Video released for Aust Army BlackHawk crash [Archive]

Gotagivitago

18th Jun 2007, 13:27

Black Hawk crash footage released

Monday Jun 18 18:00 AEST
By ninemsn staff with wires

Shocking footage of an army Black Hawk helicopter crashing into the deck of the HMAS Kanimbla has been made public after it was shown at an inquiry earlier today.

Two soldiers were killed when Black Hawk A25-221 crashed and plunged into the sea off Fiji on November 29 last year.
RELATED LINKS
VIDEO: Shocking impact

The CCTV footage shows the helicopter slamming into the ship's deck before uncontrollably spinning into the ocean.

The inquiry heard that wind conditions on the day meant the helicopter should never have attempted the landing it had been briefed to conduct.
The inquiry is being conducted by retired NSW Supreme Court Justice David Levine QC at Sydney's Randwick Barracks.

Four crew members and six passengers were on the helicopter.
Nine of the 10 were rescued before the Black Hawk sank but the pilot,

Captain Mark Bingley, later died of his injuries.

In March, the helicopter wreckage and body of Special Air Service Trooper Joshua Porter were recovered from the sea floor at a depth of almost 3km.
Counsel assisting the defence board of inquiry, Commander Jack Rush QC, said the Black Hawk was undertaking a "high-risk" training exercise in tail winds of 10-15 knots when it crashed into the deck, severing the tail rotor from the main body.

Cdr Rush said the brief of how to conduct the exercise should have been altered to take into account the tail wind, which would have made it difficult for the pilot to control the helicopter's descent.

"The evidence before the board foreshowed there was a critical lack of risk management processes," Cdr Rush told the inquiry.

"As briefed, the flight should not have been authorised.

"Specifically, changes should have been made to the brief to allow for the wind."

He said changes should have included an adjustment to the speed at which the aircraft approached the ship.

The inquiry was also shown graphic video footage filmed by a trooper sitting in the back of the helicopter. Both videos showed the helicopter colliding with HMAS Kanimbla.

The family of Trooper Porter, including his widow Carinna and one-month-old daughter Madison, along with the family of Captain Bingley, also watched video footage of the salvage operation of the Black Hawk from the ocean floor.

The inquiry was told by Major-General Anthony Fraser, head of the army's helicopter systems, that a decision had been made not to fit flotation devices to Black Hawks as it would have increased their weight and could slow escape from a sinking helicopter.

However, he said they would also have lowered the speed at which the helicopter sunk.

The inquiry continues.
©AAP 2007

Very sad indeed. Not having flown a Blackhawk and without any familiarity of
same, would a 10-15knot tailwind really have such a dramatic effect on such an aircraft?

Please let me make it clear that this is a genuine enquiry and nothing more.

Cheers

Gotagivitago

P.S Can I also just say how tremendously impressed I was with the way Captain Bingley's wife has conducted herself throughout this whole affair. He must be extremely proud of her and rightly so.
In saying that, I mean no disrespect to anyone else as she was the only widow I saw on the news

Flying Bull

18th Jun 2007, 15:09

Hi Gotagivitago,

even so I used the IE, the video didn´t start.

Back to your question.

It´s a long time since I did my last deck landing and I have never flown a black hawk - still, I have done some decklandings - at more adverse conditions - like high sea state - night - pouring rain and darkend landing area.

When approaching a ships deck you should always have some amount of forward wind. Any helicopter gets more or less unstable, when you have a tailwind component. Add to this a moving and wobbeling landing area due to the seastate and you´ll increase the risks of a deck landings by a factor, which isn´t necessary.
With any amount of wind on the nose you need less power and get a more stable helicopter (as long as you avoid flying through the turbulences of the superstructure).

The picture from the video does only show the area, where the ship was before, but where would have been the problem to go onto flying course, delivering some forward airflow?
The problem is mostly in the minds of the shipcrew because they cant understand the effects of tailwind on a helicopter - or the effects of a sharp turn with the helicopter turning on the deck....
So its up to the pilot to refuse to land - and it´s a good habit to take the responsible ships officers to a joyride - and then show them the problems, which can occur on a flight deck.
There have been instances, where only the chains keept the helicopter on the deck, because the bride did a sharp turn - vanisching the hole helicopter under water - when it reappeared, the engines where running down, the main rotor as well - while the tail rotor was already stopped.....

Flight operations to and from ship decks have many additional risks you don´t have influence on - so never add risks, you can influence.

Greetings Flying Bull

skadi

18th Jun 2007, 15:56

As I remember my training long time ago ( I flew Navy Seakings ), ship approaches should be done with headwind and not direct inbound the deck. We were instructed to do the approach into a hover left aside the deck, so in case of a malfunction a go around ( or even a OEI landing in the water ) is much easier than with a direkt approach.

skadi

gulliBell

18th Jun 2007, 16:12

More extensive footage of the accident was shown on the ABC news tonight, including a short clip taken from on-board the helicopter.

It shows the helicopter approaching the deck rapidly at a very steep angle, fast closing rate, and very high rate of descent, with coning on the main rotor disk evident suggesting very high power demand/output of the engines. The nose of the helicopter hits the helideck first, the airframe distorts causing the co-pilots door to swing open, the main wheel oleos compress fully and as the nose section bounces up off the deck the tail section pivots down causing the tail rotor to hit the safety netting resulting in immediate separation of the tail rotor pylon from the tail boom. Virtually instantaneously the cabin rotates 180 degrees to the right, the rapid rotational speed obviously due to the torque reaction applied by the engines at very high power. The helicopter appears to remain upright but spinning rapidly and pitching up as it disappears out of view prior to entering the water.

From what was shown in the video it certainly was not a normal approach by any conventional standards, although the media report described the helicopter as performing some type of tactical manouvre. For what reason they did not elaborate. In any event, having seen the footage it is a wonder that anybody survived the initial impact, let alone extraction from the aircraft whilst under water. Testament perhaps to good training and an ounce of luck.

The report went on to say that the flight data recorder was recovered and there were no indications of any systems malfunctions prior to the accident.

VeeAny

19th Jun 2007, 08:36

For those having trouble with the video link, i've put a copy of something similar here http://www.griffin-helicopters.co.uk/videos/playonevideo.asp?videokey=1614

V.

MightyGem

19th Jun 2007, 09:53

What were they thinking
Oh s***!!!

crewguard

19th Jun 2007, 11:09

As a previous crew memeber with over t 2000 hours on S70A operating in many diverse roles across oz and overseas, it was both horrific and gut wrenching to to see that footage today.

From my own experience those manurves involving special ops are practised and rehersed repeatedly by day and then by night to ensure all the skills and safety margins are acheived.

Obviously there was not enough scrutiny of the safety margins on that given day. S70A will tolerate a tail wind component but at what acft weight and performance margin is the question??

This squadron is the pinniacle of a rotary wing operational flying career in the military and I am very pleased to have been a part of that unit. They do a fantastic job....

thekite

19th Jun 2007, 13:44

Vortex Ring is the apparent culprit here. Some may call this settling with power; it is the same phenomenon.
If a helicopter is flown on a downwind approach with a high sink rate and low forward speed it will assuredly enter a vortex ring state.
The result is always thus; the descent will continue until the pilot reduces collective and increases airspeed, or where neither airspace or altitude allow, the helicopter must crash.
The reports that I have seen on TV appear to say that the pilot was ordered to make that approach. I doubt that, for he must know that to do would constitute a kamakazi operation. No Australian pilot is going to be so mute - or obedient!
Sorry to say this: pilot error, it seems. There but for.....etc
The Kite

Thomas coupling

19th Jun 2007, 17:50

What a load of b**ocks "thekite". Since when was VRS the same thing as settling with power??????
One is an aerodynamic effect, the other is a performance limitation.:ugh:

Second: how on earth can you speculate on and conclude the cause when you see the helo for about 1.5 seconds prior to impact:ugh:

God help us all:*

Mast Bumper

19th Jun 2007, 23:51

One odd thing I noticed, that would question the whole tail wind scenario:
The stabilator is still in a fairly level setting, which would suggest high airspeed (at least 50 kts, if I remember correctly). So unless they had a stabilator failure or elected to disable the auto mode, they had to be going very fast for ship ops. Then again, there is barely enough time to ascertain the actual stabilator position prior to destruction.

I don't mean to create tread drift, but I think someone is confusing "settling with power" with "power settling." Power settling is the one having to do with performance limitations, while settling with power is just another way of describing Vortex Ring State.

gadgetguru

20th Jun 2007, 02:54

What were they thinking, SERIOUSLY!

Binga's was probably more worried about the blokes in the back, than anything else. He had probably served in a battalion with more than a few of them.

they were there on a mission, SAS on board, performing mission rehearsals.
they weren't stuffing about, those boys play hard

deeper

20th Jun 2007, 03:06

Chill Thomas, VRS and Settling with power are one and the same.

The performance limitation you refer to is "over pitching".

papa68

20th Jun 2007, 04:25

Gents / ladies,

I don't often get involved with PPRuNe threads as I tend to find the speculation and gross over simplification of matters such as this a little off putting sometimes but in this instance some of the comments really need some reigning in:ugh:.

Firstly, I worked in this Sqn (prior to it being "re-badged" as 171 Sqn) in the mid to late 90's in the role that was being performed on the day. I say this only to lend a little credibility to my comments below.

Suffice it to say, the personnel involved were / are all very well trained but the roles they perform can be extremely demanding and varied. Like anything in life, they were (and never will be) infallible. That should never detract from the fact, one can assuredly assume they have had a considerable amount of training and would have been assesed as being suitably experienced (this is often considerably less than what civvies would consider suitably experienced).

In addition to the above, the exercises performed are generally extremely well briefed, rehearsed by day and then flown at night if applicable, and debriefed. They take what I would consider all "reasonable" steps to assure a desirable outcome. It doesn't mean errors or omissions can't occur.:= Hindsight is a wonderful thing but should not be abused.

Comments such as "what were they thinking?" and the like again illustrate how enthusiatic some of us are to criticise without actually having a modicum of insight into what actually happened on that particular flight. That's why an investigation and then subsequent BOI is carried out.:rolleyes:

The footage shows (for the most part) outcomes rather than causes. I find it incredible that fellow rotorheads out there actually think that the resultant flight regime as shown in the footage might be something they were striving for - clearly that would be ludicrous. So let's give them the benefit of the doubt and assume they were after a different result.

It does appear from initial reports that the weather conditions of day (particularly the wind strength and direction) may have played a significant role and if so, the assertion that vortex ring may have been involved seems plausible if not highly likely.

Looking at the footage (as ugly as it is), it appears the aircraft is not actually under control given its attitude, RoD, aiming point etc which would support the VR claim. Some of the comments provided seem to suggest that some of our brethren believe the handling pilot was actually "flying" the aircraft at this point. Hmmm...:=

What is or will be more interesting to find out is whether the crew was aware of the conditions (one would hope so). If not, then a causal factor would have been identified. If they did know, and discarded this information, then things start to get really interesting. Let's have the investigation / BOI run its course to determine the real causes behind this. Experience suggests it's rarely just one factor a la James Reason's Swiss cheese model.

As far as whether the footage should be made public or not, not everyone will be happy regardless of what stance you take. I myself would have preferred it to be released but after the BOI was complete. It would then serve the role of actually educating us all much more effectively than it does at the moment. In its present guise it's just "cannon fodder" for uninformed criticism.

I acknowledge it must be distressing for those involved and their families and my condolences go out to them. However, my belief is if the issue of VR is again highlighted (assuming that it is in fact what has occurred), and it re-educates just one of us out there to think twice about the prevailing wind on finals (or indeed our finals profile), that must be a good thing.

P68

that chinese fella

20th Jun 2007, 04:37

papa 68, on what occassions would a downwind approach to a deck landing be called for in your experience?

212man

20th Jun 2007, 04:57

I'm also genuinely curious as to when a tactical approach to a ship with a helideck would be made. Other than trying to deploy troops to a ship, to attack it (seems an unlikely scenario), the only other reason I can think of would be if the ship were under attack itself, and a dynamic arrival was required to minimise exposure (a bit like the run in and break FW technique). The ship would be manoeuvering fairly aggresively itself, though, in such circumstances: might that explain the downwind approach? (yes, I realise this was training, but for waht sort of scenario?)

I'm aware of the sort of tactics that might be deployed to storm an oil platform that has been taken over by terrorists, but that's a different scenario.

Delta Torque

20th Jun 2007, 06:40

I really don't think all this speculation is healthy.

I'm sure the BOI will come up with the right answer, via the surviving crew's testimony.

Suffice to say that the Blackhawk is a heavy machine which develops a lot of momentum and will bite, under certain conditions...

Let the BOI do it's job.....

jetflite

20th Jun 2007, 07:36

Papa68, well said...:D

How about everyone drops all the bull**** of being professional aircrash investigators.

Some of you are talking an absolute load of crap and should be ashamed of your self's.

What ever the cause two fine Australians have paid the ultimate price, the loss of there lives. ENOUGH SAID... Let the BOI run it's course but do try and show some respect...:confused:

P.S - Thomas Coupling... Settling with power is the same as VRS. Get your facts straight before shooting your mouth off old chap. :ok: it could get you a knuckle sanwhich at the pub!!!!

serf

20th Jun 2007, 07:51

I have only seen the incident once very briefly on the BBC news, and like papa68 I have formed the opinion that the aircraft was not under control!

baffler15

20th Jun 2007, 08:16

I have only seen the incident once very briefly on the BBC news, and like papa68 I have formed the opinion that the aircraft was not under control!

:DBravo, Captain Obvious!!

Thomas coupling

20th Jun 2007, 08:23

The U.S. Navy (and Marines and Coast Guard?) sees the terms as being reversed. VRS=Power settling, and SWP=not enough power to arrest descent.

This is lifted from an american military web site. It seems there is confusion over the meanings. I apologise if there was misinterpretation.

TwinHueyMan

20th Jun 2007, 08:37

Not to continue speculating, but I work around UH-60s every day and am very familiar with what the aircraft can do... and in my mind, the largest risk we run in a tactical operating environment is not the aircraft letting us down, its the aircraft being overflown by the pilots due to overconfidence in the machine. I am in no way blaming the two Australian pilots in this circumstance, however the vast majority of UH-60 pilots I work with have at least a slight feeling that the Blackhawk has been overdesigned to allow for combat situations, and that the aircraft will never bite you back no matter how hard you push it.

Case in point, and (at least in my eyes) a very similar accident, is this video:

http://www.griffin-helicopters.co.uk/vids/uh60vrs.flv

Given having a bunch of "High Speed" troopies in back and doing a tactical exercise, I can very easily see the crew performing a similar flight manuver and thus leading to a simlar incident in Fiji.

Just an idea.

Mike

212man

20th Jun 2007, 08:48

Repeating my question: I can see the need for a tactical, dynamic, arrival onshore, but why to a ship with a helideck?

Barndweller

20th Jun 2007, 08:55

212man.
Perhaps they were pretending it wasn't a ship with a helideck - eg anti terr' ops against hijacked ocean liner or oil tanker?
Whatever - i suggest you don't try it in your nice shiny new 92!

thekite

20th Jun 2007, 12:18

Whitecaps on the water - yes.

But do they not suggest a downwind condition? And yes again - the aircraft is nose down, clearly with very considerable power on. Exactly what you would expect to see on a last - minute frantic go-round.

thekite

topendtorque

20th Jun 2007, 13:52

... and it wasn't attempting a landing.

nose going forward looks more like a go-round.

sad , for sure very sad.

no conjecture could be had without at least the previous several seconds as well.
at least most of those close will know the irrelevance of some of press comments that went with it.

Exactly what you would expect to see on a last - minute frantic go-round.

Conjecture, conjecture, double bubble toil and trouble.

Please don’t shoot the messenger here, his family, colleagues and friends are obviously going through enough as it is, but should they be?

To go back to the Townsville nightime crash, was the system dealt with there or rather a messenger -- ???? --- low hour pilot --- ???.

What of the system that allows an inexperienced pilot into such vulnerability, rather than the messenger who happened to be holding the sticks at the time?

How on earth in that scenario could you have an inexperienced pilot being blamed for anything? I mean putting any rotary pilot with less than a thousand hours in close formation in distracting conditions and extremely limited visibility is like locking a mob of drunken bikies in a small pub with unlimited grog and loose iron bars, and thinking that nothing untoward will happen.

Please don’t jump down my neck; I was close enough to that tragic situation to have known that the night of that accident was merely a practice for a subsequent operation and what that subsequent target was to be.

In this scenario we have no information other than a fleeting video glimpse, but we do know that a BOI is operating. Its tradition is on the one side ‘it’ has a system, the other ‘scapegoats.’ Sorry, messengers or mistake makers, to be ultimately forgiven or unforgiven, be that in the eyes of the media public or the court room purveyors.

But what of the system that put the ‘messengers’ into the public forum?? Do they close ranks?? Or, did they before the public haranguing started.

Lots of experienced heavy metal drivers are on here, would your experience be better put to examine a fleeting glimpse of devastating footage or using your accumulated wisdom to bring to account the operational aspects of the “BOI System,” or more particularly the “system” that allowed the Townsville disaster and possibly this latest aberration to occur?

To conject further, when we talk about “experience” it is all very well, and you can all say it of me if you like, to bask in the ultra world of low level manipulative peril and having survived then come out with some seemingly easy comments, but that is what I am talking about.

This gentleman may be very well experienced in various endeavours of operational flying or his on board systems or his operational systems or whatever, but may NEVER have been put into the scenario that he encountered EVER before.

Experience has to be quantified.

If that is the case will anyone in the BOI process have enough ‘experience,’ to recognise that fact and give it due consideration, further, will it ever surface as a consideration? Perhaps even his closest and dearest will hark with misgivings in this area but be unable to surface with it.

Or, will the “system” close ranks as an endemic protection mechanism and be blind?

MSP Aviation

20th Jun 2007, 14:23

1) There are white caps on the water suggesting enough wind to perhaps rule out settling with power.

BOLLOCKS! If by settling with power you mean VRS, the windspeed has jack **** to do with it. If you have a 30kt tailwind and a 30kt groundspeed, then airspeed is 0kts, a ripe situation for VRS!

Blades clear

20th Jun 2007, 23:21

This may be a rumour network, but serioulsly people if you have no experience in this particular type of flying. How about you shut the F**k up.

These people are at the pinnacle of military aviation, and dont take anything lightly. Mistakes are made, accidents happen its a part of life.

Lets just let the BOI do its job, and lets stop witch hunting a fantastic pilot and a top bloke.

papa68

21st Jun 2007, 00:12

212 man,

Re scenarios requiring such approaches to ships, I agree they would be isolated in nature. Having said that, we did practice such scenarios both as single ship and formation assaults fairly regularly. Why? By way of an example only, ships and the like allow for relatively easy accomodation overflow when all other accomodation options have been utlised e.g. the Sydney Olympics. Lot's of people concentrated together potentially constitute a high profile target for bad guys. There are a number of other scenarios which I won't go into here.

TOT,

I think I get where you were going with your thoughts. I was involved with the '96 accident and subsequent BOI so I won't provide my thoughts on the process then or its outcomes except as to say that elements of the Spec Ops (CT as it was known then) capability have improved as a result. Of note, the '96 BOI was headed up initially by a Brig and the entire board consisted of military officers. Recently, the ADF (as a result of real / perceived transparency within its judicial system) has changed its approach in this regard and the current BOI is being headed up by a civvy. Perhaps this will alleviate you of what I think are some of your concerns.

P68:O

rjtjrt

21st Jun 2007, 00:12

212Man
The situation as I understand was that the ship was stationed off Fiji whilst a military coup was being threatened and then took place. The role for the ship and embarked roops was to be available if needed to assist with evacuation of non Fiji citizens from the airport and or port if the coup turned into a nasty situation (lots of tourists). Fortunately it was a non violent coup. At the time there was no where on land for the troops embarked to practice/keep skills up/stop boredom. Thus the only place to practice a fast rope tactical approach is on the ship.
I have no direct knowledge but this would seem to be the most likely reason for such an exercie to the helideck.

w_ocker

21st Jun 2007, 02:19

Gents. I too rarely post here anymore but I find that, in this case, its either post or punch the computer screen. (so appologies to all if this comes across as "a little terse").
The biggest thing that you people are missing here is that it appears that this was NOT an attempt to land. This appears to be a tactical assault of the ship. Not going into specifics, but the profile (which is performed/practised over and over to every concieveable target) involves low level, close formation and great speed to arrive OVER the target with the most shock and least warning to the enemy at the target. Obviously something in this case went wrong. (It looks like Bingas was trying to go around to me but lets not speculate heh). This is a high risk, no sh_t game these blokes play and I'm sure that reading various drivel on this forum is sorely tempting them to write their own replies (well done for not biting guys).
These blokes do what they do because one day we might thank them for doing it. Their job is highly specialised, and the risks are managed as well as possible whilst still allowing the aim to be achieved. As was said after 96, if we want the blokes to be able to achieve this aim (special ops delivery), then we have to manage and accept the risk involved.
I for one thank the 171 guys and feel for what they are going through. Lets give them a break heh and stop applying our lack of experience of their ops to our speculation.

sunnywa

21st Jun 2007, 04:55

212 Man

Having spent a good few days flopping around the Og off various Pacific nations in various stages of 'unrest', we used to practice all the time to the deck of the ship day and night as that was the only piece of friendly territory available to us. The deck used for this assault is HUGE (can fit two (three at a squeeze) helos on deck. We would have much preferred to do it to land but someone in the legal fraternity always kept saying that it was an act of war to just lob on someones doorstep.

Knowing the way the army does business, I'm quite sure the mission was briefed and planned well. Let the BOC decide on why the execution of the plan failed. Hopefully, we can learn from this tragic accident.

All I can say is that its a tradgedy that two young lives were lost but its a miracle that most got out (from depths of 30m they are saying).:sad:

rotorrookie

21st Jun 2007, 11:11

Damm that was one hard landing...but once again shows how strong the BlackHawk fuselage is.
R.I.P. for the two

NickLappos

21st Jun 2007, 12:30

w_ocker,
Are you saying by "assault" that he meant some kind of fly-by without slowing down and without landing?

What is the purpose of this "assault?"

Clearly, he slowed way down, and was going about 10 knots forward speed, and clearly he was passing directly over the helipad. Looks suspiciously like he meant to be at zero knots at the helipad, to me. Maybe I'd call that a "landing". What is an "assault?"

Go ahead, punch your screen, but recognize that this is a legit question!

w_ocker

21st Jun 2007, 13:32

Not at all Nick. Fair question and I perhaps should have specified what I meant by assualt - I dont think thats giving too much away. I mean "assault" as in the fast-rope delivery of special forces troops for tactical reasons to a potentially hostile target. Thus the very fast approach, late flare to a hover over the target. It's my belief (with no certainty, but some background) that whatever has (obviously) gone so sadly wrong has occured in this unforgiving flight regime. I have my beliefs about what may have caused the heavy contact with the deck but think I'll keep those to myself, as I will about the profiles used for such ops.

PaarmReader

22nd Jun 2007, 21:47

Like others I'm sure, I know a little about this situation, the history of the role, the pilots and the capabilities of the aircraft.

My only comment is that we should all follow these:

http://www.defence.gov.au/boi/blackhawk221/transcipts.htm

before having too much more to say.

PR

griffinblack

26th Jun 2007, 07:15

Boy oh boy. 171 are having a terrible time of it.
I am guessing there will be a big shake up now that they have CAT 4'ed (?) one in EM on sat.
It's been kept very quiet.

Blades clear

26th Jun 2007, 08:41

Griffinblack,

Sensationalising and big noting yourself with apparent covered up information does not make you look any more intelligent.

Maybe your backyard isnt all that clean either. Grow up fool!!:mad:

rjsquirrel

26th Jun 2007, 10:12

PaarmReader,

I read the first day's transcript, and am really impressed! Can the nation possibly find a less qualified board of inquiry? Is there a higher rank, more separated from the job that could be found, or are ministers and generals sufficient to bury the inquiry in red tape?

The officious, legalistic attitude of the board and its members ASSURES that the technical facts - the ONLY facts relevant - will not be played as strongly as the political issues.

EXAMPLE, page 23, line 17:
Q. The aircraft itself, how many engines does it have and how does it actually get into the sky?

In short, the transcript reads like a kangaroo court, not a board of experts trying to find out what happened. I think the crews would be better served by a few trained accident investigators, working quietly and professionally to uncover the facts. Don't you guys have any?

griffinblack

26th Jun 2007, 10:14

Well, Blades clear.
Them’s fighting words. Fortunately my backyard won’t be scrutinised for quite some time thanks to those
people [that] are at the pinnacle of military aviation
I agree that
Mistakes are made, accidents happen its a part of life.
But 2 in less than a year? In training? You are kidding aren’t you. I think you need to take a good close look at yourself.

EmpireOne

28th Jun 2007, 00:39

:= GriffinBlack, a word of caution mister.
Given your listed personal profile and the comments you have made, it will not be hard for interested parties to workout what you do, where you do it and (with a little assistance from DSA), who you are. Given some previous faux pas made by PPruners from a similar background as yours, I would take some time to consider who those interested parties might be and how your comments might attract their attention. Remember, punters like you and I are not the only ones who peruse the content of PPrune.
I love a bit of banter as much as the next man, but there is a right time and place. Its possible that your comments are in neither and as one professional to another, I would like to suggest you keep those comments to yourself or make them in a more appropriate forum. I would hate to see you and your 'outfit' fall foul of an investigation (witch-hunt) and subsequent censure of PPrune as a result of some irresponsible comments made on your part. Let some other f**wit do that;)
EO
PS No rile or rancour intended:)

maxeemum

28th Jun 2007, 05:58

Griffin Black, mate you really are a tool.

Griffiin......... Hmm must be associated with 1 AVN Regt. You must know absolutely everything there is about YOUR bother REGT.

Better work out what side your bread is buttered on mate.

Phone call inbound!!!!!

Max

:cool:

Delta Torque

28th Jun 2007, 08:51

The formation, line abeam or otherwise, is generally dictated by the tactical requirements of the 'client'. It depends on how they want to shake out on the ground. As one closely associated with this accident, I can assure you that the crews were very well trained. The margins were very close, but the risk was managed. Unfortunately things did not go well on the night.

And as far as Dropbear's infamous blade strike goes...well...better ask him!

I think if you look at the SF accident rate worldwide, we don't rate too highly on the list, pro rata....but of course, any accident causing injury or death is unacceptable.

Delta Torque

28th Jun 2007, 23:03

Yes, mission creep is a problem in the SF area..it is better handled now, I believe.

And thanks for your observation/opinion.

topendtorque

29th Jun 2007, 12:11

Papa 68 asked this question
Perhaps this will alleviate you of what I think are some of your concerns.

for a while i thought maybe, until I saw this in one of the press releases

The inquiry president, the retired Supreme Court judge David Levine, QC, also took a swipe at Defence top brass

I believe that I cannot answer the question.

I note the thread creep with some dismay, i would say that it be better to not criticise the outfit or the pilotage too much rather than the beauracracy that allowed or perhaps presented the expectations of performance.

We cop the same thing at times, expectations of clean musters in thick trees, mongrel cattle, poorly set up or maintained yards and fences and people who should know better, bad mouth you because you didn't get 100% in half the time. If only??

Perhaps the presence of a supreme court judge should assure that information is at least presented in a correct and legalistic manner so as not to be discounted or questioned later, perhaps???

Perhaps we could examine the terms of reference of the BOI's, do they go far enough??

And as far as Dropbear's infamous blade strike goes...well...better ask him

This one had a funny bit in the middle of all the dust and confusion.

While the dust was settling a young feathered subaltern sprinted up the hill to where he found the local commandant, legs apart hands on hips and gruff expression on dial, who enquired, "what's up?"

youngster replied in rather breathles fashion, 'we need another helicopter sir.'

the reply was quick, "well sonny you just go down to the quartermaster an' see if he can get you one."

boss man goes down to find one exalted one in the dust and heat and invites him up to his office while a replacement machine is being sought.

Exalted one says that he will be OK.

boss man says, "well sir when I get back to my office I will then organise a replacement, which will probably take thirty minutes to get airborne and forty minutes flying time down to here. You are welcome to use my air-conditioned office and telephone to get out of this heat while you wait!"

Exalted one then didn't hesitate to accept.

ShyTorque

12th Jul 2007, 14:23

Have I got this wrong, or does the report intimate that the aircraft was not being flown by visual cues but by reliance on GPS? And that a quickstop resulted in rotor droop, increased rate of descent and a sudden loss of control? :confused:

walkabout

12th Jul 2007, 18:49

ShyTorque
There's a link on the previous page of this thread to the public BOI site which is updated daily with the transcript of the previous day's evidence. I've been keeping up with them (to learn, not judge) and this week has begun to focus more on the flying aspects of the incident. If you take the chance to read the evidence you'll start getting an idea of the picture.

This newspaper report was simply constructed taken from one day's evidence, the downnside of a public inquiry I guess.

Dan Reno

12th Jul 2007, 21:51

It never ceases to amaze me to what lengths supposed experts will go to sway thought from the obvious pilot error in this case. GPS fault!? Was he doing a blindfolded instrument approach to the deck via GPS? No one wants any pilot to leave this life having been the cause for a crash that took someone else's life also and we'd all like to think that it couldn't possibly be human error, why that's too personal, unkind and not PC. What I've seen is that classified accident reports don't necessarily synch-up with what the public is fed for the sake of an individual's family, unit and morale. Had this approach been on land, he could have easily bounced along the ground till he had it in control again but he had to "stick the landing" as he had no where else to go once he committed himself. RIP. My 2 cents.

evilroy

13th Jul 2007, 06:00

It is a curious situation. Is he saying there was a GPS error, or that the GPS position for where the vessel actually was positioned at that time was in error? I think that the latter was probably correct. If that is correct, then the question raised about range calls made from the GPS data versus visual cues is pertinent.

Does the BOI site say anything about this?

walkabout

13th Jul 2007, 07:27

Evilroy

The latter: GPS mark taken at lift and I think again overhead the ship but although the ship was not making way, the drift meant that 15/20 mins later on approach the GPS mark was out by ca 100m and therefore the range calls were. The Captain registered the discrepancy visually at the first range call (corroborated by both loadmasters evidence), the copilot kept making the range calls in accordance with SOPs but it was a visual approach.

The BOI site has the written transcripts for each days evidence, scope of the inquiry etc but as yet it hasn't published any views as such and has until Jan 08 to report. So you need to read the transcripts for yourself or find the derestricted accident report which I can't. This week on Tue or Wed an army accident investigator gave evidence having tried to recreat the accident in a blackhawk sim and outlines the specific parameters which allowed them to do so.

evilroy

13th Jul 2007, 08:51

walkabout,

ta - much appreciated.

ShyTorque

13th Jul 2007, 19:08

Thanks, Walkabout, I'll read it all.

Something a bit odd about this accident, from what I've seen so far, including watching the video a few times. :confused:

I have my own theory but I always prefer to leave the verdict to the official inquiry; however I'm sure the quoted GPS problem is a red herring

Before anyone starts the usual "growling" with hackles raised; although it's been a while, I have a few hundred hours on the type and am reasonably familiar with this type of operation using the Blackhawk, including similar "lights out" ops by night using NVG; I have seen it go badly wrong too (from very close quarters). Thankfully it wasn't my aircraft and the other crew got away with their error - although a set of new main rotor blades and new trousers all round for those on board (about 20 pairs) were needed :) .

eagle 86

15th Jul 2007, 11:16

I wonder if the crew ever thought about aborting the approach and going around?
GAGS
E86

thekite

19th Jul 2007, 14:16

Sorry Thomas, but I must reiterate: the pilot executed a downwind quickstop, according to the enquiry, (18.7.07) And fell into VR.
This was not a standard procedure, but since it was a special operation, it was attempted. And failed.
As I said before, there but for the god of your choice, go I!
My background is cattle, not soldiers. But the laws of physics overide any law of military manual.
Again, as I said before, this was VR. Go ahead, bust your arse; prove me wrong.
thekite:ugh:

Thomas coupling

19th Jul 2007, 21:25

For the record, there is no mention that this was VR. The transcript attempts to invite Captain "11" to accept that it was INCIPIENT vortex ring (for a start, and not VRS), but doesn't get away with it. Capt "11" won't accept its VRS because the blackhawk isn't in the catchment zone for inducing VRS long enough.
To enter VRS you need not only low airspeed and a ROD>700'/min, but you need to become established in that zone before it takes hold - it isn't instantaneous and it most certainly isn't going to happen from 100' alongside the ship.
I have done hundreds of these approaches - taught them, flown them.
I have read the transcript carefully and my observations are this:
The blackhawk shot a "downwind" fast stop - into wind if you know what I mean. i.e. he finished up DOWNWIND. The a/c was heavy. Because of these two factors, as he rolled out experienced a descent, recognised it and corrected with collective (from an excessive nose up to combat the residual fwd g/s due to the tailwind) and drooped the Nr.
The rest as we say was history - The a/c continued to sink as it settled with power and struck the deck.
One more comment: Capt 11 who was the co-jo on another blackhawk 800m behind stated:
(a) he didn't think a downwind component had any adverse affect on the manouevre.
(b) He also stated that 5 troops onboard weighing close to 1/2 tonne total were not a consideration either.
Get a grip lads - what sort of pilot can call himself a professional after making statements like this:=:*

Beetlenut2

20th Jul 2007, 06:58

Would "half a tonne" make much difference to a Chinook? It's all relative. It may have been that being half a tonne lighter would have meant that they didn't crash, but it also says in the transcripts that they had a 25% power margin - that is 25% more power than they required to hover OGE.

The downwind comment is a little silly. 15 Kts downwind is well within the limits of the aircraft, but not at the end of the approach they conducted-Too fast and too close - within two rotor diametres of the ship!

-Left pedal in the termination to bring the nose round, speed washes off, stabilator programs down?

Beetlenut2

20th Jul 2007, 07:01

No one has to-it wasn't VRS or (I bet) incipient VRS-not mentioned as a causal factor anywhere in the BOI transcipts. The rotor drooped too far and too fast to arrest the rate of descent.

Beetlenut2

20th Jul 2007, 09:19

Boy oh boy. 171 are having a terrible time of it.
I am guessing there will be a big shake up now that they have CAT 4'ed (?) one in EM on sat.
It's been kept very quiet.

There you go Griffin - it's in the transcripts - 19 th of Jul is where I saw it.

topendtorque

20th Jul 2007, 11:55

15 Kts downwind is well within the limits of the aircraft

and VRS I dare say, as one decreases AS to arrive at a full stop??

maybe the expectant mission profilers forgot to tell the airframe the story.

once again I say, a pilot being put in a position....not trained for.... need to go higher up the chain... I reckon .... again.

Nothing has been said here or in the other VRS loop about what is often needed to set off your instantaneous drop from the sky, known by some as VRS, by others as a f'n big fright. :ugh::ugh:

That is the simple catalyst of a litlle bit of pitch to help generate that vortex at the critical time. A useful analagy could be the principle of cloud seeding with the use of an agent or catalyst, just to get the raindrops falling?? on my head, -- da dah

Mind you an oft repeated quick stop procedure until you plack in the face, but INTO WIND and thus done safely every time, would not teach anyone any bad tricks. Higher, higher up the chain guys.

TC with respect, I am confused, do you say at the beginning that captain 11 is an ace and then at the end a dill?

But you do intimate that the questioning is trying to trap him into the VRS scenario..
THAT is sad.
The court trying to trap a person into an admission, but not trying get him to reveal the truth instead.

What is this BOI I wonder, a kangaroo court???

Beetlenut2

20th Jul 2007, 13:28

From the transcripts:

Q. Can you tell us what happened as the debrief after
that particular incident?
A. Once we had landed and shut down, MAJ 4 obviously made
notice to the crew that that was not what he intended. He
apologised, debriefed the crew on how it should have been
conducted, and we handed the aircraft over to maintenance
and further accident investigation team findings.

and this:

Q. Referring to the incident in East Timor, you said that
the captain debriefed the crew that that was not what he
intended. Am I to take from that that it wasn't a
controlled landing?
A. Obviously, it wasn't a controlled landing, sir,
because it resulted in a hard landing.
Q. Am I to interpret that the aircraft actually crash
landed?
A. No, it conducted a hard landing. My reference to a
crash landing would be something that has written the
aircraft off and it's no longer serviceable for future use.
Q. My understanding from that is that the aircraft is
actually category 4, which is only one category off
write-off. Is that the case?
A. Yes.

:}

topendtorque

22nd Jul 2007, 13:03

That's comedy gold

Beetlenut2
I don’t share your sense of comedy, I also wonder about your observations; your post #23, Chinooks?

I thought the passages of your post #28 very illuminating.

1) The witness got himself well tangled up, which is not to me a point of derision, merely a trait of someone batting on and unaware of the finer details to which he is trying to refer.

2) He appeared to be on another plane of understanding as to the expected outcomes and procedures for the exercise than the person, Major 4, even though both were in the same enterprise. (Perhaps even the same machine)

3) It follows that both of the pilots of the crashed machine must have also been on a plane of understanding different from Major 4.

Those three observations speak volumes to me about procedures of; allowable manoeuvres, briefing, planning and expectations. The expectations of whom, the client, the flying detachment on site or - some one or group back in headquarters who thinks that a certain procedure is required to effect a certain result from some hypothetical threat, without regard to basic helicopter flight characteristics.

The HQ bloke may have heard that “fifteen knots downwind is well within the performance parameters of the aircraft”. If no one else in the command chain knew better about the many forms and the dangers of VRS at low level and planned exercises accordingly then they plainly wouldn’t know what they were talking about.

That - is - how - people - get - killed.

I’ll bet that there is no SOP that says that descent manoeuvres to a negative airspeed should be avoided. If there were I do not believe that this pilot would have got caught the way he did.

Someone on here recently said that after 1500 hours in the military they thought they knew everything and realized with hindsight that the only thing that saved them was the flight authorisation process.

Very honest, I too reckoned that at about 1200 hours I was just becoming aware of what it was that I did not know about this low level game, but how to learn it??? And low level challenging the elements was all that I did, unlike the military which gets lots of routine straight and level stuff.

That was why I had a bit to say about the Townsville prang where I reckon vastly inexperienced types got thrust into a situation that was beyond them, obviously.

But it was the system that allowed it to happen, most possibly because the system didn’t know what it didn’t know and hadn’t catered for that. That is plainly wrong and needs to be transparently amended. That is why I treat the BOI with somewhat a jaundiced eye.

People come on this and other forums on most subjects to either learn or perhaps impart something to help others learn. I try to subscribe to both functions as I reckon you’re never too old to learn and I am most grateful for the thanks that I have often received for the practical training that I given, including the dangers of VRS.

I am also mindful of many who may like to say something on this Fiji subject but by dent of their profession or connection must refrain, even though these forums are “rumour networks.”

I think I have outlined where I am coming from, but where do you come from Beetlenut2?

Brian Abraham

24th Jul 2007, 08:16

Some figures arising from the inquiry.
(figures in bold seconds to impact)

45 IAS 100 Knots, Altitude 100 feet
22 Collective reduced, Flare commenced with a slight right turn
14 Left turn commenced at up to 20°/sec, Altitude 70 feet, Flare increased to 20° nose up
9 TQ 30%
7 TQ 20%
3 RRPM >100% TQ 20%
2.6 Bank angle reaches a max of 43°, Rapid descent commences, TQ 10% and begins increasing rapidly
1.5 16.5° pitch nose down (from a slight nose up position)
Impact ROD 1,320 to 1,800 FPM, RRPM 75%, TQ >100%, IAS Zero to 6 Knots

before landing check list

24th Jul 2007, 11:29

I have not been posting on here very much and just saw this thread a little while ago. I read the 1st and the last board meetings. So far it appears that the board is made up of not very informed/experienced pilots.
I read this from Brian:
45 IAS 100 Knots, Altitude 100 feet
22 Collective reduced, Flare commenced with a slight right turn
14 Left turn commenced at up to 20°/sec, Altitude 70 feet, Flare increased to 20° nose up
9 TQ 30%
7 TQ 20%
3 RRPM >100% TQ 20%
2.6 Bank angle reaches a max of 43°, Rapid descent commences, TQ 10% and begins increasing rapidly
1.5 16.5° pitch nose down (from a slight nose up position)
Impact ROD 1,320 to 1,800 FPM, RRPM 75%, TQ >100%, IAS Zero to 6 Knots
I am not sure what model H60 221 was BUT if it was a “A” model and the power was applied has rapidly as suggested yes it would droop that much and that fast. The “L” model with the T701’s greatly reduced that happening. I have not flown a 60 in several years but I do have 2200 hrs in them and when in flight (Ground RPM is higher before the Gens come off line due to a squat swith on the left main mount)and RPMR is reduced to the high 80’s you lose AC generators, consequently your SAS and AFCS and Stab Auto control but that portion of the flight the gens are a moot point. Someone mentioned the Stab position in a prior post, yes the Stab control has several inputs: Collective position, indicated A/S, pitch rate etc however the stab looked down to me not up. So if it was in “auto” mode it would seem to be set for low indicated airspeed, high power setting flight.
Quote from Thomas Coupling: Capt 11 who was the co-jo on another blackhawk 800m behind stated:
(a) he didn't think a downwind component had any adverse affect on the manouevre.
(b) He also stated that 5 troops onboard weighing close to 1/2 tonne total were not a consideration either.
Get a grip lads - what sort of pilot can call himself a professional after making statements like this
I agree, capt 11 is nuts. This thinking at least in my experience with the US Army and what I saw over and over again the desert stems from people getting most of their training in advanced helos and no experience in helos that demand extreme power management skills ie B206 (OH58) UH1H and a host of others
We do not know so far what the crew was attempting at the time. All we can imagine is the pilot(s) up to the very end were exercising the culmination of 100% of their past experience and it was not quite sufficient. But we do not know because we were not actually there. And since we do not know we should quit attempting to Monday Morning quarterback. They did their best.
Jerry

Frazzled

24th Jul 2007, 12:10

Thanks for the info from the BOI but I think the DSTO guy was talking about collective position from the 7 sec to 3 sec as he states that at 20% the engines were at idle.

Quote "At 3 seconds before impact, the collective
was increased from 20 per cent, thereby increasing the
engine torque from zero per cent. So at this stage, the
engine was basically idling."

Not good in any language:(

before landing check list

24th Jul 2007, 12:15

That is exactly what I was talking about. The "A" was more prone to this situation then the "L"(FADEC's). But still were not there nor was there a FDR nor a CVR.
Jerry

Brian Abraham

24th Jul 2007, 12:45

before landing check list - I should clarify, the info came from a FDR, with some input from photographic analysis. Frazzled, I pondered that portion, not well worded as you say, but from what else was said I concluded that he was inferring that 20% TQ is more or less idle. I would expect that 20% TQ could be in the range one might see with throttles at flight when sitting on the ground, perhaps another reason he had for saying they were at idle. Know nothing of Blackhawks myself.

before landing check list

24th Jul 2007, 12:53

My mistake, I did not know there was a FDR but yes, low tq (around 20%) in that aircraft would allow the NG to spool down but from that point the rest is purely conjecture.

Jerry

topendtorque

24th Jul 2007, 13:35

Not good in any language

simulating those numbers, in any machine, that close to the ground, jeeessus.

wouldn't these sorts of numbers, in the time to run sequence, have been briefed, prior to the event? They certainly were in fast jets a mate of mine told me once.

I agree that capt 11 said some pretty weird things, he may not be nuts, just inexperienced and therefore confused, ( a normal trait) and in the wrong bloody place.

I think i'll stick to defending the drivers if it's OK by you guys, the system I'll descibe again, below:-

We've all seen cricketers that reckoned they knew everything when facing up to Warne, get their bails knocked from way out side.

before landing check list

28th Jul 2007, 15:27

I agree with you Topend.

Jerry

Dan Reno

28th Jul 2007, 19:34

Topend quote: "I think i'll stick to defending the drivers if it's OK by you guys, the system I'll descibe again, below"

Do you think it was something other than plain old pilot error?

It looks to me he simply was coming in too fast and tried to "save" the landing by trying to "stick the landing". No?

topendtorque

3rd Aug 2007, 13:20

I see from the press coverage that the BOI has adjourned. There were also some fairly robust scenes in the final curtain calls. It will be interesting to see how it is all called in the wash.

To answer Dan Reno

Do you think it was something other than plain old pilot error? YESIt looks to me he simply was coming in too fast

I think he realized this at about the 3 seconds to impact mark and at that time made a very good decision to attempt recovery with cyclic forward, to wit the resultant 16.5 pitch down at the 1.5 secs mark. Pilot error would have been the instinctive pull back on the cyclic.

“and tried to "save" the landing by trying to "stick the landing". No?”

I doubt that during the last three seconds that he had any control over his descent. Note that it has increased to 1500 fpm at deck level. That’s a steep acceleration.

There is no way to hide it, what he was doing was a descending quick stop with a 15 knot downwind component, sheer lunacy if you ask any experienced mustering pilot.

Sure lots of us teach pilots downwind landings at the operational level, for dust abatement on mining work for example, but that always has one rule, no descent into your own turbulence, do it slowly and don’t get caught.

What I am delving into is why try a procedure like this where the a/c is being turned from a crosswind to descend into a dead downwind of fifteen knots. The risks are well known for any helicopter.

Had he the opportunity for understanding downwind theory and the different variants of LL VRS and done some major rehearsals up where it’s safe I am sure that the exercise would have been done into wind on final where full control is enjoyed with minimal power required for a variety of manoeuvres, including fast descent.

Through the downwind procedure not only is the A/C set to fall like a brick within many of the VRS scenarios, (as they do) but he would have required a whole heap of extra energy and time to slow the inertia of the A/C with the 15 knots blowing him forward.

How could any of that be beneficial in a situation where you wish to get in quick in the shortest time with the greatest amount of control? Being into wind uses a lot less power, which always equates to less noise.

I think it purely academic to postulate what might have happened had he anticipated his bother a bit earlier. He ran himself out of RRPM in arresting the forward energy of the A/C from the beginning of the quick stop to say minus fifteen (with the tailwind) before the impact, where it is stated that he again had nearly six knots IAS, (that’s 21 knots groundspeed).

The thing is that the massive sinking cue happened so fast (as they do) that I suggest and the numbers confirm it, that within less than a second he, 1 realized, 2 crosschecked, 3 rationalized and 4 reacted – with forward cyclic, (giving him the six knots) all at 3 seconds before impact. Pretty slippery for a bloke first encountering this phenomena. Very good in fact.

As I have said earlier, elsewhere, repeatedly, if you’re gonna stuff it up big time at low level, then be at least above eighty feet – please, perhaps higher for a Blackhawk.

Had he been conditioned to the recovery procedure, he would have been just that much ahead of it, pitched down quicker, missed the ship and not pulled collective, possibly recovering before the water?

THE QUESTION REMAINS, WHY WAS THE APPROACH TERMINATION IN A DEAD DOWNWIND EVEN ON THE BRIEFING BOARD, LET ALONE THE PILOTS FLIGHT PLAN????

If the army big knobs in charge of flying training and SOP’s haven’t worked that out then some elementary training for them might be in order. A Blackhawk and two fine young men wiped out during a safety conscious training mission should be a sobering input to their thinking.

Perhaps also the phraseology, “fifteen knots is well within the a/c capability” will be viewed as pertaining to the engine fire maintenance instead of the egghead idea that it means you can do descending quick stops in a Blackhawk just because it is painted in camouflage.

walkabout

28th Aug 2007, 01:24

Earlier BOI transcripts implied that the last day of the hearing would be 3rd Aug and certainly the last reported proceedings on 2nd Aug were adjourned until the 3rd but no further transcripts have appeared, unless I'm being dumb and can't find them on the website.
Please advise.......
W

topendtorque

28th Aug 2007, 14:14

there's quite a few related stories on the ABC news website.

walkabout

28th Aug 2007, 20:30

Thanks. Seems like it was adjourned on the 2nd not the 3rd although final submissions are end of this week.

Capt Hollywood

30th Jun 2008, 09:29

Politicians are demanding the final report on the crash be released to the public. These aren't the actual report, just the news artices on the final report.

Sky News: Blackhawk report (http://www.skynews.com.au/news/article.aspx?id=245178)

Black Hawk flight was doomed, inquiry told - National - smh.com.au (http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/black-hawk-flight-was-doomed-inquiry-told/2007/06/18/1182019030678.html)

Black Hawk crash verdict handed down | The Australian (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23943855-12377,00.html)

topendtorque

30th Jun 2008, 12:54

Yeah, saw that on the internet news early this am. The gist seemed to be that the media was lampooning the deposed Liberals as the "political machine that was hiding".

The truth as far as I have always maintained is that they are after the wrong "political machine."
Hollywood's news stories quotes spell out in detail which 'political' party should be pursued.

As below;- 1)

Commander Rush said the strength and direction of the wind was known beforehand, and questions would be asked of the commanding officer who provided the flight authorisation.

and 2), well "it is understood" that he said it, he must be an expert on helicopters?????/ and their pilots.

The report was handed to Air Chief Marshall Angus Houston six months ago, with the defence force head said to be appalled by the findings, Fairfax reported.
It is understood that he dubbed senior pilots from the squadron "cowboys'' and launched an audit of all helicopter fleets.

Wasn't there a famous quote from a WW11 General protrayed in a film based around Patton, which went something like, "Well, bottlenecks always have the narrowest part at the top, you're fired."

in response to a subordinate complaining about a traffic jam being a bottleneck during a major military push in the war's final stages.

just a reflection.
tet

Homers_love_child

30th Jun 2008, 17:36

This is not surprising. The ADF has a long history of not releasing reports to the public. I doubt that you will see this report in the public domain. However, what would be interesting to see is the accident/incident reports leading up to this.

Savoia

18th Jul 2011, 10:50

.
Is there still no government report available for this accident?

212man

18th Jul 2011, 11:34

http://www.defence.gov.au/coi/reports/bh221_boi_report.pdf

It's been out since 2008

Savoia

18th Jul 2011, 12:12

.
Grazie mille 212! :ok:

Thomas coupling

18th Jul 2011, 16:33

The board has noticed, particularly in the context of normalised deviance, the Squadrons blase approach to wind and especially whilst conducting Special Operations Assault Approach. Furthermore it was a combination of factors: height speed and lateral distance from the ship and tail wind that contributed to the crash of BlackHawk 221. Moreover the energy that the aircraft carried into the approach could not be successfully dissipated in the available space whilst keeping the aircraft within the flight manual engine management and performance limitations. The resultant flare terminated in an extreme attitude and in the presence of a tail wind. Under these circumstances the engines were unable to respond to the power demands in a timely fashion and the BlackHawk responded as should have been expected.

The report goes on to say:

Para 2.23:

Even at a contingency power rating, the engines could not produce sufficient power to simultaneously overcome the drag to accelerate the rotor and produce sufficient lift to arrest the rate of descent

Later:

Para 2.25:

Immediately prior to impact the helicopter was descending at 1800fpm with an effective airspeed of less than 5kts and with significant power applied. These conditions are within those described in the Flt Manual to be most favourable for developing Vortex Ring.

The report leans towards VR as the cause.

I suspect (given the circumstances, the main conclusion (above) and para 2.23) that what they actually mean is: Settling with Power and not Vortex Ring. [I re-iterate: VR is an aerodynamic state and SWP is an engine performance state].

This guy came round the corner (into wind and with a gentle descent already on), ending up pointing the helo downwind (within 10degrees) with serious nose up attitude and found he was (a) still moving fwd too quickly and (b) still descending. He went from 20 - 100% (Max Cont) within 2 seconds to arrest his momentum and found that this was insufficent to arrest his trajectory. Blades slowed down exacerbating the descent - impact.

Bottom line from the BOI:

Supervisors from Command to blame - lack of supervision and Training.
No disciplinary action taken :ugh:

Paul Cantrell

8th Aug 2011, 23:33

Thomas:

The report leans towards VR as the cause.

I suspect (given the circumstances, the main conclusion (above) and para 2.23) that what they actually mean is: Settling with Power and not Vortex Ring. [I re-iterate: VR is an aerodynamic state and SWP is an engine performance state].

Why don't you think it's VR? (yes, I agree that is an aerodynamic state). Over the years I've taught the recovery (at altitude) many times. While you often get some warning, a few times it's been like stepping off a roof - bam! pegging the VSI.

1,800 ft/min descent rate does not sound to me like an engine performance state. If you look at the torque over the last 30 seconds, it's consistently low: because he was flaring off his 100 knots of airspeed, I would think. So how did the flare, which should have kept the sink rate low, turn into such a high descent rate? VRS is certainly a plausible explanation in my mind.

As you mention in another article, there is a lot of confusion in the states as to the terms "Settling With Power" and "Power Settling". I've had people describe "Settling With Power" as a lack of engine power (that then caused the helicopter to sink into it's downwash and enter VRS!). So, you can certainly have a performance problem that gets you into the VRS envelope.

Not saying you're wrong by any means, just wondering why are you discounting VRS?

Paul