G-JSAR

[Jetboxer]

Was wondering if there had been any further findings with regard to the G-JSAR ditching.

Having googled 'G-JSAR', came accross this video.

ie2KlO1ddlE

YouTube - G-Jsar scramble (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ie2KlO1ddlE)

Apologies in advance if it's already been posted somewhere!

[HeliComparator]

I have seen some crap videos on youtube but that one is really bad! Unfortunately no clues yet from the Dutch AIB as to possible causes. Yes, it seems to be taking for ever!

HC

[NorthSeaTiger]

What happened to G-JSAR after it's accident ? It still shows as registered on G-INFO . Was it written off or is it still flying ?

NST

[Jetboxer]

Still waiting..........

3 years and 1 month later.

[Achilles426]

It has been sold to Eurocopter and re-furbished and apparently sold to Romania as a SAR aircraft!

[la grua]

Good to hear that jsar has been reborn and now haunts transylvania!!
Heared a wisper ,some time ago, that Bond had been enquiring as to her health. Rumoured, as a addition to the jigsaw pair. They were advised, by ECF, that the rebuild costs would exceed the price of a new build 225.

[Senior Pilot]

Another video from YouTube:

0vmTmfpcyw4&NR=1

[HeliComparator]

The final report is published today by the Dutch Safety Board:

Emergency landing in sea, AS322L2 Search and rescue helicopter, North Sea near Den Helder - De Onderzoeksraad voor veiligheid (http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/index.php/onderzoeken/noodlanding-in-zee-gemaakt-2006137/#rapporten)

HC

ps: Its long!

[SASless]

The Summary is short and to the point!

[marcr]

Any further information about the nature of this "significant controllability problem" ?

(Accident Report, Page 120, Conclusion 12.)

[SASless]

HC,

In my experience teaching in the Sim.....I and other instructors noted a distinct tendency amongst pilots of all backgrounds to immediately kick off the AutoPilot and grab manual control when Alarms and Warning Lights of any kind activated.

Is there a technical reason the crew would have had to take the Action they did with the Auto Pilot in this accident? Was there a SOP, Flying Instruction or similar that dictated such a response prior to the onset of control issues or the decision to descend?

Considering the engine issues.....the report states the engines were sustaining flight despite the unusual indications which fit no checklist procedure. Would the aircraft have maintained flight on a single engine at the weight, temps, and altitude they were operating?

If the Factory could obtain a control degradation by test flying the profile used by the crew.....is that a "normal" situation for the Aircraft Model in question and has it been documented before the accident during testing? Is there a design flaw in the flight control system that is inherent to the design?

Is this another example of problems akin to but different of the EC Jack Stall problem in the 350/355 series?

[HeliComparator]

SAS

No, there was no technical reason to dump the upper modes. Use of the upper modes/automation was a key area of training since this aircraft had transition down to a fix, auto-hover etc. However with hindsight I think that too much training time was spent on SAR-type training and not enough on normal and abnormal general flying operations. The Ops Man didn't specifically say to engage upper modes when there was a problem, though that was generally the culture in the company. Of course its now in the manual...

I think the very limited Simulator training these pilots received was an issue - there can be no doubt that Sim training familiarises pilots with how to deal with emergencies as a crew, something that cannot be learned outside the Sim other than by making mistakes.

The engine problems did not cause any loss of power, and to answer your question yes they had easy OEI stayup capability. There was some discussios about why they decended, but as far as I was concerned it was because they were getting close to De Kooy and it was time to descend anyway for a VFR arrival, engine problem or not.

I think EC were trying to prove that it was the AP hydraulic problem, they did some test flying with AP Hydraulics out / cycling and showed that control movements could be made to match those of the accident flight, however there were many other scenarios that could also fit, so it didn't really prove anything. Not quite sure exactly what question you are asking here.

Since that type of aircraft has a millions of flight hours without a reputation for control jams, I doubt there is an inherent design issue, but we can't be certain! Its frustrating that I thought there must be a connection between the engine issue and the control problem (that started only a couple of minutes after the engine issue) but none could be found.

HC

[SASless]

It makes one wonder how an engine power delta (deviation) could lead to cyclic control problems. No doubt they were there as it would take some motivation to put down at night in cold rough water rather than continue to land which was not so far away. As you rightly say....there are so many hours on the fleet it should be a well known flying characteristic if it were common to the aircraft.

One has to assume the engine problem and the flight control problems did not have a common cause as they are two very different systems.

[HeliComparator]

SAS
the engine problem and the flight control problems did not have a common cause as they are two very different systems.

However there is a place where engine governing meets flight controls - the anticipator, which is a pair of potentiometers that set each engine's N2 datum, and therefore have the power to cause the sort of engine fluctuations they experienced. The anticipator is located in the flight control cabinet and whilst its connected only to the collective pushrod, its adjacent to the cyclic pushrods.

Despite my feeling that this must have been the common link, the investigation found no evidence that there was any connection.

HC

[SASless]

How could that cause cyclic problems? I can see where the wandering N2 issues would be possible....which would also affect Ng and other parameters.

Are you suggesting a physical binding of the cyclic controls by the Anticipator or perhaps an electrical or electronic interference? If a physical interference....would it be able for the cyclic controls to be blocked in all directions at one time? That would seem highly unlikely.

I do not believe in "coincidences"....the odds of the aircraft experiencing a some what confusing but relatively benign engine problem then experiencing a serious flight control problem, although not impossible, seems very unlikely from real life experience and from a statistical view.

[HeliComparator]

Yes, it seemed to me likely that there was some physical interaction between the anticipator and the cyclic pushrods, eg wiring harness trapped / caught, bits fallen off the anticipator onto the lower bellcrank etc, but as I said, in fact no evidence to support that.

HC

[SASless]

I view this as a great learning tool.

There are lots of lessons to learned and applied to current operations.

I would think "outside" reviews of one's operations do not harm anyone's job security. The lack of an objective review of policies, practices, and the like, set folks up for the ultimate embarrassment when their hunky dory cozy little world gets turned upside down by events such as this one. That is when folks get the can tied to their tail.

Bristow has been known to hold a "Daddy Knows Best" attitude in the past. Thus this should not come as a big surprise to anyone that is familiar with the evolution of the organization. Every large operator falls prey to that at some point thus Bristow is no different than any other in that regard.

What is important is to move forward with improvements after taking a cold hard look at how business is getting done and look for the holes in the Cheese ahead of time rather than after the fact.

[tistisnot]

Probably because we do not wish to inflict further pain? As SASless says - a good learning tool .....

But please, and I'll be shot down by many, for heavens sake:

Hanger or hangers may refer to:

Hanger, a woodland area on the side of a hill — road going through this woodland may be named 'Hanger Hill'
Clothes hanger (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clothes_hanger), device in the shape of human shoulders or legs used to hang clothes on
Hanger steak (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanger_steak), a tender cut of steak
Casing hanger (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casing_hanger), part of a wellhead assembly in oil drilling
Derailleur hanger (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derailleur_hanger), a slot in a bicycle frame where the derailleur bolt attaches to
Monkey hanger (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monkey_hanger), a British term for people from Hartlepool, England
Hanger, part of a skateboard (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skateboard)
Hanger (weapon) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanger_%28weapon%29), a sword similar to a cutlass (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cutlass), used by woodsmen and soldiers in 17th to 18th centuries
Hanger, or specky (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Specky), a slang term for spectacular mark in Australian rules football
Hangers, American slang for large, pendulous breasts
Hanger (barbershop music) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanger_%28barbershop_music%29), a long note sung by one voice in a barbershop music song
A hanger is a vertical cable or rod connecting the roadway of a suspension bridge (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suspension_bridge) to the bridge's main cable or arch
Hanger, a type of structural tie (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tie_%28engineering%29).I think you mean Hangar

Yours irrationally irritated

[jonnyloove]

What ever did happen to G-Jasr in the end was she ever rebuild..?

[cyclic]

It never happened, I don't know what you are talking about ;)

[500e]

Page 99\100 of the full report, Para 7.2 is rather disturbing.
How had this been allowed to get into the presumably type approved helicopter? how many checks tests were done by manufacturer, service centrers, and line mechs, it appears the testing was either lax or non effective.
The impresion is it is a design fault, this surely brings regulators into the equasion ,
Another paragraph from report.
The left-hand G-JSAR sponson life raft was not ready to be used.
Supporting finding:
• The left-hand G-JSAR life raft could not be released using the exterior nor the interior
release handles. A detailed investigation of the cable grip and the release control cable
proved that it had not slipped, but that the control lever angle was too large in relation to
its horizontal axis and prevented the control lever from functioning in its normal operating
range.

[HeliComparator]

Assuming it is the last highlighted bit of section 7.2 you refer to, I think you may be making a wrong interpretation of the English. It means that the mechanism showed serious deficiencies in this particular aircraft, not in all L2s.

If I recall correctly (and it was a long time ago now) the problem arose because the description in the maintenance manual and associated images, showed only the mechanism on one side. With the other side being effectively a mirror image, the images misled the engineer last rigging the cable, into setting the lever to the mirror image angle, which resulted in insufficient travel and mechanical advantage to operate the life raft. So a bit of a human factors issue resulting from MM descriptions open to error.

Fortunately for me, the EC225 mechanism, whilst looking identical externally, is completely different internally.

HC