needs legislation.

[bladewashout]

It's very hard to make a judgement. The most common time when I start to see a problem is the 'wall' of mist that appears maybe 3km in the distance going from the current cloud base all the way to the ground, and you can't see past it.

I slow down, and the wall rolls back as I progress towards it, drizzle hitting the canopy. I'm normally at over 1500ft above the ground, but I would progress in this situation as low as about 600ft. If the wall stopped rolling back, I wouldn't go into it.

Anyone got any rules of thumb about when to say stop? I think it's likely that the people who have accidents saw scenarios not unlike this prior to their incident - the degradation always seems slow, anyone got a magic trick which can help make the decision?

BW

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Yes - err on the side of caution and abort early. It's not magic, it's common sense but there are those who think they are beyond the rules and believe they are good enough pilots to push on right up to the point where they realise they aren't.

Some just won't listen and until you find a way of making them learn without killing themselves (and others) or stopping them getting into a cockpit in the first place, then we will continue to have CFIT/UCFIT/IIMC fatalities.

As hihover says, many use COCISOS (clear of cloud and in sight of the surface) as a shield of righteousness and protection and blunder on with very marginal visual cues. Special VFR is another misnomer as it implies good weather but in reality is often a COCISOS clearance in all but name.

[DennisK]

Another 'pennorth please ... can I endorse Hi-Hover's 'stage by stage' bad wx assessment system. A series of cloud & viz numbers is something positive we could teach. Also endorse the GPS trap as I've sat alongside pilots who have actually said, we are OK ... I've got our position exactly.

Pity the Skyforce 111 doesn't have precise height info.

I've found the instrument handling ability doesn't necessarily rely on flying experience either, since one of my party pieces is to have my testee fly straight & level on instruments for a minute or two, then ask him to reduce speed. As translational lift lost, I squeeze in progressive pedal, usually right and too many lose control in seconds. A/H shows level, speed is minimum, DG is whizzing and skip ball dives out of the cabin. Okay at 1500 feet, but a potential disaster at 500!

Until something better is agreed, my view is we continue to train 'the dangers of low level' IMC flying. 'Irishman Bog principle !

PS ... No reflection on my many super customers & pilots in the Irish Repulic of course. Fly safely over there lads.

DRK