TheShadow
10th Mar 2007, 14:12
Blackhawks are operated aboard ship by both Army and Navy pilots (and in the USN, onboard helo ops are by both Marines and USN aviators).
Particularly in relation to the Australian Defence Force scene, I am trying to identify comparators between the approach taken to essentially the same task by:
.
1. Army configured UH-60's and
.
2. Navy configured helo's (SeaHawks, SeaKings & etc)
.
Areas of interest include:(but aren't limited to):
.
a. navalization of RAN SeaHawks (differences in personnel kit, systems and a/c safety devices such as inflatable pontoons), radar altimeters, radars, optionally carried systems
.
b. simulator(?) or CBT training pitched directly at shipboard operations
.
c. Vertrep ops training by Army aviators (including hooked external loads carried ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore and shipboard personnel transfers by hoist)
.
d. PlaneGuard Standby ops
.
e. SAR OPS & surveillance ops (including blue-water navigation techniques and aids)
.
f. Dilbert Dunker training (pilots and crewmen)
.
g. approaches to stern pads (ship generated turbulence considerations)
.
h. Late wave-off procedures (fouled deck or poorly executed approach). Training in RAN R/T phraseology and LSO signals
.
i. foul weather ops (pitching decks, aborted poorly executed touchdowns, deck-slip, ground resonance etc)
.
j. weapons training (aircraft mounted side-guns)
.
k. Disaster relief ops, man overboard drills,
.
l. Aircrew PSK (personnel survival kit and flotation aids) - believe RAN pilots use an underwater breathing aid (a PONY?) to aid in underwater egress.....but that Army pilots don't have this.
.
m. Emergency drills, ditching (including W&B, hover OGE and power available calculations)
.
n. Shipboard maint considerations (deferred discrepancies and provision for salt accretion/accelerated corrosion, compressor washes, enhanced lubrication etc)
.
o. Any engine differences (including particle filters and anti-ice/de-ice equipment). Single-engine approach to deck hover considerations)
.
p. any hoist/winch and hook differences including emergency cutaway and emergency load jettison
.
q. HIFR refuelling from other fleet units (if practised/available)
.
Probably drawing a long bow here because chalk doesn't understand cheese (unless it's exposed to it) and vice versa. The embedded differences probably constitute an unrecognized problem that's also unacknowledged by crews and Defence in the higher echelons. "They" probably think that a helo is a helo - and a helicopter pilot is no different than another helicopter pilot no matter the uniform woorn (basically because they fly essentially the same machine).
.
Having been minimally exposed to both (in a different type), I'm not so sure that the underlying credos and differences in training and equipment aren't lining up some holes (at least) in the layers of that accidental Swiss cheese. That may be particularly the case where survival becomes the post-accident context.
.
So what I'm looking for is the specialist and the generalist comment upon the subject as a whole. - and mostly in the disaster relief, peace-time context (although hybrid out-of-area ops such as East Timor, the Solomons, Bougainville etc are also of interest). The ADF has had some particularly nasty helo prangs and some are maint-related, others are related to operational context - others are all to do with hubris and a failure to buffer for (or acknowledge) limitations of equipment (such as NVG's). Ad hoc secondment to shipboard ops might also be a factor.
.
Just to clarify, my helo experience is based mostly on a sixteen month UH-1H tour in Vietnam [SAS ops (covert insertion, extractions, rappelling & roping etc), dustoff, combat assault, people-sniffer, spraying VC vegetable gardens, some arty-spotting and NGFS, SAR winching, lots of Medevac, logistic support, ammo opdem etc]. Exposure to shipboard ops was limited to some CVH deliveries and one medevac from a DDG. After an accident-free time on helo's, but having seen many accidents, I decided that there was too much turning and burning and returned to the M.E. world. However I've noted the demise of some old friends and acquaintances over the years and thereby retained an interest in the causes of helo accidents.
Particularly in relation to the Australian Defence Force scene, I am trying to identify comparators between the approach taken to essentially the same task by:
.
1. Army configured UH-60's and
.
2. Navy configured helo's (SeaHawks, SeaKings & etc)
.
Areas of interest include:(but aren't limited to):
.
a. navalization of RAN SeaHawks (differences in personnel kit, systems and a/c safety devices such as inflatable pontoons), radar altimeters, radars, optionally carried systems
.
b. simulator(?) or CBT training pitched directly at shipboard operations
.
c. Vertrep ops training by Army aviators (including hooked external loads carried ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore and shipboard personnel transfers by hoist)
.
d. PlaneGuard Standby ops
.
e. SAR OPS & surveillance ops (including blue-water navigation techniques and aids)
.
f. Dilbert Dunker training (pilots and crewmen)
.
g. approaches to stern pads (ship generated turbulence considerations)
.
h. Late wave-off procedures (fouled deck or poorly executed approach). Training in RAN R/T phraseology and LSO signals
.
i. foul weather ops (pitching decks, aborted poorly executed touchdowns, deck-slip, ground resonance etc)
.
j. weapons training (aircraft mounted side-guns)
.
k. Disaster relief ops, man overboard drills,
.
l. Aircrew PSK (personnel survival kit and flotation aids) - believe RAN pilots use an underwater breathing aid (a PONY?) to aid in underwater egress.....but that Army pilots don't have this.
.
m. Emergency drills, ditching (including W&B, hover OGE and power available calculations)
.
n. Shipboard maint considerations (deferred discrepancies and provision for salt accretion/accelerated corrosion, compressor washes, enhanced lubrication etc)
.
o. Any engine differences (including particle filters and anti-ice/de-ice equipment). Single-engine approach to deck hover considerations)
.
p. any hoist/winch and hook differences including emergency cutaway and emergency load jettison
.
q. HIFR refuelling from other fleet units (if practised/available)
.
Probably drawing a long bow here because chalk doesn't understand cheese (unless it's exposed to it) and vice versa. The embedded differences probably constitute an unrecognized problem that's also unacknowledged by crews and Defence in the higher echelons. "They" probably think that a helo is a helo - and a helicopter pilot is no different than another helicopter pilot no matter the uniform woorn (basically because they fly essentially the same machine).
.
Having been minimally exposed to both (in a different type), I'm not so sure that the underlying credos and differences in training and equipment aren't lining up some holes (at least) in the layers of that accidental Swiss cheese. That may be particularly the case where survival becomes the post-accident context.
.
So what I'm looking for is the specialist and the generalist comment upon the subject as a whole. - and mostly in the disaster relief, peace-time context (although hybrid out-of-area ops such as East Timor, the Solomons, Bougainville etc are also of interest). The ADF has had some particularly nasty helo prangs and some are maint-related, others are related to operational context - others are all to do with hubris and a failure to buffer for (or acknowledge) limitations of equipment (such as NVG's). Ad hoc secondment to shipboard ops might also be a factor.
.
Just to clarify, my helo experience is based mostly on a sixteen month UH-1H tour in Vietnam [SAS ops (covert insertion, extractions, rappelling & roping etc), dustoff, combat assault, people-sniffer, spraying VC vegetable gardens, some arty-spotting and NGFS, SAR winching, lots of Medevac, logistic support, ammo opdem etc]. Exposure to shipboard ops was limited to some CVH deliveries and one medevac from a DDG. After an accident-free time on helo's, but having seen many accidents, I decided that there was too much turning and burning and returned to the M.E. world. However I've noted the demise of some old friends and acquaintances over the years and thereby retained an interest in the causes of helo accidents.