Incidents, accidents & statistics

[Spanish Waltzer]

Although not a regular contributor I have been a viewer of these pages for a number of years....and no I'm not a journo or historian.
I am interested in your collective & professional opinions as to whether the general consensus is that aviation accident and incident rates in the UK military per flying hour are on the up or whether a combination of increased tempo and increased reporting due to forums such as these just gives that opinion? I intentionally wish to keep away from combat losses as that obviously is a different ballgame.
I'm sure somewhere someone in officialdom is responsible for collating such statistics. The problem I have is that often official statistics can be massaged to either hide a difficult truth or to reinforce an argument in favour of that arguments author.
Those of you on the shop floor whether you be aircrew, engineers, management or those responsible for dealing with the after effects of such accidents and incidents - is the apparant increase that I perceive a result of worn out equipment, worn out people or worn out management and what is your view of the easy fix bearing in mind the operational tempo you find yourselves in? Or have I got it all wrong?!?!:confused:

[Pontius Navigator]

Although not a regular contributor I have been a viewer of these pages for a number of years....and no I'm not a journo or historian.

I am interested in your collective & professional opinions as to whether the general consensus is that aviation accident and incident rates in the UK military per flying hour are on the up or whether a combination of increased tempo and increased reporting due to forums such as these just gives that opinion?

A collective opinion is the opinion of many. On this forum you may get the subjective opinion of several. To expect a consensus is to expect too much.

I'm sure somewhere someone in officialdom is responsible for collating such statistics. The problem I have is that often official statistics can be massaged to either hide a difficult truth or to reinforce an argument in favour of that arguments author.

Indeed there is. Indeed the supposition is also true. However it is even truer of the subjective opinions of professionals that you seek.

Whilst we have all grown used to data manipulation I would opine that the official accident and incident statistics are not subject to such massage as you suggest. There may be controversy as the Chinook, C130 and
Nimrod thread will show but the bald figures of rates per flying hour are incontrovertible.

Those of you on the shop floor whether you be aircrew, engineers, management or those responsible for dealing with the after effects of such accidents and incidents - is the apparant increase that I perceive
a result of worn out equipment,
worn out people or
worn out management and
what is your view of the easy fix bearing in mind the operational tempo you find yourselves in?

You pose 4 questions based on your individual perception when you could have asked:

Is your equipment worn out,
Are your people worn out
Is your management worn out
Is there an increase in accidents/incidents per flying hour

If there is an increased rate is it due to a, b and c

and what is your view of the easy fix

Or have I got it all wrong?!?!:confused:

OK, you are not a journalist or an historian but your questions appear to be the basis for an academic thesis and based on a presumed conclusion.

Why don't you start with hard facts? If the official figures show a change then you could question the official figures rather than base your argument on a subjective premise.

[Spanish Waltzer]

PN thank you for your considered reply. I stand humbled by your input as you give such reasoned argument of my initial post. :hmm:
You are quite correct that I should perhaps have done greater research of the official statistics before consigning them to the trash can. Perhaps I should return to the backbenches again as a reader rather than contributor. ;)
I was simply hoping to stimulate some debate from those in the unenviable position of being most directly involved in these events as to whether there is a perception of a causal trend - or is that too simplistic?
The rain in my country falls often on those who complain....

[Safety_Helmut]

Cutting through some of PN's guff, look on the Defence Analytical Services Agency website:

http://www.dasa.mod.uk/

it may give you a start.

The people you really need to speak to though are here:


http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/AirSafetyandAviation/DASC/ (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/AirSafetyandAviation/DASC/)

As an aside, many of our aircraft do not meet the stated safety targets, and some of them miss the targets by a large margin. This situation will not get better as the targets are becoming much more stringent. To see this you will need access to the JSP550 series of documents.

S_H

[tucumseh]

In days gone by, when we used to maintain operational fleet levels, the stats you talk of (historical attrition rates expressed as losses every x 000 flying hours) were used as the basis for materiel and financial provisioning (the process which underpinned all effective programmes, and which no longer takes place). A Lynx, say, would be lost every 40k hours. This would equate to a need to buy, say, one every two years. In the interests of economy, this would be rolled up into an economical buy, let as one contract. This also had the benefit of letting (in this case) Westland know pretty accurately what their forward order book was. (This was in the days when MoD and Industry worked as true partners). If the attrition rate dropped, the figure was adjusted and the projected order reduced. This data is classified Confidential (that is, it routinely makes the front pages, whereas Secret is usually inside). The notorious exception to this rule was the Daily Torygraph, which used to publish Secret stuff on the front page when the Tories where in office; losses in Oman being the most obvious example. Until that day, we always wondered at the discrepancy between the stats and what we knew as fact.

Of course, replacement of attrition losses is no longer routine. Quite the opposite – I suspect there are many beancounters who view losses as “natural wastage” and pounce on the affected IPT’s budget with indecent haste.

As usual, S-H is correct about safety (or lack of it).

[PlasticCabDriver]

As an aside, many of our aircraft do not meet the stated safety targets, and some of them miss the targets by a large margin. This situation will not get better as the targets are becoming much more stringent. To see this you will need access to the JSP550 series of documents.


Not helped by the fact that many of our aircraft were designed/built/procured before 'safety targets' were even thought of. The aircraft were built to do a job, it was expected that we would lose some; it was, as tecumseh put it, "attrition" and, as long as it didn't make it out of the inside pages of the Telegraph, it was acceptable.

Safety targets usually work well, when applied to aircraft that are designed around them. When they are applied with the same rigour to older aircraft, then suddenly everything appears to be very dangerous.

[tucumseh]

PCD

You are correct, and that is why modification / upgrade contracts on older aircraft are always caveated “The aircraft was built to standards of the day………..”. That is, if the MoD don’t contract to meet the new standards, then the contractor is not liable.

Of course, the MoD routinely takes this a step too far, normally to save money but often because the right / safe way is not conducive to one’s career progression. They will knowingly modify aircraft to standards that are inappropriate, or employ practices that are downright unsafe; then expect the Service to release it to service.

For the purposes of the DIN, this has been confirmed and condoned recently by Ainsworth, to my MP. Got the original letter.

[Safeware]

PCD,When they are applied with the same rigour to older aircraft, then suddenly everything appears to be very dangerous.
Or maybe it makes you realise how risky (don't want to say dangerous) things have been? It is what you do next that matters.

What "measurement" against safety targets shows are industry's difficulties in providing a reasoned argument that the safety target has been met. That wasn't possible before. Now, when the unfortunate happens, it should be easier to establish facts - not what happened (accident investigation taking care of that), but why it happened (as in an audit trail) and at what risk.

sw

[Spanish Waltzer]

tuc,
the MoD routinely takes this a step too far, normally to save money but often because the right / safe way is not conducive to one’s career progression. They will knowingly modify aircraft to standards that are inappropriate, or employ practices that are downright unsafe; then expect the Service to release it to service.
in other words hide behind & within the big institution that is the MOD, safe in the knowledge that their personal actions will not be brought into question even though they know what they are doing could endanger others??
I have no problem accepting, and I would assume the majority of mil aircrew are the same, that operating aircraft to the edge of their envelope in challenging conditions is an inherently risky business but it's what gives the buzz & job satisfaction.
I find it extremely worrying however that there is a perception, rightly or wrongly, that the faceless MOD knowingly allow such operations to be carried out on aircraft that they have released to service inapropriately modified or downright unsafe. Thereby increasing the risk - possibly to a level unbeknown to those that operate/fly in them.

[PlasticCabDriver]

Safeware,

true enough, but previously that level of risk (even if we didn't do 'risk' then) was acceptable. It was accepted that aircraft would crash every so often. What we are now doing is retrospectively applying current levels of risk assessment and standards to systems that will never meet them, and then get all stressed because we (actually those individuals whose careers depend on never owning any risk, anywhere, ever) are not meeting our 'safety targets'.

If one went back to Ford and said, these old Cortinas that are still about, we insist you bring them up to Euro NCAP standards they would laugh us out of the office.

[Safety_Helmut]

Oh dear PCD, the points you made in #6 were good, but then #10 just shows the typical level of knowledge held by MoD staff who deal with safety and airworthiness. I thought that in #6 you had picked up on the big problem with the MoD’s safety targets.

The MoD publishes targets that it cannot realistically hope to achieve for some aircraft. Consider the C17 and Hawk as a hypothetical example, according to JSP553, they have the same safety target for technical failure. How can the Hawk possibly achieve this ? Single engine, very little redundancy and diversity of critical systems, unlike the C17.

What we are now doing is retrospectively applying current levels of risk assessment and standards to systems that will never meet them

Difficult to see what you mean by this, if you are implying that using modern risk assessment techniques on old systems is inappropriate, then you are wrong, it is a moral and legal obligation.

As for applying current standards to old systems, then that would obviously depend what the standard is.

It was accepted that aircraft would crash every so often.

This is an awkward one, but in fact you will find that this is implicit even in the targets for civil commercial aircraft as there is simply no such thing as absolute safety. But one would expect the effort to be made to reduce the loss rate to a level which as low as sensibly practicable. Look up ALARP, it really is common sense. Unfortunately, this is the aspect which many people do not understand. You can assess legacy systems and analyse whether or not it is worth spending on making improvements to safety, it is an engineering discipline, not an exercise in bean counting.

As for last comment:

If one went back to Ford and said, these old Cortinas that are still about, we insist you bring them up to Euro NCAP standards they would laugh us out of the office.

Tripe ! The MoD has a clear duty of care to it’s employees and others. It cannot be wished away because the equipment we operate is old.

I’m guessing you’re a pilot, probably best to stick to it. Leave engineering to engineers !

S_H

[Pontius Navigator]

If one went back to Ford and said, these old Cortinas that are still about, we insist you bring them up to Euro NCAP standards they would laugh us out of the office.

Actually not wrong but wrong target.

The MOD owns the aircraft and if it went to Ford (BAE) and said bring them up to to standard they would, just the MOD could not afford the bill.

These are STATE aircraft maintained and operated by the STATE. While the STATE does not own the old Cortinas it does have powers to get them improved. True there was no requirement to fit safety equipment but other standards have been imposed and the Cortina scrapped if it failed to meet those standards - lead-free fuel for instance.

The STATE has also taken proactive measures. For instance the French government had a trade-in scheme on any old cars.

[PlasticCabDriver]

but then #10 just shows the typical level of knowledge held by MoD staff who deal with safety and airworthiness

Good job I don't then!

Difficult to see what you mean by this, if you are implying that using modern risk assessment techniques on old systems is inappropriate, then you are wrong, it is a moral and legal obligation.


Don't disagree for a moment, but when a new method of risk assessment is applied, and all the 'traffic lights' suddenly go from green to amber or red overnight, has the risk actually increased, or does it just look that way?

Tripe ! The MoD has a clear duty of care to it’s employees and others. It cannot be wished away because the equipment we operate is old.


Valid point! Poor choice of example.

Is it not more a case of wishing it away because we cannot afford it?

[r supwoods]

The MARDS and Def Stan 00-970 recommend levels of safety. Whilst these levels are todays standard, our aircraft were not designed against those levels. It is up to the Stakeholders to agree and declare their own levels of safety. Obviously this target must be achievable. The RAF is not risk adversed and will accept levels of safety, providing these are ALARP.

It is a nonsense to claim that older aircraft are more dangerous than newer aircraft, in fact the opposite is probably true. With a new aircraft, we don't know what will fail or when it will fail. After 20 years, most failure modes are known because they have happened and the problem fixed. What we look for on older aircraft is failures arising from aging effects (incl fatigue and wear).

It is a fact of life that the human is the weak link in the system. Nearly two thirds of accidents are due to non-technical causes, ie HF, natural and operational failures.

[Safeware]

rsupwoods, don't know what you're reading, but the is no 'recommendation' in JSP 553:1.39 For peacetime flying, the design standard of a UK military aircraft type, its associated equipment and software may be considered airworthy where the conditions in Paras 1.39.1 and 1.39.2, or 1.39.1 and 1.39.3, are met as appropriate
PCD, Don't disagree for a moment, but when a new method of risk assessment is applied, and all the 'traffic lights' suddenly go from green to amber or red overnight, has the risk actually increased, or does it just look that way?
Or has the tolerability (whether societal, regulatory or legislatory) changed? Look back at the loss rates for some older (say 1950 /60s) military aircraft and consider whether they would be considered acceptable today. Times move on, safety is a dynamic not static issue.
But yes, possibly some wish it away because we can't afford it. However, as someone once said "If you think safety is expensive, try having an accident." Well, the MOD have succeeded and will now be realising that retrospective safety is much more expensive than built in safety.

sw

[Chugalug2]

It is a fact of life that the human is the weak link in the system. Nearly two thirds of accidents are due to non-technical causes, ie HF, natural and operational failures.

Well true enough rs, I remember as a CCF cadet being on a hill walking course in N.Wales, we knew when we had arrived at the required co-ordinates, there was always aircraft wreckage there. The hills were scattered with them, some ten years after WW2. All as a result of CFIT, no doubt. I remember reading that what we now know as HF accounted for more Allied losses than enemy action did.
However the theme of this thread seems to be more hardware orientated, and that imputes more HF though in this case seated at desks rather than in cockpits. The ambivalent attitude to airworthiness prevalent in the MOD these days may be seen in the various posts on this thread. The threat is not from old aircraft but new thinking, and is a very real safety threat. There has even been a suggestion that those concerned with Flight Safety these days suffer from LMF! On other threads I have bored on about moving responsibility for military airworthiness away from the MOD and see no reason not to do so here. The MOD is judge, jury, and often chief suspect. The most glaring example of this IMHO is the Mull accident, but that is the business of another thread. As a matter of urgency there should be established a Military Aviation Authority, independent of and exterior to the MOD. It would enforce military (not civil) airworthiness standards on all military aircraft, which the MOD appears incapable of doing. Its purpose would be to prevent accidents, thus preserving aircraft and crews, thus maintaining operational capability rather than needlessly dissipating it. That is the historic purpose of Flight Safety in the RAF. It seems to have been forgotten!